TY - CHAP A1 - Hildebrandt, Mario A1 - Lamshöft, Kevin A1 - Dittmann, Jana A1 - Neubert, Tom A1 - Vielhauer, Claus T1 - Information Hiding in Industrial Control Systems: An OPC UA based Supply Chain Attack and its Detection T2 - Proceedings of the 2020 ACM Workshop on Information Hiding and Multimedia Security (IH&MMSec’20), June 22–24, 2020, Denver, CO, USA KW - Information Hiding KW - Steganography KW - Process automation KW - Industrial Control Systems KW - OPC UA Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1145/3369412 SP - 115 EP - 120 PB - The Association for Computing Machinery CY - New York ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Hildebrandt, Mario A1 - Altschaffel, Robert A1 - Lamshöft, Kevin A1 - Lange, Mathias A1 - Szemkus, Martin A1 - Neubert, Tom A1 - Vielhauer, Claus A1 - Ding, Yongjian A1 - Dittmann, Jana T1 - Threat Analysis of Steganographic and Covert Communication in Nuclear I&C Systems T2 - Konferenz: International Conference on Nuclear Security: Sustaining and Strengthening Efforts (ICONS), Vienna, Austria, 2020/ Konferenzband: International Conference on Nuclear Security: Sustaining and Strengthening Efforts N2 - Steganographic and covert communication is increasingly used for hiding attacks. Often information hiding is used by attackers in advanced persistent threats in order to operate without being noticed. Attackers might use it to hide data exfiltration or control channels for persistent malware. The paper analyzes potential threats to operational technology by investigating different communication protocols towards their suitability as cover channels. Using a generalized network architecture model and the communication flows of nuclear power plants, the attack potential using information hiding is exemplary assessed. An example for a supply chain attack for command injection is given on the foundation of the OPC UA protocol and an off-theshelf programmable logic controller. Subsequently, recommendations for a strategic and operational preparation for operators towards the prevention and detection of information hiding attacks are derived. Y1 - 2020 UR - https://www.researchgate.net/publication/350966454_Threat_Analysis_of_Steganographic_and_Covert_Communication_in_Nuclear_IC_Systems PB - IAEA CY - Vienna, Austria ER -