@misc{WeberSteinPilgermannetal.2023, author = {Weber, Simon and Stein, Stefan and Pilgermann, Michael and Schrader, Thomas}, title = {Attack Detection for Medical Cyber- Physical Systems - The Visualization}, doi = {10.25933/opus4-2914}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:522-opus4-29142}, year = {2023}, abstract = {Attack Detection for Medical Cyber-Physical Systems - The Visualization}, language = {en} } @article{WeberSteinPilgermannetal.2023, author = {Weber, Simon B. and Stein, Stefan and Pilgermann, Michael and Schrader, Thomas}, title = {Attack Detection for Medical Cyber-Physical Systems - A Systematic Literature Review}, series = {IEEE Access}, journal = {IEEE Access}, number = {11}, publisher = {IEEE}, doi = {10.1109/ACCESS.2023.3270225}, pages = {41796 -- 41815}, year = {2023}, abstract = {The threat situation due to cyber attacks in hospitals is emerging and patient life is at risk. One significant source of potential vulnerabilities is medical cyber-physical systems (MCPS). Detecting intrusions in this environment faces challenges different from other domains, mainly due to the heterogeneity of devices, the diversity of connectivity types, and the variety of terminology. To summarize existing results, we conducted a structured literature review (SLR) following the guidelines of Kitchenham et al. for SLRs in software engineering. We developed six research questions regarding detection approach, detection location, included features, adversarial focus, utilized datasets, and intrusion prevention. We identified that most researchers focused on an anomaly-based detection approach at the network layer. The primary focus was on the detection of malicious insiders. While several researchers used publicly available datasets for training and testing their algorithms, the lack of suitable datasets resulted in the development of testbeds consisting of various medical devices. Based on the results, we formulated five future research topics. First, the special conditions of hospital networks, the MCPS deployed within them, and the contrasts to other IT and OT environments should be examined. Thereupon, MCPS-specific datasets should be created that allow researchers to address the health domain's unique requirements and possibilities. At the same time, endeavors aimed at standardization in this area should be supported and expanded. Moreover, the use of medical context for attack detection should be further explored. Last but not least, efforts for MCPS-tailored intrusion prevention should be intensified. This way, the emerging threat landscape can be addressed, IT security in hospitals can be improved, and patient health can be protected.}, language = {en} } @article{PilgermannSteinSchraderetal.2021, author = {Pilgermann, Michael and Stein, Stefan and Schrader, Thomas and Weber, Simon}, title = {Angriffserkennung beim Betrieb von KRITIS gem{\"a}ß IT-Sicherheitsgesetz 2.0}, series = {Datenschutz und Datensicherheit}, volume = {45}, journal = {Datenschutz und Datensicherheit}, doi = {10.1007/s11623-021-1525-z}, pages = {733 -- 737}, year = {2021}, abstract = {Die Krankenhaus-IT sieht sich einer stetig zunehmenden Bedrohung der Sicherheit der Patientendaten und des Krankenhausbetriebes gegen{\"u}ber. Der Gesundheitssektor geh{\"o}rt zu den Kritischen Infrastrukturen, die zunehmend strengeren Regelungen unterliegen. J{\"u}ngste Regulierung ist das IT-Sicherheitsgesetz 2.0, das unter anderem Maßnahmen zur Detektion von Angriffen fordert. Der Beitrag stellt vor, wie eine branchenspezifische Umsetzung dieser Anforderung aussehen k{\"o}nnte.}, language = {de} } @techreport{WeberPilgermannSteinetal.2024, author = {Weber, Simon and Pilgermann, Michael and Stein, Stefan and Schrader, Thomas}, title = {SzA4Hosp - Systeme zur Angriffserkennung in der Medizinischen Versorgung}, organization = {Technische Hochschule Brandenburg}, doi = {10.25933/opus4-3207}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:522-opus4-32075}, pages = {85}, year = {2024}, abstract = {Dieser Abschlussbericht stellt das Ergebnis der Projektarbeit {\"u}ber die Implementierung von Systemen zur Angriffserkennung (SzA) in deutschen Krankenh{\"a}usern im Kontext des IT-Sicherheitsgesetzes 2.0 und des branchenspezifischen Sicherheitsstandards (B3S) f{\"u}r die medizinische Versorgung dar. Ziel des Projekts war es, den aktuellen Umsetzungsstand von SzA in deutschen Krankenh{\"a}usern zu analysieren und Handlungsempfehlungen f{\"u}r die Weiterentwicklung des B3S zu erarbeiten. Die Analyse basiert auf einer umfangreichen Befragung von Krankenhausbetreibern, Expertengespr{\"a}chen sowie der Auswertung relevanter nationaler und internationaler Standards und Good Practices. Die Ergebnisse zeigen deutliche Unterschiede im Reifegrad der SzA-Implementierung zwischen verschiedenen Bereichen, wobei die Informationstechnik branchenweit am fortgeschrittensten ist. Der Bericht bietet konkrete Vorschl{\"a}ge zur Verbesserung der IT-Sicherheitslage in Krankenh{\"a}usern und betont die Notwendigkeit kontinuierlicher Weiterentwicklungen der SzA-Systeme, um den steigenden Anforderungen der IT-Sicherheit in der station{\"a}ren Versorgung gerecht zu werden.}, subject = {Computersicherheit}, language = {de} } @article{SteinWeberPilgermannetal.2024, author = {Stein, Stefan and Weber, Simon and Pilgermann, Michael and Schrader, Thomas and Sedlmayr, Martin}, title = {A Novel Approach to Medical Device IT Security Landscape Analysis Leveraging Manufacturer Disclosure Statements}, series = {IEEE Access}, journal = {IEEE Access}, number = {12}, publisher = {IEEE}, issn = {2169-3536}, doi = {10.1109/ACCESS.2024.3487824}, pages = {160506 -- 160515}, year = {2024}, abstract = {The growing number of cyberattacks targeting the healthcare sector increasingly threatens network-enabled medical devices that are vital for life-sustaining patient care. Security researchers and healthcare IT managers are pursuing effective methods to assess the IT security landscape of medical devices. Their goal is to develop a comprehensive understanding of the devices' IT security status. Recent studies have successfully uncovered structural deficiencies in medical device security. However, the limitations of their data sources, particularly in evaluating features like logging capabilities and third-party libraries, restrict the scope of their findings. In this study, we present the first systematic analysis of Manufacturer Disclosure Statement for Medical Device Security (MDS2) documents to evaluate their use in creating holistic statements regarding the IT security posture of medical devices. We examined a total of 147 MDS2 documents encompassing devices from 105 different classes. Our findings indicate that MDS2 documents, especially those from the second version (2013) onwards, are suitable for this purpose. We also discuss the shortcomings of the latest MDS2 version in meeting current IT security requirements. Based on the gaps identified, we developed several recommendations to improve MDS2 documents and enhance their effectiveness across the global healthcare sector. In the future, these documents could be used not only for comprehensive landscape analyses but also for organization-specific reports, providing healthcare managers with direct insights into the IT security status within their institutions.}, language = {en} }