@inproceedings{KevinHildebrandtAltschaffeletal.2022, author = {Kevin, Lamsh{\"o}ft and Hildebrandt, Mario and Altschaffel, Robert and Keil, Oliver and Hempel, Ivo and Dittmann, Jana and Neubert, Tom and Vielhauer, Claus}, title = {Resilience against and detection of information hiding in nuclear instrumentation and control systems within the scope of NSS 17-T}, series = {Kerntechnik 2022, Leipzig, 21. - 22. Juni 2022}, booktitle = {Kerntechnik 2022, Leipzig, 21. - 22. Juni 2022}, publisher = {INFORUM Verlags- und Verwaltungsgesellschaft mbH}, address = {Berlin}, pages = {6}, year = {2022}, language = {en} } @inproceedings{HildebrandtAltschaffelLamshoeftetal.2020, author = {Hildebrandt, Mario and Altschaffel, Robert and Lamsh{\"o}ft, Kevin and Lange, Mathias and Szemkus, Martin and Neubert, Tom and Vielhauer, Claus and Ding, Yongjian and Dittmann, Jana}, title = {Threat Analysis of Steganographic and Covert Communication in Nuclear I\&C Systems}, series = {Konferenz: International Conference on Nuclear Security: Sustaining and Strengthening Efforts (ICONS), Vienna, Austria, 2020/ Konferenzband: International Conference on Nuclear Security: Sustaining and Strengthening Efforts}, booktitle = {Konferenz: International Conference on Nuclear Security: Sustaining and Strengthening Efforts (ICONS), Vienna, Austria, 2020/ Konferenzband: International Conference on Nuclear Security: Sustaining and Strengthening Efforts}, publisher = {IAEA}, address = {Vienna, Austria}, pages = {14}, year = {2020}, abstract = {Steganographic and covert communication is increasingly used for hiding attacks. Often information hiding is used by attackers in advanced persistent threats in order to operate without being noticed. Attackers might use it to hide data exfiltration or control channels for persistent malware. The paper analyzes potential threats to operational technology by investigating different communication protocols towards their suitability as cover channels. Using a generalized network architecture model and the communication flows of nuclear power plants, the attack potential using information hiding is exemplary assessed. An example for a supply chain attack for command injection is given on the foundation of the OPC UA protocol and an off-theshelf programmable logic controller. Subsequently, recommendations for a strategic and operational preparation for operators towards the prevention and detection of information hiding attacks are derived.}, language = {en} }