@inproceedings{HildebrandtLamshoeftDittmannetal.2020, author = {Hildebrandt, Mario and Lamsh{\"o}ft, Kevin and Dittmann, Jana and Neubert, Tom and Vielhauer, Claus}, title = {Information Hiding in Industrial Control Systems: An OPC UA based Supply Chain Attack and its Detection}, series = {Proceedings of the 2020 ACM Workshop on Information Hiding and Multimedia Security (IH\&MMSec'20), June 22-24, 2020, Denver, CO, USA}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2020 ACM Workshop on Information Hiding and Multimedia Security (IH\&MMSec'20), June 22-24, 2020, Denver, CO, USA}, publisher = {The Association for Computing Machinery}, address = {New York}, doi = {10.1145/3369412}, pages = {115 -- 120}, year = {2020}, language = {en} } @inproceedings{HildebrandtAltschaffelLamshoeftetal.2020, author = {Hildebrandt, Mario and Altschaffel, Robert and Lamsh{\"o}ft, Kevin and Lange, Mathias and Szemkus, Martin and Neubert, Tom and Vielhauer, Claus and Ding, Yongjian and Dittmann, Jana}, title = {Threat Analysis of Steganographic and Covert Communication in Nuclear I\&C Systems}, series = {Konferenz: International Conference on Nuclear Security: Sustaining and Strengthening Efforts (ICONS), Vienna, Austria, 2020/ Konferenzband: International Conference on Nuclear Security: Sustaining and Strengthening Efforts}, booktitle = {Konferenz: International Conference on Nuclear Security: Sustaining and Strengthening Efforts (ICONS), Vienna, Austria, 2020/ Konferenzband: International Conference on Nuclear Security: Sustaining and Strengthening Efforts}, publisher = {IAEA}, address = {Vienna, Austria}, pages = {14}, year = {2020}, abstract = {Steganographic and covert communication is increasingly used for hiding attacks. Often information hiding is used by attackers in advanced persistent threats in order to operate without being noticed. Attackers might use it to hide data exfiltration or control channels for persistent malware. The paper analyzes potential threats to operational technology by investigating different communication protocols towards their suitability as cover channels. Using a generalized network architecture model and the communication flows of nuclear power plants, the attack potential using information hiding is exemplary assessed. An example for a supply chain attack for command injection is given on the foundation of the OPC UA protocol and an off-theshelf programmable logic controller. Subsequently, recommendations for a strategic and operational preparation for operators towards the prevention and detection of information hiding attacks are derived.}, language = {en} }