Information Leakage behind the Curtain: Abusing Anti-EMI Features for Covert Communication
Please always quote using this URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:29-opus4-71576
- We present a new class of covert channels which
can be created by utilizing common hardware but that cannot
be detected by such. Our idea is to abuse anti-EMI features
of a processor to create a covert channel on the physical layer.
Thus, the sender uses the invariants in how digital signals are
encoded over analog channels to covertly transport information.
This leaked data is present on the wire bound connections of
the compromised device, but is also by definition present in the
vicinity of the device and can be picked up by radio equipment.
As the covert channel is present only on the physical layer, the
data on all layers above, as well as the timing behavior on
those layersWe present a new class of covert channels which
can be created by utilizing common hardware but that cannot
be detected by such. Our idea is to abuse anti-EMI features
of a processor to create a covert channel on the physical layer.
Thus, the sender uses the invariants in how digital signals are
encoded over analog channels to covertly transport information.
This leaked data is present on the wire bound connections of
the compromised device, but is also by definition present in the
vicinity of the device and can be picked up by radio equipment.
As the covert channel is present only on the physical layer, the
data on all layers above, as well as the timing behavior on
those layers is indistinguishable from uncompromised devices.
We present two example implementations of such channels using
RS-232 as the carrier and use a common oscilloscope to decode
the resulting covert channel. Using this setup, we observed symbol
rates of around 5 baud. We derive the theoretical upper bound of
the covert channels bandwidth and discuss the factors by which
it is influenced.…
Author: | Johannes Bauer, Sebastian Schinzel, Felix Freiling, Andreas Dewald |
---|---|
Persistent identifiers - URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:29-opus4-71576 |
Series (Volume number): | Technical reports / Department Informatik (CS-2016-03) |
Document Type: | Report |
Language: | English |
Year of publication: | 2016 |
Date of online publication (Embargo Date): | 2016/07/26 |
Publishing Institution: | Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg (FAU) |
Release Date: | 2016/07/27 |
SWD-Keyword: | Covert channel; Elektromagnetische Verträglichkeit; Verdeckter Kanal |
Length/size: | 1-11 |
Institutes: | Technische Fakultät |
CCS-Classification: | C. Computer Systems Organization / C.m MISCELLANEOUS |
Dewey Decimal Classification: | 0 Informatik, Informationswissenschaft, allgemeine Werke / 00 Informatik, Wissen, Systeme / 000 Informatik, Informationswissenschaft, allgemeine Werke |
open_access (DINI-Set): | open_access |
Licence (German): | ![]() |