Inclusive education – a Christian perspective to an ‘overlapping consensus’

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Abstract
The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has triggered endeavours in many countries to implement inclusive education at public schools. A Christian interpretation that concentrates on the anthropological themes of fragmentarity, fragility and complementarity offers valuable impulses to the public discourse on inclusive education, including for people with a secular or different religious world view. It can thus contribute to an ‘overlapping consensus’ on inclusive education and help anchoring it in the very center of education and educational theory instead of just seeing it as one additional task of schools among others.

Keywords
Human rights, inclusion, theology, education

Inclusive education – how legitimate is a Christian perspective in the public debate?

Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948, there has been a debate about whether these rights are primarily grounded in Christian roots or whether they mirror diverse sources and mainly secular values. It will be helpful to remember some basic insights from this discussion when we consider the legitimation of a Christian theological perspective on the right to inclusive education as part of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities that was adopted by the UN in 2006.
German sociologist Hans Joas has insisted that the quarrel about whether the human rights go back to religious or secular-humanistic roots has been one of the most fruitless debates ever (e.g. Joas, 2010: 49). This is true historically, because both currents, one coming from religious sources and the other coming from secular Greek philosophy and European Enlightenment, have substantially influenced the development of the idea of human rights (cf. Bielefeldt, 2009, 2005). And even the advocates of the Christian roots of human rights cannot deny that, from Immanuel Kant down to the 20th century, human rights had to be enforced against the resistance of the Christian churches – until they eventually approved them and discovered the Christian heritage within them (cf. e.g. Lohmann, 2016; Hilpert, 2008).

But Joas is also right under a systematic perspective, because it is necessary to distinguish between genesis and validity. Even if it could be verified that the human rights values were derived mainly from the Christian tradition (as e.g. Hilpert, 2008: 83, argues), this would not necessarily mean that this Christian tradition is still relevant today as the justification of their validity. It is the very point of the human rights that they should be open to general approval of all people regardless of their religious, ideological, cultural or national backgrounds. So, if in human rights in general, and in the right to inclusion in particular, we discover Christian concerns and if we interpret them from a Christian perspective, we should not at the same time exclude other interpretations from different religious or non-religious perspectives – to do this would contradict the basic character of human rights as well as of inclusion. Rather it should be our concern that human rights and the right to inclusion can be endorsed, consolidated and ‘enculturated’ from diverse cultural and religious perspectives so that something like an ‘overlapping consensus’ can develop and be sustained in a pluralistic society.

American philosopher John Rawls, who coined the phrase and developed the idea of the ‘overlapping consensus’ (Rawls, 1993), was initially reluctant, however, to allow religious persons to bring in their religious perspectives and language, their ‘comprehensive doctrines’, to the public discourse about the common good in society. He insisted that they had to translate their religious language into a language that is accessible to non-religious citizens as well. Yet, already in the ‘Introduction to the paperback edition’ of his book Political Liberalism, published in 1995, he changed his position:

I now believe, and hereby I revise VI:8 [the corresponding chapter in Political Liberalism, M.P.], that reasonable such doctrines may be introduced in public reason at any time, provided that in due course public reasons, given by a reasonable political conception, are presented sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines are introduced to support.

In a similar way, and a little more precisely, German philosopher Jürgen Habermas distinguishes between the informal public discourse into which religious perspectives can be entered at any time, and the ‘political process of decision making in the
context of parliaments, courts and governments’ where religious arguments can ‘only count if their relevant substance has been translated into a publicly accessible language’ (Habermas, 2007: 412). The decisive step Habermas takes beyond Rawls is his conceptualization of the task of translation as a dialogical co-operative endeavour of religious and non-religious citizens. He argues that it would be unfair to expect only of believing citizens to translate their religious convictions into a secular language in order to have the chance of winning majorities for their arguments. To be fair, the non-religious citizens should vice versa be required to ‘preserve a sense for the articulative power of religious languages’ (Habermas, 2001: 12). Even more clearly Habermas explicated his argument a few years later:

The neutrality of state power vis-à-vis different worldviews, which guarantees equal individual liberties for all citizens, is incompatible with the political generalization of a secularized worldview. Secular citizens, in their role as citizens, may neither deny that religious worldviews are in principle capable of truth nor question the right of their devout fellow-citizens to couch their contributions to public discussions in religious language. A liberal political culture can even expect its secular citizens to take part in the efforts to translate relevant contributions from religious language into a publicly intelligible language. (Habermas, 2008: 113).

The background of Habermas’ position is that over the years, he has arrived at an increasingly ‘more sceptical assessment of modernity’ (Habermas, 2007: 393; my translation) with massive doubts about whether secular rationality and autonomous reason alone will be able to guarantee the humanisation of humankind. As a consequence he comes to re-value the religious traditions as sources of humanity. Looking at history, he finds that many fundamental contributions to the idea of humanity in Europe came from the Judeo-Christian tradition. He expresses the conviction that the ‘special power to articulate moral intuitions’ (Habermas, 2008: 131) and the ‘semantic potential’ of those religious traditions are ‘not yet exhausted’ (Habermas, 2001: 25). Even today, he argues, Christian ideas such as the idea of humans as created by God in his image have to say something not only to the believer but also to the ‘religiously unmusical’ like himself (Habermas, 2001: 30).

This is why Habermas advocates enhancing ‘complementary learning processes’ of religious and non-religious citizens in a pluralistic post-seular society (Habermas, 2008: 144). It is this basic idea that religious and non-religious people can and should learn from one another, and that religious perspectives – partly but not exclusively through the mode of ‘translation’ – can be beneficial to the whole of society including non-religious fellow-citizens, that constitute the framework for my Christian-theological deliberations on disability and inclusive education. They are stimulated by the secular UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its social concept of inclusion, and make a contribution to a public debate from a Christian perspective with the aim of an ‘overlapping consensus’ on how inclusive education can be best understood to make it a fruitful
endeavour for the whole of society. This approach (cf. with regard to religious schools: Pirner, 2012, 2013) positions itself within the concept of 'public theology' as represented by the Gobal Network of Public Theology (GNPT; see http://www.chester.ac.uk/node/15313) and by authors such as Elaine Graham (2013), Max Stackhouse (cf. Hainsworth and Paeth, 2009), or Heinrich Bedford-Strohm (2013). Public theology recognises the particularity of the Christian perspective in a pluralistic society and on this basis tries to make contributions to the common good that everybody, irrespective of their religious or non-religious world views, can benefit from.

Humans created in the image of God – towards a non-naïve creation theology

If humans are created in the image of God, what about my friend Catherine who was born without arms; is she, too, the image of God? Does that mean that God is disabled?’ At least in primary school, children sometimes ask such a question in a RE class. (cf. Müller-Friese, 2011)

Like no one else, John Hull has in his writings pointed out that this question is far from being a naïve children’s question but rather reveals unresolved tasks of Christian theology (see his recent sketch of a ‘theology of disability’: Hull, 2014). Christian creation theology has led to an anthropology according to which all human beings are of equal worth and have the same dignity (cf. Schoberth, 2006: 117). This is why in the prophetic traditions of the Old Testament again and again social justice has been demanded that recognises the equal dignity of all humans. Anthropologist Jan Assmann has called this concept of justice ‘connective justice’, a justice that aims at communitarian solidarity (cf. Nipkow, 2011: 91). In a community guided by this connective justice and solidarity disabled people are included and protected. So, for instance, Lev. 19:14 reads: ‘You shall not curse the deaf or put a stumbling block before the blind, but you shall fear your God: I am the Lord.’

In line with such biblical texts current theological approaches in the field of social ethics demand a participative justice that aims at the right for all to take part in and be part of the community. And it is rightly emphasised that the probably most important dimension of this kind of justice is educational justice (cf. Grümme, 2014) or, as German Systematic Theologian Wolfgang Huber has called it, enabling justice (cf. Kirchenamt der EKD, 2006). The indisputable dignity of all human beings is the foundation of the right to education for all (see also Schweitzer, 2011).

Yet, the question remains how the existence of human disabilities can be understood in the context of Christian creation theology. Are disabled people just a part of ‘God’s good creation’ so that even severe and painful hereditary disabilities are nothing else but a variety in the God’s diverse creation? If so, it would be
appropriate not to speak of ‘disabilities’ any more but rather of ‘varieties of creation’. It seems analogous to this theological perspective when some educationists today argue for completely giving up the notion of ‘disabled’ and to understand ‘disabilities’ simply as one of the many forms human life can take (cf. e.g. Boban and Hinz, 2011). Just as some people are taller and others smaller, as some are musical and others unmusical, so some people have to live with bigger or smaller bodily, sensual or intellectual constraints.

Among others, Bernd Ahrbeck, professor of education for children with behaviour disorders, has pointed to the dangers of such a view. He has warned against making disabilities ‘invisible’, because this entails making invisible the special needs that disabled people have: ‘If disability is made invisible by disposing of the term, disabled children with their special needs will suffer.’ (Ahrbeck, 2011a, my translation; see also Ahrbeck 2011b, 2014).

For theological discussion, it is important to overcome a naïve and harmonistic understanding of creation. This can be achieved by uncovering or rather re-discovering the eschatological dimension of creation theology, the connection between creation belief and the belief in a better world to come at the end of all times (Greek: ‘the eschaton’) (see e.g. Thomas, 2009). A number of biblical texts express the view that nature as it is today does not correspond to the original will of the creator any more. For instance, in Gen. 1: 30, all animals are vegetarians – only after the great flood in Genesis 9 God concedes that humans – and obviously also animals – eat other animals. In Isaiah 11 the prophet develops an eschatological vision of a world in which the law of nature that animals kill and eat each other and that humans and animals kill and eat each other, is overcome.

The wolf will live with the lamb, the leopard will lie down with the goat, the calf and the lion and the yearling together; and a little child will lead them. The cow will feed with the bear, their young will lie down together, and the lion will eat straw like the ox. The infant will play near the cobra’s den, and the young child will put its hand into the viper’s nest. (Isaiah 11: 6–8).

In such eschatological visions, all kinds of pain of humans and animals will be overcome, as in: ‘Then will the eyes of the blind be opened and the ears of the deaf unstopped. Then will the lame leap like a deer, and the mute tongue shout for joy. Water will gush forth in the wilderness and streams in the desert.’ (Isaiah 35: 5–6).

It is this vision of the coming kingdom of God that Jesus referred to when he claimed that in his person the kingdom of God has already begun: ‘The blind receive sight, the lame walk, those who have leprosy are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead are raised, and the good news is proclaimed to the poor.’ (Matthew 11: 5)

On the basis of such biblical texts, theologians have characterized creation as a ‘broken creation’, an ‘alienated creation’ (Paul Tillich), or ‘shadowed creation’ (Karl Barth) that waits, as St. Paul put it in his letter to the Romans, for redemption (Romans 8: 22). At its core, or – as Paul Tillich expressed it – in essence, it is the good creation by God; but in its factual present state – or with Tillich, in
existence – it shows dimensions that are not compatible with God’s original good will (cf. Dreisbach, 1980). It is such a non-naïve view of creation that enables us to bring together the view that every human being, regardless of his or her abilities or disabilities, enjoys the same dignity through being God’s creation and image, and the view that there are pain, suffering and life-inhibiting forces in this creation that are not the will of God. They rather will be finally overcome in God’s new creation at the end of times – and already now we can and should work to overcome them as far as this is possible. This is a view that guides us to fully accept and appreciate every disabled person without making their disability and their corresponding special needs invisible but actively responding to them.

**Human ‘fragmentarity’ and fragility**

In educational contexts Christians often tend to argue for the equality of all human beings predominantly on the basis of creation theology and the image-of-God-theology. However, the Christian tradition also emphasises the equality of all humans in that they are incomplete and fragmentary creatures who differ from God and are alienated from God. All of us, some more, some less, have to cope with imperfectness, frailties and constraints, and we suffer from them, sometimes more, sometimes less. The basic principle of Buddhism here certainly has its point: ‘Life is suffering.’

Henning Luther, a late German Practical theologian, used to emphasise this idea of the ‘fragmentarity’, the basically fragmentary character, of human existence very strongly. Neither faith nor education, he argues, can make humans whole or complete. It rather is or should be the aim of both faith and education to enable people to accept the human characteristic of not being whole, of always remaining incomplete, of being a fragmentary existence (cf. Luther, 1992: 159). In a Christian view this means that being grateful to God for having created me in his image always implies gratefulness despite my deficits, weakness and imperfectness that sometimes trouble me. Being grateful towards God is more a matter of attitude, belief and hope rather than a matter of the facts as they are experienced now. That the attitude or belief of a person is mostly more relevant for their happiness than their factual well-being can be supported by general experience. There are many extremely wealthy, healthy and beautiful people who are not satisfied and grateful at all, and there are many poor and sick people who radiate happiness and gratefulness.

Such an anthropological view that takes the fragmentarity of humans seriously goes against the grain of our society that has widely subscribed to perfecting the body, if necessary by cosmetic surgery. Such an anthropological view also contradicts a concept of education or formation (‘Bildung’) that still is quite predominant in Europe and goes back to Wilhelm von Humboldt. He propagated as the aim of education the ‘highest and most proportional formation of a human’s abilities into one whole’ (Humboldt, 1792/1851: 9; my translation). In Humboldt’s view every human should be educated to become a well-rounded, complete and
comprehensively educated personality – in modern language you might say: a complete identity. Henning Luther opposes this view by advancing a theologically founded understanding of identity that can protect us from negating or suppressing ‘the fundamental fragmentarity of a human’s identity’. According to Henning Luther a major aim of Christian faith and of education alike should be: ‘to be able to live as a fragment’ (Luther, 1992: 172).

It is theologically appropriate to complement this idea of the fragmentarity of humans by the aspect of the fragility of humans. The notion of fragility points to the contingency of human life, i.e. to the fact that our health, our sanity and even our life are permanently at risk. It is exactly in the encounter with sick or disabled people that we can become especially aware of this fragility and frailty of human life. For instance, looking at paraplegic people in a wheel-chair may promote the awareness in us that every one of us could suffer from a disease or an accident that could bring us into the same situation. This may be one reason why some people avoid the contact with disabled people: they do not like to be confronted with the principal fragility of human life – and with their own.

In a Christian view the acceptance of humans’ fragility again is a major aim of faith as well as education. It is ultimately grounded in confidence in God who enables, carries and accompanies humans’ insecure life. This Christian view finds support in the biblical notion of God identifying with the crucified Jesus of Nazareth and having humbled himself, stepped down into the depth of human suffering, of human exclusion and frailty. For non-believers, too, it will be important to be supported in developing and enhancing an appropriate confidence in life that enables them to accept the fragility and vulnerability of human life.

There is yet another and final dimension that belongs to a theological understanding of inclusion.

**Humans as creatures in need of being complemented**

The insight into the fragmentary and fragile character of human life is not only connected with a temporal perspective, namely the hope that our fragmentarity will ultimately be overcome, but also with a social perspective. To say that we as human beings are fragments means to say that we are in need of being complemented by others. In the biblical tradition this idea appears first in the creation story when God states that ‘it is not good that man be alone’ (Gen 2: 18) and he creates man and woman to complement each other.

This idea becomes even more evident in the New Testament in the community theology of St. Paul and in the first letter of St. Peter. It is characteristic of the first Christian communities that all people were welcome irrespective of their religious origin, their social status, their ethnic belonging, their gender, their intelligence, their talents or their state of health. Both St. Paul and the author of the first letter of St. Peter emphasise that everyone in the community has his or her characteristic abilities so that all members of the community can complement each other. To illustrate this, St. Paul uses the memorable image of the human body at which all
parts have their different tasks and are indispensable; they all work together in a complementary way so that the body as a whole profits (1 Corinthians 12, 13 and 21). In this way, the image indicates that the individual members of the community should work together using their individual talents and abilities to complement each other towards the building of the whole community from which all will benefit.

Again, a comparison with Humboldt’s classical theory of education is illuminating. Humboldt’s goal for education was individualistic. He aimed at the most comprehensive education of the individual person who should, so to speak, comprise the whole of humanity in himself or herself. It is the individual who is supposed to mirror the ideal of holistic humanness. St. Paul clearly places the emphasis differently. The goal here is the community, the ideal of wholeness and completeness refers to the social body instead of the individual. Whereas with Humboldt education is supposed to serve the development of the individual, with St. Paul it is first and foremost the development of the community for which the individuals should use their talents and abilities. Consequently, the ideal for the individual is not the autonomous, self-sufficient, independent all-round-personality. The Christian ideal is rather the self-transcending personality who dedicates their talents to others and at the same time the self-restricting personality who desires to be complemented in own shortcomings by others. In a Christian perspective, we might say, an educated person is one who is aware that he or she is incomplete without the other and that others remain incomplete without him or her. In this perspective, even weaknesses and deficits can be seen as chances that can support the talent-development of others and can contribute to the social cohesion of the community.

It is important to note that under such a perspective even the diaconal service for the other will not be regarded as an individually morally good deed towards the needy, but as an act of solidarity in the awareness that everybody is dependent on someone other’s help and support. The disabled theologian Ulrich Bach puts it this way:

> Our deeds do not follow the structure of ‘for’ (one person does something for another), but they follow the structure of ‘together’ (we do something together; every one of us is giving and receiving at the same time; all of us making their contribution to the community). (Quoted in Herrmann, 2006: 269).

Of course the consequence of these deliberations cannot be to sacrifice the individual support and education for every single person to the support and edification of the community – such an ideological idealisation of the collective used to characterise the educational ideas of the Nazis as well as of Eastern Socialism, with devastating effects. By contrast, the theological perspective will emphasise that the idea of the community is subject to eschatological reservation, too. The perfect community or society will come not before the final coming of the kingdom of God at the end of all times.
Conclusion

A Christian perspective on the challenge of inclusion emphasises that inclusive education cannot be conceptualised just as another additional task schools and educators have to fulfil. Rather it makes clear that this challenge requires a fundamental rethinking of our concept of education and its underlying concept of human beings. Bible-based Christian anthropology suggests to view humans as fragmentary and fragile creatures in a ‘broken’, ‘alienated’ world. This realistic, sober image of humans is, however, framed by the belief of being created by God in his image and therefore with an inalienable dignity on the one hand, and the eschatological hope that God will overcome all frailties in his new creation to come on the other hand. This enables believers to gratefully accept themselves and other people as they are without denying or downplaying their own or other people’s frailties. And it helps them to view themselves and others as human beings in the need of and capable of complementing each other in the human community, motivated and guided by the utopian vision of God’s new creation. Christian anthropology thus challenges familiar, often over-optimistic and over-individualistic views of human beings in theories of education in general and in concepts of inclusive education in particular. By doing so, it can hopefully contribute to the public discourse on inclusive education and help anchoring the idea of inclusion in the very centre of education and educational theory.

Acknowledgement

Dedicated to the memory of John M Hull († 28 July 2015) who taught us what inclusion might mean.

Note

1. An unauthorized and not in all parts successful English translation, ‘Faith and Knowledge – An Opening’, can be found online at: http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-0111/msg00100.html

References


