To vaccinate or not to vaccinate? This is the question! Delay the Booster, maybe you get a Bratwurscht!
- A game-theoretic setting is used to illuminate the conflict between vaccination proponents and vaccination opponents. A central result is that vaccination proponents could in principle persuade vaccination opponents to vaccinate by means of subsidization. Such a subsidy could increase benefits for both groups. Deeper analysis provides numerous further insights regarding the stability of these results.
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| Author: | Karl-Heinz Moritz, Georg Stadtmann |
|---|---|
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:kobv:521-opus4-12317 |
| DOI: | https://doi.org/10.11584/opus4-1231 |
| Series (Serial Number): | Discussion papers of the Faculty of Business Administration and Economics (426) |
| Document Type: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Date of Publication (online): | 2021/12/07 |
| Publishing Institution: | Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt |
| Release Date: | 2022/01/05 |
| Tag: | Coase Theorem; Corona; Covid; Game Theory; Moral Hazard; Vaccine |
| Page Number: | 10 |
| Version: | Draft |
| Institutes: | Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät |
| Licence (German): |  Creative Commons - CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 - Namensnennung-Nicht kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung |
