What Parliamentary Budget Authority in the EU? The European Parliament and the German Bundestag in the Negotiations on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020

  • The dissertation aims at better understanding the ambiguity of parliamentary representation in the EU political system where both national parliaments and the European Parliament play a functional role and are characterized by distinct electoral and territorial interests of representation. In this context EU budgetary politics are a particularly interesting field of research since they constitute a prime parliamentary function that carries high importance inside parliamentary institutions. TheThe dissertation aims at better understanding the ambiguity of parliamentary representation in the EU political system where both national parliaments and the European Parliament play a functional role and are characterized by distinct electoral and territorial interests of representation. In this context EU budgetary politics are a particularly interesting field of research since they constitute a prime parliamentary function that carries high importance inside parliamentary institutions. The EU budget – the Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF) – is formally divided between the revenue side, which is legitimated through the national parliamentary channel and the expenditure side for which the European Parliament is responsible. Analyzing the internal parliamentary coordination and the parliamentary debate on the EU’s MFF 2014-2020 it is shown that parliamentary actors are embedded at different points in the budgetary policy cycle while at the same time feeling legitimately responsible for both revenue and expenditure strands of the EU budget. The EU parliamentary budget authority is formally upheld through the national and supranational channels of legitimation. Practically, however, it is impeded by even more constraints than in national budgetary procedures due to the shape of the EU multi-level system. The performance of the parliamentary budget authority strongly diverged between the policy and the polity level of budgetary policies in the MFF 2014-2020 negotiations. On the one hand there has been a broad understanding between parliamentary actors of the same political family on the policy level in the budgetary debate. This covered joint perceptions of what policies should be enacted through the EU budget and what political priorities should be pursued. However on the polity level of the budget, there has been a fundamental disagreement on what formal structure or institutional shape should be achieved with the EU budget. Therefore the representative interests of parliamentary actors are strongly centered on territorial interests of representation – despite strong similarities in terms of electoral interests. Budget policies constitute the core of parliamentary sovereignty which in the MFF 2014-2020 negotiations lead to the dominance of an institutional power-play over a joint coordination of welfare as it has already been found with regard to the EU budget negotiations on the member state level in the Council and European Council.show moreshow less

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Metadaten
Author:Linn Selle
URN:urn:nbn:de:kobv:521-opus4-2737
Referee:Timm Beichelt, Gabriele Abels
Advisor:Timm Beichelt
Document Type:Doctoral Thesis
Language:English
Date of Publication (online):2017/09/23
Publishing Institution:Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt
Granting Institution:Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt
Date of final exam:2017/05/29
Release Date:2017/10/09
Tag:Europäische Union
Budget; European Union; Haushalt; Parliaments
Pagenumber:265
Institutes:Kulturwissenschaftliche Fakultät
Licence (German):License LogoCreative Commons - Namensnennung