

Exploring Public Diplomacy 2.0

A Comparison of German and U.S. Digital Public Diplomacy in Theory and Practice

Dissertation

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The art of diplomacy is to get other people to want what you want.

Madeleine Albright¹

¹ Steven Lee Myers, "Hillary Clinton's Last Tour as a Rock-Star Diplomat," *The New York Times*, June 27, 2012, sec. Magazine, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/magazine/hillary-clintons-last-tour-as-a-rock-star-diplomat.html>.

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ABSTRACT

Designed as an exploratory study, this dissertation consists of a policy analysis of German and U.S. American approaches to *public diplomacy 2.0*, understood as public diplomacy by means of social media. The study's main argument is that in spite of claims to the contrary, social media did not substantially change the practice of public diplomacy. No *digital turn* took place: Both countries' governments act according to their respective foreign policy tradition and public diplomacy doctrines and, by doing so, confirm a historical institutionalist view on politics.

After developing public diplomacy as an integrated concept that incorporates facets of several other related ones like propaganda, branding and cultural relations, it will be demonstrated that public diplomacy remains an instrument of power employed by a given state to reaffirm its might; it is not destined to empower other groups. It will also be shown how social media's premises like transparency and decentralization clash with those of public diplomacy and government administration, and how this impedes public diplomacy's operationalisation on the Internet. It will be explored how that contradiction affects the practice of public diplomacy 2.0 and how its stakeholders deal with given implications by laying out a methodological framework based on historical institutionalism that combines content analysis and expert interviews.

On a doctrinal strategic level, the dissertation will then show how the U.S. public diplomacy endeavour is strategically embedded into a wider concept, driven by post-9/11 feelings of vulnerability and the desire *to win back hearts and minds*. The German approach, on the other hand, refuses such a take, which is partly due to the country's history and negative experiences with propaganda especially during World War II. To Germany, distancing itself from its eventful past through presenting the country as a peaceful, stable democracy is paramount. Combined with the process of coming to terms with the major shakeup the country's reunification brought about, this attitude leads to a struggle to find a new political identity. The body of rules restricting and guiding public diplomacy 2.0 reflects these elements of both countries' respective history and foreign policy tradition. This underscores the weight of history and reaffirms its centrality as a factor for understanding politics.

The paper's centrepiece is constituted by a comparative content analysis of the Facebook pages and Twitter feeds belonging to the German embassy in Great Britain (UK) and its American counterpart. The comparison was made over three months in 2011 during discussions about the

possible adoption of a financial transaction tax. This particular conflict situation – the UK opposed the measure, backed by the USA, while Germany advocated for it – could have provided a textbook case for the use of social media in public diplomacy. The analysis will, however, reaffirm the allegations made in the dissertation’s theoretical parts: Contrary to public opinion, social media are neither interactive nor a mass phenomenon. Communication is employed to echo official government positions as stated in national foreign policy and public diplomacy doctrines as well as to legitimize general policy through subtle rhetorical strategies.

The dissertation on hand will further come to the conclusion that the effects of public diplomacy 2.0 can hardly be assessed (if at all), mainly because of a lack of reliable measuring frameworks and monitoring tools. Rather, social media are a listening and opinion gathering device, providing governments with big data on their audience.

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1 INTRODUCING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The decisive factor for a powerful nation already adequately armed is the character of its relationships with the world.

Robert S. McNamara (1966)²

1.1 Context: Real-Time Reaction and Blurred Power Relations

'Public Diplomacy is one of the most salient political communication issues in the 21st century,'³ Nancy Snow and Philip Taylor assert. Indeed, publications, academic programmes and all sorts of other undertakings sprout in its name.⁴ The concept is, however, not such a novelty after all. The denomination *public diplomacy* – designating diplomacy directed at foreign publics⁵ (as in the entire population⁶) to foster understanding for the nation in question as well as its policy⁷ – actually has its origin in the 19th century: First used as a synonym for civility in the London Times in 1856, it appeared in the New York Times in 1871 understood as the antithesis to secret intrigues.⁸ It resurfaced in the U.S. through becoming a focus of the Committee on Public Information, founded by the Wilson Administration and responsible for information and propaganda during World War I.⁹ It then came to denominate new, open diplomatic practices such as public peace declarations. An article taken from the magazine Foreign Policy in 1922 argues that citizens in democracies had started to claim more and more information as well as

² Robert S. McNamara, *Security in the Contemporary World* (Montreal, 1966), <http://www.oldcolo.com/Mc1Namara/mcnamara.txt>.

³ Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor, eds., *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy* (London, New York [etc.]: Routledge, 2009), ix.

⁴ John Brown, "Public Diplomacy and the Flight to the Academy," *Huffington Post. The Blog*, November 5, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-brown/post_4086_b_2073100.html.

⁵ It can also have an internal aspect, for example when engaging with immigrants living inside the home country; Jan Melissen and Avin Gonesh, *Public Diplomacy: Improving Practice*, Clingendael Diplomacy Papers (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 2005), 6, http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2005/20051000_cdsp_paper_diplomacy_5_gonesh_melissen.pdf.

⁶ Christine A. Lindberg, ed., "Public (noun)," *The Oxford American Thesaurus of Current English*, Oxford Reference Online (Oxford, New York [etc.]: Oxford University Press, 1999), <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t22.e11132>.

⁷ This should be considered a working definition; chapter 2 will provide a much more extensive explanation after discussing respective current academic debates.

⁸ Nicholas J. Cull, "Public Diplomacy before Gullion," in *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, ed. Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor (London, New York [etc.]: Routledge, 2009), 19–21.

⁹ Susan B. Epstein, *U.S. Public Diplomacy: Background and the 9/11 Commission Recommendations (CSR Report for Congress)*, 2006, 2, <http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/RL32607.pdf>.

their say on foreign affairs.¹⁰ After World War II, a reassessment of public diplomacy took place, dismissing it as a catch phrase and calling for a return to private diplomacy. As a consequence, public diplomacy became increasingly associated with propaganda.¹¹

Despite this proven history, public diplomacy has been attributed to the American diplomat Edmund Gullion¹² who mentioned the term during a testimony before a Congressional Committee in 1965. His introduction of the concept during the Cold War is considered its founding date because – since he used an expression considered rather neutral at that time – he was trying to liberate the activities it describes ‘from the taint of the dominant term for such work in previous decades: *propaganda*.’¹³

After the international political shakeups of 1989, public diplomacy had fallen into academic oblivion for a while. During this ‘unipolar moment’¹⁴ especially the United States focused on imposing its values through military strength and if necessary unilateral actions.¹⁵ The terrorist attacks of 11th of September 2001 are considered a watershed for public diplomacy, most importantly because policy makers understood that new security threats of this scale could no longer be dealt with military might alone. Instead, handling events like 9/11 required civilian cooperation and international joint action. Progressively, states¹⁶ focused not only on dealing with other governments but also foreign publics from which similar dangers could emerge.¹⁷ The contribution to national security is generated through fostering and spreading institutions such as democracy, free market economy and human rights. Public diplomacy and cultural relations in

¹⁰ Elihu Root, “A Requisite for the Success of Popular Diplomacy,” *Foreign Affairs*, September 15, 1922, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68331/elihu-root/a-requisite-for-the-success-of-popular-diplomacy>.

¹¹ Cull, “Public Diplomacy before Gullion,” 19–21.

¹² “Public Diplomacy - What It Is and Is Not,” *Public Diplomacy Alumni Association*, January 5, 2008, <http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/1.htm>.

¹³ Cull, “Public Diplomacy before Gullion,” 21.

¹⁴ “A Special Report on America’s Foreign Policy. Soft Power: Making up,” *The Economist*, November 23, 2013, <http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21590109-bush-years-america-seemed-overmighty-it-now-pulling-back-making-up>.

¹⁵ Mark Leonard, Catherine Stead, and Conrad Smewing, *Public Diplomacy* (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2002), 2; “A Special Report on America’s Foreign Policy. Soft Power: Making up.”

¹⁶ “The nation-state, which exists in a complex of other nation-states, is a set of institutional forms of governance maintaining an administrative monopoly over a territory with demarcated boundaries, its rules being sanctioned by law and direct control of the means of internal and external violence.” Anthony Giddens, *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism: Power, Property, and the State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 121.

¹⁷ Defense Science Board USA, *Report of the Defense Science Board - Task Force on Strategic Communication*, 2008, ix–x, http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2008-01-Strategic_Communication.pdf; Snow and Taylor, *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, ix; Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 80 (1990): 131.

particular¹⁸ are especially relevant in this new context since the creation and fear of an *other*¹⁹ can be risk factors, too, lying beyond the states' direct political control. Therefore, with regards to security policy, a getting-to-know each other might reduce conflict potential. Hence, the U.S. expanded their public diplomacy efforts; according to Lee Hamilton, co-chair of the influential 9/11 Commission, public diplomacy was a powerful means of 'how we stop them from coming here to kill us,'²⁰ resorting to a Manichean battlefield rhetoric that was common for this period.

Also, the German government came to making public diplomacy an essential part of its foreign policy²¹ even though in Europe, public diplomacy operates beyond an anti-terrorism narrative and focuses on a diverse range of social and political concerns.²² Furthermore, German diplomats have a rather special way of dealing with public diplomacy: The notion is rarely used in official capacity so it becomes a 'fuzzy terminology'²³ that only points to vague conceptions – but more on that later.

Public diplomacy is part of a spectrum of postmodern powers that function 'without using coercion and/or payment.'²⁴ At the beginning of the twenty-first century public diplomacy is said to be moving away from a straightforward promotional perspective. It is now perceived as a form of diplomatic engagement and a part of a broader collaboration with other actors.²⁵ Public

¹⁸ Please refer to chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion of these concepts.

¹⁹ "In general terms, the 'other' is anyone who is separate from one's self. The existence of others is crucial in defining what is 'normal' and in locating one's own place in the world." Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, eds., *Post-Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts*, 2nd ed., Routledge Key Guides (London, New York [etc.]: Routledge, 2009), 154.

²⁰ As quoted in: Rhonda Zaharna, *Battles to Bridges: U.S. Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy after 9/11* (London, New York [etc.]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 1.

²¹ Wilfried Grolig and Rainer Eugen Schlageter, "Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik und Public Diplomacy," in *Deutsche Außenpolitik. Sicherheit, Wohlfahrt, Institutionen und Normen*, ed. Thomas Jäger, Alexander Höse, and Kai Oppermann (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007), 565–566.

²² Jan Melissen, *Beyond the New Public Diplomacy*, Clingendael Paper No. 3 (Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, October 2011), 10.

²³ Oliver Zöllner, "German Public Diplomacy. The Dialogue of Cultures," in *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, ed. Philip M. Taylor and Nancy Snow (London, New York [etc.]: Routledge, 2009), 262.

²⁴ Peter van Ham, "Place Branding: The State of the Art," in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 616 (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2008), 132.

²⁵ Auswärtiges Amt, "Leitfaden Web 2.0" (Auswärtiges Amt, November 22, 2010), 24.

diplomacy operates in what Geoffrey Wiseman calls *polylateralism*, state to non-state diplomacy, diplomacy's third dimension next to bi- and multilateral approaches.²⁶

Nancy Snow and Philip Taylor describe this context as a '[...] post 9/11 environment dominated by fractal globalization, preemptive military invasion, information and communication technologies that seemingly shrink time and distance, and the rise of global non-state actors that challenge state-driven policy and discourse on the subject,²⁷ with other entities such as terrorist networks increasingly challenging the states' monopoly of violence.²⁸ Former Director of Policy Planning for the United States Department of State Judith McHale gives an overview of how these changes have deeper effects on statecraft:

[I]n the realm of international relations during the 20th century states mainly interacted like billiard balls – they were opaque and unitary. So it was France versus the United States versus the Soviet Union. The main object was to avoid overt conflict with one another. In the 21st century states are still very important but they interact through their component parts – government agency to government agency, lawmaker to lawmaker, municipal government to municipal government. States can be taken apart and combined and recombined with lots of social actors like non-governmental organisations or corporations or foundations or universities. We've moved from a world where the international system has a limited number of players to a networks world in which there's an infinite number of combinations.²⁹

These changes do, however, not necessarily mean that states really decline, Daniel Drezner observes. Movements often ask the state to act and then tend to fracture when simple demands are met, which underscores the durability and importance of the nation state.³⁰ Manuel Castells reckons that the nation state may be in crisis on various levels but simultaneously takes on

²⁶ Geoffrey Wiseman, "Polylateralism': Diplomacy's Third Dimension," *Public Diplomacy Magazine* 1, no. Summer (2010).

²⁷ Snow and Taylor, *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, ix.

²⁸ Enrico Fels and Roxana Georgiana Radu, "The Monopoly of Violence in the Cyber Space: Challenges of Cyber Security," in *Power in the 21st Century: International Security and International Political Economy in a Changing World*, ed. Enrico Fels, Jan-Frederik Kremer, and Katharina Kronenberg (Heidelberg: Springer, 2012), 142.

²⁹ Eve Gerber, "FiveBooks Interviews: Anne-Marie Slaughter on 21st Century Foreign Policy," *The Browser*, 2013, <http://thebrowser.com/interviews/anne-marie-slaughter-on-21st-century-foreign-policy>.

³⁰ "Bloggingheads: State Power vs. Social Movements," *Foreign Policy Blogs*, October 13, 2011, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/10/13/bloggingheads_state_power_vs_social_movements.

challenges and reinvents itself ‘under new organizational forms, new procedures of power making, and new principles of legitimacy.’³¹

But not only statecraft is evolving: The news industry is undergoing a transformation that leads it ‘back to the conversational culture of the era before mass media.’³² This, as highlighted in the *Economist*, most importantly entails a shift in the news consumers’ attitude: Readers of traditional news sources, such as newspapers and TV, have become increasingly active news contributors, filtering, sharing, compiling and discussing events.³³ This rapidity and real-time broadcasting requires the state to pick up the pace in dealing with these issues while the Internet becomes an important source of information together with television, newspapers or the radio.³⁴ Since reputation has always been a considerable factor in foreign policy, the abundance of free information and diverse heterogeneous voices increase the need for convincingly embedding policy choices into a narrative.³⁵

Especially social media embody the changes mentioned above. They enable interaction between people regardless of their geographic location³⁶ and have become the number one activity on the Internet since 2007.³⁷ 82% of the world’s online population, 1.2 billion users worldwide, put these sites in action; 19% of the time spent online is devoted to social media.³⁸ Also, one can observe a

³¹ Manuel Castells, *The Power of Identity: The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture*, 2nd ed. (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2011).

³² “A Special Report on the News Industry: The Future of News: Back to the Coffee House,” *The Economist*, July 7, 2011.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ USC Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism, “Press Release & Highlights: 2010 Digital Future Report” (USC Annenberg School for Communication & Journalism, June 3, 2011), http://www.digitalcenter.org/pdf/2011_digital_future_final_release.pdf.

³⁵ Joseph S. Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone* (Oxford, New York [etc.]: Oxford University Press, 2003), 68.

³⁶ Daniel Chandler and Rod Munday, “Social Media (noun),” *A Dictionary of Media and Communication*, Oxford Reference Online (Oxford, New York [etc.]: Oxford University Press), accessed February 9, 2012, <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t326.e2539>.

³⁷ Bill Tancer, “Facebook: More Popular Than Porn,” *Time*, October 31, 2007, <http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1678586,00.html>; Laura Hancock, “Why Social Media Is Better than Porn,” *Business2Community*, January 10, 2012, <http://www.business2community.com/social-media/why-social-media-is-better-than-porn-0116576>.

³⁸ Brian Cotty, *Comscore Top 10 Need-to-Knows about Social Networking and Where It Is Headed* (Comscore, December 22, 2011), 4, <http://www.slideshare.net/Briancrotty/comscore-top-10-needtoknows-about-social-networkingandwhereitisheaded>.

general increase in popularity of social networking sites: The time spent on these is on an upward trend worldwide, Brian Cotty asserts.³⁹ But what do social media exactly consist of?

They are '[a] broad category or genre of communications media which occasion or enable social interaction among groups of people, whether they are known to each other or strangers, localized in the same place or geographically dispersed. It includes new media such as newsgroups, [...] and social networking sites. Such media can be thought of metaphorically as virtual meeting places which function to occasion the exchange of media content among users who are both producers and consumers. Social media have also become adopted as a significant marketing tool.'⁴⁰

These new technologies eventually found their way into politics: Politicians started to share their thoughts on the social networking site Twitter, inducing for example the project *Bundestwitter* that compiles the tweets⁴¹ of German members of parliament; *Twitterbarometer* analyses real-time tweets that contain hashtags indexing Germany's political parties, in an attempt to measure the country's digital political climate.⁴² Not least since Barack Obama's memorable presidential campaign in 2008, the use of social media has become common practice in U.S. politics.⁴³ Government administration has come to the conclusion that they needed to incorporate these tools into their practice; this is why concepts such as e-diplomacy ('the use of the internet and new Information Communications Technologies to help carry out diplomatic objectives'⁴⁴) or digital diplomacy, which according to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office means 'solving foreign policy problems using the internet'⁴⁵, were created.

³⁹ Ibid., 5.

⁴⁰ Chandler and Munday, "Social Media (noun)."

⁴¹ Messages shared on Twitter.

⁴² "Politiker twittern aus dem Deutschen Bundestag," *Bundestwitter.de*, October 10, 2012, <http://bundestwitter.de/>; Sascha Lobo and BuzzRank, "Twitterbarometer: Die politische Stimmungslage im digitalen Deutschland. In Echtzeit," *Twitterbarometer - die politischen Trends im digitalen Deutschland*, accessed May 28, 2013, <http://twitterbarometer.de/>.

⁴³ Jan Schmidt, *Das neue Netz: Merkmale, Praktiken und Folgen des Web 2.0* (Konstanz: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft, 2009), 145–147.

⁴⁴ Fergus Hanson, *Baked in and Wired: eDiplomacy@State*, Foreign Policy at Brookings. Policy Paper (The Brookings Institution, October 2012), 2, <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/reports/2012/10/25%20ediplomacy/baked%20in%20hanson>.

⁴⁵ Foreign & Commonwealth Office, "What Is Digital Diplomacy?," *Digital Diplomacy Communication Directorate*, 2011, <http://digitaldiplomacy.fco.gov.uk/en/about/digital-diplomacy/>.

Traditional forms of diplomacy still dominate, but 21st-century statecraft is not mere corporate rebranding – swapping tweets for broadcasts. It represents a shift in form and in strategy – a way to amplify traditional diplomatic efforts, develop tech-based policy solutions and encourage cyberactivism. Diplomacy may now include such open-ended efforts as the short-message-service (S.M.S.) social-networking program the State Department set up in Pakistan last fall.⁴⁶

Public diplomacy's way of adjusting to this new environment consists in embracing social media, which led to *public diplomacy – PD – 2.0* that is a subcategory of e-diplomacy and means public diplomacy via social media.

The 2.0 addendum is thereby inspired by Web 2.0 '[... a] term that was introduced in 2004 and refers to the second generation of the World Wide Web. The term "2.0" comes from the software industry, where new versions of software programs are labelled with an incremental version number. Like software, the new generation of the Web includes new features and functionality that was not available in the past. However, Web 2.0 does not refer to a specific version of the Web, but rather a series of technological improvements. Web 2.0 technologies provide a level of user interaction that was not available before.'⁴⁷

This '[...] second stage of development of the Internet [...] is] characterized especially by the change from static web pages to dynamic or user-generated content and the growth of social networking'⁴⁸. It entails for example the use of blogs, social media and interactive elements such as Wikipedia.⁴⁹ It basically '[...] features a spectrum of new possibilities related to emotion, sensation (through haptic technologies), the simulation of real life experience, and the construction of parallel, virtual worlds.'⁵⁰

⁴⁶ Jesse Lichtenstein, "Digital Diplomacy," *The New York Times*, July 16, 2010, sec. Magazine, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/18/magazine/18web2-0-t.html>.

⁴⁷ "Web 2.0 Definition," *TechTerms.com*, January 14, 2008, <http://www.techterms.com/definition/web20>.

⁴⁸ "Web 2.0," Oxford Dictionaries (Oxford, New York [etc.]: Oxford University Press, April 2010), http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/Web_2.0.

⁴⁹ "Web 2.0 Definition."

⁵⁰ Daryl Copeland, "Virtuality, Diplomacy, and the Foreign Ministry: Does Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada Need a 'V Tower'?", n.d., 4.

James K. Glassman, new media enthusiast and briefly employed as Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy coined the term public diplomacy 2.0 back in 2008.⁵¹ He saw social media as a unique means of engaging world opinion and strongly supported the U.S. Department of State's adoption of the new technology. According to Colleen Graffy, the first Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, PD 2.0 is public diplomacy's social media variant, '[...] the art of using this Internet phenomenon in order to achieve those [public diplomacy's] objectives [...]'⁵² While several scholars agree that the term is somewhat outdated, it is still the one most widely used. As this dissertation is not concerned with digital diplomacy in general, but focuses on social media, it seemed appropriate to differentiate PD 2.0 from e-diplomacy.⁵³

However, these endeavours constitute by no means a substitute for traditional, face-to-face encounters.⁵⁴ Digital diplomacy never was – and never will be, as Andreas Sandre predicts – intended to substitute traditional channels.⁵⁵ Wherein lies the use of these new social media tools for public diplomacy? Answering this question will constitute this dissertation's main focus.

1.2 Significance of the Study and Research Focus

Several scholars believe that the Internet has provided international relations (IR) and public diplomacy with a new – *digital* – turn, giving it the potential to profoundly change its practice; the U.S. State Department calls it 'the Internet moment in foreign policy.'⁵⁶ Alec Ross, retired State Department's Senior Advisor for Innovation, opines that it is nowadays indispensable to interact with citizens through social media to get an idea about what is going on in a country.⁵⁷ 'The rise of social media is revolutionizing how state and non-state actors communicate with

⁵¹ Nicholas J. Cull, "WikiLeaks, Public Diplomacy 2.0 and the State of Digital Public Diplomacy," *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* 7, no. 1 (May 2011), <http://www.statesmansyearbook.com/resources/nicholasj.html>.

⁵² Colleen Graffy, "The Rise of Public Diplomacy 2.0," *The Journal of International Security Affairs*, no. 17 (2009), <http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2009/17/graffy.php>.

⁵³ Nicholas J. Cull, "The Long Road to Public Diplomacy 2.0: The Internet in U.S. Public Diplomacy," 2012, 27, <http://www.ash.harvard.edu/extension/ash/docs/cull.pdf>.

⁵⁴ "Digital Diplomacy: Virtual Relations," *The Economist*, September 22, 2012, <http://www.economist.com/node/21563284>.

⁵⁵ Andreas Sandre, "Twitter for Diplomats" (DiploFoundation, Istituto Diplomatico, 2013), 27, <http://baldi.diplomacy.edu/diplo/texts/Twitter+for+diplomats.pdf>.

⁵⁶ Bureau of Public Affairs; U.S. Department of State. The Office of Website Management, "21st Century Statecraft," *U.S. Department of State. Diplomacy in Action.*, 2013, <http://www.state.gov/statecraft/overview/index.htm>.

⁵⁷ Laura Nelson, "Senior Innovation Adviser Ross: Technology and Communication Have Sparked Worldwide Redistribution of Power," *USC Annenberg News*, February 6, 2012, <http://www.annenberg.usc.edu/News%20and%20Events/News/120206AlecRoss.aspx>.

publics in the international community,⁵⁸ R.S. Zaharna and William A. Rugh assert. Benjamin Barber argues that the Internet could (re-) integrate the public into the policy making process that diplomacy constitutes, creating a ‘global agora.’⁵⁹ A Pew study found that Internet users in general and Facebook users in particular are much more likely to be politically active.⁶⁰ This could make a case for social media enhancing participatory politics in long-established democracies, providing new forums for the dialogue between *the public* and governments through the intermediary of the respective *diplomatic corps*. Other scholars such as Robin Brown question this, ‘rai[sing] the question of the extent to which origins shape the way that countries practice PD. [...] The nature of the approaches that are chosen grow out of national contexts and ways of thinking about them. The result will be a national PD style [...] that [...] may or may not be appropriate for new or future challenges.’⁶¹ This dissertation will further investigate this matter and explore how PD 2.0 deals with this area of conflict.

Second, while digital media’s role in revolutions and political uprisings has already been extensively studied⁶² – inducing the notions of *Twitter* and *Facebook revolutions* that refer to incidents such as the Arab Spring in 2011 or the Iranian protest in 2009⁶³ – its potential regarding

⁵⁸ Rhonda Zaharna and Ambassador William A. Rugh, “Guest Editors’ Note 629,” *Global Media Journal* 12, no. The Use of Social Media in U.S. Public Diplomacy: 1, accessed January 4, 2013, <http://journals.textual.info/index.php/gmj-american/article/view/5/2>.

⁵⁹ Benjamin R. Barber, *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), xiv; Agora means “(in ancient Greece) a public open space used for assemblies and markets,” in the sense of a discussion forum for citizens. “Agora (noun),” Oxford Dictionaries (Oxford, New York [etc.]: Oxford University Press), accessed July 9, 2013, <http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/agora?q=agora>.

⁶⁰ Keith Hampton et al., “Social Networking Sites and Our Lives,” *Pew Internet & American Life Project*, June 16, 2011, <http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2011/Technology-and-social-networks/Summary.aspx>.

⁶¹ Robin Brown, “Do the Origins of PD Programmes Shape Their Long Term Development?,” *Public Diplomacy, Networks and Influence*, October 23, 2011, <http://pdnetworks.wordpress.com/2011/10/23/do-the-origins-of-pd-programmes-shape-their-long-term-development/>.

⁶² See for example: Philip Seib, *Real-Time Diplomacy: Politics and Power in the Social Media Era* (London, New York [etc.]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Malcolm Gladwell, “Small Change. Why the Revolution Will Not Be Tweeted,” *The New Yorker*, October 4, 2010, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/04/101004fa_fact_gladwell; Clay Shirky and Malcolm Gladwell, “From Innovation to Revolution,” *Foreign Affairs*, no. March / April (March 2011), <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67325/malcolm-gladwell-and-clay-shirky/from-innovation-to-revolution>; Clay Shirky, “The Political Power of Social Media. Technology, the Public Sphere, and Political Change,” *Foreign Affairs*, no. January / February (2011), <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67038/clay-shirky/the-political-power-of-social-media?page=show>.

⁶³ Marc Lynch, “Twitter Devolutions,” *Foreign Policy*, February 7, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/07/twitter_devolutions_arab_spring_social_media?page=0,2.

long-established and comparably peaceful democracies has only played a marginal role in academia so far. This dissertation aims at contributing to closing this gap.⁶⁴

Third, theory building appears underrepresented in current debates on the subject, with mostly practitioners having dominated public diplomacy until recently, Cowan and Cull assert.⁶⁵ Research confirmed that in relative terms, academia did not pay very much attention to the topic despite ‘the central place it is now occupying in foreign policy and diplomacy.’⁶⁶ Bruce Gregory is intrigued by the fact that most literature on public diplomacy is written by practitioners, which is unusual for an academic discipline.⁶⁷ This is due to the fact that for the largest part, professionals and their work preceded scientific interest and research in the topic – public diplomacy was first featured in an academic book in 1972 only.⁶⁸ It thus comes as no surprise that theory building is challenging, and a taxonomy hard to develop, as Cowan and Arsenault find.⁶⁹ This is especially true for PD 2.0, as it is even more recent and practitioners report difficulties to keep up with new developments.⁷⁰ Still, ‘[t]he literature on digital diplomacy, or e-diplomacy, is growing in leaps and bounds,’⁷¹ Jorge Heine and Joseph F. Turcotte argued in 2012. Indeed, there are a substantial number of recent academic⁷² and more journalist⁷³

⁶⁴ “Symposium: Digital Diplomacy - Foreign Policy in Times of Web 2.0” (Deutsche Welle / Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen e.V., November 22, 2011), 1.

⁶⁵ Nicholas J. Cull and Geoffrey Cowan, “Public Diplomacy in a Changing World,” in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 616 (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2008), 7.

⁶⁶ Eytan Gilboa, “Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy,” in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, ed. Geoffrey Cowan and Nicholas J. Cull, vol. 616 (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2008), 297.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 74.

⁶⁸ Cull, “Public Diplomacy before Gullion,” 21.

⁶⁹ Bruce Gregory, “Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field,” in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Sage, vol. 616 (Thousand Oaks, 2008), 274–275.

⁷⁰ A member of staff of an American cultural institution, Interview, February 27, 2013.

⁷¹ Jorge Heine and Joseph F. Turcotte, “Tweeting as Statecraft: How, Against All Odds, Twitter Is Changing the World’s Second Oldest Profession,” *Crossroads. The Macedonian Foreign Policy Journal*, 2012, 59.

⁷² Seib, *Real-Time Diplomacy*; Michael Schneider, “Public Diplomacy in the Digital Era: Toward New Partnerships,” *The Journal of Public Diplomacy*, no. Fall 2011 (2011): 1–5; Anne-Marie Slaughter, “America’s Edge,” *Foreign Affairs*, 2009, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63722/anne-marie-slaughter/americas-edge?page=show>; Lina Khatib, William Dutton, and Michael Thelwall, *Public Diplomacy 2.0. An Exploratory Case Study of the US Digital Outreach Team*, June 11, 2011, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1734850>; Martin Löffelholz et al., *Public Diplomacy* (Heidelberg: Springer, forthcoming); James Curran, Natalie Fenton, and Des Freedman, eds., *Misunderstanding the Internet*, Communication and Society (London, New York [etc.]: Routledge, 2012).

⁷³ See for example: Robin Brown, “Public Diplomacy and Social Media,” *Public Diplomacy, Networks and Influence*, January 24, 2011, <http://pdnetworks.wordpress.com/2011/01/24/public-diplomacy-and-social-media/>; Lichtenstein, “Digital Diplomacy”; Michele Kelemen, “Twitter Diplomacy: State Department 2.0,” *NPR. All Tech Considered*,

publications.

Within this context, many public diplomacy scholars find fault with the majority of literature being on the United States (and / or published there); the country's Cold War experience often induces a negligence of current matters and an omission of new relevant actors such as NGOs.⁷⁴ In addition, researchers in the U.S. and Great Britain (UK) still lead the academic debate and its practical implications⁷⁵ (the U.S. even emerged as a leader in e-diplomacy⁷⁶). Their European and Asian counterparts only just started following.⁷⁷ Especially scientists in Germany seem to be far behind American research on the topic.⁷⁸ In contrast to continental Europe, the concept of public diplomacy is familiar to casual readers in the U.S. for it has become a very current expression since 9/11.⁷⁹

It is important to mention that this dissertation will resort not only to literature from the realms of international relations and public diplomacy but also classic communication studies. From an academic standpoint PD 2.0 is located at the intersection of both disciplines.⁸⁰ Also, this study

February 21, 2012, <http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2012/02/21/147207004/twitter-diplomacy-state-department-2-0>; Sandre, "Twitter for Diplomats"; Hanson, *Baked in and Wired: eDiplomacy@State*.

⁷⁴ Daniel Ostrowski, *Die Public Diplomacy der deutschen Auslandsvertretungen weltweit: Theorie und Praxis der deutschen Auslandsöffentlichkeitsarbeit* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010), 83–84; Gilboa, "Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy," 56; Robin Brown, "The Four Paradigms of Public Diplomacy: Building a Framework for Comparative Government External Communications Research" (presented at the International Studies Association Convention, San Diego, 2012), 2, <http://pdnetworks.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/isa-2012-v4.pdf>.

⁷⁵ See for example the following reports that reflect America's foreign policy elites' concern with public diplomacy; Defense Science Board USA, *Report of the Defense Science Board - Task Force on Strategic Communication*; Commission on Smart Power, *A Smarter, More Secure America* (Centre for Strategic and International Studies), accessed September 24, 2010, http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/071106_csissmartpowerreport.pdf.

⁷⁶ Rhonda Zaharna, "Mapping out a Spectrum of Public Diplomacy Initiatives. Information and Relational Communication Framework.," in *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, ed. Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor (London, New York [etc.]: Routledge, 2009), 1; Hanson, *Baked in and Wired: eDiplomacy@State*; Jorge Benitez, "US State Department Considered Leader in E-Diplomacy," *NATO Source. Alliance News Blog*, July 18, 2012, <http://www.acus.org/natosource/us-state-department-considered-leader-e-diplomacy>.

⁷⁷ Snow and Taylor, *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, ix–xi; See also: Jan Melissen, "Public Diplomacy," in *Diplomacy in a Globalizing World: Theories and Practices*, ed. Pauline Kerr and Geoffrey Wiseman (Oxford, New York [etc.]: Oxford University Press, 2013), 205–206.

⁷⁸ Britt Inga Karten, "Staatliche Imagearbeit: Die Public Diplomacy des Auswärtigen Amtes," in *Die amerikanische Regierung gegen die Weltöffentlichkeit? Theoretische und empirische Analysen der Public Diplomacy zum Irakkrieg*, ed. Thomas Jäger and Henrike Viehrig (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2008), 163.

⁷⁹ Geoffrey Cowan and Nicholas J. Cull, eds., *Public Diplomacy in a Changing World*, vol. 616, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2008), 7.

⁸⁰ Willow F. Williamson and John Robert Kelley, "#KelleyPd: Public Diplomacy 2.0 Classroom," *Global Media Journal* 12, no. The Use of Social Media in U.S. Public Diplomacy: 4, accessed January 7, 2013, <http://journals.textual.info/index.php/gmj-american/article/view/6/3>.

will feature many online resources as in blogs, social media pages or studies that may seem slightly unconventional to add to more traditional literature found in relevant journals, newspapers and monographs. Last, the dissertation deliberately features an extensive amount of footnotes as it aims at compiling a relevant bibliography.

This said, which are the specific issues and questions the dissertation is going to explore?

1.3 Research Questions, Methodology and Structure

Drawing from *historical institutionalism*, an approach suitable to ‘[...] explain different policy outcomes in different countries with reference to their respective (stable) institutional configurations,⁸¹ this paper’s main purpose is to challenge the assumption that social media substantially changed public diplomacy. The ‘Internet moment’⁸² may only have provided governments with means to more effectively pursue their interests and traditional strategies through a different channel. This dissertation aims at stripping public diplomacy of its messianic dimension through explaining how its digital variant is perfectly consistent with the U.S and German governments’ public diplomacy and foreign policy tradition.

The argument will be developed on the basis of the following research questions: First, the dissertation will inquire to which extent public diplomacy is compatible with social media. Next, it will look at how PD 2.0 fits together with public diplomacy’s purposes as defined by both Germany’s and the U.S. Foreign Offices and their respective doctrines. Comparing the tenets of PD 2.0 to those of classical public diplomacy and investigating the resources allocated to public diplomacy’s digital variant will shed light on whether or not the respective foreign policy corner stones are met and if social media are actually an innovative instrument. In this respect, it will be interesting to see whether political topics are addressed via social media and if so, how. Their use in a conflict situation seems particularly relevant. In a second step, this study will inquire whether the embassies investigated actively encourage social media participation and try to include the audience into the policy making process (for example, by asking for user opinions). Also, the role of social media accounts within the foreign country’s media system will be explored.

⁸¹ Sven Steinmo and Kathleen Thelen, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” in *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*, ed. Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 14.

⁸² U.S. Department of State. The Office of Website Management, “21st Century Statecraft.”

Within this context, differences in American and German approaches and the reasons for them will be carved out.

Since the dissertation's subject is rather new and no comparable study exists yet, the author had to deal with relatively uncharted territory concerning the research method. The dissertation will thus be designed as an *explorative study*, for this is particularly suitable for gaining access to and subsequently exploring a field – PD – 2.0 with only vague or no information on social practices available. The dissertation is thus highly inductive: The hypotheses or rather assumptions will be developed over the first chapters and later be verified by the case study. A discussion of its results will complete it. With regards to its methodology, the dissertation will follow the framework of a policy analysis and rely on a content analysis of relevant social media pages, on a study of strategic documents issued by the State Department and the Federal Foreign Office, as well as on interviews.

A comment on the pages to follow is to conclude this introduction; the dissertation will be composed complying with a linear-analytic structure.⁸³ Chapter two will focus on the current state of research and provide a literature review. It will explain what public diplomacy is, what it consists of and detail its theoretical foundations. The third part will take a closer look at digital communication and social media, clarifying the notion's properties as well as their compatibility with and practicability for public diplomacy. A research framework will be developed throughout chapter four; chapter five will subsequently explain both countries' institutional contexts as well as foreign policy tradition and history that are necessary to evaluate whether or not substantial change took place. The following empirical case study that constitutes most of chapter 5 will provide background information on German as well as American PD 2.0 and their respective relationship with the United Kingdom. It will further operationalise the model generated beforehand, focussing on what the two governments concretely do regarding their public diplomacy via Facebook and Twitter as well as what difference their endeavours make. Finally, a conclusion will sum up the dissertation's results.

⁸³ Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, 3rd ed., vol. 5, Applied Social Research Methods (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2008), 152.

2 PUBLIC DIPLOMACY - CURRENT STATE OF RESEARCH

Public diplomacy is a practice, not a theory.

Philip M. Taylor (2011)⁸⁴

2.1 Defining Public Diplomacy

Geoffrey Cowan and Nicholas Cull understand public diplomacy as ‘(...) an international actor’s attempt to advance the ends of policy by engaging with foreign publics’⁸⁵ giving proof of a very broad understanding of who public diplomacy’s actors are, while Joseph Nye believes it is ‘diplomacy aimed at public opinion.’⁸⁶ The Clingendael Institute (referring to the Netherlands where it is located) provides a more extensive explanation: ‘[It is a policy] generating support for the aims of Dutch policy and fostering understanding for Dutch perspectives and standpoints among unofficial target groups in foreign countries. More generally, public diplomacy aims to present a realistic and favourable picture of the Netherlands in other countries.’⁸⁷ This interpretation of public diplomacy points out its goal as well as its target group. Even more important is the combination of the attributes *realistic* and *favourable* since those two do not necessarily go together. This is tremendously interesting because it suggests that public diplomacy might not be as innocent as it seems at first sight – a fact that will be explored later on.

While Josef Nye considers public diplomacy being about relationship building⁸⁸, Matt Armstrong argues ‘[p]ublic diplomacy involves understanding, influencing, developing relationships with and providing information to the general public and civic society abroad, in order to create a favourable environment for achieving national security, political, cultural and economic objectives.’⁸⁹ Anthony Pratkanis ‘[...] define[s] public diplomacy as the promotion of the national

⁸⁴ Molly Sisson, “Theory,” *Public Diplomacy and Student Exchanges. Experiences of American Fulbright Grantees in the UK and Turkey, and Their Counterparts in the US*, May 19, 2011,

<http://americanstudentsinbritain.blogspot.com/2011/05/theory.html?showComment=1305903640738>.

⁸⁵ Cull and Cowan, “Public Diplomacy in a Changing World,” 6.

⁸⁶ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, 2nd ed. (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), 105.

⁸⁷ Alan K. Henrikson, “Niche Diplomacy in the World Public Arena: The Global ‘Corners’ of Canada and Norway,” in *The New Public Diplomacy. Soft Power in International Relations*, ed. Jan Melissen (London, New York [etc.]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 30.

⁸⁸ Leonard, Stead, and Smewing, *Public Diplomacy*, 8.

⁸⁹ Matt Armstrong, “Defining Public Diplomacy,” *MountainRunner*, November 17, 2008, http://mountainrunner.us/2008/11/defining_public_diplomacy/.

interest by informing and influencing the citizens of other nations.⁹⁰ The U.S. Department of Defence's dictionary of military terms agrees with this assertion and adds the dimension of dialogue to it: Public diplomacy⁹¹ is 'those overt international public information activities of the United States Government designed to promote United States foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad.'⁹² Carnes Lord gives proof of a similar understanding: 'Public diplomacy refers to government-sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries; its chief instruments are publications, motion pictures, cultural exchanges, radio and television.'⁹³ The instruments' mix in this respect might change, but this quote still captures public diplomacy's essence: inform and influence.

Despite (or maybe due to) its increasing popularity, the term public diplomacy is still difficult to grasp. 'Public diplomacy has entered the lexicon of 21st century diplomacy without clear definition of what it is or how the tools it offers might best be used,'⁹⁴ Ann Lane states, even though consensus about the fact that public diplomacy is about transmitting a nation's image and is targeted at foreign publics exists. Unsurprisingly, definitions of the notion are abundant, which leads John Brown to call it a 'linguistic phenomenon.'⁹⁵

This explains this part's relation to its introductory quote by Philip Taylor purporting that 'public diplomacy is a practice, not a theory.'⁹⁶ First, public diplomacy's theoretical grounding is heavily criticised for lacking a 'disciplinary home, a framework of understanding, and a set of

⁹⁰ Anthony Pratkanis, "Public Diplomacy in International Conflicts. A Social Influence Analysis," in *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, ed. Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor (London, New York [etc.]: Routledge, 2009), 112.

⁹¹ The second definition provided is: "In peace building, civilian agency efforts to promote an understanding of the reconstruction efforts, rule of law, and civic responsibility through public affairs and international public diplomacy operations. Its objective is to promote and sustain consent for peace building both within the host nation and externally in the region and in the larger international community." See: "Public Diplomacy," *DOD Dictionary of Military Terms* (U.S. Department of Defence, January 31, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/p/11548.html.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Carnes Lord as quoted in: J. Michael Waller, ed., *The Public Diplomacy Reader* (Washington, D.C.: Institute of World Politics Press, 2007), 28.

⁹⁴ Anne Lane, *Public Diplomacy: Key Challenges and Priorities* (Wilton Park Conference, April 2006), 2.

⁹⁵ John Brown, "Public Diplomacy as a Linguistic Phenomenon," *Huffington Post. The Blog*, April 24, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-brown/public-diplomacy-as-a-lin_b_852828.html.

⁹⁶ Sisson, "Theory."

empirical methods.⁹⁷ While Molly Sisson⁹⁸ reckons that this is not necessarily negative but just the way the discipline works, Eytan Gilboa subtends that it ‘[...] is probably one of the most multidisciplinary areas in modern scholarship.’⁹⁹ This, he argues, leads to confusion about the premises the concept entails. He thus calls to embrace this fact through actually adapting an interdisciplinary approach to public diplomacy, including different disciplines to explain phenomena that public diplomacy literature cannot account for.¹⁰⁰ Even though this is partially already happening, it does not go far enough for him so he blames scholars of this field for not creating an integrated theoretical framework, ignoring possible contributions from other disciplines.¹⁰¹

So, what distinguishes public diplomacy from traditional diplomacy that designates ‘communication between officials designed to promote foreign policy either by formal agreement or tacit adjustment,’¹⁰² formerly known under Cardinal Richelieu’s denomination *négociation continuelle* until 1796? Both are part of ‘a state-based institution involving professional accredited diplomats from foreign ministries and embassies who follow the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic Relations (1961) and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1963); who represent, negotiate, and communicate the interests of their territorial state with diplomats from other states; and who seek [...] in advancing state interest.’¹⁰³ Public diplomacy’s main distinction from traditional diplomacy consists in that it indirectly exerts influence through unofficial channels, for example the media¹⁰⁴, primarily deals with non-governmental actors and is directed at foreign publics¹⁰⁵ also conveying values.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, it is in theory less elitist since it involves the masses and does not exclusively rely on trained state officials but also works with other

⁹⁷ “Framing the Global Research and Publication Project,” *Indiana University Bloomington. Center for the Study of Global Change*, 2011, <http://www.indiana.edu/~global/framing/index.php>.

⁹⁸ Sisson, “Theory.”

⁹⁹ Gilboa, “Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy,” 56.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 74.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 72.

¹⁰² Geoff R. Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, 3rd ed. (London, New York [etc.]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 1.

¹⁰³ Geoffrey Wiseman and Pauline Kerr, “Introduction,” in *Diplomacy in a Globalizing World: Theories and Practices*, ed. Pauline Kerr and Geoffrey Wiseman (Oxford, New York [etc.]: Oxford University Press, 2013), 4.

¹⁰⁴ Alan K. Henrikson, *What Can Public Diplomacy Achieve?*, Discussion Papers in Diplomacy (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 2006), 8.

¹⁰⁵ “Public Diplomacy - What It Is and Is Not.”

¹⁰⁶ van Ham, “Place Branding: The State of the Art,” 135.

mediator organisations.¹⁰⁷ While diplomacy used to be understood ‘as intrinsically secret and full of intrigue, carried out by few actors, with public opinion playing a passive role, if any,’¹⁰⁸ a reminder of the Talleyrand and Metternich era that partly survived until the 20th century, public diplomacy is said to embody a shift, giving the public a more active role. This dissertation will further explore to which extent this actually applies.

Indeed, György Szondi sees a change from behavioural to attitudinal, meaning that public diplomacy aims less at making its audience act in a certain way but rather aspires to shape their attitudes towards certain policies (or, newly, economic objectives, resulting in them at least not opposing them).¹⁰⁹ Also, public diplomacy is not necessarily about alteration: ‘Dialogue may or may not lead to changed foreign policy decisions or changed opinions about those foreign policy decisions. However, a willingness to listen and to show a respect for thoughtful, alternate voices may help to ameliorate conflicts, or at least facilitate understanding of positions taken by helping participants to articulate their policies in more easily understandable terms.’¹¹⁰ Public diplomacy does therefore strongly depend on a willing receiver.

The next section will now focus on the approaches considered most prominent and relevant for the case study, ordering them in ascending order of complexity, and to a certain extent according to how contemporary they are. Almost as many methodological frameworks come with this multitude of public diplomacy definitions, for there exists no consensus on which methods are appropriate or productive. Since those use a variety of metrics, some can be considered partly complementary. This part does not only aim at better grasping public diplomacy but also at providing guidance regarding where to situate PD 2.0. Thus, it will start with Eytan Gilboa’s three models of public diplomacy because it sheds light on public diplomacy’s genesis.

¹⁰⁷ Oliver Zöllner, “A Quest for Dialogue in International Broadcasting. Germany’s Public Diplomacy Targeting Arab Audiences,” *Global Media and Communication* 2006, no. 2 (2006): 163.

¹⁰⁸ Sandre, “Twitter for Diplomats,” 7.

¹⁰⁹ György Szondi, “Central and Eastern European Public Diplomacy. A Transitional Perspective on National Reputation Management,” in *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, ed. Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor (London, New York [etc.]: Routledge, 2009), 305.

¹¹⁰ Geoffrey Cowan and Amelia Arsenault, “Moving from Monologue to Dialogue to Collaboration: The Three Layers of Public Diplomacy,” in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 616 (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2008), 19.

2.2 Key Approaches to Public Diplomacy

2.2.1 Three Models of Public Diplomacy (E. Gilboa)

Eytan Gilboa distinguishes three public diplomacy models he established by means of the variables actors, initiators, and goals, types of media, as well as means and techniques. This approach seems more like a historical description of public diplomacy's evolution from its beginnings during the 20th century until now.

	Basic Cold War Model	Nonstate Transnational Model	Domestic PR Model
Actors	States	Transnational non-state actors (groups / individuals)	Contracted PR firms
Initiators	States	Transnational non-state actors (groups / individuals)	Nation states
Goals	Influence rival ideologies	Cultivate support for cause	Conceal true emitter and cause / strengthen endeavour's legitimacy
Media / techniques	International broadcasting	Global news networks and media events	PR firms and their instruments
Addressees	Autocratic regimes	Democracies	Democracies

Figure 2-1: Public Diplomacy Models (E. Gilboa)¹¹¹

The Cold War model emerged during this period and was mainly used by the United States and the Soviet Union to extend their areas of influence. It consisted in both powers targeting their counterpart's ideological sphere through praising their own respective political model and discrediting the other, relying on their respective broadcasting media. It is considered basic since public diplomacy was only revived during this time. Second, the non-state transnational model was public diplomacy's reaction to the rise of non-state actors. In contrast to the first model, the actors do not own the exploited media. However, it will be shown below that this is only conceptually public diplomacy if the actions are orchestrated by or (at least partly) financed by a state. Third, in the domestic-actors-model, a government contracts PR firms in the target country that know the environment best. This provides its campaign with more legitimacy and helps to hide the endeavour's real orchestrator. Also, communication is heavily targeted and strategic.

¹¹¹ Author's presentation; Gilboa, "Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy," 73.

Even though it is barely concrete, this design illustrates public diplomacy's evolution over the last decades. Gilboa also established parallels to Jarol B. Manheimer's model of strategic public diplomacy that will be discussed in the following subchapter.¹¹²

2.2.2 Strategic Public Diplomacy (J. B. Manheim)

Jarol B. Manheim provided public diplomacy with a more calculating focus, coining the concept of strategic public diplomacy that is 'within the limits of available knowledge, the practice of propaganda in the earliest sense of the term, but enlightened by half a century of empirical research into human motivation and behavior.'¹¹³ He distinguishes four types of diplomacy namely government-to-government, diplomat-to-diplomat, people-to-people, and government-to-people. The first consists in diplomacy in its traditional sense; the second breaks it down to the individual level. The two last forms are considered public diplomacy since they involve the public.¹¹⁴ Nancy Snow and Brian Hocking observe a shift from public diplomacy being a government-to-people approach to people-to-people.¹¹⁵ Even though Manheim admits that people-to-people diplomacy often only comes into being through governmental impulses, counting this form of interaction as public diplomacy still seems problematic. 'The term "public diplomacy" is now attributed to so many activities that it has lost useful meaning. There can effectively be only one national foreign policy. Citizens and nongovernmental organizations should reach out internationally, but everyone should be clear they are not speaking officially for their government, nor are they articulating foreign policy,'¹¹⁶ Kim Andrew Elliott subtends in this respect. Furthermore, individuals are not necessarily aligned with the government, which makes citizen diplomacy a rather hazardous endeavour and all academic analysis flawed due to a difficult traceability as well as a seemingly boundless scope of a campaign.¹¹⁷ This would lead to

¹¹² Ibid., 59–60.

¹¹³ Jarol B. Manheim, *Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy: The Evolution of Influence* (Oxford, New York [etc.]: Oxford University Press, 1994), 7.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 3.

¹¹⁵ Nancy Snow, "Rethinking Public Diplomacy," in *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, ed. Philip M. Taylor and Nancy Snow (London, New York [etc.]: Routledge, 2009), 6; Brian Hocking, "Rethinking the 'New' Public Diplomacy," in *The New Public Diplomacy. Soft Power in International Relations*, ed. Jan Melissen, 2nd ed. (London, New York [etc.]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 32.

¹¹⁶ Kim Andrew Elliott, "Joseph Nye Plugs International Broadcasting into the Wrong Theoretical Framework," *Kim Andrew Elliott Reporting on International Broadcasting*, October 7, 2010, <http://kimelli.nfshost.com/index.php?id=9804>.

¹¹⁷ Joseph S. Nye, "The Pros and Cons of Citizen Diplomacy," *The New York Times*, October 4, 2010, sec. Opinion, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/05/opinion/05iht-ednye.html?_r=2.

individuals wielding power and manipulating public opinion for their own purposes.¹¹⁸ Hence, classifying all this as public diplomacy would strip the state of a considerable amount of control, for overseeing their impact and consequences lie beyond the state's means.¹¹⁹ Indeed, Mark McDowell adds that an intended message is important for something to be public diplomacy.¹²⁰ As Joseph Nye correctly accentuates, public diplomacy is still diplomacy even though directed at publics instead of other government officials. If not, each neighbourhood row on a camping site involving people of different nations could be declared a public diplomacy crisis. So for all these reasons, even though private individuals might have an impact on international relations, this is conceptually speaking not public diplomacy.¹²¹

2.2.3 The New Public Diplomacy (J. Melissen et al.)

The third approach to be presented – the new public diplomacy – is a more contemporary understanding of the matter. Jan Melissen, director of the Clingendael Diplomatic Studies Programme, counts amongst its most prominent advocates. Since the turn of last the century, this stream observed a major change in public diplomacy, declaring the ‘new public diplomacy’¹²² that, in contrast to its predecessor, tries to win hearts and minds¹²³ through dialogue avoiding propagandistic discourses. This allegedly modern version of public diplomacy is designed as a two-way information flow, which actually engages with its audience.¹²⁴ ‘Not being “interactive” is the kiss of death in the age of ICT¹²⁵ and the ordinary individual,’¹²⁶ Melissen reasons. The

¹¹⁸ Matt Armstrong, “Operationalizing Public Diplomacy,” in *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy* (London, New York [etc.]: Routledge, 2008), 63.

¹¹⁹ Snow, “Rethinking Public Diplomacy,” 6.

¹²⁰ Mark McDowell, “Public Diplomacy at the Crossroads: Definitions and Challenges in an ‘Open Source’ Era,” *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 32, no. 2 (2008): 8.

¹²¹ Kathy R. Fitzpatrick, “Privatized Public Diplomacy,” in *Toward a New Public Diplomacy: Redirecting U.S. Foreign Policy*, ed. Philip Seib (London, New York [etc.]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 160.

¹²² Jan Melissen, Donna Lee, and Paul Sharp, eds., *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, 2nd ed. (London, New York [etc.]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 3.

¹²³ This popular phrase refers to a campaign of the USA during the Vietnam War, aimed at gaining the local populations’ support; Martin Bell, “Asia-Pacific. Winning Hearts and Minds in Vietnam,” October 30, 2008, sec. Asia Pacific, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7698055.stm>; also, it has been used by General Templar, describing Britain’s counter-insurgency campaign in Malaya (1948-1960), aimed at being less coercive; Paul Dixon, “Hearts and Minds? British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 32, no. 3 (2009): 352–81.

¹²⁴ Jan Melissen, “The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice,” in *The New Public Diplomacy. Soft Power in International Relations*, ed. Jan Melissen, 2nd ed. (London, New York [etc.]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 13.

¹²⁵ Abbreviation for **I**nformation and **C**ommunications **T**echnologies

¹²⁶ Jan Melissen, “Reflections on Public Diplomacy Today” (presented at the Public Diplomacy, Ankara: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, 2006), 8,

http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2006/20060206_cdsp_online_melissen.pdf.

concept of interactivity is rather prominent in public diplomacy. It designates an activity ‘that involves people working together and having an influence on each other.’¹²⁷ Adapted to public diplomacy, this would mean that not only the government side (diplomats or cultural institutes, for example) can make their voice heard, the same would apply to the public whose opinions would also be taken into account, creating reciprocity. Is this really the case in practice? To this we shall return in the course of this dissertation.

Melissen also brings along an unusual scepticism about public diplomacy’s potential, reckoning that it is rather limited and highly dependent on the accompanying global context.¹²⁸ He argues that public diplomacy should not be too closely associated and entangled with national foreign policy so that, should the latter be perceived as a failure, it does not drown with it. Too much proximity would expose public diplomacy to the same caprices, discontinuities and contradictions foreign policy is regularly subjected to, he assumes and contradicts Alliot’s remarks mentioned above.¹²⁹

Critics of Melissen’s approach find fault with its extreme broadness since it includes a wide range of actors and measures. Daniel Ostrowski, for example, points out the danger to treat the concept of public diplomacy as ethically and morally uncritical, neglecting its strategic purposes and possible entanglement with propaganda, a concept that will be explained more closely below.¹³⁰

Robert Entman criticises the very concept of dialogue, not only because policy makers tend to ‘misperceive majority positions.’¹³¹ This is due to a failure of properly monitoring public attitudes, a tendency of considering the vocal public the majority, confounding the media (and Congress in the case of the U.S.) as a mirror of the public and drawing ineffective conclusions.¹³² Entman further argues that whether or not public opinion / the public plays a part in public policy cannot

¹²⁷ Albert Sydney Hornby and Joanna Turnbull, “Interactive (adjective),” *Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English*, Oxford Dictionaries (Oxford, New York [etc.]: Oxford University Press, 2010), 811.

¹²⁸ Melissen, “The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice,” 15.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 13.

¹³⁰ Ostrowski, *Die Public Diplomacy der deutschen Auslandsvertretungen weltweit*, 27.

¹³¹ Robert M. Entman, “Theorizing Mediated Public Diplomacy: The U.S. Case,” *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 2008, no. 2 (2008): 89.

¹³² Frederick T. Steeper and Celinda Lake, “Foreword,” in *Misreading the Public: The Myth of a New Isolationism*, ed. Steven Kull and I. M. Destler (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 1–3; 207–228; see also: Robert M. Entman, *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 124–128.

really be established, especially since he reckons that public opinion, news frames and officials' actions are tremendously interdependent:¹³³

1. The public's actual opinions arise from framed information, from selected highlights of events, issues, and problems rather than from direct contact with the realities of foreign affairs.
2. Elites for their part cannot know the full reality of public thinking and feeling, but must rely on selective interpretations that draw heavily on news frames.
3. Policymakers relentlessly contend to influence the very news frames that influence them.¹³⁴

This still calls into question a substantial part of the endeavour of public diplomacy that aims at influencing another state's foreign policy choices through affecting the public. Entman additionally points out that elites do not necessarily appreciate the public's input, since this does not necessarily comply with the government's stance.¹³⁵ We will get back to this later.

The first three models mainly conceptualised public diplomacy's broad purpose and hinted at the many contradictions and disagreements within the discipline; the next one will have a stronger focus on public diplomacy's concrete implementation.

2.2.4 The Three Dimensions of Public Diplomacy (M. Leonard et al., J. Nye)

Mark Leonard of Britain's Foreign Policy Centre has a similar understanding of public diplomacy to Jan Melissen's but provides much more specific operationalisation directions. He underlines public diplomacy's targeted nature, which Jan Melissen and his school tend to eclipse, taking into account the criticisms mentioned above. Leonard et al. and respectively Joseph Nye¹³⁶ complete the concept's theory building by adding three dimensions, with time being the metric. First, news management engages with day-to-day issues. It shows the necessity of aligning communications with measures of traditional diplomacy and thus targets public opinion in general. Second, strategic communications tries to unify the relevant actors in conveying strategic messages about the country in question. The British Council has, for example, heavily strategized its target

¹³³ Entman, *Projections of Power*, 123–.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 123.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 138.

¹³⁶ Nye makes the same distinction. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, 107–110.

audience¹³⁷, which confirms György Szondi's claim that 21st century public diplomacy is directed at much more segmented public groups.¹³⁸ The objective of relationship building is the development of lasting relationships with specific target groups considered opinion leaders or influencers. This involves, for example, exchange programmes or scholarships and thus clearly reveals its long-term dimension.¹³⁹ In any case, public diplomacy is a rather slow endeavour since building these kinds of relationships takes time. Still, Karen Hughes, former Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy considers these exchange programmes the single most successful public diplomacy tool of the last 50 years.¹⁴⁰ A poll the British Council commissioned from YouGov and Ipsos MORI that included approximately 10.000 respondents from ten countries, aged 18-34, sustains this argument: It concluded that 'those who have had involvement in cultural relations - - arts, education, and English language activities -- with the U.K. have greater trust in people from the U.K. [...] and a higher level of interest in doing business and trading with the U.K.'¹⁴¹

The division mentioned above can indeed be found in the field: The U.S. government distinguished three categories of activities: international information programs, educational and cultural exchange programs, and international non-military broadcasting.¹⁴² There is more or less a consensus about this trinity that will reappear in other theoretical foundations below in different shapes.¹⁴³

Furthermore, Leonard et al. attribute three strategic options to public diplomacy, namely economic, political / military and social / cultural. These are implemented reactively (hours / days), proactively (weeks / months) or by focusing on relationship building (years). The actual strategy must then be tailored to each country: To outreach to Singapore, economic aspects may

¹³⁷ Robin Brown, "British Council Target Audiences," *Public Diplomacy, Networks and Influence*, January 9, 2011, <http://pdnetworks.wordpress.com/2011/01/09/british-council-target-audiences/>.

¹³⁸ Szondi, "Central and Eastern European Public Diplomacy. A Transitional Perspective on National Reputation Management," 305.

¹³⁹ Leonard, Stead, and Smewing, *Public Diplomacy*, 8–21.

¹⁴⁰ Karen Hughes and Condoleezza Rice, "Remarks With Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Karen Hughes at Town Hall for Public Diplomacy" (presented at the Town Hall for Public Diplomacy, Washington, D.C., September 8, 2008), <http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/nss/state/52748.pdf>.

¹⁴¹ Philip Seib, "Cultural Diplomacy and Construction of Trust," *Huffington Post. The Blog*, June 5, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/philip-seib/cultural-diplomacy-and-co_b_1567813.html.

¹⁴² Epstein, *U.S. Public Diplomacy: Background and the 9/11 Commission Recommendations (CSR Report for Congress)*, 6.

¹⁴³ John Robert Kelley, "Between 'Take-Offs' and 'Crash Landings'. Situational Aspects of Public Diplomacy," in *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, ed. Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor (London, New York [etc.]: Routledge, 2009), 73.

be more relevant whereas in EU countries such as Spain, all three dimensions could be considered.¹⁴⁴ Thus, the strategy has to be adapted to the specific goals and the country where they are implemented.

2.2.5 The Three Layers of Public Diplomacy (G. Cowan, A. Arsenault)

Geoffrey Cowan and Amelia Arsenault move further away from making the approach's time frame the main criteria for distinguishing different sorts of public diplomacy. They use the degree of interactivity to scale the efforts: Public diplomacy measures can be classified into three categories, namely monologue, dialogue and collaboration.

Monologue mostly consists in one-way, 'closed-container forms of communication'¹⁴⁵ addressing mass audiences, such as speeches, press releases and cultural items. However, one has to observe that it is questionable, how closed these elements really are because in today's interconnected mass media world, there always is a possibility to get in touch and to react. Second, there is dialogue, the 'exchange of ideas and information'¹⁴⁶ that, in contrast to monologue, is a two-way information flow leaving room for the audience to engage, for example public lectures of academics or politicians in the host country – a category or genre of communication media which occasion or enable social interaction among groups. Last, collaboration consists in the 'effort by citizens of different countries to complete a common project or achieve a common goal.'¹⁴⁷ Exchange programmes such as the Fulbright initiative provide telling examples. This thereby generated common experience is seen as a basis for lasting relationships. Each category is equivalent and complementary to the others and has to be implemented depending on the situation.¹⁴⁸

While all these models have similarities and divergences, Bruce Gregory would argue that all contemporary approaches have to certain extent four aspects in common. Understanding, as in getting to know the audience, and gathering data for that matter; planning, that is, developing an overall strategy that includes the involvement and coordination of other actors, as well as knowledge management; on a more operational level, engagement designates a strategic process

¹⁴⁴ Leonard, Stead, and Smewing, *Public Diplomacy*, 10.

¹⁴⁵ Cowan and Arsenault, "Moving from Monologue to Dialogue to Collaboration: The Three Layers of Public Diplomacy," 11.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 12.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 11–13.

pursuing common interests with other stakeholders. Last, advocacy, a more monologue-like endeavour, is the one-way pendant to engagement that emphasizes dialogue.¹⁴⁹

2.2.6 The Sub-Traits of Public Diplomacy (J. R. Kelley)

John Robert Kelley distinguishes three main dimensions of public diplomacy similar to the ones mentioned above, namely information (rather short-term distribution of information and news management), influence (targeted persuasion campaigns to induce changes in attitude), and engagement (relationship building).¹⁵⁰ He assigns a temporal and postural dimension as well as a communication style to it, as the next figure shows.¹⁵¹

	Advocacy Model		Advisory Model
	Information	Influence	Engagement
Communication style	Transparent	Propagandistic	Transparent
Timeframe	Long-term / short-term	Long-term / short-term	Long-term
Posture orientation	Reactive / proactive	Proactive	Reactive / proactive

Figure 2-2: Subtraits of Public Diplomacy – Matrix (J. R. Kelley)¹⁵²

He then deduces two public diplomacy models, advocacy and advisory from it, the former being a one-way and the latter a two-way information flow. Kelley’s model thus resembles Cowan and Arsenault’s theoretical grounding. Most interestingly, however, he contradicts other scholars such as Jan Melissen through attributing a propagandistic dimension to public diplomacy.

Models aiming at theorizing public diplomacy are abundant and often show substantial similarities, as the preceding chapters have shown. They, however, do not succeed to integrate the different variables identified into a framework easily adaptable to the analysis or explanation

¹⁴⁹ Bruce Gregory, “American Public Diplomacy: Enduring Characteristics, Elusive Transformation,” *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 2011, no. 6 (2011): 355–359.

¹⁵⁰ Kelley, “Between ‘Take-Offs’ and ‘Crash Landings’: Situational Aspects of Public Diplomacy,” 73.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 80–82.

¹⁵² Author’s presentation; *Ibid.*, 80.

of practical cases.¹⁵³ To remedy, Gilboa suggests his own approach, synthesising existing configurations.

2.2.7 A Framework for Analysis (E. Gilboa)

This model seems indeed suitable for the description of public diplomacy since it includes not only the temporal dimension but also the level of government implication as well as instruments. Moreover, it includes digital diplomacy ('cyber PD') into the framework. It also specifies the extent of government involvement in the endeavour.

Range	Immediate	Intermediate	Long
Time	Hours/days	Weeks/months	Years
Purpose	Reactive	Proactive	Relationship
Media/ public opinion	News management	Strategic communication	Building favorable conditions
Government	Closely linked	Partially linked	Remotely linked
Public diplomacy (pd) instrument	Advocacy, international broadcasting, cyber pd	International public relations; corporate diplomacy, diaspora pd	Cultural diplomacy, exchanges, branding

Figure 2-3: A Framework for Analysis (E. Gilboa)¹⁵⁴

For the analysis to be complete, however, the exact target group, intervening factors, institutional and national constraints as well as an approximate goal to match results should amend the model. No framework has so far provided clear information about measuring results, but more on that later.

2.2.8 The Five Practices of Public Diplomacy (N. J. Cull)

Last, Nicholas J. Cull omits a historical perspective and dwells on the forms that public diplomacy may take, defining five practices. This framework seems promising to situate PD 2.0 and make sense of its practice.

¹⁵³ Gilboa, "Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy," 73.

¹⁵⁴ Author's presentation; Ibid.

Type of Public Diplomacy	Time Frame	Flow of Information	Typical Infrastructure
1. Listening	Short and long-term	Inward to analysts and policy process	Monitoring technology and language trained staff
2. Advocacy	Short term	Outward	Embassy press office, foreign ministry strategy office
3. Cultural diplomacy	Long-term	Outward	Cultural center and/or library
4. Exchange diplomacy	Very long-term	Inward and outward	Exchange administrator, educational office
5. International broadcasting	Medium term	Outward but from a news bureaucracy	News bureaus, production studios, editorial offices, and transmitter facilities

Figure 2-4: Taxonomy of Public Diplomacy (N. J. Cull)¹⁵⁵

The first one, listening consists in collecting data about foreign publics' opinion while, amongst other things, resorting to intelligence services and traditional diplomacy. This is essentially monitoring. He thus incorporates the two-way-information flow into the equation without giving it a do-gooder dimension but allocates a clearly strategic nature to it, which seems more suitable to a foreign policy tool. Second, advocacy consists in 'actively undertaking an international communication activity'¹⁵⁶ to promote the national interest in the short term through an outward flow of information. Cultural diplomacy or the promotion of a nation's cultural achievements abroad, is the third dimension. It is composed of, for example, organising and publicising cultural events, such as lectures of a writer from the home country, through all sorts of channels such as a documentary on national TV. Exchange diplomacy designates the exchange of citizens from one country to another and visa-versa. Last, international news broadcasting denominates the broad use of available technologies such as the Internet, television, and radio to promote a nation.¹⁵⁷

This model underscores public diplomacy's variety through focussing on the different instruments involved instead of solely using time as the defining factor. It offers a more

¹⁵⁵ Author's presentation; Nicholas J. Cull, "Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories," in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 616 (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2008), 35.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 32.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

encompassing explanation of the concept as well as of its current practice than most of the other taxonomies. It will prove the most suitable working base for this dissertation for it shows public diplomacy's different dimensions and permits to situate PD 2.0 as well as what will later be carved out as its main characteristics within the framework; this will be discussed in more detail below.

Still, Cull's model does not resolve many of the criticisms mentioned with regards to Gilboa's previous model. Indeed, evaluation, as in measuring results, was completely omitted. 'The effectiveness of public diplomacy is measured by minds changed, not dollars spent or slick production packages,'¹⁵⁸ Joseph Nye asserts, which already suggests the problem with assessing its impact. What is a *mind changed*? How can one weigh that? Public diplomacy seems to rely on fuzzy concepts such as trust that cannot be grasped in a scientific way,¹⁵⁹ which is why Brian Fung writes that '[...]public diplomacy has always been an inexact science.'¹⁶⁰ There exist 'three inherent challenges in measuring the effectiveness of their strategic communication efforts: They may only produce long-term rather than immediate effect with the latter being difficult to isolate from other influences such as policy anyway. Last, strategic communications often target audiences' perceptions, which are intangible and complex and thus difficult to measure.'¹⁶¹ There are attempts to develop frameworks to evaluate public diplomacy but they are still in an early stage and controversial.¹⁶² The U.S. Department of State disposes of an Evaluation and Measurement Unit for public diplomacy but no further information could be obtained unfortunately.¹⁶³ Robert Banks, U.S. State Department Public Diplomat in Residence (2009-2011) also worked on such an evaluation project and aimed at establishing a correlation between the outcome and specific public diplomacy. He complained about practical difficulties such as interview partners not being available or diplomats already posted away to their next task before

¹⁵⁸ "Public Diplomacy Magazine," 2010, <http://publicdiplomacymagazine.com/>.

¹⁵⁹ Pratkanis, "Public Diplomacy in International Conflicts. A Social Influence Analysis," 128.

¹⁶⁰ Brian D. Fung, "Klout and the Evolution of Digital Diplomacy," *The Washington Post*, August 25, 2011, sec. National, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/on-innovations/how-klout-could-change-americas-image-abroad/2011/08/22/gIQAsooNWJ_story.html.

¹⁶¹ *U.S. Public Diplomacy. Key Issues for Congressional Oversight*, Report to Congressional Committees (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Accountability Office, May 2009), 16, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09679sp.pdf>.

¹⁶² Foreign Policy Centre, "Foreign Policy Centre," accessed December 10, 2009, <http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/publications/publications/pd-publication/impact>; Bureau of Public Affairs U.S. Department of State, "Evaluation and Measurement Unit," January 30, 2009, <http://www.state.gov/r/ppr/emu/index.htm>.

¹⁶³ U.S. Department of State, "Evaluation and Measurement Unit."

completing the analysis.¹⁶⁴ Therefore, opinion polls often substitute the actual evaluation, a procedure Anthony Pratkanis questions, since their actual contribution to the design of public diplomacy campaigns has not yet been researched. In addition, the integration of opinion polls into public diplomacy measures proves difficult as well since those have certain structural limitations such as answers given out of social conformity and the lack of guidelines regarding the interpretation of the findings.¹⁶⁵ While Blake Deutsch opines that ‘you get what you measure,’¹⁶⁶ Robert Banks emphasizes the importance of metric standards since evaluation ‘is still a fantastic way to understand which tactics work for future projects, gain stakeholder confidence for continued funding and legitimize the efforts of public diplomacy professionals.’¹⁶⁷

Even though the diversity of models with different focal points has shown the fragmentation of its theoretical corpus, this subchapter has nevertheless provided a rough overview of the most prominent approaches to tackle the subject. The existence of several other concepts whose boundaries in relation to public diplomacy are not that clear further complicates the matter – especially the notion of propaganda that has appeared several times already – which is where we will direct our attention to now.

2.3 Capturing the Essence

2.3.1 Explaining Related Concepts

While discussing public diplomacy, it is imperative to explain seven concepts, namely propaganda, PSYOP, branding, cultural diplomacy as well as public relations, public affairs and guerrilla diplomacy that are often mentioned in the same breath. These notions and public diplomacy overlap to a certain extent for, above all, public diplomacy is still a very blurred concept as has transpired on the foregoing pages.¹⁶⁸ Briefly defining them will provide clarity and underscore the many facets that are part of public diplomacy, starting with propaganda.

¹⁶⁴ “Events Detail: U.S. Public Diplomat in Residence, Dr. Robert Banks: Evaluating Public Diplomacy. CPD Conversations in Public Diplomacy,” *USC Center on Public Diplomacy*, April 21, 2011, http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/index.php/events/events_detail/14218/.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁶ *U.S. Public Diplomacy. Key Issues for Congressional Oversight*, 16.

¹⁶⁷ “Events Detail: U.S. Public Diplomat in Residence, Dr. Robert Banks: Evaluating Public Diplomacy. CPD Conversations in Public Diplomacy.”

¹⁶⁸ Melissen and Gonesh, *Public Diplomacy: Improving Practice*, 18.

2.3.1.1 Propaganda

David Welch defines it ‘as the deliberate attempt to influence the opinions of an audience through the transmission of ideas and values for a specific persuasive purpose, consciously designed to serve the interest of the propagandists and their political masters, either directly or indirectly.’¹⁶⁹ Scapegoating, stereotyping or name calling count amongst its popular techniques, information control, deception and manipulation are strategic attributes. One distinguishes between white, grey and black propaganda depending on the extent to which the sources of and the information itself are accurately mentioned: If so, it is considered white, if not, then black.¹⁷⁰ Historically seen as an instrument of war, propaganda is most effective in closed communication environments such as dictatorships or destabilised conflict zones since it loses its persuasion once exposed.¹⁷¹

Therefore, Rhonda Zaharna argues that propaganda is nowadays rather tough to uphold with mass media society and constant communications.¹⁷² Some scholars such as Nancy Snow and G.R. Berridge characterise public diplomacy as a modern form of propaganda¹⁷³ or respectively a ‘(...) euphemism for propaganda, conducted or orchestrated by the (...)’¹⁷⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Richard Holbrooke, former U.S. top diplomat, takes a similar stance towards it. ‘Call it public diplomacy, or public affairs, or psychological warfare, or – if you really want to be blunt – propaganda,’¹⁷⁵ he wrote. Mark Blitz compares public diplomacy to ‘(...) what the earliest political thinkers understood as *rhetoric*,’¹⁷⁶ considering embellishment and euphemism its essential features.

Propaganda is clearly negatively connoted since it is reminiscent of autocratic or totalitarian

¹⁶⁹ David Welch, “Power of Propaganda,” *History Today*, August 1999,

<http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm?outfit=pmt&folder=715&paper=1072>.

¹⁷⁰ Mark Kilbane, “Military Psychological Operations as Public Diplomacy,” in *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, ed. Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor (London, New York [etc.]: Routledge, 2009), 188.

¹⁷¹ John Brown, “Propaganda, Public Diplomacy and the Smith-Mundt Act,” *Huffington Post. The Blog*, May 26, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-brown/propaganda-public-diplomacy_b_1547214.html.

¹⁷² Zaharna, “Mapping out a Spectrum of Public Diplomacy Initiatives. Information and Relational Communication Framework.,” 89–90.

¹⁷³ Snow, “Rethinking Public Diplomacy,” 21.

¹⁷⁴ Berridge, *Diplomacy*, 17.

¹⁷⁵ Richard Holbrooke, “Get the Message out,” *Washington Post*, October 28, 2001.

¹⁷⁶ Mark Blitz, “Public Diplomacy, Propaganda, Rhetoric,” in *The Public Diplomacy Reader*, ed. J. Michael Waller (Washington, D.C.: Institute of World Politics Press, 2007), 334.

regimes and is often about absolute control or the evocation of hostility.¹⁷⁷ Public diplomacy does not convey false information; something certain forms of propaganda (especially so-called black propaganda) are likely to do¹⁷⁸ – a feature Joseph Nye considers counterproductive for public diplomacy.¹⁷⁹ Instead, '[d]emocratic politics is all about convincing others to see things as you do, so that they will support your goals.'¹⁸⁰ Therefore, public diplomacy incorporates persuasive and manipulative elements, as the foregoing literature review has shown. One also needs to concede that the line between public diplomacy and white propaganda is in practice admittedly a little blurred. Despite its manipulative tendencies, however, it is supposed to be (at least to a certain extent) a two-way information flow, leaving room for the audience's autonomous and critical reflection.

Moreover, 'actions speak louder than words – and public diplomacy that appears to be mere window dressing for the projection of power is unlikely to succeed.'¹⁸¹ This means that actual politics remain paramount and a disagreement with the latter can hardly be countered with public diplomacy. Also, it would be presumptuous for public diplomacy to claim to be able to change long-term realities. A state's image has developed and been shaped for centuries, 'the strength of a country's image emerges from its cultural, political and economic plurality.'¹⁸² Transforming such a thing is thus tremendously challenging.

Reality just has to indeed somehow correspond to the expectations raised or build on pre-existing convictions. If new facts challenge long-held opinions, they are likely to be dismissed by the audience. And changing a negative image is even more difficult than turning a positive into a negative one because it is said to be more persistent.¹⁸³ Thus, providing additional factual information – it is often argued that if only more of that was available to the public, they would understand better – seems rather candid.¹⁸⁴ Other scholars support this stance and remark that

¹⁷⁷ Melissen, "The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice," 19.

¹⁷⁸ Kilbane, "Military Psychological Operations as Public Diplomacy," 188.

¹⁷⁹ Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, 107.

¹⁸⁰ Entman, *Projections of Power*, 147.

¹⁸¹ Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, 110.

¹⁸² Shaun Riordan, "Dialogue-Based Public Diplomacy: A New Foreign Policy Paradigm?," in *The New Public Diplomacy. Soft Power in International Relations*, ed. Jan Melissen (London, New York [etc.]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 9.

¹⁸³ Eva Sand, "Das Image Deutschlands im Vereinigten Königreich vor, während und unmittelbar nach der FIFA Fußball - Weltmeisterschaft 2006" (Diploma thesis, Fachhochschule Worms, 2007), 23.

¹⁸⁴ Entman, "Theorizing Mediated Public Diplomacy: The U.S. Case," 88–89.

public diplomacy's intervening variables are 'imagined realities and real images'¹⁸⁵ as well as 'simplification and foe images',¹⁸⁶ underlining how public diplomacy can also rely on constructed ideas.

2.3.1.2 PSYOP

The second term often appearing in relation to public diplomacy is Psychological Operations (PSYOP or psy-ops).¹⁸⁷ According to the U.S. military, PSYOP are 'planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behaviour of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.'¹⁸⁸ In short, PSYOP is an (often covertly conducted) communications strategy targeting the public and combatants in an area of military operations abroad to shape their behaviour, employing 'a nonlethal capability across the range of military operations from peace through conflict to war and during postconflict operations.'¹⁸⁹ Lt. Colonel Michael Holmes, deployed in Afghanistan, reasons that '[his] job in psy-ops is to play with people's heads,'¹⁹⁰ regulated by United States law.¹⁹¹

Public diplomacy, however, has civilian purposes and is not used within the scope of military conflicts, an aspect that marks the essential difference between both concepts.¹⁹² In addition, public diplomacy does not only aim at influencing but also at educating through exchange programmes for example, an endeavour that PSYOP is not concerned with. Public diplomacy also targets the regular population, whereas PSYOP exclusively focuses on a specific group of

¹⁸⁵ Carola Richter, "Has Public Diplomacy Failed? The U.S. Media Strategy towards the Middle East and the Regional Perception of U.S. Foreign Policy," in *Great Powers and Regional Orders: The United States and the Persian Gulf*, ed. Markus Kaim (London: Ashgate Publishing, 2008), 113.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 114.

¹⁸⁷ PSYOP has now been officially changed to MISO (military information operations) for the denomination sounded questionable. See: Rachel Greenspan, "Public Diplomacy in Uniform. The Role of the U.S. Department of Defense in Supporting Modern Day Public Diplomacy," March 11, 2011, http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2011/0104/comm/greenspan_pduniform.html.

¹⁸⁸ Department of the Army United States of America et al., *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*, Joint Publications, September 5, 2003, <http://www.iwar.org.uk/psyops/resources/doctrine/psyop-jp-3-53.pdf>.

¹⁸⁹ "Psychological Operations" (U.S. Department of the Army, April 2005), 1-2, <http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-05-30.pdf>.

¹⁹⁰ Michael Hastings, "Another Runaway General: Army Deploys Psy-Ops on U.S. Senators," *Rolling Stone*, February 23, 2011, <http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/another-runaway-general-army-deploys-psy-ops-on-u-s-senators-20110223>.

¹⁹¹ "Psychological Operations," 1-7; Matt Armstrong, "Mind Games," *Foreign Policy*, March 1, 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/28/mind_games?page=0,1.

¹⁹² Kilbane, "Military Psychological Operations as Public Diplomacy," 18.

individuals.¹⁹³ Joseph Nye points out that public diplomacy, on the other hand, is not necessarily a zero sum game with competing information, it entails in theory the possibility of gains for both sides, as in the promotion of human rights.¹⁹⁴

Still, this aspect underscores that the terminology used [...] can be misleading to some scholars and practitioners of public diplomacy who view what we [public diplomats] do almost in messianic terms [...], [the wording] is often used in conjunction with more forceful and threatening forms of compliance and persuasion.¹⁹⁵ The fact that public diplomacy is featured in the Department of Defense's (DOD) dictionary of military terms, as mentioned above, beautifully illustrates this instance.¹⁹⁶ Also, it cannot only be wielded by those perceived as *forces for good* in world politics but is at everyone's disposal, including terrorist network Al-Qaida's, David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla observe.¹⁹⁷ J. Michael Waller states that public diplomacy's objective is to shape 'the opinions and attitudes of foreign publics and decision-makers, with the goal of influencing their policies and actions. The goal of strategic communication, in other words, is strategic influence.'¹⁹⁸ Therefore, it is indispensable to point out that public diplomacy is grounded on a very realist understanding of international relations, a school of thought perceiving the world as an anarchic battlefield where sovereign states – the main actors – need to compete for security and power to essentially help themselves to guarantee their own survival.¹⁹⁹ In this logic, it makes perfect sense to consider public diplomacy's goal 'to serve a country's national interest and to result in an increase of influence, understanding and more support for their views,'²⁰⁰ ultimately enhancing power and / or security. Following this argumentation,

¹⁹³ Greenspan, "Public Diplomacy in Uniform. The Role of the U.S. Department of Defense in Supporting Modern Day Public Diplomacy."

¹⁹⁴ Joseph S. Nye, "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power," in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 616 (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2008), 106–107.

¹⁹⁵ Snow, "Rethinking Public Diplomacy," 3.

¹⁹⁶ "Public Diplomacy."

¹⁹⁷ David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla, "Noopolitik. A New Paradigm for Public Diplomacy," in *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, ed. Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor (London, New York [etc.]: Routledge, 2009), 364.

¹⁹⁸ J. Michael Waller, "Getting Serious About Strategic Influence," *The Journal of International Security Affairs* Fall 2009, no. 17 (2009), <http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2009/17/waller.php>.

¹⁹⁹ Enrico Fels, Andrej Pustovitovskij, and Jan-Frederik Kremer, "Towards a New Understanding of Structural Power: 'Structure Is What States Make of It,'" in *Power in the 21st Century: International Security and International Political Economy in a Changing World*, ed. Enrico Fels, Jan-Frederik Kremer, and Katharina Kronenberg (Heidelberg: Springer, 2012), 60–61; Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, "Realism," in *The Globalization of World Politics*, ed. Steve Smith and John Baylis, 3rd ed. (Oxford, New York [etc.]: Oxford University Press, 2005), 165; 172–177.

²⁰⁰ Melissen and Gonesh, *Public Diplomacy: Improving Practice*, 5.

Anthony Pratkanis adapts public diplomacy to international conflicts and includes the writings of military strategists Carl von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu into public diplomacy theory building.²⁰¹

As already mentioned above, this dissertation's case study will also evolve around a conflict situation. While realist ideas have certainly influenced public diplomacy and underscore its power political tendencies, it seems relevant to point out that pure realism would consider public diplomacy, as understood in academia, a rather pointless endeavour since the states' interests are exogenously given anyway and could thus be hardly swayed by its public. Still, this theory has affected public diplomacy only to certain extent and is just one influence among many, as the next chapters will show.

2.3.1.3 Branding

The next notion worth mentioning is branding – either of a place or nation – depending on its focus. Branding is derived from product marketing and initially designates ‘[...] a disciplined process used to build awareness and extend customer loyalty. It requires a mandate from the top and a readiness to invest in the future. Branding is about seizing every opportunity to express why people should choose one brand over another. Desires to lead, to outpace the competition, and to give employees the best tools to reach customers are the reasons why companies leverage branding.’²⁰² An example would be the so-called country-of-origin-effect Peter von Ham points out and gives the example of Japanese electronics and German cars whose provenience acts as a quality feature.²⁰³ Others liken their political endeavour to marketing: ‘What are we doing?’ We’re selling a product. That product we are selling is democracy,’²⁰⁴ retired Secretary of State Colin Powell said.

Adapted to a geographic entity, Simon Anholt, credited as the architect of branding, defines it as a ‘legitimate self defence against public opinion’s trivialising tendencies,’²⁰⁵ meaning a simplistic or simplifying description of a country. The necessity for states to dispose of a brand image is, according to Anholt, a consequence of globalisation: Countries increasingly have to compete for

²⁰¹ Pratkanis, “Public Diplomacy in International Conflicts. A Social Influence Analysis,” 125.

²⁰² Alina Wheeler, *Designing Brand Identity*, 3rd ed. (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2009), 6.

²⁰³ van Ham, “Place Branding: The State of the Art,” 129.

²⁰⁴ “Brand U.S.A.,” *Foreign Policy*, November 1, 2001, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2001/11/01/brand_usa.

²⁰⁵ Simon Anholt, “Marke Rechtschaffenheit. Deutschlands ‘Brand Image’ und seine Trümpfe für eine erfolgreiche Vermarktung,” *Kulturaustausch online*, 2005, <http://cms.ifa.de/publikationen/zeitschrift-fuer-kulturaustausch/archiv/ausgaben-2005/deutschland-von-auen/anholt/>; own translation from German to English.

the trust of customers, qualified migrants to enhance the labour force, media, investors and tourists.²⁰⁶ Thus, branding resembles the positioning of a commercial product on the market²⁰⁷ but, in contrast to a conventional consumer good, heavily relies on its citizens' support and compliance.²⁰⁸ Marketing for a place proves rather complex: 'Branding [...] is not only about "selling" products, services and ideas, it is not only about gaining market share and attention, it is also about managing identity, loyalty and image.'²⁰⁹ This attitude is gaining traction: For example, former communist states resorted to branding strategies to redefine themselves after 1989 with the help of professionalised agencies such as *Interbrand*.²¹⁰ Also, branding has an internal (making citizens feel good about themselves) and an external aspect (attract tourists and investors).²¹¹ This internal aspect is really not public diplomacy's concern.

Let us now turn to two practical schemes: First, within the framework of their *Markenmanifest Deutschland*²¹² the management consultancy Accenture has developed an interesting brand matrix in cooperation with its partners that follows below.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Sand, "Das Image Deutschlands im Vereinigten Königreich vor, während und unmittelbar nach der FIFA Fußball - Weltmeisterschaft 2006," 25.

²⁰⁸ Peter van Ham, "Branding Territory: Inside the Wonderful Worlds of PR and IR Theory," *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 31, no. 2 (March 1, 2002): 267.

²⁰⁹ Ibid., 255.

²¹⁰ Szondi, "Central and Eastern European Public Diplomacy. A Transitional Perspective on National Reputation Management," 300–301; "Interbrand Corporation | Global Branding Consultancy," 2010, <http://www.interbrand.com/de/Default.aspx>.

²¹¹ van Ham, "Place Branding: The State of the Art," 131.

²¹² Author's translation: Brand Manifest Germany




Figure 2-5: Brand Matrix (Accenture)²¹³

The research group took Wolff Olins' brand matrix, originally developed for companies and adapted them to nation branding. The four categories position, behaviour, competence and culture are supposed to form the core idea of the brand Germany. It links a country's culture to competences, positions and behaviour and resembles a consulting firm's catchy pitch to sell an idea / product rather than a foreign policy instrument.

Simon Anholt had developed a similar model. The following six aspects show the dimensions of the brand image, underlining its multi-faceted approach:




Figure 2-6: Nation Brand Hexagon (S. Anholt)²¹⁴

²¹³ Author's presentation and translation; Ulf Henning, Jörg Ihlau, and Claudius König, "Markenmanifest für Deutschland. DEbatte - Die Zukunft der Marke Deutschland" (Accenture, ECC Kohtes Klewes, Wolff Olins, June 2002), 13.

This matrix names all the factors that contribute to the nation brand but is again not very precise. It clearly brings politics in through the governance factor but seems more fitting to a marketing campaign than to provide an instrument for the complexities of international relations.

Nation branding and public diplomacy overlap since they both have long-term objectives and aim at creating or sustaining a positive image of the home country. Both address a wide range of domains, from tourism to governance. However, nation branding seems to be and often is implemented as some form of marketing even though Simon Anholt contests this view, pointing out that the concept is not about branding a place but about admitting that a place might dispose of a certain brand image.²¹⁵ He also considers nation branding essentially concerned with the projection of identity,²¹⁶ which is only partly relevant to public diplomacy. The cultivation of prestige is just one item on a whole list of duties.²¹⁷ Also, in contrast to nation branding, public diplomacy clearly has a predominantly political dimension and is conducted by actors mostly affiliated with the government.²¹⁸ Relationship building and interaction count also amongst public diplomacy's central features but are barely addressed by branding.²¹⁹

The concept of branding itself is also not indisputable: Chris Powell, director of Britain's second biggest agency BMP DDP, argues that it is impossible to brand countries like canned soup because neither the product nor worldwide perceptions are susceptible to such manipulation. A telling example is the campaign through which the Blair government tried in the 1990s to brand the UK as *Cool Britannia*, also referred to as the 'Waterworld of nation branding efforts.'²²⁰ The image contrasted extremely with Britain's perception as a traditional nation; the campaign did

²¹⁴ Anholt (2005) Nation Brands Index: NBI Q3 Report 2005, as quoted in: Sand, "Das Image Deutschlands im Vereinigten Königreich vor, während und unmittelbar nach der FIFA Fußball - Weltmeisterschaft 2006," 25; author's presentation.

²¹⁵ Simon Anholt, "Place Branding: Is It Marketing, or Isn't It?," *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* 4, no. 1 (February 2008): 2.

²¹⁶ Anholt, "Marke Rechtschaffenheit. Deutschlands 'Brand Image' und seine Trümpfe für eine erfolgreiche Vermarktung."

²¹⁷ Melissen, "The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice," 21.

²¹⁸ Anna Schwan, "Der Standort als Marke," *Politik & Kommunikation*, no. 2007-06 (June 2007): 46.

²¹⁹ Alejo, "The Limits of Country Branding," *Global Public Diplomacy*, June 21, 2012,

<http://globaldiplomats.blogspot.de/2012/06/limits-of-country-branding.html>.

²²⁰ Refers to unsuccessful Hollywood movie titled "Waterworld" starring Kevin Costner; Laura McGinnis, "Dual Britannia," *manIC: The Extremes of International Communication: Public, Cultural and Traditional Diplomacy -- in Blog Form.*, May 4, 2011, <http://manic-lm.blogspot.com/2011/05/dual-britannia.html>.

not succeed and nation branding remains contested; 'it is [...] important to remember that there are "givens" in how we are seen abroad,'²²¹ Leonard et al. point out and suggest that this aspect was regrettably neglected, contributing that way to its own demise. Jan Melissen even argues that branding has nowadays become slightly dated in the Western world.²²²

2.3.1.4 Public Relations / Public Affairs

The fourth notion to be discussed is public relations (PR), meaning 'influencing the public so that they regard an individual, firm, charity, etc., in a favourable light in comparison to their competitors.'²²³ This, at first sight, seems quite similar to public diplomacy. Anthony Pratkanis argues that alongside advertising, public relations 'was one of the principal and popular models for achieving public diplomacy goals and objectives,'²²⁴ a point Nancy Snow agrees with²²⁵ but makes the concession that PR is, in contrast to public diplomacy, more of a technique than a strategy.²²⁶ Ostrowski shows Albert Oehl's public relations model and suggests public diplomacy might be PR's foreign policy form.²²⁷

There exist certainly similitude between public relations and public diplomacy, but PR has different addressees and is used for different goals. It aims at relationship building of a different sort: binding costumers to a product or a company does not compare to making citizens appreciate and respect other nations. 'Conveying information and selling a positive image is part of it, but public diplomacy also involves building long-term relationships that create an enabling environment for government politics.'²²⁸ Public diplomacy thus also incorporates elements of PR but is much more than that.

The difference from public affairs is rather obvious: Contrary to the latter, which addresses its domestic audiences, public diplomacy is targeted at foreign publics, a fact their main difference

²²¹ Leonard, Stead, and Smewing, *Public Diplomacy*, 17.

²²² Melissen, "Public Diplomacy," 200.

²²³ Jonathan Law, ed., "Public Relations (noun)," *Oxford Reference Online* (Oxford, New York [etc.]: Oxford University Press. Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 2009), <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t18.e5185>.

²²⁴ Pratkanis, "Public Diplomacy in International Conflicts. A Social Influence Analysis," 114.

²²⁵ Snow, "Rethinking Public Diplomacy," 9.

²²⁶ Pratkanis, "Public Diplomacy in International Conflicts. A Social Influence Analysis," 118.

²²⁷ Ostrowski, *Die Public Diplomacy der deutschen Auslandsvertretungen weltweit*, 46.

²²⁸ Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, 107.

consists in.²²⁹ Similar to public diplomacy, public affairs is about sharing information, but lacks the relationship building component, essential to public diplomacy.²³⁰ Also, the latter is by definition strategic, public affairs not necessarily.²³¹

2.3.1.5 Cultural Diplomacy

Sixth, one should take a closer look at cultural diplomacy. According to the Institute for Cultural Diplomacy ‘... cultural diplomacy persuades through culture [including, for example, arts or sports], value, and ideas.’²³² This comprises, amongst others, lectures, movie screenings or the promotion of a writer from the home country. Cultural diplomacy ‘[...] entails many aspects such as art, the media, externally oriented cultural policies and tourism [...]. [It is...] a means to present the country [...] to promote ideas and to encourage a dialogue, and it is a long-term process.’²³³

Directed at foreign publics, cultural diplomacy traditionally represents the non-governmental voice in IR. However, the actors conducting it (with regards to Germany, for instance, the Goethe Institute is the main organisation) are primarily financed by the state.²³⁴ Besides, public diplomacy gets increasingly involved with the cultural sector; governments often fund the cultural institutes in charge, or work in cooperation with them. Since ‘[...] postmodern publics are generally sceptical of authorities and governments are often mistrusted,’²³⁵ it may seem wise for governments to outsource their campaigns to other organisations. Therefore, in addition to the government, represented by its embassies and consulates, public diplomacy traditionally involves for example cultural institutes, NGOs, the media and individuals.²³⁶ This development induces a merger of the two concepts which both emphasize dialogue.²³⁷ Thus, certain scholars such as Jan

²²⁹ Melissen and Gonesh, *Public Diplomacy: Improving Practice*, 6.

²³⁰ Ken S. Heller and Liza M. Persson, “The Distinction between Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy,” in *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, ed. Philip M. Taylor and Nancy Snow (London, New York [etc.]: Routledge, 2009), 226.

²³¹ *Ibid.*, 228.

²³² *Ibid.*

²³³ Martina Topic and Cassandra Sciortino, “Cultural Diplomacy and Cultural Hegemony: A Framework for the Analysis,” in *Cultural Diplomacy and Cultural Imperialism: European Perspective(s)*, ed. Martina Topic and Sinisa Rodin (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2012), 34.

²³⁴ Goethe Institute, “14.12.2006: Trendwende muss weitergeführt werden,” December 14, 2006, <http://www.goethe.de/prs/prm/a06/de1939825.htm>.

²³⁵ Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” 105.

²³⁶ Melissen, “The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice,” 12.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, 23.

Melissen²³⁸ consider cultural diplomacy a part of public diplomacy, a stance this paper will embrace.

The following example shows how cultural institutions can play a paramount role in international relations: German chancellor Gerhard Schröder's refusal to send German troops to Iraq without the UN Security Council's approval put a strain on U.S.-German relations.²³⁹ During this so-called *ice age*, representatives of both countries as well as private stakeholders would meet at the American Academy in Berlin, a cultural institution that tries to foster understanding between the two nations, instead of the local embassy. Gary Smith, its executive director, was even called the unofficial American ambassador for that reason. When official channels are inaccessible for some reasons, the unofficial ones can thus create a considerable balance.²⁴⁰

Actually, public diplomacy is in theory a neutral concept.²⁴¹ Anyhow, it is about strategic influence and a storybook tool of power, as already mentioned above. Governments try in a certain way to exploit their audience by trying to influence them, which is, at least from a moral point of view, rather questionable. Also, it will become clear later on that especially public diplomacy's digital variant comes with potentially borderline consequences for the audience. So, to which extent is it justifiable to exploit culture, amongst other elements, for political aims? Retired German Minister of Foreign Affairs Guido Westerwelle stated that 'art and culture solely in the service of power are not art and culture but propaganda.'²⁴² Yu Changjiang argues that this is a rhetorical question, which the combining of the two non-related notions of culture and diplomacy in one term already points to – an argument that seems fair.²⁴³ Snow and Taylor see the critical aspect in the contradiction in, on the one hand, considering other cultures as equal while, on the other

²³⁸ Ibid., 21–23.

²³⁹ "Bush und Schröder: Stationen der „Eiszeit“," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, September 24, 2003, sec. Politik, <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/bush-und-schroeder-stationen-der-eiszeit-1112383.html>.

²⁴⁰ A member of staff of an American cultural institution, Interview.

²⁴¹ Richard Nelson and Foad Izadi, "Ethics and Social Issues in Public Diplomacy," in *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, ed. Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor (London, New York [etc.]: Routledge, 2009), 337.

²⁴² Guido Westerwelle, "New Directions in Cultural Policy," *Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen (ifa) – Kulturen verbinden*, accessed March 11, 2013, http://www.ifa.de/no_cache/en/info/news-press-review/magazin/article/14020/.

²⁴³ Yu Changjiang, "Kulturaustausch zwischen Deutschland und China," *Deutsch-Chinesisches Kulturnetz*, November 2012, <http://www.de-cn.net/dis/cult/de10091187.htm>.

hand, pushing *Western values* on the underlying presumption that these should be the universal ones.²⁴⁴

In this context, one has to address the allegation of *cultural imperialism* ‘the increasing influence or domination in one country of the culture of another.’²⁴⁵ Indeed, Tanner Mirrless underscores public diplomacy’s realist grounding²⁴⁶ and opines that ‘[...] American soft power [...] is an apologia of U.S. cultural imperialism.’²⁴⁷ Richard Nelson and Foad Izadi support this argument, stating that American public diplomacy promotes a Manichean *us versus them* worldview, suggesting American moral superiority and an accompanying idea of *mission civilisatrice*,²⁴⁸ a view Nancy Snow agrees with.²⁴⁹ Peter van Ham suspects the desire for economic hegemony to have a stake in branding.²⁵⁰

The writer Mario Vargas Llosa subtends especially with regards to the United States that ‘the fear of Americanization of the planet is more ideological paranoia than reality [...]. The vanishing of borders and an increasingly interdependent world have created incentives for new generations to learn and assimilate to other cultures, not merely as a hobby but also out of necessity, since the ability to speak several languages and navigate comfortably in different cultures has become crucial for professional success.’²⁵¹ He further argues that rather than erasing local cultures, globalisation provides them with more freedom to re-emerge.²⁵² John Tomlinson is similarly critical stating that cultural imperialism should rather be understood as a discourse, recognising diversity and complexity. He considers the very debate of this matter largely flawed since the elements it sets forth to exterminate are very much alive which is proven by the fact that most of the writings on the topics originate in the so-called *West*. He furthermore considers the

²⁴⁴ Snow and Taylor, *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, ix.

²⁴⁵ Katherine Barber, “Cultural Imperialism (noun),” *The Canadian Oxford Dictionary*, Oxford Reference Online (Oxford, New York [etc.]: Oxford University Press, 2004), <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t150.e16905>.

²⁴⁶ Tanner Mirrless, “American Soft Power, or American Cultural Imperialism?,” in *The New Imperialists: Ideologies of Empire*, ed. Colin Mooers (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2006), 211.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 206.

²⁴⁸ Nelson and Izadi, “Ethics and Social Issues in Public Diplomacy,” 339; Matthew Fraser, *Weapons of Mass Distraction: Soft Power and American Empire* (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2003), 260.

²⁴⁹ Nancy Snow, *Propaganda, Inc.: Selling America’s Culture to the World*, 2nd ed. (New York: Seven Stories, 2002), 29.

²⁵⁰ van Ham, “Branding Territory,” 264.

²⁵¹ Mario Vargas Llosa, “The Culture of Liberty,” *Foreign Policy*, no. January / February (January 1, 2001), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2001/01/01/the_culture_of_liberty.

²⁵² *Ibid.*

assumption of a cultural totality within a society as highly problematic since many choices such as the preference for a TV show over the other lies in the cultural background of the family environment. Also, it stipulates that a culture belongs to a territory and is immune to change, which does contradict the very nature of culture as being human-made. It therefore denies the possibility of hybrid cultures and people's role in its creation.²⁵³ Furthermore, public diplomacy goes beyond the goal of imposing a different culture; its ultimate object being foreign policy-related.

These phrases highlight another point of criticism that public diplomacy should take into account: Its state-centrism. In line with its origin in (realist) international relations theory, public diplomacy heavily thinks in terms of national borders, for example by defining the audience by the borders of the state they live in, which underscores the nation state's centrality to this concept. It thus cannot avoid ignoring local particularities and cultural diversities within a state's population, equating nation as well as culture with state, which is not necessarily the case. It does not seem to take diversity within a country into account by considering the foreign public as a homogenous group, which does not necessarily correspond to reality.

Anyway, presenting one culture to another is necessarily about emphasized difference; otherwise, there would be no need to introduce one culture to another. If, however, one nation is more powerful than the other in terms of military, economic or soft power (to be explained in chapter 2.4), which leads to the latter having more difficulties to speak up or contradict, structural asymmetries arise and the political power structure becomes visible. Since Germany and the UK are both European middle powers, this scenario may not apply to this relationship. It presents itself a little different in relation to the superpower USA – to this we shall return. Mentioning this aspect is indispensable in order to point out that the notion of public diplomacy is ethically not totally unobjectionable.

But why should one consider moral aspects at all? Most theories of international relations are not concerned with ethics in their field of study (it suffices to take a look at the realist understanding of world politics mentioned above).²⁵⁴ Mervyn Frost, however, refutes this stance,

²⁵³ John Tomlinson, *Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction* (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 1991), 7–30.

²⁵⁴ See for example: Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).

arguing that normative questions are central to the discipline and that ethical competence counts amongst the crucial and mandatory skills for all actors aiming at effectively operating in world politics.²⁵⁵ Nelson and Izadi opine similarly, pointing out that ‘adopting the ethical standards of commitment to truth, two-way symmetrical public diplomacy, and values-based leadership is vital to an effective public diplomacy strategy.’²⁵⁶ For that reason, the case study in chapter 5 will further explore to what extent these aspects are addressed.

2.3.1.6 Guerrilla Diplomacy

The last notion to be presented is guerrilla diplomacy. Daryl Copeland whose widely discussed monograph bearing the same name coined this recent concept aims at rethinking international relations as the title suggest. His book can thus essentially be read as a plea for a new kind of diplomacy:

The guerrilla diplomat’s ears will always be to the ground and his or her eyes on the horizon – but the success of any endeavor will turn especially on the collection of strategic intelligence, the development of alternative networks, and the production of demonstrable results. It may involve relying on technology and especially the new media as a force multiplier; on taking a less formal approach to representation; and, probably most importantly, on thinking outside the box and innovating relentlessly.²⁵⁷

Even though certain parts of the book read more like a spy drama TV show than a theoretical concept, it offers some interesting thoughts on the subject: Guerrilla diplomacy, Copeland argues, is a more unconventional form of public diplomacy, combining the discipline’s classical tools with ‘some of the classical qualities of guerrilla warfare: agility, adaptability, improvisation, self-sufficiency, and popular support.’²⁵⁸ Copeland considers these diplomats the ‘crucial link between and embodiment of [the much vaunted] thinking globally and acting locally.’²⁵⁹ The comments by other scholars such as Nicholas J. Cull or R.S. Zaharna printed on the book’s back cover illustrate

²⁵⁵ Mervyn Frost, “Ethical Competence in International Relations,” *Ethics and International Affairs Journal* 23, no. 2 (2009), http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/journal/23_2/essays/001; Mervyn Frost, *Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 2.

²⁵⁶ Nelson and Izadi, “Ethics and Social Issues in Public Diplomacy,” 343.

²⁵⁷ Daryl Copeland, *Guerrilla Diplomacy: Rethinking International Relations* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), 207.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 206–207.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 209.

that it has entered and shaped the academic debate. The book was included into this dissertation for it shows the changing nature of public diplomacy and the effort to conceptually adapt it to new developments.

To conclude this section, one may say that all these concepts mentioned above overlap to a certain extent with public diplomacy. In practice, they might not differ that much from it, especially since public diplomacy incorporates facets of all of them. Thus, after having explained the notions related to public diplomacy, the next paragraphs will now synthesise the essence of the concept and carve out a working definition that will underlie this dissertation.

2.3.2 Addressees

Robert Entman suggests employing public diplomacy rather as a tool to shape elite action and opinion than being concerned with the broad public. The reasons for this attitude are studies that discovered that public opinion might move the elites that ultimately take the decisions and sometimes even hold sway.²⁶⁰ Moreover, the domains public diplomacy really operates in – cultural offerings, newspapers, publications and language studies – appeal predominantly to certain social classes.

Katz' and Lazarsfeld's research supports this stance: They uncovered that personal influence was the most powerful factor determining how people made up their minds. These opinion leaders – wielding this personal influence – were in turn much more exposed to media that were more relevant to the area of their leadership.²⁶¹ The media may, in short, 'stimulate the elite to actions which affect the masses and incidentally re-stimulate to affect that way both the media and channels of interpersonal influence.'²⁶²

These ideas have been taken up by several scholars²⁶³ since influence is a highly complex matter and at the same time crucial not only for advertisers. Research has indeed convincingly shown

²⁶⁰ Entman, "Theorizing Mediated Public Diplomacy: The U.S. Case," 82.

²⁶¹ Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "Between Media and Mass / the Part Played by People / the Two-Step Flow of Communication," in *Approaches to Media: A Reader*, ed. Chris Newbold and Oliver Boyd-Barrett (London: Arnold, 1995), 127–131.

²⁶² Joseph T. Klapper, "The Effects of Mass Communication," in *Approaches to Media: A Reader*, ed. Chris Newbold and Oliver Boyd-Barrett (London: Arnold, 1995), 139.

²⁶³ Philip Sheldrake, "The Complexity of Influence Is a Challenge – and an Opportunity," *The Guardian*, February 15, 2012, sec. Media network, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/media-network/media-network-blog/2012/feb/15/complexity->

that in general, a handful of well-connected individuals dispose of a higher number of connections than the average and has more friends than most people.²⁶⁴ Also, people are mostly influenced by the 150 people near them²⁶⁵ that is the so-called Dunbar-Number, the average maximum of social connections a human can form.²⁶⁶ Still, Duncan Watts found out through several experiments that trends were picked up randomly and that the people who started them, the influencers, became such accidentally, making the whole process tremendously unpredictable: '[T]he social network is liable to throw up almost any result.'²⁶⁷ So, he would argue that there is no such thing as an influencer but only someone who accidentally *sparks the fire*. He therefore recommends targeting the masses since one never knows who will set the trend and spread the idea. Public diplomacy is therefore directed at the broad foreign public, media representatives such as journalists or specific key opinion leaders and the interested public.²⁶⁸

2.3.3 Public Diplomacy Components

Summing up, what does 21st century public diplomacy consist of and which requirements does it have to meet? To answer the first question, let us draw from the literature discussion as well as in particular from Nicholas Cull's model presented above. Public diplomacy is a strategic foreign policy tool supporting traditional diplomatic and military operations. Public diplomacy does not only consist of a one-way broadcasting of information through several news channels, it also aims at taking advantage of an inward information flow that is strategically assessed. This communication activity, carried out by typical broadcasting facilities or the embassy staff can be short-, medium- and long-term oriented, depending on if it is a reaction to a recent crisis or general routine announcements. This can involve persuasion, marketing as well as classical public relation techniques and even propagandistic elements, as mentioned above, as in embellishing or focussing on certain aspects while omitting others.

influence-challenge-opportunity; John Brown, "Live Public Diplomacy," *John Brown's Public Diplomacy Press and Blog Review, Version 2.0*, June 1, 2011, <http://johnbrownnotesandessays.blogspot.com/2011/06/live-diplomacy.html>.

²⁶⁴ J. P., "Why Are Your Friends More Popular than You?," *The Economist Explains. Questions Answered Daily*, April 22, 2013, <http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/04/economist-explains-why-friends-more-popular-paradox>.

²⁶⁵ Philip Sheldrake, "The Business of Influence," April 2, 2012, 8, <http://www.philipsheldrake.com/>.

²⁶⁶ Clive Thompson, "Brave New World of Digital Intimacy," *The New York Times*, September 7, 2008, sec. Magazine, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/magazine/07awareness-t.html>.

²⁶⁷ Clive Thompson, "Is the Tipping Point Toast?," *Fast Company*, February 1, 2008, 4, <http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/122/is-the-tipping-point-toast.html?page=0%2C0>.

²⁶⁸ Ostrowski, *Die Public Diplomacy der deutschen Auslandsvertretungen weltweit*, 31.

Moreover, cultural diplomacy that aims at creating familiarity with the emitter's culture is an additional corner stone. Exchange programs with all sorts of social groups, be it pupils, professionals or decision makers further broaden the spectrum. They consist in the classical instruments of relationship building. A meaningful example would be Think German²⁶⁹, a web portal destined to inform about events related to Germany and promote the learning of the German language. These measures are implemented in the long-term and involve cultural institutions. Also, they are targeted at key individuals and so-called multipliers such as teachers through a special exchange programme, but also the broad public through a series of foreign movies at the local cinema. The information flow is again in- and outward. Networking is an additional aspect relevant for that matter and aspires to link parties interested in and important to public diplomacy (e.g. diplomats with the minister for education or the local newspaper director) as well as different public diplomacy actors (diplomats, members of the local institute or other organisations) with each other, and is thus targeted at distinguished key individuals. Media relations are a crucial element to public diplomacy. It consists for example in strategically addressing certain issues, agenda-setting in local media or in giving targeted interviews. They aim at reaching the broad public.²⁷⁰

This underscores how present-day public diplomacy is as bottom-up as it is top-down, thus reaching not only so-called decision makers but also giving diplomats the opportunity to get in touch with ordinary people, which underscores the centrality of dialogue. Since in today's communication environment, the target groups' overwhelming majority disposes of easy access to information and is pretty well connected, public diplomacy is better off sticking to the truth in relative terms, taking into account peoples' pre-existing conceptions.

These are thus the elements the dissertation will need to focus on with regards to PD 2.0 to further investigate its nature.

²⁶⁹ "Are You a Wunderkind? - Think German," 2011, <http://www.thinkgerman.org.uk/home>.

²⁷⁰ Ostrowski, *Die Public Diplomacy der deutschen Auslandsvertretungen weltweit*, 39–40.

2.3.4 Working Definition

As repeatedly mentioned and discussed throughout this thesis, there is no universal definition for public diplomacy. To clarify, it seems useful to attempt a new synthesised definition of public diplomacy that this dissertation will be based on:

Public Diplomacy is the totality of overtly conducted measures directed at foreign publics orchestrated by, in cooperation with or (at least partly) financed by governmental actors involved in foreign policy. They convey an intended message while aiming at informing the target groups as well as engaging them with the foreign country in question, thus also getting a sense of their opinions. The goal is to further the emitting state's national interest by indirectly swaying a foreign government's policy through influence on its public and / or fostering positive attitudes towards the emitting country. The public diplomat's toolbox in this respect is tremendously varied ranging from marketing and persuasion to relationship building and cultural policy, including elements of one and two-way broadcasting.

After having set the limits to public diplomacy, narrowing it down to what it is and what it is not, the question arises where to situate public diplomacy in international relations theory. The next part will therefore present the theories or rather theoretical concepts considered as a crucial background. However, it is important to point out that this is only complementary grounding since all of those theories entail different purposes and premises that cannot simply be combined. The ideas presented in the next chapter should thus be considered having influenced public diplomacy theory independently from each other.

While public diplomacy's realist body of thought has already been hinted at, the next part will abstain from addressing it in its isolated form again for matters of redundancy, not least so as to avoid theoretical confusion. Thus, the following paragraphs will present liberal international relations theory as well as the soft power discourse.

2.4 Public Diplomacy in International Relations Theory

2.4.1 Liberal International Relations Theory (A. Moravcsik)

Why should publics and their opinion matter at all in world politics? Researchers such as Daniel Ostrowski, Henrike Viehrig and Jens Tescher argue that Andrew Moravcsik's theory of liberal

intergovernmentalism provides an additional interesting hub for public diplomacy theory building.²⁷¹ The latter states that:

Liberal IR theory elaborates the insight that state-society relations – the relationship of states to the domestic and transnational social context in which they are embedded – have a fundamental impact on state behavior in world politics. Societal ideas, interests, and institutions influence state behavior by shaping state preferences, that is, the fundamental social purposes underlying the strategic calculations of governments. For liberals, the configuration of state preferences matters most in world politics – not, as realists argue, the configuration of capabilities and not, as institutionalists (that is, functional regime theorists) maintain, the configuration of information and institutions.²⁷²

Ideal liberalism²⁷³ considers societal actors (individuals and private groups) the main actors in international politics whose demands are prior to political action and thus relies on a bottom-up approach to international politics. These actors are supposed to be ‘on the average rational and risk-averse and who organize exchange and collective action to promote differentiated interests under constraints imposed by material scarcity, conflicting values, and variations in societal influence.’²⁷⁴ This is what public diplomacy relies on, namely that the foreign public can influence its government’s behaviour.

Moving thus away from realism’s state-centric approach, ‘representative institutions and practices constitute the critical “transmission belt” by which the preferences and social power of individuals and groups are translated into state policy [...]. Government policy is therefore constrained by the underlying identities, interests, and power of individuals and groups (inside

²⁷¹ Ibid., 49–53; Jens Tenschler and Henrike Viehrig, “Politische Kommunikation in internationalen Beziehungen. Zugänge und Perspektiven,” in *Politische Kommunikation in internationalen Beziehungen: Studien zur politischen Kommunikation, Bd.2*, ed. Jens Tenschler and Henrike Viehrig, 2nd ed. (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2009), 9.

²⁷² Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” *International Organisation* 55, no. 4 (1997): 513.

²⁷³ Moravcsik distinguishes two other forms, namely commercial (international economic transactions determine the state’s actions) and republican (forms of representation are the main focus) liberalism.

²⁷⁴ Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” 516.

and outside the state apparatus) who constantly pressure the central decision makers to pursue policies consistent with their preferences.²⁷⁵

Moravcsik considers policy making a constant process of bargaining between the executive and societal interest groups. Both parties' relative power in this respect depends on their respective ability to master four domestic political resources, namely initiative (agenda setting), institutions (influencing of political decision making through institutions), information (access to political and technical information) as well as ideas (provide ideological justification for political action).²⁷⁶ Indeed, public diplomacy acts upon these factors, which is why this previous paragraph is crucial to understand public diplomacy; therefore the latter's theoretical grounding can, as a matter of fact, in part be found in ideational liberalism: Public diplomacy targets foreign publics because it is possible to influence the political agenda in their home country through swaying public opinion and relevant opinion leaders. In addition to that, it provides the host country with specific information on the home country (for example: publications, broadcasting) and aims at influencing the foreign public's values and ideas (through exchanges, meetings with chosen individuals).

2.4.2 Soft Power (J. Nye)

Also, one should mention Joseph Nye's concepts of soft and smart power, counting amongst public diplomacy's theoretical foundations. Even though 'the concept of power [is until today] one of the most troublesome in the field of international relations'²⁷⁷ while an effective definition of it in IR 'remains a matter of controversy,'²⁷⁸ Joseph Nye's attempts at closing this gap seem particularly useful to this analysis.²⁷⁹ He defines power as 'the ability to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes one wants.'²⁸⁰ Public diplomacy is considered '[...] an official policy translating soft power resources into action,'²⁸¹ a point Jan Melissen²⁸² and Joseph Nye²⁸³ agree on.

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

²⁷⁶ Andrew Moravcsik, "Why the European Union Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International Cooperation," Working Paper Series #52 (presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, USA: Center for European Studies, 1994), 4–5.

²⁷⁷ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 13.

²⁷⁸ Kenneth Waltz, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics," in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 333.

²⁷⁹ Enrico Fels, Jan-Frederik Kremer, and Katharina Kronenberg, eds., *Power in the 21st Century: International Security and International Political Economy in a Changing World* (Heidelberg: Springer, 2012), vii.

²⁸⁰ Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, 2.

²⁸¹ Gilboa, "Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy," 61.

Power is understood as a resource and less in relational²⁸⁴ or structural terms.²⁸⁵

Nye coined the understanding of soft power as opposed to hard power, the ‘ability to shape what others want.’²⁸⁶ He argues that attraction can often be more successful than coercion in generating the outcomes one wants.²⁸⁷ ‘It is the ability to entice and attract. And attraction often leads to acquiescence or imitation.’²⁸⁸ Gilboa adds that soft power is implemented through social influence.²⁸⁹ This division of power is not entirely new; already classical realist E. H. Carr defined three categories of international power: military, economic, and power over opinion.²⁹⁰ In the style of Michel Foucault’s interpretation of the concept of power²⁹¹ advocates of public diplomacy reckon that ‘power is becoming less transferable, less coercive and less tangible. Modern trends and changes in political issues are having significant effects on the nature of power and the resources that produce it.’²⁹²

Joseph Nye introduces the term smart power, a combination of soft ‘attractive power’²⁹³ and hard power into a successful strategy.²⁹⁴ It relies on the idea that the U.S. can hardly face major security threats such as international terrorism and even military conflicts like the wars in Iraq or Afghanistan alone with military hard power.²⁹⁵ As Nye observes, ‘the United States cannot bomb Al Qaeda cells in Hamburg, Kuala Lumpur, or Detroit. Success against them depends on close civilian cooperation whether sharing intelligence, coordinating police work across borders, or

²⁸² Melissen and Gonesh, *Public Diplomacy: Improving Practice*.

²⁸³ Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, 31.

²⁸⁴ Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 5th ed. (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr Paul Siebeck, 1972), 28; “Macht bedeutet jede Chance, innerhalb einer sozialen Beziehung den eigenen Willen auch gegen Widerstreben durchzusetzen, gleichviel worauf diese Chance beruht.”

²⁸⁵ Fels, Pustovitovskij, and Kremer, “Towards a New Understanding of Structural Power: ‘Structure Is What States Make of It,’” 61.

²⁸⁶ Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, 7 & 9.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 17.

²⁸⁸ Nye, *The Paradox of American Power*, 9.

²⁸⁹ Gilboa, “Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy.”

²⁹⁰ Edward Hallet Carr, *The Twenty Years Crisis: 1919-1939*, 2nd ed. (London, New York [etc.]: Palgrave Macmillan, 1945), vi.

²⁹¹ Michel Foucault, *Sexualität und Wahrheit: Der Wille zum Wissen*, 18th ed., vol. 1 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1987), 75–76; 93.

²⁹² Nye, “Soft Power,” 166.

²⁹³ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁴ Joseph S. Nye, “Smart Power,” *The Huffington Post*, November 29, 2007, sec. Politics, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-nye/smart-power_b_74725.html.

²⁹⁵ Defense Science Board USA, *Report of the Defense Science Board - Task Force on Strategic Communication*, ix–x; Ali S. Wyne, “Public Opinion and Power,” in *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, ed. Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor (London, New York [etc.]: Routledge, 2009), 42–43.

tracing global financial flows.²⁹⁶ ‘To succeed in such a world, America must not only maintain its hard power but understand its soft power and how to combine the two in the pursuit of national and global interest.’²⁹⁷ Still, critics argue that scholars supportive of this concept have failed to produce significant examples of situations where states altered their position on major issues due to the ideational attractiveness of another actor.²⁹⁸

Critics of the concept of soft power point out that ‘soft power does matter... But soft power alone cannot guarantee America remains indispensable for the world’s political and economic stability ... [since they consider it too volatile; this remark refers to the years after 9/11 when the U.S. had the impression that its standing in the world was suffering.²⁹⁹] The erosion of US soft power has already begun.’³⁰⁰ In addition, Gilboa finds fault with the concepts of smart and soft power not being clear which, according to him, hampers their operationalisation.³⁰¹ Barry M. Blechmann has a similar opinion on those matters, arguing that soft power will not ‘be a dominant consideration in situations in which there are real differences of interest and perspective. In these cases, harder forms of national strength will continue to dominate policy choices.’³⁰² Blechmann reasons that ‘[soft power] is a form of power, yes, but not an instrument of power that can be deployed in specific situations or even one that can be shaped in a meaningful way by the government. Soft power exists, and may be influenced by governmental choices, but it is more an existential factor in the policy environment than something policy makers can utilize to their advantage.’³⁰³ Josef Joffe warns against seeing soft power as a panacea in foreign policy and observes that ‘[...] soft power does not necessarily increase the world’s love for America. It is still power and it can still make enemies.’³⁰⁴

²⁹⁶ Nye, “Soft Power,” 131.

²⁹⁷ Nye, *The Paradox of American Power*, 171.

²⁹⁸ Fels, Pustovitovskij, and Kremer, “Towards a New Understanding of Structural Power: ‘Structure Is What States Make of It,’” 61.

²⁹⁹ As quoted in: Zaharna, *Battles to Bridges*, 1.

³⁰⁰ Ian Bremmer, “Why Hard Power Still Matters,” *What Matters*, February 29, 2009, <http://whatmatters.mckinseydigital.com/geopolitics/why-hard-power-still-matters>.

³⁰¹ Gilboa, “Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy,” 62.

³⁰² Barry M. Blechmann, “Book Review: Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*,” *Political Science Quarterly* 119, no. 4 (2004): 681.

³⁰³ *Ibid.*, 680.

³⁰⁴ Josef Joffe, “The Perils of Soft Power,” *The New York Times*, May 14, 2006, sec. Magazine, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/14/magazine/14wwln_lede.html?_r=3&pagewanted=1.

Moreover, in contrast to most hard power resources, soft power capacities sometimes do not directly belong to or cannot directly be influenced by a government, which could relate to a cacophony undermining soft power.³⁰⁵ ‘Many aspects of soft power are more a by-product of American society than of deliberate government actions, and they may increase or decrease government power.’³⁰⁶ In 2006, for example, British comedian Sasha Baron Cohen starred in the movie *Borat, Cultural Learnings of America for Make Benefit Glorious Nation of Kazakhstan* as its main character, Borat, a fictional Kazakh journalist. He claims to be doing a documentary while travelling through the United States. The controversial aspect about this commercially very successful movie was the fact that Kazakhstan was portrayed as a tremendously primitive place. Even though the movie aims at denouncing how easily ordinary viewers would just accept deliberately homophobic, racist and sexist content, it raised concern. Since Kazakh officials feared the impact of these ideas on American perceptions of Kazakhstan since there were hardly any before, they condemned Baron Cohen’s performance.³⁰⁷ Even though there might be *no such thing as bad publicity*³⁰⁸ (the Economist discovered a four times increase in tourism in Kazakhstan since then³⁰⁹), this shows how publics are exposed to so many influences with public diplomacy ending up being just one factor of many. Therefore, it can only marginally support.³¹⁰

In this respect, Cowan and Arsenault argue that target groups may not be able to distinguish between someone’s private actions and those carried out while in office. Also, differentiating between official and unofficial actors – even though it has already been established that the latter is conceptually speaking not public diplomacy – might prove difficult.³¹¹ Also, public diplomacy is often a very subjective undertaking. All the factual information can also be interpreted on an emotional level. Its success can depend on the sympathy the foreign audience feels for example for the diplomat speaking. A bad presentation can counteract the intention. Because of this subjective aspect, a certain message might need an eternity to be interiorised but can be

³⁰⁵ Nye, *The Paradox of American Power*, 11.

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 72.

³⁰⁷ van Ham, “Place Branding: The State of the Art,” 142–143.

³⁰⁸ “Bad Publicity: Better to Be Reviled than Ignored,” *The Economist*, February 26, 2011.

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

³¹⁰ Leonard, Stead, and Smewing, *Public Diplomacy*, 4.

³¹¹ Cowan and Arsenault, “Moving from Monologue to Dialogue to Collaboration: The Three Layers of Public Diplomacy,” 14.

destroyed within a very short time frame. ‘Public Diplomacy operates in centuries, or in seconds.’³¹²

Since a coordinated approach seems required to efficiently shape perceptions, cacophony may result in confusion and soft power slipping from the states’ hands.³¹³ Also, ‘all power depends on context – who relates to who under what circumstances – but soft power depends more than hard power upon the existence of willing interpreters and receivers.’³¹⁴ How to ensure this precondition? None of the theoretical frameworks mentioned above address this issue. The result is that public diplomacy’s influence may be limited – even public diplomacy’s enthusiastic advocate Jan Melissen concedes this.³¹⁵ As suggested above, public diplomacy and soft power are to be wielded in sync with others and no standalone tool.

2.5 Conclusion: ‘Statesmen are not Social Workers!!!’³¹⁶

Summing up this dissertation’s second chapter, public diplomacy stipulates that it is ‘realistic to aspire to influencing the milieu factors that constitute the psychological and political environment in which attitudes and policies towards other countries are debated.’³¹⁷ In addition to that, ‘public diplomacy is based on the premise that the image and reputation of a country are public goods which can create either an enabling or a disabling environment for individual transactions. Work on particular issues will feed off the general image of the country and reflect back on to it – in both positive and negative directions.’³¹⁸

Communication is targeted at foreign publics – and not only its elites, but also its masses. Public diplomacy is not a *one size fits all* approach; instead, it is adapted to its target groups and embedded in wider strategies. Really, it is only one channel amongst many. With regards to its desirable impacts, it should increase the audience’s familiarity with the foreign country, increase

³¹² Leonard, Stead, and Smewing, *Public Diplomacy*, 31.

³¹³ Nye, *The Paradox of American Power*, 74; Armstrong, “Operationalizing Public Diplomacy,” 64; Hocking, “Rethinking the ‘New’ Public Diplomacy,” 34.

³¹⁴ Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, 16.

³¹⁵ Blechmann, “Book Review: Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*,” 681; Melissen, “The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice,” 15.

³¹⁶ “The Westphalian Post (westphalianpost) on Twitter,” Twitter page, (February 28, 2012), <https://twitter.com/#!/WestphalianPost>.

³¹⁷ Melissen, “The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice,” 15.

³¹⁸ Leonard, Stead, and Smewing, *Public Diplomacy*, 9.

appreciation thereof and engage people with it.³¹⁹ Also, it is important to highlight that public diplomacy is an instrument of political power: '[C]ultural diplomacy', 'public diplomacy' now there's even 'health diplomacy'. Statesmen are not social workers!!!³²⁰ the user *The Westphalian Post* therefore proclaims to his audience on Twitter. Public diplomacy is destined to foster a state's national interest.

Chapter 2 also illustrated the multidisciplinary background public diplomacy emerged from. The academic difficulties that its origin induces lead to public diplomacy not being universally defined. It can be understood as an integrated concept in the sense that it incorporates all sorts of different elements borrowed from related notions as diverse as propaganda, branding and cultural relations. Public diplomacy's effects cannot be properly measured, which is why the concept has been called into question. Public diplomacy and also its operationalisation are at least at the moment still difficult to fully grasp, for they are based on a wide-ranging theoretical body and consist in an eclectic set of measures; public diplomacy does not dispose of 'a supposition or a system of ideas intended to explain something, especially one based on general principles independent of the thing to be explained.'³²¹ Referring to Philip Taylor's quote mentioned above, this makes it even harder to understand practical public diplomacy efforts. Still, or maybe even because of this instance, public diplomacy is a tremendously vibrant current within international relations theory gaining traction.

With this said, let us now move on to public diplomacy's digital and above all social forms and discover their particularities. This dissertation's third part will take a closer look at digital communication and social media, clarifying the notion's properties. Are social media instruments – at least in theory – compatible with the requirements and functioning of public diplomacy? Which opportunities and risks does the use of social media entail for foreign policy entail? The next chapter will answer these questions.

³¹⁹ Ibid.

³²⁰ "The Westphalian Post (westphalianpost) on Twitter."

³²¹ "Theory (noun)," Oxford Dictionaries (Oxford, New York [etc.]: Oxford University Press, April 2010), <http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/theory>.

3 DIGITAL COMMUNICATION – STATE OF THE ART

The loss of control you fear is already in the past [...]. You do not actually control the message, and if you believe you control the message, it merely means you no longer understand what's going on.

Clay Shirky (2010)³²²

3.1 Introducing Social Media or 'Writing Oneself into Being'³²³

After having discussed traditional public diplomacy throughout the preceding pages, it is now important to investigate digital communication and social media in particular since these are the other elements constitutive of PD 2.0. For that matter, we will first discuss why social media are such a relevant tool to address (targeted) individuals and the broad public through detailing their features before exploring their general practicability for public diplomacy, starting with its theoretical context.

3.1.1 Meet the *Prosumer*³²⁴

Jan Schmidt attributes three characteristics to social web practices: identity management, relationship management and information management even though they overlap to a certain extent.³²⁵ First, this means that a social media presence allows the author in question to project a certain image. The users' (or companies' for that matter) personalities are put forward in a somehow standardised manner through filling in uniform and regulated profile information. Second, Schmidt argues that software creates and structures relationships, by forcing users to express certain relational aspects into categories, subjecting them to the desire to make social connections accessible for algorithms, navigable and useful for databases. These networks allow users to manage relationships, as in stay in touch, keep track of users and categorise

³²² Lichtenstein, "Digital Diplomacy."

³²³ Danah Boyd, "Taken Out of Context. American Teen Sociality in Networked Publics" (University of California, Berkeley, 2008), 119, <http://www.danah.org/papers/TakenOutOfContext.pdf>.

³²⁴ Refers to Toffler's concept meaning a fusion of the producer and consumer of goods; Alvin Toffler, *The Third Wave* (New York: Bantam Books, 1989), 11.

³²⁵ Schmidt, *Das neue Netz*, 71–103.

relationships.³²⁶ Third, information management designates the way information is distributed and consumed through social networks.

Social media therefore create a personal public sphere³²⁷ as Jan Schmidt calls it. This concept characterises those parts of the World Wide Web where users share their personal thoughts without claiming socio-political relevance. Four main features can describe it: persistency (all information entered once onto the Internet cannot be deleted), reproducibility (since information is digital, it can be copied without affecting its quality), scalability (information's reach is technically unlimited) and search engine exposure (web based search engines allow information to be found).³²⁸ Beside the size and composition of an audience within a social network, there are other temporal (stable durable information as in the address or website), spatial (a user can be present on several social platforms with regards to different target groups and audiences depending on the content in question) and social characteristics.

'[T]he people formerly known as the audience'³²⁹ are now themselves creating content with sender and receiver constantly switching between both positions, sharing content with their own network they might just have seen somewhere else. Thus, "You" as in the user was elected TIME magazine's person of the year in 2006³³⁰ since every user became a potential emitter of content, susceptible to be linked to other already existing information.³³¹ Jan Schmidt therefore prefers the term social web to web 2.0 to stronger underline this dimension.³³² He distinguishes three forms of online user participation: positioning (explicitly sharing opinions about politics), engagement (creating virtual spaces such as blogs to further discussion with others on certain topics) as well as activation of others to get involved into the debate.³³³ Also, user-generated

³²⁶ Individuals can categorise their contacts – friends, family etc. – a possibility that does not exist for Facebook fan pages.

³²⁷ "Persönliche Öffentlichkeit"; see Schmidt, *Das neue Netz*, 105.

³²⁸ *Ibid.*, 105–106.

³²⁹ Jay Rosen, "The People Formerly Known as the Audience," *Pressthink*, June 27, 2006, http://archive.pressthink.org/2006/06/27/ppl_frmr.html.

³³⁰ Lev Grossman, "You - Yes, You - Are TIME's Person of the Year," *Time*, December 25, 2006, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1570810,00.html>.

³³¹ Schmidt, *Das neue Netz*, 20.

³³² *Ibid.*, 21.

³³³ *Ibid.*, 151–152.

classification as in tagging sites easily enables others to categorise content.³³⁴ Social media seem thus prone to reach a considerable number of people and influence their opinion.

The emergence of social media is embedded into wider changes that the information and communication spheres are undergoing in general, namely a shift to the digital realm. While newspaper print circulation is declining in North America (United States -13.3%), Oceania and Europe (Britain: -15.9%, Germany -8.3%), it is increasing in the emerging markets. In the second quarter of 2011, a significant part of Britain, Germany's and the United States' populations were on Facebook, for example.




Figure 3-1: Average Newspaper Circulation and Social-Media Penetration³³⁵

Also, the Internet is generally becoming a more important source of information: In 2001, only approximately 10% of the respondents in the U.S. got most of their news about (inter)national issues from the web, in 2010, it was almost 50% already.³³⁶

Indeed, people ‘[...] don’t just consume news, they share it, develop it, add to it – it’s a very dynamic relationship with news,³³⁷ says Arianna Huffington, co-founder of the *Huffington Post*, a

³³⁴ Ibid., 162.

³³⁵ © The Economist Newspaper Limited, London “A Special Report on the News Industry: Bulletins from the Future.” *The Economist*, July 7, 2011.

³³⁶ Ibid.

news website in the vanguard of integrating news with social media. ‘News is [...] becoming more diverse as publishing tools become wildly available, barriers to entry fall and new models become possible, as demonstrated by the astonishing rise of the Huffington Post, *WikiLeaks* and other newcomers in the past few years, not to mention the millions of blogs.’³³⁸ Amateur contributions such as videos or images from citizens who witnessed an event and recorded it are enriching news broadcasting rather than substituting it, as many had feared.³³⁹ The increasing spread of mobile devices (see graph below), able to easily record videos or pictures, which people always take with them, further fosters this:

	2012	2017
North America	288 M	316 M
Western Europe	362 M	380 M
Central / Eastern Europe	319 M	342 M
Latin American	438 M	494 M
Middle East / Africa	661 M	849 M
Asia Pacific	2.216 M	2.819 M

Figure 3-2: Global Mobile Users in 2012 and Projection for 2017 (in Million)³⁴⁰

The Internet’s surge that provides people with a platform to then share their information with, ‘[...] mak[es] news more participatory, social, diverse and partisan, reviving the discursive ethos of the era before mass media.’³⁴¹ The Economist explains this phenomenon as a reoccurrence rather than a novelty, arguing that news are returning to what they were until the early 19th century – a social medium – nowadays just accelerated by the speed of information technology.³⁴²

³³⁷ Ibid., 4.

³³⁸ “A Special Report on the News Industry: The End of Mass Media. Coming Full Circle,” *The Economist*, July 7, 2011, 16.

³³⁹ “Citizen Journalism: Foreign Correspondents,” *The Economist*, June 1, 2013.

³⁴⁰ “Global Mobile Users,” author’s own presentation, accessed October 25, 2013, <http://static6.businessinsider.com/image/51109cc86bb3f7c051000005-590/worldwide-people-are-buying-mobile-devices-faster-than-babies-are-being-born.jpg>.

³⁴¹ “A Special Report on the News Industry: The Future of News: Back to the Coffee House.”

³⁴² “A Special Report on the News Industry: The End of Mass Media. Coming Full Circle,” 16.

Furthermore, the Internet expedites the spreading of news, which also affects policy makers since they increasingly [...] face pressure to move quickly, acknowledging, if not matching, the pace set by the communication technologies that deliver information. They need to have systems in place to sort through the material that pours in and they must push back against media-driven public expectations that all problems can be resolved at the same high speed with which information is provided.³⁴³ This also reflects back onto the way news is covered: News also started to rely to a greater extent on social media sources. This does not only enrich the content up to a certain point but also increases the general quantity of news. Thus, often only the most dramatic stories stand out, sometimes ignoring the wider context they are embedded in and then leading to the public attempting to pressure policy makers into actions.³⁴⁴

In this respect, it seems important to point out that accessibility and social relevance do not necessarily go together.³⁴⁵ Henrik Örnebring concludes that user-generated content has only very limited use for the generation of news: “[...T]he overall impression is that users are mostly empowered to create popular culture-oriented content and personal/everyday life-oriented content rather than news/informational content.”³⁴⁶ A study from 2009 on the subject of Twitter backs up this assertion: 40.5% of the tweets were trivial talk, 37.5% conversational, and 5.8% self-promotion while only 3.6% of the tweets were news.³⁴⁷ This may have its roots in an interesting aspect of human communication, *phatic communion*.³⁴⁸ For this type of speech, the words’ actual meaning is secondary and their social function (filling awkward silences or facilitating social interaction) – creating social ties between the interlocutors – primary. It is not about transmitting content or the result of intellectual reflections. Depending on the social context, supposedly trivial comments about the weather or gossip may fall into this category.³⁴⁹ ‘As long as there are

³⁴³ Seib, *Real-Time Diplomacy*, 86.

³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 101.

³⁴⁵ Schmidt, *Das neue Netz*, 179.

³⁴⁶ Henrik Örnebring, “The Consumer as Producer - of What? User-Generated Tabloid Content in The Sun (UK) and Aftonbladet (Sweden),” *Journalism Studies* 9, no. 5 (2008): 783.

³⁴⁷ *Twitter Study* (Pearanalytics, August 2009), 5, <http://www.pearanalytics.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/Twitter-Study-August-2009.pdf>.

³⁴⁸ Even though the concept has been criticised and amended over the years, it still seems quite useful to this analysis. See for example: Gunter Senft, “Phatic Communion” (Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen, 2009), http://pubman.mpdl.mpg.de/pubman/item/escidoc:68366:5/component/escidoc:468107/Senft_2009_phatic.pdf.

³⁴⁹ Bronislaw Malinowski, “The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages,” in *The Meaning of Meaning: A Study of the Influence of Language upon Thought and of the Science of Symbolism*, ed. Charles Kay Ogden and Ivor Armstrong

words to exchange, phatic communion brings [...people] into the pleasant atmosphere of polite, social intercourse.³⁵⁰

Danica Radovanovic and Massimo Ragnedda adapt this to social media.³⁵¹ 'Indeed, these phatic messages tend to reinforce existing relationships and facilitate further relation without giving information or adding to the messages,³⁵² a virtual 'what's up?'.³⁵³ Both Facebook's *like* and *poke* functions³⁵⁴ are the most basic manifestations of this, enabling users to join the conversation without any effort and without saying much.

Twitter – like many emergent genres of social media – is structured around networks of people interacting with people they know or find interesting. Those who are truly performing to broad audiences (e.g., “celebs”, corporations, news entities, and high-profile blogger types) are consciously crafting consumable content that doesn't require actually having an intimate engagement with the person to appreciate. Yet, the vast majority of Twitter users are there to maintain social relations, keep up with friends and acquaintances, follow high-profile users, and otherwise connect. It's all about shared intimacy that is of no value to a third-party ear that doesn't know the person babbling.³⁵⁵

Radovanovic and Ragnedda identified four types of phatic posts: While the first one suggests a short approval or disapproval through emoticons, expressions such as *lol* (an acronym for *laughing out loud*) or *hm*, the second one conveys information about daily life to initiate a conversation, for example: I went to see the new Harry Potter movie tonight and highly recommend it to all of you. The third one consists in some sort of secret language, used for example by teenagers to exclude grown-ups; #yolo (an acronym for *you only live once*) is a great

Richards, 2d ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1927), 315,
<http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015014594892>.

³⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 316.

³⁵¹ Danica Radovanovic and Massimo Ragnedda, “Small Talk in the Digital Age: Making Sense of Phatic Posts,” in *CEUR*, vol. 838 (presented at the #MSM2012. 2nd Workshop on Making Sense of Microposts, Lyon, France, 2012), http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-838/paper_18.pdf.

³⁵² *Ibid.*, 11.

³⁵³ *Ibid.*, 12.

³⁵⁴ See chapter 3.1.2 for an explanation of these notions.

³⁵⁵ Danah Boyd, “Twitter: ‘Pointless Babble’ or Peripheral Awareness + Social Grooming?,” *Apophenia. Making Connections Where None Previously Existed.*, August 16, 2009, http://www.zephoros.org/thoughts/archives/2009/08/16/twitter_pointle.html.

example. Last, phatic posts can also simply indicate that a user is connected and present online.³⁵⁶ Social media thus seems to be particularly prone to this kind of communications.

The downside is that ‘[...] the real consequence of the Web 2.0 revolution is less culture, less reliable news, and a chaos of useless information. One chilling reality in this brave new digital epoch is the blurring, obfuscation, and even disappearance of truth,’³⁵⁷ Andrew Keene reckons. He warns in this respect against the levelling of culture induced by the masses of content produced regardless of relevance and the replacement of the expert by the crowd.

Because Web 2.0 celebrates the “noble amateur” over the expert, and because many search engines and Web sites tout popularity rather than reliability, [...], it’s easy for misinformation and rumors to proliferate in cyberspace. For instance, the online encyclopedia Wikipedia (which relies upon volunteer editors and contributors) gets way more traffic than the Web site run by Encyclopedia Britannica (which relies upon experts and scholars), even though the interactive format employed by Wikipedia opens it to postings that are inaccurate, unverified, even downright fraudulent.³⁵⁸

With this background in mind, let us now take a closer look at the most relevant social media tools and uncover where they fit in.

3.1.2 Focussing on Facebook and Twitter

The government of New Zealand defines five core tools in their handbook for the use of social media entitled ‘Social Media in Government. Hands-on Toolbox.’³⁵⁹

1. Social networks: This refers to website where private, semi-private or publicly visible conversations between users take place. Facebook, LinkedIn or Twitter fall for example into this category. Networks are ‘phenomena that are similar to institutionalized social

³⁵⁶ Radovanovic and Ragnedda, “Small Talk in the Digital Age: Making Sense of Phatic Posts,” 12–13.

³⁵⁷ Andrew Keen, “The Cult of the Amateur: How Today’s Internet Is Killing Our Culture and Assaulting Our Economy,” *BBC Two Newsnight*, June 5, 2007.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/newsnight/2007/06/the_cult_of_the_amateur_by_andrew_keen.html.

³⁵⁸ Andrew Keen, “Web 2.0. The Second Generation of the Internet Has Arrived. It’s Worse than You Think,” *The Weekly Standard*, February 14, 2006,

<http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/714fjczq.asp%3Fpage%3D3>; Michiko Kakutani, “The Cult of the Amateur,” *The New York Times*, June 29, 2007, sec. Books,

<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/29/books/29book.html>.

³⁵⁹ Government Information Service, *Social Media in Government. Hands-on Toolbox* (New Zealand: Department of International Affairs, November 2011), 5.

relations, such as tribal affiliations and political dynasties, but also distinct from them, because to be networked entails making a choice to be connected across recognized boundaries.³⁶⁰

2. Media-sharing networks enable users to share images or videos for example and to comment on these files. YouTube and Flickr count amongst the most popular of these sites.
3. (Web)Blogs designate content-managed websites allowing visitors to not only read but also comment and share the posts. Blogger, Tumblr or WordPress are examples of popular tools.
4. Wikis are web-based collaborative applications. Users can not only add content but also entire pages within this framework; in return, everyone else can amend, delete or correct. Wikipedia, an online encyclopaedia, counts amongst the most popular wikis.
5. Forums such as Yahoo!Answers enable groups of participants to discuss diverse themes and to ask questions.³⁶¹

While Twitter is used to rapidly transmit compact real-time news and to enable organisation, circumventing the mainstream media's more complex procedures, Facebook helps to establish (flexible) connections and groups with a varying degree of strength. Foursquare³⁶² allows the user to transmit his or her location to others and to see where friends currently are; Instagram, an app, lets the smart phone user take photographs whose layout can easily be changed thanks to several picture filters and then shared. During several uprisings in 2011, media sharing networks such as YouTube (videos) or photographic site Flickr supported the claims made with instant evidence.³⁶³ Pinterest is an online pin board that helps the user to easily organise and share

³⁶⁰ Miriam Cooke and Bruce B. Lawrence, "Introduction," in *Muslim Networks From Hajj To Hip Hop*, ed. Miriam Cooke and Bruce B. Lawrence (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 1.

³⁶¹ Government Information Service, *Social Media in Government. Hands-on Toolbox*, 5.

³⁶² "Foursquare," 2012, <https://foursquare.com/>.

³⁶³ Paul Mason, "Global Unrest: How the Revolution Went Viral," *The Guardian*, January 3, 2012, sec. World news, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/03/how-the-revolution-went-viral>.

things. Each social medium serves a more or less distinct purpose, which explains the appeal to have profiles on several ones.³⁶⁴

This dissertation will actually centre on Facebook and Twitter. The focus on Facebook is due to the fact that it is not only ‘the largest player by virtually any metric’³⁶⁵ on the social media market despite its IPO (initial public offering) disaster in 2012 that saw Facebook’s share price collapse and disappoint investors.³⁶⁶ It also is the most actively used tool by the German Foreign Office, considered the first to step towards embracing social media.³⁶⁷ In view of the description above, this seems plausible since networking and news management count amongst public diplomacy’s most essential purposes. Therefore, it is fully intentional that the main arguments will refer to Facebook. Since the German embassy uses Twitter complementarily to its Facebook page, it is crucial to include it into the analysis. For reasons of comparability, the same instruments will be investigated with regards to U.S. PD 2.0.³⁶⁸

3.1.2.1 Facebook: THE Social Network³⁶⁹

Facebook was founded in 2004 mainly by Mark Zuckerberg, its present-day CEO, for his fellow students at Harvard University to stay in touch. After Google, Facebook is the second most visited web property with 137.664.000 unique visitors per month who spent an average of 7:45 hours per month on the site.³⁷⁰ As of 31 December 2011, Facebook counted 845 million monthly active users, which equals an increase of 39% as compared to a year earlier; 483 million used Facebook on a daily basis at that date (+48% compared to 21 December 2010).³⁷¹ Facebook

³⁶⁴ “Onefeat,” *Onefeat Facebook Fan Page*, February 6, 2012,

<https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=355189971166883&set=a.346794582006422.88826.220494377969777&type=1&heater>.

³⁶⁵ Cotty, *Comscore Top 10 Need-to-Knows about Social Networking and Where It Is Headed*, 8.

³⁶⁶ Axel Postinett, “Gerüchte: Was wissen Facebooks Altaktionäre?,” *Handelsblatt*, May 22, 2012, sec. Finanzen, <http://www.handelsblatt.com/finanzen/aktien/neuemissionen/geruechte-was-wissen-facebooks-altaktionae/6662742.html>.

³⁶⁷ Auswärtiges Amt, “Leitfaden Web 2.0,” 24.

³⁶⁸ “German Embassy London: Likes and People Talking About This,” *Facebook*, August 12, 2012, <https://www.facebook.com/GermanEmbassyUK/likes>.

³⁶⁹ Refers to the title of a movie made about Facebook; “The Social Network (2010),” *Internet Movie Data Base*, 2012, <http://www.imdb.de/title/tt1285016/>.

³⁷⁰ “How People Spend Their Time Online,” *Socialmediatoday*, May 9, 2012, http://socialmediatoday.com/we-are-social-singapore/504064/how-people-spend-their-time-online?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Social+Media+Today+%28all+posts%29.

³⁷¹ Since the case study will refer to the end of 2011, also providing information for this time seems useful.

accounted for one in seven minutes spent worldwide³⁷² and reached 55% of the global audience (October 2011).³⁷³ In December 2011, more than 425 million of these monthly users would access Facebook through their mobile device. More than 100 billion friend connections existed until the end of December 2011; during the last three months of 2011, more than 250 million photos were uploaded daily. All this activity translated into approximately 2.7 billion daily likes and comments (measured during the last three months of the year 2011).³⁷⁴ Moreover, Facebook accounts for approximately 20% of the time an average American spends online.³⁷⁵

Besides, it managed to generate more traffic than Google.³⁷⁶ To put this into perspective, every Facebook visitor spent an average of 405 minutes on the network in January 2012 compared to 3 on Google+ and 89 on Pinterest.³⁷⁷ Also, social media cannot be dismissed as limited to youngsters, older age groups are catching up: the 55+ group was the fastest growing segment (+ 9.4% in 2011 compared to a year earlier).³⁷⁸ As of January 2011, the average user had 130 friends and was connected to 80 community pages, groups and events. Since Facebook is available in more than 70 languages, more than 75% of its users are located outside the USA. Facebook's position 'as a web within the web'³⁷⁹ is underscored by the fact that more than 7 million apps and websites were integrated with the social network.³⁸⁰ Unsurprisingly, Facebook has become the dominant social network in several countries.

³⁷² "Facebook: A Fistful of Dollars," *The Economist*, February 4, 2012, 9.

³⁷³ Cotty, *Comscore Top 10 Need-to-Knows about Social Networking and Where It Is Headed*, 8.

³⁷⁴ Facebook, Inc., *Form S-1 Registration Statement*, February 1, 2012, 1; 74, <http://battellemidia.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Facebook-S-1.pdf>.

³⁷⁵ Somini Sengupta, "Facebook Needs to Turn Data Trove Into Investor Gold," *The New York Times*, May 14, 2012, sec. Technology, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/15/technology/facebook-needs-to-turn-data-trove-into-investor-gold.html>.

³⁷⁶ "Facebook bringt mehr Traffic als Google," *Meedia.de*, February 29, 2012, <http://meedia.de/internet/pwc-studie-facebook-wichtigster-trafficbringer/2012/02/29.html>.

³⁷⁷ Keith Wagstaff, "The Average User Spent Only Three Minutes on Google+ Last Month," *Time*, February 28, 2012, <http://techland.time.com/2012/02/28/the-average-user-spent-only-three-minutes-on-google-last-month/>.

³⁷⁸ Cotty, *Comscore Top 10 Need-to-Knows about Social Networking and Where It Is Headed*, 12.

³⁷⁹ Sam Laird, "Want Half-Off Facebook Ads? Keep Users On-Site," *Mashable Social Media*, January 16, 2012, <http://mashable.com/2012/01/16/facebook-offers-ad-discounts/>.

³⁸⁰ "Statistics," *Facebook*, 2012, <http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics>.




Figure 3-3: The Sun never Sets. Dominant Social Networks by Country in 2011³⁸¹

This social success did translate into economic results: Facebook Inc. would then even go public in May 2012 with a market capitalisation of \$16 billion³⁸², making it the third biggest IPO in U.S. history.³⁸³ In 2011, Facebook Inc. generated \$1 billion in profit (+65% in 2010) and \$3.7 billion in revenues (+8% between 2010 and 2011) of which Zynga, a game provider (developed for example FarmVille, hugely popular game on Facebook), makes up 12%. To put this into perspective: When Google went public, its posted revenue was \$961.8 million with a profit of \$105.6 million; Facebook generated 1.6 times Amazon's profit in 2011.³⁸⁴

Facebook connects people globally, which suggest its magnificent strength.³⁸⁵ Also a study has revealed that the Facebook connection between countries mirrors old empires, underscoring how

³⁸¹ © The Economist Newspaper Limited, London "Floating Facebook: The Value of Friendship," *The Economist*, February 4, 2012, 20.

³⁸² If not stated otherwise, \$ refers to the U.S. American currency.

³⁸³ Postinett, "Gerüchte: Was wissen Facebooks Altaktionäre?"

³⁸⁴ Brian Solis, "Facebook Files S-1 for \$5 Billion IPO (revealing Stats & Revenue)," *Brian Solis. Defining the Convergence of Media and Influence*, February 1, 2012, <http://www.briansolis.com/2012/02/facebook-files-s-1-for-5-billion-ipo-revealing-stats-revenue/>.

³⁸⁵ See image by Karen Bleier of AFP/Getty; Kimberly J. Curtis, "Digital Diplomacy in the 21st Century," *Foreign Policy Blogs*, September 24, 2012, <http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/09/24/digital-diplomacy-in-the-21st-century/>.

Facebook builds on existing connections of all sorts.³⁸⁶ Facebook's relevance can be also illustrated by the plethora of manuals about how to use the social network for all sorts of things³⁸⁷

So, how does Facebook function? As a registered user, one disposes of a so-called profile that is composed of a personal information section, pictures and a wall, a virtual pin board, where oneself as well as so-called *friends*, other users one is connected to, can share content visible to the user and his or her other connections or even the world depending on the wall owner's privacy settings. On this occasion, it is important to point out that the status of being a friend does not say anything about the connection between the users: some *friends* have never met each other in their offline life. Users can exchange messages as well as *like*, *comment* on or *share* (as in re-distribute on their wall or someone else's) a post. Virtually *poking* someone else is another feature. Especially the *like*-button, a thumbs-up symbol that is intended to show a user's appreciation for the post / item in question, has become truly popular.

A fan page operates similarly to a personal profile: Fans can subscribe to its updates that will then appear in their newsfeed (start screen / page), comment on posts, like or share them. Sometimes, they can even post content on the fan page's wall. Fandom thus equals a subscription. While personal accounts tend to be private, to certain extent, fan pages are not.

Facebook is suitable for personal as opposed to business-related information that can be publicly shared. 'I really like that you like what I like'³⁸⁸ underscores what the network relies on: It is driven by its members wanting to share news with others or seeking attention and feedback.³⁸⁹

Alike to Jan Schmidt's framework mentioned earlier on, Carolin Wiedemann attributes four functions to the use of Facebook: First, image cultivation that takes place within the framework of creating a profile, and documentation of all sorts of events and emotions in the application area (status updates, comments). 'Facebook [...] therefore, is a self-enhancer's paradise, where people can share only the flukiest of flattering photos, the cream of their wit, style, beauty,

³⁸⁶ "The Sun Never Sets," *The Economist Newspaper Limited*, March 19, 2012, <http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2012/03/daily-chart-12>.

³⁸⁷ "Facebook," *Amazon*, 2013, http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_sb_noss?url=search-alias%3Daps&field-keywords=facebook.

³⁸⁸ Nathan Heller, "I Really Like That You Like What I Like," *New York Magazine*, November 18, 2012, <http://nymag.com/news/features/internet-nice-2012-11/index3.html>.

³⁸⁹ Daryl Lang, "Status Conscious? Check out This Social Media Flowchart," September 7, 2011, <http://www.breakingcopy.com/social-media-flowchart-status>.

intellect and lifestyles. It's not that people's profiles are dishonest, says Catalina Toma of Wisconsin-Madison University, but they portray an idealised version of themselves.³⁹⁰ Third, Facebook pushes users to find more friends and boost their level of connections.³⁹¹ This also increases the possibilities to get feedback for all sorts of actions since friends are public and evaluator at the same time, which brings us back to the image cultivation, leading to users becoming increasingly productive – as in communicative – on Facebook through posting, commenting, *friending*,³⁹² etc.³⁹³ As mentioned above, the users communicate themselves into being; a user becomes visible and thus existent on the network through producing content.

Wiedemann furthermore argues that the accumulation of qualitative wealth (currency: number of friends and their status) counts to its main features.³⁹⁴ The accumulation of social capital and financial capital (market value increase) are crucial to Facebook while content is secondary.³⁹⁵ This comment is of high relevance to this analysis since it underscores the network's self-interest it has to pursue, being a privately held company. A fourth point consists in tensions between the network's requirement such as the registration with a real name and users behaving differently, trying to protect their privacy.³⁹⁶

Several social plug-ins as well as using the Facebook account for other applications have made it possible to recommend or post something on Facebook without actively opening the social network site such as Facebook like-buttons. They transmit the endorsement to one's page and helped Facebook to fortify its market dominating position, which led to it being possibly all over the web.³⁹⁷

Furthermore, Facebook has proven to be extremely useful in forming connections, especially *weak ties*; 'the strength of a tie [being...] a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the

³⁹⁰ Amy Fleming, "Hot or Not? How We Really Rate Our Looks," *The Guardian*, June 23, 2013, sec. Life and style, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2013/jun/23/hot-or-not-rate-our-looks>.

³⁹¹ Carolin Wiedemann, "Facebook: Das Assessment-Center der alltäglichen Lebensführung," in *Generation Facebook: Über das Leben im Social Net*, ed. Oliver Leistert and Theo Röhle (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2011), 162; 172–173.

³⁹² This neologism means 'sending someone a friend request.'

³⁹³ Wiedemann, "Facebook: Das Assessment-Center der alltäglichen Lebensführung," 175.

³⁹⁴ Ibid.

³⁹⁵ Susanne Lummerding, "Facebooking. What you book is what you get - what else?," in *Generation Facebook: Über das Leben im Social Net*, ed. Oliver Leistert and Theo Röhle (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2011), 204.

³⁹⁶ Wiedemann, "Facebook: Das Assessment-Center der alltäglichen Lebensführung," 178.

³⁹⁷ Carolin Gerlitz, "Die Like Economy. Digitaler Raum, Daten und Wertschöpfung," in *Generation Facebook: Über das Leben im Social Net*, ed. Oliver Leistert and Theo Röhle (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2011), 101.

emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie.³⁹⁸ A person known informally can be considered a weak tie relationship.³⁹⁹ ‘Facebook is a tool for efficiently managing your acquaintances, for keeping up with people you would not otherwise be able to stay in touch with.’⁴⁰⁰ So, even though these contacts are labelled as friends, they rarely are since they include not only people known informally but also family and colleagues; Facebook does not mirror the complexity of social relations but simplifies them by offering only one category.

These mostly weak ties broaden an individual’s horizon since the people it connects it to are more likely to be different; so these prove particularly useful when looking for specific information because in a broad network, the chances of finding someone acquainted with a specific subject that one is unfamiliar with are higher than if only surrounded by people with similar interest.⁴⁰¹ Indeed, research confirms that the stronger the bond between individuals, the more similar they are; in reverse, people linked by weak ties are unlikely to be a good match.⁴⁰² Weak ties, however, can constitute these bridges – in a network the only path between two points – bringing diverse individuals together and thus most apt to spreading new ideas.⁴⁰³ If these acquaintances really are so different, Facebook could give individuals the possibility to get in touch with the wider public they would not usually interact with, building relationships and networks. To this we shall return, so let us for now take a closer but brief look at Twitter to uncover its potential use for public diplomacy.

3.1.2.2 Twitter: Public Diplomacy in 140 Characters

‘Find out what’s happening, right now, with the people and organizations you care about.’⁴⁰⁴ This is the sentence the micro blogging site features on its login page that pretty much sums up what

³⁹⁸ Mark S. Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” *American Journal of Sociology* 78, no. 6 (May 1973): 1361; Please note that even though Granovetter’s conceptualisation has been criticised for being too dichotomous to describe relationships beyond information exchanges, its results are still very relevant to this dissertation since it is mainly about communication. See for example Christian Stegbauer, “Weak und Strong Ties – Freundschaft aus netzwerktheoretischer Perspektive,” 3–5, accessed June 7, 2012, <http://www.soz.uni-frankfurt.de/Netzwerktagung/Stegbauer-Freundschaften.pdf>.

³⁹⁹ Thompson, “Brave New World of Digital Intimacy.”

⁴⁰⁰ Gladwell, “Small Change. Why the Revolution Will Not Be Tweeted.”

⁴⁰¹ Thompson, “Brave New World of Digital Intimacy”; Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” 1371.

⁴⁰² Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” 1362.

⁴⁰³ *Ibid.*, 1364; 1367–1368.

⁴⁰⁴ “Twitter,” accessed June 27, 2012, <https://twitter.com/>.

Twitter is all about: Twitter gives the possibility to transmit unfiltered information in real-time with the possibility to circumvent the mainstream media's more complex procedures. Indeed, 'Twitter's greatest strength is its ability to provide a snapshot of what anyone is discussing, anywhere in the world, right at the time of asking.'⁴⁰⁵ A message on this network, a *tweet*, is limited to 140 characters. It can be *retweeted* meaning forwarded someone else's message to one's own followers. Tweets are frequently tagged with key words, preceded by a hashtag that identifies contributions to similar themes and guarantees a better traceability (for example #climatechange). One can also reply or integrate others users into the conversation through @ connecting (@StateDept, for example). The tweet then appears on the own as well as the included user's home feed.

Founded in 2006 as *twtr*⁴⁰⁶ and initially conceptualised as an Internet based SMS service, Twitter noted 500 million registered users in 2011 of which one fifth was considered active, with roughly one third based in the U.S. with an average of 50 million tweets sent per day.⁴⁰⁷ Twitter is thus far from the omnipresent Facebook and is rather used for professional and news purposes.⁴⁰⁸ Feeds also tend to be public and in contrast to Facebook, users are likely to have asymmetrical relationships with each other: To follow someone, he or she does not have to accept and / or follow the other one in return.⁴⁰⁹ It supplies the user with direct real-time information and gives businesses the opportunity to monitor what is said about them or their industry. Facebook on the other hand is much more interactive through likes, comments, shares, apps and games and provides more thorough information about a brand or organisation – the timeline (the

⁴⁰⁵ Natalie Fenton, "The Internet and Social Networking," in *Misunderstanding the Internet*, ed. Natalie Fenton, Des Freedman, and James Curran, Communication and Society (London, New York [etc.]: Routledge, 2012), 137.

⁴⁰⁶ Lutz Hachmeister, "Vorwort," in *Twitterpolitik. Politische Inszenierungen in einem neuen Medium*, by Jasmin Siri and Katharina Seßler (Berlin, Köln: Institut für Medien- und Kommunikationspolitik, 2013), 4, <http://medienpolitik.eu/cms/media/pdf/Twitterpolitik.pdf>.

⁴⁰⁷ "Twitter Blog: #numbers," March 14, 2011, <http://blog.twitter.com/2011/03/numbers.html>; Sandre, "Twitter for Diplomats," 19.

⁴⁰⁸ Tonya Garcia, "Research: Twitter Drives More Traffic to Press Releases Than Facebook," *LinkedIn PRNewser: Your Daily PR Release*, November 9, 2011, <http://www.linkedin.com/news?actionBar=&articleID=900858399&ids=0Md3cNdPcQc3Aicz4Od3gPdPoVb3sQd34Sc3oMeiMVeJcUdjwMc3AIdjsUdjVcPoV&aag=true&freq=weekly&trk=eml-to-d-b-ttle-98&ut=1NhmXuqz9q1l01>.

⁴⁰⁹ Jasmin Siri and Katharina Seßler, *Twitterpolitik. Politische Inszenierungen in einem neuen Medium* (Berlin, Köln: Institut für Medien- und Kommunikationspolitik, 2013), 19, <http://medienpolitik.eu/cms/media/pdf/Twitterpolitik.pdf>.

user profile was renamed timeline to focus on personal story telling) makes it now even easier to get a sense of the page owner's history.⁴¹⁰

Politicians increasingly use Twitter, which is why it became the focus of new agencies:

Agence France Press's e-diplomacy hub 'visualizes, analyses and measures the presence and influence of diplomatic actors on Twitter, across the globe and in real-time. Our algorithms yield constantly updated rankings for both states and individuals, and an innovative interface that makes it possible to watch diplomacy in action. Users can customize the application to highlight the e-diplomatic activities of their home country. Driving the app is a database stocked with thousands of accounts, ranging from heads of state, ministers and diplomats to experts, activists and politically-motivated hackers.'⁴¹¹

This site allows the user to follow tweets on certain long-term conflicts such as PKK vs. Turkey for example. Another project, *Bundestwitter*, compiles the tweets of the members of the German parliament using this microblog service and gives the user the opportunity to follow politics in real-time.⁴¹²

With regards to making most of the aggregated data, Twitter analytics provides the account holder with insights into, for example, user behaviour, the number of clicks a tweet generated, and keeps track of the follower base. It also advertises that it helps the administrators to better understand which content is shared on Twitter and what kind of content its followers are interested in.⁴¹³ Its website tool gives the opportunity to analyse the efficiency of the website's Twitter integration through, for example, providing information about how much traffic it generates to the owner's website.⁴¹⁴ In contrast to Facebook's analytics tool that gives the page administrator access to similar information and comes automatically with it, businesses have to

⁴¹⁰ Brian Solis, "The Rise of Generation-C...and What to Do about It," *Brian Solis. Defining the Convergence of Media and Influence*, April 20, 2012, <http://www.briansolis.com/2012/04/the-rise-of-generation-c-and-what-to-do-about-it/>.

⁴¹¹ Agence France Press, "The E-Diplomacy Hub, a Real-Time Window onto Digital Diplomacy in Action," *AFP: E-Diplomacy*, 2012, <http://ediplomacy.afp.com>.

⁴¹² "Politiker twittern aus dem Deutschen Bundestag."

⁴¹³ "Analytics|Twitter for Business," *Twitter for Business*, 2013, <https://business.twitter.com/products/analytics-self-service>.

⁴¹⁴ Christopher Golda, "Introducing Twitter Web Analytics," *Twitter Developers*, September 13, 2011, <https://dev.twitter.com/blog/introducing-twitter-web-analytics>.

register for it. Furthermore, there is TweetDeck, an application that allows the user to monitor relevant content through creating lists and filters, monitoring the audience and scheduling tweets.⁴¹⁵ Twitter may thus prove beneficial for getting a message out without having to rely on other news agencies. Also, it can foster a direct connection between Twitter users and the broad audience.

While the foregoing paragraphs emphasized the controversy that social media raise, they nevertheless showed their high relevance for today's information sphere. Therefore, the next part will inquire how they could serve political causes.

3.2 'The Political Power of Social Media'⁴¹⁶

3.2.1 A Fifth Estate⁴¹⁷?

Despite the shortcomings mentioned above, social media appear at first sight to be the perfect medium for public diplomacy since they easily embody all three components as developed above (see chapter 2.3.3): Being a *network*, it facilitates *networking* by nature, potentially fosters relations since it can bring together all sorts of different people with diverse backgrounds as well as promote the national culture. The same applies to media representatives who can be easily targeted and included into the communication process.⁴¹⁸ Diplomats argue that social media can therefore expand a message's reach.⁴¹⁹

With platforms like Twitter and Facebook, we are able to dramatically broaden our reach, join the global conversation, and present America's narrative directly and not through someone else's filter. A case in point is Iran -- to counter the regime's propaganda against us, we are working to communicate directly with the Iranian people, so we have established a Farsi Twitter feed and a Facebook page, worked to circumvent Iran's "electronic curtain", and will soon launch our virtual Embassy Tehran. And, more broadly, we are enabling State Department officials to field questions from Twitter users

⁴¹⁵ "TweetDeck by Twitter," 2013, <http://www.tweetdeck.com/>.

⁴¹⁶ Shirky, "The Political Power of Social Media. Technology, the Public Sphere, and Political Change."

⁴¹⁷ Fenton, "The Internet and Social Networking," 136.

⁴¹⁸ Ostrowski, *Die Public Diplomacy der deutschen Auslandsvertretungen weltweit*, 39.

⁴¹⁹ See for example: Diplomat 3, Off-the-record conversation, Phone, January 17, 2012; Government Information Service, *Social Media in Government. Hands-on Toolbox*.

via our @StateDept account and our nine foreign language feeds -- Arabic, Farsi, Chinese, Russian, Spanish, French, Portuguese, Hindi, and Urdu.⁴²⁰

In short, one expects to pass on information in a more direct and unfiltered way as well as to reach ordinary people. Indeed, press releases posted on Twitter generate 30% more traffic, research shows.⁴²¹ Already in 2009, a report of the United States Government Accountability Office came to the conclusion that “[...] current information suggests a failure to adapt in this dynamic communications environment could significantly raise the risk that U.S. public diplomacy efforts could become increasingly irrelevant, particularly among younger audiences that represent a key focus of U.S. strategic communication efforts.”⁴²²

General enthusiasm surrounds the Internet that, decentralised by design, consists in a *network of networks*, much of which is built and operated by the private sector:⁴²³ ‘Where once the country had been at the mercy of gatekeepers and corporate connectors, it would now be open for intellectual growth. “Digital highways” would set paths for “free speech,” the thinking went, and “free speech” would give power to “ordinary people.”’⁴²⁴ Others praise a shift of power from hierarchies like the nation state or federal governments to citizen networks made possible amongst others through social media networks.⁴²⁵ PD 2.0 thus strongly relies on the thought of the individual’s empowerment through technology.⁴²⁶ ‘All you need is a camera phone to start a movement,’⁴²⁷ Jesse Lichtenstein enthuses.

Therefore, social media have been praised as ‘a “Fifth Estate” that reaches beyond and moves across the boundaries of existing institutions, becoming an alternative source of news as well as a

⁴²⁰ Mike Hammer, “Social Media and Foreign Policy: An Update From Silicon Valley,” *U.S. Department of State Blog*, November 21, 2011, http://blogs.state.gov/index.php/site/entry/social_media_and_foreign_policy/.

⁴²¹ Garcia, “Research: Twitter Drives More Traffic to Press Releases Than Facebook.”

⁴²² *U.S. Public Diplomacy. Key Issues for Congressional Oversight*, 31.

⁴²³ Jermyn Brooks, “Hands Off the Internet!,” *The New York Times*, December 6, 2012, sec. Opinion, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/07/opinion/hands-off-the-internet.html>.

⁴²⁴ Heller, “I Really Like That You Like What I Like.”

⁴²⁵ *DLD 2012 - Digital Policies* (Munich, Germany, 2012),

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jGsKYza1n8A&feature=youtube_gdata_player; Benjamin R. Barber, “Globalizing Democracy,” *The American Prospect*, December 19, 2012, <http://prospect.org/article/globalizing-democracy>.

⁴²⁶ Edward Comor and Hamilton Bean, “America’s ‘Engagement’ Delusion: Critiquing a Public Diplomacy Consensus,” *International Communication Gazette* 74, no. 3 (2012): 209–201.

⁴²⁷ Lichtenstein, “Digital Diplomacy.”

citizen-check on public life and private enterprise.⁴²⁸ This refers to the expression the *fourth estate*, placing the press in line with the former three sections (estates) of parliament in Britain (nobles, clergy, and commons).⁴²⁹ Indeed, several examples prove social media's substantial role in moral conflicts through uncovering for example scandals.⁴³⁰ While Kathie Jacobs Stanton, Twitter's head of strategy⁴³¹ who also worked as an adviser to former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, underlines that social media help all sorts of different voices to be heard.⁴³² Markus Kaim considers digital diplomacy giving citizens the possibility to influence governments, reversing traditional power relations.⁴³³ Both phenomena could be observed with the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) act, a U.S. House of Representative's bill, whose debate was indefinitely shelved due to the biggest online protests in Internet history. Initially destined to strengthen copyright protection on the Internet, SOPA fuelled fears of restraining Internet freedom instead. Its Senate counterpart, the Protect IP Act (PIPA) was similarly unpopular. Both proposals unleashed a firestorm of protest led by significant companies such as Google, Twitter and Facebook; roughly 115.000 sites changed their appearance, some like Wikipedia went down for an hour. This happened in the beginning of 2012, an election year, and Congress delayed the bill. Hacker group Anonymous attacked U.S. Ministry of Justice's Website because it arrested the operators of online file sharing platform *megaupload* and shut down the site.⁴³⁴ It is therefore not astonishing that 31% of the participants in the 2010 World Internet report were after all convinced that the Internet would give people like them more political power.⁴³⁵

⁴²⁸ Fenton, "The Internet and Social Networking," 136.

⁴²⁹ Kathy Gill, "What Is the Fourth Estate?," *About.com US Politics*, accessed March 1, 2013, http://uspolitics.about.com/od/politicaljunkies/a/fourth_estate.htm.

⁴³⁰ Fenton, "The Internet and Social Networking," 136-137.

⁴³¹ *DLD 2012 - Digital Policies*.

⁴³² Cull, "The Long Road to Public Diplomacy 2.0: The Internet in U.S. Public Diplomacy," 20.

⁴³³ Anja Türkan, "Digital Diplomacy – Foreign Policy in Times of Web 2.0," *Institut Für Auslandsbeziehungen (ifa) – Kulturen Verbinden.*, accessed January 5, 2012, <http://www.ifa.de/foerderprogramme/forschungsprogramm-kultur-und-aussenpolitik/aktuell/digital-diplomacy-foreign-policy-in-times-of-web-20/>.

⁴³⁴ *SOPA Stopped: "Bill Delay Major Victory for Internet Freedom,"* 2012,

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E7wrlRxIK4A&feature=youtube_gdata_player; Jonathan Weisman, "After an Online Firestorm, Congress Shelves Antipiracy Bills," *The New York Times*, January 20, 2012, sec. Technology,

<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/technology/senate-postpones-piracy-vote.html>; Matt Williams, "Sopa and PIPA Votes Shelved after Congress Climbs down on Piracy Bills," *The Guardian*, January 20, 2012, sec. Technology,

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/jan/20/pipa-vote-shelved-harry-reid>.

⁴³⁵ USC Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism, "Press Release & Highlights: World Internet Project: International Report 2010" (USC Annenberg School for Communication & Journalism, February 26, 2010), http://www.digitalcenter.org/WIP2010/wip2010_long_press_release_v2.pdf; USC Annenberg School for Communication

On this note, let us briefly discuss why public diplomats would consider opening the discipline up for such new developments altogether.

3.2.2 A Condition to Remaining Relevant?

Jan Melissen opines that ‘[...] public diplomacy can only be properly understood if it is analyzed in the context of change in diplomacy at large.’⁴³⁶ Let us for that matter take a brief look at what Harold Nicholson called the *French system of diplomacy*, which began to emerge during the second half of the 15th century and owes its name to the French’s dominant influence in its development and the fact that French substituted Latin as its working language. One could then observe a shift from diplomacy being the responsibility of a plenipotentiary – having full powers – and his *nuncios* – some sort of messenger – popular during the Middle Ages, who were then amended with a permanent resident embassy. The Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations from 1961 provides the system’s legal grounding up until today, defining for example the diplomatic mission’s rights, privileges and functions.⁴³⁷

During the 1970s and 1980s, however, this system was increasingly called into question, with voices claiming resident embassies had become anachronistic. Thanks to the communication revolution, heads of governments and their likes now had a direct line to each other at their disposal. They could simply pick up the phone if necessary, bypassing the ambassadors they had to rely on back in the days, which proved diplomatically and economically beneficial. Second, the multiplication of international organisations, notably the strengthening of the European Union (EU) had led to an increasing number of gatherings and indirect contacts happening anyway. Third, it was argued that international broadcasters as well as the Internet had magnificently extended and simplified information gathering. Last, resident missions in hostile states subject the staff to extreme danger of becoming, for example, hostages should conflicts escalate.⁴³⁸

The resident embassy’s actual disappearance was (amongst other reasons) adverted by the resident embassy proving tremendously versatile and adaptable, thus underscoring their relevance, defying their demission. While the relevance of resident embassies certainly also

and Journalism, “Press Release & Highlights: 2010 USC Annenberg Digital Future Study” (USC Annenberg School for Communication & Journalism, July 23, 2010).

⁴³⁶ Melissen, “Public Diplomacy,” 207.

⁴³⁷ Berridge, *Diplomacy*, 108–109; 115–118.

⁴³⁸ *Ibid.*, 119–120.

depends on each one individually, Berridge asserts that the effective majority performed the following crucial tasks at least to some extent: Represent their country in place of the head of state who cannot be everywhere at once, promote friendly relations with the host country as in networking or throwing receptions and (at least partially) support negotiations with the host country, especially the lengthy ones. Also, lobbying, commercial diplomacy and consular services as well as policy advice and clarifying intentions, as in explaining for example what reads between the lines of certain actions, are of relevance. Last, public diplomacy and information gathering as well as political reporting count amongst the duties.⁴³⁹

From this piece of history, it becomes clear that it is indispensable for embassies to move with the times and constantly reinvent themselves.⁴⁴⁰ This need to adapt combined with a fear of becoming marginalised is echoed in relevant strategy papers.⁴⁴¹ ‘As social media continue to expand and billions of people acquire mobile phones with text messaging capabilities, analysts say there is clearly a need for new and creative ways of vetting global issues to different publics.’⁴⁴² Similar voices can be heard at the German Foreign Office, whose web 2.0 handbook asserts that the adequate use of social media is crucial for any institution to continue to be perceived as a relevant and credible source.⁴⁴³ Judith McHale ‘[...] put[s] it bluntly: The world has changed, and if we do not change the way we interact with people, we risk being marginalized or made obsolete.’⁴⁴⁴

On the ministerial level *remaining relevant* proves crucial for funding negotiations that take place within the framework of the usual budget process with the federal government. In Germany, the latter depends on the *Bundestag’s* budgetary committee that controls the federal government’s cost policy and advises as well as acts as the central coordinator of the annual

⁴³⁹ Ibid., 120–130.

⁴⁴⁰ Michael Siebert, “The Changing Role of Embassies in EU Member States,” *UACES On Europe*, August 10, 2009, <http://uacesoneurope.ideasononeurope.eu/2009/08/10/the-changing-role-of-embassies-in-eu-member-states/>; Philip Lader, “What Else an Embassy Really Does,” *Council of American Ambassadors*, 2000, <http://www.americanambassadors.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publications.article&articleid=47>.

⁴⁴¹ *U.S. Public Diplomacy. Key Issues for Congressional Oversight*, 31.

⁴⁴² Eric Abdullateef, “USAID’s First Public Engagement Campaign: Measuring Public Engagement,” *Global Media Journal* 12, no. The Use of Social Media in U.S. Public Diplomacy: 3, accessed January 4, 2013, <http://journals.textual.info/index.php/gmj-american/article/view/14/11>.

⁴⁴³ Auswärtiges Amt, “Leitfaden Web 2.0,” 6.

⁴⁴⁴ Bureau of Public Affairs U.S. Department of State. The Office of Electronic Information, “Public Diplomacy and Social Media in Latin America,” *U.S. Department of State. Diplomacy in Action.*, March 29, 2011, <http://www.state.gov/r/remarks/2011/159355.htm>.

federal budget.⁴⁴⁵ In the U.S., the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee⁴⁴⁶ is in charge of foreign policy legislation in the Senate and, amongst other things, oversees funding. So, the Secretary of State makes a yearly budget request in front of it, trying to underscore the administration's crucial role that should translate into a matching budget.⁴⁴⁷

When now compiling all this information, social media promise unlimited reach (is the Internet not a global network?) and engagement (is not its main purpose to interact?). Also, cannot everyone just easily do it, which provides people with a tool of empowerment? Does this media environment really 'have profound effects on society and politics'⁴⁴⁸? What do these entail? Could social media foster political participation as Clay Shirky asserts or is it rather unfit to achieve these goals and serves rather modest purposes, as Malcolm Gladwell reckons?⁴⁴⁹ To further investigate these claims, let us now address the main characteristics of social media that seem crucial to its adoption for politics, namely the content typically shared, its potential reach and capacity for empowerment as well as its possibility to interact, the network structure and the features that come with being a privately owned platform. Also, its trustworthiness and how one can evaluate social media efforts will be explained.

3.3 Assessing Social Media's Practicability for Public Diplomacy

3.3.1 Content Focus

As already suggested, most people visit social media sites to relax and fill time, underscoring the tools' playful character.⁴⁵⁰ This reflects on the content shared: The most re-tweeted line in 2010 'In honour of oil-soaked birds, 'tweets' are now 'gurgles.'" came from Comedian Stephen Colbert, referring to the oil spill in the Mexican gulf. The YouTube statistics show similar results: The most popular videos were the 'Bed Intruder Song!!!' and a parody of singer Kesha's video 'Tik

⁴⁴⁵ "Deutscher Bundestag: Haushaltsausschuss," accessed January 4, 2013, <http://www.bundestag.de/bundestag/ausschuesse17/a08/index.jsp>.

⁴⁴⁶ "US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Home," 2013, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/>.

⁴⁴⁷ *Background Information on the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate* (Washington: Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 2000); *Testimony Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton 2012 State and USAID Budget Request Senate Foreign Relations Committee March 2, 2011* (Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 2, 2011), http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Clinton_Testimony.pdf.

⁴⁴⁸ "A Special Report on the News Industry: The Future of News: Back to the Coffee House."

⁴⁴⁹ Shirky, "The Political Power of Social Media. Technology, the Public Sphere, and Political Change"; Shirky and Gladwell, "From Innovation to Revolution"; Gladwell, "Small Change. Why the Revolution Will Not Be Tweeted."

⁴⁵⁰ USC Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism, "Press Release & Highlights: World Internet Project: International Report 2010."

Tok'.⁴⁵¹ The most liked video until November 2012 was K-pop Psy's *Gangnam Style*.⁴⁵² Clothing company GAP Inc. or video game retailer Gamestop Corp. just to name two examples both closed their storefront on Facebook initially expected to be a successful endeavour. 'But it was like trying to sell stuff to people while they're hanging out with their friends at the bar,'⁴⁵³ analyst Sucharita Mulpuru explains the failure.

Moreover, things may spin out of control since users tend to be an unpredictable factor. A TV-advertising for an ING DiBa bank account featuring basketball star Dirk Nowitzki eating sausage induced an ethical debate on Facebook about eating meat and hunger that overstrained the page administrators' resources to such an extent, countering their initial intentions that in the end, the comments were deleted and content taken down. This shows how hard it is to control the message once it has become public and that such endeavours require considerable resources many organisations lack.⁴⁵⁴ These online protest waves, so-called *shitstorms* can easily hit anybody but the more famous someone is, the more he or she tends to polarise and is likely to become a target, Jasmin Siri and Kathrin Seßler argue.⁴⁵⁵ These shitstorms are, however, not necessarily genuine and the result of indignant users can also be professionally orchestrated: The agency Caveman, for example, has specialised in righting wrongs through creating these sorts of *shitstorms* keeping their client anonymous and complying with certain moral standards that are not specified further. This includes actions such as flooding Facebook fan pages with comments or likes.⁴⁵⁶ Fighting such campaigns can prove truly difficult and would require substantial technical resources as well as manpower.

⁴⁵¹ "How Much Is Your Content Worth?," *DigitalAnalog*, June 28, 2011, <http://digitalanalog.in/2011/06/28/how-much-is-your-content-worth/>.

⁴⁵² Jay Rayner, "How Psy Taught Me Gangnam Style," *The Observer*, November 18, 2012, sec. Music, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/music/2012/nov/18/gangnam-style-psy>.

⁴⁵³ Ashley Lutz, "Gamestop to J.C. Penney Shut Facebook Stores," *Bloomberg*, February 22, 2012, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-17/f-commerce-trips-as-gap-to-penney-shut-facebook-stores-retail.html>.

⁴⁵⁴ "ING-Diba beendet Facebook-Diskussion zu Werbeclip," *heise online*, January 21, 2012, <http://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/ING-Diba-beendet-Facebook-Diskussion-zu-Werbeclip-1418741.html>; Dominik Ruisinger, "ITK-Branche ist unzureichend auf Shitstorms vorbereitet," *PR Journal*, August 20, 2012, http://www.pr-journal.de/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=11935&catid=380&Itemid=592.

⁴⁵⁵ Siri and Seßler, *Twitterpolitik. Politische Inszenierungen in einem neuen Medium*, 67.

⁴⁵⁶ "Shitstormagentur - wir bringen die kritische Masse für eine Empörungswelle," *Caveman Guerilla Marketing Agentur*, 2011, <http://www.caveman-werbeagentur.de/shitstormagentur>; Peter Kümmel, "Netz-Phänomen: Nehmt es als Erfrischung!," *Die Zeit*, March 31, 2013, sec. Internet, <http://www.zeit.de/2013/14/internet-shitstorm/komplettansicht>.

For example, information can easily get distorted, as Nicholas J. Cull observes.⁴⁵⁷ This happened with a statement Alec Ross, former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's retired Senior Advisor for Technology and Innovation, may or may not have made during a speech. It was then tweeted and widely discussed, resulting in Alec Ross having to release an official statement with regards to this matter.⁴⁵⁸

Enthusiasm and humour can create problems, too: In 2012, the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) in North-Rhine Westphalia asked their sympathisers to vote for the design and slogan of one of their six election campaign posters. The questions asked were: 'Which topic is of importance to you? Which political statement should we present on an even larger scale?' The result, elected with 4,500 likes on their Facebook fan page was the slogan 'SPD ist Currywurst'⁴⁵⁹ above a picture showing a popular dish: *Currywurst*, chips with ketchup and mayonnaise, probably intending to show the party's proximity to the masses. Despite the fact that the suggestion came from two members of the SPD's youth organization *Jusos*, the party leadership was not amused. Just making it disappear was, however, not an option, which is why the posters were printed nevertheless, inducing widespread amusement.⁴⁶⁰ This example confirms Andrew Keen's concerns mentioned above. Since this shows that a page's content can easily be misunderstood as endorsement, noted blogger Matt Armstrong for example explicitly indicated on his Twitter site that '(re)tweet is not an endorsement.'⁴⁶¹

A report concluded that '[o]ne of the problems with public Diplomacy today is not a lack of theory but a lack of imagination in how to successfully implement campaigns. Practitioners have to keep in mind that the essence of Public Diplomacy is to connect the message with the overall

⁴⁵⁷ Cull, "Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories," 52.

⁴⁵⁸ John Brown, "Happy April Fool's Day," *John Brown's Public Diplomacy Press and Blog Review, Version 2.0*, April 2, 2012, <http://johnbrownnotesandessays.blogspot.de/2012/04/happy-april-fools-day.html>.

⁴⁵⁹ Translation: 'SPD is Currywurst'; Currywurst is a roasted sausage with curry ketchup sauce.

⁴⁶⁰ Andreas Niesmann, "Missglückte Internet-Aktion?: Pommes Schranke für die SPD," *Handelsblatt*, April 16, 2012, sec. Deutschland - Politik, <http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/nrw-wahl-2012/missglueckte-internet-aktion-pommes-schranke-fuer-die-spd/6516178.html>; "Martin Sonneborn on Facebook," Facebook fan page, (April 16, 2012), <https://www.facebook.com/martin.sonneborn>.

⁴⁶¹ Matt Armstrong, "Matt Armstrong (mountainrunner) on Twitter," Twitter Page, (January 10, 2011), <https://twitter.com/mountainrunner>.

strategic outlook of government.⁴⁶² One telling example of how difficult it is to combine salient content with politics is Sweden's concept. Its official Twitter account, followed by 27.915 people as of 10 April 2012, gives sole control of the account each week to a different Swede.⁴⁶³ The latter then shares his or her opinions and / or daily experiences. This equals a supreme loss of (editorial) control and strategic message, Maddy Savage feels,⁴⁶⁴ that is actually so important to maintain in the midst of the information overload that makes it hard to remain visible.⁴⁶⁵ In the case of Sweden, this looseness led to unwanted anti-Semitic comments that one of the temporary administrators made.⁴⁶⁶ It all comes down to diplomacy working with different premises than social media, as Jay Newton-Small points out: 'Diplomacy has always been the art of politesse and subtly, two words that are virtually incompatible with Twitter.'⁴⁶⁷ While public diplomacy is certainly more flexible on that – it is traditionally more open and unconventional with regards to content and in the way that it includes the public – it still is a form of statecraft that needs to comply with certain codes of conduct. Just because interaction happens on a different digital level, diplomats and / or government officials are still representing their country.

From what we have discovered so far, it might be challenging to adapt social media to public diplomacy since its workings with regards to content and approach are quite different from the former. Let us now focus on its potential reach.

3.3.2 Restricted Reach

3.3.2.1 Limited Virality

Since Facebook develops increasingly 'as a web within the web',⁴⁶⁸ the presence on the platform certainly boosts an organisation's visibility. Facebook's algorithms determine that the higher the response measured in likes, comments and shares a post generates the more likely it is to show

⁴⁶² Report on Wilton Park Conference 1034. "Public Diplomacy: Moving From Policy to Practice." p.3; Carolijn van Noort, "Bringing Public Diplomacy 2.0 to the Next Level," March 14, 2011, 16, <http://dl.dropbox.com/u/1574605/Blog/Public%20Diplomacy%202.0%20Research,%20Carolijn%20van%20Noort.pdf>.

⁴⁶³ "@sweden / Micke (sweden) on Twitter," April 10, 2012, <https://twitter.com/#!/sweden>.

⁴⁶⁴ Maddy Savage, "Twitter Feed Gives Swedes a New Picture," *BBC*, January 14, 2012, sec. Europe, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16534090>.

⁴⁶⁵ Government Information Service, *Social Media in Government. Hands-on Toolbox*, 7.

⁴⁶⁶ Kelsey Suemnicht, "The Digital Diplomacy Horizon," *Kelsey Suemnicht*, February 25, 2013, <http://kelsey-suemnicht.wordpress.com/2013/02/25/the-digital-diplomacy-horizon/>.

⁴⁶⁷ Jay Newton-Small, "Diplomacy in the Age of Twitter," *Time*, April 3, 2013, <http://swampland.time.com/2013/04/03/diplomacy-in-the-age-of-twitter/>.

⁴⁶⁸ Laird, "Want Half-Off Facebook Ads? Keep Users On-Site."

up in the fans' / friends' newsfeed. Still, a study found that only 17% of a page's fans really saw a post, as in it showing up in their newsfeed, which does not even imply that they clicked on it.⁴⁶⁹ This number is found to decrease the more fans a page accumulates, which calls the longing for fans into question.⁴⁷⁰ Furthermore, approximately 2% of the post views that take place generate negative feedback, as in users either hiding only the post in question, hiding all updates from the newsfeed, *unliking* the fan page (stop following it) or reporting it as spam.⁴⁷¹ 4% of the posts on Facebook are plain spam.⁴⁷²

Moreover, the bare use of these technologies does not necessarily turn politics-adverse people into dedicated citizens. On the contrary, research has shown that rather those already interested in certain topics suddenly have an increased reservoir of options to their disposal increasing their engagement.⁴⁷³ Schmidt reckons that the Internet fosters a segmentation of the public sphere, the individual parts being tailored to the particular interests of the addressed members.⁴⁷⁴ Natalie Fenton specifies: [...].far from broadening our communicational horizons and deliberative understandings, social media work to reinforce already existing social hierarchies and further strengthen close(d) communities.⁴⁷⁵ She also compiled evidence suggesting how social networks led members to be exposed to very selective media content, not least because they tended to communicate with people whose opinions they shared.⁴⁷⁶ One reason for this is that the Internet is a so-called *pull medium* that in contrast to other tools such as television requires the user to

⁴⁶⁹ Brian Carter, "UH, OH! Facebook Pages Only Reach 17% Of Fans," *AllFacebook*, January 18, 2012, http://www.allfacebook.com/facebook-page-17-2012-01?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=WW&utm_term=%23SocialMedia+%23SM.

⁴⁷⁰ "As Page Reach Decreases, Is Facebook Starting to Screw Brand Pages?," *SimplyZesty*, October 14, 2012, <http://www.simplyzesty.com/facebook/how-massive-changes-to-newsfeed-are-screwing-business-pages-on-facebook/>.

⁴⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷² Alex Fitzpatrick, "Facebook Takes the Fight Against Clickjacking to the Courts," *Mashable Social Media*, January 29, 2012, <http://mashable.com/2012/01/28/facebook-clickjacking-spam/>; Anna Sauerbrey, "Facebook ernennt Chef-Lobbyisten für Berlin," *SPIEGEL ONLINE*, January 2, 2012, sec. Netzwelt, <http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/netzpolitik/0,1518,812773,00.html>.

⁴⁷³ Schmidt, *Das neue Netz*, 149–150.

⁴⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 151–152.

⁴⁷⁵ Fenton, "The Internet and Social Networking," 127.

⁴⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 130.

actively look for content, which is mostly done in accordance with pre-existing interests.⁴⁷⁷ Accordingly, communication via social media often equals *preaching to the converted*.⁴⁷⁸

In addition, its pundits reckon that social media's technology makes it easy for users to get in touch, comment on posts or ask questions they would normally not voice because of too much awe for or distance to a foreign diplomatic mission.⁴⁷⁹ UK Foreign Secretary William Hague used his account to help people better understand foreign policy through explaining issues and inviting his followers to ask questions.⁴⁸⁰ Twitter also seemed useful in fostering interaction between officials: When the U.S. ambassador the United Nations, Susan Rice, tweeted from behind closed doors of a Security Council meeting that she was '[d]isgusted that Russia and China prevented the #UN from fulfilling its sole purpose,'⁴⁸¹ referring to these governments vetoing a resolution on Syria, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov replied on Twitter: 'Certain western states are trying to obscure the developments with hysterical statements on Russia's veto of the Syria resolution.'⁴⁸²

Schmidt subtends that structural obstacles hinder the emergence of *politics 2.0* through new technological developments because of the political system. The latter allegedly hampers and sometimes even inhibits truly authentic and participation-oriented communication due to presentation constraints and the rules of a political party's organisation.⁴⁸³ Indeed, while politicians ideally do have a clear position, many abstain from explicitly defining stances on unpopular topics and from deviating from the official party line. Furthermore, it is in an embassy's nature not to have an opinion. 'As with anything a diplomat says, we have to avoid becoming part of the story. There is no such thing as a "personal opinion": anything you say is recorded and can be held against you – and the government you represent,'⁴⁸⁴ British ambassador to Amman Peter Millet points out. This distinguishes diplomats from other political figures, such

⁴⁷⁷ Carola Richter, "Revolutionen 2.0? Zur Rolle der Medien beim politischen Wandel in der arabischen Welt 2011," in *Friedensgutachten 2011*, ed. Margret Johannsen et al. (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2011), 50.

⁴⁷⁸ Schmidt, *Das neue Netz*, 149–150.

⁴⁷⁹ Diplomat 3, Off-the-record conversation; Employee of Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Interview, Skype, January 9, 2012.

⁴⁸⁰ Sandre, "Twitter for Diplomats," 30–33.

⁴⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 45.

⁴⁸² *Ibid.*

⁴⁸³ Schmidt, *Das neue Netz*, 155.

⁴⁸⁴ Peter Millet, "Twiplomacy," *Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Global Conversations*, June 26, 2013, <http://blogs.fco.gov.uk/petermillet/2013/06/26/twiplomacy/>.

as Sigmar Gabriel, who can share their opinions about all sorts of issues.⁴⁸⁵ And this does not change with interactive formats: Molly Walker argues that the initiative #AskState that permitted Twitter users to directly ask questions led only to predictable answers in line with official State Department policy.⁴⁸⁶

Furthermore, social media's advocates hope for information going viral much more easily.⁴⁸⁷ Tweets often only get attention after having been broadcasted through conventional channels, though: The #aufschrei campaign against sexism in Germany, induced by an article in the Stern magazine, was popularised through traditional media picking the story up but imploded just as fast.⁴⁸⁸ While the Internet might offer a voice to those who could not make themselves heard before, critics argue that the generated content often subjects individual thoughts to those of the masses.⁴⁸⁹

[T]he larger pattern of the appeal of a new online collectivism that is nothing less than a resurgence of the idea that the collective is all-wise, that it is desirable to have influence concentrated in a bottleneck that can channel the collective with the most verity and force. This is different from representative democracy, or meritocracy. This idea has had dreadful consequences when thrust upon us from the extreme Right or the extreme Left in various historical periods.⁴⁹⁰

Besides, it would be more than premature to declare all other forms of communication dead. Vast parts of the population still rely heavily on radio or television. A report of the McKinsey Global Institute uncovered that social media (when compared to other media such as TV, mobile phones or personal conversation) do only account for 5% of the time spent on media consumption and communication.⁴⁹¹ 'Research [...] has demonstrated that new modes of communication do not

⁴⁸⁵ "Sigmar Gabriel, SPD," Facebook fan page, accessed May 18, 2012, <http://de-de.facebook.com/sigmar.gabriel>; Employee of Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Interview.

⁴⁸⁶ Molly Bernhart Walker, "Twitter Enables Global State Department Briefings," *FierceGovernmentIT*, January 9, 2012, <http://www.fiercegovernmentit.com/story/twitter-enables-global-state-department-briefings/2012-01-09>.

⁴⁸⁷ Diplomat 3, Off-the-record conversation.

⁴⁸⁸ Hachmeister, "Vorwort," 4–6.

⁴⁸⁹ Schmidt, *Das neue Netz*, 178.

⁴⁹⁰ Lanier Jaron, "Digital Maoism: The Hazards of the New Online Collectivism," May 30, 2006, http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/lanier06/lanier06_index.html.

⁴⁹¹ Michael Chui et al., *The Social Economy: Unlocking Value and Productivity through Social Technologies*, Executive Summary (McKinsey Global Institute, McKinsey & Company, July 2012), 6, http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/mgi/research/technology_and_innovation/the_social_economy.

displace old ones, at least not in the short run. [...] Radio did not destroy the newspaper; television did not kill radio; and the Internet did not make TV extinct. In each case, the information environment became richer and more complex. That is what we are experiencing in this crucial phase of transition to a dominantly digital ecology.⁴⁹² The so-called digital divide explains why only few people have access to social media content in the first place.

3.3.2.2 Digital Divide

While the Internet seems omnipresent in industrial nations, this does not apply to all states: Only roughly a third – 30.2 % – of the world’s population are connected to the Internet and only 4.6% with broadband.⁴⁹³




Figure 3-4: World Internet Usage Penetration 2011⁴⁹⁴

While especially North Americans are well connected, only 13.5% of Africans dispose of Internet access. This divide is also manifest within states: Older generations in industrialised countries do not see the advantages using the Internet and computers could yield and thus abstain from (regularly) resorting to this technology.⁴⁹⁵ This also reflects back on the use of social media – without a proper Internet connection, accessing these services is less convenient. Most tweets

⁴⁹² Robert Damton, “5 Myths About the ‘Information Age,’” *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, April 17, 2011, sec. The Chronicle Review, <http://chronicle.com/article/5-Myths-About-the-Information/127105/>.

⁴⁹³ “The World’s Broadband Usage and Statistics,” *TechLoy*, December 3, 2011, <http://techloy.com/2011/12/03/the-worlds-broadband-usage-and-statistics-infographic/>.

⁴⁹⁴ Author’s presentation; “World Internet Usage Statistics News and World Population Stats,” accessed January 26, 2012, <http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm>.

⁴⁹⁵ Kai Hafez, *Mythos Globalisierung: Warum die Medien nicht grenzenlos sind* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2005), 142–147.

also originate in the U.S. followed by Brazil, Indonesia, the UK, Mexico and Malaysia while a country like Nigeria has not only a low Twitter penetration; also very few tweets are sent from within the country. A study tracking the frequency with which articles from major newspapers in several countries were tweeted found out that the majority was American (35%), the UK somewhere placed in the middle (19%) with Germany being at the bottom of the league (4%).⁴⁹⁶ This shows how technical or general premises severely limit social media's reach refuting its possibility to be a tool of mass communication in a predefined geographic area.

In addition to age, the level of education, income as well as gender – there are generally more men than women online⁴⁹⁷ – has a high influence on e-participation, the German parliament's committee of enquiry on *The Internet and digital society* found out. The more exigent a political activity, the higher participants were dispersed. Furthermore, so-called *digital citizens* who drive changes with regards to political communication and participation represent only 16% of Germany's population and are considerably younger and more educated than the average.⁴⁹⁸

While social media, however, seem to attract more women than men (43% to 57% on Facebook and 41% to 59% on Twitter), the income data confirm the German enquiry committee's findings: 37% and 47% of Twitter's and respectively Facebook's users dispose of a (presumably yearly) household income of \$50.000 – \$99.000; more than half of both network's users had done some college and roughly a quarter had earned at least a bachelor's degree. 46% and 19% of Facebook's and Twitter's members respectively were younger than 25.⁴⁹⁹ Also, only a fracture of the population is on Twitter or Facebook: While in the second quarter of 2011 almost 50% of Britain's and the United States' population as well as approximately 25% of Germans were using Facebook, only roughly 6%, 5% and 3% of Britons, U.S. Americans and Germans respectively were on Twitter.⁵⁰⁰ Social media are as a matter of fact truly exclusive.

⁴⁹⁶ Marco Toledo Bastos, "Newsmaking in the Twittersphere - Some New International Data on How Journalism Flows through the Microblog Network (Guest Blog)," *London School of Economics. Polis*, March 14, 2013, <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/polis/2013/03/14/newsmaking-in-the-twittersphere-some-new-international-data-on-how-journalism-flows-through-the-microblog-network-guest-blog-twitter/>.

⁴⁹⁷ USC Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism, "Press Release & Highlights: World Internet Project: International Report 2010."

⁴⁹⁸ "Deutscher Bundestag: Wirkung des Internets bei politischer Teilhabe begrenzt," accessed March 20, 2012, http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2012/38163897_kw12_pa_enquete_internet/index.html.

⁴⁹⁹ Sandre, "Twitter for Diplomats," 22.

⁵⁰⁰ "A Special Report on the News Industry: Bulletins from the Future."

Can PD 2.0 transcend this? With regards to elite-centrism and exclusivity, Kai Hafez' thoughts on the coverage of foreign affairs are of great interest. He assigns the following characteristics to foreign affairs broadcasting:⁵⁰¹

- Regionalism (and focus on metropolises)
- Conflict perspective
- Politics centred
- Elite centred (focus on official actors, marginalisation of other political groups such as NGOs)
- Decontextualizing (simplified broadcasting, framing)
- Omitting structural problems of international relations (complex interactions between industrialisation and underdevelopment, for example, and focus on armed conflicts)

To uncover whether or not social media are indeed an unconventional channel for public diplomacy, the case study will later explore to which extent these criteria apply to PD 2.0.

Furthermore, digital diplomacy relies on the concept of Internet freedom that is not given everywhere: 'The Internet doesn't exist [...] there are 190 different internets.'⁵⁰² There are not only regional preferences for certain content: Westerners seem to prefer home videos on such platforms while Chinese users are more interested in professionally produced videos. Censorship is significant as well: China's regulations are called the *Great Firewall*, behind which YouTube and Facebook are blocked; Alec Ross argues that there are severe regressions in Turkey and Thailand, for example – and regulations vary heavily from country to country.⁵⁰³ *Reporters Without Borders* confirm these assertions, finding that supervising users, state propaganda, filtering content, as well as completely shutting down the Internet and mobile phones have

⁵⁰¹ Hafez, *Mythos Globalisierung*, 46–56.

⁵⁰² "A Special Report on Technology and Geography: National Differences: The World Is What You Make It," *The Economist*, October 27, 2012.

⁵⁰³ *Gov2.0 Expo 2010: Alec Ross, "Global Engagement Starts at Home,"* 2010, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GvemrXYF074&feature=youtube_gdata_player; Christopher Walker and Sarah Cook, "China's Parallel Online Universe," *The Diplomat*, December 27, 2011, <http://the-diplomat.com/2011/12/27/china%E2%80%99s-parallel-online-universe/?all=true>; "A Special Report on Technology and Geography: National Differences: The World Is What You Make It."

become a usual practice in certain regions.⁵⁰⁴ These restrictions do not only apply to political content but extend also to social, cultural or transparency issues.⁵⁰⁵

On a global scale, this means that many citizens all over the world are unable to join debates, especially since most of them take place in English, which excludes those not fluent in the language.⁵⁰⁶ Only 15% of the world's population is believed to understand English.⁵⁰⁷ In addition to that, research has shown that while Internet communication can cross all sorts of geographical and social boundaries, the cyberspace paradoxically reflects real world inequalities.⁵⁰⁸

Assuming that social networks are discretely explanatory for human behavior, then, ignores not only the influence of systemic power relations related to gender, sexuality, race, class etc. on behavior, but also how the subject's own ability for empirical action is influenced by the larger interrelated context in which he or she is situated. Social networking applications remove these "webs of power" while simultaneously exposing identity self-presentation and relational ties, with the result of removing value and signification from the network.⁵⁰⁹

Another interesting aspect in this regard is Frederick Solt's conclusion that higher economic inequality restraints 'political interest, the frequency of political discussion, and participation in elections among all but the most affluent citizens [...].'⁵¹⁰ This may not only deepen the inequalities, he argues, since the privileged population's position is further strengthened, it also

⁵⁰⁴ "Beset by Online Surveillance and Content Filtering, Netizens Fight on," *Reporters Without Borders. For Freedom of Information*, March 12, 2012, <http://en.rsf.org/beset-by-online-surveillance-and-12-03-2012,42061.html>.

⁵⁰⁵ Garry Bligh et al., "How Open Is Your Internet? An Interactive Map," *The Guardian*, April 16, 2012, sec. Technology, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/datablog/interactive/2012/apr/16/web-filtering-censorship>.

⁵⁰⁶ Giles Crouch, "Digital Diplomacy and Language Use in Social Media," *Mediabadger*, April 2, 2012, <http://www.mediabadger.com/2012/04/language-use-in-digital-diplomacy-via-social-media/>.

⁵⁰⁷ "ITU Calls for Broadband Internet Access for Half the World's Population by 2015," *Internet Telecommunications Union*, May 25, 2010, http://www.itu.int/net/pressoffice/press_releases/2010/25.aspx#.UQajwvLbWxg.

⁵⁰⁸ Tom Postmes, Russell Spears, and Martin Lea, "Breaching or Building Social Boundaries? SIDE-Effects of Computer-Mediated Communication," *Communication Research* 25, no. 6 (January 12, 1998): 689; James Curran, "Reinterpreting the Internet," in *Misunderstanding the Internet*, ed. Natalie Fenton, Des Freedman, and James Curran, Communication and Society (London, New York [etc.]: Routledge, 2012), 11.

⁵⁰⁹ Alice Marwick, "I'm a Lot More Interesting than a Friendster Profile': Identity Presentation, Authenticity and Power in Social Networking Services" (presented at the Association Of Internet Researchers 6.0: Internet Generations, Chicago, 2005), 12,

http://www.academia.edu/421099/Im_a_Lot_More_Interesting_Than_a_Friendster_Profile_Identity_Presentation_Authenticity_and_Power_In_Social_Networking_Services.

⁵¹⁰ Frederick Solt, "Economic Inequality and Democratic Political Engagement," *American Journal of Political Science* 52, no. 1 (January 28, 2008): 48.

underscores the selective nature of active citizens. The UK's *Commission on Poverty, Participation and Power* detected further barriers to participation amongst the least wealthy, for example insufficient literacy or a lack of self-esteem and powerlessness leading to disbelief in change.⁵¹¹

Having thus demonstrated that not only technological characteristics but also the digital divide substantially hampers social media's reach, the next paragraph will discuss its second feature that is often praised, namely interaction and citizen empowerment.

3.3.3 Of Citizen Empowerment and *Slacktivism*

Paul Mason opines that 'a network can usually defeat a hierarchy [because it...] is better at adapting to a situation where the quality of information is crucial to success, but where information itself is fluid; [...] once information networks become social, the implications are massive: truth can now travel faster than lies, and all propaganda becomes instantly flammable. [...] Ultimately the truth, or something close to it, persists much longer than disinformation.'⁵¹²

Indeed, 'social media are not about [...] hierarchical organization. Facebook and the like are tools for building networks, which are the opposite, in structure and character, of hierarchies. Unlike hierarchies such as a government administration, with their rules and procedures, networks are not controlled by a single central authority. Decisions are made through consensus, and the ties that bind people to the group are loose.'⁵¹³ '[B]ecause networks don't have a centralized leadership structure and clear lines of authority, [though], they have real difficulty reaching consensus and setting goals. They can't think strategically; they are chronically prone to conflict and error. How do you make difficult choices about tactics or strategy or philosophical direction when everyone has an equal say?'⁵¹⁴

These aspects are hardly relevant if the network does neither aim at inducing systemic changes nor needs strategic thinking to achieve its goals, Malcolm Gladwell argues, but are crucial to challenge an organised and powerful authority;⁵¹⁵ networks are not organisations, lacking net

⁵¹¹ Commission on Poverty, Participation and Power, *Listen Hear: The Right to Be Heard. Report of the Commission on Poverty, Participation and Power* (Bristol: University of Bristol Policy Press, 2000), 32–33, <http://www.jrf.org.uk/sites/files/jrf/1861347804.pdf>.

⁵¹² Mason, "Global Unrest."

⁵¹³ Gladwell, "Small Change. Why the Revolution Will Not Be Tweeted."

⁵¹⁴ Ibid.

⁵¹⁵ Ibid.

information flows as well as clearly defined lines of responsibility and authority which makes them spin out of control more easily when no leadership commands the ensemble.⁵¹⁶ Natalie Fenton reckons that the lack of an authority to coordinate or frame different streams may lead to an organisation's political dissolution or fragmentation.⁵¹⁷

Besides, Gladwell argues that major changes rely on strong ties and not the weak ones social media are based upon and mentions several uprisings as different as the American Civil rights movement, democratisation in Eastern Germany and the Taliban to make his point.⁵¹⁸ As Granovetter states, more people could be reached in theory through weak ties; to mobilise them for a cause, however, strong ties are required since following an idea requires trust that a personal connection is the basis for, as shown in chapter 2. The reason for this is that trust in someone is strongly affected by the ability of predicting and affecting such a leader's behaviour. Within a net of weak ties, such a leader figure would be less inclined to act trustworthily towards the others because there is no deep personal connection to them.⁵¹⁹

Social media rather strengthen existing ties: A study about social media in Brussels found that they reaffirmed the so-called *Brussels Bubble*, that is, EU stakeholders transposing their close circle to the Internet.⁵²⁰ With regards to politics, a study in 2012 found that *twiplomacy* as it is frequently called resembled more an echo chamber than a discussion forum. It concluded that only a few political leaders have ever tweeted themselves, if regularly at all. Only roughly one third follows other political leaders and many more do not follow anyone. Also, most tweets were in English and Spanish, which per se exclude a substantial part of the globe's population, illiterate in these languages, as already suggested above.⁵²¹ As chapter 2.3.2 has shown, a personal connection is a crucial element when it comes to taking up ideas. When asked what made them retweet, 84% of the respondents answered that the factor was a personal connection and 69%

⁵¹⁶ Seib, *Real-Time Diplomacy*, 136–137.

⁵¹⁷ Natalie Fenton, "The Internet and Radical Politics," in *Misunderstanding the Internet*, ed. Natalie Fenton, Des Freedman, and James Curran, Communication and Society (London, New York [etc.]: Routledge, 2012), 159.

⁵¹⁸ Gladwell, "Small Change. Why the Revolution Will Not Be Tweeted."

⁵¹⁹ Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," 1369;1373–1374.

⁵²⁰ Emmanouil Patavos, "Social Media in the Brussels Bubble: Why It Matters for Public Affairs Professionals," *Interel*, accessed March 14, 2013, <http://www.interelgroup.com/what-were-talking-about/social-media-brussels-bubble-why-it-matters-public-affairs-p/>.

⁵²¹ John Heilprin, "Tweet This: Study Finds Limits to New 'Twiplomacy,'" *The Sacramento Bee*, July 26, 2012, sec. News, <http://www.sacbee.com/2012/07/26/4661726/tweet-this-study-finds-limits.html>.

decide on whom they should follow based on suggestions by friends.⁵²² This supports John Brown's claims that "the last three feet in face-to-face conversation" (to quote Edward R. Murrow) far surpasses Facebook-to-Facebook diplomacy as a means of human communication.⁵²³ Personal relationships are indeed paramount.

The concepts of *clicktivism* ('requiring no more commitment than the twitch of a gamer's finger'⁵²⁴) and *slacktivism*⁵²⁵ – a blend of *slacker* (being good for nothing) and *activist* (campaigning for political change) – are particularly significant in this respect. The latter refers to 'actions performed via the Internet in support of a political or social cause but regarded as requiring little time or involvement, e.g. signing an online petition or joining a campaign group on a social networking website.'⁵²⁶ The Kony2012 campaign, calling for the arrest of Ugandan warlord Joseph Kony⁵²⁷ that saw an unprecedented rise and fall is a telling example. 'The video seemed to embody the *slacktivist* ethos: viewers oblivious to a complex foreign conflict are made heroic by watching a video, buying a bracelet, hanging a poster.'⁵²⁸ Despite the organisers' claims of their sincere interest in helping to arrest Joseph Kony and that the huge volume of support underscored these new forms of human rights enforcement, its critics condemned its vagueness and messianic tendencies that failed to bring about profound discussions of the issue.⁵²⁹ Facebook's feedback process works similarly: Radovanovic and Ragnedda quote an interviewee who suggested that the *like* button signified "I like your post, but I am far too lazy or not interested enough to make an actual comment, or in a hurry."⁵³⁰

In this respect, we should also address user interaction and the 90-9-1 rule. Another argument in favour of resorting to social media is that it increases the possibility for people to voice their

⁵²² Sandre, "Twitter for Diplomats," 18.

⁵²³ Brown, "Live Public Diplomacy."

⁵²⁴ "Everything Is Connected," *The Economist*, January 5, 2012, 18.

⁵²⁵ Anne Roth, "Facebook: Whose side are you on," in *Generation Facebook: Über das Leben im Social Net*, ed. Oliver Leistert and Theo Röhle (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2011), 219.

⁵²⁶ "Slacktivism (noun)," Oxford Dictionaries (Oxford, New York [etc.]: Oxford University Press, 2012), <http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/slacktivism>.

⁵²⁷ "Kony 2012 - What's Next?," *Invisible Children*, accessed June 7, 2012, <http://www.kony2012.com/index.html>.

⁵²⁸ Sarah Kendzior, "The Subjectivity of Slacktivism," *Aljazeera*, April 5, 2012, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/04/201244114223946160.html>.

⁵²⁹ Ibid.

⁵³⁰ Radovanovic and Ragnedda, "Small Talk in the Digital Age: Making Sense of Phatic Posts," 12.

opinion.⁵³¹ However, Jakob Nielsen's 90-9-1 rule stipulates that '[i]n most online communities, 90% of users are *lurkers*⁵³² who never contribute, 9% of users contribute a little, and 1% of users account for almost all the action.'⁵³³ With regards to social networks, a Harvard Business Review study concluded that typically, 10% of the users generate 30% of the content with Twitter being even more extreme since the top 10% account for 90% of the content.⁵³⁴ Furthermore, the Economist quotes a study by Socialbakers that 'found that 95% of posts to brands' pages on Facebook went unanswered.'⁵³⁵ Indeed, social media facilitate information sharing but require the users' desire to accept the offer.

Getting back to the political power of social media, Philip Seib criticises UK Prime Minister David Cameron for crediting social media for causing violence when he addressed the parliament regarding the riots that unsettled the country in August 2011.⁵³⁶ 'That is as much in error as labelling the Arab Awakening "the Twitter revolution" and attributing power to the tools, rather than to the people who wielded them.'⁵³⁷ With regards to the Iranian protests, Golnaz Esfandiari points out how most of the online protests were generated in exile and not within the country.⁵³⁸ The changes that occurred in this region cannot simply be directly attributed to medial interconnectedness but were in fact a complex interplay of factors that opened a window of political possibilities. While the instruments were certainly tremendously helpful in this respect⁵³⁹ social media are a tool that depends on both the political context and the actors that

⁵³¹ Fergus Hanson, *Revolution @State: The Spread of Ediplomacy* (Sidney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, March 2012), 4.

⁵³² Internet speak for a person who only reads content in forums but rarely if ever contributes; "Lurk (verb)," *Oxford Dictionaries*, Oxford Dictionaries (Oxford, New York [etc.]: Oxford University Press, April 2010), <http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/lurk>.

⁵³³ Jakob Nielsen, "'90-9-1' Rule for Participation Inequality: Lurkers vs. Contributors in Internet Communities," October 9, 2006, http://www.useit.com/alertbox/participation_inequality.html.

⁵³⁴ Bill Heil and Mikolaj Piskorski, "New Twitter Research: Men Follow Men and Nobody Tweets," *Harvard Business Review*, June 1, 2009, http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2009/06/new_twitter_research_men_follo.html.

⁵³⁵ "Floating Facebook," 20.

⁵³⁶ J. David Goodman, "In British Riots, Social Media and Face Masks Are the Focus," *The New York Times: The Lede. Blogging the News With Robert Mackey*, August 11, 2011, <http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/11/social-media-and-facemasks-are-targets-after-british-riots/>.

⁵³⁷ Seib, *Real-Time Diplomacy*, 149.

⁵³⁸ Golnaz Esfandiari, "The Twitter Devolution," *Foreign Policy*, June 7, 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/07/the_twitter_revolution_that_wasnt.

⁵³⁹ See for example: Carola Richter, "Virtual Mobilisation: The Internet and Political Activism in Egypt," *Orient* 1 (2010): 16-24.

wield it, but is no panacea.⁵⁴⁰ Seib agrees with Clay Shirky who suggests that discontent with the economic situation or everyday politics has a stronger impact on the emergence of a public sphere than embracing abstract political ideas or simply owning a smart phone.⁵⁴¹

Many social networks are thus not per se public spheres in a political sense, also they are rather increasingly employed to organise everyday life. For example Facebook offers an event-planning tool, Twitter can be used as a news provider.⁵⁴² Manzerolle argues furthermore that ‘the drive to democratize culture said to inhere in Web 2.0 [...] is outweighed by a much more powerful interest in monetizing online behaviour.’⁵⁴³ Benjamin Barber supports this stance:

The dominant form of Web life today is neither civic nor democratic, but commercial, resembling nothing so much as a virtual mall, which is to say a private mall where even the minimalist public features of shopping disappear in favor of a private world of consumption. In this world it is hardly a surprise that fully one-third of traffic on the World Wide Web is devoted to pornography (a favorite of commerce since the beginning of time).⁵⁴⁴

The next paragraphs will further detail how the commercial factors mentioned above can also affect its users through driving a social media platform’s strategy.

3.3.4 Third Party Interests

Advertising is an important determinant: While Twitter projected advertising revenue for 2012 was \$259 million⁵⁴⁵ advertising accounted for 85% of Facebook’s income in 2011.⁵⁴⁶ Offering free membership in the first place and later selling these members as a commodity to advertisers to generate profits is common practice.⁵⁴⁷ ‘There’s no question Facebook’s utility as an advertising

⁵⁴⁰ Richter, “Revolutionen 2.0? Zur Rolle der Medien beim politischen Wandel in der arabischen Welt 2011,” 54; 60.

⁵⁴¹ Shirky, “The Political Power of Social Media. Technology, the Public Sphere, and Political Change”; Seib, *Real-Time Diplomacy*, 149.

⁵⁴² Schmidt, *Das neue Netz*, 155.

⁵⁴³ Vincent Manzerolle, “Mobilizing the Audience Commodity: Digital Labour in a Wireless World,” *Ephemera. Theory & Politics in Organization* 10, no. 3 (2010): 461.

⁵⁴⁴ Barber, *Strong Democracy*, xv.

⁵⁴⁵ Sandre, “Twitter for Diplomats,” 18.

⁵⁴⁶ Facebook, Inc., *Form S-1 Registration Statement*, 12.

⁵⁴⁷ Christian Fuchs, “studIVZ: Social Networking in the Surveillance Society,” *Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society*, no. 12 (2010): 175.

tool is huge, and it's only getting bigger. Facebook's ad revenue was over \$3 billion last year and has been growing at more than \$1 billion every year since 2009.⁵⁴⁸




Figure 3-5: U.S. Online Display-Advertising Revenue (% of total)⁵⁴⁹

Facebook is also said to drain commercial pages, introducing so-called promoted posts: Facebook changed the algorithm in such a way that fewer posts appeared in the users' newsfeeds. This was felt instantly: The Guardian newspaper, for example, noticed a significant drop in social reader traffic it attributed to changes Facebook made, regarding the visibility of articles read by users in their friend's newsfeeds.⁵⁵⁰ To then make the posts more prominent (again), Facebook would charge the page owners.⁵⁵¹

And Facebook's IPO in 2012 (Twitter had just done so as well when this dissertation went to press⁵⁵²) may even contribute to an expansion of these advertising activities since both companies will then have to answer to their shareholders – they are a commercial entity, after all.⁵⁵³ With

⁵⁴⁸ Peter Pachal, "The IPO Won't Change Facebook. Online Ads Will," *Mashable*, February 3, 2012, <http://mashable.com/2012/02/02/facebook-ipo-online-advertising/>.

⁵⁴⁹ © The Economist Newspaper Limited, London "Floating Facebook."

⁵⁵⁰ Justin Ellis, "The Guardian: Yep, It Was 'Major Changes' by Facebook That Caused Drop in Social Reader Traffic," *Nieman Journalism Lab*, May 8, 2012, http://www.niemanlab.org/2012/05/the-guardian-yep-it-was-major-changes-by-facebook-that-caused-drop-in-social-reader-traffic/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+NiemanJournalismLab+%28Nieman+Journalism+Lab%29.

⁵⁵¹ "As Page Reach Decreases, Is Facebook Starting to Screw Brand Pages?"

⁵⁵² Olivia Oran and Gerry Shih, "Twitter Shares Soar in Frenzied NYSE Debut," *Reuters*, November 7, 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/07/us-twitter-ipo-idUSBRE99N1AE20131107>.

⁵⁵³ Doug Gross, "What Would a Publicly Traded Facebook Mean to Users?," *CNN*, November 30, 2011, <http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/30/tech/social-media/facebook-ipo-effect/index.html>.

strength – Facebook claims having a major economic impact on Europe – comes political power it happily enforces through, for example, lobbying governments.⁵⁵⁴

With the many advantages that come with using the technical infrastructure of a third-party site (it is not only widely popular but most importantly free and easy to maintain) also come inconveniences.⁵⁵⁵ This namely entails that the user has no control over the social network's policy. Facebook reserves itself the right to silently change its terms of use without explicitly informing the users.⁵⁵⁶ It also has come under public scrutiny because of its data protection policy. With roughly a quarter of its users login in 5 times a day, a huge amount of data is created.⁵⁵⁷ Facebook does not only save everything a user has ever uploaded, a user automatically transfers the right to its data to Facebook, of which it may take advantage of; pictures are sold, social ads are created with personal data, for example, offering a user his wife as an available single completed with the profile picture belonging to her Facebook page.⁵⁵⁸ Also it frequently changes its privacy settings, which makes it hard for the user to keep up.

Like every other private company, Facebook can freely choose its contractual partners and delete content as well as profiles just as it pleases.⁵⁵⁹ Facebook's employees also monitor its users for crime and sexual violence such as child molestation.⁵⁶⁰ Gossip blog Gawker calls them an

⁵⁵⁴ *Measuring Facebook's Economic Impact in Europe. Executive Summary*, January 2012; Joann Pan, "Facebook Spent More than \$1 Million on Lobbying in 2011," *Mashable*, January 23, 2012, <http://mashable.com/2012/01/23/facebook-lobbying-record/>; Richard Allan, "Measuring Facebook's Economic Impact in Europe," *Facebook Public Policy Europe*, January 24, 2012, <https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-public-policy-europe/measuring-facebooks-economic-impact-in-europe/309416962438169>.

⁵⁵⁵ Government Information Service, *Social Media in Government. Hands-on Toolbox*, 7.

⁵⁵⁶ Mark Andrejevic, "Facebook als neue Produktionsweise," in *Generation Facebook: Über das Leben im Social Net*, ed. Oliver Leistert and Theo Röhle (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2011), 41.

⁵⁵⁷ Jay Baer, "The Social Habit - Is Our Facebook Addiction Ruinous," *Convince&Convert*, July 24, 2012, <http://www.convinceandconvert.com/social-media-research-2/the-social-habit-is-our-facebook-addiction-ruinous/>.

⁵⁵⁸ Josh Smith, "Facebook Now Lets Advertisers Use Your Picture," *Daily Finance*, July 17, 2009, <http://www.dailyfinance.com/2009/07/17/facebook-now-lets-advertisers-use-your-picture/>; Susie Mesure and Ian Griggs, "The Facebook Betrayal - Users Revolt over Advertising Sell-Out," *The Independent*, November 18, 2007, sec. Technology, <http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/the-facebook-betrayal--users-revolt-over-advertising-sellout-400855.html>; Elizabeth Day and James Silver, "Is It Time to Leave Facebook?," *The Observer*, February 5, 2012, sec. Comment is free, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/feb/05/time-to-leave-facebook-debate>.

⁵⁵⁹ Alexander Wragge, "Inhalte auf Facebook veröffentlichen: Was muss ich beachten?," *iRights.info - Kreativität und Urheberrecht in der digitalen Welt*, February 15, 2013, <http://irights.info/inhalte-auf-facebook-veroeffentlichen-was-muss-ich-beachten/11555>.

⁵⁶⁰ Evgeny Morozov, "How Facebook Could Get You Arrested," *The Observer*, March 9, 2013, sec. Technology, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2013/mar/09/facebook-arrested-evgeny-morozov-extract>.

‘outsourced anti-porn and gore brigade’⁵⁶¹ that is equipped with guidelines as to what is allowed on the network (‘Crushed heads, limbs etc. are OK as long as no insides are showing’) and what is not (‘Versus photos... photos comparing two people side by side’) and to delete content accordingly.⁵⁶² Jillian York of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a free-speech group, explains that companies are afraid of nudity inadvertently triggering anti-porn software, which the host sites aim to avoid. On the downside, this can lead to the removal of artistic or innocent content such as a *New Yorker* cartoon depicting a bare-chested Eve in the Garden of Eden that Facebook took down.⁵⁶³ Social media guru Sascha Lobo accuses Facebook of colliding with the German *Grundgesetz* for allegedly infringing the privacy of correspondence.⁵⁶⁴

While some guidelines are pretty straightforward, it gets difficult when it comes to so-called international compliance, meaning certain (political) acts forbidden in specific countries (Holocaust denial in Germany or defamation of Turkey’s first president Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Turkey).⁵⁶⁵ Apple, Google and Amazon have also been accused of filtering content in a certain manner. Since, together with Facebook, these big four concentrate approximately 80% of cross-frontier traffic and 40% of the time people spend online, giving the companies a huge sphere of influence with regards to public opinion, this information gets an even more disturbing dimension.⁵⁶⁶ Most importantly, the content that is uploaded does generally not belong to the user anymore but to the network.⁵⁶⁷ This means that a page’s content may suddenly be blocked in certain areas: Similarly to Google, Twitter announced selective censorship depending on countries, which raised concerns. The reason for this move is that due to commercial interests, the site wants to expand from approximately 100 million active users to 1 billion and thus needs to target countries with restrictive laws. Also, Twitter has the power to for example wipe out

⁵⁶¹ Gawker, “Inside Facebook’s Outsourced Anti-Porn and Gore Brigade, Where ‘Camel Toes’ Are More Offensive than ‘Crushed Heads,’” *Gawker*, February 16, 2012, <http://gawker.com/5885714/inside-facebooks-outsourced-anti-porn-and-gore-brigade-where-camel-toes-are-more-offensive-than-crushed-heads>.

⁵⁶² Ibid.

⁵⁶³ “Internet Freedom: Free to Choose,” *The Economist*, October 6, 2012.

⁵⁶⁴ Sascha Lobo, “Facebook kollidiert mit dem Grundgesetz,” *SPIEGEL ONLINE*, July 17, 2012, sec. Netzwelt, <http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/web/die-mensch-maschine-sascha-lobo-ueber-das-telemediengeheimnis-a-844782.html>; Markus Ehrenberg, “Strafverfolgung: Facebook überwacht die Chats seiner Nutzer,” *Die Zeit*, July 8, 2012, sec. Datenschutz, <http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2012-07/facebook-chat-ueberwachung>.

⁵⁶⁵ Gawker, “Inside Facebook’s Outsourced Anti-Porn and Gore Brigade, Where ‘Camel Toes’ Are More Offensive than ‘Crushed Heads.’”

⁵⁶⁶ Götz Hamann and Marcus Rohwetter, “Internetunternehmen: Vier Sheriffs zensieren die Welt,” *Die Zeit*, August 6, 2012, sec. Internet, <http://www.zeit.de/2012/32/Zensur-Apple-Facebook-Amazon-Google/komplettansicht>.

⁵⁶⁷ “How Much Is Your Content Worth?”

tweets worldwide; it has rightly done so with regards to child pornography but could supposedly also do so with other information.⁵⁶⁸

Jovan Kurbalija concludes that these structures, which the state has only limited control over, challenge its sovereignty – all these aspects further call into question these tools' use for public diplomacy.⁵⁶⁹ The next subchapter will now show how governments still make the most of this situation.

3.3.5 A Neutral Tool

Alec Ross points out that social media are a neutral tool, nothing positive per se.⁵⁷⁰ Since they are freely available, it is in practice strongly exploited.⁵⁷¹ First, social media make information vulnerable; cyber insecurity is as a matter of fact on the rise.⁵⁷² Hacker groups such as Anonymous⁵⁷³ are susceptible to access the platforms, endangering private data. Both Twitter and Facebook became victims of such attacks exposing private content.⁵⁷⁴ Especially apps (as mentioned above, an increasing amount of users access their social media profiles through smartphone applications) constitute security risks because of the extensive rights they dispose of regarding content saved on the smartphone.⁵⁷⁵ For example, unit 61398, an elite division of China's People's Liberation Army is said to be behind large-scale cybertheft of Western corporate

⁵⁶⁸ "Twitter Able to Censor Tweets in Individual Countries," *The Guardian*, January 27, 2012, sec. Technology, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/jan/27/twitter-censor-tweets-by-country>.

⁵⁶⁹ Jovan Kurbalija, "The Impact of the Internet and ICT on Contemporary Diplomacy," in *Diplomacy in a Globalizing World: Theories and Practices*, ed. Pauline Kerr and Geoffrey Wiseman (Oxford, New York [etc.]: Oxford University Press, 2013), 145.

⁵⁷⁰ Bureau of Public Affairs U.S. Department of State. The Office of Electronic Information, "LiveAtState: 21st Century Statecraft Month," January 10, 2012, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ime/180297.htm>.

⁵⁷¹ Cyril Mychalejko, "Decline 'Friend' Request: Social Media Meets 21st Century Statecraft in Latin America," *Pulse*, January 18, 2012, <http://pulsemedia.org/2012/01/18/decline-friend-request-social-media-meets-21st-century-statecraft-in-latin-america/>.

⁵⁷² Wilson P. Dizard, *Digital Diplomacy: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Information Age* (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001), 180–181.

⁵⁷³ Zoe Fox, "Anonymous' Hackers Hit Security Group," *CNN*, December 26, 2011, <http://www.cnn.com/2011/12/26/tech/web/anonymous-hack-stratfor/index.html>.

⁵⁷⁴ "Online-Netzwerk: Hacker spähnen Nutzerkonten von Twitter aus," *Die Zeit*, February 2, 2013, sec. Datenschutz, <http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2013-02/twitter-nutzerkonten-hacker>; DPA, "Cyberattacken: Hacker schlichen sich ins Facebook-Netzwerk," *Handelsblatt*, February 16, 2012, sec. IT + Medien, <http://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/it-medien/cyberattacken-hacker-schlichen-sich-ins-facebook-netzwerk/7793592.html>.

⁵⁷⁵ "Secusmart Smartphones: Sicher bis Geheimhaltungsstufe vier," *Die Zeit*, March 6, 2013, sec. Mobil, <http://www.zeit.de/digital/mobil/2013-03/cebit-sichere-smartphones/komplettansicht>.

secrets.⁵⁷⁶ Also, cyber-warfare is expanding: Israel, the United States or a cooperation of both were allegedly behind the Stuxnet worm, discovered in 2010, destined to paralyse the Iranian Natanz uranium-enrichment plant.⁵⁷⁷ Securing the government's networks is already a burden but what about Facebook data? Since everything is saved on the company's servers, government entities have no control over the use and (mis)use of their pages' content.

Moreover, social media are increasingly abused by both democratic and authoritarian regimes alike, even though in different ways. Joseph Fitsanakis argues that government intelligence services increasingly use social media networks for information gathering.⁵⁷⁸ The United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operates an Open Source Centre where millions of Tweets, Facebook posts as well as other similar information are analysed generating reports that end up in Barack Obama's daily security briefing.⁵⁷⁹ The Pentagon's recent announcement reveals similar activities.⁵⁸⁰ They use social networks not only to flag rumours but to also engage in counter messaging, Adam Rawnsley argues.⁵⁸¹ In summer 2013, it was revealed that the U.S. American National Security Agency (NSA) was operating PRISM, a program destined to collect social-networking data, e-mails, and files from for example Google, Apple and Facebook.⁵⁸² Al Jazeera reports on the Pentagon currently working on a software that would allow their officers to create multiple virtual identities they would then use to post targeted information in chat rooms and similar sites in the Muslim world.⁵⁸³ These endeavours seem current practice: Britain's government aims at extending its right to monitor not only email but also social media tools.⁵⁸⁴

In the offline world, governments generally need a judge to sign a warrant to put a wire-tap in place; the same goes for a physical search of property. In the online world,

⁵⁷⁶ "Smoking Gun," *The Economist*, February 23, 2013.

⁵⁷⁷ "Cyber-Warfare. Hype and Fear," *The Economist*, December 8, 2012, 60.

⁵⁷⁸ Joseph Fitsanakis, "Research: Spies Increasingly Using Facebook, Twitter to Gather Data," *IntelNews.org*, accessed February 16, 2012, <http://intelnews.org/2012/02/13/01-927/>.

⁵⁷⁹ Kimberly Dozier, "CIA Open Source Center Follows Foreign Twitter, Facebook Accounts," *The Huffington Post*, April 11, 2011, sec. Tech, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/04/cia-open-source-center_n_1075827.html.

⁵⁸⁰ *Broad Agency Announcement. Social Media in Strategic Communication (SMISC)* (Arlington: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, July 14, 2011), 7.

https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=6ef12558b44258382452fcf02942396a&tab=core&_cview=0.

⁵⁸¹ Adam Rawnsley, "Pentagon Wants a Social Media Propaganda Machine," *Wired*, July 15, 2011,

<http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/07/darpa-wants-social-media-sensor-for-propaganda-ops/>.

⁵⁸² "Secrets, Lies and America's Spies," *The Economist*, June 15, 2013.

⁵⁸³ *US Steps up Cyber Propaganda War*, 2011,

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qdU4c9ndgZA&feature=youtube_gdata_player.

⁵⁸⁴ "Snooping on New Media: Spies, Lies and the Internet," *The Economist*, April 7, 2012.

most data – concerning who called or e-mailed whom, or visited what website, though not the content of a communication – is handed over without any such judicial review.⁵⁸⁵

With the Internet's growing social, economic and political significance, regulation and government efforts to control it have increased.⁵⁸⁶ A U.S. law permits its authorities to access people's online data without disposing of a warrant, for example.⁵⁸⁷ Facebook provides investigative authorities without resistance with its users' data and gets paid for the service.⁵⁸⁸ Several mobile and Internet companies do, according to privacy advocate Chris Soghoian offer easy-to-use "pay-and-wiretap" for law enforcement agencies.⁵⁸⁹ Legal scholar Eoin O'Dell reasons that due to this power over expression in the virtual realm that applies to other intermediary gatekeepers as he calls Internet companies like Google, it had become easier for governments to censor content through these intermediate companies since those would feel they could not turn down a friendly request from let's say the White House. Furthermore, they were legally able to do so by claiming a violation of their own terms of service, which sets a dangerous precedent for extra-legal government action, achieving more than through legal action and also a violation of the first amendment in the United States.⁵⁹⁰ Indeed, from July to December 2011, the United States government made 187, its German and British counterparts respectively 103 and 49 requests for content removal to Google.⁵⁹¹ 'Facebook – or YouTube, for that matter – may look like public spaces but when it comes to the crunch they offer no more freedom of speech than the average shopping mall,'⁵⁹² John Naughton concludes.

⁵⁸⁵ "Data Privacy: Out of Shape," *The Economist*, July 21, 2012.

⁵⁸⁶ "Global Internet Diplomacy," *The New York Times*, December 12, 2012, sec. Opinion, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/13/opinion/global-internet-diplomacy.html>.

⁵⁸⁷ Dominic Rushe, "Google Calls for Greater Electronic Privacy Protections," *The Guardian*, January 28, 2013, sec. Technology, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2013/jan/28/google-data-privacy-day-ecpa>.

⁵⁸⁸ Roth, "Facebook: Whose side are you on," 217.

⁵⁸⁹ Morozov, "How Facebook Could Get You Arrested."

⁵⁹⁰ Yochai Benkler, "Working Draft: A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the Battle over the Soul of the Networked Fourth Estate," *Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review*, n.d., 24-26; Eoin O'Dell, "YouTube, Facebook, and the Responsibilities of Intermediary Gatekeepers," *Cearta.ie. the Irish for Rights*, September 18, 2012, <http://www.cearta.ie/2012/09/youtube-facebook-and-the-responsibilities-of-intermediary-gatekeepers/>.

⁵⁹¹ "A Special Report on Technology and Geography: National Differences: The World Is What You Make It."

⁵⁹² John Naughton, "When the Cybermen Serve as Censors," *The Guardian*, September 23, 2012, sec. Technology, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/sep/23/innocence-muslims-youtube-censorship>.

Evgeny Morozov is concerned with this instance and calls with regards to Facebook to subject the use of social media for criminal persecution to the same rules and laws that contain police work in a democratic state. ‘We cannot circumvent legal procedures and subvert democratic norms in the name of efficiency alone,’⁵⁹³ he urges. Sociologist Nicholas Christakis put this phenomenon into perspective and argues that this lack of regulation is typical for new industries. He compares the rise of Internet firms with those of energy and water suppliers at the beginning of the 20th century that was hardly regulated then. This issue will be taken up again in chapter 5.2 when the dissertation will discuss how national rules and laws may or may not balance these conflicts of interest. Christakis is thus certain that the law will have to adapt in due course to these new environments, for example by determining which data can be saved or not.⁵⁹⁴

Furthermore, social media are also employed to fight for example democratic movements or suppress political opposition. According to Fadi Salem, social media were abused for propaganda purposes in Syria.⁵⁹⁵ Morozov critically observes that the Internet and its new technologies may also be used to suppress freedom and is highly sceptical about the Internet’s ability in opening up the world.⁵⁹⁶ He provides the example of two software programmes that were unsuccessful for they failed to ensure the users’ anonymity, increasing their risk of exposure: An anonymous SMS tip line for information about drug cartels in Mexico as well as *Haystack*, a censorship-circumventing and privacy-protecting technology made available to dissidents in Iran.⁵⁹⁷

Moreover, terrorist networks have discovered that social media can service their purposes as well, with Twitter allegedly becoming the main hub for links leading to such digital content.⁵⁹⁸ For example Al-Shabaab who describe themselves as ‘[...] an Islamic movement that governs

⁵⁹³ Morozov, “How Facebook Could Get You Arrested.”

⁵⁹⁴ Stefan Klein, “Soziologie: ‘Unser Glück hängt von den Freunden ab,’” *Die Zeit*, January 6, 2012, sec. Partnerschaft, <http://www.zeit.de/2012/05/Freundschaft-Christakis/komplettansicht>.

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⁵⁹⁶ Evgeny Morozov, “The Digital Dictatorship,” *The Wall Street Journal*, February 20, 2010, sec. The Saturday Essay, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703983004575073911147404540.html>.

⁵⁹⁷ Jacob Comenetz, “Innovating Public Diplomacy For a New Digital World,” *The Washington Diplomat*, August 27, 2011, http://www.washdiplomat.com/index.php?Itemid=428&catid=1476&id=7955:innovating-public-diplomacy-for-a-new-digital-world&option=com_content&view=article.

⁵⁹⁸ Nico Prucha and Ali Fisher, “Tweeting for the Caliphate: Twitter as the New Frontier for Jihadist Propaganda,” *CTC Sentinel*, June 25, 2013, <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/tweeting-for-the-caliphate-twitter-as-the-new-frontier-for-jihadist-propaganda>.

South & Cen. Somalia & part of the global struggle towards the revival of Islamic Khilaafa⁵⁹⁹ operates a Twitter account in English with 12.282 followers as of 10th April 2012. It ‘has gained a reputation for being strikingly interactive -- for a handle that represents a group of murderous thugs -- and for its articulateness, as in a Jan. 10 Tweet stating that “Perhaps we are unreconstructed fundamentalists who believe that fundamentals of Islam do not need to be reformed to suit modernity.”⁶⁰⁰ A research group at Humboldt State University mapped racist, homophobic and ableist tweets in the United States.⁶⁰¹ Referring to the Arab Spring and the Syrian civil war, Marc Lynch similarly underscores how not only human rights or democracy but also hatred and violence can be spread as easily through social media, reckoning that “[...] the end of the story did not have to be partying in Tahrir Square [...]”.⁶⁰² This underscores that social media are just a tool that can be wielded for better and for worse.

Most Internet users have also already seen how debates in comment sections or message boards on for example newspaper web sites or blogs come easily and frequently close to defaming and inflammatory tirades.⁶⁰³ This is a very interesting aspect with regards to PD 2.0: Alec Ross points out that “[s]ocial media punishes moderation – those who seek compromise – [which is another key competence of both public diplomacy and classic diplomacy] and amplifies extremism on both ends.”⁶⁰⁴ This phenomenon lies in a (frequent) characteristic of Internet communication, namely the anonymity that often comes with it. Anonymity does not per se make people more irresponsible but rather more receptive to the normative rules present in their new environment that may clash with otherwise dominant social norms.⁶⁰⁵ The effect is this polarisation Alec Ross

⁵⁹⁹ “HSM Press Office (hsmprss) on Twitter,” accessed April 10, 2012, <https://twitter.com/#!/hsmprss>.

⁶⁰⁰ David Perera, “Alec Ross: No Sympathy for Al Shabaab Twitter Account,” January 10, 2012, <http://www.fiercegovernmentit.com/story/alec-ross-no-sympathy-al-shabaab-twitter-account/2012-01-10>.

⁶⁰¹ Mona Chalabi, “Mapping Hate Speech: Homophobia and Racism on Twitter,” *The Guardian*, May 10, 2013, sec. News, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/interactive/2013/may/10/twitter-geography-hate-racism-homophobia>.

⁶⁰² Lynch, “Twitter Devolutions.”

⁶⁰³ Heller, “I Really Like That You Like What I Like.”

⁶⁰⁴ Rhonda Zaharna, “The Ironies of Social Media in Public Diplomacy,” *The CPD Blog*, May 20, 2012, http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/index.php/newswire/cpdblog_detail/the_ironies_of_social_media_in_public_diplomacy1/.

⁶⁰⁵ Tom Postmes, “Deindividuation,” in *Docstoc.com* (Exeter, 2005), 4, <http://www.docstoc.com/docs/28223760/Deindividuation-Tom-Postmes-University-of-Exeter-Deindividuation>.

mentioned above with people within a group gaining credibility through exaggerating loosely held prejudices, which leads to like-minded people ending up in more extreme positions.⁶⁰⁶

The preceding paragraphs have shown how social media cannot only advance noble goals but can be wielded by all sorts of actors to serve a variation of purposes. But this is not the only negative allegation that social media face: Another point of critique lies in social media's limited truthfulness, which seems rather problematic for politics and public diplomacy in particular since the latter heavily relies on trust.

3.3.6 Limited Reliability

'Social media is the most unverifiable information source in the world but the news media believes it because of its need for speed,'⁶⁰⁷ says Tomaso De Benedetti, whom the Guardian describes as 'one of the world's most creative and successful fake tweeters.'⁶⁰⁸ The famous hoax of the allegedly disappeared and tortured Syrian female gay blogger Amina ('Gay Girl in Damascus') whose apparent capture unleashed Internet campaigns asking for her release provides a telling example. Eventually, it turned out that a straight and married middle-aged man from Scotland had been operating the blog and entirely made up the content.⁶⁰⁹ In April 2013, the Twitter account of the trusted news organisation Associated Press was hacked. It issued a tweet informing that the White House had been bombed and President Obama left injured, which immediately caused the Dow Jones to crumble.⁶¹⁰ Also, even real events sometimes get an additional twist when broadcasted through social media: Especially Twitter messages tend to exaggerate to make the story more salient and to stand out. During the Arab Spring, for example, this instance cost certain bloggers their credibility and coined the catch phrase 'it is never as bad as it seems on Twitter.'⁶¹¹

⁶⁰⁶ Tim Adams, "How the Internet Created an Age of Rage," *The Guardian*, July 24, 2011, sec. Technology, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/jul/24/internet-anonymity-trolling-tim-adams>.

⁶⁰⁷ Tom Kington, "Twitter Hoaxer Comes Clean and Says: I Did It to Expose Weak Media," *The Guardian*, March 30, 2012, sec. Technology, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/mar/30/twitter-hoaxer-tommaso-de-benedetti>.

⁶⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁹ Esther Addley, "Syrian Lesbian Blogger Is Revealed Conclusively to Be a Married Man," *The Guardian*, June 13, 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/13/syrian-lesbian-blogger-tom-macmaster>.

⁶¹⁰ Heidi Moore and Dan Roberts, "AP Twitter Hack Causes Panic on Wall Street and Sends Dow Plunging," *The Guardian*, April 23, 2013, sec. Business, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2013/apr/23/ap-tweet-hack-wall-street-freefall>.

⁶¹¹ Lynch, "Twitter Devolutions."

Furthermore, *astroturfing* (buying Facebook fans or Twitter follower) seems a common practice, allegedly used by companies and politicians such as former Federal Secretary Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg and former U.S. governor Mitt Romney.⁶¹² Depending on the selling agency in question, this is either a matter of fake follower profiles or real users who get a share of the profits. The reason for this is that the Twitter feed is listed further up in rankings since the more followers one account has, the more important it is considered compared to others.⁶¹³

How do these issues affect social media's users? Many consider the web only reliable to a limited extent.⁶¹⁴ In 2010, 61% of the people asked within the framework of the Digital Future Project a poll about the Internet use in the USA, considered only half or less of the information on the Internet reliable while 14% stated bluntly that only few or none of the content distributed online was reliable – and these numbers were up compared to the three previous years. The World Internet Project comes to a similar conclusion in 2011: Approximately 40% of users and 38% of non-users estimated the Internet a trustworthy source of information.⁶¹⁵ The numbers for social media content are even worse: Very few users (15%) regard it as believable while 51% considered only very little information accurate and reliable.⁶¹⁶ People do not really trust Facebook in general a poll in California found out.⁶¹⁷ In contrast to that, content emanating from newspapers is

⁶¹² Peter Wagner, "Wo kommen all die Guttenberg-Fans her?," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, February 24, 2011, sec. jetzt.de, <http://jetzt.sueddeutsche.de/texte/anzeigen/520399>; Carsten Luther, "Das unwahrscheinliche Interesse an Romneys Tweets," *US Wahlblog. Zeit Online*, July 24, 2012, <http://blog.zeit.de/us-wahl/2012/07/24/das-unwahrscheinliche-interesse-an-romneys-tweets/>; Carsten Ulbricht, "Gefälschte Fans bei Weleda? Rechtliche Bewertung falscher Facebook Profile," *Recht2.0*, October 17, 2011, <http://www.rechtzweinnull.de/index.php?/archives/187-Gefaelschte-Fans-bei-Weleda-Rechtliche-Bewertung-falscher-Profilen-in-Sozialen-Netzwerken.html>.

⁶¹³ Jens Schröder, "Das wundersame Follower-Wachstum der CDU," *ZDF Hyperland. Darüber spricht das Web*, July 12, 2012, <http://blog.zdf.de/hyperland/2012/07/das-wundersame-follower-wachstum-der-cdu/>; Charles Arthur, "How Low-Paid Workers at 'Click Farms' Create Appearance of Online Popularity," *The Guardian*, August 2, 2013, sec. Technology, <http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/aug/02/click-farms-appearance-online-popularity>.

⁶¹⁴ "Only 17% of People Feel That Social Media Has Had A Positive Effect on News Reporting," *SimplyZesty*, February 28, 2012, http://www.simplyzesty.com/social-media/only-17-of-people-feel-social-media-has-a-positive-effect-on-news-reporting-infographic/?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+SimplyZesty+%28Simply+Zesty%29.

⁶¹⁵ USC Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism, "Press Release & Highlights: World Internet Project: International Report 2010."

⁶¹⁶ USC Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism, "Press Release & Highlights: 2010 Digital Future Report."

⁶¹⁷ David Sarno, "Tech Firms' Data Gathering Worries Most Californians, Poll Finds," *Los Angeles Times*, March 31, 2012, sec. News, <http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-fi-privacy-poll-20120331,0,7660995,print.story>.

considered reliable and from governments generally reliable.⁶¹⁸ Christian Fuchs investigated the perceived disadvantages to social networks as seen by its users and found out that the majority feared privacy violations leading to surveillance.⁶¹⁹ These user concerns seem to be taken up by the economy: In Silicon Valley, substantial funds are allegedly invested into technology companies specialising in the erasure of data.⁶²⁰

A poll conducted by the USC Annenberg School of Journalism found out that many Internet users thought that the Internet was becoming increasingly relevant for political campaigning and fostered understanding of these processes. A majority was sceptical when it came to the Internet's ability to establish political power, making officials care more about their voters and giving citizens more influence on their governments.⁶²¹ The Digital Future Report 2010 (amongst Americans only) revealed the users' fear of companies and the government (48% and 38% respectively assert this) monitoring their actions online. This goes hand in hand with uneasiness to voice political opinions: While 70% think it is acceptable to criticise one's government, only 33% consider it safe to do so and 36% assert the opposite.⁶²² Especially political opinions might be too sensitive to share, despite available privacy controls.⁶²³ Furthermore, it has become common knowledge that the Internet never (or rather rarely) forgets anything so users may also be reluctant to share thoughts they might regret later when the content has already moved beyond their control.⁶²⁴

Politically interested users are also found to gather relevant information on major news sites and rarely through social media.⁶²⁵ A study examining where Americans got their news on the

⁶¹⁸ USC Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism, "Press Release & Highlights: 2010 Digital Future Report."

⁶¹⁹ Christian Fuchs, *Social Networking Sites and the Surveillance Society a Critical Case Study of the Usage of studiVZ, Facebook, and MySpace by Students in Salzburg in the Context of Electronic Surveillance* (Salzburg: Forschungsgruppe Unified Theory of Information, 2009), 93–97.
http://fuchs.icts.sbg.ac.at/SNS_Surveillance_Fuchs.pdf.

⁶²⁰ Owen Bowcott, "Britain Seeks Opt-out of New European Social Media Privacy Laws," *The Guardian*, April 4, 2013, sec. Technology, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2013/apr/04/britain-opt-out-right-to-be-forgotten-law>.

⁶²¹ USC Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism, "Press Release & Highlights: 2010 Digital Future Report."

⁶²² Ibid.

⁶²³ Danah Boyd, "Facebook's Privacy Trainwreck. Exposure, Invasion, and Social Convergence," *The International Journal of Research into New Media Technologies* 14, no. 1 (2008): 18–19.

⁶²⁴ Inge Kutter, "Digitales Gedächtnis: Das Netz vergisst doch," *Die Zeit*, September 27, 2012, sec. Datenschutz, <http://www.zeit.de/2012/40/Internet-Digitales-Gedaechtnis-Daten-Speicherung/komplettansicht>.

⁶²⁵ Fenton, "The Internet and Social Networking," 134–135.

presidential campaign from found that only very few (4% of Americans in their 30s, and 1% of those ages 40 and older) procured information from MySpace and Facebook.⁶²⁶

To conclude this subchapter, one can say that the preceding paragraphs have shown how social media are not really interactive, limited in reach, and based on weak ties. Thus, they are not necessarily prone to strengthen relations. Also, they are not interested in empowering its users but to a great extent guided by (commercial) self-interests, increasingly abused by governments and other organisations to varying degrees, which led to major trust issues on the users' side.

Before, however, concluding chapter three, one last point to discuss in this respect is evaluation and in particular whether social media might provide public diplomacy with more room for manoeuvre to assess its acts. The next lines will shed light on the issue.

3.3.7 Evaluating Social Media

Another interesting point that merits this dissertation's attention is the evaluation of PD 2.0: Having discussed how Internet activity can be monitored, this may offer tremendous opportunities for public diplomacy to easily extract some numbers, too. Indeed, social media scores such as followers are often used as a measurement to evaluate a person's social relevance: American socialite Kim Kardashian's popularity is underscored by information about her Twitter followers ('Twitter is an unreliable measure of influence, but Kardashian has nearly 16 million followers, putting her ninth in the world [...]'⁶²⁷); the alleged success of President Obama's speech at the democratic convention was rated according to the tweets it generated (52.756 per minute).⁶²⁸ Also, social scientists have begun to rely on social media for their research; that – with the appropriate tools once developed – may be further explored in the future: Song Chaoming of Northeastern University worked out an algorithm that based on mobile phone records could predict with an accuracy of 93% where a given person was at any given moment of the day.⁶²⁹ A

⁶²⁶ Andrew Kohut et al., *Social Networking and Online Videos Take Off. Internet's Broader Role in Campaign 2008* (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, January 11, 2008), <http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/384.pdf>.

⁶²⁷ Emma Brockes, "Kim Kardashian: My Life as a Brand," *The Guardian*, September 7, 2012, sec. Life and style, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2012/sep/07/kim-kardashian-life-as-brand>.

⁶²⁸ "Wahlkampf: Obama erkämpft sich Umfrage-Vorsprung," *Die Zeit*, September 8, 2012, sec. Ausland, <http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2012-09/obama-umfrage-wahlkampf>.

⁶²⁹ "Dr Seldon, I Presume," *The Economist*, February 23, 2013.

group of sociologists at Cornell University established a global barometer of public opinion based on tweets.⁶³⁰

Furthermore, the tools promising to translate social media activity into measuring influence are abundant.⁶³¹ Social analytics or other forms of monitoring (network analysis, for example) could give policy makers a more accurate idea of what people in certain areas / circles are talking about, providing hints about how they think and what they are up to. For all these reasons, public diplomacy is considered a tool to listen, not to talk and gives us a clue about where to situate it within public diplomacy's academic literature.⁶³² It can be classified under what Cull called *listening*, executed on the short or long term, employing inward flowing information typically requiring staff that is trained in monitoring technology and languages/communication.⁶³³

Brian Fung praises the social analytic software Klout, for example, which Time Magazine elected amongst the 50 best websites of 2011.⁶³⁴ It calculates how influential a user is throughout several social networks, as something that 'may soon become a vital tool for digital diplomats.'⁶³⁵ Radian6 can identify relevant users based on their shared content (on blogs, Twitter or Facebook, for example), number of fans/followers/readers and level of interaction as in likes, comments, retweets.⁶³⁶ According to Brian Carlson of the Public Diplomacy Council, a study found that 4.7 (and not 6 as in the offline world) people separate each user from another. Thus, he opines, these tools bring people closer together and furthermore enable public diplomacy professionals to better exploit contacts (one can easily see who someone is also in contact with) and map out

⁶³⁰ Hartmut Wewetzer, "Sozialforschung: Twitter als globales Stimmungsbarometer," *Die Zeit*, September 30, 2011, sec. Internet, <http://www.zeit.de/digital/internet/2011-09/twitter-stimmung-sozialforschung>.

⁶³¹ See for example: "Radian6 - Social Media Monitoring and Engagement," accessed October 19, 2011, <http://www.radian6.com/>; "Klout | The Standard for Influence," accessed October 13, 2011, <http://klout.com/home>; Facebook Inc., ed., "Facebook Page Insights. Product Guide for Facebook Page Owners," 2011, http://ads.ak.facebook.com/ads/FacebookAds/Page_Insights_en_US.pdf; "Social Analytics | Kontagent," accessed October 13, 2011, <http://www.kontagent.com/solutions/social-analytics/>.

⁶³² Vestniak, "Social Media: Lessons for Public Diplomacy," *Vestniak*, February 9, 2013, <http://vestniak.blogspot.de/2013/02/social-media-lessons-for-public.html>.

⁶³³ Cull, "Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories," 32.

⁶³⁴ Harry McCracken, "The 50 Best Websites of 2011: Klout," *Time*, August 16, 2011, http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2087815_2088159_2088154,00.html.

⁶³⁵ Fung, "Klout and the Evolution of Digital Diplomacy."

⁶³⁶ Ali Fisher and David Montez, *Evaluating Online Public Diplomacy Using Digital Media Research Methods: A Case Study of #ObamainBrazil* (InterMedia Global Research Network, July 2011), 15, http://www.intermedia.org/press_releases/InterMedia_ObamainBrazil%20and%20New%20Media%20Research_Fisher%20and%20Montez.pdf.

influencers.⁶³⁷ Ali Fisher praises a combination of network, discourse and semantic analysis to extensively monitor digital conversations in order to identify the different foci specific communities may lay on a topic within a wider context such as #IranElection in 2009. This, according to her research, facilitates the diplomat's task to engage in conversations.⁶³⁸

Facebook provides such information to certain extent: It offers *Insights* a tool that, in its own words '[...] provides Facebook Page owners and Facebook Platform developers with metrics around their content. By understanding and analysing trends within user growth and demographics, consumption of content, and creation of content, Page owners and Platform developers are better equipped to improve their business with Facebook.'⁶³⁹ This instrument reveals user data (age, provenience, Facebook language), how many users a post reached and how many interacted with it.⁶⁴⁰ As already mentioned above, both a fan page and a Twitter feed provide the administrator with a bunch of data on users and the content's reach.

Also, Google Analytics is an easy-to-install code that helps to measure and analyse a website's quantitative traffic and can be easily added to any page as long as one is its administrator.⁶⁴¹ It now even disposes of a feature for social media.⁶⁴² It does not, however, provide information on how the content is redistributed – both offline and online.⁶⁴³ Traackr, another tool, aims at finding out for which topic an individual can be considered an *influencer* through evaluating

⁶³⁷ Brian Carlson, "Six Degrees of Separation: Now 4,7 Degrees of Proximity," *The Public Diplomacy Council*, November 29, 2011, <http://publicdiplomacycouncil.org/commentaries/six-degrees-separation-now-47-degrees-proximity>.

⁶³⁸ Ali Fisher, "Everybody's Getting Hooked Up; Building Innovative Strategies in the Era of Big Data," *Public Diplomacy Magazine*, no. Innovations in Public Diplomacy (2012), <http://publicdiplomacymagazine.com/everybody%e2%80%99s-getting-hooked-up-building-innovative-strategies-in-the-era-of-big-data/>.

⁶³⁹ "Facebook Help Center," accessed October 13, 2011, <https://www.facebook.com/help/search/?q=insights>.

⁶⁴⁰ Facebook Inc., "Facebook Page Insights. Product Guide for Facebook Page Owners," Talking about signifies: "The number of unique people who created a story about your page from [...dates of the week in question]."

⁶⁴¹ "Google Analytics," 2012, <http://www.google.com/intl/de/analytics/>.

⁶⁴² "Google Analytics Add Social Reports To Service; Measure Social Media's ROI," *SimplyZesty*, March 21, 2012, http://www.simplyzesty.com/google/google-analytics-add-social-reports-to-service-measure-social-medias-roi/?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=Feed%3ASimplyZesty+%28Simply+Zesty%29.

⁶⁴³ van Noort, "Bringing Public Diplomacy 2.0 to the Next Level," 45.

‘reach, resonance and relevance.’⁶⁴⁴ For that matter it combines an individual’s overall activity on the Internet.⁶⁴⁵

On second thought, however, things are slightly more complex: As already shown above (see chapter 2.3.2), influence is truly unpredictable. Furthermore, critics find fault with social analytics’ score not depicting reality. Alexander B. Howard criticises measuring influence through using followers as the only or most important metric (not everyone is on social media and would deny those all sway). Also he considers social analytics flawed because, to begin with, the concept of influence is not properly defined: Who is influenced? And what does influence mean? To what purpose does this happen? How to establish causality between a message and an action?⁶⁴⁶ As blogger Laura McGinnis accurately observes, ‘reach isn’t always the same thing as influence.’⁶⁴⁷ Barely of legal age teen idol Justin Bieber, for example, has the perfect Klout score of 100, allegedly counting him amongst the most influential human beings, a fact Gary Schirr doubts.⁶⁴⁸ He also fears that ‘measuring an activity changes it’⁶⁴⁹ because it may encourage cheating and people behaving according to the measure, the supreme goal being reaching or conserving a certain score. Furthermore, especially chapter 3.3.2 on the digital divide has underscored the fact that for the time being Internet activity can only offer a snapshot of a very particular crowd.

Social analytics are still unfit to reliably measure the return on investment, a project manager social media evaluation of a media-monitoring company affirms.⁶⁵⁰ This brings us to another crucial element, namely the return part rarely defined before engaging in digital communication

⁶⁴⁴ Christina Chaey, “Would You Pay To Discover Social Influencers?,” *Fast Company*, October 5, 2012, <http://www.fastcompany.com/3001937/would-you-pay-discover-social-influencers>.

⁶⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁶ Alexander B. Howard, “In the Capital, Influence on Social Media in DC Is More than Twitter Followers,” *Digiphile*, March 29, 2012, <http://digiphile.wordpress.com/2012/03/29/in-the-capital-influence-in-social-media-in-dc-is-more-than-twitter-followers/>; Susan Etlinger, *A Framework for Social Analytics*, August 10, 2011, 22, <http://www.slideshare.net/setlinger/altimeter-social-analytics081011final>.

⁶⁴⁷ Laura McGinnis, “Lowy Gives USPD an A for E,” *manIC: The Extremes of International Communication: Public, Cultural and Traditional Diplomacy -- in Blog Form.*, April 4, 2012, <http://manic-lm.blogspot.de/2012/04/lowy-gives-uspd-a-for-e.html#comment-form>.

⁶⁴⁸ Gary Schirr, “Why Klout Is Dangerous,” *Business2Community*, December 30, 2011, <http://www.business2community.com/social-media/why-klout-is-dangerous-0112936>; Mccracken, “The 50 Best Websites of 2011: Klout.”

⁶⁴⁹ Schirr, “Why Klout Is Dangerous.”

⁶⁵⁰ Project Manager Social Media Evaluation, Interview, November 5, 2011.

and lacking tangible categories, social media Guru Brian Solis asserts.⁶⁵¹ Developing hard tangible categories may take a lot of pressure from the endeavour. From an academic standpoint, however, most commercially available software is intransparent and often imprecise, Stefan Stieglitz, Professor for economic computer science at the University of Münster, opines.⁶⁵²

In addition to that, users can easily block these social analytics. *Do Not Track Plus*⁶⁵³ for example is a free of charge and effortlessly installed add-on available for the most popular browsers (Safari, Internet Explorer, Firefox, and Chrome). Even though most people may not alter the default settings and set up the add-on and a *do not track* signal does not legally oblige advertisers from quitting the tracking, many including Twitter have promised to do so.⁶⁵⁴

To conclude, the expectations with regards to social analytics may be a little farfetched. Not only are the criteria that are possibly useful to measure not clearly defined, they rely on fuzzy concepts such as influence that are difficult to evaluate. Also, they are rather questionable from a scientific point of view.

3.4 Conclusion: ‘Diplomacy Turned Upside-Down’⁶⁵⁵

This part has shown that social media work contrary to what (public) diplomacy is all about, namely ‘[m]ove slow and be careful not to break anything.’⁶⁵⁶ Also, PD 2.0 relies on the assumption that users want to also talk politics while logged onto a social media site, which is not universally true.⁶⁵⁷ In general, the political power of social media is controversial, because its content can be unreliable. ‘Web 2.0 harnesses the stupidity of crowds as well as its wisdom. Some

⁶⁵¹ Brian Solis, “What’s the R.O.I.? A Framework for Social Analytics,” *Defining the Convergence of Media and Influence*, accessed October 13, 2011, <http://www.briansolis.com/2011/09/whats-the-r-o-i-a-framework-for-social-analytics/>.

⁶⁵² Astrid Herbold, “Social Media: Die Stimmung des Netzes erfassen,” *Die Zeit*, October 28, 2012, sec. Internet, <http://www.zeit.de/digital/internet/2012-10/stimmung-analyse-social-media/komplettansicht>.

⁶⁵³ “Do Not Track Plus,” accessed June 24, 2012, <http://abine.com/dntdetail.php>.

⁶⁵⁴ “Microsoft and Privacy: Change of Track,” *The Economist*, June 9, 2012, <http://www.economist.com/node/21556623>.

⁶⁵⁵ Seib, *Real-Time Diplomacy*, 65.

⁶⁵⁶ Zaharna, “The Ironies of Social Media in Public Diplomacy.”

⁶⁵⁷ Patrick Beuth, “App.net und Medium: Seitenhiebe für Facebook und Twitter,” *Die Zeit*, August 20, 2012, sec. Internet, <http://www.zeit.de/digital/internet/2012-08/medium-app-net/komplettansicht>; Patrick Beuth, “Soziales Netzwerk: Facebooks Chronik soll müde Nutzer munter machen,” *Die Zeit*, December 15, 2011, sec. Internet, <http://www.zeit.de/digital/internet/2011-12/facebook-chronik-deutschland/komplettansicht>; Chris Morrison, “Facebook’s June 2010 US Traffic by Age and Sex: Users Aged 18-44 Take a Growth Break,” *Inside Facebook*, July 6, 2012, <http://www.insidefacebook.com/2010/07/06/facebooks-june-2010-us-traffic-by-age-and-sex-users-aged-18-44-take-a-break-2/>.

of the comments on YouTube make you weep for the future of humanity just for the spelling alone, never mind the obscenity and the naked hatred. But that's what makes all this interesting. Web 2.0 is a massive social experiment, and like any experiment worth trying, it could fail.⁶⁵⁸

Also, social media's flat hierarchies clash with the Foreign Service's hierarchical structures. While the latter are flexible, scalable and survivable, diplomatic structures are rather static and operate from single centres.⁶⁵⁹ According to former practitioner John Brown, public diplomacy is a 'very down-to-earth, "real-life" activity [that], once implemented by an independent and very imperfect agency (the [...] USIA), is hidden away at the regulations-driven State Department.'⁶⁶⁰ This aspect further emphasizes the contradictions it embodies and underscores the importance of institutions that will be explored later on. Also, (public) diplomacy often deals with confidential and sensible information that, once leaked, can have highly damaging consequences. While public diplomacy is certainly less '[...] intrinsically secret and full of intrigue, carried out by few actors, with public opinion playing a passive role, if any',⁶⁶¹ than traditional diplomacy, it has become apparent that certain elements linger on.

In addition to that, the media environment changes rapidly; it would be too optimistic to assume that any public administration was able to follow suit. Also, the diversification of public diplomacy to these many channels could lead to cacophony instead of a unified strategic message. This increase in available communication further challenges PD 2.0 since it has to compete with other online content. 'There is an information explosion, and we are competing for attention and credibility in the midst of that explosion,'⁶⁶² Karen Hughes, former Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy opines.

Besides, this chapter underlined the fact that Internet technology is a neutral tool that can be used for communicating both the good and bad – the terrorist group al Shabaab's active Twitter account makes this very clear. Also, by operating third party websites with commercial interests

⁶⁵⁸ Grossman, "You - Yes, You - Are TIME's Person of the Year."

⁶⁵⁹ Manuel Castells, "Informationalism, Networks, and the Network Society: A Theoretical Blueprint," 2004, <http://annenbergl.usc.edu/Faculty/Communication/~media/Faculty/Facpdfs/Informationalism%20pdf.ashx>.

⁶⁶⁰ Brown, "Public Diplomacy and the Flight to the Academy."

⁶⁶¹ Sandre, "Twitter for Diplomats," 7.

⁶⁶² "Arabic Speakers Monitor Net Chats," *The Washington Times*, March 8, 2007, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2007/mar/08/20070308-111426-4682r/?page=all>.

and their own agendas, governments may lose control over their content, not least because some of them are sometimes ill-equipped to deal with social media crises such as sudden waves of comments.

Last, the access to and reach of social media is restricted to those fortunate enough to dispose of the financial, timely and intellectual means. Due to the technical parameters of certain social media tools and the digital divide between regions, social classes, age and gender, public diplomacy is unlikely to really expand its reach via social media. Contrary to popular belief, overall user engagement is scarce and citizen engagement as such has proven to be highly controversial. Social media seem to above all help governments to fortify their power position over citizens.

After having discussed what public diplomacy consists of and how it relates to digital communication, the question of how the institutional actors constituting this dissertation's focus, namely the Federal Foreign Office and the State Department, deal with these contradictions and the area of conflict that conditions PD 2.0 (citizen empowerment versus authoritarian means to an end). Do social media shake up traditional public diplomacy or is its institutional framework too rigid, hindering change? To further investigate this, the next chapter will take a closer look at the concept of historical institutionalism.

Since this is not a classical paper with a model of variables, it will refrain from this terminology; instead, it will verify a set of assumptions generated from the text corpus discussed in chapters two and three. These are supposed to guide the subsequent analysis and will be tested by means of the data to be collected in a second step.⁶⁶³ Let us thus briefly recapitulate them.

Hypothesis 1: Public diplomacy is an instrument to sway power. It is thus extremely unlikely for states to use it to empower others groups. Rather public diplomacy serves their respective ends. Interaction, engagement and the creation of a global agora are illusive.

Hypothesis 2: Public diplomacy is a multifaceted concept and includes if not propagandistic than persuasion oriented elements in addition to centring on culture and relationship building.

⁶⁶³ Yin, *Case Study Research*, 5:111–112.

Hypothesis 3: The fundamental structural differences between the medium (social media) and the executor (public administration and diplomatic service) must hamper the practice and lead to substantial conflicts, for example, through limited choice of content.

Hypothesis 4: PD 2.0 is not an innovative concept but reproduces the common points of criticism that foreign affairs broadcasting is often faced with (elitism, regionalism, and simplification).

To inquire these matters, chapter 4 will provide a research framework to analyse PD 2.0.

4 A RESEARCH FRAMEWORK TO ANALYSE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 2.0

Despite the growing significance of public diplomacy in contemporary international relations, scholars have not yet pursued or even sufficiently promoted systematic theoretical research in this field. [...] A new research agenda is clearly needed to close the wide gaps.

Eytan Gilboa (2008)⁶⁶⁴

4.1 Historical Institutionalism

Before taking a specific look at the actual research objects, it is important to draw from a theoretical framework explaining the way corporate actors behave within their environment and how institutions affect their behaviour.⁶⁶⁵ To address these issues, the analysis' theoretical part will be mainly constituted of and inspired by historical institutionalism, a *research heuristic* that provides a meta-theoretical framework. The latter seems particularly suitable to this research project since it has, according to Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, proven very helpful in '[...] illuminating cross-national differences and the persistence of patterns or policies over time within individual countries.'⁶⁶⁶ This is exactly what this paper aspires to do, namely to '[...] explain different policy outcomes in different countries with reference to their respective (stable) institutional configurations,'⁶⁶⁷ departing from an empirical puzzle, that was laid out over the previous chapters.⁶⁶⁸ Historical institutionalism further aims at explaining past political decisions to help practitioners to develop realisable problem solutions as well as institutions, through studying social groups and state structures.⁶⁶⁹ This seems suitable since the introductory remarks have already underscored that history plays an important role with regards to public diplomacy. In contrast to other forms of institutionalism, it does not consider interests as exogenously given and necessarily rational, as rational choice institutionalism does, nor are cultural norms seen as

⁶⁶⁴ Gilboa, "Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy," 73; 75.

⁶⁶⁵ Peter A. Hall, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms" (presented at the MPIFG Scientific Advisory Board Meeting, Cologne, May 9, 1996), 7, http://www.mpifg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp96-6.pdf.

⁶⁶⁶ Steinmo and Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," 14.

⁶⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁸ Kathleen Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science* 1999, no. 2 (1999): 373-374.

⁶⁶⁹ Sven Steinmo, "What Is Historical Institutionalism?," in *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences. A Pluralist Perspective*, ed. Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 158; 175, <http://spot.colorado.edu/~steinmo/HI.pdf>; Paul Pierson, "When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political Change," *World Politics* 45, no. 04 (1993): 627.

all-encompassing, as sociological institutionalism argues.⁶⁷⁰

Historical institutionalism aims at explaining the factors and dynamics that lead to a certain outcome or the occurrence of certain decisions, that are realised through a combination of interest maximising and rule following.⁶⁷¹ Historical institutionalism claims that ‘particular courses of action, once introduced, can be virtually impossible to reverse; and consequently, political development is often punctuated by critical moments or junctures that shape the basic contours of social life.’⁶⁷² Studying political processes over time thus leads to a better uncovering of their workings. Could the rise of the Internet and social media in particular constitute such a critical juncture for public diplomacy – a *digital turn* – substantially changing it? The case study aims at finding it out.

Historical institutionalism also acts on the assumption that structures constrain but do not necessarily determine individual actions and are crucial to understand political behaviour with comparative case studies being able to provide substantial insights into explaining political change.⁶⁷³ This means that this research heuristic examines the nature between agents and structure, subjecting the former to the latter even though these institutions are themselves subjected to change induced by the actors through what Steinmo and Thelen call *institutional dynamism*.⁶⁷⁴

Institutions are understood as rules, ‘[...] the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy. They can range from the rules of a constitutional order or the standard operating procedures of a bureaucracy to the conventions governing trade union behavior or bank-firm relations. In general, historical institutionalists associate institutions with organizations and the rules or conventions promulgated by formal organization.’⁶⁷⁵

⁶⁷⁰ Vivien A. Schmidt, “Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 11, no. 1 (2008): 304.

⁶⁷¹ Steinmo, “What Is Historical Institutionalism?,” 163.

⁶⁷² Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” *The American Political Science Review* 94, no. 2 (June 1, 2000): 251.

⁶⁷³ Pierson, “When Effect Becomes Cause,” 596.

⁶⁷⁴ Steinmo and Thelen, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” 16.

⁶⁷⁵ Hall, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” 6–7.

Institutions are an umbrella term for the influences understood as most relevant for the actors that are this analysis' actual focus. The latter are dependent on the former to find their way in a chaotic environment.⁶⁷⁶ In short, institutions shape the actors and their respective interests, 'those things that a person needs, or that are conducive to his or her flourishing and success,'⁶⁷⁷ which are endogenous and not objectively determinable.⁶⁷⁸

Historical institutionalism accords paramount importance to history, not only because it provides the context that actions take place in and directly influences them. Actors can also learn from experience and base their behaviour on past occurrences. Expectations are strongly entangled with history and shape the reactions to certain situations. Thus, actions are not necessarily efficient or purely self-interested but the choice sometimes falls on doing what has always been done.⁶⁷⁹ The concept of path dependence is central to this approach: Underlying a narrow understanding of it, it means that preceding behaviour is likely to induce a continuity of it in the future. 'Path dependence is a way to narrow conceptually the choice set and link decision making through time.'⁶⁸⁰ In addition to that, *increasing return processes*, which consist in the likelihood of continuing down a road growing with every step taken, can further influence and restrain the actors. The reason for this is that the risks of adopting a previously plausible alternative rise over time.⁶⁸¹ According to Paul Pierson, politics are especially susceptible to those patterns because political actors dispose of rather short time horizons (think of four-year legislative periods in Germany, for example) and governing rules are associated with a strong status quo bias. He argues that since politicians often focus on short-term consequences (that benefit their position or standing while in office) major policy or institutional reforms that only provide returns in the long run tend to be neglected. He also claims that institutions and public policies tend to (and are designed to) be change resistant: Not only are they made to bind possible successors to the same path, making it impossible to undo all previous efforts in a heartbeat. There is also

⁶⁷⁶ Steinmo, "What Is Historical Institutionalism?," 159–160.

⁶⁷⁷ John Scott and Gordon Marshall, "Interests (noun)," *A Dictionary of Sociology* (Oxford, New York [etc.]: Oxford University Press, Reference Online, 2009), <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t88.e1150>.

⁶⁷⁸ Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," 375.

⁶⁷⁹ Steinmo, "What Is Historical Institutionalism?," 164–166; 178.

⁶⁸⁰ Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 98.

⁶⁸¹ Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics," 252.

evidence that actors constraining themselves benefits the country in the long and short run.⁶⁸² Historical institutionalism further claims that institutions are associated with social conventions, to some extent so deeply enshrined that an individual actor cannot easily overturn them if at all.⁶⁸³ These institutions have a tendency to unevenly distribute power resources among actors or interests, which enables some to a greater extent than others to create new institutions.⁶⁸⁴

While there are theories clarifying why institutions come into being or are replaced, explaining (especially gradual) change constitutes a main challenge for all three – sociological, rational choice and historical – forms of institutionalism that come with a focus on institutional persistence and relative endurance.⁶⁸⁵ Only centring on these periodical and punctuated moments of choice and agency, breakdowns, would lead to omitting endogenous and gradual sources of change that are crucial as well.⁶⁸⁶ A shift from understanding institutions as a rigid corset that accords little space for spontaneity or calculated behaviour to conceptualising it as the product of the interaction of diverse actors with each other and the structure, appears helpful in this respect.⁶⁸⁷

This brings us to the need for clarification of the term *actors*. The level of analysis will be the so-called *meso level* focussing on corporative actors; individuals intentionally regroup their resources to create a super-individual legal person that acts on their behalf of, that is, organisations, capable of acting with preferences independent of its members. Especially government-related sectors are highly organised. This however, does theoretically not imply a total exclusion of individual actors since those may in certain situations strongly impact the organisations' actions.⁶⁸⁸ Still, the author will not be in any position to clearly distinguish on which level a decision took place.

⁶⁸² Ibid., 261–263.

⁶⁸³ Hall, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” 8.

⁶⁸⁴ Ibid., 9; 21.

⁶⁸⁵ James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, “A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change,” in *Explaining Institutional Change*, ed. Kathleen Thelen and James Mahoney (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 2–4.

⁶⁸⁶ Ibid., 7.

⁶⁸⁷ Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen, “Introduction: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies,” in *Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies*, ed. Kathleen Thelen (Oxford, New York [etc.]: Oxford University Press, 2005), 16.

⁶⁸⁸ Renate Mayntz and Fritz W. Scharpf, “Der Ansatz des akteurzentrierten Institutionalismus,” in *Gesellschaftliche Selbstregelung und politische Steuerung*, ed. Renate Mayntz and Fritz W. Scharpf (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 1995), 43–44, <http://duepublico.uni-duisburg-essen.de/servlets/DocumentServlet/Document/22000/Mayntz,%20Scharpf%201995.pdf>.

The dissertation will include the German Foreign Office as in its unit 608, entrusted with communication related to Web 2.0 and the strategic department 02 as well as the London embassy.⁶⁸⁹ The analysis will thus be performed on two levels. The same applies for the State Department, its division pertaining to the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs as well as other relevant advisors and the diplomatic mission to the UK.⁶⁹⁰

Returning to historical institutionalism, James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen argue that the gaps between institutions and their operationalisation sometimes leave room for interpretation. Actors can then (un)intentionally induce change through strategic – instrumental or intuitive – action within such an institutional context that indeed favoured these very perceptions, strategies or actors over others.⁶⁹¹ Thus, Mahoney and Thelen reckon that ‘[...] change and stability are in fact inextricably linked. Those who benefit from existing arrangements may have an objective preference for continuity but ensuring such continuity requires the ongoing mobilization of political support as well as, often, active efforts to resolve institutional ambiguities in their favor.’⁶⁹² To therefore generally evaluate change, it is important to also define which institutional properties are conducive to change, how and why they foster change-savvy agents and how change can be operationalised. Last, it seems crucial to further investigate change strategies, as in which approaches work best under which conditions.⁶⁹³

For that matter, Mahoney and Thelen elaborated a model to explain gradual institutional change and developed a typology of different modes of institutional change, different political contexts and change agents. To investigate whether or not change took place, this dissertation needs not only to understand what sameness as opposed to an alteration would consist in; analysing the environment and conditions that might bring about these modifications as well as their potential to provide a breeding ground for institutional changes in the first place seems

⁶⁸⁹ See for details on financial resources: Bundesregierung, *Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kultur- und Bildungspolitik 2009/2010*, 2011, 10–12, <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/560176/publicationFile/144756/110112-AKBP-Bericht.pdf>.

⁶⁹⁰ Bureau of Public Affairs U.S. Department of State. The Office of Website Management, “Department Organization Chart,” *U.S. Department of State*, May 2012, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/dos/99494.htm>.

⁶⁹¹ Colin Hay and Daniel Wincott, “Structure, Agency and Historical Institutionalism,” *Political Studies* 46, no. 5 (1998): 955.

⁶⁹² Mahoney and Thelen, “A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change,” 8–9.

⁶⁹³ *Ibid.*, 3.

crucial as well. This is especially true since social media has slowly risen to importance as one diplomat argued.⁶⁹⁴

This paper will thus briefly sum up this model, drawing from it for the subsequent case study, providing this dissertation with ideas about which aspects need to be assessed further to investigate whether or not the rise of social media changed public diplomacy. It will, however, not be transposed literally, rather serving as an inspiration.

In Mahoney and Thelen’s view, institutional change is a complex interplay between both the political context and the institutions in question. They shape the type of dominant change agent that is likely to emerge and flourish in specific institutional contexts, and the kinds of strategies this agent is likely to pursue to effect change.

	Displacement	Layering	Drift	Conversion
Removal of Old Rules	Yes	No	No	No
Neglect of Old Rules	--	No	Yes	No
Changed Impact / Enactment of Old Rules	--	No	Yes	Yes
Introduction of New Rules	Yes	Yes	No	No

Figure 4-1: Types of Gradual Change⁶⁹⁵

They distinguish four modes of institutional change, depending on the extent of transformation regarding the body of rules. *Displacement*, substituting old through new rules, can be slow but also abrupt. *Layering* happens when new rules are introduced in addition to old ones. *Drift* takes place when shifts that occur in the environment lead to the existing rules having a different impact. It can be generated out of neglect to adapt and / or to update the institutions. Mahoney

⁶⁹⁴ Diplomat 5, Off-the-record conversation, March 14, 2013.

⁶⁹⁵ Author’s own presentation; Mahoney and Thelen, “A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change,” 16.

and Thelen speak of *conversion* when rules remain the same but their interpretation and subsequent operationalisation changes.⁶⁹⁶

Thelen and Mahoney suggest exploring several links, starting with change factors associated with the contextual and institutional background. For that matter, the relevant questions are: 'Does the political context afford defenders of the status quo strong or weak veto possibilities? Does the targeted institution afford actors opportunities for exercising discretion in interpretation or enforcement?'⁶⁹⁷ *Veto possibilities* mean either being able to block the changing of rules and / or the enactment of the latter. In such a context, *layering* or *drift* seem more promising since rule change needs to be actively voted and neglect and / or creation of new rules might be out of reach because of strong veto actors. *Conversion* is similarly auspicious since it provides change actors with substantial room for manoeuvre through relying on taking advantages of ambiguities that lie in the rules' actual nature.

Next, it is important to investigate if the actors in question tend to preserve existing rules and to follow them. Mahoney and Thelen define four types of change agents: *Insurrectionaries*, *symbionts*, *subversives* and *opportunists*. While *insurrectionaries* actively and visibly act as well as mobilise against existing institutions, they also tend to disregard them. Such types are most likely to arise in a climate of mutually reinforcing institutions that disadvantage groups of actors, thus creating common ground for rebellion. With rapid displacement being their main goal, they tend to appear at critical junctures. *Symbionts*, actors that take advantage of rules they did not create themselves, can be divided into *parasitic* and *mutualistic*. While the former take advantage of the institutions in question but exploit them through acting against their actual purpose, they demote it in the long-term. They proliferate when compliance is expected but can hardly be enforced, which is why they tend to be associated with *drift* in particular since it comes along with a neglect of rules. The latter exploit the existing body of rules as well but since they play along to certain extent, they do not undermine them thus reinforcing existing institutions. *Subversives* aim at displacing an institution from within without their goal being obvious. *Layering* is their favourite method of choice because subtly spinning off new rules from already existing ones counts amongst their preferred approach. Last, *opportunists* have no clear

⁶⁹⁶ Ibid., 15–19.

⁶⁹⁷ Ibid., 8–9.

preferences regarding the institution’s persistence or disappearance. Instead, they exploit the status quo to their ends but would also go for *conversion* if convenient. Out of this ambivalence, they tend to support existing conditions through their passivity.⁶⁹⁸

		Characteristics of the Targeted Institution	
		Low Level of Discretion in Interpretation/ Enforcement	High Level of Discretion in Interpretation / Enforcement
Characteristics of the Political Context	Strong Veto Possibilities	Subversives (layering)	Parasitic Symbionts (drift)
	Low Veto Possibilities	Insurrectionaries (displacement)	Opportunists (conversion)

Figure 4-2: Contextual and Institutional Sources of Change Agents⁶⁹⁹

Last, one needs to address how this institutional context favours the emergence of certain types of change agents since they ‘[...] become the intervening step through which the character of institutional rules and political context do their causal work.’⁷⁰⁰ As already mentioned, *insurrectionaries* are those most likely to appear at critical junctures. The latter would consist in a context where the defenders of the status quo dispose of few possibilities to veto while their room for manoeuvre regarding enforcement and interpretation is rather restricted; *displacement* does namely not rely on exploiting ambiguities in the existing body of rules. Still, they can appear in all contexts. *Parasitic symbionts* tend to thrive when strong veto players secure the current situation and substantial room for rule interpretation and enforcement is left so that they can still advance their interests. *Subversives* are most likely to flourish when change can only be induced from within since it is difficult to bend the rules because of strong veto possibilities and limited room for rule interpretation. *Opportunists* are at their best when few actors prevent change through their veto capabilities while discretion regarding institutional enactment is high. This enables them to exploit gaps between the latter and the actual rules.

In reality, actors do not necessarily work alone but form coalitions. While *opportunists* are

⁶⁹⁸ Ibid., 23–28.

⁶⁹⁹ Author’s own presentation; Ibid., 28.

⁷⁰⁰ Ibid., 28.

generally open to coalitions with institutional supporters and challengers alike at the precondition that they are persuaded that change is inevitable, *insurrectionaries* only ally with the latter. Since both forms of *sympionts* favour the persistence of the status quo, they tend to work with its defenders. *Subversives* tend to work alone since they operate rather secretly.⁷⁰¹

Adapting the framework of historical institutionalism to this dissertation project not only aims to prove a certain continuity with regards to PD 2.0, it will further investigate the political context to uncover which types of change and change agents are likely to emerge and be potentially empowered: A document analysis in chapter 5.1 will shed light on whether or not U.S. and German public diplomacy (2.0) doctrines perpetuate their respective foreign policy tradition. Chapter 5.2 will then further investigate the ensuing body of rules to determine the institutional context's level of rigidity and how much room for manoeuvre it leaves to the actors. Supported through interviews, it will furthermore clarify which agents are empowered and what their respective stance towards the system of rules is. In this respect, we will not only consider national legislation relevant to the use of social media in foreign policy, the institutions considered the most prominent in the context of public diplomacy, the German Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt) and the State Department respectively are of interest as well. Both ministries bring about concrete rules and constraints for the actors involved. Indeed, the Auswärtiges Amt (AA) / State Department constitute respective cognitive frameworks, a whole cosmos of culture and systems of rule with a long tradition. Chapter 5.3 will lastly underscore the findings with empirical examples.

Before explaining the concrete methodology mentioned above, the next paragraphs will first explore why these two cases provide such compelling examples and further explain the concept of a case study.

4.2 Building a Case

4.2.1 Case Study Design

Robert Yin understands a case study as 'an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. [... It] relies on multiple sources of evidence with data needing to

⁷⁰¹ Ibid., 29–31.

converge in a triangulating fashion [...] and benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis.⁷⁰² It furthermore helps to reduce complexity through focusing on specific elements to bridge the gap between abstraction and singularity.

The benefits of a comparative case study are first of all that two or more samples supporting a theory might constitute a strong case for further investigating the matter, which is why this dissertation is built up as a multiple case study. Also, case studies are especially suitable to ask *how* and *why* questions. Furthermore, Olivier Giraud argues that such a comparison perfectly fits with the challenges globalisation imposes for the analysis of actors since it questions the national space by going beyond frontiers to explain phenomena. At the same time, this approach reaffirms the state's relevance by recognising national barriers as an important frame for the formation of the systemic differences that coin the cases.⁷⁰³ In addition, it allows putting results into perspective and giving them a meaning: Difference is not only illustrative and descriptive of the social world's diversity but can help uncover unexpected mechanisms materialised through heavily generalised categories such as federalism or privacy regulation. This comparison – with the use of PD 2.0 as the same analytical category – is tremendously suitable to explore and further test a phenomenon's constitutive mechanisms as its operationalisation is observed under various conditions.⁷⁰⁴

Five aspects are crucial to develop a research design: First, the research question, which is here: How does PD 2.0 fit together with public diplomacy's purposes as defined by both countries' Foreign Offices and their respective doctrines? Do the embassies actively encourage participation, trying to include the audience into the policy-making process? Are the social media sites entangled with the local media system? How do German and American approaches to PD 2.0 differ and why? The second issue is about the propositions of this research, which aims to challenge PD 2.0 and to show through focusing on internal and external conditions how public diplomacy was not profoundly modified with the rise of social media. Next, its units of analysis need to be defined. Research occurs on two separate levels – the foreign office and the embassy in

⁷⁰² Yin, *Case Study Research*, 5:13–14.

⁷⁰³ Olivier Giraud, "Les défis de la comparaison à l'âge de la globalisation: Pour une approche centrée sur les cas les plus différents inspirée de Clifford Geertz," *Critique internationale* 57, no. 4 (2012): 90; 99; 105–106; 109; Yin, *Case Study Research*, 5:12–13;33.

⁷⁰⁴ Giraud, "Les défis de la comparaison à l'âge de la globalisation: Pour une approche centrée sur les cas les plus différents inspirée de Clifford Geertz," 90; 99; 109.

question that are both embedded into the respective diplomatic services – for both are necessarily intertwined with each other. Thus, the dissertation will consist in an embedded, multiple-case design, explaining each case within its context.

Fourth, it is also important to underscore the logic linking the data to the proposition and the criteria for interpreting the findings, the latter being both countries' major foreign policy and public diplomacy characteristics to be explained in chapter 5.1 as well as the properties of change mentioned above. For that matter, the categories of the content analysis will be developed from (to a certain extent) the respective foreign policy as well as public diplomacy strategies and compared to the actual operationalisation. Also, the study will follow Robert Yin's replication logic consisting in first defining and designing the research that is conducted for the first case: After drawing conclusions, the second one is analysed and the results incorporated into the conclusions, leading to an adaptation of the theory and the inferred policy implications.⁷⁰⁵

To strengthen this study's validity, Robert Yin suggests amongst others to use several sources of evidence and to have key informants review drafts. Further, it is crucial to demonstrate reliability as in precisely describing the procedure so that it could be replicated with the same results.⁷⁰⁶ To create common ground between the two rather different subjects of comparison – superpower USA and middle power Germany – the dissertation will try to match the terminology used as suggested by Robin Brown, especially when based on translations.⁷⁰⁷

4.2.2 Case Selection

Germany and the United States constitute two most likely cases. Their comparison will take place on the conceptual ministerial level and the operative one as in the embassies to shed light on the implementation of Facebook and Twitter for public diplomacy as suggested above.

This case design is based on the assumption that certain cases are more suitable to test a theory or hypothesis.

⁷⁰⁵ Yin, *Case Study Research*, 5:21–28; 40–53.

⁷⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 5:33–39.

⁷⁰⁷ Brown, "The Four Paradigms of Public Diplomacy: Building a Framework for Comparative Government External Communications Research," 2.

If one's theoretical priors suggest that a particular case is unlikely to be consistent with a theory's predictions – either because the theory's assumptions and scope conditions are not fully satisfied or because the values of many of the theory's key variables point in the other direction – and if the data supports the theory, then the evidence from the case provides a great deal of leverage for increasing our confidence in the validity of the theory. Similarly, if one's priors suggest that a case is likely to fit a theory, and if the data confound our expectations, that result can be quite damaging to the theory. In reverse, this means that if an element is not visible here, the chances of it being somewhere else are extremely slight.⁷⁰⁸

One can hypothesise that the embassies that combine a high level of strategic importance and resources are more prone to give proof of or even embody changes in statecraft for example take up new trends in foreign policy. Thus, if such a *digital turn* had or was taking place, it is most likely to appear in this context. To further strengthen the argument that both Anglo-German and Anglo-American relations constitute a *special relationship*⁷⁰⁹ of paramount importance, the following subchapters will further explain Britain's relationship to both countries. Also, public diplomacy – like all forms of communication is tremendously dependent on its context whose analysis is crucial to give communication a meaning⁷¹⁰ – a brief overview on the latter before addressing the actual subject, and even more so in line with historical institutionalism, appears to be productive.⁷¹¹

4.2.2.1 Anglo-German Relations

Germany and the UK overcame the antagonism of World War II and are now very close allies, which becomes visible through their active roles in various international bodies such as the G8/20, NATO, the United Nations and the European Union. Frequent exchanges between both

⁷⁰⁸ Jack S. Levy, "Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 25, no. 1 (March 1, 2008): 12–13.

⁷⁰⁹ Mark Tran, "UK Special Relationship with US Is Over, Say MPs," *The Guardian*, March 28, 2010, sec. Politics, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/mar/28/us-uk-special-relationship-over>; Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, "Britain Becomes Germany's Biggest Trade Partner as Berlin-London Pact Deepens," *The Telegraph*, January 21, 2013, sec. Industry, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/9816643/Britain-becomes-Germans-biggest-trade-partner-as-Berlin-London-pact-deepens.html>.

⁷¹⁰ Chris Newbold and Oliver Boyd-Barrett, "Defining the Field," in *Approaches to Media: A Reader*, ed. Chris Newbold and Oliver Boyd-Barrett (London: Arnold, 1995), 4.

⁷¹¹ Steinmo, "What Is Historical Institutionalism?," 164.

politically conservative heads of governments, ministers and members of parliament mirror this relationship. Furthermore, both the Friedrich Ebert and Konrad Adenauer Foundations, two important German political foundations, have a liaison office in London; the annual Königswinter Conference, an exchange forum destined to strengthen bilateral relations that was founded in 1950 plays a major role, too.⁷¹²

Economic relations between the UK and Germany are flourishing as well, overtaking the U.S. as Britain's most important goods trading partner (the UK is Germany's trading partner number five and if counting only services that play a paramount role to the UK's economy, Germany would even rank second). Expressed in numbers from 2012, this equals a trading volume worth €72 billion (German exports) and €44 billion (German imports). In addition, (in)direct German investment in the UK amounted to €102 billion and British cash flows to the Federal Republic to €62 billion in 2011. The fact that the London-based German-British Chamber of Industry and Commerce, founded in 1971, which acts as a business-to-business organisation composed of approximately 750 British and German member firms, each year provides roughly 20.000 companies with business contacts, information and advice further underscores the relevance.⁷¹³

Last, cultural relations are at their best as well: The bilateral youth initiative UK-German Connection launched in 2005 by the then heads of state as well as both countries' Ministers of Foreign Affairs became the central contact point regarding youth exchanges between the two countries. The web portal offers age-based content (for example games for kids and travel tips or lifestyle information for teenagers) as well as several exchange and encounter programmes.⁷¹⁴

Still, 'Germany is reported upon almost daily in the British media. We cannot complain about the level of interest shown, but we sometimes suffer from a distorted, biased approach. Despite manifold political, economic, cultural and social links between the countries and their people, the

⁷¹² "Deutsch-Britische Gesellschaft," accessed September 23, 2013, <http://www.debrige.de/>; "United Kingdom," *Auswärtiges Amt*, August 2013, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/01-Nodes/Grossbritannien_node.html.

⁷¹³ "United Kingdom"; "Kooperation-International: Deutsch-Britische Industrie- und Handelskammer," *Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung*, August 13, 2013, <http://www.kooperation-international.de/detail/info/deutsch-britische-industrie-und-handelskammer-london.html>.

⁷¹⁴ "United Kingdom"; "UK German Connection," accessed September 23, 2013, <http://www.ukgermanconnection.org/home>.

image of modern Germany is unfortunately still tainted by history and stereotypes.⁷¹⁵ Indeed, '[t]he British are obsessed with Germany – and not always in a funny way,'⁷¹⁶ anthropologist Elisabeth Day acclaims. Especially international football competitions such as the World Cup in South Africa in 2010 incite British newspapers to dig out the *Nazi* stereotypes or random allusions to it. In January 2010, the *Daily Star* for example compared the German football team's new black jerseys to SS-uniforms⁷¹⁷ inducing the obligatory outrage on the German side. So, how is it that despite excellent social, cultural, economic and relations such images exist?⁷¹⁸

One aspect is that 'Hitler sells,'⁷¹⁹ as Regina Tritz reckons, which is a crucial element given the cut-throat competition that reins on the UK's tabloid market that mostly transmit these images. In Britain, '[...] populist tabloids [...tend to] fan anti-German jingoism,'⁷²⁰ with the *Sun* being the most widely read newspaper in the Anglophone world with roughly 8.2 Million readers and 3.2 Million copies sold daily.⁷²¹ Indeed, the print market declines worldwide (-21% in Britain during the 2008-09 recession), which causes a problem because of decreasing advertising revenue that generates a significant part of the newspaper's income.⁷²² Actually, 'Britain has long had a scrappy press. A brutally competitive newspaper market encourages screaming headlines and intrusive tittle-tattle [...] Britons know their newspapers are rude, excessive and unreliable. But they want them to draw blood from politicians and misbehaving celebrities.'⁷²³ Nevertheless, it is important to point out that being denigrated by the tabloids is no exclusive German privilege: Jacques

⁷¹⁵ Gebhard von Moltke, "Getting to Grips with 'Public Diplomacy,'" 1999,

http://www.london.diplo.de/Vertretung/london/en/02/Kanzlei_und_Residenz/An_Embassy_in_Belgrave_Square/Getting_to_grips_public_diplomacy_Seite.html.

⁷¹⁶ Elisabeth Day, "The British Are Obsessed with Germany - and Not Always in a Funny Way," *The Telegraph*, May 8, 2005, sec. UK news, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1489581/The-British-are-obsessed-with-Germany-and-not-always-in-a-funny-way.html>.

⁷¹⁷ Tom Savage, "Germany Bring Back the Black Shirts," *The Daily Star*, January 28, 2010, sec. News, <http://www.dailystar.co.uk/posts/view/119278/Return-of-the-the-black-shirts->.

⁷¹⁸ "Directory of German-British Co-Operation / Adressbuch der Deutsch-Britischen Zusammenarbeit," accessed February 6, 2012, http://www.london.diplo.de/contentblob/2110874/Daten/106290/British_German_directory_DD.pdf.

⁷¹⁹ Regina Tritz, "Die Veränderung der britischen Presseberichterstattung über Deutschland im Zuge des Regierungswechsels Schröder / Merkel" (Master thesis, Universität Köln, 2007), 5.

⁷²⁰ "France and Germany: No Thanks for the Memories," *The Economist*, December 10, 2011.

⁷²¹ Tim Grout-Smith and Lily Poberezhska, "UK Media - Innovation and Tradition" (Media Players International), accessed January 9, 2013, www.mpinternational.org/ukmediaweb.doc.

⁷²² "A Special Report on the News Industry: How Newspapers Are Faring," July 7, 2011, 5; "Newspapers," *The Economist*, October 15, 2011.

⁷²³ "Britain's Phone-Hacking Scandal: Street of Shame," *The Economist*, July 7, 2011.

Chirac, former French president, was once referred to as ‘Chirac the Worm’ because of his attitude to NATO military strikes.⁷²⁴

Another aspect is that ‘[w]e’ve always found Hitler hilarious.’⁷²⁵ Most of the negatively connoted comments on Germany are actually supposed to be humorous. And for many Britons ‘humour governs. Humour is omnipresent and omnipotent.’⁷²⁶ In Britain, humour is particularly harsh and crude, former British ambassador, Sir Peter Torry, states. Third, ‘[t]he Enduring Nazification of Evil’⁷²⁷ constitutes another interesting aspect to shed light on the phenomenon. A British history teacher puts it in a nutshell: “I think the problem with the Nazis is that they are sexy. Evil is fascinating.”⁷²⁸ This obsession with Hitler is however no exclusive British phenomenon, Daniel Erk asserts.⁷²⁹ Still, the Nazi period is accorded an important part of history classes in Britain⁷³⁰ thus playing a crucial role in defining affiliation as well as who is called we and who is the *other*.⁷³¹ John Ramsden reckons that ‘the defeat of Germany, the reassertion of the legend of “two world wars and one world cup,”’⁷³² is still essential to the English sense of who we are, and how they got there.⁷³³ Also, one should note that the ‘[...] Janus head of every distinction necessarily [...]

⁷²⁴ Ciar Byrne, “Sun’s French Stunt Branded ‘Disgusting,’” *The Guardian*, February 21, 2003, sec. MediaGuardian, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2003/feb/21/pressandpublishing.Iraqandthemedial>.

⁷²⁵ David Mitchell, “We’ve Always Found Hitler Hilarious – the Alternative Is Much More Odious,” *The Observer*, August 28, 2011, sec. Comment is free, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/aug/28/hitler-madame-tussauds-david-mitchell>.

⁷²⁶ Kate Fox, *Watching the English. The Hidden Rules of English Behaviour* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2004), 61.

⁷²⁷ Simon Jenkins, “Britain’s Nazi Obsession Betrays Our Insecurity – It’s Time We Moved on,” *The Guardian*, September 22, 2011, sec. Comment is free, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/sep/22/britain-nazi-obsession-insecurity-history?fb=optOut>.

⁷²⁸ Luke Harding, “Germans Lay on 5-Star Visit to Lure British Teachers Away from Nazi Image of History. Rare ‘Freebie’ Brings Night at the Opera and Penthouse Suite,” *The Guardian*, October 26, 2004, sec. World news, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/oct/26/schoolsworldwide.artsandhumanities>.

⁷²⁹ Daniel Erk, *So viel Hitler war selten: Die Banalisierung des Bösen oder warum der Mann mit dem kleinen Bart nicht totzukriegen ist* (München: Heyne Verlag, 2012).

⁷³⁰ John Ramsden, *Don’t Mention the War: The British and the Germans since 1890 - The British and Modern Germany* (London: Little, Brown Book Group, 2006), 397; Julie Henry and David Harrison, “Children Learning More about Nazis than Our Own History, Claims Education Secretary,” *The Telegraph*, June 15, 2003, sec. Education, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/educationnews/3313531/Children-learning-more-about-Nazis-than-our-own-history-claims-Education-Secretary.html>; Donald MacLeod, “Schools ‘Neglecting’ History of British Empire,” *The Guardian*, July 12, 2004, sec. Education, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2004/jul/12/schools.secondaryschools>.

⁷³¹ Klaus Bergmann, “Identität,” in *Handbuch der Geschichtsdidaktik*, ed. Klaus Fröhlich, Annette Kuhn, and Klaus Bergmann (Düsseldorf: Schwann, 1979), 50.

⁷³² Refers to the World Cup finals in 1966 (Germany versus England): A questionable goal of English player Geoff Hurst led to his team winning the match 3:2.

⁷³³ Ramsden, *Don’t Mention the War*, 417.

is both exclusive and inclusive. [The subject in question] is seen in the mirror of the other.⁷³⁴ This is an unconscious process during which a group of people actively chooses another group, stigmatises it as the *other* and subsequently constructs it, not always in accordance with reality.⁷³⁵ Still, Lutz Niethammer warns about arguments relying on the idea of a *collective identity* as too simplistic.⁷³⁶

The fact that the Eurosceptic camp in Britain often uses the German stereotype to warn about the European Union constitutes an additional explanatory element of paramount importance.⁷³⁷

Britain is not the only country that strains against the EU. The euro crisis and austerity have made others cynical, too [...]. But Britain is the only country where Euroscepticism is the default position of the largest political party. And it is the only country that says it wants first to adjust its place in the union and then ask its citizens whether they want to stay in at all.⁷³⁸

Indeed, 'the root cause of this hostility [towards Germany] was the notion that Germany was the main motor behind European federalism [...]'⁷³⁹ The European debt crisis affords more than one opportunity to make this point with intensity unknown since the 1990s that were particularly harsh regarding the press's treatment of Germany.⁷⁴⁰ This issue will be the case study's target with a special focus on the potential introduction of a financial transaction tax since it directly opposed Germany and the UK as institutional actors for, according to Marcel Fratzscher, president of DIW Berlin, '[s]capegoating is inevitable during financial upheavals'⁷⁴¹ and hit Germany very much during the eurozone crisis as will be further developed below. Exploring the role of public diplomacy in such an environment is fascinating because these issues provide a

⁷³⁴ Bo Stråth, "Introduction: Europe as a Discourse," in *Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other*, ed. Bo Stråth (Bern: Peter Lang, 2010), 15.

⁷³⁵ Bergmann, "Identität," 46.

⁷³⁶ Lutz Niethammer, *Kollektive Identität. Heimliche Quellen einer unheimlichen Konjunktur*. (Reinbek: rororo, 2000), 30;40.

⁷³⁷ Anthony J. Nicholls, *Die deutsch-britischen Beziehungen: Ein hoffnungsloser Fall?*, ZEI Discussion Paper (Bonn: Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung, 1998), 17, http://www.zei.de/download/zei_dp/dp_c16_nicholls.pdf.

⁷³⁸ "A Special Report on Britain: Channel Deep and Wide," *The Economist*, November 9, 2013.

⁷³⁹ Anthony J. Nicholls, "Always Good Neighbours – Never Good Friends? Anglo-German Relations 1949-2001" (presented at the 2004 Annual Lecture, German Historical Institute London, 2004), 25.

⁷⁴⁰ Richard J. Evans, "The Myth of the Fourth Reich," *NewStatesman*, November 24, 2011, <http://www.newstatesman.com/europe/2011/11/germany-european-economic>.

⁷⁴¹ "Don't Make Us Führer," *The Economist*, April 13, 2013, <http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21576142-germans-are-losing-patience-being-cast-euro-zones-scapegoats-dont-make-us-f%C3%BChrer>.

perfect scene for it to come into operation, especially since in contrast to ‘foreign policy [that] is based upon a general conception of national requirements, [...d]iplomacy [...] is not an end but a means, not a purpose but a method. It seeks, by the use of reason conciliation and exchange of interests to prevent major conflicts between sovereign states.’⁷⁴²

Due to the critical nature of Anglo-German relations, the embassy to the UK is not only well funded⁷⁴³ but also of strategic importance.⁷⁴⁴ Moreover, it is classified under the highest pay level, further emphasising its relevance making it a strong candidate for a comparative most likely case design. With regards to PD 2.0, the Federal Foreign Office praises the London embassy amongst others as a positive benchmark (the page’s good moderation and maintenance were acclaimed⁷⁴⁵) together with the embassy in Washington. The latter would have made a comparison with the United States impossible, the choice of the object of investigation fell on London, which is even more convenient since the American embassy in London counts as one of the best foreign operations in town.⁷⁴⁶

With this said, let us take a look at the special relationship that connects the U.S. to the UK.

4.2.2.2 Anglo-American Relations

Anglo-American relations began in 1607 with Britain’s first permanent settlement in the new world; the U.S. then declared independence from the UK in 1776, which the latter recognized in 1785. This common historical and cultural inheritance such as a shared language, kinship and similarities of the legal system translated into mutual interests and strong alliances on several levels.⁷⁴⁷

⁷⁴² Sir Harold Nicolson, *The Congress of Vienna: A Study in Allied Unity, 1812-1822* (London: Taylor & Francis, 1961), 164.

⁷⁴³ Bundesministerium der Justiz, “Anlage I Bundesbesoldungsordnungen A und B,” accessed July 4, 2013, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bbesg/anlage_i_112.html.

⁷⁴⁴ Diplomat 7, Off-the-record conversation, April 8, 2010.

⁷⁴⁵ Auswärtiges Amt, “Auswertung Facebookauftritte der Auslandsvertretungen,” 2011; Auswärtiges Amt, “Auswertung und generelle Beurteilung der Facebookauftritte der Auslandsvertretungen,” August 18, 2011.

⁷⁴⁶ Auswärtiges Amt, “Leitfaden Web 2.0,” 17; Brian Carlson, “Cultural Diplomacy,” *The Public Diplomacy Council*, August 19, 2012, <http://www.publicdiplomacycouncil.org/commentaries/08-19-12/cultural-diplomacy>.

⁷⁴⁷ Katherine Burk, “Foreword,” in *Twentieth-Century Anglo-American Relations*, ed. Jonathan Hollowell (London, New York [etc.]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), ix–x; Alan P. Dobson, “The Lion and the Eagle,” in *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers* (London, New York [etc.]: Routledge, 1995), 3–5; Bureau of Public Affairs Department of State. The Office of Website Management, “United Kingdom,” Press release, fact sheet, *U.S. Department of State*, (September 5, 2013),

Winston Churchill coined the label *special relationship* for U.S.-UK relations in 1946 during his iron curtain speech⁷⁴⁸ ‘[...] after a depleted Britain passed the baton of global leadership to Washington in 1945.’⁷⁴⁹ Indeed, politicians constantly reaffirm this particularity: ‘Whether it is defeating the Nazis, standing up to the Soviets, defending the Korean peninsula or hunting down al-Qaida in Afghanistan, there can be no more tangible illustration of our two nations defending our values and advancing our interests than the mutual sacrifice made by our servicemen and women,’⁷⁵⁰ Prime Minister David Cameron said during a visit to the U.S. in spring 2012.

Especially during the Cold War, both countries’ shared history and culture resulted in close diplomatic consultation as well as defence and nuclear cooperation. While this arrangement afforded the U.S. with a loyal ally in Europe as well as a key strategic base on the Soviet Union’s doorstep [and in Brussels], ‘Britain could [not only secure military protection but also] continue to exert an influence in international affairs far beyond its fading status as an imperial power.’⁷⁵¹ After the terrorist attacks on September 11th 2001, then Prime Minister Tony Blair unswervingly backed retired President George W. Bush’s subsequently proclaimed *war on terrorism*.⁷⁵² One can observe a close partnership not only with regards to joint missions such as in Afghanistan, common staff trainings and development and a clear commitment to future endeavours: Cyber security and shared intelligence are high on the collaborative agenda as well. Furthermore, counterterrorism and homeland security play an important role.⁷⁵³ This relationship is further

<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3846.htm>; Mary Ann Glendon, “Common Law,” *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 2013, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/128386/common-law>.

⁷⁴⁸ Tran, “UK Special Relationship with US Is Over, Say MPs.”

⁷⁴⁹ Roger Cohen, “A Much Less Special Relationship,” *The New York Times*, August 30, 2013, sec. Opinion, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/31/opinion/cohen-a-much-less-special-relationship.html>.

⁷⁵⁰ Nicholas Watt, “Barack Obama Pays Gushing Tribute to Special Relationship,” *The Guardian*, March 14, 2012, sec. World news, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/14/barack-obama-special-relationship>.

⁷⁵¹ Ben Wright, “Analysis: Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship,’” *BBC*, April 6, 2002, sec. Americas, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1913522.stm>.

⁷⁵² Ibid.

⁷⁵³ “Joint Fact Sheet: U.S. and UK Cooperation on Cyberspace,” *The White House*, May 25, 2011, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/25/joint-fact-sheet-us-and-uk-cooperation-cyberspace>; “Joint Fact Sheet: U.S. and UK Counterterrorism Cooperation,” *The White House*, (March 14, 2012), <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/03/14/joint-fact-sheet-us-and-uk-counterterrorism-cooperation>; “Joint Fact Sheet: U.S. and UK Defense Cooperation,” *The White House*, (March 14, 2012), <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/03/14/joint-fact-sheet-us-and-uk-defense-cooperation>; James Ball, Julian Borger, and Glenn Greenwald, “Revealed: How US and UK Spy Agencies Defeat Internet Privacy and Security,”

mirrored by both countries' membership in international organisations such as NATO, the United Nations or the Organisation for Security and Economic Cooperation as well as the World Trade Organisation or the World Bank. The UK was also awarded observer status to the Organisation of American States.⁷⁵⁴ Despite several frictions that arose over the years, mutual interests thus lie at the heart of this alliance, Rebekah Brown opines.⁷⁵⁵

Economic relations are excellent, too: Britain counts not only amongst the U.S.' largest good export markets, it is also one of the most important import nations to the States, with both countries constituting together the globe's largest bilateral foreign direct investment partnership. The U.S. exported goods worth \$54,850,5 million to the UK and imported \$54,962,4 million from Britain in 2012. Furthermore, the U.S. is one of the British's most favourite tourist destinations, which is supported by the visa waiver program. The latter affords citizens of certain countries to travel to the U.S. without a visa for up to 90 days.⁷⁵⁶

Nevertheless, it is not all roses: The period after World War II saw the U.S. balance realist with idealist tendencies and the UK reconsider whether to strengthen transatlantic ties or to enhance European integration when the Commonwealth was fading. Margaret Thatcher and her American counterpart Ronald Reagan sharing ideology and political decisions then further intensified cooperation. Actually, the U.S. welcomed the UK joining the European community project since America hoped to steer the organisation into what it deemed a favourable direction through its ally. This stance is still valid today with the U.S. aiming at extending its influence over the European Union through the UK. Thus, the U.S. government opposes a possible British exit from the union, fearing that such a move would not only weaken their strongest ally in Europe but also the very pact. The organisation, on the other hand, encounters the UK's close alliance with the U.S. with scepticism.⁷⁵⁷ The U.S. has therefore not only a stake in the Tobin tax

The Guardian, September 5, 2013, sec. World, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security>.

⁷⁵⁴ "Joint Fact Sheet," March 14, 2012; "Joint Fact Sheet," March 14, 2012; "Joint Fact Sheet," May 25, 2011; Department of State. The Office of Website Management, "United Kingdom."

⁷⁵⁵ Rebekah Brown, "A History of the Anglo-American Special Relationship," 15, accessed September 18, 2013, <http://ashbrook.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/ShermanBrown-Printable.pdf>.

⁷⁵⁶ Department of State. The Office of Website Management, "United Kingdom"; US Census Bureau Foreign Trade Division, "Foreign Trade: Data," September 4, 2013, <http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c4120.html>.

⁷⁵⁷ Alex Spillius, "Britain Will Be Weaker without EU, Says USA," *The Telegraph*, December 18, 2012, sec. World news, 15;25, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/9754042/Britain-will-be-weaker-without-EU-says-USA.html>.

issue but in the UK's general relation to the European Union (the UK's possible pull-out from the Union accompanied discussions then as well). In this respect, public opinion is truly relevant, too: During the time, which is set as the case study's period of investigation (approximately the last three months of 2011), 51 – 44 % of the British population favoured leaving the Union according to YouGov.⁷⁵⁸

Getting back to Anglo-American relations, they are also sometimes considered unequal (Britain can hardly compete with the US in both military and economic terms) and not always exclusive: The U.S. also has somewhat *special relationships* with Israel and Mexico, for example. Several incidents such as the Suez crisis or the Vietnam (Britain refused the American request to send troops) and Korea Wars put a strain on bilateral relations. Steve Clemons states that Anglo-American relations have turned from unconditional love to a new normal, with the U.S. also cultivating these other special relationships since the 20th century saw a rise of powerful other gradually more relevant countries such as India and China that need to be taken into account when making world politics. Also, due to a much more modest defence budget, the UK will have to increasingly back out of or refrain from joint missions.⁷⁵⁹ “‘Britain may not be able to afford ‘special relationship’ with US”, General Sir David Richards warns.⁷⁶⁰

For all those reasons, (future and / or eventual) breakups are occasionally announced. On the home front, enthusiasm for U.S.-foreign policy is increasingly controversial, inducing British MPs to argue in 2010 that the ‘UK special relationship with US is over,’⁷⁶¹ stating that the UK's influence on U.S. policy decisions is fading with the UK refusing to continue to be the US's henchman. Similar voices can be heard on the other side of the Atlantic, too.⁷⁶² Also, its bridge function between the U.S. and Europe seems quite shaky: While Britain acted as such through the Cold War, dissent over issues as diverse as Iraq, the Middle East, missile defence or the Kyoto protocol are now on the rise between the powers. Still, to this day, Anglo-American

⁷⁵⁸ Peter Kellner, “The EU Referendum Paradox,” *YouGov: What the World Thinks*, May 7, 2013, <http://yougov.co.uk/news/2013/05/07/eu-referendum-paradox/>.

⁷⁵⁹ Steve Clemons, “Special Relationship: The Raw Truth,” *BBC*, May 23, 2011, sec. US & Canada, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-13506036>.

⁷⁶⁰ Jon Swaine, “Britain May Not Be Able to Afford ‘Special Relationship’ with US, General Sir David Richards Warns,” *The Telegraph*, May 23, 2012, sec. UK News, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9286432/Britain-may-not-be-able-to-afford-special-relationship-with-US-General-Sir-David-Richards-warns.html>.

⁷⁶¹ Tran, “UK Special Relationship with US Is Over, Say MPs.”

⁷⁶² Catherine Mayer, “Why Britain's Affair with the U.S. Is Over,” *Time*, March 29, 2010, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1976102,00.html>.

relations are – whichever form they may take – very much alive and kicking.⁷⁶³ Unsurprisingly, the U.S. London embassy reflects this strategic importance: It is not only the country's largest representation in Europe, its new building that is currently under construction will be the most expensive one ever built to this day.⁷⁶⁴

The foregoing lines provided us with a brief overview of both countries' relationship to the UK, detailed enough to act as background knowledge to the content analysis. Also, this section's goal was mainly to carve out that both alliances to the UK are somewhat particular justifying the case selection.

With this said, let us now turn to the concrete operationalisation of the model developed above. Eytan Gilboa as well as Martin Welker and others ask for a critical methodological reflection regarding online content analysis.⁷⁶⁵ With regards to Facebook and Twitter, actually, no all-embracing academic methodological framework existed when this dissertation went to press as discussed earlier on.⁷⁶⁶ The next subchapters are now destined to develop an approach to tackle the issue.

4.2.3 Combining Exploratory Study and Policy Analysis

The dissertation will be designed as an *explorative study* since this type of approach is particularly suitable to gain access to and subsequently explore a rather unknown field with only vague or no information on social practices – a fact that applies to public diplomacy and even more so to its digital variant. Its effects are very difficult to measure and establishing causality is tremendously challenging (if possible at all). The aim is to mainly develop ideas for further research and does not necessarily exclude other possible ways of explanation.⁷⁶⁷ The methods preferably resorted to in this respect are research designs of qualitative nature such as (media) content analyses, expert interviews – in this case – with public diplomacy officers and background

⁷⁶³ Watt, "Barack Obama Pays Gushing Tribute to Special Relationship."

⁷⁶⁴ "US Embassy Moving to South London," *BBC*, October 2, 2008, sec. UK News,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/london/7649184.stm; "America's Embassies: First, Dig Your Moat," *The Economist*, July 30, 2011, <http://www.economist.com/node/21524909>.

⁷⁶⁵ Martin Welker et al., "Die Online-Inhaltsanalyse: Methodische Herausforderung, aber ohne Alternative," in *Die Online-Inhaltsanalyse. Forschungsobjekt Internet*, ed. Martin Welker and Carsten Wunsch (Köln: Herbert von Halem Verlag, 2010), 13.

⁷⁶⁶ Patrick Rössler, *Inhaltsanalyse*, UTB Basics (Konstanz: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft, 2005), 42.

⁷⁶⁷ Andreas Diekmann, *Empirische Sozialforschung: Grundlagen, Methoden, Anwendungen*, 4th ed. (Reinbek: rororo, 2007), 33, 188; Yin, *Case Study Research*, 5:30; 120–121.

interviews with other experts involved with public diplomacy or related fields to gain access to the topic and to understand motivations.⁷⁶⁸

In this particular case, a *policy analysis* will be implemented, aimed at showing ‘what governments do, why they do it and what difference it makes.’⁷⁶⁹ Its focus is the output, discovering the origin of a specific policy.⁷⁷⁰ Adapted to this particular case, the paper will investigate both countries’ respective PD 2.0 strategies and the reasons for the concrete handling. It will further check if PD 2.0 complies with national foreign policy and public diplomacy, allowing us to evaluate if the rise of social media altered the way of practicing it. Last, possible evaluation possibilities will be addressed. Such approach is actually especially suitable to bridge the gap between theories and practice that seems particularly wide in the field of public diplomacy.⁷⁷¹ Also, its goal is to better understand the mechanisms in detail as to how PD 2.0 comes into being and which principles guide it.⁷⁷² Further, a policy analysis is rather a framework and not tied to a specific method, which has been criticised, but positively speaking means that it is grounded on a multimethod approach. Such ‘[...] a conceptual framework [...] can provide anything from a modest set of variables to something as extensive as a paradigm. It does not need to identify references between relationships; although more developed frameworks will certainly specify some hypotheses.’⁷⁷³ Despite the absence of a uniform method or theory, policy analysis is especially fitting since it offers a choice of a broad range of all sorts of approaches that can be tailored to needs, which will actually happen with this dissertation.

In short, descriptive policy analysis tries to explain processes of problem handling.⁷⁷⁴ The *explanandum* is the actual policy (concrete contents that are reactions to questions and issues), so in this case the two different PD 2.0 strategies with regards to Facebook and Twitter. The *explanantia* are politics (related political processes, as in how the actor in question tries to enforce its interests and if it is integrated into political decision-making process.⁷⁷⁵) and polity

⁷⁶⁸ Diekmann, *Empirische Sozialforschung*, 33–35.

⁷⁶⁹ Thomas Dye, *Policy Analysis: What Governments Do, Why They Do It, and What Difference It Makes* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1976), 1.

⁷⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 5–6.

⁷⁷¹ Sonja Blum and Klaus Schubert, *Politikfeldanalyse*, 2nd ed., *Elemente der Politik* (Heidelberg: Springer, 2010), 20.

⁷⁷² *Ibid.*, 177–178.

⁷⁷³ Paul A. Sabatier, *Theories of the Policy Process* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2007), 5–6.

⁷⁷⁴ Blum and Schubert, *Politikfeldanalyse*, 51–52.

⁷⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 60–61.

(affiliated institutional conditions of political orders; structures).⁷⁷⁶ Basically, they provide the institutional context that PD 2.0 operates in, allowing to answer the questions Mahoney and Thelen raised that were discussed above.

While the policy analysis builds up the general framework, a thorough study of both countries' respective public diplomacy doctrines that will provide most of the categories for the subsequent content analysis, detailing the substance of both embassies' communication via social media, will be operationalised to show how both governments' activities can actually be explained through *historical institutionalism*. Let us therefore explain the concrete methodology, starting with content analysis.

4.3 Content Analysis

A content analysis is an empirical method to systematically, intersubjectively and reproducibly describe content - and form-related characteristics of communication that serve as a base for further interpretative inference.⁷⁷⁷ Traditional content analysis allows the examination of texts from the past as well as of social trends and developments while reducing complexity. Through consciously restricting the perspective, one can more easily detect connections and systematise comparisons. Besides the description of the actual communication and the supporting media, the analysis aims at uncovering the underlying ideology.⁷⁷⁸

There exist three forms of content analysis, formal-descriptive, diagnostic and prognostic. The first one aims at explaining a text's formal characteristics and has a time dimension, that is, whether one of the characteristics has changed over time. The second focuses on the relationship between sender and receiver: What does the producer want to convey? Which values lie underneath the text? Moreover, it can establish a causal or correlative relationship with a variable outside the text. Has a certain political event led to a greater prominence of a certain topic within the text? The third approach aims at exploring the impact of the communication. The present analysis will actually incorporate elements of all three types but more on that later.⁷⁷⁹

⁷⁷⁶ Ibid., 14-15; 33-35;44.

⁷⁷⁷ Werner Früh, *Inhaltsanalyse: Theorie und Praxis* (Konstanz: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft, 2007), 27.

⁷⁷⁸ Ibid., 42-43.

⁷⁷⁹ Ibid., 44.

According to Werner Früh, the advantages of this approach are that one can make statements about communicators and receivers when the latter are not available (anymore). Also, the researcher is not dependent on any test person's support and the analysis can be performed independently of time. Also, applying the same rules should yield the same results and it is generally a less costly endeavour than other data collection methods.⁷⁸⁰ Last, the *raw material* is not reactive, meaning the researcher cannot influence it. Furthermore, the content analysis provides the opportunity to either compare different media sources, analysing changes regarding the broadcasting over a certain period of time, or to focus on a specific topic.⁷⁸¹

The research subject *Internet* comes with certain particularities that need to be taken into account when investigating its nature: First, online content is tremendously elusive, dynamic and transitory since it can be and often is altered or deleted any minute without this process being easily recoverable. Since it is always available (if it has not been erased), the concept of *on-going / currently* – as in *right now* – has become really flexible: *On-going* is actually when the user discovers the content which may be long after its publication, includes new knowledge into the debate and considers the whole issue from a different angle.⁷⁸² Also, the process of securing the data additionally endangers the data's reliability since errors can occur during the saving process (printing out incorrectly, data getting lost etc.).⁷⁸³

Furthermore, content tends to be heterogeneous since a variety of media (for example videos, links, pictures) and applications can be used. Third, boundaries between different sorts of sources become increasingly blurred since most of them are not linear but instead refer to / are embedded in other sites. In addition, online content is reactive and personalised because users often actively contribute to generate it. Fifth, this sort of information is readily available in its digital form, which requires little extra effort for electronic processing. This also contributes to the fact that the Internet accommodates a huge quantity of data.⁷⁸⁴

⁷⁸⁰ Ibid., 41–42.

⁷⁸¹ Rössler, *Inhaltsanalyse*, 28.

⁷⁸² Welker et al., "Die Online-Inhaltsanalyse: Methodische Herausforderung, aber ohne Alternative," 10–13; Patrick Rössler, "Das Medium ist nicht die Botschaft," in *Die Online-Inhaltsanalyse. Forschungsobjekt Internet*, ed. Martin Welker and Carsten Wunsch (Köln: Herbert von Halem Verlag, 2010), 40.

⁷⁸³ Welker et al., "Die Online-Inhaltsanalyse: Methodische Herausforderung, aber ohne Alternative," 25.

⁷⁸⁴ Ibid., 10–13; Rössler, "Das Medium ist nicht die Botschaft," 40.

In addition, Patrick Rössler points out that the boundaries between interpersonal and mass communication are increasingly blurred making a methodological adaptation of methods from both fields of study necessary.⁷⁸⁵ All these specific characteristics constitute a real challenge for conventional content analysis. Moreover, the complex reception and effects of visual content adds to the difficulty of analysis. Approaching videos, newspaper articles, and web links with the same criteria is more than difficult since all the different types of media come with diverse properties and need to be analysed accordingly.⁷⁸⁶

Besides, the author was not granted access to the pages' Facebook and Twitter administrator information of the pages the dissertation was devoted to.⁷⁸⁷ Thus, valuable data such as the fans' regional provenience and an overview over certain interaction data could unfortunately not be accessed. Those proved, luckily, not crucial to this sort of analysis and may above all be flawed as the previous chapters have shown. Therefore, only visible communication on the embassy pages will be analysed so that comments and fan posts (if existing at all) will only be considered for a quantitative part since no further information on the users (for example origin, country of residence, gender, socio-economic background) could be generated.

The chosen method seems particularly appropriate to this project since it helps to uncover argumentative and self-portrayal strategies. Also, it provides actual empirical evidence to support the arguments made. This approach will thus help to analyse the relevant Facebook pages⁷⁸⁸ and Twitter feeds, detect trends and generate reliable quantitative and qualitative data.⁷⁸⁹ It seems rather precise with regards to content, can be easily executed and combined with the analysis of offline content. Still, it only represents a snapshot to make projections about the whole issue and tends to neglect any of the site's technical aspects.⁷⁹⁰

⁷⁸⁵ Rössler, "Das Medium ist nicht die Botschaft," 39–40.

⁷⁸⁶ Welker et al., "Die Online-Inhaltsanalyse: Methodische Herausforderung, aber ohne Alternative," 10–13.

⁷⁸⁷ German Embassy UK, "Ihre Anfrage," January 23, 2012.

⁷⁸⁸ "U.S. Embassy London," Facebook fan page, (December 21, 2011), <https://www.facebook.com/uk.usembassy>;

"German Embassy London," Facebook fan page, (December 16, 2011),

<https://www.facebook.com/GermanEmbassyUK>.

⁷⁸⁹ Rössler, *Inhaltsanalyse*, 18.

⁷⁹⁰ Eva Johanna Schweitzer, "Politische Websites als Gegenstand der Online-Inhaltsanalyse," in *Die Online-Inhaltsanalyse. Forschungsobjekt Internet*, ed. Martin Welker and Carsten Wunsch (Köln: Herbert von Halem Verlag, 2010), 79; Stefan Meier et al., "Auswahlverfahren für Online-Inhalte," in *Die Online-Inhaltsanalyse. Forschungsobjekt Internet*, ed. Martin Welker and Carsten Wunsch (Köln: Herbert von Halem Verlag, 2010), 106.

First, it is important to define the units of this analysis, determining which material is actually taken into account: The *sampling units* – the available spectrum of communication – are the Facebook pages and Twitter feeds of the German and U.S. embassies in the UK respectively while the *recording units* – the ones to be considered – are only those posts made after 30th September 2011 and before 17th December 2011. This chosen period, indeed not more than a snapshot to start exploring the issue, refers to a – relative – escalation in November 2011 about the proposal of a Tobin (financial transaction) tax for the European Union that required both the UK and Germany to act as institutional actors.

Since Anthony Pratkanis argues that public diplomacy often plays a major role in international conflicts, underscoring its strategic nature as an instrument of power, this dissertation actually aims at analysing it in such an environment.⁷⁹¹ The U.S. embassy will not only be monitored during the same time frame to make the results comparable; the country actually also had a stake in the debate, opposing the tax, supporting the UK's position.⁷⁹² Also, the eurozone debt crisis had global repercussions, not least because the European Union is an important economic sphere and with Croatia's joining in July 2013 contains 500 million people, thus becoming the largest market as well as trading bloc in the world.⁷⁹³ The analysis' time frame starts one month before the conflict erupted and ended one month after it but does not end precisely with a European Union summit 9th of December, destined to resolve the issue. To give broadcasting time to catch up, the recording period ended on 16th December. All these data are publicly accessible, even for non-members of Facebook, no transcription or the like is necessary; the data can simply be printed out.

The posts constitute Facebook fan pages' most important component. They are sorted in inverse chronological order, meaning the newest post appears right on top.⁷⁹⁴ The *unit of analysis* is the single administrator post / tweet and the *context units* the particular aspects that are interesting

⁷⁹¹ Pratkanis, "Public Diplomacy in International Conflicts. A Social Influence Analysis," 111.

⁷⁹² Noam Noked, "EU Proposed Financial Transaction Tax – Fortune or Folly?," *The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation*, November 17, 2011, <http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/11/17/eu-proposed-financial-transaction-tax-%E2%80%93-fortune-or-folly/>; "Volcker Finds British Bonus Tax Interesting: Report," *Reuters*, December 13, 2009, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/12/13/us-financial-volcker-idUSTRE5BCoMH20091213>.

⁷⁹³ Stuart Jeffries, "Is Germany Too Powerful for Europe?," *The Guardian*, March 31, 2013, sec. World news, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/31/is-germany-too-powerful-for-europe>.

⁷⁹⁴ Features a similar description with regards to web blogs; Rössler, *Inhaltsanalyse*, 93.

with regards to a post / tweet.⁷⁹⁵ As already suggested, the analysis will be performed manually since software is not only hard to access but the author was not aware of any suitable to this concrete research project.⁷⁹⁶ Also, human analysis could avoid semantic pitfalls and irony, which software often fails to detect. Katherine Gürtler and Elke Kronewald explain the difficulties than can go along with such an undertaking giving the example of the word *fine*. As an adjective, it has a positive connotation; as a noun it is rather negative. Similarly, a double negative (not great at all) may be overlooked.

The author developed two distinct codebooks for each of the two media but aimed at constructing them as similar to each other as possible, not only to facilitate the actual coding process but also to increase comparability. Still, due to differences in the very nature of the two types of social media, they vary slightly. Both codebooks were inductively developed alongside the material, which is why an explicit example from the source material accompanies and backs every code. Please refer to the annex for more detailed definitions and the method's theoretical grounding.

The content analysis will in a first step focus on formal criteria to get a better sense of the communication. The investigation will orientate itself along Nicholas Cull's model (listening, advocacy, cultural and exchange diplomacy as well as international broadcasting) and take a look at how these communication methods are operationalised. For that matter, it will centre on the following aspects: How many words constitute a post? How often do the embassies post or tweet? Are there patterns regarding the timing? Those details are relevant to explore the communication's context and to link it to current events.⁷⁹⁷ To explore the elite-centrism of the communication (see chapter 3.3.2.2 for a detailed explanation), its regional and content-related focus as well as the broadcasting of non-governmental actors will be investigated.⁷⁹⁸ The analysis will further explore the kind of content PD 2.0 is concerned with. In this respect, it is relevant to investigate if current affairs are addressed: Is PD 2.0 employed to support both countries' respective stances regarding the European debt crisis? Does it reflect the ideational foundations

⁷⁹⁵ Ibid., 39–45.

⁷⁹⁶ François Rüt, Saskia Nöcking, and Stefan Kummer, "Automatisierte Inhaltsanalysen im Internet: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen am Beispiel des SINDBAD-Knowledge-Generators," in *Die Online-Inhaltsanalyse. Forschungsobjekt Internet*, ed. Martin Welker and Carsten Wunsch (Köln: Herbert von Halem Verlag, 2010), 337.

⁷⁹⁷ Rössler, *Inhaltsanalyse*, 151.

⁷⁹⁸ Hafez, *Mythos Globalisierung*, 46–56.

both countries base their respective foreign policy and public diplomacy doctrines on (to be presented in chapter 5.1)? This applies not only to the explicit communication but its ideological meta-level seems crucial as well; chapter 2 has revealed that persuasion and the emphasis of a government's perspective are paramount to politics in general but to public diplomacy in particular (see for example Gilboa's model in chapter 2.2.1).

The study of relevant documents will prove crucial to develop most of the categories for that matter. Those are white papers about national foreign policy, respective foreign policy reports as well as PD 2.0 handbooks and rules. The author was actually able to compile the current U.S. strategy for public diplomacy and its predecessor – the first ever – as well as a framework for strategic communication, issued by the U.S. government. The same applies to Germany. Furthermore, an extensive report on the State Department's digital diplomacy efforts proved tremendously helpful.

Last, regarding interaction, the analysis will inquire if posts and tweets incite users to react in any way, fostering a global agora and which sorts of media are shared for that matter. The social media sites' entanglement with the local media system is of relevance: Do they often share or refer to local sites and news or do they rather centre on the home country?

4.4 Guided Exploratory Interviews

Interviews – sometimes even already included in the foregoing chapters – complete the analysis through background information and provide additional details on for example internal matters that were nowhere else to be found. Since the previous chapter have established that public diplomacy is a truly operative undertaking, interviews gave insights into how practitioners actually work.

These guided qualitative interviews helped the author to explore and delimit the field. There actually exist three different categories of interviews: face-to-face, via phone and in writing (questionnaire). 16 of the 19 interviews the author was fortunate to be accorded were done face-to-face, 2 via phone and one in writing because of geographical distance. Most conversations with different practitioners and diplomats or other experts were led between December 2009 and January 2012, prior to the content analysis. Two others were conducted in the aftermath, to further discuss the results. They took in general approximately an hour; the mostly open questions differed slightly from one interview partner to another.

The interview partners were either practitioners of public diplomacy at the Foreign Office, cooperation partners, involved in Anglo-German relations or social media (public diplomacy) or experts in fields relevant to this analysis. The non-representative sample was constituted through *snowballing*. This notion designates a [p]rocedure by which respondents are recruited for interviews or group discussions by means of informal contact between them. So one respondent successfully recruited suggests others known to them who might similarly be eligible. It is useful for particular types of sample that would otherwise be difficult to recruit, such as participants in a minority sport or interest.⁷⁹⁹

This technique proved crucial to this dissertation since public diplomacy is a tremendously sensitive field with information especially on Germany difficult to obtain. Thus, the author had to rely on personal recommendations that allowed her to expand her network to the relevant decision makers.

The sample was composed as follows:

Diplomats:

- 7 German diplomats concerned with German public diplomacy (2.0)
- 1 diplomat who had recently managed the transition to social media
- 1 employee of an American embassy with a focus on U.S.-German relations and public diplomacy

Public diplomacy practitioners

- 1 employee of a U.S. cultural institute, an American mediator organisation
- Director, European Academy Berlin, mediator organisation of the German Foreign Office
- Rory MacLean, Author of *Rory's Berlin Blog*⁸⁰⁰ affiliated with the Goethe Institute

⁷⁹⁹ "Snowballing: Qualitative Research Definition," *The Association for Qualitative Research*, 2013, <http://www.aqr.org.uk/glossary/?term=snowballing>.

⁸⁰⁰ Rory MacLean, "Sledging in Germany," *Meet the Germans | Rory's Berlin Blog | Goethe-Institut*, 2013, <http://blog.goethe.de/meet-the-germans/>.

Other experts

- 1 social media consultant
- 1 data protection and social media legal issues expert
- 1 employee, Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, who had recently managed the transition to social media
- 1 employee, German Historical Institute, London, working on Anglo-German relations
- 1 researcher at the Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen (Ifa) specialising in PD 2.0
- 1 German exchange pupil in the UK
- 1 German expat living in the UK

Furthermore, the degree of standardisation and systematisation is relevant in this respect. The author conducted guided interviews with mainly open, barely standardised or structured questions. This was due to the fact that the analysis is exploratory. The open questions thus aimed at getting the most out of the discussion. The author recorded the answers in writing.⁸⁰¹

Conducting interviews is a very reactive method, meaning that the interviewee responds to the context the questions are asked in. Possible flaws of this method are that, often, the interview partners have a certain room for manoeuvre for their answers, saying what they consider true. This may or may not deviate from the actual events. Also, there is the component of social desirability and avoidance of social disapproval that may leave a mark. Certain interviewees are also less eloquent than others. Moreover, many questions are related to past occurrences, which might also lead to distortion. The questions' formulation, the interviewer's characteristics as well as situational characteristics may furthermore influence the answers.⁸⁰² Still, interviews provided crucial background information otherwise not accessible to this analysis that will mainly pour into the explanatory parts.

⁸⁰¹ Hans-Bernd Brosius, Friederike Koschel, and Alexander Haas, "Befragung I: Grundlagen," in *Methoden der empirischen Kommunikationsforschung. Eine Einführung*, 5th ed. (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2009), 94–95.

⁸⁰² Diekmann, *Empirische Sozialforschung*, 437–438; 443–444; 531–532; Brosius, Koschel, and Haas, "Befragung I: Grundlagen," 96.

4.5 Conclusion: A Multimethod Approach

This section provided the dissertation with a theoretical framework – historical institutionalism – and the specific methodology to operationalise for the analysis of PD 2.0. By means of a content analysis as well as interviews, this dissertation aims to carve out whether PD 2.0 is a mere continuation of conducting public diplomacy through other means or whether the rise of social media constitutes a *critical juncture* that fundamentally changed the practice. In this respect, it will investigate if the combination of institutional and political context provides a potential breeding ground for change in the first place. Combining both quantitative and qualitative data is of great benefit here because they are not only complementary but interlinked: The document analysis provided many categories that the content analysis is built on, and, the interviews helped to explain and / or back up some of the analysis' findings in return.⁸⁰³

To assess if change in the practice of public diplomacy took place, the following chapter will now present the corner stones of both countries' foreign policies and public diplomacy traditions that will be used as a benchmark to find out whether or not a transformation induced by social media had taken place. Analysing the interplay of the political and the institutional context conditioning the actors will show which actors are potentially empowered as well as their respective strategies.

A very brief excursus into two theories of international relations – constructivism and realism – will define what paths the United States and Germany could be dependent on as well as the countries' stance regarding PD 2.0. There will be no actual theoretical debate of the two concepts, as this would go beyond this dissertation's scope, but only the presentation of two patterns of explanation, which seem most suitable to explain the differences in the use of PD 2.0.

⁸⁰³ Yin, *Case Study Research*, 5:150–151.

5 PUBLIC DIPLOMACY MEETS WEB 2.0 – A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY

In order to effectively engage citizens, an organisation needs to believe that the voice of citizens matters and there is still a culture of 'I'd rather not'.

Andy Williamson (2009)⁸⁰⁴

5.1 Comparing Foreign Policy and Public Diplomacy Doctrines

First, it is necessary to explore both the United States' and Germany's respective foreign policy tradition to later compare it to the corresponding public diplomacy (2.0) strategies and implementation. Chapter 5.2 will then detail the relevant institutional and political contexts, enlightening us about the type of change (agents) it potentially empowers. Section 5.3 will investigate if those key elements of both countries' foreign policy and public diplomacy doctrines can be found in the field, operationalised through PD 2.0.

5.1.1 Civilian Power Germany

5.1.1.1 Historical Background and Foreign Policy Tradition

Since one of the author's interview partners suggested that diplomats are 'professional Germans'⁸⁰⁵ it seems interesting to start investigating this idea from a constructivist point of view.⁸⁰⁶ This school of thought 'consider[s] normative structures shap[ing] the identity and interests of actors such as states [...]. Power can be understood not only as the ability of one actor to get another actor to do what they would not do otherwise but also as the production of identities and interests that limit the ability to control their fate.'⁸⁰⁷ Following this paradigm, Germany can be understood as a civilian power.⁸⁰⁸ This concept, originally designating the European Union, refers to an organisation resorting to peaceful means to enforce its interests to compensate a lack of military capabilities and was after 1990 associated with the Federal Republic, too, and still is. According to Kirste and Maull, it describes a state whose foreign policy

⁸⁰⁴ As quoted in: Jane Wakefield, "Moving towards Government 2.0," *BBC*, October 15, 2009, sec. Technology, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/1/ukfs_news/hi/newsid_8300000/newsid_8302900/8302977.stm.

⁸⁰⁵ Eckart Stratenschulte (Europäische Akademie Berlin), Interview, March 30, 2010.

⁸⁰⁶ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

⁸⁰⁷ Michael Barnett, "Social Constructivism," in *The Globalization of World Politics*, ed. Steve Smith and John Baylis, 3rd ed. (Oxford, New York [etc.]: Oxford University Press, 2005), 263–264.

⁸⁰⁸ Siegmund Schmidt et al., eds., "Deutschland als Zivilmacht," in *Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007), 73–84; Hanns W. Maull, "Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers," *Foreign Affairs* 69, no. 5 (1990): 91–106.

is bound by goals, values, principles and forms of influence as well as the exercise of power that aims at *civilising* international relations. Its main characteristics are the reluctance of unilateral military action for the pursuit of national interests, a general inclination to transferring sovereignty to supranational institutions and in the case of Germany ‘a reflexive support for an exaggerated multilateralism.’⁸⁰⁹ Furthermore, a desire to regulate international relations through the rule of law, especially establishing guidelines for an eventual use of military power and the creation of participatory mechanisms to legitimate a world order based on the values of freedom, democracy and market economy can be observed.⁸¹⁰ It was ‘[...] under [...the American] aegis [after World War II that] Germans [were] able to build their new post-war identity as pacifist Gutmenschen (do-gooders),’⁸¹¹ former American ambassador to Germany John Kornblum quips. This stance translates into action:

Germans are deeply ambivalent about their growing role in Europe, and generally uncomfortable talking about leadership. The mere vocabulary is fraught with historical echoes. The German word for leader is Führer, the title adopted by Adolf Hitler. Mention the word “hegemon”, and German politicians flinch. Mrs Merkel recently described the concept as “totally foreign to me”. Strategic thinking is strikingly absent anywhere in government. Joschka Fischer, a former foreign minister, laments that: “Germans have never had a serious conversation about the destiny of a reunited Germany in Europe.”⁸¹²

While the beginning of the Euro crisis has certainly led to a shift of power from Brussels and Paris to Berlin, a broad debate on Germany as a *Gestaltungsmacht* – the literal translation would be something like *creating power* – has so far only yielded limited results.⁸¹³ This behaviour earned Germany semi-flattering attributes such as ‘reluctant hegemon,’⁸¹⁴ ‘unintentional power’⁸¹⁵

⁸⁰⁹ Jeffrey J. Anderson, “Hard Interest, Soft Power, and Germany’s Changing Role in Europe,” in *Tamed Power: Germany in Europe*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 85.

⁸¹⁰ Hanns W. Maull and Knut Kirste, *Zivilmacht und Rollentheorie*, DFG-Projekt Zivilmaechte - Fallstudie (Trier: Universität Trier, 1996), 24–25.

⁸¹¹ “Falling out of Love,” *The Economist*, November 9, 2013.

⁸¹² “A Special Report on Germany: Europe’s Reluctant Hegemon,” *The Economist*, June 15, 2013.

⁸¹³ “Economist Debates: Germany’s Role in Europe,” *The Economist*, July 22, 2013.

<http://www.economist.com/debate/overview/255>; Eberhard Sandschneider, “Deutsche Außenpolitik: eine Gestaltungsmacht in der Kontinuitätsfalle,” *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 2012, no. 10 (2012),

<http://www.bpb.de/apuz/75784/deutsche-aussenpolitik-eine-gestaltungsmacht-in-der-kontinuitaetsfalle-essay?p=all>.

⁸¹⁴ “A Special Report on Germany: Europe’s Reluctant Hegemon.”

or ‘accidental empire.’⁸¹⁶ The reasons for this are strongly related to the country’s history as already hinted at above, the Economist argues: First, Germany has a limited tradition of political international leadership that the present-day state wants to follow, looking back on long periods of political fragmentation of the German speaking world. Thus, there is no tradition and rather a reluctance of strategic centralised thinking and a focus on economic success while remaining politically modest. Second, a desire for stability (fear of inflation for example) is considered a paramount factor, not least because stability was seldom durable. Third, World War II but also the end of Hitler’s regime had a fundamental impact on Germany and the mind-set of its elites, namely West Germany’s fundamental break from the expansionist hegemony to committing itself to the European peace project and becoming a stable element of the West.⁸¹⁷ Especially the Euro crisis challenges German politicians ‘because it brings these powerful historical forces – reluctance to lead, desire for European integration and fear of instability – into conflict.’⁸¹⁸

After the reunification, things seemed to have changed: While no soldier of the Federal Republic shot in military action between 1945 and 1989, the departure of the Allied troops, international pressure and a new generation of political leaders who had not actively lived through the Hitler period induced alternations.⁸¹⁹ Out-of-territory missions of the Bundeswehr took place since 1991; the Federal Constitutional Court declared it constitutional in 1994.⁸²⁰ In 1999, having convinced the public that it was almost a moral duty for Germany to intervene; German Air Force took part in the NATO campaign in Kosovo without clear UN mandate, according to international law a war of aggression against Yugoslavia. German troops also participated in the subsequent peacekeeping mission. In 2001, Germany led *Amber Fox* the NATO-run peacekeeping mission in Macedonia and also provided more than half of the 1.000 troops. After

⁸¹⁵ Peter J. Katzenstein, “United Germany in an Integrating Europe,” in *Tamed Power: Germany in Europe*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 4.

⁸¹⁶ Luke Harding, “Cool, Laid Back – Germans Are Even Finding Friends in Britain,” *The Guardian*, September 18, 2012, sec. World news, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/18/germans-finding-friends-britain>.

⁸¹⁷ Marcus Schneider, “Germany’s Iran Policy (2000-2008): A Theoretical Analysis” (Master thesis, Freie Universität Berlin, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, Universität Potsdam, Institut d’Etudes Politiques Paris, 2009), 19; “A Special Report on Germany: Europe’s Reluctant Hegemon.”

⁸¹⁸ “A Special Report on Germany: Europe’s Reluctant Hegemon.”

⁸¹⁹ Rainer Baumann and Gunther Hellmann, “Germany and the Use of Military Force: ‘Total War’, the ‘Culture of Restraint’, and the Quest for Normality,” *German Politics* 10, no. 1 (April 2001): 67; Douglas Webber, “Introduction: German European and Foreign Policy before and after Unification,” *German Politics* 10, no. 1 (2001): 5; Piotr Buras and Kerry Longhurst, “The Berlin Republic, Iraq, and the Use of Force,” *European Security* 13, no. 3 (2004): 226–228.

⁸²⁰ “Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr,” *Deutscher Bundestag*, accessed July 25, 2013, <http://www.bundestag.de/bundestag/ausschuesse17/a12/auslandseinsaetze/index.html>.

9/11, Germany deployed troops for the U.S.-led military operation *Enduring Freedom* against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan as well as for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Germany's out-of-area missions began to belong to its normal repertoire of security measures with the Federal Republic assuming its new security and peace responsibilities on a global scale. From being the most in need of security (due to its fault line position during the Cold War), Germany became a security provider itself. Indeed, German troops are nowadays deployed all over the world.⁸²¹ To face these new missions, the army was restructured in 2000, trying to turn it from a peace army into a deployment force. Capacities were reduced and small, well-trained rapid reaction units formed. Also, the organisational structure has been modified (tightened and adapted to quicker decision making) and the equipment adapted.⁸²²

Nevertheless, '[a]tonement for Germany's awful past is woven into the constitution and still shapes foreign and domestic policies.'⁸²³ Indeed, German post-reunification foreign policy is located somewhere between continuity and change, which is not surprising after this major shake-up, Volker Rittberger and Wolfgang Wagner argue.⁸²⁴ Peter Katzenstein speaks of an 'institutionalized taming of Germany's power in Europe.'⁸²⁵ Under Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle's tenure, a new foreign policy strategy was developed alongside with a new concept for cultural diplomacy.⁸²⁶ The former generated criticism and controversy from not only journalists but also the political opposition⁸²⁷ that underlines that the soul searching, which Rittberger and Wagner allude to, is still on.⁸²⁸

⁸²¹ Franz-Josef Meiers, "A Change of Course? German Foreign and Security Policy After Unification," *German Politics* 11, no. 3 (2002): 209; "Aktuelle Einsätze der Bundeswehr," *Bundeswehr*, May 21, 2013, http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pPKUVL3UzLzixNSSqlS93MziYqCK1Dz9gmxHRQCQ45Pn/.

⁸²² Meiers, "A Change of Course?," 211–212.

⁸²³ "A Muted Normality," *The Economist*, 2010.

⁸²⁴ Volker Rittberger and Wolfgang Wagner, "German Foreign Policy Since Unification - Theories Meet Reality," in *Panel: Zehn Jahre Neue Deutsche Außenpolitik: Eine Bilanz*, 2001, 16–17, <http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/resources/conferences/rittberger.pdf>.

⁸²⁵ Katzenstein, "United Germany in an Integrating Europe," 46.

⁸²⁶ Auswärtiges Amt, *Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik in Zeiten der Globalisierung - Partner gewinnen, Werte vermitteln, Interessen vertreten* (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt, September 2011), <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/595030/publicationFile/161978/AKBP-Konzeption-2011.pdf>.

⁸²⁷ See for example: Christoph Seils, "Statt Merkels Schlingerkurs braucht die deutsche Außenpolitik eine klare Richtung," *Cicero*, April 14, 2011, <http://www.cicero.de/berliner-republik/statt-merkels-schlingerkurs-braucht-die-deutsche-au%C3%9Fenpolitik-eine-klare-richtung>; Ulla Schmidt, "Koalition gefährdet mit Kürzungen die Freiheit des Goethe-Instituts," *SPD Bundestagsfraktion*, November 12, 2012, <http://www.spdfraktion.de/presse/pressemitteilungen/koalition-gef%C3%A4hrdet-mit-k%C3%BCrzungen-die->

Furthermore, Thomas Bagger, head of the AA's strategy department provides an additional explanation for the Federal Republic's attitude that is more specifically tailored to the German Foreign Office and its role within national foreign policy. Not only is Germany finding its place in international relations, also the AA is currently struggling with adapting to changes induced by reunification. Bagger explains how in 1990 the ministry's role was defined as coordinating the relevant actions of Germany's state and other public organisations within the framework of the federal government's policy. This, however, has proven even more difficult in present times were the AA's monopoly on shaping foreign relations is fading. Instead of regarding these developments as a zero-sum game between for example the different departments (of other ministries and organisations also involved in foreign affairs) as it is often the case, he calls for understanding the entanglements of diverse divisions as a necessary consequence of and adaptation to globalisation. He also points out that an integration of all these approaches to foreign policy needs to be provided through what he calls a *network oriented foreign policy*.

The AA's role is thus of no less importance than during the country's reunification, he stresses, since it should function as a platform integrating all the approaches, not in competition but complementary to the other actors. The reason for this is that many solutions to global problems can only be negotiated with complex packages that try to satisfy diverse national interests of several global players. The Foreign Office provides in this respect the perfect place to analyse such situations, Bagger suggests, develop linkages and test them since information from all capitals converge at the AA. The *rotation system* (diplomats change posts very frequently) further strengthens this aspect, fostering synergies that Bagger believes crucial. He therefore calls for a change from only including other stakeholders when it is indispensable to systematically integrating other departments through, for example, exchanges of specialised staff. These networks, do, however, require leadership to be fully operational, something the Foreign Office could safeguard in his opinion.⁸²⁹

freiheit-des-goethe-instituts; Daniel Bax, "Leitlinien für die deutsche Außenpolitik: Im Namen der Gestaltungsmacht," *die tageszeitung*, February 8, 2012, sec. Deutschland, <http://www.taz.de/!87305/>.

⁸²⁸ Rittberger and Wagner, "German Foreign Policy Since Unification - Theories Meet Reality," 16–17.

⁸²⁹ Thomas Bagger, "Netzwerkpolitik," *Internationale Politik*, January 8, 2013, 47–48.

To conclude, we can say that history highly impacts Germany's present-day foreign policy that focuses on international cooperation and has a complicated relationship with leadership. This being said let us now explore how this context impacts public diplomacy.

5.1.1.2 German Public Diplomacy: Presenting a Modern *Kulturnation*⁸³⁰

German external communications has its origin in the late 19th century when a variety of private organisations aimed at supporting compatriots residing at the exterior of the new German state. The *Verein für das Deutschtum in Ausland* (VdA) that was created as *Deutscher Schulverein* in 1881 counts amongst the best known examples and continues to exist as *Verein für Deutsche Kulturbeziehungen im Ausland*.⁸³¹ The historical background mentioned above changed the approach to cultural relations: After World War II, Germany's external relations were targeted to rebuild trust and relationships as well as to resume language teaching. Essentially, Germany aimed at proving that the Federal Republic of Germany was a trustworthy, democratic and peaceful state, different from Nazi Germany. During the 1950s, Germany handed out an increasing array of financial resources and tried to enforce its cultural presence worldwide to transmit a positive image of the country. The Brandt / Scheel government (1969-1974) strongly focused on foreign cultural policy (*Auswärtige Kulturpolitik*) that became one of the main pillars of foreign policy.⁸³² From then on, Germany wanted to present itself as a democratic *Kulturnation*, a nation based on and defined by *culture*. Up to this day, *Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik* (AKBP) is constantly presented as the 3rd pillar of Germany's foreign policy, providing it in theory with a strategic orientation.⁸³³ Externally, it legitimises this policy area and justifies its existence. Internally, it serves as a compulsory commitment to a sparsely concrete set of goals and actions that are mainly foreign policy specific.⁸³⁴

⁸³⁰ English translation: Cultural nation

⁸³¹ Brown, "The Four Paradigms of Public Diplomacy: Building a Framework for Comparative Government External Communications Research," 12.

⁸³² Christoph Mücher, "Press Release: Goethe-Institut feiert 60jähriges Jubiläum," June 15, 2011, <http://www.goethe.de/prs/pro/pressemappe60/Pressemitteilung1.pdf>.

⁸³³ Kurt-Jürgen Maaß, ed., *Kultur und Außenpolitik: Handbuch für Studium und Praxis* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005), 23.

⁸³⁴ Patrick Schreiner, *Auswärtige Kulturarbeit zwischen Konzeption und Umsetzung. Steuerungsprobleme in einem schwierigen Politikfeld*, SWP Studie (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2008), 7–8, http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=4878.

In 1990, the fall of the Berlin Wall made the policies' redefinition necessary and the following key goals of cultural foreign policy were set:⁸³⁵

- 'Consolidation of the unity of the German *Kulturnation*
- Strengthening of Western European and transatlantic solidarity
- Extension of partnership based on trust between West and East
- Promotion of the North-South dialogue⁸³⁶

In view of the foregoing paragraphs, those aims are indeed rather imprecise, value driven and abstain from obvious power ambitions.

With the beginning of the 21st century and the changing media environment, public diplomacy is presented as a necessary tool not exclusively driven by a desire for sympathy but also used to underline Germany's power to attract: Major upheavals abroad, the rise of new powers such as the BRIC⁸³⁷ countries, demographic change inside and outside the country constitute main challenges – especially cultural diplomacy is hoped to be able to support Germany's influence despite these changes.⁸³⁸ The incorporation of the department for foreign press relations of the Federal Government's Press and Information Agency (BPA) into the Federal Foreign Office in 2003, a crucial move towards an integrated German public diplomacy, underscores the increasing room allocated to it.⁸³⁹

So what are the main goals and challenges for Germany's cultural policy at the turn of the 21st century? The German Foreign Office redefines them as follows:

- [T]o present Germany as a country with a lively, multifaceted and internationally renowned cultural scene
- [T]o strengthen Germany as higher education location by awarding scholarships, for example, to outstanding young researchers from all parts of the world
- [T]o promote interest in the German language in Europe and also internationally

⁸³⁵ Nicholaus Werz, "External Cultural Policy: Continuity or Change," *Aussenpolitik* 42, no. 3 (1992): 247–252.

⁸³⁶ *Ibid.*, 253.

⁸³⁷ Grouping acronym referring to **B**razil, **R**ussia, **I**ndia and **C**hina.

⁸³⁸ Auswärtiges Amt, *Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik in Zeiten der Globalisierung - Partner gewinnen, Werte vermitteln, Interessen vertreten*, 2.

⁸³⁹ Karten, "Staatliche Imagearbeit: Die Public Diplomacy des Auswärtigen Amtes," 163.

- [T]o contribute to international crisis and conflict prevention efforts by helping, for example, to rebuild schools and universities in Afghanistan
- [T]o promote European integration by introducing EU-wide education and training parameters, for example
- [T]o preserve cultural diversity around the world by supporting projects, for example, to restore endangered cultural sites in developing countries
- [T]o create a stable foundation for international relations by fostering dialogue and encounter.⁸⁴⁰

First, the focus seems to have shifted from traditional allies to new ones as the new AKBP concept explicitly stresses. Second, strengthening a European identity is also on the agenda, especially since culture can constitute a positive antipole to the general perception of the European Union as truly bureaucratic. Moreover, this protects the cultural and language diversity in Europe, which counts amongst its foundations. Germany is also presented as a science hub. In addition to that, only of secondary importance, a positive reputation of the Federal Republic may be beneficial for it as a business and education location. With regards to security policy, it aspires to reduce conflict potential through mutual getting-to know each other with other cultures and spreading values such as the rule of law and democracy. While this conceptualisation entails similar elements as after reunification, its goals have become slightly more global, strategic and concrete.

The term *public diplomacy* has only recently been included into the German language because commonly used concepts such as *außenpolitische Öffentlichkeitsarbeit* or *Auswärtige Kulturpolitik* do not provide a comprehensive translation of it. While the literal translation (*öffentliche Diplomatie*) failed to prevail, the government's reports, however, do not really make this distinction and are still labelled as AKBP (the words public diplomacy appeared once in the 2013 report) even though Oliver Zöllner reckons that public diplomacy is slowly replacing the other notion. Also, this lack of consequent denomination of these concepts makes for example a clear attribution of financial means very difficult; measures considered AKBP in one report are called

⁸⁴⁰ Auswärtiges Amt, "Tasks, Objectives and Partners," June 4, 2010, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/KulturDialog/ZieleUndPartner/ZielePartner_node.html.

culture and intercultural dialogue on the German Foreign Offices Website.⁸⁴¹ ‘The fuzzy terminology points at conceptions of German public diplomacy that are developing but are far from clear cut,⁸⁴² Zöllner opines. The case study will reveal how this translates into action.

To give an idea what Germany’s public diplomacy concretely entails, Daniel Ostrowski adapts the three dimensions of public diplomacy (news management, strategic communications and relationship building; see chapter 2.2) detected above and fills them with practical examples regarding German public diplomacy. Thus, he provides a clear illustration, synthesising approaches previously discussed, giving an overview of what the Federal Republic’s public diplomacy entails:

	Routinized Communication - short-term -	Strategic Communications - mid-term-	Multiplicator Network - long-term -
	Information	Influence	Engagement
Media Relations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Press releases ▪ Dealing with press inquiries ▪ Press conferences ▪ Stake-outs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Contributions (name dropping) ▪ Interviews ▪ Series ▪ (Online) Cooperation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Trainee/ editorial staff exchanges ▪ Press trips ▪ Press roundtables ▪ Media seminars
Advertising / Campaigning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ads ▪ Advertorials ▪ TV spots ▪ Radio spots ▪ PR materials 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Mid-term projects ▪ Paid editorial cooperation ▪ Ad series 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Sponsoring major projects ▪ Durable cooperation ▪ Parts of AKBP
Relationship Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Dealing with citizen inquiries ▪ Routinized press relations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Open days ▪ Citizen fairs ▪ Summer fete / Oktoberfest ▪ Concerts ▪ Exhibitions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Receptions ▪ Exhibition openings ▪ Guest speaker-events ▪ Think tank-events ▪ Parts of AKBP

Figure 5-1: Public Diplomacy Instruments (D. Ostrowski)⁸⁴³

⁸⁴¹ Zöllner, “German Public Diplomacy. The Dialogue of Cultures,” 262; since cultural diplomacy has conclusively been found to be a part of public diplomacy, this dissertation will continue to use both expressions.

⁸⁴² Ibid.

⁸⁴³ Author’s translation and presentation; Ostrowski, *Die Public Diplomacy der deutschen Auslandsvertretungen weltweit*, 42.

This shows not only the complexity of measures as diverse as press relations, concerts and exhibitions as well as editorials and staff exchanges.⁸⁴⁴ It also underscores that it must entail a broad range of actors to implement all this with the Federal Foreign Office playing a central role: Concerning cultural relations and education programmes, the AA strongly relies on and operates through so-called *Mittlerorganisationen* (mediator organisations) with various degrees of proximity to the government, the principal partners being the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), the Goethe Institute, Institute for Foreign Relations (Ifa) and Alexander von Humboldt Foundation (AvH) whose actions are loosely coordinated by the local embassies. As of 2011, the German government disposed of 229 diplomatic representations abroad, 136 Goethe Institutes and 11 liaison offices. Approximately 1,500 partner schools (140 German Schools and 870 schools offering German language certificates) are part of the network. In addition to that, the DAAD disposes of 14 offices abroad, 50 information centres and 493 editorial offices. Moreover, 170 bi-national culture agencies financed and promoted by the German state and 10 humanities institutes abroad exist in addition to eleven departments and offices abroad belonging to the German Archaeological Institute. 58 special consultants of the central office for the school system abroad (*Zentralstelle für das Auslandsschulwesen*) are dispatched worldwide. Furthermore, the Foreign Office invites about 1,000 *opinion leaders* such as journalists, artists and other socially relevant actors a year within the framework of its visitors programme, offering a diverse range of events.⁸⁴⁵

Even though these organisations are tied to certain guidelines the Foreign Office issued and are asked to implement in a differentiated manner depending on their individual mission and structure, the organisations dispose of a rather large room for manoeuvre.⁸⁴⁶ Still, this structure aims at strengthening a community of actors and institutions abroad but also at creating AKBP's common identity. Also, it aspires to guarantee cultural pluralism and AKBP's independence from the government, which constitutes a particularity of the German concept of the latter.⁸⁴⁷ This

⁸⁴⁴ PD 2.0 does probably not appear because it was just in its very beginnings at the time of Ostrowski's research.

⁸⁴⁵ Bundesregierung, *Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kultur- und Bildungspolitik 2009/2010*, 9.

⁸⁴⁶ Auswärtiges Amt, "Tasks, Objectives and Partners."

⁸⁴⁷ Auswärtiges Amt, *Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik in Zeiten der Globalisierung - Partner gewinnen, Werte vermitteln, Interessen vertreten*.

autonomy can be traced back to conceptualising art (in theory) as being an end in itself, a consensus all relevant actors follow.⁸⁴⁸

This structure has also another benefit than the ones mentioned above: Governments tend to increasingly cooperate with mediator organisations mainly financed by the state, as in NGOs or other bodies while staying in the background, which could make them seem trustworthier to their audiences since the latter do not suspect a hidden agenda.⁸⁴⁹ Therefore, governments can use them as useful communication channels. On the downside, Patrick Schreiner diagnoses a lack of such a common approach because concrete goals are missing, leading to operative confusion, and thus partly confirms Thomas Bagger's assertions made above. The mediator organisations' perceptions vary, which is due to their heterogeneity and various missions. This communication problem does not only exist from top-down but also bottom-up. The executing parties' considerable autonomy makes it on the other hand really hard to transmit their own achievements to the media and other political actors.⁸⁵⁰ Still, without being perceived as such, the government can influence and control while acting via non-state actors.⁸⁵¹ Concerning this matter, this handling of public diplomacy is said to abandon the state-centric approach, including other actors such as NGOs, the media and individuals.⁸⁵² This is admittedly only true to a certain extent, for the government is still their main source of income.

Speaking of financing, public diplomacy is included in Germany's national budget plan, the *Bundeshaushaltsplan* that is fiercely negotiated every year for the following one between national and federal state governments.⁸⁵³ Public diplomacy falls under the single plan number 05 – Auswärtiges Amt.⁸⁵⁴

⁸⁴⁸ Schreiner, *Auswärtige Kulturarbeit zwischen Konzeption und Umsetzung. Steuerungsprobleme in einem schwierigen Politikfeld*, 10.

⁸⁴⁹ Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, 113; Goethe Institute, "14.12.2006: Trendwende muss weitergeführt werden."

⁸⁵⁰ Schreiner, *Auswärtige Kulturarbeit zwischen Konzeption und Umsetzung. Steuerungsprobleme in einem schwierigen Politikfeld*, 26–28.

⁸⁵¹ Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, 115.

⁸⁵² Melissen, "The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice," 12.

⁸⁵³ "Einleitung," *Offener Haushalt. Den Bundeshaushalt visualisieren, analysieren und kommentieren*, accessed July 13, 2012, <http://bund.offenerhaushalt.de/intro.html>.

⁸⁵⁴ "Bundeshaushaltsplan 2010. Einzelplan 05. Auswärtiges Amt," 2010, <http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/bundeshaushalt2010/pdf/epl05.pdf>.




Figure 5-2: German Public Diplomacy Budget (1993-2011) in Million €⁸⁵⁵

Spending remains more or less constant around 1.2000 Million Euros, an increase from 2006 onwards.⁸⁵⁶ The federal public diplomacy budget and the AA's sub-budget developed in parallel, slightly increasing. Germany's AKBP budget is distributed to the Auswärtige Amt (roughly 50%), which it partly passes on to the Goethe Institute and 16 further cooperation partners. The other part goes to the budgets of the commissioner for culture and media (BKM), the Federal Ministry for Family, Seniors, Women and Youth (BMFSFJ), the Federal Ministry of Education and

⁸⁵⁵ Bundesregierung, 5. *Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik 2000*, 2000, 6, http://www.ifa.de/pdf/aa/akbp_bericht2000.pdf; Bundesregierung, *Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik 2002*, 2003, 10, http://www.ifa.de/pdf/aa/akbp_bericht2002.pdf; Bundesregierung, 6. *Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik 2001*, 2001, 6, http://www.ifa.de/pdf/aa/akbp_bericht2001.pdf; Bundesregierung, *Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik 2003*, 2004, 10-12, http://www.ifa.de/pdf/aa/akbp_bericht2003.pdf; Bundesregierung, *Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik 2004*, 2005, 10-11, http://www.ifa.de/pdf/aa/akbp_bericht2004.pdf; Bundesregierung, *Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik 2005/2006*, 2006, 13-14, http://www.ifa.de/pdf/aa/akbp_bericht2005-06.pdf; Bundesregierung, *Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik 2006/2007*, 2007, 10-11, http://www.ifa.de/pdf/aa/akbp_bericht2006-07.pdf; Bundesregierung, *Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik 2007/2008*, 2008, 3, http://www.ifa.de/pdf/aa/akbp_bericht2007-08.pdf; Bundesregierung, *Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik 2008/2009*, 2009, 10-13, <http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/diplo/de/Aussenpolitik/KulturDialog/Aktuell-RegionaleKulturVeranstaltungen/100303-AKBP20082009.pdf>; Bundesregierung, *Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kultur- und Bildungspolitik 2009/2010*, 10; Statista, "Inflationsrate Deutschland | Zeitreihe," 2011, [http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/1046/umfrage/inflationsrate-\(veraenderung-des-verbraucherpreisindex-zum-vorjahr\)](http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/1046/umfrage/inflationsrate-(veraenderung-des-verbraucherpreisindex-zum-vorjahr)); Bundesregierung, 16. *Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kultur- und Bildungspolitik 2011/2012*, January 9, 2013, 12, http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/636728/publicationFile/175854/AKBP-Bericht_2011-2012.pdf.

⁸⁵⁶ The numbers dating from before the adaptation of the Euro on 1 January 1999 have been recalculated based on the official exchange rate of 1,95583 to 1; "EZB: Einführung," accessed August 18, 2011, <http://www.ecb.int/euro/intro/html/index.de.html>.

Research (BMBF) as well as the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.⁸⁵⁷




Figure 5-3: Growth Rate German Public Diplomacy Budget (1993-2011)⁸⁵⁸

When comparing the growth rate to the inflation, it becomes obvious that the AA budget has slightly increased especially during the last years.

⁸⁵⁷ Bundesregierung, *Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kultur- und Bildungspolitik 2009/2010*, 9–10.

⁸⁵⁸ Bundesregierung, *5. Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik 2000*, 6; Bundesregierung, *Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik 2002*, 10; Bundesregierung, *6. Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik 2001*, 6; Bundesregierung, *Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik 2003*, 10–12; Bundesregierung, *Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik 2004*, 10–11; Bundesregierung, *Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik 2005/2006*, 13–14; Bundesregierung, *Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik 2006/2007*, 10–11; Bundesregierung, *Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik 2007/2008*, 3; Bundesregierung, *Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik 2008/2009*, 10–13; Bundesregierung, *Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kultur- und Bildungspolitik 2009/2010*, 9–11; Bundesregierung, *16. Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kultur- und Bildungspolitik 2011/2012*, 12–13.




Figure 5-4: Share Federal Foreign Office Public Diplomacy of Federal Budget (1993-2011)⁸⁵⁹

This graph shows the share that public diplomacy takes up within the federal budget – constantly less than 1%, which seems rather modest. The defence budget, for example, amounted to 10.35% of federal expenses in 2011.⁸⁶⁰

After having established the environment in which Germany public diplomacy operates in, let us now turn to its digital variant. The updated concept of AKBP mentioned above actually underscores the criticalness of the use of social media for public diplomacy, especially the aim of adapting to younger audiences, potentially giving it more future relevance.⁸⁶¹ It also suggests the possibility of a media initiative to become a substantial pillar of German AKBP through supporting for example the building up of democratic media or strengthening German presence

⁸⁵⁹ Bundesregierung, 5. Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik 2000, 6; Bundesregierung, Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik 2002, 10; Bundesregierung, 6. Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik 2001, 6; Bundesregierung, Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik 2003, 10–12; Bundesregierung, Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik 2004, 10–11; Bundesregierung, Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik 2005/2006, 13–14; Bundesregierung, Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik 2006/2007, 10–11; Bundesregierung, Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik 2007/2008, 3; Bundesregierung, Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik 2008/2009, 10–13; Bundesregierung, Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kultur- und Bildungspolitik 2009/2010, 9–11; Bundesregierung, 16. Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kultur- und Bildungspolitik 2011/2012, 12–13.

⁸⁶⁰ "Verteidigungshaushalt 2011," Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, August 12, 2012, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/lut/p/c4/NYxNC8IwEET_UTZVCupNiUIvetR6kbQJcSEfZbuJF3-8ycEZ5loeDDyhNuqCTjOmqD08YJzxMH3EFIoTASOubAlzEMUSWzTocnTrW-c6z6-NlD3c242xYk7RciPbyFjpSHMisSRi3owmqkaggVF26iQ7-U_33amz2o_9Vg7Xyw2WEI4_a4vvjQ!!/.

⁸⁶¹ Auswärtiges Amt, *Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik in Zeiten der Globalisierung - Partner gewinnen, Werte vermitteln, Interessen vertreten*, 13.

on TV. The notions social media, Facebook or digital diplomacy do not appear at all in the German government's most recent report on public diplomacy referring to the 2011/12 period.⁸⁶²

5.1.1.3 Going Social Media

The Federal Foreign Office's department number 6 out of 7 (Culture and Communication) is responsible for public diplomacy. Divided into 9 divisions, it is headed by Under Secretary of State, Harald Braun.⁸⁶³ Unfortunately, the author's contact people were unable to reliably trace back when exactly the interest in social media arose. They rather suspected it being a subtle process that may have started somewhere around 2008/09.⁸⁶⁴ Division 608 is responsible for *Germany's image abroad*; within it, three members of staff deal with PD 2.0: One diplomat works on the strategy; another one provides technical support and helps the embassies with the technical setup. In addition to that, the strategy department 02 and especially the diplomat who is working on position 02-9 specialise in strategic communication as well as ground rules and questions regarding communication. The budget for the mission *Deutschlandbild im Ausland* – Germany's image abroad – amounted to 12 million Euros for 2012.⁸⁶⁵

Let us take a look at a few illustrative numbers with regard to Germany's digital activities: The AA's website www.diplo.de is available in German, English, French and Spanish as well as Arabic; including the information of its consulates and information centres worldwide broadens the offer to 43 languages.⁸⁶⁶ This central website was visited more than 1.6 million times in January 2013. Its German Twitter feed (it also operates an English one), online since March 2011⁸⁶⁷ has more than 30.000 followers, the English one about 4.400. Its Facebook page that exists since September 2012 has more than 5.800 fans. At the end of 2012, its German YouTube channel⁸⁶⁸ chronicled more than 11.000 video clicks and around 300 subscribers; the English one exceeded 1.700 clicks,

⁸⁶² Auswärtiges Amt, *Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik in Zeiten der Globalisierung - Partner gewinnen, Werte vermitteln, Interessen vertreten*.

⁸⁶³ Auswärtiges Amt, Referat "Organisation und Globalplanung," ed., "Organisationsplan des Auswärtigen Amtes," December 7, 2011.

⁸⁶⁴ Diplomat 5, Off-the-record conversation.

⁸⁶⁵ A member of staff, division 608, "Off-the-record-conversation", January 17, 2012.

⁸⁶⁶ Zöllner, "German Public Diplomacy. The Dialogue of Cultures," 263–264.

⁸⁶⁷ Jörg Eisfeld-Reschke, "Das Auswärtige Amt wagt erste Schritte in Richtung sozialer Medien: @AuswaertigesAmt," *Institut für Kommunikation in sozialen Medien (ikosom)*, May 10, 2011, <http://www.ikosom.de/2011/05/10/das-auswaertige-amt-wagt-erste-schritte-in-richtung-sozialer-medien-auswaertigesamt/>.

⁸⁶⁸ "Pressemitteilung. Public Diplomacy 2.0: Auswärtiges Amt auf YouTube," October 30, 2012, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/Meldungen/2012/121030-AA_Youtube.html?nn=382590.

the French one 1.700 and the Arabic one 1.000. There also exist Spanish, Russian and Chinese versions but no numbers were available for those, unfortunately. Furthermore, 230 diplomatic missions do dispose of mobile sites in 62 languages in total that were even awarded the *MobileWebAward 2012*. In addition to that, there are some developments in the area of apps: There now is one for travel and security advices and for studying in Germany.⁸⁶⁹ Also, the German government's spokesperson Steffen Seibert (@regsprecher) and the Federal Press Office *Bundespresseamt* are on Twitter.⁸⁷⁰

As of August 2011, the Foreign Office operated 36 Facebook accounts with 52.015 fans in total. The general consulate in Naples led the list established within the framework of the Foreign Offices general evaluation of all its Facebook pages in August 2011 counting 9.775 fans while the German embassies in Nairobi and Rome finished the ranking with 59 and 2 fans respectively. In August 2011, the London embassy's page had 1.859 fans of which 1.205 were active users and is well placed in the table's top-third. It chronicled 44.103 monthly accesses with a negative trend (-29%); each post received an average feedback of 3.76 likes and 2.28 comments.

The following graph that depicts the Auswärtiges Amt's global reach shows that most pages have a modest fan base.

⁸⁶⁹ Diplomat 5, "AW: Promotion Digitale Diplomatie," April 3, 2013.

⁸⁷⁰ Auswärtiges Amt, "Auswertung Facebookauftritte der Auslandsvertretungen."




Figure 5-5: Federal Foreign Office Total Facebook Fans and Monthly Active Users (2011)⁸⁷¹

⁸⁷¹ Ibid.

This comparison shows that the actual number of fans often exceeds its monthly active users. A monthly active user has visited Facebook, was logged in or had used a Facebook feature such as the like button within the last 30 days. It can surpass the number of page likes since not all active users interacting with the page necessarily chose to like as in follow it.⁸⁷² The number of fans does thus not equal the actual reach.

Since all these diplomatic missions represent Germany, they implement the Foreign Office's overall ideas. A Facebook fan page's concrete handling, however, is established at the embassy since operationalisation is incumbent on the ambassador.⁸⁷³ There are two different ways for a Facebook page to come into being; either one member of staff asks permission or the ambassador orders the setup.⁸⁷⁴

The author was told that until January 2012, approximately 20 pages had emerged in addition to the ones analysed above but there was no time to re-evaluate.⁸⁷⁵ At this point of time, division 608 keeps a record of the pages and occasionally evaluates them as it was done in 2011: In March 2013, there existed already approximately 70 Facebook pages and 11 Twitter feeds worldwide, the author was told.⁸⁷⁶ This instance hints at slight difficulties to keep up with the medium and its speed, confirming assumptions made in chapter 3.

A researcher working on digital diplomacy argues that the German Foreign Office lacks an integrated communication strategy comprising several instruments such as Twitter and Facebook, which the author's interviews at the Foreign Office confirmed.⁸⁷⁷ Unfortunately, the embassy in London declined to comment on their digital undertakings.⁸⁷⁸ This German reluctance to link concepts such as branding, marketing or strategic communications, which are elements of public diplomacy, to foreign policy issues as shown above is due to its history: A combination of these two realms seems coming too close to the Nazi Propaganda Ministry. Britta Karten quotes Wilfried Grolig of the AA saying that this reserve should not be confused with incompetence or ignorance: Regaining credibility – the Goethe Institute's guiding theme at its

⁸⁷² Nigel Brookson, "Definition of Active Users," *Thinking IT*, March 28, 2013, <http://www.thinkingit.com.au/blog/definition-of-active-users>.

⁸⁷³ Diplomat 3, Off-the-record conversation.

⁸⁷⁴ Diplomat 2, Off-the-record conversation, December 12, 2011.

⁸⁷⁵ Diplomat 3, Off-the-record conversation.

⁸⁷⁶ Diplomat 5, Off-the-record conversation.

⁸⁷⁷ Researcher at the Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen, Interview, Phone, May 12, 2012.

⁸⁷⁸ German Embassy UK, "Ihre Anfrage."

foundation in 1951 – had long overshadowed German public diplomacy. Germany’s approach clearly distinguishes itself from other countries as in being less strategic, less integrated and less *professional* in the sense of a PR campaign not only with regards to operationalisation but also to content.⁸⁷⁹ Thus, Germany trails behind its American counterpart for whom public diplomacy is not a *why* but *how* matter, as we will see later.

Nonetheless, Germany takes PD 2.0 seriously: ‘State Dep[artmen]t Bundle of Joy’⁸⁸⁰ Alec Ross, as one blogger quipped, ‘has been on an endless international roadshow evangelizing ediplomacy [...] with most serious foreign ministries around the world beginning the technological transition.’⁸⁸¹ He visited other countries’ ministries of foreign affairs and explained the use of social media.⁸⁸² This mission also led him to various ones in Europe and several times to Berlin where he for example gave a speech at an ambassadors’ conference and met the head of the AA’s web 2.0 division. While it is nothing out of the ordinary to foster this kind of exchange with other ministries, especially if they are considered leading the field, the very fact that a social media advocate was invited as a speaker might hint at forces in the German Foreign Office wanting to advance the topic.⁸⁸³

Public diplomacy thus seems like a continuation of Germany’s foreign policy tradition (value-driven, reluctant to embrace a power position and somewhat confused or rather lacking a clear strategy) with other means.⁸⁸⁴ Let us now turn to the U.S. and their approach to figure out how they approach the matter. The U.S. government on the other hand often refers to itself as the *leader of the free world*, alluding to its role during World War II and the Cold War.⁸⁸⁵ From a constructivist point of view, this self-conception as moral leader and superpower has led to it

⁸⁷⁹ Karten, “Staatliche Imagearbeit: Die Public Diplomacy des Auswärtigen Amtes,” 163; Albert Spiegel, “Public Diplomacy - the German View,” March 19, 2002, <http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm?outfit=pmt&folder=7&paper=2226>.

⁸⁸⁰ Domani Spero, “Alec Ross, State Dept Bundle of Joy Visits Pakistan for Tittersation on Innovation,” *Diplo pundit*, October 14, 2012, <http://diplo pundit.net/2012/10/14/alec-ross-state-dept-bundle-of-joy-visits-pakistan-for-tittersation-on-innovation/>.

⁸⁸¹ Hanson, *Baked in and Wired: eDiplomacy@State*, 4; 5.

⁸⁸² Diplomat 3, Off-the-record conversation.

⁸⁸³ “Beziehungen zwischen den USA und Deutschland,” *Auswärtiges Amt*, October 2012, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/UsaVereinigteStaaten/Bilateral_node.html.

⁸⁸⁴ Rittberger and Wagner, “German Foreign Policy Since Unification - Theories Meet Reality,” 30–32.

⁸⁸⁵ Garry Wills, “Bully of the Free World,” *Foreign Affairs*, no. March/April 1999 (March 1, 1999), <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/54798/garry-wills/bully-of-the-free-world>.

assuming a role of *globocop*, a global policeman with worldwide strategic interests. In contrast to Germany, it is thus more at ease with the formulation of specific goals and their enforcement.

5.1.2 Superpower USA

5.1.2.1 Historical Background and Foreign Policy Tradition

Still, the neorealist framework⁸⁸⁶ offers an additional maybe more powerful explanation for America's handling of public diplomacy. In this logic, the structure of international relations shapes the states' foreign policy behaviour. Anarchy or at least the absence of a central authority characterises this system where every entity has to look out for itself. The distribution of power, understood as a state's combined capabilities, is the central element, affecting the states' foreign policy choices since it determines its position in the system. Superpower USA and middle power Germany thus take very different positions in the realm of international relations. Their relative disposal of power leads to the U.S. being able to impose certain behaviour on others and exercise pressure.⁸⁸⁷ Adapted to current affairs, this means that in a supposedly anarchic world where so-called terrorists endanger the U.S. the government needs to look out for its survival in the first place. Disposing, from this point of view, of immense capabilities, the state combines them to preserve its survival in this anarchic system. Influence maximisation (or what is perceived as such) and threat perception (definition of competing influences the U.S. is up against⁸⁸⁸) shape the behaviour. In contrast to Germany that focuses on multilateral action and the promotion of stability, the State Department, also spoken of as *Foggy Bottom* which refers to the neighbourhood it is located in, considers its country in competition with several other actors and thus tries to accumulate more power at other players' expense.⁸⁸⁹

⁸⁸⁶ Rainer Baumann, Volker Rittberger, and Wolfgang Wagner, *Macht und Machtpolitik: Neorealistische Außenpolitiktheorie und Prognosen für die deutsche Außenpolitik nach der Vereinigung*, Tübinger Arbeitspapiere zur internationalen Politik und Friedensforschung (Tübingen: Universität Tübingen, 1998), 2–5, <http://tobias-lib.uni-tuebingen.de/volltexte/2000/144/pdf/tap30.pdf>.

⁸⁸⁷ See: Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Boston, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1979); Steven L. Lamy, "Contemporary Mainstream Approaches: Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberalism," in *The Globalization of World Politics*, ed. Steve Smith and John Baylis, 3rd ed. (Oxford, New York [etc.]: Oxford University Press, 2005), 207–211.

⁸⁸⁸ Office of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, *Public Diplomacy: Strengthening U.S. Engagement with the World. A Strategic Approach for the 21st Century*, February 26, 2010, 6,

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/DIME/documents/Public%20Diplomacy%20US%20World%20Engagement.pdf>.

⁸⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 6.

9/11 – considered a watershed moment in this context – adds additional elements to this picture and intensifies a full understanding of threat perception, Rhonda Zaharna asserts: Against the emotional backdrop generated from the feeling of vulnerability and the fear that, as they say, misinterpreted foreign policy could have direct deadly repercussions at home drive the desire to get America’s message out and show people the allegedly real America. Especially American-led military intervention all over the world, destined to re-establish deterrence and prevent similar events in the future, had led to increased hostility.⁸⁹⁰

This paradigm cannot provide an encompassing image of the U.S. government’s behaviour, though, but can account for certain elements: ‘It would be better to admit, of course, that there are no pure realists or idealists once in office, and then fashion a hybrid approach to describe Obama, much as Kissinger did so eloquently and convincingly for Reagan in his great work *Diplomacy*.’⁸⁹¹ Still, since it has been a central element of the United States’ foreign policy tradition, it is of high relevance to this dissertation project.⁸⁹²

Also, in this realist logic, public opinion plays a marginal role in foreign policy; the latter is determined by the structural workings of the international system.⁸⁹³ While a complete adherence to this understanding would certainly go too far, it could explain why the main focus of public diplomacy (2.0) may not be the public’s empowerment and inclusion into the policy making process as hinted at in chapter 2.1 – but more on that later.

5.1.2.2 U.S. Public Diplomacy: Shaping the Narrative⁸⁹⁴

The U.S. has a far more relaxed relationship towards political communication than Germany, which is underscored by the straightforwardness and easy availability of most relevant information. Since the concept’s genesis was closely associated with U.S. history, most of its

⁸⁹⁰ Zaharna, *Battles to Bridges*, 1; Office of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, *Public Diplomacy: Strengthening U.S. Engagement with the World. A Strategic Approach for the 21st Century*, 8;14–15; “A Special Report on America’s Foreign Policy. Soft Power: Making up.”

⁸⁹¹ Paul Bonicelli, “Obama the Realist?,” *Foreign Policy Blogs*, December 10, 2012,

http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/12/10/obama_the_realist?wp_login_redirect=0.

⁸⁹² Sumantra Maitra, “U.S. Foreign Policy: Back to Realism,” *International Affairs Review*, January 13, 2013,

<http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/453>.

⁸⁹³ Daniel W. Drezner, “The Realist Tradition in American Public Opinion,” *Perspectives on Politics* 6, no. 1 (February 26, 2008): 51.

⁸⁹⁴ Refers to the State Department’s public diplomacy strategy; Office of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, *Public Diplomacy: Strengthening U.S. Engagement with the World. A Strategic Approach for the 21st Century*, 9.

background has already been mentioned in the foregoing chapters, which is why the next lines will merely serve as a supplement.

In contrast to the German approach that favours durable government information organisations, U.S. public diplomacy institutions only emerged during the 20th century.⁸⁹⁵ Their '[e]pisodic resolve correlates with war, public anxiety and surges of zeal.'⁸⁹⁶ Public diplomacy was originally a duty of the United States Information Agency (USIA) that was founded by President Dwight Eisenhower in 1953 to provide the activities with an institutional home even though these sorts of endeavours were common since the revolutionary wars. Therefore, all official U.S. engagement with foreign publics, including the Voice of America's radio operation and the Fulbright exchange program were regrouped under the USIA's supervision from 1978 on. While the Reagan years led to spending increases and the popularisation of the term public diplomacy, the 1990s saw it also slowly entering the foreign mainstream. Considered especially crucial during the Cold War to counter the Soviet Union, public diplomacy saw a relative demise after the changes of 1989, which materialised in the dissolution of the U.S. Information Agency and its absorption by the State Department in 1999.

Public diplomacy was revived after the attacks of 9/11 as a result of a national soul searching process that also tried to explain the soft factor reasons for the attacks.⁸⁹⁷ It seemed not only clear that foreign policy choices could have national consequences but also underscored the need for public diplomacy to be strategically adjusted to geopolitics and communication to succeed. Initially heavily criticised for being too unidirectional, a change towards more engaged approaches began after 2004, considered a watershed since foreign opinions of the U.S. were said to have hit rock bottom, mainly induced by a clear disapproval of foreign policy choices such as the invasion of Iraq.⁸⁹⁸

The focus on terrorist security threats, on-going military conflicts (Iran, Afghanistan) and so-called rogue states (George W. Bush's *axis of evil* terminology was rapidly abandoned) such as Iran's alleged wrongdoings remained on the agenda. Also, a stronger attention was accorded to global issues like pandemic diseases and climate change during Barack Obama's first term this

⁸⁹⁵ Gregory, "American Public Diplomacy: Enduring Characteristics, Elusive Transformation," 362.

⁸⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 361.

⁸⁹⁷ Cull and Cowan, "Public Diplomacy in a Changing World," 6–7; Cull, "Public Diplomacy before Gullion," 21–22.

⁸⁹⁸ Zaharna, *Battles to Bridges*, 3–6;18.

study falls into. The Arab spring and Muslim audiences in general, the Middle East process and emerging powers such as China were very much relevant, too.⁸⁹⁹

The United States dispose of 307 diplomatic missions and 39 cultural centres worldwide; the latter are down from over 300 in the 1970s that were mostly closed after 1999 – since 9/11 the United States rather opt for modest *American corners* in foreign institutions such as universities for security reasons.⁹⁰⁰ 194 schools abroad, 26 American international colleges and 83 overseas campuses of U.S. universities further strengthen cultural relations.⁹⁰¹ U.S. public diplomacy also consists in broadcasting efforts (Voice of America, Arabic language branches such as *Alhurra*) overseen by the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) that works alongside State, cooperation with USAID (its agency for international development), the State Department and outreach programmes (Fulbright exchange) as well as *Peace Corps* activities. In contrast to Germany, it is for obvious reasons mentioned above strongly focused on the Muslim world and especially their youth. In 2001, the Department of Defense created the Office of Strategic Influence to promote a favourable image of the U.S. military that was rapidly denounced as spreading propaganda and disinformation resulting in its rapid closure.⁹⁰² Also, Nicholas J. Cull argues that ‘the cordial working relationship between Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’⁹⁰³ led to both departments balancing their power relations with the latter assuming a rather supporting role with regards to strategic communications and public diplomacy. While

⁸⁹⁹ Martin Indyk, Kenneth Lieberthal, and Michael E. O’Hanlon, *Bending History: Barack Obama’s Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2012), 5; 70–74; 186 – 196; 231–232, <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=444836>; Barack Obama, *Update to Congress on National Framework for Strategic Communication*, 2012, 2, <http://mountainrunner.us/files/2012/03/President-response-to-NDAA-1055-of-2009.pdf>.

⁹⁰⁰ Norimitsu Onishi, “American Cultural Center in Jakarta Reaches Out,” *The New York Times*, March 5, 2011, sec. World / Asia Pacific, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/06/world/asia/06indonesia.html>; Amy Roberts, “By the Numbers: U.S. Diplomatic Presence,” *CNN*, May 10, 2013, <http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/09/politics/btn-diplomatic-presence/index.html>.

⁹⁰¹ Bureau of Public Affairs The Office of Website Management, “Schools Worldwide,” *U.S. Department of State. Diplomacy in Action*, July 17, 2008, <http://www.state.gov/m/a/os/c1684.htm>; “Associate Members,” Association of American International Colleges and Universities, accessed December 8, 2013, <http://www.aaicu.org/aaicu/members/associate/Pages/index.aspx>; “Regular Members,” *Association of American International Colleges and Universities*, accessed December 8, 2013, <http://www.aaicu.org/aaicu/members/regular/Pages/index.aspx>; Justin Pope, “U.S. Universities Overseas Abroad: Failure Is A Reality,” *The Huffington Post*, October 20, 2011, sec. College, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/20/us-universities-overseas-_n_1022689.html.

⁹⁰² Zaharna, *Battles to Bridges*, 40–41.

⁹⁰³ Cull, “The Long Road to Public Diplomacy 2.0: The Internet in U.S. Public Diplomacy,” 22.

U.S. public diplomacy is certainly diverse and distributed to several agencies it seems still by far less decentralised than the German endeavour that focusses on culture.

The road map, effective while this dissertation was written, specifies the endeavour: ‘To support the achievement of **U.S. foreign policy goals** and objectives, advance **national interests**, and enhance **national security** by **informing and influencing foreign publics** and by **expanding and strengthening the relationship** between the people and government of the United States and citizens of the rest of the world.’⁹⁰⁴ This strategy reads also more like the executive summary of a consulting firm’s pitch than a concrete foreign policy approach, prompting Philip Seib to consider it ‘flimsy.’⁹⁰⁵

The first Obama administration’s foreign policy leitmotif *engagement* becomes really visible in the country’s public diplomacy strategy. It encompasses the formulation of collective goals and mutual interests with other actors, fostering dialogue and relationship building plus strategic communication.⁹⁰⁶ Also, nowadays, policy legitimacy counts amongst the major focal points since the *winning the hearts* part has become increasingly challenging after the invasion of Iraq, the Afghanistan war and new anti-terrorism measures:

Across all of our efforts, effective strategic communications are essential to sustaining global legitimacy and supporting our policy aims. Aligning our actions with our words is a shared responsibility that must be fostered by a culture of communication throughout the government. We must also be more effective in our deliberate communication and engagement, and do a better job understanding the attitudes, opinions, grievances, and concerns of peoples -- not just elites -- around the world. Doing so is critical to allow us to convey credible, consistent messages, develop effective plans and to better understand how our actions will be perceived. [...]

⁹⁰⁴ Office of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, *Public Diplomacy: Strengthening U.S. Engagement with the World. A Strategic Approach for the 21st Century*, 3.

⁹⁰⁵ Philip Seib, “U.S. Public Diplomacy’s Flimsy New Framework,” *The CPD Blog*, March 8, 2010,

http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/index.php/newswire/cpdblog_detail/us_public_diplomacys_flimsy_new_framework/.

⁹⁰⁶ Gregory, “American Public Diplomacy: Enduring Characteristics, Elusive Transformation,” 352.

Information, intelligence, research, and analysis are key enablers for policy development and strategic planning.⁹⁰⁷

These comments also show that monitoring opinions is at the very heart of the strategy. These documents do by no means suggest a desire to empower the public through including them into policy making but rather to understand it to spin information accordingly, which becomes clear when taking a look at the desired effects of its public diplomacy:

- ‘Foreign audiences recognize areas of mutual interest with the United States
- Foreign audiences believe the United States plays a constructive role in global affairs
- Foreign audiences see the United States as a respectful partner in efforts to meet complex global challenges.’⁹⁰⁸

This also confirms that legitimisation plays a crucial role in present-day public diplomacy as Gilboa stated (see model presented in chapter 2.2.1); the subsequent case study will explore to which extent this aspect was realised. Also, U.S. public diplomacy is not only more strategic but also better staffed: Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy, Tara Sonenshine, coordinates policies on behalf of the State Department, supported by six newly created deputy assistant secretaries for public diplomacy. Country teams within each diplomatic mission made of all heads of section at the embassy as well as other U.S. entities in the country that are headed by the respective chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission abroad operationalise the policy. Furthermore, the White House has up-front integrated public diplomacy and strategic communications into major policy reviews. Also, it fosters cooperation and exchange of ideas between State and DOD with regards to Military Information Support Teams, digital and other communication tools and aligning messages with policy.⁹⁰⁹

Unsurprisingly, the foreign policy focal points mentioned above have found their way into public diplomacy and are very clearly reflected in the main challenges on a global scale that the concept defines:

⁹⁰⁷ Joseph R. Jr. Biden, *National Framework for Strategic Communication* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2010), 1, <http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/pubdip.pdf>.

⁹⁰⁸ Ibid., 6.

⁹⁰⁹ Spero, “Alec Ross, State Dept Bundle of Joy Visits Pakistan for Twittersation on Innovation.”

- Democracy and human rights
- Combating violent extremism
- Economic opportunity and prosperity
- Women's empowerment
- Climate change and natural disasters
- Food security
- Global health
- Outreach to Muslim communities⁹¹⁰

To face these challenges, the State Department suggests a road map that is formulated in catchy phrases, namely:

- *Shape the narrative* to counter mis- or underrepresentation of the US on a global scale.
- *Expand and strengthen people-to-people relationships* to build trust.
- *Combat violent extremism* through discrediting terrorism outlets such as Al-Qaeda and challenging their worldview while empowering other voices.
- *Better informed policy making* through understanding the opinions and attitudes of foreign publics.
- *Deploy resources in line with current priorities* through optimizing processes and structures.⁹¹¹

In contrast to Germany that is interested in promoting its unique selling points, the State Department considers itself in competition with several other actors: First, alleged extremists that successfully shape narratives and influence the public; second comes China's expanding global influence. Third, it aims at supporting the U.S. as an attractive destination for higher education against what it perceives as aggressive marketing from the European Union, Singapore and Australia promoting their respective systems. Last, Russia's media presence in former URSS

⁹¹⁰ Office of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, *Public Diplomacy: Strengthening U.S. Engagement with the World. A Strategic Approach for the 21st Century*, 7.

⁹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 8.

countries and Iran's cultural centres and political linkages that have created important relationships with key publics are observed with a critical eye.⁹¹²

Bruce Gregory suggests that the actions the Obama administration describes as U.S. public diplomacy – global public engagement combined with strategic communication that requires a multi-stakeholder instrument including many domestic and foreign affairs departments as well as agencies and civil society actors – has become a central aspect to diplomacy as a whole that considering it only a subdivision of diplomacy would belittle the undertaking.⁹¹³ Still, Vice President Joseph Biden finds fault with a lack of coordination and calls for a better access for its staff in the field to the resources.⁹¹⁴

Similar to the German approach, U.S. public diplomacy's target groups include opinion leaders, defined as journalists, teachers/professors, artists, political and social (youth) movement and NGO leaders.⁹¹⁵ Unsurprisingly, the USA's spending on public diplomacy is higher. A reliable comparison is, however, hard – not only because of currency conversion – but also most importantly because each nation defines public diplomacy differently and allocates funds in distinctive ways. Furthermore, certain public diplomacy activities formerly carried out by the U.S. Information Agency were integrated into the State Department during the fiscal year 2000.

Let us now take a look at the financing of public diplomacy in the U.S.: Unfortunately, no evident numbers over the last 10 years were available. It also did not seem productive and reliable to deduce them, which is why the author refrained from calculating them based on the entire U.S. budget.⁹¹⁶ While one could detect a significant increase of expenditures for public diplomacy over the last years from 2006 to 2011 (from \$869,767,000 to \$1,292,222,000), the following graph shows how public diplomacy consumes only a small part of State's entire budget.

⁹¹² Ibid., 6.

⁹¹³ Gregory, "American Public Diplomacy: Enduring Characteristics, Elusive Transformation," 353.

⁹¹⁴ Biden, *National Framework for Strategic Communication*, 5.

⁹¹⁵ Mark Jeffers, "Opinion Leaders: Still the Most Important PD Audience," *Take Five. The IPDGC Blog on Public Diplomacy and Global Communication*, October 4, 2012, <http://takefiveblog.org/2012/10/04/opinion-leaders-still-the-most-important-pd-audience/>.

⁹¹⁶ "Budget of the United States Government," *U.S. Government Printing Office. Keeping America Informed*, accessed June 5, 2013, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collection.action?collectionCode=BUDGET&browsePath=Fiscal+Year+2002&searchPath=Fiscal+Year+2002&leafLevelBrowse=false&isCollapsed=false&isOpen=true&packageid=BUDGET-2002-BUD&ycord=419>.

Unsurprisingly, funding is still a multiple of Germany’s plan money: Helle C. Dale et al argue that U.S. public diplomacy spending since 1999 has exceeded \$15 billion.⁹¹⁷




Figure 5-6: State Department (Public Diplomacy) Budget (2006-2011) in \$ Thousands⁹¹⁸

The graph shows how public diplomacy constitutes only a small fraction of State’s budget; the rest of it is allocated to other issues such as state administration, international organisations or economic assistance.⁹¹⁹

⁹¹⁷ Helle C. Dale, Ariel Cohen, and Janice A. Smith, “Challenging America: How Russia, China, and Other Countries Use Public Diplomacy to Compete with the U.S.,” *The Heritage Foundation*, June 21, 2012, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/06/challenging-america-how-russia-china-and-other-countries-use-public-diplomacy-to-compete-with-the-us>.

⁹¹⁸ *Congressional Budget Justification. Volume 1: Department of State Operations, Fiscal Year 2013*, 11–13, accessed June 5, 2013, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/181061.pdf>; *Congressional Budget Justification. Volume 1: Department of State Operations. Fiscal Year 2012* (U.S. Department of State, 2011), 15, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/156215.pdf>; U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification Fiscal Year 2009*, 15, accessed October 3, 2012, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100326.pdf>; *Congressional Budget Justification. Fiscal Year 2008* (U.S. Department of State), accessed June 4, 2013, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/81227.pdf>.

⁹¹⁹ U.S. Department of State, *Executive Budget Summary. Function 150 and Other International Programs*, 9–16, accessed February 8, 2012, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/156214.pdf>.




Figure 5-7 Growth Rate State Department (Public Diplomacy) Budget (2007-2011)⁹²⁰

This graph illustrates that the budget's growth rates often exceed the inflation rate by far. In 2011, however, the growth rate was negative, showing no clear trend. Still, the numbers underscore that the U.S. dispose of significant means in this respect.

5.1.2.3 Going Social Media

The use of online resources for diplomacy already started during the 1990s with the USIA's website going live in 1995.⁹²¹ E-diplomacy, diplomacy through digital means with PD 2.0 just counting amongst a whole range of strategies can already be traced back to 1998 but Colin Powell instituted the first serious taskforce in 2002, right after 9/11. With the vast amount of resources the U.S. disposes of, they unsurprisingly lead the field and drive innovation within it.⁹²² Still, it was only in 2008 that the first Obama administration's arrival gave increased importance to the use of digital tools for public diplomacy.⁹²³ A group of individuals, Jared Cohen, appointed by Condoleezza Rice, who stayed on for some time under Secretary Clinton's tenure, Alec Ross, Clinton's former Senior Advisor for Innovation and Ben Scott, her Innovation Advisor, as well as

⁹²⁰ *Congressional Budget Justification. Volume 1: Department of State Operations, Fiscal Year 2013*, 11–13; *Congressional Budget Justification. Volume 1: Department of State Operations. Fiscal Year 2012*, 15; U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification Fiscal Year 2009*, 15; *Congressional Budget Justification. Fiscal Year 2008*; "U.S. Inflation Rate 1990-2012 | Timeline," *Statista*, January 2013, <http://www.statista.com/statistics/191077/inflation-rate-in-the-usa-since-1990/>.

⁹²¹ Cull, "The Long Road to Public Diplomacy 2.0: The Internet in U.S. Public Diplomacy," 8–9.

⁹²² Hanson, *Baked in and Wired: eDiplomacy@State*, 3.

⁹²³ *The Future of U.S. Public Diplomacy*, Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Operations I and Organizations, Human Rights, Democracy, and Global Women's Issues of the Committee on Foreign Relations (Washington, D.C.: United States Senate, March 2010), 39; Lichtenstein, "Digital Diplomacy."

Director of Planning from 2009-2011, Anne-Marie Slaughter, are credited for being central in developing the endeavour.⁹²⁴ Alec Ross, who left the state department when John Kerry took over in early 2013 is tremendously visible beyond his position: He was awarded the 2010 Middle East/North Africa Technology Person of the Year, was elected one of the 10 Game Changers in Politics (Huffington Post), named as one of Politico's *50 Politicos to watch* in 2010, and featured amongst the *40 under 40 leaders* in international development as well as one of the *Top 100 Global Thinkers* elected by the journal Foreign Policy in 2011.⁹²⁵ The German diplomats working on digital communication are in contrast not known beyond their immediate working environment.

The U.S. has actually dubbed their version of digital diplomacy *21st century statecraft*, the latter being a term developed under Hillary Clinton's patronage. It can be summed up as follows:

We are adapting our statecraft by reshaping our development and diplomatic agendas to meet old challenges in new ways and by deploying one of America's great assets – innovation. This is 21st Century Statecraft: complementing traditional foreign policy tools with newly innovated and adapted instruments of statecraft that fully leverage the networks, technologies, and demographics of our interconnected world.⁹²⁶

It aims at using technology to transform diplomacy from a traditionally top-down approach to a more citizen centred and empowering business – at least so it says.⁹²⁷ Within this context, the State Department has reportedly shifted its staff capacities away from its website towards social media tools such as Twitter, YouTube and Facebook.⁹²⁸ State dedicates a whole web complex to its 21st century statecraft initiative and details its various dimensions: Worldwide Internet freedom and the fostering of what they call *Civil Society 2.0*, which consists in matching the efforts to strengthen civil society with supporting technologies to advance American foreign policy goals and increase public services, stability and security. Furthermore, the initiative aims to enshrine institutional innovation through providing trainings including the handling of social

⁹²⁴ Hanson, *Baked in and Wired: eDiplomacy@State*, 1–4.

⁹²⁵ "NYC Keynote Speakers," *Social Media Week*, accessed May 21, 2012, <http://socialmediaweek.org/newyork/keynotes/>.

⁹²⁶ "21st Century Statecraft," accessed January 2, 2012, <http://www.state.gov/statecraft/>.

⁹²⁷ *Gov 2.0 Expo 2010*.

⁹²⁸ Ben Smith, "Public Diplomacy Shifts to Social Media," *Politico.com*, June 18, 2011, http://www.politico.com/blogs/bensmith/0411/Public_diplomacy_shifts_to_social_media.html.

media.⁹²⁹ It also details speeches, concept notes and videos, thus providing a huge space for interaction.⁹³⁰

People at *Foggy Bottom* are actually heavily engaged with social media tools: In addition to 288 Facebook accounts, it operates 196 Twitter feeds and 125 YouTube channels.⁹³¹ Almost 70% of its embassies were said to be on Twitter.⁹³² Moreover, the State Department initiated diverse initiatives such as the *digital outreach team*, created in 2006 that targets the Arabic speaking / Muslim cybersphere, actively engaging in debates and monitoring the public debate. The 50 staff, Americans and foreigners, is composed of native speakers of either Arabic, Somali, Punjabi and Urdu and have the goal to claim space allegedly taken over by extremists such as Al-Qaida and to counter this kind of propaganda in online discussions.⁹³³ Also, an office of e-diplomacy was developed aiming at knowledge management, e-collaboration as well as decision making with regards to IT matters. It also incorporates virtual diplomatic representations⁹³⁴ and is hosting Diplopedia, a wiki-like intranet application.⁹³⁵ Its most successful in-house application is said to be *Statebook*, the State Department's own version of Facebook.⁹³⁶ This shows how at State, social media are embedded and not only employed for public diplomacy purposes, as it seems to be the case at the *Auswärtige Amt*.

From the U.S.' perspective, pushing e-diplomacy worldwide perfectly fits the country's agenda of great power politics and foreign policy tradition in a wider sense: Bruce Gregory asserts that '[t]he United States does have a public diplomacy *modus operandi*, however, with enduring characteristics that are rooted in the nation's history and political culture.'⁹³⁷ The country's [...]

⁹²⁹ Bureau of Public Affairs U.S. Department of State. The Office of Electronic Information, "21st Century Statecraft," *U.S. Department of State. Diplomacy in Action.*, March 16, 2011, <http://www.state.gov/statecraft/overview/index.htm>.

⁹³⁰ Fung, "Klout and the Evolution of Digital Diplomacy."

⁹³¹ Hanson, *Baked in and Wired: eDiplomacy@State*, 16.

⁹³² "Twitter and US Embassies | Open Government Data," *Sunlight Labs*, March 2012, <https://data.sunlightlabs.com/Government/Twitter-and-US-Embassies/cq2g-d3tv>.

⁹³³ Khatib, Dutton, and Thelwall, *Public Diplomacy 2.0. An Exploratory Case Study of the US Digital Outreach Team*; Associated Press, "U.S. Government Using Twitter, Facebook to Counter Propaganda," *Politico*, April 13, 2013, <http://www.politico.com/story/2013/04/89998.html>.

⁹³⁴ See for example: "Home," *Virtual Embassy of the United States Tehran, Iran*, 2012, <http://iran.usembassy.gov/>.

⁹³⁵ Bureau of Public Affairs U.S. Department of State. The Office of Electronic Information, "Office of eDiplomacy," *U.S. Department of State. Diplomacy in Action*, January 20, 2009, <http://www.state.gov/m/irm/ediplomacy/>; Copeland, "Virtuality, Diplomacy, and the Foreign Ministry: Does Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada Need a 'V Tower?'," 8.

⁹³⁶ Cull, "The Long Road to Public Diplomacy 2.0: The Internet in U.S. Public Diplomacy," 19.

⁹³⁷ Gregory, "American Public Diplomacy: Enduring Characteristics, Elusive Transformation," 361.

values and ideals – freedom, equality, democracy and human rights⁹³⁸ significantly shape its public diplomacy. ‘For Americans, projecting ideals globally is a national interest,’⁹³⁹ Gregory reckons. Actually, the *21st century statecraft* initiative reflects the principles (for example the aspect *civil society 2.0*).⁹⁴⁰ Thus, social media has become one of the instruments to further wield power.

All these initiatives obviously come with a higher workforce: 150 full-time equivalent staff is employed at the 25 separate e-diplomacy nodes operating at State’s Washington, D.C. headquarters. Furthermore, the equivalent of 175 full-time personnel are using e-diplomacy tools abroad.⁹⁴¹ This highly contrasts with Germany’s comparably modest manpower.

Fergus Hanson details the goals social media are used for at the State Department: First, comes official messaging. Most interestingly, the Bureau of Public Affairs manages the State Department’s social media presences on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Flickr, Google+ and Tumblr as well as its blog. It aims at broadcasting the official government positions and deals with breaking news. Also, the same channels are directed at domestic and foreign audiences alike, blurring the lines between public diplomacy and public affairs.

Second, the various U.S. embassy accounts combine official messaging with classic public diplomacy activities as in engaging with multipliers such as journalists and officials as well as the general public. In addition to that, social media are used for consular affairs through providing visa information for tourists travelling to the U.S. or American citizens aiming at visiting other countries. This function is said to be the most popular one. Fourth, diplo-media consist in editing information ultimately destined to advance the U.S. national interest in a more entertaining and leisure time oriented way and to downplay the direct association with the State Department. This aspect does by the way coincide with a German diplomat’s remarks on the use of *soft news* they increasingly resorted to; this aspect is a similarity between both countries’ approach.⁹⁴²

Fifth, State aims at extending its network and building up a resiliency capacity. The latter consists in real-time monitoring of online conversations on topics that may impact the United

⁹³⁸ Ibid., 362.

⁹³⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁴⁰ “21st Century Statecraft.”

⁹⁴¹ Hanson, *Revolution @State: The Spread of Ediplomacy*, 3.

⁹⁴² Diplomat 5, Off-the-record conversation.

States' national interests; the information is compiled to daily briefing reports. 'New media and connective technologies enhance our ability to listen. That is the number one improvement to our 21st century public diplomacy toolkit. Social media provides new ways for us to keep our ear to the ground. And when we better understand cultural attitudes and developing trends, social media can help us craft better policies.⁹⁴³ In short, it tells you what people think of you.⁹⁴⁴ Also, analysing these data through network analysis, for example, affords the opportunity to identify so-called *key online influencers*, individuals that seem to drive conversations and opinions. This provides State with the possibility to directly reach a mass audience of allegedly 15 million people via social media it can broadcast its stances on specific situations or general positions to, circumventing other more traditional channels that potentially distort the message.⁹⁴⁵

Fergus Hanson opines, '[...] the rapid spread of social media around the world has increased all countries' exposure to nation brand-damaging events. [...] To some extent it is impossible (and contrary to Western principles) to try to prevent this communication taking place. But it is still the job of the foreign ministry to do its best to protect the national interest of the country and people they represent.⁹⁴⁶ And to be able to do that, increasing the available quantity of data is of crucial importance.⁹⁴⁷ PD 2.0 is therefore the essence of Cull's listening function discussed earlier on.⁹⁴⁸ This is what the Economist magazine calls 'improving diplomatic preparedness.'⁹⁴⁹ There is actually no evidence about how the public's opinions are taken into account and translate into policy beyond being monitored.⁹⁵⁰

The U.S. State Department gives proof of an extensive social media reach: Through its embassies, it claims having 0.4 million Facebook fans and 127.000 Twitter followers in Europe compared to for example 1.2 million Facebook fans and 34.000 Twitter fans in South and Central Asia as of July 2012.⁹⁵¹ At this time, the most popular page was the Facebook site titled 'Global

⁹⁴³ U.S. Department of State. The Office of Electronic Information, "Public Diplomacy and Social Media in Latin America."

⁹⁴⁴ Project Manager Social Media Evaluation, Interview.

⁹⁴⁵ Hanson, *Baked in and Wired: eDiplomacy@State*, 16–21.

⁹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 19.

⁹⁴⁷ See for the extent of spying: "The Lives of Others," *The Economist*, July 6, 2013.

⁹⁴⁸ Author's presentation

⁹⁴⁹ "Digital Diplomacy."

⁹⁵⁰ "How U.S. Foreign Policy Is Made," *Foreign Policy Association*, August 8, 2011,

http://www.fpa.org/features/index.cfm?act=feature&announcement_id=45&show_sidebar=0.

⁹⁵¹ Hanson, *Baked in and Wired: eDiplomacy@State*, 15.

Conversations: Our Planet' counting 2.004.503 fans; the most followed embassy page was the one in Jakarta with 507.057 fans.⁹⁵²

Even though aforementioned Tara Sonenshine stresses the importance of social media for public diplomacy, she pointed out that they were no substitute for direct face-to-face communication.⁹⁵³ PD 2.0 is an add-on rather than an all-encompassing tool. Still, we can conclude that State's communication empire is by far more extensive and its approach to and the use of social media more sophisticated as well as broad than the German one. Especially the monitoring aspect appears interesting since the *Auswärtige Amt* abstains from such activities for reasons mentioned above.

The persona of Hillary Clinton, in the words of the *New York Times* a 'rock-star diplomat',⁹⁵⁴ also adds to the State Department's cutting-edge reputation: A behind the scenes image from *Time* magazine went viral on Tumblr in the beginning of 2012 through a blog called *Texts from Hillary*, featuring posts about imagined text exchanges with the Secretary of State and other public people.⁹⁵⁵ It features the Secretary of States professionally dressed, wearing big dark shades concentrating on her BlackBerry smartphone.⁹⁵⁶ The reason for this success was among others that 'it was so unexpected, speaking volumes about a new era of American power abroad: cool, technologically cutting-edge, and female.'⁹⁵⁷ This echoes the official stance: Suzanne Phillion, Senior Advisor for Innovation in the Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs at the State Department said in an interview that she aimed at dissociating her work 'from the unfortunate perception that diplomacy is an inaccessible, disengaged, bureaucratic thing.'⁹⁵⁸ Hillary Clinton's now retired German counterpart Guido Westerwelle's online presence seems to generate rather the opposite kind of attention: Social media content featuring him often produces nasty

⁹⁵² Ibid.

⁹⁵³ Jane Morse, "Effective Public Diplomacy Needs Social Media," *Embassy of the United States, Brussels, Belgium*, October 15, 2012, <http://www.uspolicy.be/headline/effective-public-diplomacy-needs-social-media>.

⁹⁵⁴ Myers, "Hillary Clinton's Last Tour as a Rock-Star Diplomat."

⁹⁵⁵ Adam Smith and Stacy Lambe, "Texts from Hillary," *Texts from Hillary*, April 11, 2012, <http://textsfromhillaryclinton.tumblr.com/>.

⁹⁵⁶ Diana Walker for *Time*; Richard Stengel, "On the Road with Hillary Clinton," *Time*, November 7, 2011, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2097970,00.html>.

⁹⁵⁷ Adam Bluestein, "Dude, This Diplomat's No Stiff," *Fast Company*, May 21, 2012,

<http://www.fastcompany.com/1837826/21st-century-foreign-service>.

⁹⁵⁸ Ibid.

comments personally attacking him.⁹⁵⁹ A mock Facebook fan page titled *Westerwave – no one can reach me the water*⁹⁶⁰ makes fun not only of the Minister but especially derides his alleged lack of English language skills.⁹⁶¹ This instance might contribute to Mr Westerwelle not further embracing social media.

But not all voices are similarly positive about State's digital undertakings. This enthusiasm about real-time communication risks also be taken too far if the messages get repetitive, trivial and too numerous, occasionally leading to a 'State Department Twitter Overload,'⁹⁶² Peter van Buren, one of its most outspoken critics, reckons. He also criticises the nature of the content spread, doubts its relevance and the resources in terms of money and staff allocated to it.⁹⁶³

To conclude this section we would have to find elements of both countries' foreign policy and public diplomacy doctrines in the actual implementation of PD 2.0 to show that the latter is only the continuation of a tradition with other means. For that matter, the next paragraphs will investigate if and how these aspects and experiences had an impact on both countries' respective institutional framework. They will show how those for now still rather abstract past events are of high relevance to today's policy makers and knowledge of this is thus crucial to better understand the undertaking. Furthermore, it will shed light on the type of change agents potentially empowered and the kind of transformation they are most likely to drive.

⁹⁵⁹ See for example: *Guido Westerwelle - Ich will Europa*, 2012,

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xdDLxJc11z8&feature=youtube_gdata_player; *Markus Lanz (vom 11. Oktober 2012) - ZDF (1/6)*, 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G16n56Q89Pw&feature=youtube_gdata_player.

⁹⁶⁰ Anglicism or rather literal translation of a German saying that means 'to be unable to hold a candle to someone.'

⁹⁶¹ "Westerwave - No One Can Reach Me the Water," Facebook fan page, (2013),

<http://www.facebook.com/pages/Westerwave-no-one-can-reach-me-the-water/170082881214>.

⁹⁶² Peter van Buren, "State Department Twitter Overload," *We Meant Well. How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People*, July 6, 2012, <http://wemeantwell.com/blog/2012/07/06/state-department-twitter-overload/>.

⁹⁶³ Peter van Buren, "Social Media Uber Alles: Embassy Baghdad Gets Its Head Around Twitter," *We Meant Well. How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People*, September 28, 2012,

<http://wemeantwell.com/blog/2012/09/28/social-media-uber-alles-embassy-baghdad-gets-its-head-around-twitter/>;

Peter van Buren, "Your Tax Dollars Pay for This Garbage," *We Meant Well. How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People*, September 4, 2012, <http://wemeantwell.com/blog/2012/09/04/your-tax-dollars-pay-for-this-garbage/>.

5.2 Context: National Legislation and Internal Rules

5.2.1 General Legislation

Indeed, the historical background translates into action, as the following paragraphs will show. Let us start with general legislation regarding privacy and copyright that is particularly strong and complex in Germany: Data protection is a big issue in Germany in general and was of special concern to now retired Federal Minister of Justice, Sabine Leutheuser-Schnarrenberger.⁹⁶⁴ This is mainly due to Facebook accumulating big data that – aggregated and transformed into algorithms – can reveal a tremendous amount of personal information about the user.⁹⁶⁵ German authorities are particularly sceptical of Facebook⁹⁶⁶ with Schleswig-Holstein even wanting to outlaw fan pages and social plug-ins.⁹⁶⁷ The reason for this is that Facebook’s social analytics service *Facebook Insight*, which is used by fan pages and social plug-ins, supposedly gathers and processes for example personal information of each user by saving cookies and IP addresses.⁹⁶⁸ This leads to user profiling for marketing or similar purposes. A big share of the problem lies in the very nature of Internet corporations such as Facebook: Even though the latter states that ‘[i]t is free and always will be,’⁹⁶⁹ Des Freedman points out that *free* is controversial since content needs to be subsidised somehow – be it for example through using user data or advertising.⁹⁷⁰ Providing services for free is not practicable especially if it concerns a public company that needs to generate profits.

⁹⁶⁴ “Leutheuser-Schnarrenberger: Justizministerin will Datenschutz grunderneuern,” *FOCUS*, December 5, 2010, http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/leutheuser-schnarrenberger-justizministerin-will-datenschutz-grunderneuern_aid_578703.html.

⁹⁶⁵ Sharon Jayon, “Facebook ‘Likes’ Reveal More about You than You Think,” *USA Today*, March 12, 2013, <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/03/11/facebook-likes-predictions-privacy/1975777/>.

⁹⁶⁶ Birgit Schröder and Anne Hawxwell, *Die Verletzung datenschutzrechtlicher Bestimmungen durch sogenannte Facebook Fanpages und Social-Plugins. Zum Arbeitspapier des Unabhängigen Landeszentrums für Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein*, Ausarbeitung (Wissenschaftlicher Dienst des Deutschen Bundestages, October 7, 2011), 19, <https://www.datenschutzzentrum.de/facebook/material/WissDienst-BT-Facebook-ULD.pdf>.

⁹⁶⁷ “Wer ist datenschutzrechtlich verantwortlich für Facebook-Fanpages und Social-Plugins?,” *Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein*, September 30, 2011, <https://www.datenschutzzentrum.de/facebook/facebook-verantwortlichkeit.html>.

⁹⁶⁸ Schröder and Hawxwell, *Die Verletzung datenschutzrechtlicher Bestimmungen durch sogenannte Facebook Fanpages und Social-Plugins. Zum Arbeitspapier des Unabhängigen Landeszentrums für Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein*, 5.

⁹⁶⁹ “Welcome to Facebook - Log In, Sign Up or Learn More,” *Facebook*, 2013, <https://www.facebook.com/>.

⁹⁷⁰ Des Freedman, “Web 2.0 and the Death of the Blockbuster Economy,” in *Misunderstanding the Internet*, ed. James Curran, Natalie Fenton, and Des Freedman, Communication and Society (London, New York [etc.]: Routledge, 2012), 81–82.

The legal situation in this respect is, however, far from being clear and tremendously complicated. Even though in 2011, the research service at the German Bundestag came to the conclusion that whether or not Facebook was infringing the law could not be finally settled, it continues to concern the German Ministry of the Interior.⁹⁷¹ Proceedings versus Facebook are ongoing in Ireland; student Max Schrems sued Facebook and made the corporation give in to a tiny fraction of his demands.⁹⁷² Another issue is that Facebook is not really transparent so one does not know if the network saves IP addresses or not and for what purpose it processes data if at all. This twilight zone creates additional insecurities that complicate dealing with the social network.⁹⁷³

The European Union is similarly concerned with data protection: In the beginning of 2012, Commissioner Viviane Reding presented the new updated European Data Protection Initiative that is supposed to replace the old one from 1995. It is destined to provide companies with planning security while protecting the users at the same time, through enabling people to object to the kind of profiling criticised above. Before coming into force, the regulation has to, however, not only be uniformly and bindingly transposed in all the EU's member countries.⁹⁷⁴ It also needs to be adopted by the EU Council of Ministers and the European Parliament and converted into prevailing law, which can take at least two years.⁹⁷⁵ While Schleswig Holstein's data protection officer Thilo Weichert⁹⁷⁶ remains sceptical about European powers to strengthen data protection

⁹⁷¹ Schröder and Hawxwell, *Die Verletzung datenschutzrechtlicher Bestimmungen durch sogenannte Facebook Fanpages und Social-Plugins. Zum Arbeitspapier des Unabhängigen Landeszentrums für Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein*, 19; Patrick Beuth and Kai Biermann, "EU-Datenschutz: 'Facebook tut Dinge, die nicht akzeptabel sind,'" *Die Zeit*, October 17, 2012, sec. Datenschutz, <http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2012-10/facebook-friedrich-schrems/komplettansicht>.

⁹⁷² Frederik Fischer, "Nutzerdaten: Student Max Schrems spricht nun direkt mit Facebook," *Die Zeit*, February 1, 2012, sec. Datenschutz, <http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2012-02/student-verhandelt-mit-facebook/komplettansicht>.

⁹⁷³ Data protection expert, Off-the-record conversation, 2012.

⁹⁷⁴ Fischer, "Nutzerdaten"; Patrick Beuth, "EU-Kommission: Datenschutzverordnung soll EU-Bürgern mehr Kontrolle geben," *Die Zeit*, January 25, 2012, sec. Datenschutz, <http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2012-01/eu-datenschutzverordnung-reding/komplettansicht>; Guardian Professional, "Rewrite of EU Data Protection Law to Bring in €1m Fines," *The Guardian*, January 27, 2012, sec. Guardian Government Computing, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/government-computing-network/2012/jan/27/european-commission-data-protection-law>.

⁹⁷⁵ See § 17 and 18; European Commission, *Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation) (Text with EEA Relevance) Version 56*, 49–50, accessed February 3, 2012, <http://statewatch.org/news/2011/dec/eu-com-draft-dp-reg-inter-service-consultation.pdf>.

⁹⁷⁶ Varinia Bernau, "Sie machen, was sie wollen," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, January 31, 2012, sec. jetzt.de, <http://jetzt.sueddeutsche.de/texte/anzeigen/538438>.

with regards to U.S.-based Internet corporations, Facebook appointed a new lobbyist to Germany in 2012.⁹⁷⁷

But not only privacy issues are of concern, copyright violations are on the agenda, too. Especially the use of images often creates legal confusion since legislation works at a magnificently slow pace when compared to social media's velocity.⁹⁷⁸ When sharing a link on Facebook, for example, it automatically creates a so-called thumbnail, a small preview picture taken from the link, which can be a picture. If the copyright holder had objected to the use of his or her oeuvre with Facebook ignoring this, the commercial actor operating the sharing Facebook page in question could be served notice.⁹⁷⁹ The result is that a tremendous amount of uncertainty governs the use of Facebook.

This also affects the AA and its embassies that are subjected to German data protection and copyright law⁹⁸⁰ because the latter need to be incorporated into the use of social media.⁹⁸¹ For this legal confusion, the general dealings with Facebook are unclear and a decision about how to react to these issues pending. While only the respective officials of Germany's federal states gave proof of an overall rather limited delight towards Facebook until now, one of the author's interview partners said that before making a decision, the Federal Foreign Office awaited an official statement of the federal data protection watchdog.⁹⁸²

In the U.S., things are slightly less complicated. In 2011, Facebook settled a dispute with America's Federal Trade Commission (FTC) over users' complaints that Facebook was making data public they aimed at keeping private. As part of the agreement, the company vowed to submit its privacy policies and practices to an external audit every two years for the next 20 years. Still, also the United States government seems to pay closer attention to privacy concerns

⁹⁷⁷ Sauerbrey, "Facebook ernennt Chef-Lobbyisten für Berlin."

⁹⁷⁸ Data protection expert, Off-the-record conversation.

⁹⁷⁹ Johannes Wendt, "Urheberrecht: Abmahnung wegen eines Bildchens auf Facebook," *Die Zeit*, January 9, 2013, sec. Internet, <http://www.zeit.de/digital/internet/2013-01/facebook-thumbnails/komplettansicht>.

⁹⁸⁰ "Ihre Anfrage vom 2.2.," February 10, 2012.

⁹⁸¹ Auswärtiges Amt, "Leitfaden Web 2.0," 18.

⁹⁸² Diplomat 3, Off-the-record conversation; "Datenschutz in sozialen Netzwerken gefordert," *Der Bundesbeauftragter für den Datenschutz und die Informationsfreiheit*, December 8, 2011, http://www.bfdi.bund.de/DE/Oeffentlichkeitsarbeit/Pressemitteilungen/2011/41_BeschlussDuesseldorferKreis.html?n=408908.

through hypothetically considering a general consumer privacy law.⁹⁸³ Furthermore, the Smith-Mundt-Act from 1948 that legally prevents the American government to direct strategic communication at its own public to protect them against state propaganda is very important. With this came need for reform especially with regards to public diplomacy since diaspora communities within the United States could not be engaged.⁹⁸⁴ Thus, an amendment was introduced to the House to ‘authorize the domestic dissemination of information and material about the United States intended primarily for foreign audiences, and for other purposes.’⁹⁸⁵ Still, online communication easily circumvents this firewall between internal and external communication (for example through Public Affairs managing State’s social media accounts), Fergus Hanson argues, and seems to advocate for merging public affairs and public diplomacy to combine both structures to enhance the State Department’s communication power.⁹⁸⁶ While this at the moment still restrains State’s communication might, it may very soon serve at expanding it.

While Facebook is because of its relevance the watchdogs’ main focus, Twitter gives also reason to concern: Brendan Meeder et al. uncovered how protected tweets can easily be retweeted, thus making them public.⁹⁸⁷ Still, Twitter is less invasive because it disposes of less data and will not ‘let the world know you might be interested in sex toys, losing weight, or like to listen to polka music. Twitter only tells others what you Tweet, or show in your public profile settings.’⁹⁸⁸

So, what does all this mean in practice? In contrast to Germany, the U.S. can exploit user data through social analytics to identify users that are particularly active in retweeting for example the embassy’s messages or using a particular hashtag. Also, the network structure within a particular conversation could help map how and through whom information travels. This was

⁹⁸³ “Floating Facebook,” 20.

⁹⁸⁴ Matt Armstrong, “Smith-Mundt Act,” *MountainRunner*, June 5, 2012, <http://mountainrunner.us/smith-mundt/>.

⁹⁸⁵ Matt Armstrong, “Smith-Mundt Modernization Act of 2012 Introduced in the House,” *MountainRunner*, May 17, 2012, <http://mountainrunner.us/2012/05/smith-mundt-modernization-ac/>; Brown, “Propaganda, Public Diplomacy and the Smith-Mundt Act.”

⁹⁸⁶ Hanson, *Baked in and Wired: eDiplomacy@State*, 22–24.

⁹⁸⁷ Brendan Meeder et al., *RT @IWantPrivacy: Widespread Violation of Privacy Settings in the Twitter Social Network* (Pittsburgh: Carnegie Mellon University, 2010), <http://patrickgage.com/papers/Meeder-W2SP10.pdf>.

⁹⁸⁸ Lahle Wolfe, “Facebook vs. Twitter: Privacy Issues,” *About.com Women in Business*, accessed January 5, 2013, <http://womeninbusiness.about.com/od/facebook/a/Facebook-Vs-Twitter-Privacy-Issues.htm>.

done to evaluate President Barack Obama's trip to Brazil (#obainbrazil).⁹⁸⁹ Also, the detection and cultivation of what the State Department calls key online influencers are possible through social analytics in the U.S. – but more on that later in chapter 5.3.5.⁹⁹⁰ While such things can be easily done in the United States, it is severely restrained in Germany, probably not only because of the current data protection laws. Negative experiences with surveillance through the Nazi's *Geheime Staatspolizei* (Gestapo) and East Germany's *Ministerium für Staatssicherheit* (Stasi) could make the Foreign Office's monitoring very hard to sell to a public.

After having described national legislation's impact on PD 2.0, the next part will explore each country's specific rules dealing with the use of social media.

5.2.2 German Social Media Guidelines

While most of the operationalisation of PD 2.0 is incumbent on the ambassador, a special task force within division 608 had developed a social media guideline explaining the handling and setup of social media profiles.⁹⁹¹ Those are, however, barely concrete. Germany is in contrast to some of its European neighbours, who publish information about their digital strategies online,⁹⁹² rather secretive about its digital endeavours – all this information was only available on request.

A few rules following the set-up that is done at the AA in Berlin (choice of profile picture, name, URL and information) complete the directions.⁹⁹³ They also do not present much strategic information with regards to desired effects; only a few are binding. The booklet mainly states the following goals for PD 2.0, namely the transmission of a positive image of Germany, a positive presentation of the work and the organisation of its diplomatic missions as well as information for German citizens about the situation in the host country.⁹⁹⁴ This sounds a little different from the presentation of a realist and multifaceted picture that was depicted in the public diplomacy documents. Furthermore, *positive* is rather imprecise, so the AA does not particularly direct their diplomatic missions, which conflicts with the development of a uniform strategic message. Most

⁹⁸⁹ Fisher and Montez, *Evaluating Online Public Diplomacy Using Digital Media Research Methods: A Case Study of #ObainBrazil*.

⁹⁹⁰ Hanson, *Baked in and Wired: eDiplomacy@State*, 20.

⁹⁹¹ Auswärtiges Amt, "Leitfaden Web 2.0," 26–31.

⁹⁹² See for example: Foreign & Commonwealth Office, "Digital Strategy - Executive Summary," *Digital Diplomacy – the FCO's Digital Work*, accessed February 26, 2013, <http://blogs.fco.gov.uk/digitaldiplomacy/digital-strategy/executive-summary/>; Sandre, "Twitter for Diplomats."

⁹⁹³ Auswärtiges Amt, "Leitfaden Web 2.0," 9–13.

⁹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 7.

interestingly, the target groups of these Facebook sites are not only citizens in the host country interested in Germany but also the German expat community living abroad as well as German citizens interested in travelling to the host country in question.⁹⁹⁵ The two latter groups, however, are technically not public diplomacy's targets. In any case, a truly pointed public diplomacy seems difficult since the embassy has no control whatsoever over whom likes the page.

Practical implications are similarly imprecise: The diplomat in charge of the page is supposed to be 'competent' – what this entails does not figure. In the course of the handbook, it, however, becomes clear that he or she needs to be familiar with the norms and rules the social network they are operating in entails (again, no further explanation what this could be) to 'get a feeling' for it. The diplomat should also dispose of a positive attitude towards the medium and 'enjoy direct conversation with citizens'. With regards to the frequency of the postings, the direction is to post at least once a week to be recognised as active even though once a day is desirable. This seems not much if one aims at engaging in global conversations. Furthermore, *dialogue capacity* as in being ready to communicate with users, including guaranteeing a holiday replacement, is underscored. Also, communication should take place in the host country's official language. In general, one should always reply in the language the user addressed the page in in the first place. Still, the diplomats should be prepared to also be able to communicate in English and German since the pages are also directed towards the German diaspora. Moreover, the handbook provides an overview about the editorial tasks to implement and suggests keeping an editorial calendar.

With regards to content, the handbook recommends that web page appropriate content should generally be adapted to the social network's more personal character. It advises to keep it 'short, concise, appealing and in general attractive, positive, emotionally appealing and easy to consume.'⁹⁹⁶ Even though a few examples such as the year's first snowfall are provided, the explanation remains tremendously vague.

Furthermore, the tone should be friendly and sociable, sincere and open minded, in the case of a conflict factual and binding. Addressing the user needs to remain politically neutral even if the diplomats in charge have a personal opinion on the individual comment. 'Public administration

⁹⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁹⁶ Ibid., 16.

language’ should be avoided, the user should be considered a ‘real person coming into the embassy’; questions should be answered as if one was writing an email (complete address, content, maybe additional link, complimentary close). Communication should call users to enter into a dialogue, also with each other. To what aim is not mentioned. Content and spelling style are supposed to be adapted to the exact target group.

The inclusion of other media as in web links or video is suggested – however with the hint to take those from other mediator organisations. The administrator is urged to find a regular post rhythm and to vary the content. Also, he or she is advised not to post anything controversial on a Friday afternoon or a public holiday.

A few rules with regards to copyright (which kind of images can be uploaded on Facebook under which conditions) and the advice to check a social network’s terms of use before getting into it complete the handbook. Especially the comment to regularly check the page since the administrator can be held accountable for unlawful comments of third parties is of interest. These pages explicitly point out that the use of social media induces many risks with regards to copyrights. Ten so-called moderation rules complete the guidelines: In addition to the details mentioned above, the administrator is advised to answer comments almost in real-time, which also applies to potentially critical comments.

Another interesting point distinguishing Germany’s approach from the United States’ is that exclusively the ambassador and the official spokesperson are allowed to express themselves abroad on behalf of Germany (a U.S. foreign agency employee may give his take on government policy if approved by the chief of mission⁹⁹⁷). Those, however, often do not dispose of the (mostly time-related) resources to engage on Facebook or, rather, work on the embassy’s Facebook site, so discussion potential is limited.⁹⁹⁸ While the U.S. strategy relies on decentralisation and Internet freedom, which is why every single diplomat who decides to use social media can do so, sometimes at the expense of a unified strategic message, the German approach focuses on coherence, one of the author’s interview partners explained.⁹⁹⁹

⁹⁹⁷ U.S. Department of State, *3 FAM 4170: Official Clearance of Speaking, Writing, and Teaching*, U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual (Washington, D.C., 2009), 10, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/85123.pdf>.

⁹⁹⁸ Diplomat 3, Off-the-record conversation.

⁹⁹⁹ Diplomat 5, Off-the-record conversation.

While the Foreign Office distributes a document from 2010 that may be still in use (the author received it in January 2012), Facebook evolves extremely fast: In January 2012, for example, the social network announced that it would partner with 78 apps to be included in the then new Facebook timeline.¹⁰⁰⁰ Still a rather unknown field, it also is constantly changing and requires close attention to keep up with these developments, challenging traditional bureaucracy such as the Foreign Office with complex decision making processes.¹⁰⁰¹ Actually, the social media guidelines on hand are only related to Facebook, nothing exists for other media.

We can thus conclude that, while general legislation is despite some unresolved issues rather rigid and transformation not easy, the specific guidelines seem to dispose of a much higher level of discretion in interpretation and enforcement since they are so imprecise. This does, however, not broaden the common diplomat's room for manoeuvre, to the contrary; they can do barely anything without the ambassador's consent. Defenders of the status quo with strong veto capabilities indeed dominate the political context: Many German civil servants in leading positions are of higher age and do not necessarily struggle with technology, but are often reluctant to embrace them.¹⁰⁰² Since the AA relies on tremendously hierarchical structures, this significantly hampers further integration of social media and a change of the practice of public diplomacy. The hands of mainly younger change agents are tied. A low level of discretion in interpretation and enforcement of these rules further hampered their endeavour. This context would favour *subversive change agents* aiming at *layering* as in keeping the old body of rules but adding new ones. Some of the author's interview partners confessed that they were indeed trying to drive change slowly and subtly, but for now without much success.¹⁰⁰³

5.2.3 American Social Media Regulations

The State Department also tries to keep a grip over its social media presences within the bounds of possibility: Alec Ross personally trained all future ambassadors at State's Foreign Service Institute and its ambassadorial seminar with regards to social media's benefits but not

¹⁰⁰⁰ Quinton O'Reilly, "Facebook Finally Rolls Out 'Actions': 78 Different Apps To Now Include On Timeline," *SimplyZesty*, January 19, 2012, http://www.simplyzesty.com/facebook/facebook-finally-rollouts-actions-78-different-apps-to-now-include-on-timeline/?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+SimplyZesty+%28Simply+Zesty%29.

¹⁰⁰¹ Diplomat 3, Off-the-record conversation.

¹⁰⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰⁰³ Ibid.; Diplomat 5, Off-the-record conversation.

necessarily inducing them to operate the accounts themselves but rather (how to) empower their employees.¹⁰⁰⁴

Even though ‘[t]he 21st century is a lousy time to be a control freak’¹⁰⁰⁵ as Alec Ross pointed out, someone going off message should be corrected. Until now, diplomats were rather free in their use of social media. This, however, may change soon.¹⁰⁰⁶ An American diplomat at the embassy in Cairo went rogue on Twitter and spread content despite orders not to do so. This – something that according to one of the author’s sources at the AA would not happen in Germany since the use of these tools is by far more restricted¹⁰⁰⁷ – sparked a public relations scandal: It provided then presidential challenger Mitt Romney with an opportunity to attack the serving government and the latter to publicly distance itself from the content. Such incidents are actually not that uncommon: Employees of the UK Ministry of Defence leaked information via social media 16 times over 18 months; when one member of the Israeli defence forces posted sensitive information about a raid on Facebook, the whole operation had to be cancelled.¹⁰⁰⁸ While such things are certainly bound to happen anytime, they would probably have been kept to a small circle in an analogue world; nowadays, everyone who disposes of the necessary technology, and would want to, could follow the story.¹⁰⁰⁹

To avoid such things in the future, State is allegedly rewriting the 3 FAM 4170 rules that provide the applicable regulations – legally binding and not flexible guidelines as in the German case – for former or current employees of U.S. foreign affairs agencies on official clearance. Its current version from 2009 states that ‘[p]ublic speaking, writing, or teaching materials produced by an employee in an official capacity may be publicly disseminated if approved by the employee’s agency pursuant to applicable guidelines, standards, and procedures.’¹⁰¹⁰ Amongst other changes, diplomats could be forced to submit their tweets to a two-day review when tweeting in their official capacity; 5 days would apply to blog posts. This would reduce providing real-time information to absurdity, which is why the rumour led to strong criticism, prompting

¹⁰⁰⁴ U.S. Department of State. The Office of Electronic Information, “LiveAtState.”

¹⁰⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰⁶ “Digital Diplomacy.”

¹⁰⁰⁷ Diplomat 5, Off-the-record conversation.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Suemnicht, “The Digital Diplomacy Horizon.”

¹⁰⁰⁹ Josh Rogin, “Inside the Public Relations Disaster at the Cairo Embassy,” *Foreign Policy Blogs*, September 12, 2012, http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/09/12/inside_the_public_relations_disaster_at_the_cairo_embassy.

¹⁰¹⁰ U.S. Department of State, *3 FAM 4170: Official Clearance of Speaking, Writing, and Teaching*, 2.

Alec Ross to publicly deny the news on Twitter. According to former employee Peter van Buren, this proves impossible in practice resulting in the content going public without review or having become obsolete by the time the review passed. Furthermore, he argues that the social media regulations were allegedly found unconstitutional because of a first amendment right violation.¹⁰¹¹ Furthermore, a clause providing former employees such as Peter van Buren with the opportunity to use information from their time as an employee (he wrote an extensive book on reconstruction efforts in Iraq which caused a scandal) will be deleted to avoid such things in the future.¹⁰¹²

The political context provides the defenders of the status quo (super power with realist tendencies, exploiting PD 2.0 in this respect through aligning it with an overall strategy but according minor importance to national coherence) with strong veto possibilities; relevant players include Alec Ross or Hillary Clinton. The status quo truly benefits its foreign policy by facilitating for example counter-terrorist activities and data gathering, as explained above. The U.S. institutional context is less rigid than the German one. It disposes for now of a high level of discretion regarding enforcement. The U.S. strategy relies on decentralisation and Internet freedom, which is why every single diplomat who decides to use social media can do so, sometimes at the expense of a unified strategic message. This indicates an environment that would promote the perfect breeding ground for *subversives* to drive change, disrespecting rules and thus fostering their demise – examples would be the aforementioned Cairo diplomat or Peter van Buren.

5.2.4 Synopsis: Differences and Similarities

This section has further shown the impact of history on the institutional framework PD 2.0 is embedded in and underscored how both countries' foreign policy and public diplomacy tradition translated into legislation. German PD 2.0 seems to operate within a rigid corset: 'Gestapo and Stasi crimes still leave dark shadows, and privacy rights have near-religious significance,'¹⁰¹³ the Economist quips while U.S. diplomats dispose of more liberties. German public diplomacy's

¹⁰¹¹ Peter van Buren, "On Social Media, State Department Stands Alone," *Huffington Post. The Blog*, June 1, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-van-buren/state-department-social-media_b_1562741.html; Ben Wizner and Kate Wood, "Letter to State Department" (American Civil Liberties Union, May 15, 2012), http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/letter_to_state_dept-van_buren.pdf.

¹⁰¹² van Buren, "On Social Media, State Department Stands Alone"; Wizner and Wood, "Letter to State Department."

¹⁰¹³ "The Lives of Others."

leitmotifs are culture and overcoming prejudices related to its role during World War II, the U.S. aims at spreading its values and messages, further strengthening its power position.

Moreover, German PD 2.0 appears in its infancy compared to the U.S. It disposes of much less resources as well as sophistication and strategy aligned with its foreign policy and public diplomacy doctrine. The German Foreign Office up until now indeed lacks a strategic public diplomacy framework.¹⁰¹⁴ While social media at the AA are exclusively used to engage with publics, the U.S. has not only developed a knowledge management system, it is also used to monitor online conversations. Also, compared to the United States, manpower is scarce not only at the relevant division at the Federal Foreign Office but also at the embassy so that sometimes, interns operate the pages even though they only share authorised content either coming directly from the ambassador or the relevant press office.

In addition, other countries seem much more visible and transparent regarding their activities: strategy papers and numbers are freely available on the Internet.¹⁰¹⁵ Especially Fergus Hanson's almost eulogia-like reports that provide detailed and substantial information proved truly helpful to this dissertation.¹⁰¹⁶ Details about German PD 2.0 were rather difficult to obtain and this only on the condition of keeping the data private. Furthermore, both Foreign Offices dispose of different images: While State had managed to position itself as cutting-edge, modern and embracing technology, not least fostered through Hillary Clinton's support for the cause and Alec Ross praising e-diplomacy, Germany's stance could not be more different. One could infer from the strategies that public diplomacy served the purpose of legitimising (foreign) policy choices towards foreign publics. Public diplomacy was further intended to increase their familiarity with the emitting country and praise its commercial and education advantages.

Does PD 2.0's operationalisation validate these claims? With regards to Germany, the case study will focus on carving out if its communication style is rather cautious, abstains from strategic public relations elements and mostly centres on values and multilateral action, conveying a peaceful and *civilised* image. The U.S., on the other hand, will be more likely to provide a

¹⁰¹⁴ Diplomat 5, Off-the-record conversation.

¹⁰¹⁵ See for example: Hanson, *Revolution @State: The Spread of Ediplomacy*; U.S. Department of State. The Office of Electronic Information, "LiveAtState"; "21st Century Statecraft."

¹⁰¹⁶ Hanson, *Baked in and Wired: eDiplomacy@State*; Hanson, *Revolution @State: The Spread of Ediplomacy*.

strategic, integrated and great power politics oriented framework, using PD 2.0 as a tool to strengthen the state's position.

Before addressing these questions, additional background information is needed, summing up the main events of Anglo-German and Anglo-American political relations since this information will prove crucial to the subsequent content analysis that will amongst others analyse to which extent these issues are dealt with.

5.3 Public Diplomacy 2.0 Applied to the UK: Rethinking Foreign Policy?

5.3.1 Time Line: The European Debt Crisis (October – December 2011)

Debt-laden countries and a half-baked currency union had weakened the Euro. Anti-German tendencies were emerging as a reaction to the severe politics of austerity and Germany's leading role in the Euro crisis: The Daily Mail suspects a 'rise of the Fourth Reich'¹⁰¹⁷ as a reaction to a Franco-German summit on 16th August.¹⁰¹⁸ Historian Richard Evans reckons that '[w]e haven't seen this kind of language since the 1990s, when German reunification led to a spate of Germanophobic commentary in politics and the media. [...] The fears of a Fourth Reich have not been realised. [Such] [r]hetoric [...] is an unthinking throwback to the language of the post-reunification years, even more ignorant and hysterical now than it was then.'¹⁰¹⁹

During fall 2011, this dissertation's investigation period, the financial situation worsened: Within the eurozone, economic growth is modest if existent at all; the crisis risks to spread to Portugal, Spain and Ireland as their bond yields are rising.

4 October: European shares almost crash after the decision about Greece's next part of bailout payments is delayed by the eurozone finance ministers, giving room to speculation about European leaders planning a recapitalisation of the banking system.

¹⁰¹⁷ Simon Heffer, "European Debt Summit: Germany Is Using Financial Crisis to Conquer Europe," *The Daily Mail*, August 17, 2011, sec. News, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2026840/European-debt-summit-Germany-using-financial-crisis-conquer-Europe.html>.

¹⁰¹⁸ David Gow, "No, EU Talk of Economic Governance Does Not Herald the Fourth Reich," *The Guardian*, August 18, 2011, sec. Comment is free, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/aug/18/eu-economic-governance-merkel-sarkozy>.

¹⁰¹⁹ Evans, "The Myth of the Fourth Reich."

6 October: Further round of quantitative easing through injection of £75 billion into the UK economy; measures to grant emergency loans destined to help commercial banks unveiled by the European Central Bank.

8 October: Rumours about the German and French leaders having agreed on measures helping resolve the debt crisis fail to completely calm the markets since no details are provided.

10 October: Franco-Belgian bank Dexia, which is in difficulties, receives a considerable amount of financial help; news about it causes relief on the markets. The EU summit is delayed by a week to give the ministers more time to finalise their planning, necessary for Greece to get its next tranche of bailout money and to support indebted banks. This perceived new German leadership – due to the fact that Germany is one of the few less struggling economies in the eurozone – provokes resentment: ‘For Britain, the new supremacy of Germany amounts to a psychic shock,’¹⁰²⁰ the Daily Mail, a tabloid, diagnoses.

14 October: G20 finance ministers meeting in Paris.

21 October: Next tranche of Greek bailout loans worth €8 billion are approved by eurozone finance ministers, a move Greece would allegedly have defaulted without.

26 October: Vital agreement towards a solution to the debt crisis reached by European leaders; extensive talks in Brussels lead to a number of private banks holding Greek debts accepting a haircut of 50%. To additionally protect banks from government defaults that may occur in the future, new rules regarding capital ratios were instated.

In November, the debate over the Tobin tax to be hypothetically raised on financial transactions sparks a row especially between the German government, in favour, and the British one that is less inclined to advance the project. ‘We no longer need to fear the jackboot but we have a great deal to fear from German bossy boots.’¹⁰²¹

14 November: In an article published in the evening standard, the Chancellor of the Exchequer considers the Europe-only tax on financial transaction as a ‘bullet aimed at the heart

¹⁰²⁰ Stephen Glover, “Angela Merkel: We Have a Great Deal to Fear from German Bossy Boots,” *The Daily Mail*, November 17, 2011, sec. RightMinds, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2062500/Angela-Merkel-We-great-deal-fear-German-bossy-boots.html>.

¹⁰²¹ Ibid.

of London.¹⁰²² Economic secretary Vincent Cable opposed the idea supported by Germany and France because 30% of its GDP are generated in London's financial district, the city, and Britain fears being disadvantaged.¹⁰²³ David Cameron urges Germany and France to tackle the eurozone crisis.¹⁰²⁴

15 November: Volker Kauder, CDU-leader in the Bundestag, accuses the UK of irresponsibility (because of their opposition to the tax that may generate €55 billion a year) and makes a comment that is misunderstood and wrongly translated into 'Europe now speaks German.'¹⁰²⁵

16 November: The story is all over German and British newspapers.¹⁰²⁶ Former British ambassador to Berlin Christoph Meyer writes an article entitled 'The Return of the German Question'¹⁰²⁷ in the Huffington Post, following comments after Angela Merkel's allies supposedly said she would not let the UK get away with opposing the Tobin tax, also backed by France and the European Commission.

18 November: David Cameron and Angela Merkel meet in Berlin. The leaders 'pledge unity [...] and stress strong bonds of friendship.'¹⁰²⁸ Cameron affirms his deep commitment to the EU while Merkel asserts that both countries needed each other. They still disagreed, however, on how to tackle the crisis and the Tobin tax. Still, the public spat seemed settled.

¹⁰²² George Osborne, "Fix This Euro Crisis with the Smack of Firm Government," *The Evening Standard*, November 14, 2012, sec. News, <http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/news/fix-this-euro-crisis-with-the-smack-of-firm-government-6367942.html>.

¹⁰²³ "Finanztransaktionssteuer: Briten reagieren empört auf Kauder-Attacke," *Handelsblatt*, November 16, 2011, sec. International - Politik, <http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/finanztransaktionssteuer-briten-reagieren-empuert-auf-kauder-attacke-seite-all/5849694-all.html>.

¹⁰²⁴ Nils Pratley, "David Cameron's 'Big Bazooka' Idea Leaves Big Questions Unanswered," *The Guardian*, October 10, 2011, sec. Business, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/nils-pratley-on-finance/2011/oct/10/david-cameron-big-bazooka-questions>.

¹⁰²⁵ He actually said: "Jetzt auf einmal wird in Europa deutsch gesprochen - nicht in der Sprache, aber in der Akzeptanz der Instrumente, für die Angela Merkel so lange und dann erfolgreich gekämpft hat." Translation: Now, suddenly people in Europe speak German – not the language, but in the acceptance of the instruments, for which Angela Merkel has fought successfully for so long. "Finanztransaktionssteuer: Briten reagieren empört auf Kauder-Attacke."

¹⁰²⁶ See for example: James Chapman, "Europe Speaks German Now! Controversial Claim from Merkel Ally That EU Countries All Follow Berlin's Lead - and Britain Should Fall into Line," *The Daily Mail*, November 16, 2011, sec. News, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2062015/Eurozone-crisis-Merkel-ally-says-UK-fall-line-oppose-Tobin-tax.html>.

¹⁰²⁷ Sir Christopher Meyer, "The Return of the German Question," *Huffington Post. The Blog*, November 23, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/sir-christopher-meyer/the-return-of-the-german-question_b_1110673.html.

¹⁰²⁸ Graeme Wearden and Julia Kollewe, "Eurozone Crisis: Cameron and Merkel Pledge Unity," *The Guardian*, November 18, 2011, sec. Business, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/blog/2011/nov/18/eurozone-crisis-spain-markets-cameron-merkel#block-19>.

19 November: Christoph Meyer states in *Der Spiegel* that ‘Germany and Britain are in a fight,’¹⁰²⁹ arguing against the UK possibly leaving the European Union that does not seem unthinkable anymore, a move he considers disastrous for both sides.

9 December: Another intensive summit in Brussels ends with French President Nicolas Sarkozy announcing a ‘plan of an inter-governmental treaty enshrining new budgetary rules to tackle the crisis.’¹⁰³⁰ Due to a failure in getting all 27 EU countries to find an agreement regarding relevant treaty changes, a decision on this was to be expected by March 2012, postponing further debates, which poured oil into troubled water.¹⁰³¹

This timeline has provided us with the relevant dates to look for as well as with keywords. Before proceeding to investigate its translation into PD 2.0, however, the next chapter will turn to the events in Anglo-American relations that took place during the investigation period. Even though the European debt crisis is of global importance since it has impacts on the world economy, it plays a rather minor role in Anglo-American relations, as we will see.¹⁰³²

12 October: Both the U.S. and the UK make a commitment to their special relationship with a ceremony to which officials from both countries were present.

18 October: The Home Secretary presents a report of the UK’s Independent Review Panel on Extradition. It finds that the Anglo-American treaty, heavily criticised for disadvantaging Britain as well as for civil rights issues, is ‘balanced and fair.’¹⁰³³

¹⁰²⁹ Christoph Meyer, “Warum die EU Großbritannien dringend braucht,” *SPIEGEL ONLINE*, November 19, 2011, sec. Politik, <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,798666,00.html>.

¹⁰³⁰ Wearden and Kollwe, “Eurozone Crisis.”

¹⁰³¹ “Euro-Krise: Briten wütend über deutsche Dominanz in Europa,” *Die Welt*, November 17, 2011, sec. Politik, <http://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article13721943/Briten-wuetend-ueber-deutsche-Dominanz-in-Europa.html>; Timothy Garton Ash, “If David Cameron Has a British Vision for Europe, Let Him Tell Us What It Is,” *The Guardian*, November 16, 2011, sec. Comment is free, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/nov/16/cameron-vision-europe-merkel>; Meyer, “Warum die EU Großbritannien dringend braucht”; “Deutsch-britischer Schlagabtausch über Börsensteuer,” *Welt Online*, November 17, 2011, sec. Politik, <http://www.welt.de/politik/article13721193/Deutsch-britischer-Schlagabtausch-ueber-Boersensteuer.html>; “Timeline: The Unfolding Eurozone Crisis,” *BBC*, February 13, 2012, sec. Business, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-13856580>; Chapman, “Eurozone Crisis.”

¹⁰³² This chapter is mainly based on: “U.S. - U.K. Relations,” *Embassy of the United States*, accessed May 27, 2012, <http://london.usembassy.gov/gb.html>; quotes are taken from this website if not stated otherwise.

¹⁰³³ Wesley Johnson, “Anger at Extradition Treaty Review,” *The Independent*, October 18, 2011, sec. Home news, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/anger-at-extradition-treaty-review-2372276.html>.

18 October: U.S. National Security Committee’s spokesman Tommy Vietor announced that the U.S. welcomed the UK’s decision ‘to impose sanctions against the five individuals identified by the United States as connected to the plot to assassinate Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the United States. This sends yet another message that the international community rejects this flagrant violation of international law.’¹⁰³⁴

27 October: U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton acts as the keynote speaker at the London Conference on Cyberspace, hosted by the UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, William Hague. Furthermore, she will meet with her counterpart ‘to review a range of issues on our shared global agenda.’¹⁰³⁵

29 November: As a reaction to British sanctions Iranian protesters storm and subsequently vandalise two compounds of the British Embassy in Teheran.¹⁰³⁶ The United States release a statement expressing their concern over the situation and strongly condemn the acts urging the Iranian governments to take action and – referring to the Vienna convention – to prevent such things from happening in the first place.¹⁰³⁷

5 December: During the International Year of Volunteers’ tenth anniversary and the International Volunteer Day, which fell together, the American Peace Corps and its British counterpart, the VSO (Voluntary Service Overseas), signed a partnership agreement at the United Nations headquarters in New York. It is destined to enable both organisations to share work more effectively in countries where volunteers serve as well as share best practices.

12 December: U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and her British counterpart William Hague meet in Washington at the State Department, discussing common interests and global policy issues including amongst others the eurozone crisis, the aforementioned attack on the UK

¹⁰³⁴ Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement from NSC Spokesman Tommy Vietor on the United Kingdom’s Sanctions Announcement,” *The White House*, October 18, 2011, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/18/statement-nsc-spokesman-tommy-vietor-united-kingdoms-sanctions-announcem>.

¹⁰³⁵ “U.S. - U.K. Relations.”

¹⁰³⁶ Robin Pomeroy, “Iranian Protesters Storm British Diplomatic Compounds,” *Reuters*, November 29, 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/29/us-iran-britain-embassy-idUSTRE7AS0X720111129>.

¹⁰³⁷ “Vienna Convention Obliges Iran to Protect Diplomats,” *Embassy of the United States, London, UK*, November 29, 2011, <http://london.usembassy.gov/forpol076.html>.

Embassy in Iran and the transition in Afghanistan. William Hague affirms during the subsequent press conference that the U.S. ‘is our closest and our indispensable ally in foreign policy.’¹⁰³⁸

Having said this, let us now turn to the actual results the analysis of both countries’ Facebook pages and Twitter feeds generated (please refer to the codebook in the annex for further details). Let us start with a brief overview of the accounts in question.

5.3.2 Content: Restrained Repertory

5.3.2.1 Introducing the Embassies’ Social Media Accounts

The German Embassy operates in addition to a Twitter account (for news and policy information as its Facebook page states) a Facebook fan page entitled *German Embassy London*, which it refers to on its website. A press officer at the embassy manages those communication channels.¹⁰³⁹

No one at the ministry could retrace when the Embassy’s Facebook fan page came into existence.¹⁰⁴⁰ Fortunately, its new Facebook timeline reveals the date: 8 May 2009.¹⁰⁴¹ The fan page’s wall is blocked, fans are thus unable to post content; they can only comment, like or share posts the administrators shared, which makes perfect sense in the logic of national coherence. The German page had 2.432 fans on the coding date (16 December 2011). During the investigation period, the German Embassy in the UK chronicled 32 posts. 45 ‘were talking about this’ and 238 ‘were here.’¹⁰⁴²

Posting content to the U.S. Facebook page is possible, which is also in line with its understanding of communicational openness. 11.103 users liked the American page that made 74 entries during the investigation period while 132 were ‘talking about this’ and 372 ‘were here.’¹⁰⁴³ Compared to other players, however, this seems rather modest: Deceased pop star Michael Jackson’s and teen idol Justin Bieber’s fan page recorded 45.041.172¹⁰⁴⁴ and 40.102.764¹⁰⁴⁵ fans respectively. While

¹⁰³⁸ “Remarks With UK Foreign Secretary William Hague After Their Meeting,” *Embassy of the United States, London, UK*, December 12, 2012, <http://london.usembassy.gov/gb158.html>.

¹⁰³⁹ Auswärtiges Amt, “Auswertung und generelle Beurteilung der Facebookauftritte der Auslandsvertretungen”; Auswärtiges Amt, “Auswertung Facebookauftritte der Auslandsvertretungen.”

¹⁰⁴⁰ Diplomat 3, Off-the-record conversation.

¹⁰⁴¹ “German Embassy London,” Facebook fan page, accessed April 1, 2012, <https://www.facebook.com/GermanEmbassyUK>.

¹⁰⁴² This equals transmitting the embassy’s address as one’s current location on the respective individual profile.

¹⁰⁴³ “German Embassy London,” December 16, 2011; “U.S. Embassy London.”

¹⁰⁴⁴ “Michael Jackson,” Facebook fan page, (2012), <https://www.facebook.com/michaeljackson>.

¹⁰⁴⁵ “Justin Bieber,” Facebook fan page, (2012), <https://www.facebook.com/JustinBieber>.

politics does certainly not attract as many crowds as the entertainment industry, this comparison nevertheless puts the numbers into perspective.

On the Twitter coding date in June 2012, the German embassy's Twitter feed had made 828 tweets, followed 82 other users and had 741 followers itself.¹⁰⁴⁶ 74 tweets were made during the period of investigation. The American Twitter feed on the other hand provided the author with 495 tweets to analyse while it chronicled 8.042 tweets until the coding date. It was following 780 other users and had 14.820 followers.¹⁰⁴⁷ Let us relativise these numbers as well: Pop music super star Lady Gaga operates the most followed account (29.222.319 followers) in the world, President Barack Obama comes 6th (19.478.092 followers). He is the first politician as well as the only one in the top twenty who is not a celebrity in the sense of popular singers or actors (excluding @twitter and @youtube that occupy place 15 and 9 respectively).¹⁰⁴⁸ Again, the embassy's feed seems unsurprisingly rather minor compared to the attractiveness of these other pages.

Neither Germany nor the U.S. follow a distinctive pattern regarding the timing of their posts, it happened between 9 a.m. and 16:55.¹⁰⁴⁹ This is consistent with current research or rather its inconclusiveness about which communication times are the most conducive to generating a maximum of attention.¹⁰⁵⁰ Since the half-life of a link posted on Twitter is about 2.8 hours, it was used much more frequently (with 495 tweets over the 77 days this analysis covered 6.4 per day on average on the U.S. side and 0.96 by the German embassy), while there was rarely more than one Facebook post per day (U.S. embassy: 0.96 / day and German embassy: 0.41 per day on average).¹⁰⁵¹

With this said, what was communication via social media all about? Could one draw parallels to both foreign policy and public diplomacy doctrines? Were current (bilateral) affairs – extensively described above – addressed?

¹⁰⁴⁶ "German Embassy (germanembassy) on Twitter," Twitter page, (December 2011), <https://twitter.com/#!/GermanEmbassy>.

¹⁰⁴⁷ "U.S. Embassy London (usainuk) on Twitter," Twitter page, (June 18, 2012), <https://twitter.com/#!/USAinUK>.

¹⁰⁴⁸ "Twitter Top 100 Most Followed," *Twitter Counter*, accessed September 8, 2012, <http://twittercounter.com/pages/100>.

¹⁰⁴⁹ The Twitter feeds do not show the time, so no information in this respect can be provided.

¹⁰⁵⁰ hmason, "Time Is on Your Side," *Bitly Blog*, May 8, 2012, <http://blog.bitly.com/post/22663850994/time-is-on-your-side>.

¹⁰⁵¹ *Ibid.*; Samantha Murphy, "The Best and Worst Times to Share on Facebook, Twitter," *Mashable*, May 9, 2012, <http://mashable.com/2012/05/09/best-time-to-post-on-facebook/>.

5.3.2.2 Content: What's on Your Mind?

The following comparative table, summing up the results to be discussed below, shows both the German and American Facebook pages in a comparative perspective. Please note that all the tables will only show the results deemed most relevant – all other posts / tweets will be summarised under the category *other*. Also, the indented categories are subcategories to the above left-justified one; only the most meaningful sub-categories are mentioned. Numbers are rounded.

While both countries focus on cultural aspects and education, the most striking difference lies in the U.S. concentrating more strongly on politics and completely neglecting the Euro crisis.

Characteristic	Facebook Germany		Facebook USA	
	N=32	%	N=74	%
Culture	20	62,50%	31	41,89%
Sports	0	0,00%	9	12,16%
Arts	12	37,50%	10	13,51%
Education / careers	6	18,75 %	8	10,81 %
Euro crisis	3	9,38%	0	0,00%
Politics	1	3,13%	27	36,49%
National affairs	1	3,13%	9	12,16%
Foreign affairs	0	0,00%	7	9,46%
Global affairs	0	0,00%	7	9,46%
Other	2	6,25%	8	10,81%

Figure 5-8: Content Shared on Facebook

A direct comparison of both embassies' Twitter feeds gives proof of similar results with the U.S. according more importance to politics and foreign affairs in particular. Germany neglects culture in exchange for politics, especially foreign affairs as well as the Euro crisis that plays an insignificant role for the U.S. embassy.

Characteristic	Twitter Germany		Twitter USA	
	N=74	%	N=495	%
Education / careers	8	10,81%	27	5,46%
Studying in Germany	2	2,70%	0	0,00%
Studying in USA	0	0,00%	9	1,82%
Culture	13	17,56%	137	27,68%
of which Sport	2	2,70%	40	8,08%
of which Art	5	6,76%	49	9,90%
of which customs Germany / USA	4	5,41%	32	6,46%
Politics	35	47,30%	272	54,95%
National affairs	3	4,05%	48	9,70%
Foreign affairs	22	29,73%	130	26,26%
Global affairs & development	5	6,76%	87	17,58%
Euro crisis	14	18,92%	6	1,21%
of which Tobin Tax	1	1,35%	0	0,00%
Other	4	5,41%	53	10,7%

Figure 5-9: Tweeted Content

First, the German social media sites in question could hardly be considered depicting an extensive image of Germany as suggested by the embassy's press secretary since they clearly focused on specific aspects.¹⁰⁵² Also, one of the author's interview partners at the Federal Foreign Office said that they were well aware that social media was not the place to distribute challenging content, which is why they were trying to work with *soft news*.¹⁰⁵³ Indeed, posts and tweets are too short to draft a complex picture of structural issues of international relations or even cultural issues (see for example tweet #15: 'German Chancellor Angela Merkel says #Greece "must remain part of euro area & get opportunity to improve its situation"'). It lies in the medium's nature not to be able to transmit complex circumstances.

On the U.S. side, one could observe a focus on recurring conflicts (Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan for example, but nothing on African countries or China, rarely anything about Iran even though the latter two are of high interest to the U.S.). Context (for example: How did conflicts come about, which role did the U.S. really play in this respect, what does the other conflict party has to say) was faded out, too.

¹⁰⁵² German Embassy UK, "Ihre Anfrage."

¹⁰⁵³ Diplomat 5, Off-the-record conversation.

Both Twitter and Facebook did not swamp their audience with overly sophisticated matters: With regards to content, the Facebook page was mainly dedicated to culture (62.5%¹⁰⁵⁴ Germany) which consisted in event suggestions, for example, while politics played only a marginal role (3.13% Germany). This perfectly fits the presentation of German as a *Kulturnation* its public diplomacy revolves around as the preceding chapters have shown. In line with its purpose, Twitter was much more politics centred (47.30%) with foreign affairs constituting its main share (almost 30% of the total), predominating global and national issues. Social issues are barely addressed if at all and also many aspects pertaining to foreign affairs are completely left out. The only on-going conflicts featured were Syria (#172) and Afghanistan (#174), which is only a very small portion of issues Germany has a stake in.

Second, PD 2.0 is not quite if at all employed as a tool to address day-to-day bilateral issues and the Tobin tax discussion in particular or to directly contact the public with regards to this topic. So, one can assume that such a ‘[...] tool is useful for seeing what these influential figures have to say in public, but it does not give a clear picture of these diplomatic relationships – most negotiations and international relations still happen behind closed doors.’¹⁰⁵⁵ Indeed, a major event such as the euro-zone crisis without explicit reference to the Euro crisis featured just 3 times on Facebook. Only 9 posts referred to bilateral Anglo-German relations. The euro-zone crisis in general appeared more prominent on Twitter with the Tobin tax issue being mentioned once (out of 14 posts on the subject, 1.35% of total). Most of the timeline points discussed earlier on were only briefly addressed: While the feed shares broadcasting pieces on the Euro crisis (see #16) or retweeted them with a quote by a German politician such as chancellor Angela Merkel (#15) or morale-boosting slogans (generally assures the world of Germany’s good intentions, for example #123: ‘Germany does not want to rule Europe’ or #173: ‘Europe will emerge stronger from the crisis’), the few posts about the Tobin tax did not address the conflict situation with the UK. Only the press conference Angela Merkel and David Cameron gave on 18th November is announced with a link to follow it live.

This underscores how the aspect of Germany still has to deal with World War II-associated fears of wanting to dominate the continent, an element often hinted at within the framework of its

¹⁰⁵⁴ Those percentages always refer to the total unless stated otherwise.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Kimber Streams, “AFP’s E-Diplomacy Tool Maps Tweets between World Leaders,” *The Verge*, June 24, 2012, <http://www.theverge.com/2012/6/24/3114450/afp-e-diplomacy-tool-maps-tweets-between-world-leaders>.

public diplomacy doctrine. Nevertheless, the negative coverage making allusions to a *Fourth Reich* mentioned earlier on are not specifically discussed either.¹⁰⁵⁶ The focus was a European treaty change and preparations for the summit in December (see #111 and #154). The content reflected Germany's general national interest instead of being tailored to the UK. Remarkable is also the fact that despite explicitly wanting to separate culture and politics, the Twitter feed still addressed the former (17.56%). So, Germany's social media pages reflect its public diplomacy doctrine's focal points (culture and assuring the world of Germany's good intentions).

On the U.S. side, things are only slightly different: While its Facebook page also focused mainly on culture (41.89%), politics played an almost as important role (36.49%, with 12.16% being on national and 9.46% on foreign and global affairs each). Bilateral Anglo-American relations were rarely addressed (8.1%). On Twitter, politics accounted for the majority of tweets (54.95%, again with a focus on foreign, 26.26%, and global 17.58% affairs). Culture amounted to almost 28% while education matters were marginalised even though fortifying the U.S. position as such seemed high on the agenda according to the public diplomacy roadmap.¹⁰⁵⁷ Both countries worked with stylistic devices such as quotes from not only official actors such as Barack Obama or Angela Merkel but also artists (U.S.: almost 15% of posts and 13.94% of tweets / Germany: 0 on Facebook, almost 14% on Twitter), probably to provide the message with additional authority. In contrast to the German feed, the U.S. Twitter feed was perfectly integrated into the wider strategy, all details seemed intertwined: All but one tiny detail of the chronicle of Anglo-American relations to be found on the U.S. Embassy website already mentioned above are also referenced on the Twitter feed in a more or less extensive way. Similarly to the German page, only very few events are taken up on Facebook.

Besides, the agenda point of *shaping the narrative* in the public diplomacy strategy paper presented above was quite present. What happens indeed is that '[...] what we need to do is be aggressive in getting out there and pushing out the truth,'¹⁰⁵⁸ as Alex Ross argues. For that matter, story lines – rhetoric strategies as this dissertation calls them – are perfectly suitable since they give the opportunity to put the information in a convenient way, presenting one's

¹⁰⁵⁶ Evans, "The Myth of the Fourth Reich."

¹⁰⁵⁷ Office of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, *Public Diplomacy: Strengthening U.S. Engagement with the World. A Strategic Approach for the 21st Century*, 6.

¹⁰⁵⁸ U.S. Department of State. The Office of Electronic Information, "LiveAtState."

version of what is believed to be *the truth*. Indeed, [i]t’s not just those whose army is most powerful. It’s those whose story is most powerful’¹⁰⁵⁹ as Joseph Nye asserts. A White House strategy paper¹⁰⁶⁰ already mentioned above that formulated the following three goals for public diplomacy was particularly helpful in this respect: Present the United States as a reliable partner that plays a constructive role in international relations and has many mutual areas of interest with foreign audiences. For they matched both countries’ public diplomacy frameworks and embodied their goals, they were deemed useful to provide more comparability with the German social media pages. Thus, those were also slightly adapted and applied with regards to the German pages, especially to underscore possible differences in communication. Public diplomacy is after all about transmitting a positive impression of the home country and as mentioned above, policy legitimization was a crucial element for both countries’ public diplomacy strategies. Please note in this that a post or tweet could contain elements of all three legitimization categories and be thus counted several times – refer to codebooks for further information.

	Facebook Germany		Facebook USA	
	N=32	%	N=74	%
Policy legitimization	3	9,38%	15	20,27%
Constructive role	0	0,00%	13	17,57%
Respectful partner	0	0,00%	5	6,76%
Mutual interest	3	9,38%	15	20,27%
No story line	29	90,62%	59	79,73%

Figure 5-10: Story Lines on Facebook

	Twitter Germany		Twitter USA	
	N=74	%	N=495	%
Policy legitimization	40	54,05%	243	49,09%
Constructive role	28	37,84%	228	46,06%
Respectful partner	23	31,08%	100	20,20%
Mutual interest	39	52,70%	225	45,45%
No story line	34	45,95%	252	50,91%

Figure 5-11: Story Lines on Twitter

¹⁰⁵⁹ Alan Heil, “Power Is Not Just Power over Others, It Is Power with Others,” *The Public Diplomacy Council*, accessed February 21, 2011, <http://publicdiplomacycouncil.org/commentaries/%E2%80%9Cpower-not-just-power-over-others-it-power-others-not-just-power-over-others-it-power-o>.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Biden, *National Framework for Strategic Communication*.

Almost 50% and 20.27% of U.S. tweets and posts respectively could be associated with one of the story lines developed beforehand. This makes perfect sense with regards to the public diplomacy strategy since its goal is to counter alleged misrepresentations of the U.S. in global conversations. On Twitter, the focus lay on presenting the U.S. as playing a constructive role in global affairs (46.06%) and operating in *areas of mutual interest* with the UK (45.45%). The U.S. centres less on its role as a respectful partner (20.20%). A similar ratio appeared on Facebook: 17.57% of the posts presented the U.S. as playing a constructive role and 20.27% as supporting mutual interests with the UK. The partnership role accounted for less than 7% of the posts. Social media were thus used to legitimise foreign policy choices. This underscores public diplomacy's characteristic as a power tool that aims at strengthening the nation state.

The German embassy used Facebook to a lesser extent to legitimise policy (9.38%) and almost exclusively focussed on the partner role while Twitter centred on this aspect (54.05%) with almost equal weight put on presenting Germany as a respectful partner (31.08%) that played a constructive role (37.84%) with the emphasis on *areas of mutual interest* (52.70%). In contrast to the U.S., Germany's focal point lies in line with its foreign policy tradition on international cooperation and multilateral action; this could be traced back to the social media sites.

The content analysis also investigated the creation of closeness or distance to the audience or respectively other actors. As previously discussed especially U.S. public diplomacy seemed inclined to use Manichean *us versus them* rhetoric.¹⁰⁶¹ Since public diplomacy is about bringing nations closer together, *othering*¹⁰⁶² may be a powerful in this respect for one can build strong ties and a feeling of affiliation with a third party. Such rhetoric strategies aspire to legitimise, create or underscore certain power relations (of dominance over others).¹⁰⁶³ The *othering* element was hardly present on the German social media pages (6.76% on Twitter and 3.12% on Facebook) but appeared on the U.S. ones more frequently (21.21% on Twitter and 8.11% on Facebook).

¹⁰⁶¹ Zaharna, *Battles to Bridges*, 1.

¹⁰⁶² "This term was coined by Gayatri Spivak for the process by which imperial discourse creates its 'others'. Whereas the Other corresponds to the focus of desire or power (the M-Other or Father – or Empire) in relation to which the subject is produced, the other is the excluded or 'mastered' subject created by the discourse of power. Othering describes the various ways in which colonial discourse produces its subjects. In Spivak's explanation, othering is a dialectical process because the colonizing Other is established at the same time as its colonized others are produced as subjects." Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin, *Post-Colonial Studies*, 156.

¹⁰⁶³ Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 25–26; 40.

	Twitter Germany		Twitter USA		Facebook Germany		Facebook USA	
	N=74	%	N=495	%	N=32	%	N=74	%
Us	62	83,78%	311	62,83%	24	75,00%	63	85,13%
Them	5	6,76%	105	21,21%	1	3,12%	6	8,11%
No	7	9,46%	79	15,96%	7	21,88%	5	6,76%

Figure 5-12: Othering on Facebook and Twitter

This finding underscores how the U.S. proceeds more strategically and uses classic rhetoric mechanisms when communicating. This part is consistent with the public diplomacy road map's goal of *combating violent extremism* discrediting these others.¹⁰⁶⁴ Through constantly depicting *them*, these *other* countries (mainly Syria, North Korea and the Iran) as rogue and endangering public welfare, it is suggested that they are '[...] in need of corrective study by the West,'¹⁰⁶⁵ that way creating a power relations of U.S. dominance. Germany, on the other hand, reassures its audience of the absence of any hegemonic desires and confirms its self-understanding as a civilian power through abstaining from using such stylistic devices, emphasising its mutual interests with Britain.

Fourth, social media communication was rather elite-centred and / or selective, which starts with the focus on London. 34.38% of the German Facebook posts referred to events in the UK whose majority took place in London (31.25%), followed by 18.75% in Germany. On the U.S. page, most events it referred to were located in the U.S. (36.49%), 21.62% in the UK and 13.51% in London. Twitter seemed much less location-fixated (in 64.86% of the German tweets / 38.38 % in the U.S. case, no location could be established) but the events on the German Twitter feed that could be associated with the UK (9.46%) took all place in London; the U.S. feed shows a similar ratio. This focus on London could be due to the fact that most users access both Facebook pages from London.¹⁰⁶⁶ Still, it excludes the largest parts of the population living in the UK who are not based in London.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Office of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, *Public Diplomacy: Strengthening U.S. Engagement with the World. A Strategic Approach for the 21st Century*, 15.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Said, *Orientalism*, 41.

¹⁰⁶⁶ "German Embassy London: Likes and People Talking About This"; "U.S. Embassy London: Likes and People Talking About This," *Facebook*, August 2, 2012, <https://www.facebook.com/uk.usembassy/likes>.

Also, the activities the social media pages centred on targeted certain social groups: The culture related posts were mainly devoted to classical middle class endeavours (art exhibitions, literature). The same applies to information about studying in the U.S., a rather costly undertaking. Sports, which according to anthropologist Kate Fox are an essential cultural activity and widely popular, are marginalised.¹⁰⁶⁷ Nothing was featured on the German Facebook page and only 2 tweets dedicated to it. The elite centrism applied to the U.S. pages, too, even though to a lesser extent: Arts and sports (mainly the Olympics, scheduled for summer 2012 in London, and American football) were almost equals with regards to quantity on Facebook and Twitter (12.16% and 8.08% respectively); a similar share was devoted to American customs such as *Thanksgiving* (6.46%). On the other hand, this content might suit social media's users who, as chapter three has detailed, seem to overwhelmingly correspond to such social groups. Also, the largest age cluster *talking about* the German embassy's page are the 18-24 year olds;¹⁰⁶⁸ the American embassy reaches mostly people aged 18-34¹⁰⁶⁹ (providing that the users filled in their real age on their profile). This additionally underscores these media's exclusive character.

While in the German case the majority of content could not be associated with particular institutions or individual actors, those that did mainly focused on official actors as in civil servants holding official posts in the government, marginalising other political groups such as NGOs. The fact that the most frequent hashtags on Germany's Twitter feed were #merkel (N=5) followed by #westerwelle (N=4) underscores this instance.

	Twitter Germany		Twitter USA		Facebook Germany		Facebook USA	
	N=74	%	N=495	%	N=32	%	N=74	%
Official	43	58,11%	240	48,48%	7	21,88%	22	29,73%
Unofficial	8	10,81%	103	20,81%	4	12,50%	28	37,84%
Both	0	0,00%	15	3,03%	1	3,12%	2	2,70%
No Actor	23	31,08%	137	27,68%	20	62,50%	22	29,73%

Figure 5-13: Nature of Actors on Facebook and Twitter

¹⁰⁶⁷ Fox, *Watching the English. The Hidden Rules of English Behaviour*, 239.

¹⁰⁶⁸ "German Embassy London: Likes and People Talking About This."

¹⁰⁶⁹ "U.S. Embassy London: Likes and People Talking About This."

Regarding the U.S., official actors were privileged over unofficial ones on Twitter but on Facebook, unofficial groups were more prominent. On the U.S. Twitter feed, the most frequent hashtags during the investigation period were #clinton (N=28) and #obama (N=27), Secretary of State and President respectively as well.

With regards to timing, similarly to the U.S. page most of the events on Germany's Facebook page were either occurring the same day they were broadcast (46.88%) or in the future (21.88%).¹⁰⁷⁰ In general, all news was related to events taking place after World War II, which refutes the hypothesis that German PD (2.0) was deeply concerned with this issue, as one could have inferred from the historical part.

To conclude, the content on the social media sites in question is perfectly in line with the United States' realist background and could explain the moralising aspects of communication (Facebook post #257: 'The White House and Department of State have condemned "in the strongest terms" the storming of the British Embassy in Tehran saying, "we'll provide whatever supports the British...might need." Or tweet #211: 'The U.S. is deeply concerned by reports of the #Iranian government's continued repression of its people. #humanrights') stylising the U.S. as a force for good in the world or making '[...]foreign audiences believe the United States plays a constructive role in global affairs.'¹⁰⁷¹

Also, communication through social media showed similar flaws to foreign affairs broadcasting as mentioned above, as in being rather selective, elitist and simplifying.¹⁰⁷² Addressing motivations that go beyond acting as a force for good in the world combating evil, such as commercial interests that play a role in the reconstruction of a country after military intervention or keeping another country from expanding its power base has no room. For example Iran is presented as a rogue power accumulating nuclear weapons; similar allegations are made with regards to Syria without further explaining the issue and the context surrounding the affair.¹⁰⁷³ The German embassy focussed on culture and abstained from a strategic approach. Instead, it repeated its good intentions regarding its national and international affairs.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Twitter is a real-time broadcaster by definition; the analysis did thus not investigate this aspect.

¹⁰⁷¹ Biden, *National Framework for Strategic Communication*, 6.

¹⁰⁷² Hafez, *Mythos Globalisierung*, 46–56.

¹⁰⁷³ Ibid.

This elite-centrism did not only apply to content (mostly culture and politics), it heavily focused on London, official actors and middle class activities. While Facebook seemed to be highly attached to a certain place, as in mostly London, information shared on Twitter not so much. So, social media reproduce mechanisms as explained above.

Cultural differences in communication style account for another divergence: The U.S. social media pages shared for example personal details about the first family that rather resembled a glossy magazine than a foreign policy channel. For example: Tweet #252 'Is @whitehouse dog Bo the most powerful dog in the world? He could be the cutest. Here he is, looking suitably proud'; or #2201: 'President Obama and the First Lady getting into the #Halloween spirit.' Barbara McMahon argues that this might be due the first family's life fascinating Americans, who expect them to reflect ordinary peoples' existence and dreams, which is especially true with the Obama family.¹⁰⁷⁴ Since this is different in Germany – for example chancellor Merkel and her husband decorating a Christmas tree does not seem very appealing – no such information appears.

5.3.3 Interaction and Inter-User Communication: At the Echo Chamber

While almost one third of Germany's posts were not moderated, this applied to only 1.35% of the U.S. page's posts. On average, roughly 15 words constituted a German post; an American one was almost three times as extensive with 40 words. As expected, interaction was not PD 2.0's main characteristic with Facebook generating more feedback than Twitter that was used like a traditional – monologue – broadcaster:

¹⁰⁷⁴ Barbara McMahon, "Ordinary People: The Middle Class Aspirations That Give the Obamas Their Appeal," *The Observer*, November 11, 2012, sec. World news, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/11/obama-ordinary-people-first-family>.

	Facebook Germany		Facebook USA	
	N=32	%	N=74	%
Question	6	18,75%	32	43,24%
Assertion	16	50,00%	28	37,84%
Quote	0	0,00%	10	13,51%
Quote + question	0	0,00%	1	1,35%
No moderation	9	28,13%	1	1,35%
Other	1	3,12%	2	2,70%
	Twitter Germany		Twitter USA	
	N=74	%	N=495	%
Question	3	4,05%	74	14,95%
Assertion	61	82,43%	352	71,11%
Quote	10	13,51%	69	13,94%

Figure 5-14: Type of Post / Tweet

While the German embassy rarely asked questions, the U.S. embassy page was more active: Questions accounted for 43.24% of the posts and 14.95% of the tweets. Most of these questions seemed, however, if not rhetorical then little more than a stylistic device: Only a few tweets but almost a third of the posts asked their audience to contribute / send in something / join a debate.

Still, neither the Facebook pages nor the Twitter feeds were used like a discussion forum or some sort of *global agora*, interaction with and also between users was truly limited: On Facebook, only 6.25% of the posts chronicled user-user interaction (Germany), it was more on the U.S. page (21.62%) where the embassy sometimes also replied to a user's comments (12.61%) but there rarely was even a user-user-embassy discussion (4.05% of the U.S. posts). Also, Twitter was rarely (7% of the U.S. tweets) if at all (Germany) used to connect users with each other through including them into the same tweet, for example. Even though Twitter allows for a vast potential of interaction possibilities, as the following graph will show, those remain almost untapped:

	Twitter Germany		Twitter USA	
	N=74	%	N=495	%
Retweet	20	27,03%	18	3,64%
German mediator organisation	14	18,92%	0	0,00%
USA mediator organisation	0	0,00%	10	2,02%
Broadcaster	4	5,41%	2	0,40%
of which German	1	1,35%	0	0,00%
of which USA	1	1,35%	1	0,20%
of which UK	2	2,70%	0	0,00%
Conversation	0	0,00%	20	4,04%
Individual user	0	0,00%	19	3,84%
Connect@	3	4,05%	200	40,40%
Germany mediator organisation	1	1,35%	0	0,00%
USA mediator organisation	0	0,00%	61	12,32%
UK political organisation	0	0,00%	18	3,64%
Mix of users	0	0,00%	35	7,07%
No Interactivity	51	68,92%	257	51,91%

Figure 5-15: Twitter Interactivity

On Twitter, only the U.S. page administrator rarely engaged in discussions with individual users (3.84%) and replied to their questions, which did not happen on the German feed. Still, 2.63% of its tweets led to web chats that invited users to a discussion. Germany mainly *retweeted* information of mediator organisations or other official German political entities, mostly @Regspreecher (the official government spokesperson Steffen Seibert) which constitutes an echo of the official position. The U.S. rarely retweeted others; almost two thirds of the content came from American mediator or national political organisations. The USAinUK account sometimes connected with others (40.4% of the tweets), mainly U.S. mediator organisations or domestic political entities that accounted for more than a quarter of the @s. The German feed only rarely connected with other users (4.05%). The comparison with an echo chamber – meaning that the same official stances are repeated over and over again – applies here as well.¹⁰⁷⁵

¹⁰⁷⁵ Heilprin, "Tweet This."

Feedback from the audience was in general very limited: Regarding the German Facebook account, just one post about a heavily stereotyped orderly German generated such huge feedback completely out of the ordinary that it distorted the findings, which is why the feedback is not addressed any further, especially since this metric has been found elusive in the previous chapters. For the sake of completeness, let us just notice that in general, the feedback ratio (likes, comments, shares) was below 1 per post. Melissen's two-way information flow, which engages with its audience, is absent in this context.¹⁰⁷⁶ Also, it is important to notice that any feedback generated, especially comments, constitute a random not necessarily representative sample of the (not necessarily) target public since anyone everywhere could become a fan or follower of the embassies' social media accounts. Also, we already discussed that anonymous online feedback tended to neglect social norms which derogates its value further.

A third point to be addressed subsequently is whether or not the social media pages are significantly entangled with the local media system in the UK.

5.3.4 Media Relations: 'Get the Message Out [?]'¹⁰⁷⁷

Media engagement is high on the USA's agenda: 'Work with posts to create media engagement plans based on detailed analysis of the environment and target audiences to shape stories early and effectively tailor the content of our messages.'¹⁰⁷⁸ Similarly, the German AKBP concept stresses the interaction with the media.¹⁰⁷⁹

While on Twitter, both embassies mainly shared links to homepages and rarely tweeted other media; on Facebook, the majority of U.S. posts were either videos or pictures, Germany mainly posted written broadcasting pieces. To which kind of sites did they refer? Mainly to their own communication channels as the following table will show:

¹⁰⁷⁶ Melissen, "The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice," 13.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Holbrooke, "Get the Message out."

¹⁰⁷⁸ Office of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, *Public Diplomacy: Strengthening U.S. Engagement with the World. A Strategic Approach for the 21st Century*, 10.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Auswärtiges Amt - Kulturabteilung, "Auswärtige Kulturpolitik – Konzeption 2000" (Auswärtiges Amt), 6, accessed July 13, 2012, http://www.ifa.de/pdf/aa/akbp_konzeption2000.pdf.

	Facebook Germany		Facebook USA	
	N=32	%	N=74	%
Embassy site	7	21,88%	5	6,76%
Embassy social media	5	15,62%	8	10,81%
Mediator organisation	6	18,75%	14	18,92%
External	11	34,38%	40	54,05%
of which UK	7	21,88%	13	17,57%
Other	3	9,37%	7	9,46%

Figure 5-16: Website Referral on Facebook

On Facebook, almost all posts featured a link, one third of which was what the analysis has qualified as *other homepage* in both cases. The U.S. embassy rarely referred to its own website (6.76%) but rather posted external links (54.05%) that came partly from the UK (17.57%). The German embassy used its Facebook account to drive traffic to its home page or its mediator organisations / national political entities. External sites (as in not part of the public diplomacy realm) made 34.38% of the attachments, 21.88% of the total had a UK based extension code. Twitter presents a similar situation:

	Twitter Germany		Twitter USA	
	N=74	%	N=495	%
Embassy home page	26	35,13%	98	19,80%
Embassy social media	0	0,00%	40	8,08%
German mediator organisation	19	25,68%	0	0,00%
American mediator organisation	0	0,00%	199	40,20%
External site	21	28,38%	95	19,2%
of which German	8	10,81%	0	0,00%
of which USA	1	1,35%	45	9,10%
of which UK	11	14,86%	47	9,09%
Other	1	1,35%	1	0,2%
Other	27	36,49%	302	61,00%

Figure 5-17: Website Referral on Twitter

Traffic went mostly to the embassy home pages (Germany: 35.13%, U.S.: 19.8%) and mediator organisations or political entities (Germany: 25.68%, USA: 40.20%). External sites constituted almost a third of the German feed's links of which half came from the UK and roughly 20% of the links on the American feed of which half came from the UK.

On Twitter, 8.11% of the German and 12.53% of the American tweets had no attachment – slightly more than on Facebook. Both feeds focused on other homepages (56.76% Germany, 38.59% U.S.) with newspaper or magazine articles accounting for almost a third in total on the German side and not even 10% on the U.S. one. In second place came broadcaster pages. In contrast to Germany, the U.S. also frequently used images and videos (accounted for almost a third of the posts), making the content potentially more appealing. Noticeably, the U.S. recycled many press releases or statements on Twitter; Germany only rarely did so.

	Twitter Germany		Twitter USA	
	N=74	%	N=495	%
Broadcaster	20	27,03%	37	7,48%
Other home page	42	56,76%	191	38,59%
Video	2	2,70%	48	9,70%
Blogs	0	0,00%	24	4,84%
Press release	2	2,70%	68	13,74%
Web chat	0	0,00%	13	2,62%
No attachment	6	8,11%	62	12,53%
Other	2	2,70%	52	10,5%
	Facebook Germany		Facebook USA	
	N=32	%	N=74	%
Home page	10	31,25%	20	27,03%
Broadcaster	8	25,00%	11	14,86%
Images	3	9,38%	25	33,78%
Video	0	0,00%	26	35,14%
No attachment	2	6,25%	0	0,00%
Other	9	28,12%	1	1,25%

Figure 5-18: Media Shared on Facebook and Twitter¹⁰⁸⁰

Neither the U.S. nor the German embassy often retweeted UK broadcasting agencies or newspapers and even less by the U.S. They also only accounted for an insignificant fraction of @-connects. Actually, most media shared came from the *upmarket segment* for an educated audience (The Guardian, for example), that is, accurate quality press that provides hard news and comments, which are well separated as opposed to sensational journalism.¹⁰⁸¹ This brings us back to social media's elite-centrism and selectivity. Still, broadcasting pieces constitute a visible part of the attachments.

¹⁰⁸⁰ The U.S. embassy often included media of different types into one post. Since this analysis wanted to consider them all, those posts in question were counted multiple times, which is why the total does not equal 100% or 74 posts.

¹⁰⁸¹ Grout-Smith and Poberezhska, "UK Media - Innovation and Tradition."

Nevertheless, social media pages were barely entangled with the UK's media system and their weight in this context negligible, which (in addition to the digital divide addressed earlier on) probably further hampers their reach. They favour interaction with and foster their own partners, be it mediator organisations or other political entities. Having now underscored that indeed, PD 2.0 is a continuance of both countries' foreign policy traditions, this paper will now turn to reflecting on what difference all of this makes, especially since evaluation has – for numerous reasons laid out in chapter two and three – long been considered public diplomacy's Achilles' heel.¹⁰⁸²

Social media do not really produce relief even though software enables even the amateur to access back-end information as we discussed earlier.¹⁰⁸³ In absence of the social media page administrators' data, the following chapter will in addition to this rather consist in a general reflection on the effects of PD 2.0.

5.3.5 The Difference it Makes

In general diplomats struggle with social media and how they could be integrated into policy-making and strategy: '[M]any are clueless as to how something like Facebook can "be factored into strategic decisions."¹⁰⁸⁴ 'For all the hype and positive headlines, the State Department has yet to produce any tangible successes from its tech-based strategies, Morozov argues, noting that it's "enthusiasm for technology has surpassed its understanding of it."¹⁰⁸⁵ To evaluate, the first important thing to know is what the criteria is. This, however, often does not exceed the desire of increasing fans and the abstract 'reach more people,'¹⁰⁸⁶ as an employee of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation argues. Interviews showed that evaluation rarely went beyond anecdotic relevance and the firm believe in one's actions. Furthermore, social media users do not only represent a magnificently restricted part of the population, the actual followers or fans of a site do even more so. Also, only a few of those comment or interact, so data are not representative. Thus, the real benefit does not consist in analysing each page's or feed's data set individually but to create a

¹⁰⁸² Melissen, *Beyond the New Public Diplomacy*, 13.

¹⁰⁸³ Siri and Seßler, *Twitterpolitik. Politische Inszenierungen in einem neuen Medium*, 13.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Ziz Harvey, "Report on Public & Cultural Diplomacy: Wilton House July 2010 Conference Report," *Public and Cultural Diplomacy B. A Reflective Group Blog by Students on the Public and Cultural Diplomacy Module at London Metropolitan University*, June 5, 2011, <http://publicandculturaldiplomacyb.blogspot.com/2011/06/report-on-public-cultural-diplomacy.html>.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Comenetz, "Innovating Public Diplomacy For a New Digital World."

¹⁰⁸⁶ Employee of Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Interview.

broader picture through merging all sorts of data depending on the context, which is exactly what the State Department does with its resiliency capacity mentioned above.

So, what difference does PD 2.0 make? With regards to German efforts, the author's fieldwork revealed that the ministry did an evaluation in autumn 2011 of all the 36 Facebook pages that existed then. The author was specifically told that the list was not up to date as already mentioned above.¹⁰⁸⁷ While this evaluation does not go beyond counting likes, comments, shares and a very broad overall impression as well as monthly site clicks and trends, it provides an idea of what is going on.¹⁰⁸⁸ In addition to that, a verbal comment of roughly three sentences per pages synthesised the findings and provided information about the site's maintenance and evaluation.¹⁰⁸⁹

However, no evaluation of PD 2.0's general state is given. Also, these isolated data are hardly meaningful if not set in relation to others. For that matter – the author was told – external agencies were commissioned to provide comparative data.¹⁰⁹⁰ For the time being, the responsible referee at the Foreign Office is generally kept updated on the situation in the foreign country as well as public diplomacy including its 2.0 version through written reports. The verbal assessment that accompanied the quantitative assessment was also hardly more revealing: The German embassy to the UK's Facebook page is '[a] really well maintained site that is bilingual [...]. This translates into the corresponding numbers. The post could occasionally be better introduced / commented by the staff when posted.'¹⁰⁹¹ Unfortunately, more evaluation does not take place even though the author was told that the Foreign Office was looking into the matter.

Another detail is really interesting in this respect: When the author asked for a breakdown of public diplomacy funds per country, she was advised not to use the numbers the Foreign Office had provided her with. The reason was that the documents' accuracy and meaningfulness was in doubt.¹⁰⁹²

¹⁰⁸⁷ Rory MacLean, Interview, October 13, 2010.

¹⁰⁸⁸ Auswärtiges Amt, "Auswertung Facebookauftritte der Auslandsvertretungen."

¹⁰⁸⁹ Auswärtiges Amt, "Auswertung und generelle Beurteilung der Facebookauftritte der Auslandsvertretungen."

¹⁰⁹⁰ Diplomat 3, Off-the-record conversation.

¹⁰⁹¹ Author's translation of: Eine sehr gut gepflegte Seite, die ebenfalls zweisprachig geführt wird. Dies schlägt sich in den entsprechenden Zahlen nieder. Die Beiträge könnten bisweilen noch öfter anmoderiert sein. Auswärtiges Amt, "Auswertung und generelle Beurteilung der Facebookauftritte der Auslandsvertretungen."

¹⁰⁹² "Länderaufstellung Mittel AKBP," May 3, 2011.

Furthermore, German diplomats come from all sorts of academic backgrounds (for example law, business, and economics) and were not always introduced to political and intercultural communication.¹⁰⁹³ The German Foreign Office offers a limited amount of trainings for interested members of staff with external experts to foster understanding for social media especially amongst older diplomats who are often rather reluctant and sceptical towards these tools.¹⁰⁹⁴ The Federal Foreign Office eventually hosted in-house presentations by external speakers about social media in the context of diplomacy. Also, everyone employed at the referee and staffer level who is supposed to work in an embassy's press department or similar divisions gets a special training that also includes the use of social media.¹⁰⁹⁵

In the United States, the public diplomacy department allegedly suffers from issues such as a very generalist formation of the diplomats and understaffed divisions.¹⁰⁹⁶ Also, public diplomacy seems no particularly attractive career path.¹⁰⁹⁷ With regards to assessment, *Foggy Bottom* disposes of its very own *Evaluation and Measurement Unit*.¹⁰⁹⁸ The latter was unfortunately not available for further questioning. Therefore, a detailed analysis regarding the possible impacts of American PD 2.0 needs to be left to future research. Still, other scholars have some interesting thoughts on the matter: Eric Abdullateef finds fault with no official guidelines being available on how to operate in today's communication environment and how to evaluate communication campaigns coming from the U.S. government.¹⁰⁹⁹ The contribution to a data pool that feeds the resiliency capacity on real-time monitoring that flows into policy briefings is already a substantial use. Evaluation in the sense of how a message was received by the public is only of secondary concern since – at least in the U.S. case – data gathering is a beneficial outcome of the social media efforts.

While no tangible information about PD 2.0's effects can be provided, let us now reflect on whether PD 2.0 could have other benefits such as leading to popularise statecraft. This might be a real benefit of sharing political issues via social media: It introduces political issues to the mainstream as in making certain positions and information much more easily accessible; as

¹⁰⁹³ See for example: Diplomat 3, Off-the-record conversation; Diplomat 7, Off-the-record conversation.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Diplomat 2, Off-the-record conversation.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Diplomat 5, Off-the-record conversation.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Government Accountability Office as quoted in: Waller, *The Public Diplomacy Reader*, 403.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Diplomat 1, Off-the-record conversation, December 3, 2009.

¹⁰⁹⁸ U.S. Department of State, "Evaluation and Measurement Unit."

¹⁰⁹⁹ Abdullateef, "USAID's First Public Engagement Campaign: Measuring Public Engagement," 15.

already discussed social media has increasingly become an element of everyday life. The stories are presented in a format the user is already familiar with and – provided that it really runs through the news feed in the case of Facebook – appear on the screen without requiring the user to do anything besides checking the social media service’s home feed. As already mentioned above, Facebook works increasingly as a ‘web within the web’¹¹⁰⁰ with especially younger generations spending considerable amounts of their free time on Facebook. It might for those become a first point of reference to look up information.

Twitter operates more and more as an additional news channel, giving access to first-hand information from all over the world: Researcher at the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology’s Department of Computer Science have performed an extensive study of Twitter and found that 67.6% of the users were not followed by any of the users they followed themselves, leading the scientists to hypothesise that they used Twitter to gather information rather than to interact socially.¹¹⁰¹ While the previous chapter has shown that interaction was limited and that mostly own content was shared, there was nevertheless interaction with national newspapers. Indeed, when @connecting with someone, especially a broadcaster, content or a following potential discussion (the official tweets and posts mostly repeat the official position) may be picked up by journalists that use social media increasingly as sources. Also, it raises awareness since newspapers can see when someone shares their content.

However, similar things could also be said about Deutsche Welle TV or other formats that are not less accessible, and, if one believes research studies, TV is not less popular than the Internet as already discussed above – quite to the contrary.¹¹⁰² The Internet is, however, surrounded by a hipster-ish, cutting-edge aura and affords a welcome opportunity to distance oneself ‘from the unfortunate perception that diplomacy is an inaccessible, disengaged, bureaucratic thing.’¹¹⁰³ On a similar note, Susan Glasser reckons that Hillary ‘Clinton gets big points for style and for taking her brand of “people to people” diplomacy international at a time when America desperately

¹¹⁰⁰ Laird, “Want Half-Off Facebook Ads? Keep Users On-Site.”

¹¹⁰¹ Haewoon Kwak et al., *What Is Twitter, a Social Network or a News Media?* (Daejeon: Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, 2010), <http://an.kaist.ac.kr/~haewoon/papers/2010-www-twitter.pdf>.

¹¹⁰² “Television in Mexico: Channelling Public Anger,” *The Economist*, July 7, 2012.

¹¹⁰³ Bluestein, “Dude, This Diplomat’s No Stiff.”

needed just her kind of star power to revive an image tarnished by a near decade of George W. Bush's cowboy unilateralism.¹¹⁰⁴ But is this kind of *rebranding* necessarily a good thing?

The following controversy provides a telling example: German hip hop artist Bushido who cultivates a bad boy image changed his Twitter profile picture to a map of Israel in the colours of the Palestinian flag titled 'Free Palestine'. The Israeli embassy in Berlin replied via Twitter: '@bushido78: Erst Frauen, dann Schwule, nun #Israel: Wir sind stolz darauf, zu den Opfern des Integrationspreisgewinners #Bushido zu gehören.'¹¹⁰⁵ This raises the question whether it is really productive to engage in such discussions in the first place. On another occasion, the embassy quoted Hugh Hefner, founder of the adult magazine Playboy, tweeting: 'Hugh Hefner: "Der Playboy und Israel teilen die selben Werte." <http://ow.ly/inBvq> #Israel #Playboy,'¹¹⁰⁶ commemorating the launch of the magazine's Israeli edition.¹¹⁰⁷ Praising and comparing a country to an adult magazine seems rather odd for a diplomatic mission.

Still, broadcasting through social media can create some sort of elusive transparency about how diplomacy works, countering stereotypes the metier is often associated with such as '[c]ocktail parties, foreign dignitaries, expense accounts'¹¹⁰⁸ that are according to one of the author's sources still wide-spread.¹¹⁰⁹ 'These [insights] may not be sexy or glamorous, but they provide useful insight into day-to-day diplomatic activity and expose policy statements to casual users not likely to seek out or come across official communications,'¹¹¹⁰ Alexis Wichowski confirms. Social media can also expand traditional – not necessarily public – diplomacy's toolbox: The United States' mission to China operates a Twitter account @BeijingAir through which it informs every

¹¹⁰⁴ Susan B. Glasser, "Head of State," *Foreign Policy*, no. July/August (2012), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/2012/06/18/Head_of_State.

¹¹⁰⁵ Author's translation: First women, then gays, now Israel: We are proud to count amongst the victims of Bushido, the winner of Germany's price for integration.' "Bushido sät Hass laut Innenminister Friedrich," *SPIEGEL ONLINE*, January 14, 2013, sec. Kultur, <http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/bushido-saet-hass-laut-innenminister-friedrich-israel-tweetert-zurueck-a-877384.html>; IsraelinGermany, "Botschaft Israel: @bushido78," Twitter Page, @IsraelinGermany, (January 12, 2013), <https://twitter.com/IsraelinGermany/statuses/290173634369187840>.

¹¹⁰⁶ Author's translation: Playboy and Israel share core values. IsraelinGermany, "Botschaft Israel: Hugh Hefner," Twitter Page, @IsraelinGermany, (March 5, 2013), <https://twitter.com/IsraelinGermany/status/308962899643224064>.

¹¹⁰⁷ Niv Elis, "Hugh Hefner: Playboy and Israel Share Core Values," *The Jerusalem Post*, May 3, 2013, sec. Israel News, <http://www.jpost.com/NationalNews/Article.aspx?id=305370>.

¹¹⁰⁸ Eva Holland, "The Life of a Diplomat," February 18, 2008, <http://matadornetwork.com/notebook/the-life-of-a-diplomat/>.

¹¹⁰⁹ Diplomat 5, Off-the-record conversation.

¹¹¹⁰ Alexis Wichowski, "Social Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs*, April 6, 2013, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139134/alexis-wichowski/social-diplomacy?page=show>.

hour about the air in China's capital that is notoriously polluted. While this angers Chinese authorities, the responsible diplomats play innocent and continue to do so, with the intention of putting pressure on the local government.¹¹¹¹

Let us now turn to a third aspect, namely whether or not PD 2.0 has the potential to induce a substantial change for public diplomacy. Do social media alter the way public diplomacy is operationalised in general, meaning that unofficial actors are integrated into decision-making processes or asked for advice? It does not seem that way. No government will seriously address its (or a foreign) public to ask for advice on how to do statecraft.¹¹¹² 'In the days of the old diplomacy it would have been regarded as an act of unthinkable vulgarity to appeal to the common people upon any issue of international policy,'¹¹¹³ Sir Harold Nicolson wrote in 1939. This may have been for a reason: How could the Foreign Office include citizens or other interest groups into its decision-making processes? Those issues are mostly tremendously complex and only a few people dispose of sufficient knowledge and capacities to really grasp the matters, especially since decisions are often based on classified information that is understood as such for a reason. Also, they are often embedded into a wider context that does not open up just like that, which is where the benefits of representative democracy come into play: The government was – in the ideal case – democratically elected to take certain decisions for the public. Which legitimacy would an individual or a randomly selected group of social media users have without the people's backing to interfere with national affairs? How could they be made accountable if one disagrees? This supports James Curran's stance on the limitations of online dialogue between governments and citizens: 'Citizens' inputs are often disconnected from real structures of decision making; citizens tend not to take part in these consultations partly for this reason; also, communication is often one-sided, limited to the government presenting services and their use.'¹¹¹⁴ Jürgen Habermas offers additional insights that explain the dilemma:

Of course, these [public] opinions must be given shape in the form of decisions by democratically constituted decision-making bodies. The responsibility for practically consequential decisions must be based in an institution. Discourses do not govern.

¹¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹¹² Diplomat 5, Off-the-record conversation.

¹¹¹³ Sir Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy* (London: Taylor & Francis, 1939), 168.

¹¹¹⁴ Curran, "Reinterpreting the Internet," 13.

They generate a communicative power that cannot take the place of administration but can only influence it. This influence is limited to the procurement and withdrawal of legitimation. Communicative power cannot supply a substitute for the systematic inner logic of public bureaucracies.¹¹¹⁵

The integration of public opinion into foreign affairs presents indeed inherent deficiencies.

Since PD 2.0's impact can for now not be assessed, this study would like to suggest a couple of ideas for future research that came about while doing this investigation, shifting the focus from PD 2.0's effects to this dissertation's results. First, an all-encompassing analysis of the totality of German social media sites and feeds over an extended period of time seems useful to confirm the statements made: Are they all limited with regards to content and interaction? Do they also focus on legitimising policy? This undertaking should certainly be performed with an appropriate software tool to make the resulting data deluge manageable. Second, to get to grips with PD 2.0, it seems crucial to develop taxonomies (similar to Daniel Ostrowski's work already quoted) enumerating all the instruments a government uses, including the level of interactivity, the time frame with concrete ideas about how to evaluate. Also, clear goals should be stated beforehand; indeed, a strategy would be of tremendous help. Third, targeted and more structured interviews with ambassadors and other relevant actors such as the press officers at participating embassies could shed additional light on the issue, especially including those sceptical about PD 2.0. Fourth, the importance of Cull's *listening* aspect raises the question if PD 2.0 may not get closer to spycraft than to actual (public) diplomacy. Further exploring this aspect seems worthwhile.

Fifth, this dissertation has more or less neglected the users (fans and followers). Who are they? Age, sex, socio-cultural background and location could be interesting aspects to uncover. What motivates them to follow embassy pages? And how often as well as on which occasions do they access the pages? What is their stance on the pages' performance? Which kind of content are they most interested in, which aspects could be marginalised? Do privacy violations, untruthfulness of Facebook or data protection concerns influence their online behaviour? Also, a network analysis about if, and if so, how, the content is shared could be interesting. Further investigating news agencies in the host countries to see whether or not they tend to check the

¹¹¹⁵ Jürgen Habermas, "Further Reflections on the Public Sphere," in *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, ed. Craig J. Calhoun, Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), 452.

embassy accounts to get additional insights into national events might be interesting, too. Furthermore, who are the actors that bundle and lead discussions? And in which capacity would that be? The dissertation has shown how individuals such as Hillary Clinton and Alec Ross or Guido Westerwelle have apparently a substantial impact on the advancement of instruments and concepts like PD 2.0. Further research should inquire which positions are exactly pivotal and if so, because of which characteristics – since this paper could unfortunately not extensively study power relations within both Ministries of Foreign Affairs. The other actors relevant in this policy should also be considered, meaning an encompassing study of, for example, all actors involved in German PD 2.0 including the Goethe Institute, DAAD, and Deutsche Welle etc. Furthermore, it might be interesting to uncover whether political events in the foreign country, conflicts with the host country or other incidents would increase traffic on sites to see whether the social media pages may have become an additional news channel or place to find undistorted first-hand information.

5.4 Conclusion: Why They Do It? ‘Because We Have to’¹¹¹⁶

In chapter five, the hypotheses developed from the theoretical chapters 2, 3 and 4 were confirmed. Compared to the established works of the U.S., German PD 2.0 appears to be in its infancy. It disposes of much fewer resources and has been lacking a strategic framework so far.¹¹¹⁷ Thus, its PD 2.0 is less sophisticated and less aligned with general foreign policy and public diplomacy tenets. Since German public diplomacy does not follow a clear code of practice, PD 2.0 leads to inconsistencies between the national doctrines and their implementation. As is common in Europe, Germany’s cultural policy has also a longer tradition than that of the U.S. where it is episodically revived and cut back depending on international politics.¹¹¹⁸ While the Auswärtiges Amt uses social media exclusively to engage with publics, the U.S. has not only developed a social media knowledge management system, it has also been monitoring online conversations.

Both countries’ different mission and history – the recovery from World War II and orientation difficulties after the reunification and the role of moral leader and superpower respectively – significantly shape German and U.S. public diplomacy (2.0). Germany aims at restoring its credibility and refrains from professional PR designs; its leitmotifs are culture and overcoming

¹¹¹⁶ Foreign & Commonwealth Office, “What Is Digital Diplomacy?”.

¹¹¹⁷ Diplomat 5, Off-the-record conversation.

¹¹¹⁸ Gregory, “American Public Diplomacy: Enduring Characteristics, Elusive Transformation,” 362.

prejudices related to its role during World War II. The United States, in contrast, presents its audience with integrated strategic approaches and aims at spreading its worldview.

This cross-national case study has moreover shown the paramount role of institutions, which paved the paths both governments are taking. The rules coming from State and the AA respectively are a product of different histories and experiences with communication: While *Foggy Bottom* stresses decentralisation and encourages its employees to go digital, the German approach focuses on coherence and subjects its social media communication to strict rules. While Germany disposes of very rigid privacy and copyright regulations that prevent government agencies from using the information, the U.S. has a far more relaxed approach towards the issue and bases its strategy analyses partly on it.

PD 2.0 still is all about the state. Since public diplomacy is an instrument to sway power, it is thus extremely unlikely for states to use it to empower other groups. Interaction (more frequent on the U.S. sites than the German ones, but still) and extensive engagement are not the undertaking's actual goal. Policy legitimisation through rhetoric strategies such as othering and persuasion played a significant role when communicating through social media.

This case study revealed furthermore that PD 2.0 is not an innovative concept but reproduces the common criticism that foreign affairs broadcasting is often faced with (elitism, regionalism, and simplification).¹¹¹⁹ The actors centred on were mainly official statesmen; most events presented were middle class targeted and took place in London. Only limited exchange with local media systems could be observed, political actors mainly talked to each other. Their communication appears to happen in an echo chamber more than in a global agora. Current international affairs such as the Tobin tax discussions barely featured. Complex background surrounding the stories discussed was faded out. This might be due to PD 2.0 being restrained content-wise – it lies in the nature of diplomats not to voice an opinion deviating from the government they represent; recurring themes are the content of choice.

Unfortunately, effects could not be assessed since no evaluation framework exists; a general reflection of whether PD 2.0 might potentially popularise statecraft was answered to the

¹¹¹⁹ Hafez, *Mythos Globalisierung*, 46–56.

negative. It could, however, serve to expand the diplomat's toolbox, offering an additional channel for communication.

Also, both Foreign Offices are perceived differently by the public: While the State Department managed to position itself as a cutting-edge, modern and technology embracing actor, Germany's stance could not be more different: Barely present in discussions on the topic, it follows the United States' leadership. Retired German Federal Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle is also said not to be technology's biggest fan, which is why the expansion of the latter is allegedly low on the agenda.

All these results compiled, we can conclusively answer the question whether or not the rise of social media substantially altered the practice of public diplomacy to the negative.

6 CONCLUSION: ‘LOST IN CYBERSPACE’¹¹²⁰

How do you reconcile P[ublic] D[iplomacy]’s apparent conservatism and reticence and the inherent nature of social networks which are not elite centred but social and democratic? It is a horned dilemma.

Ziz Harvey (2011)¹¹²¹

The dissertation has reaffirmed public diplomacy as an instrument of power, primarily destined to strengthen a state’s might. It also showed academic difficulties to theorize the concept since it disposes of an eclectic scientific background and is subjected to various influences ranging from propaganda to cultural relations. This instance also explains the extensive theoretical part, deemed crucial, for all these areas work with various rationalities and had to be reconstructed in order to build on them in the empirical section. While academia defines public diplomacy as an honest dialogue transmitting a realistic, multi-layered image of the home country, engaging with its audience, its social media operationalisation turns out to be pretty much the opposite: Manipulative, one-dimensional monologue-style discussion. For now, PD 2.0 seems far from the ideals *the new diplomacy* proclaims, namely a two-way information flow that engages the public.¹¹²² Also, governments have yet to display tangible results generated from the use of PD 2.0 to further underscore its validity. Additionally, social analytics cannot offer reliable numbers since they are not only ethically controversial but also methodologically flawed.

Furthermore, social media’s premises clash with those of (public) diplomacy: While social media evolve with velocity, Foreign Offices and legislation cannot follow because of their strong public administration hierarchies that need to carefully review everything and above all respect the government position. “Move fast and break things” may be a good motto for Silicon Valley, but it is a poor prescription for politics,¹¹²³ the Economist notes. This is especially true for the tremendously hierarchic organisation that is the German Federal Foreign Office. As a result, PD 2.0 is barely mentioned if at all in public and cultural diplomacy strategy papers; one of the author’s sources stated bluntly that up to this point no true digital concept existed. Even though

¹¹²⁰ Will McCants, “Lost in Cyberspace,” *Foreign Policy*, December 10, 2012,

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/12/10/lost_in_cyberspace?wp_login_redirect=0.

¹¹²¹ Harvey, “Report on Public & Cultural Diplomacy: Wilton House July 2010 Conference Report.”

¹¹²² Melissen, “The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice,” 13.

¹¹²³ “Processing Power,” *The Economist*, March 30, 2013.

the U.S. embed social media into a wider strategy aligned with its foreign policy and public diplomacy doctrine, State is also struggling with integrating social media into public diplomacy without compromising the broadcasting of a uniform message: Rogue diplomats spark controversy and keeping the audience at bay has proven to be difficult. These differences underline how the U.S. favours autonomous and seemingly liberal communication while the German approach demands national coherence, which substantially restricts the PD 2.0 undertaking.

Also, social media are limited in reach and based on weak ties. They are not necessarily prone to build new relations, but rather to strengthen the networks of those who were already connected. They spread mainly *soft news* and omit complex subjects as well as lengthy background information. Often, social media sites are operated by third party entities and to a great extent guided by (commercial) self-interests. On top of that, governments, secret services and other organisations increasingly abuse them, which has led to major trust issues on the users' side. This potentially obstructs their use for diplomacy in the future. Analysing communication on the meta-level further revealed that legitimising policy was high on the agenda. The U.S. exploited the accumulated data for network analyses, opinion monitoring and policy briefings amongst other things.

This chapter's catchy title was taken from a Foreign Policy article¹¹²⁴ and hits the nail on the head: 'As an official "tweep" you have to avoid simply repeating the official line. Engaging in dialogue is valuable. The default mode should be to interact, not just to transmit.'¹¹²⁵ British ambassador to Amman Peter Millet points out. This study has shown, however, that exactly the contrary is happening. PD 2.0's operationalisation confirms the allegations made in chapter 3: Therefore it does not provide the framework for *engagement* for which it is often hailed. The sites mainly share information and communicate with their peers like other embassies or mediator organisations – in fact, communication environment very much resembles an echo chamber; the social media sites in question were hardly integrated into the host country's media system.

¹¹²⁴ Mccants, "Lost in Cyberspace" The title refers to a 1960s TV series entitled "Lost in Space"; "Lost in Space (TV Series 1965–1968)," *Internet Movie Data Base*, 2013, <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0058824/>.

¹¹²⁵ Millet, "Twiplomacy."

Moreover, Nicholas J. Cull explains that the embassies forget that strategic diplomatic orientation is not necessarily in line with the audience's intention when accessing social media sites, which are used for casual communication whereas (public) diplomacy conveys substantial and challenging content.¹¹²⁶ 'In this world the worst error is to be irrelevant and the fastest route to irrelevance is for a public diplomacy actor to assume that its interests match those of the audience,'¹¹²⁷ he reckons. This confirms blogger Robin Brown's allegations that U.S. PD 2.0 'conflates the fact that there are a growing number of international broadcasters with the claims that they a) actually have an audience b) that there is an effect on the audience, and c) that effect is antithetical to US interests; [...] the audience for these channels is small, elite and selective.'¹¹²⁸ The fact that teenagers decreasingly use Facebook and resort to more private and selective messenger services like WhatsApp underscores that users and diplomats are on different pages.¹¹²⁹

Besides, the intention of including the audience into political processes seems rather questionable in the first place: The public is a random mass that may or may not possess an understanding of the matters in question. Also, the digital realm reproduces real-world power structures; it tends to exclude the less wealthy, disabled and otherwise marginalised groups of society: 'Researchers in Germany report that e-petitions are mostly created by the same well-educated males who create and sign paper ones.'¹¹³⁰ This emphasises how social media did not induce fundamental changes to statecraft. Diplomacy is still (and always may be) a secretive elite business; foreign policy is still made top-down behind closed doors while social media is based on representative decisions taken bottom-up. Philip Seib concludes that 'in an official environment, tools such as blogs might be *too* egalitarian, appearing to level the policymaking playing field when, in reality, hierarchies are very much still in place. Creating and implementing foreign policy is only partly a democratic process, and communication practices that seem to indicate

¹¹²⁶ Cull, "The Long Road to Public Diplomacy 2.0: The Internet in U.S. Public Diplomacy," 25.

¹¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹¹²⁸ Robin Brown, "Hillary Clinton on International Broadcasting," *Public Diplomacy, Networks and Influence*, March 5, 2011, <http://pdnetworks.wordpress.com/2011/03/05/hilary-clinton-on-international-broadcasting/>.

¹¹²⁹ Parmy Olson, "Teenagers Say Goodbye to Facebook and Hello to Messenger Apps," *The Observer*, November 10, 2013, sec. Technology, <http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/10/teenagers-messenger-apps-facebook-exodus>.

¹¹³⁰ "Processing Power."

otherwise can be unhelpful.¹¹³¹ Digital tools are thus still far from materialising into a Utopian's dream of direct democracy. Instead, they might support the undertaking by giving citizens the opportunity to educate themselves through vast information and experts an extensive range of numbers to crunch.¹¹³²

Praising a *digital turn* seems therefore premature. In line with historical institutionalism, institutions – be it national legislation or internal rules and history – keep a firm grip on the actors in question, limiting their scope of action. The dissertation has confirmed the importance of the national context provided by the state that enacts its traditional role in international relations by guiding its administrations' actions. Both the U.S. and German approaches to PD 2.0 are perfectly consistent with the countries' foreign policy and public diplomacy tradition in particular; their public administrations' path-dependency was confirmed.

The U.S. tries to further enforce its national interest through expanding its power base, understanding politics as a zero sum game and protecting its security. It considers the digital realm to be just another area wherein it must defend its stakes. A post-9/11 feeling of vulnerability and security maximisation, aiming at *winning back hearts and minds*, drives the U.S. endeavour. It is also more strategic by nature, embedded in a wider concept since the U.S. has less scruples applying strategic communications to foreign policy. The German approach, on the other hand, refuses such a take, which is partly due to the country's history and negative experiences with propaganda especially during World War II. Present-day Germany distances itself from its past through *regaining credibility* and makes an on-going effort to readjust its foreign policy after reunification. Civilian power Germany is driven by promoting values and therefore abstaining from a professionalised communication approach to public diplomacy; the Federal Republic wants to avoid the demonised concept of propaganda at all costs.

This translated into respective institutional backgrounds that operationalise both countries' approaches to politics: Data protection and copyright law in Germany as well as the Smith-Mundt act in the U.S. were paramount in this respect. Institutional rules emanating from the respective Foreign Offices substantially guided the operationalisation of PD 2.0 in line with each country's self-understanding.

¹¹³¹ Seib, *Real-Time Diplomacy*, 108.

¹¹³² "Processing Power."

One can conclude that PD 2.0, at least for now, seems to be just another form of doing international relations under the same premises as always. For PD 2.0 to be a different approach to statecraft, it needs to live up to what it preaches: Openness, inclusion, and reciprocity. Simply characterising public diplomacy as such will not transform it. ‘The danger – as with any re-branding or re-labelling – is that the product or behavior behind the label does not change [...]. As ever, we travel in hope.’¹¹³³

¹¹³³ Nicholas J. Cull, “Engagement Is the New Public Diplomacy or the Adventures of a Euphemism of a Euphemism,” *PD News – CPD Blog*, accessed October 30, 2011, http://uspublicdiplomacy.org/index.php/newswire/cpdblog_detail/engagement_is_the_new_public_diplomacy/.

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ANNEXE

Codebook Facebook¹¹³⁴

Category	Characteristic	Code	Description	Example
Formal Coding Units (Important: The variables forming the system of analysis need to be disjoint, exhausted and precise.) ¹¹³⁵				
Post ID	German Embassy	1xxx	First, it is important to assign an ID to every post with ascending consecutive numbers to make them easily identifiable within the data set. A post by the German embassy generally starts with a 1, one by the U.S. embassy with a 2, followed by a consecutive number. The first number assigns the post to the Facebook page in question, starting with the less recent date in October, so in general the 1st or 2nd. To avoid confusion with the subsequent coding, a hashtag is put in front.	German post: #11, #12,...#19,#110...#1nn
	American Embassy	2xxx		U.S. post: #21, #22...29, 210... #2nn
Tag			To avoid confusion, up to 6 key words featured in the post in question describing its content are noted down as an additional security measure, destined to briefly summarise what the post is about.	#266: Opening new virtual US embassy Teheran
Code date	Available	dd.mm.yy	This code refers to the coding date. This is highly important since the administrator may have changed the Facebook page in-between. This will follow the model: Year Month Day (yy mm	16 01 12

¹¹³⁴ Only the categories deemed most relevant for the analysis were actually discussed within the dissertation's framework; the same applies to Twitter.

¹¹³⁵ Diekmann, *Empirische Sozialforschung*, 576–598.

¹¹³⁶ In general only few feedback is given after the posting occurred (applies to this dissertation's sample as well), which is why a later coding date should not be a problem; Vadim Lavrusik, "Is Sharing More Valuable for Publishers on Facebook or Twitter?," *Mashable*, March 25, 2011, <http://mashable.com/2011/03/25/facebook-twitter-clicks-per-share/>.

			dd). ¹¹³⁶	
Post date	Available	dd.mm.yy	This code refers to the date the post appeared on the Facebook wall. This is relevant to connect it to political events. Follow the model: Year Month Day (yy mm dd). ¹¹³⁷	16 11 11
	Not available	99	Due to problems during data saving, happens not to be available anymore	See post #228
Post time	Available	hh:mm	At which times was the post made? This information normally appears below the post next to the date. Due to the author saving the data in a different time zone (GMT+1), the time needs to be adapted (time shown calculated -1).	10:21 becomes 09:21
	Not available	99	Due to problems during data saving, dates happen not to be available anymore	See post #130
WORDS (Number of words)	Counts number of words the post excluding the attachment is composed of. Counting words seems more convenient and tangible than signs. This provides information about the extent and complexity of the communication. Are posts moderated or rather not? If so, how long are the statements made? Also, the American diplomats can communicate in their mother tongue English while German officials have to express themselves in a foreign language. Thus, the analysis will barely focus on linguistic details. (Facebook only since a tweet is restricted to 140 characters anyway.) A sequence of letters and or numbers without a space is considered a word. Include numbers; each number is a word and not each digit. Count signs such as '+' or '&' as one word. Abbreviations resulting from colloquial speech such as 'don't' are counted as two words. Refers to 'moderation' part only. If no moderation, put 0. Exclude hyperlinks. If someone else's status is shared or a photo album set up by the embassy, count all words belonging to description visible on the page. Other structural characteristics seem of little relevance since Facebook fan pages and Twitter feeds are all similarly designed, leaving little creative room for manoeuvre.			#251: 24
	Not available	99	Not available due to incorrect data saving.	See post #250

¹¹³⁷ Rössler, *Inhaltsanalyse*, 151.

Content Related Coding Units				
ABOUT	Germany	1	The content is somehow related to Germany, features information about it, nationals abroad etc.	#111: 'For breaking news about Germany, follow us on Twitter'
	United States	2	The content is somehow related to the United States, features information about it, nationals abroad etc.	#22: 'It's exactly one year to go until the next Presidential election.'
	Other	99	The post is not (at least partly) about the home country.	n/a
BILREL (Bilateral Relations)	Anglo-German relations	1	Some posts may, in addition to their topic, touch the countries' relationship with the UK, be it regarding political or cultural issues. Since public diplomacy is supposed to be concerned with the relationship between the foreign power and the home country, it may be interesting to uncover whether PD 2.0 does address such topics. This will prove even more interesting since bilateral conflicts and / or common issues took place during the investigating period. Since some form of bilateral relations can also take place between the European Union, which Britain is a member of, this might be relevant to address – especially with regards to the Euro crisis. This addition is necessary since posts will be evaluated from the emitter's perspective. 'Euro crisis', the mention of politicians from both countries giving a joint statement could be examples.	#120: 'Cameron's Little Englanders need some German lessons.'
	Anglo-American relations	2	The post is concerned with bilateral relations between the United States and the UK, that talk about the attitude of one country towards the other or subjects that concern both countries' governments. The mention of politicians from both countries giving a joint statement or joint activities could be examples. Key words are 'Anglo-American', 'partnership' or 'cooperation'.	#257: 'The White House and Department of State have condemned "in the strongest terms" the storming of the British Embassy in Teheran...'

	No / other	99	Does not fit any of the above as in not related to bilateral relations with the UK.	#130: 'Good morning everybody, today we've got a new university highlight on our website for you: Take a look at Freie Universität Berlin!'
POSCON (Post Content)	Research & technology	100	Investigation of materials and resources to advance science through new conclusions or the verification of existing issues. If a post is somehow related to this category but does not fit any of the more specific ones, class under the general category. Since this dissertation aims at finding out whether the social media sites reflect both countries' respective foreign policy and public diplomacy doctrines, it is crucial to uncover which content is featured. Since PD 2.0 is rather cutting-edge with regards to technology (its users may be tech-savvy), it seemed of interest to investigate whether or not this sort of content is featured.	
	Natural sciences	110	New discoveries, space research	#269: 'Stop Press! NASA has found an Earth-like planet, Kepler-22b...'
	Technology / innovation	120	'The application of scientific knowledge for practical purposes, especially in industry.' ¹¹³⁸ In this case especially relevant to mobile and communication technology, apps etc.	#215: 'United States Embassy London, there's an app for that...'
	Education / careers	200	Since exchange programmes and foreign education are understood as one major pillar of cultural relations in Germany and its importance underscored in both countries' public diplomacy strategy papers (one goal of public diplomacy was to counter other countries' efforts to present their education system as appealing), it is relevant to uncover whether this also plays a role with regards to PD 2.0. This category also features job offers and other educational programmes. If a post is somehow related to a category but does not fit any of the more specific ones, class under the next available general category.	
	Careers	210	Job offers or advice on how to apply for a position. If somehow related to careers but does not fit into a more detailed category, put into the general one.	

¹¹³⁸ "Technology (noun)," Oxford Dictionaries (Oxford, New York [etc.]: Oxford University Press, April 2010), <http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/technology>.

	Job offers	211	Calls for applications	#113: 'Jobs at the Deutsche Schule London and the German-British Chamber of Industry & Commerce'.
	Career events such as fairs	212	Events for job seekers, the promotion of Germany as an attractive business location	#16: 'Think German Careers Fair'
	Higher education	220	About post-A-levels education (university studies, apprenticeships), excluding exchange programs.	
	Studying in Germany	221	Information about universities in Germany, studying in general such as entry requirements	#130: 'Good morning everybody, today we've got a new university highlight on our website for you: Take a look at Freie Universität Berlin!'
	Studying in the USA	222	Information about universities in the USA, studying in general such as entry requirements	#242: 'Are you interested in studying in the United States?'
	Studying in Britain	223	Information about universities in the USA, studying in general such as entry requirements	n/a
	School education	230	Information about primary and secondary educational. If a post is somehow related to this category but does not fit any of the more specific ones, class under the general category.	
	School in Germany	231	Information about schools in Germany, entry requirements, education facilities for kids	n/a
	School in the USA	232	Information about schools in the USA, entry requirements, education facilities for kids	#237: 'In 1860, three women living in Hartford, Connecticut organized a club where children could find a safe place and enjoy activities.'
	School in Britain	233	Information about schools in Britain, entry requirements, education facilities for kids	n/a
	Academic Exchange	240	Exchange restricted to students	n/a
	Professional exchange	250	Exchange restricted to specific professions	#213: 'U.S.-UK Fulbright teacher exchange'

	Culture	300	Understood as ‘the arts and other manifestations of human intellectual achievement regarded collectively [...or] the ideas, customs, and social behaviour of a particular people or society.’ ¹¹³⁹ Features news about respectively German and American exhibitions, food, music etc.; keywords are ‘art, exhibition, music, film’. If a post is somehow related to this category but does not fit any of the more specific ones, class under the general category. This sort of content remains one of the corner stones of public diplomacy, especially in Germany (Kulturnation!), and is also prominently featured in the strategy papers. The same applies to the U.S. that wants to increase foreign citizens’ familiarity with their country. How is it addressed?	
	Art	310	‘The expression or application of human creative skill and imagination, typically in a visual form such as painting or sculpture, producing works to be appreciated primarily for their beauty or emotional power.’ ¹¹⁴⁰ If a post is somehow related to this category but does not fit any of the more specific ones, class under the general category.	
	Movie (TV and cinema); cartoons	311	Refers to recorded moving images with sound	#112: BFI London Film Festival
	Literature / Poetry	312	Applies if the post is about writings such as books, public lectures given by writers of such content.	#128: ‘Love Berlin? Love books? Then this is something for you! Take part in our competition and win one of five copies of Hans Fallada’s most famous book “Alone in Berlin”’.
	Theatre	313	Acting in, preparing or directing plays or plays in general	#127: ‘Schaubühne goes Barbican!...’
	Music	314	Music performances or artists working in this sector	#129: ‘Hundreds are in town next Tuesday! More on their London concert here:’
	Painting / Installations, Other Performances	315	Applies to exhibitions in museums etc.	#12: ‘New Gerhard Richter exhibition opens tomorrow at Tate Modern.’

¹¹³⁹ Angus Stevenson, ed., “Culture (noun),” *Oxford Dictionary of English* (Oxford, New York [etc.]: Oxford University Press, 2010),

<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t140.e0196870>.

¹¹⁴⁰ “Art (noun),” *Oxford Dictionaries*, Oxford Dictionaries (Oxford, New York [etc.]: Oxford University Press, April 2010), <http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/art>.

	Radio Show	316	The broadcasting of sound programmes to the public	#117: 'Listen to part 1 of a three part series on the history of Germany on BBC Radio 4...'
	Food	320	Recipes, restaurant or product suggestions	#132: 'Got your German Christmas cake "Christstollen" yet? Find out more about this traditional delicacy.'
	Sports	330	Any physical activity organised by a sport federation. If a post is somehow related to this category but does not fit any of the more specific ones, class under the general category.	#26: "The Olympics is the biggest peace movement on earth" - We interview the World's Number One Archer, Brady Ellison...'
	American football	331	Refers to 'a kind of football played with an oval ball on a field marked out as a gridiron. Points are scored mainly through touchdowns and field goals. Each side has eleven players on the field at any time. In the US called simply football.' ¹¹⁴¹	#217: 'It's NFL week in the UK!...'
	Football (soccer)	332	Refers to 'a form of football played by two teams of eleven players with a round ball which may not be handled during play except by the goalkeepers.' ¹¹⁴²	#250: 'Congratulations to LA Galaxy and David Beckham, this year's Major League Soccer Champions...'
	Travel	340	Making a journey, especially to a foreign country as in the USA or Germany respectively, for the sake of it or to visit something in particular.	#131: 'Congratulations, Germany has been awarded "Best International Youth Destination"! And now, it's time to vote for a "TravelMeister"'
	Architecture / Construction	350	Refers to buildings, construction or housing projects.	#15: 'A monastery, one millennium in the making.'

¹¹⁴¹ "American Football (noun)," *Oxford Dictionaries*, Oxford Dictionaries (Oxford, New York [etc.]: Oxford University Press, April 2010),

[http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/American football](http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/American%20football).

¹¹⁴² "Soccer (noun)," *Oxford Dictionaries* (Oxford, New York [etc.]: Oxford University Press, April 2010), <http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/soccer>.

	Monarchy	360	About British Royals and their activities not related to politics.	#212: 'Welcome to California Prince Harry!'
	Customs	370	About national holidays, customs special to the home country. Other curious information and random anecdotes about the country that do not fit any other category.	#228: 'Here's President Obama and the First Lady getting into the Halloween spirit...'
	Politics	400	About '[t]he activities associated with the governance of a country or area, especially the debate between parties having power.' ¹¹⁴³ If a post is somehow related to this category but does not fit any of the more specific ones, class under the next available general category. Are political events in the home and guest country mentioned? This seems crucial for proving whether or not social media users are implicated into the political discourse. Does PD 2.0 address major political events affecting bilateral relations between the home and guest countries? Does it play an active part? Furthermore, this dissertation aims at uncovering whether conflict situations in bilateral relations are dealt with or rather not. Thus, this category is crucial in combination with the next one.	
	Domestic Affairs	410	Concerned with national issues depending on the country in question.	
	Germany	411	Concerns Germany only: Legislation, politics, health policy etc.	#118: REGIERUNGonline
	USA	412	Concerns the U.S. only: Legislation, politics, health policy etc.	#218: 'President Obama has set the goal of giving 80% of Americans access to high-speed rail within 25 years...'
	Foreign Affairs	420	Concerned with foreign policy issues as in strategic dealings with other nations.	#268: 'Michael Douglas talks diplomacy'
	Germany	421	Germany's strategy towards other countries.	n/a
	USA	422	US strategy towards other countries, conflicts such as the war in Iraq or Afghanistan.	#273: '... A small group of American soldiers will begin the final march out of Iraq...'
	UK	423	UK foreign policy choices towards other nations.	n/a

¹¹⁴³ "Politics (noun)," *Oxford Dictionaries*, Oxford Dictionaries (Oxford, New York [etc.]: Oxford University Press, April 2010), <http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/politics>.

	Development	424	Supporting other less wealthy countries with money or knowledge.	#245: '...USDA Agricultural Advisor Gary Solseth has been working with farmers of Arghandab District, Kandahar Province...'
	Global	425	Concerned with global issues such as health or cyber security. These issues are of a general nature and concern all countries since they deal for example with world infrastructure.	#259: 'The goal of an AIDS-free generation may be ambitious, but it is possible'
	Military/Army	430	Concerned with entities belonging to the military such as the marines, veterans or the Bundeswehr respectively.	#239: 'Today is veteran's day...'
	Economics	500	Information about macro-economic issues. If a post is somehow related to this category but does not fit any of the more specific ones, class under the next available general category. These aspects are important to consider since the euro-zone crisis put a strain on Anglo-German relations during the investigation period. With regards to the U.S., the employment situation as well as economic growth played an important role in national politics, especially since presidential elections were to take place in 2012. Also, the U.S. opposed the Tobin tax. Are these issues addressed?	
	Euro crisis	510	Concerned with the European debt crisis, features information about bailout, legislation etc.	#14: 'Can Merkel save bailout plans?'
	Economic cycle	520	Concerned with national, global or foreign domestic economic cycles and growth rates.	n/a
	Employment data	530	Concerned with national employment rates and the employment situation.	n/a
	Other	999	Even though the codebook has been inductively created, there might be doubts about a post's content or it might address a topic that is so particular and rare that it does not make sense to create a category for it.	#111: 'For breaking news about Germany, don't forget you can follow us on Twitter.'

EVELOC (Event location)	Does the post refer to an event or other occurrence? If so, where does it take place? This aspect is relevant to confirm whether or not PD 2.0 can be considered promoting regionalism and focussing on urban elites as mentioned above. This should help to uncover if the pages promote events in the home country or rather in Britain. Should they take place in Britain, where exactly? A distinction between London ¹¹⁴⁴ and the rest of it could help to show if references are geographically diverse and not exclusively targeted at an elite / part of the population. Furthermore, the location does not (necessarily) refer to the subject but where the context action takes place since this analysis is interested in the conversation's topic rather than where the conversation about it takes place.			
	Germany	11	Within the borders of the Federal Republic of Germany, excluding extraterritorial areas such as German embassies and consulates	#11: 'Optimism shines in Unity Day celebrations.'
	United States	12	Within the borders of the United States of America, excluding extraterritorial areas such as American embassies and consulates	#271: 'Foreign Secretary William Hague is meeting Secretary Clinton in Washington DC...'
	UK	13	Within the borders of the United Kingdom excluding British extraterritorial areas such as embassies and consulates, excluding London (Greater London Urban Area as defined by the Office of National Statistics) ¹¹⁴⁵	#13: 'Guided tours of the exhibition with the curator are available...'
	Europe	14	Countries defined as located in Europe ¹¹⁴⁶ excluding Germany and the UK	n/a
	World	15	All other countries not located within Europe and excluding the USA	#245: 'Great video from our colleagues in Kabul...'
	UK - London	16	The events take place in London (Greater London Urban Area as defined by the Office of National Statistics).	#243: 'On Monday night in London there will be a celebration of the life and works of the great American poet Robert Frost.'

¹¹⁴⁴ As defined by the Office of National Statistics; "Census 2001 Key Statistics," *Office for National Statistics*, 2004, <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/census-2001-key-statistics/index.html>.

¹¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁴⁶ "Europe (noun)," *British & World English*, Oxford Dictionaries (Oxford, New York [etc.]: Oxford University Press), accessed October 4, 2013, <http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/Europe>.

	Other	99	Either the post does not refer to an occurrence or if it does, no information about the event's location is provided.	#18: Photo 'Chaos. German Style' showing well-ordered paper clips.
TIMING	What is the nature of the occurrence the post is about, as in when did it or will it take place? It includes current occurrences of anniversaries etc. When do the events that a post / tweet refers to take place? Is it about past, current or future events? This will show whether the information is rather about real-time broadcasting and short-term notice or works on the long-term.			
	Timeless information with general information	0	This information is not bound to a certain period of time.	#268: 'What do you think of as diplomacy?...'
	Seasonal broadcasting	10	Refers to occurrences or customs typical for a certain period of time such as Christmas, Easter, and Summer/Winter. Includes federal holidays in the UK/German/US depending on the emitter.	#132: 'Got your German Christmas cake "Christstollen", yet? Find out more about this traditional delicacy.'
	Past years' events	20	6 months to infinity before broadcasting	#272: 'Here's a blast from the past. From 1973-1985 the "Schoolhouse Rock" animations went out across America...'
	Past months' events	30	Up to 6 months before the broadcasting date.	n/a
	Last week's events	40	6 up to 1 day before the post.	#277: 'The US Embassy recently held a reception for Fulbright Teachers.'
	Live stream / coverage	50	The events take place while they are broadcasted or refer to current / on-going events taking place the day they are broadcasted. Includes anniversaries of past events unless they are broadcasted after the actual date.	#241: 'Today is the start of International Education week'
	Future events	60	The events the post refers to will take place later that day (after the time the information was posted) or in the future, counting from a day after the post date.	#243: 'On Monday night in London there will be a celebration of the life and works of the great American poet Robert Frost.'
	Other	99	If none of the categories above fit or if the timing is not clear.	#245: 'Great video from our colleagues in Kabul...'

REFACT (Reference to current events)	Does the post refer to a historic event, as in its anniversary (Memorial Day, anniversary, birthday, holiday)? If so, when did this event take place? To which period of time does a post refer? Before, during or after World War II? Since World War II seems to play a rather odd role not only in British history but also in Anglo-German relations, the dissertation aims at uncovering whether PD 2.0 takes the issue up. This category is Facebook only since Twitter is more of a real-time broadcasting tool. ¹¹⁴⁷			
	Pre-WWII	10	Events that occurred before 1939.	#238: 'Happy Birthday! The Marine Corps was founded during the American Revolution at a tavern in Philadelphia 236 years old today.'
	WWII	20	Events that occurred from 1 September 1939- 8 May 1945.	#274: 'Double Victory documentary by George Lucas.'
	Post-WWII	30	Events that occurred after 8 May 1945	#11: 'Optimism shines on Unity day celebrations'
	Other	99	No reference to historic event, timing not clear or no event	#258: 'On behalf of President Obama and the people of the U.S., I send best wishes of the people of Scotland as you celebrate St. Andrew's Day...'

¹¹⁴⁷ Rössler, *Inhaltsanalyse*, 151.

Interaction Related Coding Units				
This section analyses the extent to which the page interacts with its fans as well as the entanglement with the local media system. It will show whether or not social media are really as highly interactive as it is often claimed or if the 90-9-1 rule mentioned earlier on applies. Furthermore, the U.S. states a clear commitment to listening to foreign publics. ¹¹⁴⁸ How does this translate into action?				
POSTYP (Type of post)	This is relevant to uncover whether the administrators moderate the posts if at all with statements, questions or quotes, information and whether or not the posts are assertions or invite interaction. Is communication rather static and dominated by statements or do the embassies ask questions?			
	Moderation – question	11	A question includes a question mark. Rhetorical questions or posts that could be considered as such will be included since the author of this analysis can make no definite statement about the question's intention. Questions that are answered right after the question is asked are excluded. As soon as a question mark appears, the post is considered a question.	#249: 'Silent movie "The Artist" is among the top tips for this year's Oscars. Will it win? What are your Oscar picks?'
	Moderation – statement	12	A post is considered a statement if it consists in one or more sentences in which the author clearly states his opinion.	n/a
	Moderation – introduction / complement	13	Includes words and does not only consist in a link accompanying the post. Those words do not express an opinion but are amendments introducing the post.	#129: 'Hundreds are in town next Tuesday! More on their London concert here:'
	Moderation – quote	14	The post includes a quote, indicated by the presence of “ ” or ‘ ’ marking beginning and end of the sentence as well as an emitter.	#216: "“He will stand for all time, among those..” - President Obama at the Martin Luther King Kr. Memorial dedication.'
	Moderation – quote / question	15	The post includes a quote indicated by the presence of “ ” or ‘ ’ marking beginning and end of the sentence as well as an emitter, and a question not included in the quote, indicated by the presence of a question mark.	See post #241

¹¹⁴⁸ Office of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, *Public Diplomacy: Strengthening U.S. Engagement with the World. A Strategic Approach for the 21st Century*.

	No moderation	88	The post only consists in a link; the page administrator has added no additional content.	See post #117
	Not clear	99	Due to incorrect data saving, the post is no longer clearly displayed.	See post #250
USEIMP (User implication)	Yes	10	Is the user explicitly asked to contribute something, for example, to share personal thoughts on an issue or send in documents? Are the users asked to do something, participate in a competition and send in pictures etc.? Does the embassy incite its users to join discussions, taking an active part in the policy making process? Does the embassy get back to the users if they express their opinions? This additional category is necessary since questions can also be rhetorical or are just destined to make the receiver reflect and are thus not necessarily interactive. Imperative verb forms are sometimes a good indicator. Figures of speech such as 'Find out more' do not count. Simple yes or no questions are excluded as well.	#225: 'Did you know? President Obama's last task each night is to read 10 letters from the public. He often writes back. What would you write to the President Obama about?...'
	No	88	The user is not asked to act.	#241: 'Today is the start of International Education week.'
	Other / not clear	99	Not clear due to incorrect data saving.	See post #232

MEDTYP (Media type)	Is there an attachment? If so, what kind of media? If more than one kind of media is posted, put both. If in doubt, the featured link often reveals the kind of media that is used (it features the word 'video' for example). Is it an embedded video, a picture, a sound file, a newspaper article or any other link to a website? This shows how multimedia-based the embassies communicate. The use of media as well as the following – referral – are important to uncover if these foreign social media pages are entangled with the media system in the UK. This is relevant since <i>shaping the narrative</i> plays a substantial role for public diplomacy and engagement with media as well as regional debates is a focus.			
	Poll	10	Facebook features a 'Questions App' that allows pages to integrate a poll into their page.	See post #250
	Newspaper article	11	The link leads to a newspaper website	#120: 'Interesting comparison between UK and Germany...'
	Video	12	Moving images and sounds.	#245: 'Great video from our colleagues in Kabul...' www.youtube.com
	Sound file	13	Embedded sound, no images	n/a
	Other home page	14	The link leads to a website that is not a newspaper or other news broadcaster.	#223: http://thehelpmovie.com/us
	Broadcasting agency news	15	Web page leads to a text based broadcaster / news agency page that is not a newspaper. A broadcaster is a service whose purpose is to spread news.	#260: http://bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-15792186
	Image(s)	16	Photos, pictures	See post #244
	Shared status	17	Status update of someone else that is shared.	German Embassy London shared <i>Visit Germany's</i> status update
	Web blog	18	Personal website featuring the other(')s(') personal opinions appearing from the most recent to the less recent one. Popular platforms are BlogSpot, Tumblr, or blogger.com / wordpress.com	#25: http://www.soldierrideuk.blogspot.com
	Web chat	19	Internet chat facility as in writing or speaking directly to another person.	See post #211
	No attachment, just text	88	No attachment is featured.	#119: 'Gewandhaus at Barbican - at Barbican Centre.'

	Other links	99	Everything that does not fit into the categories mentioned above or if not clear (extension code is not understandable).	#215: http://itunes.apple.com/gb/app/u.s.-embassy-media-kit/id449075453?mt=8
Referral (REFFER)	The link's geographical extension code (.com / .co.uk or .de) will serve as an indicator unless the text gives reason to believe otherwise. The link often reveals the organisation it leads to. This part, similar to a link analysis, is supposed to show if the pages are entangled with other media systems through sharing their content and thus driving content to their sites. ¹¹⁴⁹ It will show if the embassies' pages are intertwined with national or international media actors or rather constitute a closed system, only sharing their content thus above all to drive traffic to their own website.			
	Embassy web page	10	The link leads to a page belonging to one of the embassies' official page.	
	Germany	11	The link begins with and/ or includes http://www.london.diplo.de	See #128
	USA	12	The link begins with and / or includes http://london.usembassy.gov	#219: http://london.usembassy.gov/obama218.html
	Embassy social media	20	The post refers to a social media site as in Facebook album, Twitter feed, other Facebook page.	
	Germany	21	The social media site in question is operated by the German embassy and carries 'embassy' in its name or its publishing information does so.	#111: 'For breaking news about Germany, follow us on Twitter'
	USA	22	The social media site in question is operated by the US embassy and carries 'embassy' in its name or its publishing information does so.	#115
	Mediator organisation / political entity	30	Refers to a web page belonging to a mediator organisation (organisation affiliated with the embassy conducting public diplomacy measures on its orders) or another political entity such as the White House, the German Bundestag etc. The web link is telling in this respect.	
	Germany	31	The link leads to one of the facilitator organisations as defined in chapter 4 as well as other German political organisations such as the government or the chancellor.	#118: www.bundesregierung.de
	USA	32	The White House or the State Department would fall into this category. Also, other organisations involved in public diplomacy	https://statedept.connnectsolutions.com/foodsecurity?launcher=false

¹¹⁴⁹ Schweitzer, "Politische Websites als Gegenstand der Online-Inhaltsanalyse," 72–74; 79.

			such as the Fulbright Commission are classified under this code. The web link that is posted reveals its origin.	
	UK	33	The link leads to a political entity belonging to the UK such as the parliament, Downing Street Number 10	n/a
	External site	40	The site is not affiliated with one of the embassies or any other political entity in relation with them.	
	Germany	41	The link leads to a website with the extension code '.de' that is not the German embassy in London	n/a
	USA	42	The link leads to a website with the extension code '.com', '.org' meaning that it is hosted on a server in the U.S. and that it is not the U.S. embassy in London or any other political entity.	#25: http://www.soldierrideuk.blogspot.com
	UK	43	The link leads to a website with the extension code '.co.uk'.	#115: www.bbc.co.uk
	No	88	No link is visible.	See post #19
		99	Sites with all other extension codes possible	#17: http://survey.2ask.net/9d97e8bf137af934/survey.html
FORUM	This code aims at discovering whether the fan page is used as a discussion platform by investigating if it is used by users to interact with each other or by the embassy to interact with its fans. Since diplomats frequently claim that interactivity and closeness to citizens counted amongst PD 2.0's defined goals, the dissertation aims at finding out whether discussions took place.			
	User-user	11	Applies when at least one user explicitly replies to another one; '@ someone' is an indicator but also when a question is answered or a user is clearly addressed in the comment.	See post #219
	User-embassy	12	The name of another user is mentioned in the comment; '@ someone' is an indicator but also when a question is answered.	See post #249
	User-user and user-embassy	13	Different users and the embassy, too, engage in a conversation. The use of a user's first name (sometimes preceded by an '@') is a clear indicator, or a quote from a comment.	See post #26

	No	88	There is no discussion between users and / or the embassy diplomats.	See post #17
	Other	99	It is not clear whether or not the post engages different users into a discussion – mainly due to an error that occurred during the data saving.	See post #222
FAN INTER-ACTION	Comments per post		Count comments per individual post and write down number.	#19: 15
	Likes per post		Count likes per individual post and write down number.	#19: 164
	Shares per post		Count shares per individual post and write down number.	#19: 97
	Comments per fan		Divide sum of comments of all the posts by the number of fans. Round numbers to two digits after comma.	$280/11.000 = 0,02$
	Likes per fan		Divide the total number of likes by the total number of fans to be provided. Round numbers to two digits after comma.	$150/11.000 = 0,01$
	Shares per fan		Divide the total number of shares by the total number of fans to be provided. Round numbers to two digits after comma.	$230/11.000 = 0,02$

Interpretative Coding Units			
STORY LINES	<p>Does the post contain a certain story line? Only look at posts, ignore the attachments. This analysis aims at finding out whether the rhetoric is consistent with each country's respective public diplomacy doctrines and mission presented earlier on as well as the historical background. 'Democratic politics is all about convincing others to see things as you do, so that they will support your goals,'¹¹⁵⁰ which is why it seems perfectly meaningful to explore how and if such a process takes place here. The story lines – as the elements constituting a rhetoric strategy will be called from now on – that the author went then on to look for were thus developed from the information available and partly the data set for reasons of adjustment.</p> <p>A White House strategy paper¹¹⁵¹ already mentioned above that formulated the following three goals for public diplomacy was particularly helpful in this respect: Present the U.S. as a reliable partner that plays a constructive role in international relations and has many mutual areas of interest with foreign audiences. While they matched both countries' public diplomacy frameworks and embodied their goals, they were deemed useful to provide more comparability with the German social media pages. Thus, those were also slightly adapted and applied with regards to the German pages, especially to underscore possible differences in communication. Public diplomacy is after all about transmitting a positive impression of the home country and as mentioned above, policy legitimization was considered a crucial element for both countries' public diplomacy. How is this operationalised through social media?</p>		
	Policy Legitimation		Which role does the home country (Germany or U.S.) play? How does it present its actions? The story lines are compatible and can appear simultaneously.
	Constructive and positive role	1	<p>Several elements fall under this category: Creation of a rogue other, indicators are the denunciation of others' actions 'fight against', 'we condemn', demand of 'sanctions' / involvement in conflicts and, or world affairs through participation in meetings e.g., supporting causes that are generally considered positive: environment, minority rights, development, crisis relief / signs of support and expression of achievement 'we got it done', 'we are proud', giving of positive advice.</p> <p>#260: 'The goal of an AIDS-free generation may be ambitious, but it is possible.'</p>

¹¹⁵⁰ Entman, *Projections of Power*, 147.

¹¹⁵¹ Biden, *National Framework for Strategic Communication*.

	Respectful partner	2	Presents joint actions of the home country as an institutional actor and other parties, not necessarily governmental, e.g. within the framework of international organisations/treaties. Indicators are 'together with', 'join us'.	#245: 'Great video from our colleagues in Kabul...USDA Agricultural Advisor Gary Solseth has been working with farmers of Arghandab District, Kandahar Province, to teach them...'
	Foreign audiences recognize <i>areas of mutual interest</i> with the United States or Germany	3	Foreign policy positions similar to the UK or rather presenting similar areas of interests such as the Middle East conflict, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan or minority issues. Google UK position on the issue, check currently valid foreign policy doctrine.	#257: 'The White House and Department of State have condemned "in the strongest terms" the storming of the British Embassy in Tehran...'
	No	88	The post does not correspond to any of the story lines mentioned above.	#17: 'Calling all German Teachers! Take part in the Goethe-Institut's survey, and you could win prizes for your department. The survey should not take any longer than 15 minutes to complete and is specifically aimed at teachers of German. Click on the following link to start the survey: http://jsurvey.2ask.net/9d97e8bf137af934/survey.html '

	Othering	Causal force behind the issue discussed, deemed responsible for the issue the post is about. The second part is about analysing the creation of closeness or distance to the audience or respectively other actors. As previously discussed especially U.S. public diplomacy seemed inclined to use Manichean <i>us versus them</i> rhetoric. ¹¹⁵² This aspect is also featured in Anglo-German relations. Does this thus also apply to PD 2.0? Furthermore, public diplomacy is about bringing nations closer together for which othering ¹¹⁵³ may be a powerful tool in this respect for one can build strong ties and a feeling of affiliation in marking a boundary against a third party. Such rhetoric strategies aspire to legitimise, create or underscore certain power relations (of dominance over others). ¹¹⁵⁴ This category thus aims at finding out whether the German or U.S. embassies try to foster closeness to the UK through alienating other actors. Its focus is to detect the force deemed to have caused the instance the post or tweet is about, namely 'us' or 'them', a (rogue) other. If these are perceived to threaten the U.S.' or Germany's respective national interest leading to antagonist positions, the evaluation is 'them', if not, positive as in rather directed towards further improving an aspect conducive to the own position, the forces counts as 'us'.	
	Us	1 Government representatives of Germany or the U.S., respective mediator organisations or institution allied to the countries. The actor in question is praised (judgemental adjectives such as 'good', the presentation of an achievement) either if something positive was achieved, something useful done (provide the UK with cultural offerings, for example, 'find out more') as in advancing the public good); sometimes, mentioning an instance alone (minister x did a trip to country x) already underscores its importance. Also applies when the subject is positively connoted like public holidays, for example. Exclamation marks can be stylistic devices. Express support.	#14: 'Can Merkel save bailout plans?'

¹¹⁵² Zaharna, *Battles to Bridges*, 1.

¹¹⁵³ "This term was coined by Gayatri Spivak for the process by which imperial discourse creates its 'others'. Whereas the Other corresponds to the focus of desire or power (the M-Other or Father – or Empire) in relation to which the subject is produced, the other is the excluded or 'mastered' subject created by the discourse of power. Othering describes the various ways in which colonial discourse produces its subjects. In Spivak's explanation, othering is a dialectical process because the colonizing Other is established at the same time as its colonized others are produced as subjects." Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin, *Post-Colonial Studies*, 156.

¹¹⁵⁴ Said, *Orientalism*, 25–26; 40.

	Them	2	All other countries, especially foreign rogue powers in the case of the U.S. such as Syria or North Korea; in the case of Germany those countries perceived as endangering the eurozone such as Greece. Its actions are vilified ('condemned') or if something harmful such as hunger, natural disasters or wars are fought.	257: 'The White House and Department of State have condemned "In the strongest terms" the storming of the British Embassy in Tehran saying, "we'll provide whatever support the British ... might need".'
	No	99	None of the above fits.	#See 263 'Studying in the U.S.'
NATACT (Nature of Actor)	What is the nature of the actor? The actor is either the sentence's subject, the one(s) who does or do something. If several actors are involved consider them as one item (e.g. 'the cabinet', 'the ministers'). Which kind of actors – only official office holders or also citizens and representative of civil society, for example – does social media content evolve around? This code constitutes one component of determining whether the communication is elite-centred, the actor(s) the post or tweet refer to will be put into two categories, namely official or unofficial.			
	Official	1	Office holder for the states such as presidents, chancellors, ministers.	#11: 'Optimism shines on Unity Day Celebrations...'
	Unofficial	2	The actor does not hold an official office of the state in question, is not a member of government.	#23: 'We will be with hip hop singer and slam poet Gina Loring when she comes to the UK next week.'
	Both	3	Joint action of official and unofficial actors.	#245: 'Great video from our colleagues in Kabul...USDA Agricultural Advisor Gary Solseth has been working with farmers of Arghandab District, Kandahar Province, to teach them...'

Codebook Twitter

Category	Characteristic	Code	Description	Example
Formal Coding Units (Important: The variables forming the system of analysis need to be disjoint, exhausted and precise.) ¹¹⁵⁵				
Tweet ID	German Embassy	1xxx	First, it is important to assign an ID to every tweet with ascending consecutive numbers to make them easily identifiable within the data set. A tweet by the German embassy generally starts with a 1, one by the US embassy with a 2, followed by a consecutive number. The first number assigns the tweet to the Twitter feed in question, starting with the less recent date in October, so in general the 1st or 2nd. To avoid confusion with the subsequent coding, a hashtag is put in front.	German tweet: #11, #12,...#19,#110...#1nn
	American Embassy	2xxx		U.S. tweet: #21, #22,...29, 210... #2nn
Tag			To avoid confusion, up to six key words featured in the tweet in question describing its content are noted down as an additional security measure. They are destined to briefly summarise what the tweet is about.	#122: Schäuble, Tobin Tax
Code date	Available	dd.mm.yy	This code refers to the coding date. This is highly important since the administrator may have changed the Twitter feed in-between. This will follow the model: Year Month Day (yy mm dd). ¹¹⁵⁶	12-01-16
Tweet date	Available	dd.mm.yy	This code refers to the date the tweet appeared on the Twitter home feed. This is relevant to connect it to political events. Follow the model: Year Month Day (yy mm dd).	11-11-16

¹¹⁵⁵ Diekmann, *Empirische Sozialforschung*, 576–598.

¹¹⁵⁶ Rössler, *Inhaltsanalyse*, 151.

Content Related Coding Units				
Rely on tweet for information; use attachment only to complement if information is missing. The information taken from the tweet overrides. Take the emitting country's perspective.				
ABOUT	Germany	1	The content is somehow related to Germany, features information about it, nationals abroad etc. or shows the country's involvement into an action.	#160: 'Upward trend in German consumer climate continues'
	United States	2	The content is somehow related to the United States, features information about it, nationals abroad etc. or shows the country's involvement into an action.	#2202: '@DeptofDefense is monitoring the flood situation in #Thailand.'
	Other	99	The tweet is not somehow related to the home country.	n/a
BILREL (Bilateral relations)	Anglo-German relations	1	The tweet is concerned with bilateral political relations between Germany and the UK and addresses the attitude of one country towards the other or subjects that concern both countries' governments. Some tweets may, in addition to their topic, touch the countries relationship with the UK, be it regarding political or cultural issues. Since public diplomacy is supposed to be concerned with the relationship between the foreign power and the home country, it may be interesting to uncover whether PD 2.0 does address such topics. This will prove even more interesting since bilateral conflicts and or common issues took place during the investigating period. Since some form of bilateral relations can also take place with the European Union, which Britain is a member of, this might be relevant to address – especially with regards to the Euro crisis. This addition is necessary since tweets will be evaluated from the emitter's perspective. 'Euro crisis', the mention of politicians from both countries giving a joint statement could be examples.	#143: 'BBC News - The 'British' Germans the war left behind.'

	Anglo-American relations	2	The tweet is concerned with bilateral political relations between the United States and the UK, as well as with talk about the attitude of one country towards the other or subjects that concern both countries' governments. The mention of politicians from both countries giving a joint statement or joint activities could be examples. Key words could be 'Anglo-American', 'partnership' or 'cooperation'.	#272: 'USA's @DrCliffStanley & UK's Andrew Robatham MP sign a memo pledging to support our veterans together #USUKTaskForce'
	EU-U.S. relations	3	The tweet is concerned with bilateral political relations between the United States and the European Union and addresses the attitude of one region towards the other or subjects that concern both countries' governments. The mention of politicians from both entities giving a joint statement or joint activities could be examples. Key words are for example 'U.S.-EU' or European - American.	#2214: 'President #Obama will welcome the EU leaders to a summit in Washington, D.C. on November 28th'
	No / other	99	Does not fit any of the above as in not related to bilateral political relations with the UK.	#125: 'German government is keen to take international #climate diplomacy forward.'
POSCON (Tweet content)	Research & technology	100	Investigation of materials and resources to advance science through new conclusions or the verification of existing issues. If a tweet is somehow related to this category but does not fit any of the more specific ones, class under the general category.	#266: 'Congratulations to #Nobel #Economics Prize winners Thomas Sargent & Christopher Sims!'
	Space	110	New discoveries, space research, research awards.	#2397: 'Ask the Commander of the International Space Station your question about living and working in space.'
	Technology/Innovation	120	'The application of scientific knowledge for practical purposes, especially in industry.' ¹¹⁵⁷ In this case especially relevant to mobile and communication technology, apps etc.	#269: '#Photo gallery: US Innovators - Extraordinary Changes to Everyday Life.'

¹¹⁵⁷ "Technology (noun)."

	Energy	130	About energy sources / fuels, energy engineering	#2381: '#Hydroelectric power is America's largest renewable energy source. @EIAgov has more.'
	Education / Careers	200	This category refers to information about schools, universities or similar education institutions in Germany and the U.S. respectively or the UK. It also features job offers and other educational programmes. If a tweet is somehow related to this category but does not fit any of the more specific ones, class under the next available general category.	#2170: 'Countries prosper most when they lock the potential of their young people Amb #Susmann @UniofEdinburgh.'
	Careers	210	Job offers or advice on how to apply for a position. If somehow related to careers but does not fit into a more detailed category, put into the general one.	
	Job offers	211	Calls for applications	#113: 'Jobs at DSL and German-British Chamber of Industry & Commerce'
	Career events such as fairs	212	Events for job seekers, the promotion of Germany or the USA as an attractive business location	#18: 'The second #ThinkGerman career fair will take place at the #GermanEmbassy on 9 November.'
	Higher Education	220	About post-A-levels education (university studies, apprenticeships), excluding exchange programs; contests.	#210: 'Are you a student of foreign relations? The Office of Historian is a great place to start.'
	Studying in Germany	221	Information about universities in Germany, studying in general such as entry requirements	#134: 'RT @DAADLondon: Six PhD Scholarships - European University Viadrina - Stellenangebote - academics.de #scholarships'
	Studying in the USA	222	Information about universities in the USA, studying in general such as entry requirements	#296: '@Yale was founded today in 1701. Are you interested in studying in America? @USUKFulbright is the place to start.'
	Studying in Britain	223	Information about universities in Britain, studying in general such as entry requirements	n/a

	School Education	230	Information about secondary education in general such as entry requirements, information about primary educational facilities. Reminder: If a tweet is somehow related to this category but does not fit any of the more specific ones, class under the general category.	#2145: 'Are you a teacher? Check out our blog Education matters!'
	School in Germany	231	Information about schools in Germany, entry requirements, education facilities for children	n/a
	School in the U.S.	232	Information about schools in the US, entry requirements, education facilities for children	#247: '#Surfing is now officially on the school curriculum in #Hawaii. Radical!'
	School in Britain	233	Information about schools in Britain, entry requirements, education facilities for children	n/a
	Academic exchange	240	Exchange restricted to students	n/a
	Professional exchange	250	Exchange restricted to specific professions	#2237: "It changed my life & influenced the way I teach" - Kathleen Velo went on a @USUKFulbright exchange in 2003.'
	Immigration	260	Information about how to enter the country for non-touristic and non-education purposes.	#229: 'Don't Fall for a #Scam! Learn About the Diversity Visa Program 2013. Tune in Wednesday, October 12th at 1:30 pm #DV2013.'

	Culture	300	Understood as ‘the arts and other manifestations of human intellectual achievement regarded collectively [...or] the ideas, customs, and social behaviour of a particular people or society.’ ¹¹⁵⁸ Features news about respectively German and American exhibitions, food, music etc.; keywords are ‘art, exhibition, music, film’. If a tweet is somehow related to this category but does not fit any of the more specific ones, class under the general category. This sort of content remains one of the corner stones of public diplomacy, especially in Germany (Kulturnation!), and is also prominently featured in the strategy papers. The same applies to the U.S., which wants to increase foreign citizens’ familiarity with their country. How is it addressed?	
	Art	310	‘The expression or application of human creative skill and imagination, typically in a visual form such as painting or sculpture, producing works to be appreciated primarily for their beauty or emotional power.’ ¹¹⁵⁹ If a tweet is somehow related to this category but does not fit any of the more specific ones, class under the general category.	
	Movie (TV and cinema); cartoons	311	Refers to recorded moving images with sound	#2153: ‘Out this week, The Help tells the story of the struggle for civil rights suburban, 1960s America. One not to miss.’
	Literature / poetry	312	Applies if the tweet is about writings such as books, public lectures given by writers of such content	#2146: ‘Did you know? The new #poet laureate of the United States started out as an autoworker in #Detroit.’
	Theatre	313	Acting in, preparing or directing plays or plays in general. Information about relevant authors would fall into this category as well	#244: ‘UK & U.S. acting legends James Earl Jones and Vanessa Redgrave have been getting great reviews in Driving Miss Daisy.’
	Music / dance	314	Music performances or artists working in this sector including opera	#246: ‘Follow @USAinUK to ask questions to #hophop artist & poet Gina Loring as she visits London next week #TheVoiceNews.’

¹¹⁵⁸ Stevenson, “Culture (noun).”

¹¹⁵⁹ “Art (noun).”

	Painting / installations, other performances	315	Applies to exhibitions in museums etc	#12: 'New Gerhard Richter exhibition opens tomorrow at Tate Modern.'
	Radio show	316	The broadcasting of sound programmes to the public	#117: 'Listen to part 1 of a three part series on the history of Germany on BBC Radio 4...'
	Public lectures	317	Public lectures, talks not to be classified under any other category above	#26: "When London was capital of America" - Tomorrow night Julie Flavell gives a talk on Georgian London'.
	Photography	318	About pictures, photography	#2123: 'Can you take a great photo of people dancing? You still have time to enter @ConnectStateGov's contest to win an iPad2.'
	Sports	330	Any physical activity organised by a sport federation. If a tweet is somehow related to this category but does not fit any of the more specific ones, class under the general category.	#239: 'Tonight, @RoyalAlbertHall hosts the UK vs. U.S. military boxing contest. It's all for a good cause. Who will win?'
	American football	331	Refers to 'a kind of football played with an oval ball on a field marked out as a gridiron. Points are scored mainly through touchdowns and field goals. Each side has eleven players on the field at any time. In the U.S. called simply football.' ¹¹⁶⁰	#21: 'Join Super Bowl winner @JeromeBettis36 @TBBuccaneers cheerleader & squad members at the @nfl_uk fan rally, Oct 22.'
	Football (soccer)	332	Refers to 'a form of football played by two teams of eleven players with a round ball which may not be handled during play except by the goalkeepers.' ¹¹⁶¹	#110: 'Perfect 10 for Germany in Euro 2012 qualifying.'

¹¹⁶⁰ "American Football (noun)."

¹¹⁶¹ "Soccer (noun)."

	Olympics 2012	333	About the Olympic games about to take place in summer 2012. #London2012 is a telling hashtag.	#214: '@USAArchery We're at @London2012's archery test event. Here's World No 1 Brady Ellison in action.'
	American baseball	334	'A ball game played between two teams of nine on a diamond-shaped circuit of four bases. It is played chiefly as a warm-weather sport in the US and Canada.' ¹¹⁶²	¹¹⁶³ #2264: 'President Obama has called @Cardinals manager to congratulate the team on World Series victory.'
	Travel	340	Making a journey, especially to a foreign country as in the U.S. or Germany respectively, for the sake of it or to visit something in particular.	#131: 'Congratulations, Germany has been awarded "Best International Youth Destination"! And now, it's time to vote for a "TravelMeister"'
	Architecture /construction	350	Refers to buildings, construction or housing projects.	#15: 'A monastery, one millennium in the making.'
	Monarchy	360	About British Royals and their activities not related to politics.	#258: 'Welcome to #California Prince Harry! @BritishMonarchy'
	Customs	370	About national holidays, special customs to a country or stories /history/facts about the country in question that do not fit the other categories.	#2174: 'To all who are observing this sacred holiday around the world, Happy #Diwali and Saal Mubarak.-President #Obama.'
	Germany	371	About German national holidays, special customs or stories /history/facts about Germany that do not fit the other categories.	#115: 'Heard about the #German tradition of the ST Martin's Day Lantern Procession? Join the fun in Hyde Park on 13 Nov.'
	USA	372	About American national holidays, special customs or stories /history/facts about the U.S. that do not fit the other categories.	#260: 'RT @plymbuzz: @USAinUK Thanksgiving in Plymouth - All welcome!'

¹¹⁶² "Baseball (noun)," *British & World English*, Oxford Dictionaries (Oxford, New York [etc.]: Oxford University Press, 2013).

<http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/baseball>.

¹¹⁶³ Ibid.

	UK	373	About British national holidays, customs special to it or stories /history/facts about Britain that do not seem to fit the other categories. Other curious information and random anecdotes about Britain that do not fit any other category.	#2358: 'A very happy Saint Andrew's Day to all our #Scottish friends.'
	Politics	400	About '[t]he activities associated with the governance of a country or area, especially the debate between parties having power.' ¹¹⁶⁴ If a tweet is somehow related to this category but does not fit any of the more specific ones, class under the next available general category. Are political events in the home and guest country mentioned? This seems crucial for proving whether or not social media users are implicated into the political discourse. Does PD 2.0 address major political events affecting bilateral relations between the home and guest countries? Does it play an active part? Furthermore, this dissertation aims at uncovering whether conflict situations in bilateral relations are dealt with or rather not. Thus, this category is crucial in combination with the next one.	
	Domestic Affairs	410	Concerned with national issues depending on the country in question. Includes dealings with international organisations or the home country's role within the latter. Includes legal issues, social questions regarding minorities.	
	Germany	411	Information about German national politics, actions of the government, be it with regards to national issues such as legislation, health or taxes	#129: '#Onthisday 22 years ago, fall of the Berlin wall. More on German #reunification.'
	USA	412	Information about U.S. national politics, actions of the government, be it with regards to national issues such as legislation, health or taxes	#224: 'Do you have a question about the First Lady's Initiative to en childhood obesity? Use #askMichelle & @whitehouse'
	Foreign Affairs	420	Concerned with foreign policy issues as in strategic dealings with other nations.	#2436: 'What is diplomacy? Is it worthwhile? Here's Michael Douglas giving his opinion. What's yours?'
	Germany	421	Germany's strategy towards other countries.	#139: 'Foreign minister Westerwelle welcomes #EU's position on Syria.'

¹¹⁶⁴ "Politics (noun)."

	USA	422	U.S. strategy towards other countries, conflicts such as the war in Iraq or Afghanistan; military /army.	#270: 'Welcome to the UK @WarriorCare RT Met with Parliamentary Undersecretary of Armed Forces. Great partners here! #USUKTaskForce'
	Development	424	Supporting other less wealthy countries with money or knowledge.	#2197: '@USAID has announced the FWD campaign to raise awareness about the crisis in the #hornofafrica. #FWD.'
	Global	425	Concerned with global issues such as health, climate change, empowerment or cyber security. These issues are of a general nature and concern all countries since they deal for example with world infrastructure. The word 'international' is a good indicator.	#153: 'Germany supports comprehensive climate protection agreement.'
	Economics	500	Information about macro-economic issues. If a tweet is somehow related to this category but does not fit any of the more specific ones, class under the next available general category. These aspects are important to consider since the eurozone crisis put a strain on Anglo-German relations during the investigation period. With regards to the U.S., the employment situation as well as economic growth played an important role in national politics, especially since presidential elections were to take place in 2012. Also, the U.S. opposed the Tobin tax. Are these issues addressed?	#155: '#Bundesbank: 'Credit standing of German Federal Government bonds beyond doubt'...'
	Euro crisis	510	Concerned with the European debt crisis, features information about bailout, legislation etc. Economic data about how people cope with the crisis, how it affects their spending etc. Key words are Euro crisis, eurozone crisis, and debt crisis.	#14: 'Can Merkel save bailout plans?'
	Tobin tax	511	Concerned with the Tobin tax in particular to tackle part of the Euro crisis.	#122: 'Interview: #Schäuble wants EU to take lead on introducing a Tobin tax'

	Economic cycle	520	Concerned with national, global or foreign domestic economic cycles and GDP growth rates.	#2260: “When women are able to participate in the political process and enter the labor force, economies grow faster” #Clinton’
	Germany	521	Concerned with German national, global or foreign domestic economic cycles and GDP growth rates.	#140: ‘German economy continues growth: GDP plus 0.5% in 3rd quarter 2011.’
	USA	522	Concerned with U.S. national, global or foreign domestic economic cycles and GDP growth rates.	#2189: ‘The U.S. economy grew at 2.5% over the summer.’
	Other	999	None of the above fit.	#2243: ‘Hi @londonschilling please ask @USAinUKCGCorner.’
Hashtag			Also, do the embassies use hashtags that help users to filter content? If so, which ones? This will show with which topics the embassy will be most visible since the tweet is more likely to appear in search results. Note hashtags and count the two hashtags, which ones appear most often.	#2260: #Clinton
EVELOC Event location			Does the tweet refer to an event or other occurrence? If so, where does it take place? This aspect is relevant to confirm whether or not PD 2.0 can be considered promoting regionalism and focussing on urban elites as mentioned above. This should help to uncover if the pages promote events in the home country or rather in Britain. Should they take place in Britain, where exactly? A distinction between London ¹¹⁶⁵ and the rest of it will show if references are geographically diverse and not exclusively targeted at an elite / part of the population. Furthermore, the location does not (necessarily) refer to the subject but where the context action takes place since this analysis is interested in the conversation’s topic and not where the conversation about it takes place. If in doubt, focus on action; if not available, background story. Use attachment to complete blanks if appropriate.	
	Germany	11	Within the borders of the Federal Republic of Germany, excluding extraterritorial areas such as German embassies and consulates.	#160: ‘Upward trend in German consumer climate continues.’

¹¹⁶⁵ As defined by the Office of National Statistics; “Census 2001 Key Statistics.”

	USA	12	Within the borders of the United States of America, excluding exterritorial areas such as American embassies and consulates.	#2480: 'Pic: #Clinton & @WilliamJHague in Washington DC this week.'
	UK	13	Within the borders of the United Kingdom excluding British exterritorial areas such as embassies and consulates, excluding London (Greater London Urban Area as defined by the Office of National Statistics). ¹¹⁶⁶	#2116: '@NFL in the UK goes back a long way. Here's Ambassador Catto with the @Eagles cheerleaders in 1989.'
	Europe	14	Countries defined as located in Europe ¹¹⁶⁷ excluding Germany and the UK.	#2233: 'RT @AmbRivkin looking forward to welcoming President #Obama back to #France tomorrow for the #G20. @franceg20'
	World	15	All other countries not located within Europe as defined and excluding the USA, and / or is something that affects the world.	#268: 'Please see this new worldwide travel alert. #Iran'
	UK - London	16	The events take place in London (Greater London Urban Area as defined by the Office of National Statistics).	#2211: '@whitehouse Cybersecurity Coordinator Howard Schmidt writes in @whitehouse's blog #LondonCyber.'
	Other	99	Either the tweet does not refer to an occurrence or if it does, no information about the event's location are provided or can be inferred. Also, if this is ambiguous, choose this code.	#266: 'Congratulations to #Nobel #Economics Prize winners Thomas Sargent & Christopher Sims!'
Interaction Related Coding Units				
TWETYP (Type of tweet)			What is the formal nature of the tweet in question? This refers to stylistic figures. This category will turn out fairly sparse since with regards to Twitter, the focus lies on the content analysis. According to a project manager social media evaluation the author talked to, analysing interaction with regards to Twitter is rather hazardous since re-tweets are often not properly displayed on the page. ¹¹⁶⁸ For reasons of reliability, the analysis will therefore be limited to counting retweets, replies (@) and whether or not an additional link was featured. This will show how entangled	

¹¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁶⁷ "Europe (noun)."

¹¹⁶⁸ Project Manager Social Media Evaluation, Interview.

			the Twitter feed is with other media actors.	
	Question	11	A question includes a question mark. Rhetorical questions or tweets that could be considered as such will be included since the author can make no definite statement about the question's intention. Questions that are answered right after the question is asked are excluded. As soon as a question mark appears, the tweet is considered a question unless it can be considered a quote (see below).	#296: '@Yale was founded today in 1701. Are you interested in studying in America? @USUKFulbright is the place to start.'
	Assertion	13	Statement, suggestion	#126: 'Survey on German brand reception in #BRIC countries.'
	Quote	14	The tweet includes a quote, indicated by the presence of “ ” or ‘ ’ marking beginning and end of the sentence as well as an emitter.	#2237: "It changed my life & influenced the way I teach" - Kathleen Velo went on a @USUKFulbright exchange in 2003.'
USEIMP (User implication)	Yes	10	Is the user explicitly asked to contribute something (or the possibility of it is advertised) as in share personal thoughts on a political issue or send in documents? Imperative verb forms could be a good indicator. Figures of speech such as 'Find out more' do not count.	#2105: 'Join us to discuss the problem of human trafficking & how to fight it. Today at 1:30 p.m.'
	No	88	The user is not asked to act.	#122: 'Interview: #Schäuble wants EU to take lead on introducing a Tobin tax'
MEDTYP (Media type)			Is there an attachment? If so, what kind of media? If more than one kind of media is tweeted, put both. If in doubt, the featured link often reveals the kind of media that is used (it features the word 'video' for example). Is it an embedded video, a picture, a sound file, a newspaper article or any other link to a website? This shows how multimedia-based the embassies communicate. The use of media as well as the following – referral – are important to uncover if these foreign social media sites are entangled with the media system in the UK. This is relevant since engagement with media as well as regional debates is a focus.	
	Newspaper or magazine article	11	The link leads to a newspaper website. If it includes another medium such as a video, it only counts as such if accompanied by less than 140 words.	#2148: 'Heraldry and Hip Hop? Looks like anything can go together in #New York's vibrant cultural scene.'

	Video	12	Moving images and sounds. Leads to a video hosting platform.	#2383: 'Is @whitehouse dog Bo the most powerful dog in the world?'
	Sound file	13	Embedded sound, no images	#2139: 'American #Olympic legend Michael Johnson shares his all-time musical picks and how they inspired him on Radio 4.'
	Home page	14	The link leads to a website that is not a newspaper or other news broadcaster but a home page consisting mainly in text. If it includes another medium such as a video, in only counts as such if accompanied by less than 140 words.	#2123: 'Can you take a great photo of people dancing? You still have time to enter @ConnectStateGov's contest to win an iPad2.'
	Broadcasting piece	15	Web page leads to a text based broadcaster / news agency page that is not a newspaper / magazine but consists mainly in text.	#263: 'Factbox: 15 #women who have won the #Nobel #Peace Prize.'
	Image(s)	16	Photos, pictures	#2269: 'Pic: President #Obama talks with a patron at Reid's House Restaurant in Reidsville, N.C.'
	Newsletter	17	Newsletter or similar information source.	#2276: 'Are you a teacher? Don't miss the latest edition of our "News for Teachers".'
	Web blog	18	(Personal) website called blog / featuring the other(')s(') personal opinions appearing from the most recent to the less recent one. Popular platforms are BlogSpot, Tumblr, or blogger.com / wordpress.com. If blogs contain videos or pictures etc., they are nonetheless classified as blogs since they tend to be illustrated with photos or videos.	#230: "'Steve was bold enough to believe he could change the world & talented enough to do it. The world has lost a visionary.'
	Web chat	19	Internet chat facility as in writing or speaking directly to another person.	#2105: 'Join us to discuss the problem of human trafficking & how to fight it. Today at 1:30 p.m.'

	Press release	20	Message released by an organisation, titled 'Pressemitteilung' or 'press release' or a written statement to the press made by the respective press secretary.	#147:Link (http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn_1272/Content/DE/Pressemitteilungen/BPA/2011/11/2011-11-17-telefonat-bkin-sarkozy-monti.html)
	Other links	99	Everything that does not fit into the categories mentioned above or if not clear (extension code is not understandable).	#2234: 'Jefferson's birthplace was named after which East London area? Test UK.-US knowledge with our U.S. Embassy trivia app.'
	No attachment, just text	88	No attachment is featured.	#154: 'RT @Regsprecher: Chanc. #Merkel in Strasbourg: GER and Frau want to table proposition for #EU treaty change ahead of EU Council (8Dec).'
REFERER (Referral)			The link's geographical extension code (.com /.co.uk or .de) will serve as an indicator unless the text gives reason to believe otherwise. The link often reveals the organisation it leads to. This part, similar to a link analysis, is supposed to show if the pages are entangled with other media systems through sharing their content and thus driving content to their sites. ¹¹⁶⁹ It will show if the embassies' pages are intertwined with national or international media actors or rather constitute a closed system, only sharing their content thus above all to drive traffic to their own website.	
	Embassy web page	10	The link leads to a page belonging to one of the embassies' official page.	
	Germany	11	The link begins and / or includes with http://www.london.diplo.de	#173: '#Merkel "Europe will emerge stronger from the crisis." #eurozone'
	USA	12	The link begins with and / or includes http://london.usembassy.gov	#2132: 'Got a nonimmigrant #visas question? Join our friends @USAinUKCGCorner on Thursday, October 27th at 12 p.m.'

¹¹⁶⁹ Schweitzer, "Politische Websites als Gegenstand der Online-Inhaltsanalyse," 72-74; 79.

	Embassy social media	20	The tweet refers to a social media site, considering only Facebook page, Twitter feed, Flickr account, Youtube channel. Blogs belonging to the embassy web page are excluded.	
	Germany	21	The social media site in question is operated by the German embassy and the word embassy appears in its name or its publishing information.	n/a
	USA	22	The social media site in question is operated by the U.S. embassy and the word embassy appears in its name or its publishing information. This includes the embassy's youtube channel. If, however, the video is independently posted on youtube, it would be classified under external.	#2372: 'We've changed our Facebook profile to mark #WorldAIDSDay.'
	Mediator organisation / political entity	30	Refers to a web page belonging to a mediator organisation (organisation affiliated with the embassy conducting public diplomacy measures on its orders) or another political entity such as the White House, the German Bundestag or governmental agency, official spokesperson for one of these actors or an individual that can be clearly associated with one of these. The web link is telling in this respect.	#149: 'RT@UN: Starts today in London: 27th Assembly of the International Maritime Organization. Here's a preview...'
	Germany	31	The link leads to one of the facilitator organisations as defined in chapter 5 as well as other German political organisation such as the government or the chancellor.	n/a
	USA	32	The White House, State Department would fall into this category. Also, other organisations involved in public diplomacy such as the Fulbright Commission are classified under this code. The web link that is tweeted reveals its origin (.gov is a government organisation).	#2492: 'What are your @goldenglobes picks?#film'
	UK	33	The link leads to a political entity belonging to the UK such as the parliament, Downing Street Number 10.	n/a
	External site	40	The site is not affiliated with one of the embassies or any other political entity in relation with them and not a broadcaster.	#271: Interview with BBC Persia
	Germany	41	The link leads to a website with the extension code .de that is neither the German embassy in London nor a mediator / political organisation	#118: '33.000 #British-German married couples living in #Germany in 2010.'

			or broadcaster.	Federal Statistical Office.'
	USA	42	The link leads to a website with the extension code '.com', '.org' or '.edu' meaning that it is hosted on a server in the US and that it is not the US embassy in London or any other political entity unless it becomes clear that the organisation is nevertheless based in another country.	#232: 'The 47th Chicago International Film Festival begins today! And yes, there's an App for that.'
	UK	43	The link leads to a website with the extension code '.co.uk' that is neither a political nor a mediator organisation.	#2419: 'Hats off to @wheres_wallace on your epic walk. Where's Wallace! Are you coming through London? @hannahmeredith.'
	Broadcaster	50	Link leads to newspaper, broadcasting agency	#263: 'Factbox: 15 #women who have won the #Nobel #Peace Prize.'
	Germany	51	The site's extension code is '.de' or it can otherwise be associated with Germany.	n/a
	USA	52	The site's extension code is '.com' / '.org' or it can otherwise be associated with the USA.	#2148: 'Heraldry and Hip Hop? Looks like anything can go together in #New York's vibrant cultural scene.'
	UK	53	The site's extension code is '.co.uk' or it can otherwise be associated with the UK.	#258: 'Welcome to #California Prince Harry! @BritishMonarchy.'
	No	88	No link is visible.	#133: 'Chancellor Merkel: "We only have one goal, that is to bring about a stabilisation of the euro zone in its current form" #merkel #eurozone'

FORUM			Does a tweet engage the users into a discussion? It will show whether or not social media are really as highly interactive as it is often claimed or if the 90-9-1 rule mentioned earlier on applies. Furthermore, the U.S. states a clear commitment to listening to foreign publics. ¹¹⁷⁰ How does this translate into action? Applies when the embassy page administrator comments on a tweet in reply to someone else. If comments are liked, this is excluded since it is not possible anymore to trace back the origin of these comments.
	Retweet	100	Applies when a tweet is preceded by 'RT + @ ' followed by a user name which stands for retweet or when another user's tweet appears on the feed, followed by 'retweeted by'. #149: 'RT@UN: Starts today in London: 27th Assembly of the International Maritime Organization. Here's a preview...'
	Mediator organisation / political organisation	110	Refers to a feed belonging to a mediator organisation (organisation affiliated with the embassy conducting public diplomacy measures on its orders) or another political entity. This includes people representing such institutions such as a minister or spokesperson.
	Germany	111	The political organisation in question is a German one: The feed is in German; it belongs to Germany (Deutsche Welle) or claims doing so on its feed. Another indicator of 'belonging' is the homepage indicated on the feed (see above for further information on how to geographically place links). #141: 'RT @young_germany Calling all UK-based students who want to win a trip to Germany and become a #TravelMeister'
	USA	112	The political organisation in question is an American one: The feed belongs to the USA (e.g. Voice of America) or claims doing so on its feed. Another indicator of belonging is the homepage indicated on the feed (see above for further information on how to geographically place links). #2354: 'RT @usainukcgc corner: Information for American Citizens on UK Border Authority and Public Sector Workers #strikes'.
	UK	113	The political organisation in question is a British one: The feed belongs to the UK or claims doing so on its feed. Another indicator of belonging is the homepage indicated on the feed (see above for further information on how to geographically place links.) #2199: 'RT @LondonCyber Find out more about how to get involved in the debate on the future of all things digital #LondonCyber.'

¹¹⁷⁰ Office of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, *Public Diplomacy: Strengthening U.S. Engagement with the World. A Strategic Approach for the 21st Century*.

	Broadcaster	120	Web page leads to a text based broadcaster / news agency page. A broadcaster is a service whose purpose is to spread news.	
	Germany	121	The website mentioned on the feed has a German extension code; the feed is operated by an organisation identifying itself as German.	See #112
	USA	122	The website mentioned on the feed has an U.S. American extension code, the feed is operated by an organisation identifying itself as U.S. American.	See #122
	UK	123	The website mentioned on the feed has a British extension code; the feed is operated by an organisation identifying itself as British.	See #19
	External site	130	External as in not a political entity or mediator organisation as defined under '100'.	
	Germany	131	The site in question is a German one: The feed is in German, it belongs to Germany (e.g. German Car Association) or claims doing so on its feed. Another indicator of belonging is the homepage indicated on the feed (see above for further information on how to geographically place links).	n/a
	USA	132	The site in question is an American one: The feed belongs to the USA (e.g. American Car Association) or claims doing so on its feed. Another indicator of belonging is the homepage indicated on the feed (see above for further information on how to geographically place links).	#2184: 'RT@FinancialTimes President #Obama writes in today's FT on his agenda for global growth #obama.'
	UK	133	The site in question is a British one: The feed belongs to Britain (e.g. British Car Association) or claims doing so on its feed. Another indicator of belonging is the homepage indicated on the feed (see above for further information on how to geographically place links).	#260: 'RT @plymbuzz: @USAinUK Thanksgiving in Plymouth - All welcome!'
	No	88	The tweet is not a re-tweet.	#2168: 'The United States is not participating in #Kenya's current operation in #Somalia.'

	Connect - '@'	200	With whom does the Twitter feed connect? Does the tweet refer to one user, suggest their feed or talk about it? This excludes retweets (they always feature the user whose information is shared). If in doubt, check the website indicated on the Twitter feed.	
	Mediator organisation / political organisation	210	Refers to a feed belonging to a mediator organisation (organisation affiliated with the embassy conducting public diplomacy measures on its orders) or another political entity such as the White House, the German Bundestag etc. This includes people representing such institutions such as a minister or spokesperson.	#2223: '@NATO's success in #Libya was not just the result of 1 or 2 nations. 14 Allies & 4 partners participated.'
	Germany	211	The political organisation in question is a German one: The feed is in German; it belongs to Germany (Deutsche Welle) or claims doing so on its feed. Another indicator of belonging is the homepage indicated on the feed (see above for further information on how to geographically place links.).	#130: 'New law clears way for recognition of degrees and training earned abroad via @young_germany #study #Germany'
	USA	212	The political organisation in question is an American one: The feed belongs to the U.S. (e.g. Voice of America) or claims doing so on its feed. Another indicator of belonging is the homepage indicated on the feed (see above for further information on how to geographically place links.).	#2190: 'Helen Eugenie Moore Anderson became the first female American Ambassador on this day in 1949 @usembdenkmark.'
	UK	213	The political organisation in question is a British one: The feed belongs to the UK or claims doing so on its feed. Another indicator of 'belonging' is the homepage indicated on the feed (see above for further information on how to geographically place links.).	#2232: 'The future of the #internet is something that will affect us all. What do you think? @LondonCyber #LondonCyber.'
	Broadcaster	220	Designates a news organisation, either television or radio station, newspaper, magazine and similar.	
	Germany	221	The site's extension code is '.de' or it can otherwise be associated with Germany.	n/a
	USA	222	The site's extension code is '.com' / '.org' or it can otherwise be associated with the US.	#2267: 'Slideshow: @NYTimes slideshow of life on a bike in the Big Apple.'

	UK	223	The site's extension code is '.co.uk' or it can otherwise be associated with the UK.	#230: "Creating an AIDS-free generation...is possible" - Secretary Clinton in @TheIndyNews today #WorldAIDSDay.'
Individual user		230	A user that does not tweet in the capacity of an official position in a government, which would be obvious from their individual Twitter feed.	#2117: 'Hi @mikedroid Please ask our friends @USAinUKCGCorner.'
Embassy		240	Connects with the embassy itself as in the feed owner.	
	Germany	241	Features @GermanEmbassyLondon	n/a
	USA	242	Features @USAinUK	#285: 'Twice President Dwight #Eisenhower "Ike" was born today in 1890. We've saluting him outside @USAinUK since 1989.'
External		260	The user does not fall in one of the categories mentioned above. Again, the description on the feed and / or the stated homepage is significant.	#2233: 'RT @AmbRivkin looking forward to welcoming President #Obama back to #France tomorrow for the #G20. @franceg20'
	Germany	261	The site's extension code is '.de' or it can otherwise be associated with Germany.	n/a
	USA	262	The site's extension code is '.com' / '.org' or it can otherwise be associated with the USA.	#2222: 'Years ago politicians went to the market to engage citizens now they must go online @Facebook's LordAllan #LondonCyber.'
	UK	263	The site's extension code is '.co.uk' or it can otherwise be associated with the UK.	#287: '#Fulbright alumni Tarik O'Reagan's opera Heart of Darkness opens soon @RoyalOperaHouse One not to miss.'

	Mixture	270	Includes more than one 'connect @'. In this case, it seems relevant to explore whether this brings together official and unofficial actors as well as links British and non-British organisations. Government affiliated users such as organisations or minister count as official. All others – through the process of evaluation – count as unofficial.	
	Official – 1 country	271	Users belong to one country.	#2164: “The Internet has become the public space of the 21st century” - #Clinton #LondonCyber @LondonCyber @WilliamJHague.’
	Official – 2 countries (+UK)	272	One of the countries in question is the UK.	#2173: ‘President #Obama & Prime Minister #Cameron have strengthened the partnership between @PeaceCorps & @VSOUK.’
	Official – 2 countries	273	Users belong to two different countries.	#2265: ‘The President and @NATO Secretary General @AndersFoghR have held discussions @whitehouse #Afghanistan.’
	Unofficial – 1 country	274	Users belong to one country.	#2116: ‘@NFL in the UK goes back a long way. Here’s Ambassador Catto with the @Eagles cheerleaders in 1989.’
	Unofficial – 2 countries	275	One of the countries in question is the UK.	n/a
	Unofficial – 2 countries (+UK)	276	Users belong to two different countries.	#2127: ‘@TBBBuccaneers preparing for Sunday’s big clash against the @ChicagoBearscom @wembleystadium! #NFL.’
	Official / unofficial – 1 country	277	Users belong to one country.	#2285: ‘@USAID private groups join to improve babies’ #health @SavetheChildren @leardalmedical @AmerACadPeds @KCCorp.’

	Official / unofficial – 2 countries	278	One of the countries in question is the UK.	#2346: 'Watch Chairman of @thejointstaff @Martin_Dempsey interviewed by @BBCNewsnight's Jeremy Paxman.'
	Official / unofficial – 2 countries (+UK)	279	Users belong to two different countries.	#2142: 'Vid: @TBBuccaneers training for Sunday and their cheerleaders who met London's @AscensionEagles @bbc5live @talkSPORT.'
	No	88	The tweet does not include an @ connect.	#2168: 'The United States is not participating in #Kenya's current operation in #Somalia.'
	Conversation	300	Does the tweet refer to one or more other users, suggest their feed or talk about them? The indication 'conversation' appears below the tweet.	
	Individual user	310	A user that does not tweet in his official capacity of an official position in a government, which would be obvious from their individual twitter feed.	#2405: '@paultwinn @sarahsouthern @xeniaformandy @wdjstraw lisaby Thanks for coming. We're glad you had fun.'
	Organisation	320	The user the tweet connects with is an organisation.	#2422: '@wheres_wallace Sure just tweet us when you're not too far away. Keep walking!'
	No	88	The tweet is not (part of) a conversation.	#2168: 'The United States is not participating in #Kenya's current operation in #Somalia.'
Interpretative Coding Units: Rely on tweet only, exclude attachment				
STOLIN (Story line)			Does the tweet contain a certain story line? Only look at tweet, ignore the attachments. This analysis aims at finding out whether the rhetoric is consistent with each country's respective public diplomacy doctrines and mission	

			<p>presented earlier on as well as the historical background. ‘Democratic politics is all about convincing others to see things as you do, so that they will support your goals,’¹¹⁷¹ which is why it seems perfectly meaningful to explore how and if such a process takes place here. The story lines the author went then on to look for were thus developed from the information available and partly the data set for reasons of adjustment.</p> <p>A White House strategy paper¹¹⁷² already mentioned above that formulated the following three goals for public diplomacy was particularly helpful in this respect: Present the U.S. as a reliable partner that plays a constructive role in international relations and has many mutual areas of interest with foreign audiences. While they matched both countries’ public diplomacy frameworks and embodied their goals, they were deemed useful to provide more comparability with the German social media pages. Thus, those were also slightly adapted and applied with regards to the German pages, especially to underscore possible differences in communication. Public diplomacy is after all about transmitting a positive impression of the home country and as mentioned above, policy legitimization was considered a crucial element for both countries’ public diplomacy. How is this operationalised through social media?</p>	
	Legitimation		Please put 1 if applicable and 88 if not applicable.	
	Constructive and positive role	1	<p>Several elements fall under this category: Creation of a rogue other, indicators are the denunciation of others’ actions, ‘fight against’, ‘we condemn’, demand of ‘sanctions’ / involvement in conflicts and, or world affairs through participation in meetings e.g., supporting causes that are generally considered positive: environment, minority rights, development, crisis relief / signs of support and expression of achievement ‘we got it done’, ‘we are proud’, giving of positive advice.</p>	#211: ‘The Z.S. is deeply concerned by reports of the #Iranian government’s continued repression of its people’
	Respectful partner	2	<p>Presents joint actions with other states, governments or their representatives, e.g. within the framework of international organisations/treaties. Indicators are ‘together with’, ‘join us’.</p>	#22: ‘Current and former First Ladies from the UK, USA & around the world have been meeting to support #African women’.

¹¹⁷¹ Entman, *Projections of Power*, 147.

¹¹⁷² Biden, *National Framework for Strategic Communication*.

	Foreign audiences recognize <i>areas of mutual interest</i> with the United States or Germany	3	Foreign policy positions similar to the UK or rather presenting similar areas of interests such as the Middle East conflict, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan or minority issues. General information with regards to political, social or political issues such as youth.	#218: 'October is Cybersecurity Awareness Month. Stay safe online with onguardonline.gov.'
	Other	99	The tweet does not correspond to any of the rhetoric strategies mentioned above.	#117: '#German Government launched a YouTube channel this week, and invites you to interview #Merkel'.

<p>OTHER (Othering)</p>	<p>Causal force behind the issue discussed, deemed responsible for the issue the tweet is about. The second part is about analysing the creation of closeness or distance to the audience or respectively other actors. As previously discussed especially U.S. public diplomacy seemed inclined to use Manichean <i>us versus them</i> rhetoric.¹¹⁷³ This aspect is also featured in Anglo-German relations. Does this thus also apply to PD 2.0? Furthermore, public diplomacy is about bringing nations closer together for which othering¹¹⁷⁴ may be a powerful instrument in this respect for one can thus build strong ties and a feeling of affiliation in marking a boundary against a third party. Such rhetoric strategies aspire to legitimise, create or underscore certain power relations (of dominance over others).¹¹⁷⁵ This category thus aims at finding out whether the German or U.S. embassies try to foster closeness to the UK through alienating other actors. Its focus is to detect the force deemed to have caused the instance the tweet is about, namely ‘us’ or ‘them’, a (rogue) other. If these are perceived to threaten the U.S.’ or Germany’s national interest leading to antagonist positions, the evaluation is ‘them’, if not, positive as in rather directed towards further improving an aspect conducive to the own position, the forces counts as ‘us’.</p>		
<p>Us</p>	<p>1</p>	<p>Government representatives of Germany or the U.S., respective mediator organisations or institution allied countries. The actor in question is praised (valuing adjectives such as ‘good’, achievement’) either if something positive was achieved, something useful done (provide the UK with cultural offerings, for example, ‘find out more’) as in advancing the public good); sometimes, mentioning an instance alone (minister x did a trip to country x) already underscores its importance. Also applies when the subject is positively connoted like public holidays, for example. Exclamation marks can be stylistic devices. Express support.</p>	<p>#14: ‘Can Merkel save bailout plans?’</p>
<p>Them</p>	<p>2</p>	<p>All other countries, especially foreign rogue powers in the case of the U.S. such as Syria or North Korea; in the case of Germany those countries perceived as endangering the eurozone such as Greece. Its actions are vilified (‘condemned’) or if something harmful such as</p>	<p>257: ‘The White House and Department of State have condemned “In the strongest terms” the storming of the British Embassy In Tehran saying, “we’ll provide</p>

¹¹⁷³ Zaharna, *Battles to Bridges*, 1.

¹¹⁷⁴ “This term was coined by Gayatri Spivak for the process by which imperial discourse creates its ‘others’. Whereas the Other corresponds to the focus of desire or power (the M-Other or Father – or Empire) in relation to which the subject is produced, the other is the excluded or ‘mastered’ subject created by the discourse of power. Othering describes the various ways in which colonial discourse produces its subjects. In Spivak’s explanation, othering is a dialectical process because the colonizing Other is established at the same time as its colonized others are produced as subjects.” Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin, *Post-Colonial Studies*, 156.

¹¹⁷⁵ Said, *Orientalism*, 25–26; 40.

			hunger, natural disasters or wars are fought.	whatever support the British ... might need”.
	Other	99	None of the above fits	#See 263 ‘Studying in the US’
NATACT (Nature of Actor)			What is the nature of the actor? The actor is either the sentence’s subject, the one(s) who does or do something or is asked to do so. Suggestions such as ‘read our report’ do not count. If several actors are involved consider them as one item (e.g. ‘the cabinet’, ‘the ministers’). An actor is necessarily an individual or an organisation.	
	Official	1	Office holder for the states such as presidents, ministers, soldiers or monarchs.	#272: ‘USA’s @DrCliffStanley & UK’s Andrew Robatham MP sign a memo pledging to support our veterans together #USUKTaskForce’
	Unofficial	2	The actor does not hold an official office of the state in question, is not a member of government.	#266: ‘Congratulations to #Nobel #Economics Prize winners Thomas Sargent & Christopher Sims!’
	Both	3	Joint action of official and unofficial actors.	#276: ‘Here’s @tomhanks lending his support to @JoiningForces. It comes a day after the #USUKTaskForce signing. #veterans’
	Other	99	Either no actor is mentioned or can be identified or the tweet does not feature one.	#274: ‘Are you interest in the intersection of religion and foreign policy? Join a panel discussion October 19, 2011, 1:30 p.m.’