Ambivalences of Europeanization. Modernity and Europe in Perspective

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Abstract

This working paper aims to reformulate the teleological concepts of Europeanization by relating them to modernity’s ambivalences, which seems necessary for two reasons. First, both the number and the scope of “crises” in European politics and societies have increased considerably in the last two decades. Second, and more importantly, the project of European integration has changed its status from being a potential problem solver to being a part of the problem. The paper establishes a broader historical perspective than is usual in most projects on Europeanization. It argues that crises and drawbacks have been a part of European societal and political development during most periods of European history. One reason has been the purely European strategy of colonialism, which was used as a mechanism to outsource the negative consequences of modernity to places outside of Europe and to peripheral locations within Europe. By including historical and postcolonial perspectives on contemporary Europeanization, we argue that Europe and modernity are not characterized by teleological progress but rather engender ambivalent and entangled developments.

Keywords: Europe; Modernity; Europeanization; EU; Ambivalences

Zusammenfassung


Schlagworte: Europa; Moderne; Europäisierung; EU; Ambivalenzen
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“Trajectorism”, as Arjun Appadurai (2012: 26) has put it, “is the great narrative trap of the West and is also, like all great myths, the secret of its successes in industry, empire and world conquest”. Trajectorism entails the idea that a telos can be found in all patterns of social change, process and history – an idea that is inherent to Europeanization and studies on Europeanization as well. On the one hand, the trajectorist ideology has helped scholars conceive of Europeanization as a larger unfolding of the European story of modernization and cosmopolitanism. On the other hand, it has also impeded the detection of alternative sources and paths of Europeanization. Consequently, rethinking Europeanization and European modernity beyond trajectorism remains a challenging yet necessary task.

The question that we will address in this paper is as follows: How can Europeanization be conceptualized beyond trajectorism and which particular insights does a nonteleological perspective on the Europeanization processes offer? Trajectorism has been an axiomatic part of the social science of Europeanization. In line with Appaduraj, Reinhart Koselleck (2000) has pointed out that teleology has been the way in which European history and development have been conceptualized between about 1750 and 1850 when the French and early industrial revolutions laid (inter alia) the normative ground for modernity. Only since this period, which is called Sattelzeit (saddle time) by Koselleck, time is imagined as an arrow pointing in a precise direction. Since the Enlightenment and the Sattelzeit, the concepts of Europe, progressive modernity, and trajectorism have become increasingly interwoven, forming a triad of an emerging “European teleological modernity”.

It is both necessary and adequate to ask which concepts and ideas of Europe, Europeanization and modernity arise once we try to break up this triad. The Western idea of modern progress – which is connected to the moral expectations of freedom, equality, welfare, and democracy – has been inherently linked to the ideas of Europe, Europeanization, and (later) European integration. However, neither the process of Europeanization nor the respective results are unidirectional. In contrast, the creation of (economic) welfare and modernization has often depended on the dynamics of destruction, with societal progress or integration proceeding at the expense of societal alienation. Democratic progress may flourish in key places but may leave out geographical or social peripheries. On a closer and non-trajectorist look, these ambivalences of modernization are equally mirrored in Europeanization processes.

Accordingly, we define Europeanization as historical and current processes of negotiating modernity. In this sense, Europeanization means fluid, contentious and often violent confrontation. Conflicts have been triggers for contingent processes of Europeanization throughout all of European history and have intensified with social, economic, and political transformations since the 18th century.

Why is it necessary to reformulate Europeanization and to relate it to modernity’s ambivalences at this very moment? We offer two answers. The first is related to the various societal and political crises in contemporary Europe: for example, with regard to the Eurozone, the war in Eastern Ukraine, or the EU’s migration policy. We argue that these crises are mainly perceived against a shortened time horizon that compares today’s Europe with that of a perceived golden period of the postwar era. Crises in Europe and loss of confidence in the promises of the European modernity project are by far not new phenomena. Even if we concentrate on the 20th century only, it becomes clear that European history has always been marked by tidal waves. The multiple political, social, and economic crises in the 1930s were preceded by the cultural pessimism of
the fin de siècle (Beck and Grande 2010; Assmann 2013b). The Holocaust triggered the deepest doubts about the connection between reason and modern thinking. After 1945, the occasions for pessimistic thinking were numerous, as demonstrated for instance by the broad political and societal debates of the 1970s on the oil crisis and the feared end of political steering (Esposito 2017; Assmann 2013a). Neglecting to deal with the Holocaust and collaboration was one of the main reasons that led to the 1968 protests. The self-declared modern regimes in a socialist guise had a hard time coping with internal protests. Regular uprisings in East-Berlin (1953), Budapest (1956), Prague (1968), and Warsaw (1981) were also a consequence of the criticism of socialist modernization.

Second, we detect a difference in the past understanding of a crisis from today’s understanding. In all the abovementioned cases, scientific and intellectual discourses concentrated on the drawbacks of modernity, which were usually perceived as happening within national contexts. Europe, in particular Western Europe, in contrast, figured as a blueprint for overcoming national drawbacks. In past ‘European crises’, ‘Europe’ itself was not addressed as a problem, whereas the specific constellation of the nation state that had built its wealth on market capitalism appeared to constitute a dilemma. Nationalism and the side effects of capitalism were framed as the major pathologies of modernization, not of Europeanization.

Today, this perspective on Europe has changed considerably. In recent years, the characterization of the European idea has shifted from a salutary to a highly questionable character:

“...The Europe of today has become the major arena in which the hegemony of a Western modernity and its economic, political, and cultural claims to global dominance are being fundamentally contested. Not only global crises, but also transnational movements – of people within, outside, and across European borders, and of goods and risks, ideas and histories, extending from the ‘periphery’ to the ‘center’ – are putting the national, but also the Europeanized, will to political control under pressure” (Heinlein et al. 2014: 14).

In our project, we try to understand this shift as an epistemological one by drawing parallels with the field of postcolonial studies. We follow authors such as Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000), Arjun Appadurai and many of the contributions in two pertinent volumes edited by Sebastian Conrad (2002) and by Sandra Ponzanesi and Bolette Blaagaard (2013). These authors argue that Europe serves as a major battleground for the contradictions of modernity. Historical insight shows that it has not (only) been Europe, but also its colonized regions around the world that have been places where the dark sides of European modernity have been more present than in Europe itself.

The imperial colonial politics of Europe during recent centuries have also represented a strategy to roll out certain competing narratives of Europe – for example, the conflict between the state and the church, between private and collective property, between the politics of the masses and the rule of law (Appadurai 2012: 29-30). However, the narrative of progress has been mirrored to a much lesser extent in the colonized parts of the world. Here, clerical power usually did not accept local rule, private European property did not care much about the collective non-European good, and Western rule of law rarely fed back into local regimes of power and justice. Thus, the postcolonial perspective discloses the nonparallelism of Europeanization and progress – and hence, ambivalences and fractures as inherent to the very concept of Europeanization.

This review of the interlinkage of the concepts of Europe, modernity and crises reveals that this triad...
has been interpreted very differently at different points in time and from different geographical viewpoints. The recent conjunction of crises and crises in the understandings of Europe – ranging from the financial and so-called ‘refugee’ crises to the rise of populism and authoritarianism – represents an auspicious moment for analyzing Europeanization beyond trajectorism. We argue that Europe and modernity are not characterized by teleological progress but bring along ambivalent and entangled developments instead. The processes of Europeanization are complex with regard to their causes, directions, and consequences.

Our paper proceeds as follows. In the next part, we will outline the three central concepts that form the basis of our nonteleological approach to Europeanization. First, we will discuss the concepts of modernity and modernization with respect to their teleological and nonteleological components. Second, we will present an overview of contemporary conceptions of Europeanization both in the social sciences and in history and search for the entry points for nontrajectorist approaches. Third, we will discuss the concept of ambivalence as part of social scientific reasoning. In chapter 3, we will elaborate on our concept of ambivalent Europeanization by taking into account ambivalences that can be found in the internal and external dimensions of Europeanization.

2. Modernization, Europeanization, and ambivalence: existing definitions, missing parts and the potential of interdisciplinary approaches

Modernity / modernization

In his seminal book “modernity and ambivalence”, published in 1991, the late sociologist Zygmunt Bauman responds to the debate on the construction of orders (for example Anderson 1983) and elaborates on the drive of modern societies to link development to an explicit organization of political and economic regimes. Other than in premodern times, modern orders are by definition distinct from ‘nature’. While their archetypical task is to dominate natural settings, modernity gains the status of a quasi-natural phenomenon by succeeding the unordered states of nature. At the same time, the expectation horizon of modernity is closer to utopia than to a frictionless order, and modernity represents a future that can never be reached. The category of modernity therefore bears two contradictory elements: the success and the simultaneous failure of modernization. The result, in Bauman’s words, is “ambivalence”:

“If modernity is about the production of order then ambivalence is the waste of modernity. Both order and ambivalence are alike products of modern practice; and neither has anything except modern practice – continuous, vigilant practice – to sustain it. Both share in typically modern contingency, foundationlessness of
being. Ambivalence is arguably the modern era’s most genuine worry and concern, since unlike other enemies, defeated and enslaved, it grows in strength with every success of modern powers. It is its own failure that the tidying-up activity construes as ambivalence” (Bauman 1991: 16).

If order as a societal telos creates ambivalence, then the results of modernization processes are in principle different from those that were eventually intended.

It is no accident that Bauman formulated his arguments in the late 1980s. In empirical terms, the disillusionment with an economic model based on growth and expansion had been expressed in the famous report of the Club of Rome in the 1970s. Many continental European countries, including the UK (where Bauman resided in Leeds, a city undergoing industrial restructuring), were confronted with high rates of unemployment. In Poland (where Bauman was born) and other socialist European countries, the promises of economic and societal modernization turned out to be greatly disappointing. In the social sciences, a lively debate on the character of modernity took place during that period. Emerging constructivism challenged the structural functionalist approaches. In 1979, Jean-François Lyotard introduced his argument on the end of grand narratives in history and science (Lyotard 1979). This French line of thinking was heavily debated in social philosophy, and it inspired the thought that modernity as a whole might have come to its end (Meier and Bell 1990). Other voices were less critical toward modernity as such and pointed at the new complexity of late-modern societies, which turned modernity into an “incomplete project” (Habermas 1985, 1992).

While terms such as the “end” or “incompleteness” of modernity already make temporal allusions, the notion of “second modernity” made the time regime of modernity completely visible. In 1986, the German sociologist Ulrich Beck wrote a book called “risk society”, in which he tried to coin the outlook on “another modernity” (Beck 1986). Beck also later used the terms “second” or “reflexive” modernity in order to highlight not only the immanent dangers of (European) modernity – for example, nuclear energy or climate change – but also the fact that (Western) societies had become aware of these risks. Together with the British sociologist Anthony Giddens, Beck argued for strategies to regain control of the unleashed first modernity by embracing a Third Way to realign societal and capitalist interests and (a few years later) by developing cosmopolitan globalization (Giddens 1990; Beck 1991, 1997).

The debate on second modernity exposed the precariousness of modernity and brought about self-transformation and self-critique. First, modernity lost its teleological touch and its premises were to a good extent discredited (Beck and Bonß 2001: 19). While the first modernity had been engaged in dominating nature, thinkers during the second modernity lost their belief that nature can be designed by the human will. Instead, the dangerous consequences of modernity came into focus and allowed for the possibility that modernity may take different directions: “The teleological understanding of modernity that associates time and history with purposeful progress is profoundly unsettled. […] The quality of the futures of modernity consists in their (epochal?) new openness […]. It is controversial, contradictory and ambivalent” (Heinlein et al. 2012: 8-9). Clearly, Bauman referred to these writings, which put the premises of modernity into a new perspective. However, he did not share Giddens’ and Beck’s confidence in the self-healing potential of the second modernity. In Bauman’s view, there is no room for overcoming the restrictions and oppositions of modernity by introducing reflexivity – modernity is, regardless of its phase, the harbor of ambivalence.
In taking this position, Bauman followed a prominent tradition. The first generation of the Frankfurt School, especially Walter Benjamin, Max Horkheimer, and Theodor Adorno, referred to a structural tilting of the instrumental reason of the Enlightenment. Their argument unfolded against the background of European fascist dictatorships during the 1930s and the Holocaust. Horkheimer and Adorno argued that the rationalization of the world separated the self from the modern forms of life, leading to an inescapable difference between the object and the subject and a subsequent need to dominate both. European modernity is therefore inherently connected to totalitarianism, which represents its ‘most natural’ form of government (Horkheimer and Adorno 1971 [1944]). If thought through and practiced to the very end, the processes of modernization according to this view are equal to modern barbarianism.

While the arguments of Horkheimer and Adorno had an enormous epistemological impact, their arguments were less important for empirical social science. This certainly has to do with the fact that much of the first generation of the Frankfurt School had to go into exile and remained scattered after 1945. Another reason seems to be the rapid pacification that took place after the first steps of European integration in 1951. Especially in Germany, the so-called Wirtschaftswunder helped keep pessimistic diagnoses in the background. Prominent advocates of the optimistic view were Karl Popper (2003 [1945]), and even more explicit modernization theorists were Daniel Lerner (1958), Seymour M. Lipset (1959a, 1959b), and Manfred Zapf (1991). They had argued with reference to different regions and decades that increasing levels of education, economic freedom, and democratic rule were preconditions for societal wealth and social peace. In their view, modernization would help overcome the hardships of traditional life in any society, regardless of its respective cultural and/or historical context.

The skeptics, in turn, listed “barbarianism” as “the secret principle of modern society” (Miller and Soeffner 1998a: 17). Again, Zygmunt Bauman noted that modernity cannot be neutral with regard to the question of violence. Bauman even inherently linked the principles of modernity and the Holocaust (Bauman 1989). A decade later, Bauman refined his argument, systematically including violence in the concepts of modernity and civilization: In the end, modernity legitimizes itself as a process of civilization (...) The process of civilization is not about eliminating violence but about redistributing it (Bauman 1998: 39; translation back into English by the authors).

Taken together, modernity and modernization are based on potentially destructive elements. The actual scope of destruction or construction may depend on the question of whether and how violence and power may be distributed, transformed or institutionally channeled. The becoming of Europe comprises remarkable examples in both directions, thereby indicating that the ambivalences of modernization translate into the ambivalences of Europeanization. The next section will discuss the theoretical and conceptual connections behind this idea.
Europeanization

In the social sciences as well as in history, modernity is closely linked to Europe. This is based on approaches that link ideas of modernity to practices that appeared mainly in Europe: be it the early granting of legal autonomy to cities and the attempt to separate religious and secular power (Mitterauer 2003); the development of capitalism and the accompanying economic ethics (Weber 1988 [1904]); or the development of manners within the framework of the European courtly society (Elias 1969). Although postcolonial studies have pointed out the normative equivalence of cultural orders around the globe (Said 1994; Gilroy 2000), we hold that the attribution of the abovementioned processes to European practices usually goes along with latent neutral or positive connotations.

In the mainstream understanding of political science, scholars refer to Europeanization by its post-1945 meaning as a process of domestic change caused by European integration and the mechanisms of EU policy making (Börzel and Risse 2000; Vink 2003). These processes are possible because of the considerable transfer of political competencies from the level of the nation state to the supranational EU. Because of its close connection to the European Union, some authors have suggested using the neologism “EU-ization” in order to distinguish between the supranational processes of the EU and other forms of non-EU related Europeanness (Kohler-Koch 2000). Since the overidealized nation states were the source of the bellicose politics of (at least) the years 1914-1945, EU-ization – even if it is most commonly called “Europeanization” (Ladrech 1994; Radaelli 2000) – is associated with a political style that is better suited to keeping war away from Europe. Over time, scholars have noted the emergence of a European civil society, transnational communication, and a growing European public sphere (Liebert and Trenz 2011; Risse 2010). The becoming of Europe is also related to Europeanization and identity construction without the classic foundations of nation states (Bach 2000; Eigmüller and Mau 2010). Empirically, it can be observed that among most of the elites of postwar (Western) Europe, “European integration” and “Europeanization” have been understood as attributes of peace and prosperity, not of critique or rejection.

In turning away from the research on EU-ization, different judgements come to the fore. A major aspect concerns terminology. Whereas political scientists still tend to reserve the notion “Europeanization” for the impact that the EU has on nation states, other disciplines such as history stress the variety and complexity of the concepts of Europe and Europeanization. If “Europeanization” in a strict grammatical sense can be translated as the “becoming of Europe” (Beichelt 2015), then its meaning has changed over time, although always on the basis of and in reference to modernity. After “becoming imperial”, it meant “becoming national” in the course of the 19th century; and liberal or illiberal and transnational in recent years. Historians usually do not consider the EU as the main frame of reference for Europeanization processes. Consequently, the teleological plot and the legitimizing potential inherent to the political rhetoric of Europeanization are viewed with skepticism. Many historians rather define Europeanization as a process of cultural, social, and political convergence implying an increase in entanglements, interactions, and limitations (Jarausch/Kleßmann 2004; Kaelble/Kirsch 2008; Hirschhausen/Patel 2010).

Taken together, the different approaches to Europeanization emphasize forms of integration and disintegration, of global reach and isolation, of acceptance and refusal (Frevert 2003). Europe
appears to be the fluid result of the historical overlapping of (shared) experiences and (common) expectations, communication, transfers and of the long-term establishment of European institutions, as well as the discourse about and imagination of Europe itself (Schmale 2000; Bösch et al. 2012). Moreover, Norman Davies’s metaphor of a “tidal Europe” (Patel and Hirschhausen 2010) is equally convincing as is the commonplace insight that European history is an open process of unpredictable events. We will not only accept the inherent ambivalence of Europeanization, but we will systematize it in the next section.

**Ambivalences**

After having outlined the contradictory and ambivalent aspects that are inherent to both modernization and Europeanization, we now turn to the concept of ambivalence itself. We have seen that Zygmunt Bauman called ambivalence the waste of modernity and the inseparable byproduct of modernity’s attempt to establish order. However, Bauman was not the first to assign the concept of ambivalence a central role in the processes of sociation. Ambivalence has played a central role in at least four epistemic traditions.

First, starting with ancient theology, divinities have been marked by double-valuedness (Lurker 1991: 30-31). Osiris was the old Egyptian god of the underworld but also the god of the sky. The Canaanite god of the dead Mot was at the same time the god of fertility. The Greek god Apollo sent diseases but also created the art of healing. Jahwe is the source of light and darkness as well as salvation and disaster. The symbols of Jesus Christ are the lamb and the lion, and so on. While we know that all symbols bear different and contingent meanings, the abovementioned examples show the closeness of mutually exclusive elements of life. Ambivalence has been constructed as an intrinsic element of life in moments of creation and destruction.

Second, in the prosaic literature of the 19th and early 20th centuries, double-valuedness was extended to diagnoses of society (Wilpert 1989: 23). Double-facedness was a prominent metaphor, for example, in Heinrich Kleist’s character Michael Kohlhaas (who oscillates between gentleness and self-destruction) or in Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s The Double (where the main character appears as two different persons and characters). In authors such as Marcel Proust (In Search of Lost Time), Robert Louis Stevenson (The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde), Franz Kafka (The Process), and Robert Musil (Man Without Qualities), the double- or multi-valuedness of persons translates into societies that are marked by a loss of predictability and generally by a loss of positive values. While individuals may be the carriers of virtue, they are confronted with amoral conditions in various kinds of collectivities.

Third, in 1911, the Swiss psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler introduced the term ambivalence with the broader intention to bring Freud’s psychoanalytic thinking into clinical psychology. Bleuler attributed the term ambivalence to persons who suffered from schizophrenia, which is also a term that Bleuler formulated (Bleuler 2014). Schizophrenia has its roots in the Greek verb ὁσιζεῖν, which can be translated as the verb to split, splinter, and cleave. Despite what is sometimes implied by everyday language, the ambivalence of schizophrenic minds is not necessarily linked to binary components. Ambivalence allows for multiple divisions within persons but also within collective identities.

The roots of the term ambivalence in psychoanalytic thinking lead to two aspects that cannot be
disregarded (Lurker 1991: 31-32). First, the term ambivalence is linked to code systems such as normal/abnormal or healthy/ill. In order to make sense of such distinctions, it is necessary to critically reconstruct the context for the attribution of sanity or insanity to affirmative or noncompliant behavior (Foucault 2014, 2015). Second, the roots of ambivalence, whether in allegedly healthy/normal or unhealthy/abnormal contexts, are firmly connected to base cases such as the evolution of young personalities, parent/child relationships, or family constellations. Ambivalences usually have their roots (better: it is assumed that they have their roots) in core settings, not in peripheral incidents.

Fourth, ambivalence is also a key concept in postcolonial studies. For Homi Bhabha, ambivalence is the main feature of the colonial discourse: the source of both its power and its instability. Ambivalence manifests itself in the structure of the colonial stereotype, which presents its discriminatory knowledge about the colonized as something obvious and “already known” on the one hand and as something that has to be “anxiously repeated” (Bhabha 1994: 66) on the other. Even the content of the colonial stereotype is ambivalent – stereotypes include both admiration and fear, “desire and derision, an articulation of difference contained within the fantasy of origin and identity” (ibid.: 67).

In the colonial discourse, the colonized simultaneously represents the eternal Other and a subject that can be reformed according to the model of the colonizer-Self. This double role of the colonized as a carrier “of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite” (ibid.: 86) produces deeply ambivalent identities on both sides. Bhabha even conceptualizes the colonized subject as the hybrid Doppelgänger of the colonizer: through the mimicking and adoption of the colonizer-culture, the colonized destabilize the very same idea of originality, uniqueness and exclusive belonging that characterizes the colonizer’s paradigm of civilizational superiority. In this sense, the mimicry of the colonized also unveils the inner contradictions in the central values of the Enlightenment, civilization and freedom (Castro Varela and Dhawan 2005: 89). Consequently, ambivalence does not divide, but it links subjects and objects of the colonial discourse (Finzi 2012: 67). In postcolonial studies, ambivalence therefore stands for inherent contradiction as well as for polysemy. From these four understandings, we may distill four reference points. Ambivalences are (a) related to core settings of individual and collective life, (b) linked to elements of creation or, in a broader sense, to human action, (c) associated with an asymmetry between an encompassing societal modernity and fragile individual selves, and (d) marked by hybridity through the simultaneous repetition and transformation of power relations. In adapting these ideas to the subject of Europeanization, we argue that historical, political, or societal processes in Europe are ambivalent because they carry an inherent moment of contradiction and polysemy that is immanent in the key ideas and concepts of European modernity. In this sense, ambivalent processes are not merely contingent, but their contingency results in contradictoriness and multi-directionality toward a teleological understanding of European modernity that is accompanied by moments of alienation due to unequal relations of cultural, economic, and political power.

As has been demonstrated by the abovementioned literary authors of the 19th and early 20th century, individuals may be forced to live their lives according to the confinements of modern societies, but they have their individual strategies to cope with modernity. Similarly, the colonized have adapted the apparently fixed norms of European modernity in their own ways, thus transforming them at the same time. There is a gap between the room for maneuver that individuals and groups have and
the seemingly iron cage of the modern society; a gap that is open to contingent – and consequently, ambivalent – social action. Combined, our triad concept of i) ‘Europeanization, modernization and trajectorism’, which we already transformed into ii) ‘Europeanization, modernization and crises’, is now adjusted anew into the triad iii) ‘Europeanization, modernization and ambivalences’. In rejecting trajectorism/teleology and promoting an understanding of crises that conceives of them as a constitutive element of Europeanization, our approach resonates with the perspective that views ambivalence as a central aspect of Europeanization, both as an inherent feature and an outcome.

3. Teleology, modernity, and Europe: from historic to postcolonial studies of Europeanization

Our proposition that Europeanization and modernization are tied to ambivalence does not allow for the reverse conclusion that ambivalences are solely tied to Europeanization. In particular, the postcolonial perspective regards ambivalences in a more structural way than modernization-oriented approaches. We will present both perspectives with the aim of unfolding the different functions that ambivalence may have in the concepts of Europe and Europeanization.

When Bauman attributed ambivalence to modernity, he certainly had in mind Europe and hence European forms of modernity. Alluding to Krzysztof Pomian, Bauman characterized Europe as a “civilization of frontier crossing” that is willing to “give the world a better form”. This striving for a global order – and hence global power – needs a historic mission to enforce its own will throughout the world (Bauman 1998: 38; translation from German by the authors). In Bauman’s book on the ambivalence of modernity, the link between intra-European and extra-European processes of modernization is not spelled out with many historical examples. This should be done, however. European dominance throughout the world has been – with the discovery of ‘India’ in 1492 as a turning point – linked to imperialism and/or colonialism (see Castro Varela and Dhawan 2015: 20-39). Both processes serve as playing fields that both unleashed and extended the experience of European modernity; its global reach and purposiveness distinguish it from, for example, Roman and Islamist expansion in earlier periods of history (Appadurai 2012; Boață 2013; Frischmann 2017). European teleology and trajectorism not only contains a temporal but also a spatial dimension. However, there is another level of the asymmetrical distribution of power in European modernity that the classical authors of postcolonial studies mostly ignore. Beyond the obvious dimension of the exploitation of colonized non-European spaces, inner-European differences with regard to modernity have played and still play a significant role. Most imaginations of history that did not contain a Western European component were seen as normatively inferior. British parliamentarism, the French Revolution, industrialization, the building of nation states and even colonization largely emanated from Western Europe. In his lectures on the philosophy of history, Hegel spoke of freedom on the “march from East to West” – not only to highlight the backwardness of Asia.
or Arabia but also of the (rural) European East (Hegel 1986: 74, 134). The idea of progress was increasingly associated with its socioeconomic components. Marx and many others spoke of historic necessities in taming a phenomenon that had acquired a Western European code (Salvadori 2008: 17-23).

The teleological component became ever stronger and led to the classical modernization theory of the 20th century. Besides the authors that have already been mentioned (Lerner 1958; Lipset 1959b; Zapf 1996), another pertinent example is Walt W. Rostow’s stages of growth (Rostow 1960), a perspective that has also been taken up to construct the Human Development Index (HDI) of the United Nations. Ever since then, aspects such as secularization, social differentiation, individualization, industrialization, capitalism, urbanization, nation-building, democratization and rationalization have been seen as the core elements of a seemingly universal modernity based on the model of a Western European development.

Of course, many authors have tried to put this argument into perspective. The most prominent counterarguments have referred to the terms “multiple” or “diverse” modernities (Eisenstadt 1987; Spohn 2006, 2010). They were coined by historical sociologists with the aim of reinstating non-European forms of modernity; for example, in urban centers around the globe or in periods and places that are easily disregarded. Eisenstadt and Spohn also introduced the argument that modernity includes sociocultural elements, for example, the capacity for peaceful conflict resolution or cultural and scientific accomplishments. Eisenstadt’s and Spohn’s arguments rightly pointed out that modernity, or components of it, should not be reduced to Western Europe (and North America) alone.

At the same time, Eisenstadt and Spohn placed little emphasis on teleology as a problematic element of the idea of European modernity. In their view, the core values of Enlightenment such as rationality or freedom are not the only ones to have a positive normative connotation. Additionally, socioeconomic accomplishments such as social differentiation, urbanization, or a capitalist regime present preferable characteristics – “modern” societies are in their view normatively superior to “nonmodern” ones and should therefore be established for the sake of societal progress. Eisenstadt and Spohn shed doubt on the pseudouniversal evolutionary pattern of Western Europe and North America (Spohn 2010: 4), but they do not reject modernity as such.

Another field of criticism of modernization theory in the 20th century unfolded explicitly with regard to non-Western parts of Europe. The question arose because certain parts of Central and Eastern Europe had undoubtedly belonged to the ‘modern’ sphere in previous times. For example, St. Petersburg of the 18th and 19th centuries was a flourishing center that attracted arts and knowledge as well as economic and military resources from all around Europe. Another example is parts of Czechoslovakia, which belonged to one of the most industrialized regions of Europe before World War II.

Another critical aspect of European modernity concerns state socialism. Electrification was one of the core slogans of Lenin’s economic policy in the Soviet Union of the 1920s and 1930s – certainly an element of conceptions of modernity. While the myth of Soviet and communist modernization was strengthened by technological and scientific innovations, ambitious research and prestigious projects such as space missions, the myth receded when the standards of life and levels of societal freedom were found to clearly lag way behind Western Europe. Nevertheless, the appraisal of the political, social, and economic developments beyond the Iron Curtain proceeded via the terminology of modernization. Perhaps the best example was the monumental “East Central Europe in the Modern World” by
Andrew Janos (2000), which again captured the region in its different degrees of “backwardness” – always in reference to the Western European capitalist market democracy. Nearly one decade earlier, Francis Fukuyama’s notorious vision of the “end of history” already underscored that no other form of political and economic organization would gain the same level of legitimacy as Western democracies (Fukuyama 1992).

A historically more coherent concept has been presented by Manuela Boatcă, who distinguishes between “decadent” Southern and “epigonic” Eastern Europe, with both European subregions employed in establishing the hegemony of the one (West) European model of modernity (Boatcă 2010). This model goes much further than most approaches within the postcolonial studies paradigm, which often conceptualizes Europe as a uniform construct instead of diversifying and pluralizing European actors and experiences.

By and large, the core elements of teleological modernity have remained the normative reference until today, even if insightful authors have undertaken various efforts to problematize the very notion of modernity (Banerjee 2006: 1-7). The current imagination of modernity is not only established as a real-world benchmark of human development but this benchmark is also defined by Western actors who therefore create the epistemological standards of modernity (Boatcă 2010: 343).

What, however, was the role of modernity in the notion of Europe and/or Europeanness? Not only does Western Europe seem to have a “patent” (Boatcă 2013: 322) on the definition of modernity, but modernity has also played a role in the formation of the idea of Europe. This can be discussed along three dimensions: a temporal, a spatial and a normative dimension.

The first concerns temporality, and in particular, periodization. We argue that based on the idea of ambivalence, temporality without teleology as part of Europeanization is possible. While the temporal idea of Europe “between tradition and modernity” reflects dichotomous concepts that in the end only reproduce teleology, a nonteleological approach to Europeanization takes into account time concepts of acceleration and accelerating creative destruction (Rosa 2005; Reckwitz 2014). The temporal dimension of Europeanization points to the simultaneity or temporal arrangement of interlinked phenomena; their (temporal) superimposition and dynamic; or at particular “tilting points” when processes or mechanisms of Europeanization clash and effect neologisms or new directions of European phenomena (Junge 2000; Knöbl 2007). Our focus on temporality pays attention to “symbolic meaning-making” related to decisive ambivalent turning points in Europeanization (Basta 2017).

The second dimension concerns the spatial and imperial construction of Europe. Many historians understand the emergence of the idea of Europe as a reaction to territorial experiences that are associated with the passage to modernity. Elements are the confrontation with the Osman empire, European colonialism, religious wars, and secularization (Asbach 2014 and Burke 1980). The military confrontation with the Osmans created a consciousness of European solidarity in confrontation with the Asian enemy and of superiority toward the Asian-Ottoman culture. The religious wars of the 17th century destroyed the role of the Catholic Church as guarantor of unity on the continent and enabled the emergence of the modern idea of Europe as a system of states (Burke 1980: 25-25). Colonialism created an awareness of being European through contact with the Others on other continents. Moreover, colonization paved the way for an entangled history that structurally overarched Europe (Conrad 2013).

If we accept the late appearance of the idea and notion of Europe and its reliance on the colonial experience, we have to define Europe as an imperial construct based on the subjective feeling of
superiority and as a definite result of global interactions (Asbach 2017; Conrad and Randeira 2013). Therefore, territorial placings of culture and identity and their interdependence form the spatial dimension of ambivalent Europeanization. As scholars from both political science and history, we have noticed different epistemologies regarding the scope of Europe. In mainstream political science, European modernity has to a significant extent been built on the imagination that the nation state lies at the foundation of effective statehood. This position rests on the relative stability of certain nation states (for example Great Britain, France, or the states in Scandinavia) and on the relatively peaceful conditions of the post-1945 order that was built on nation states. The nation state has been seen as an effective model through counterfactuals: in many places and periods where the cultural and political nation state did not coincide, regimes were unstable and had a tendency to turn or remain nondemocratic (for example, in the Balkans).

From the perspective of historical scholarship, however, the nation state is seen neither as central nor as positive as in political science: large periods of history, for example, in the 18th and 19th centuries, have been marked by empires rather than by nation states. Even France and the United Kingdom can be categorized as colonial empires until well into the 1960s. Additionally, the judgement on empires has changed considerably in recent decades. Many of them (for example Hapsburg or the United Kingdom) underwent considerable modernization and were quite effective in regard to internal security or multiethnic administration. Additionally, there are examples of nation states that took over imperial practices, as can be seen from the incorporation of Southern Italy into central rule and the creation of colonies by Italy and Germany in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

Therefore, we put forward the question of whether the nation state has generally been overestimated as a seemingly modern point of reference. At the same time, transnational orders and regimes have not yet been established. Europeanization has, in historic hindsight and from the perspective of today, been permanently characterized by border-drawing and debordering. It has ambivalent impacts on the territorial attributions of political and social orders, nation states and the transnational realm.

The third dimension concerns the normative expectation horizons of modernity that were and still are associated with the notion of Europe. Already during the Enlightenment, the establishment of a peaceful order to overcome the violent conflicts of the 16th and 17th centuries was projected onto Europe (Delanty 2013: 156-157). In that sense, Europe took the place of premodern phenomena such as the Holy Roman Empire as an order of (imagined) peace. When the Christian world diversified, this also dissolved the religious unity of the Empire. The Religious Peace of Augsburg (1555) was made by Ferdinand I. (the brother of Charles V.) and the estates of the empire – the secular and/or political forces had taken over the former empires’ function of guaranteeing peace (Koselleck 1979: 17-37). With the anti-Napoleonic coalition and the Congress of Vienna, the task of European peacekeeping had acquired a new meaning. From the beginning of the 19th century, the major challenge did not consist in containing religious conflict any more, but in fencing in military projects of conquest that aimed at the whole continent.

While the European powers of the 19th century struggled with internal imperialist attempts, they had fewer problems exporting the imperial model to the rest of the world. As has been outlined above, it became the basic form of the relationship between the European great powers and the peripheries, be
it at the edges of Europe or in the rest of the world (Delanty 2013: 158-159). Exactly during this time, the teleological processes of rationalization, bureaucratization, and self-determination of (Western European) individuals, societies and states, as well as industrialization and market capitalism, took clear shape in Western Europe and formed the core of modernization theory (Asbach 2017: 188). The “Westernization of Europe”, as this normative effigy has been called (Randeira and Römhild 2013: 20-21), culminated during the postwar period and did not even find its end with the end of the Cold War, when the adoption of the EU’s rules by Eastern European countries became the most prominent interpretation of Europeanization.

Normative expectations such as peace, stability, rational power, democracy and wealth as relevant targets that also influence political practices can therefore be conceptualized as the third dimension of European modernization, comprising the ambivalence of (re)producing patterns of instability, inequality, mistrust and autocracy. The ambivalence in the dimension of normative (societal) expectations consists of potentially overlapping, divergent or parallel processes of homogenization and differentiation of norms, practices, or discourses. For instance, industrialization, social differentiation, the consolidation of nation states, economic regulation, and the creation of welfare states have brought about lasting processes of institutional alignment and homogenization in Europe. At the same time, these processes have also brought inequality, disparities, asymmetries of knowledge or material resources, or deprivation. Both integrative and disintegrative functions of conflict, crises and boundary drawing are constantly present in and related to Europe. This perspective on ambivalent normative expectations in and toward European societies helps to analyze both homogenization and alignment, as well as differentiation and alienation, as aspects of Europeanization.

In summary, we consider these three dimensions - normative expectations, and the spatial and temporal dimensions – as three decisive ‘arenas’ in which ambivalences of Europeanization can be observed, systematized and analyzed with respect to their roots, entanglements and consequences.

4. Conclusion

The aim of our paper was to formulate and deploy an approach to Europeanization beyond trajectorism. We have tried to shed light on the link between the Europeanization and modernization approaches, and we tried to investigate the idea of sequence that is inherent to both concepts. We have argued that ambivalences, that is, the inherent contradictoriness and multidirectionality of processes, form the core of Europeanization and are at the same time the coupling element that dovetails with Europeanization and modernization. With the help of theories on modernity – first and foremost, Zygmunt Bauman’s writings on ambivalent modernity – and of postcolonial studies that broaden the perspective on Europeanization beyond Europe’s territorial borders, we elaborated a concept of Europeanization that replaces teleology with ambivalence and shifts the focus on the role
of contradictions, crises and conflict. Taking the concept of ambivalences seriously leads us to place contingency, not teleology, at the core of Europeanization. The reflection on Europeanization from the specific perspective of postcolonial studies sheds light on the three particular dimensions of Europeanization in which the inherent ambivalences become especially apparent: the dimensions of time, normative expectations, and space and empire. We think that our approach of ambivalent Europeanization – split into these three dimensions – shows the applicability of the concept to empirical research. The research perspective of ambivalences takes into account that outcomes of Europeanization can be peace and conflict, contestation and compromise, integration and crisis. We argue that this represents the core of Europeanization. Our approach may help to implement a perspective on Europeanization that conceptualizes Europe not as a kind of ‘logical outcome’ of former processes, decisions, coincidences or ambitions but as a fragile, dynamic, multifaceted societal construct that is situated in the particular institutionalized transnationalism of the European continent.

5. Bibliography


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The Viadrina Institute for European Studies (IFES) at the School for Cultural and Social Sciences of the European University Viadrina offers a platform for interdisciplinary research on social, political, and cultural figurations in a globally entangled Europe. The research interests lie on historic and present processes of Europeanisation, focusing on their inherent ambivalences and including Europe’s colonial history and its aftermath. We encourage the exploration of ruptures, contradictions, and transformation processes and aim to integrate these inquiries in the academic and public debates about Europe, Eurocentrism, and the EU in past and present.

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