The Bright & Dark Sides of Civil Society

Democratic Consolidation and Regime Hybridity in Divided Societies

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List of Abbreviations

ACP = African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
BiH/BH = Bosnia i Herzegovina/ Bosnia and Herzegovina, also Bosnia-Herzegovina
BTI = Bertelsmann Transformations Index
CARDS = Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation
CCM = constant comparative method
CSI= Civil Society Index
CSO = civil society organizations
DPA = Dayton Peace Accords
DPA = Democratic Party of Albanians
DUI = Democratic Union for Integration
ECJ = European Court of Justice
EDP = external democracy promotion
EIDHR = European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EU = European Union
EUSR = European Union Special Representative
FH = Freedom House
GONGO = government organized non-governmental organization
IMF = International Monetary Fund
INGO = international non-governmental organizations
IO = international organization
IPA = The Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance
KM = konvertibilna marka
MK = Macedonia/Republic Macedonia/ FYROM
MZ = ‘mjesne zajednice’ (‘local communities’)
Nato = North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NED = National Endowment for Democracy
NGO = non-governmental organizations
OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OFA = Ohrid Framework Agreement
OHR = Office of the High Representative
OSCE = Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PCI = problem-centered interviews
PIC = Peace Implementation Council
QCA = qualitative content analysis
QUANGO = quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisation
RS = Republika Srbska
SAA = Stabilisation and Association Agreement
SDC = Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SDSM = Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia
SIDA = Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
UN = United Nations
UNDP = United Nations Development Programm
USAID = United States Agency for International Development
VMRO-DPMNE = Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity
Abstract (English)

This dissertation examines the widely assumed positive effect of civil society on democratic consolidation. During the past twenty-five years, civil society has been strongly supported in target states of external democracy promotion. A relatively rising share of so-called “hybrid regimes” around the world, among them many displaying deep ethno-national divisions, has led to increased attention to the “dark sides” of civil society. Also, doubts have arisen whether external democracy promotion in general and civil society promotion in particular are actually conducive to overall democratization. This, however, so far has not been investigated systematically.

The dissertation investigates this research gap and asks to what extent previous ethno-national conflict influences civil society’s contribution to democratic consolidation and the role external democracy promotion plays in this context. The research is conducted on the basis of two qualitative case-studies, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic Macedonia, both far advanced, but currently stagnating on their way of democratic consolidation.

The research project comes to the conclusion that civil society can in fact positively influence democratic consolidation – particularly with regard to procedural aspects such as political participation, representation of interests, implementation of laws, or the rule of law – but it can also influence structural aspects, as for instance legislation, or the establishing of formal procedures for political involvement of citizens. Nevertheless, ethno-national divisions strongly inhibit civil society’s impact. While, in fact, currently prevailing ethno-nationally mobilized cleavages affect civil society’s influence more negatively than the scale of previous inter-ethnic violence – as frequently very dominant (clientelistic) networks impede coalitions and thus divide the society both vertically (between state, civil society, and citizens) as well as horizontally (within state, civil society, and citizens), which in turn limits the political influence of civil society. Summing up, civil society’s theoretically assumed positive functions can, provided ethno-national divisions and incomplete democratic consolidation, be inhibited if not negatively reversed, as the case studies show.

External democracy promotion is found to play a controversial, yet potentially influential role – as the contrast between a relatively better trained civil society in combination with a state increasingly ready to take civil society into account in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the one hand and a civil society with less resources and a state less inclined to cooperate with critical civil society in Macedonia on the other hand shows. International organizations can, on the one hand, positively promote democratic structures, improve inter-ethnic relations, and support the establishment and improvement of civil society, notably in the fields of organizational capacity and social service provision. On the other hand, however, external democracy promotion also carries certain risks: previous practices have led to an “NGOization” and intransparent funding and clientelism between donors and recipients has fostered competition and mistrust between civil society organizations.

Generally, where external democracy promotion wishes to lead to sustainable effects, external actors should provide continued support in states with weak regimes, and, in states with (over-)powerful regimes, they should provide a counterweight to the state and in support of civil society. If external democracy promotion pulls out before democratic consolidation is achieved, the risk is that (too) strong regimes may then promote mostly politically uncritical and social services providing CSOs, which will then lead to an undermining of the sustainability of civil society promotion, or, in states where sufficiently functioning structures for the cooperation between state and civil society have been established, fading external support combined with quality monitoring and incentives for elite cooperation can actually lead to “natural selection” of civil society organizations.
Abstract (Deutsch)


Die Dissertation widmet sich der sich daraus ergebenden Forschungslücke und untersucht, inwieweit frühere ethno-nationale Konflikte den Beitrag der Zivilgesellschaft zur demokratischen Konsolidierung beeinflussen und welche Rolle externe Demokratieförderung in diesem Kontext spielt. Dies geschieht auf der Grundlage von zwei qualitativen Fallstudien, Bosnien-Herzegowina und Republik Mazedonien, beide weit voran geschritten aber derzeit stagnierend auf dem Weg zu demokratischer Konsolidierung.


Wo externe Demokratieförderung einen nachhaltigen Effekt bis zum Erlangen der Konsolidierung anstrebt, können externe Akteure in Staaten mit schwachen Regierungsstrukturen die Etablierung politischer Strukturen weiter fördern und in Staaten mit (zu) starken Regierungsstrukturen ein Gegengewicht zur Unterstützung der Zivilgesellschaft bilden. Ein Rückzug externer Demokratieförderer vor Erreichen der Konsolidierung birgt das Risiko, das (zu starke) Staaten anschließend unkritische und soziale Zivilgesellschaft fördern und damit zu einer Unterminierung der Nachhaltigkeit im Bereich Zivilgesellschaftsförderung beitragen, beziehungsweise wo bereits ausreichende Strukturen zur Kooperation zwischen Staat und Zivilgesellschaft etabliert sind, kann ein Rückzug externer Geber in Kombination mit fortgesetzten Qualitätskontrollen und ausreichenden Kooperationsanreizen für politische Eliten aber auch eine „natürliche Selektion“ von Zivilgesellschaftsorganisationen fördern.
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CHAPTER 1: DISILLUSIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY’S CONTRIBUTION TO DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

While at time of the fall of the Iron Curtain “the end of history” had already been declared (Fukuyama 1989), during the past ten years scholars have increasingly been reflecting on a possible “end of transition paradigm” (Carothers 2002). Research on transition and democratization found that while the real number of authoritarian regimes has steadily decreased over the past 25 years, at the same time the total share of hybrid regimes has risen. As a consequence, researchers are debating to what extent regimes “in the gray zone” actually make up a stable regime type of their own, referred to as ‘hybrid regimes’ or whether they are just cases of protracted transition and need to be assessed as “diminished subtypes”, somewhere on the continuum between authoritarianism and consolidated democracy. For many decades now, Western states have been supporting democratization in states around the world – through measures ranging from military interventions to various types of incentives and cooperation, also referred to as “external democracy promotion”. While calls for democratization have become an established part of the rhetoric of international cooperation, the rising share of non-consolidated democracies as well as further recent scientific findings suggest that the effect of democracy promotion on actual democratization processes in fact may not be as significant, as had been declared for the past decades. (See exemplary Schimmelfennig 2010; Schimmelfennig, Scholtz 2008, 2010; Cirtautas, Schimmelfennig 2010; Carothers 1999.)

One point incessantly underlined in the context of external democracy promotion is the important role of civil society with regard to democratization in general and to democratic consolidation in particular. The limited success of overall democratization has fueled research of civil society’s actual nature and impact. Many publications continue to discuss the theoretical functions of civil society for positive contribution to democratization. However, the number of publications investigating on “uncivil society” or civil society’s “dark sides” has steadily increased. Against this background, this dissertation investigates whether the theoretically assumed democratic spill-over of civil society can de facto contribute to democratic consolidation of deeply divided hybrid regimes and whether and how external democracy promotion can successfully support these efforts. The research focuses on a particularly challenging, yet common context of democratization: democratization in deeply divided societies.

1.1 Current State-of-the Art: Civil Society’s Democratic Spill-Over in Divided Hybrid Regimes

This section briefly summarizes the most important aspects of current research on civil society’s possible contribution to democratization. The particular focus is on democratic consolidation vs. regime hybridity, and on the role that societal divisions, civil society’s “dark sides” and external democracy promotion play in this context. As the extensive literature review is given in the following theory part of the dissertation, the present overview is limited to highlighting the most important points with regard to open questions and research gaps.

1.1.1 Democratization: The Transition Paradigm vs. Regime Hybridity – It’s all About Procedures

Between 1974, the year of the beginning of the third wave of democratization, and 2001 the number of democracies in the world quadrupled. (Merkel et al. 2003: 10) However, the relative share of “partly free” regimes has also increased. (See e.g. Freedom House 2010 and Polity IV 2012.) According to Polity IV, in 2011 out of a total 193 states 95 (49%) are democratic, 22 (11%) autocratic, and 48 (25%) are...
anocratic, falling in between democracy and autocracy. (Polity IV 2012) Until the late 1990s, states were commonly classified as either ‘autocracies’ or ‘democracies’ (for a critical overview compare e.g. Zinecker 2007). Recent research has shifted the focus towards the conditions that are conducive or impeding to the completion of democratic consolidation, especially with regard to states that seem to have settled on the way of democratization without having achieved complete democratic consolidation. Analytically, democratization has conventionally been divided into a two or three staged process, lasting from the opening of an autocratic regime to its democratic consolidation.

The understanding of ‘democracy’ ranges from minimal (comp. e.g. (Lincoln 1955) to ambitious, ideal-type definitions (see e.g. Dahl 1971; Schedler 2001). Particularly since the mid-1990s some authors have begun to underline the significance of the actual “rules of the game”, e.g. (O'Donnell 1996), and that democratic consolidation means that democracy is considered “the only game in town” (Linz, Stepan 1996: 5; Przeworski 1991), is accompanied by “the will to democracy” (Held 1995: 158) and a democratic political culture (Gunther et al. 1996: 158), and that no significant group of actors contests these rules and the integrity of the state. (Linz, Stepan 1996)

Particularly with regard to unsuccessful democratization, research has started to investigate about possible positive and negative factors for success. In recent years, several scholars have shifted their focus from looking not so much at democratic structures, but at the quality of their functioning and it is widely believed that democratization may take place at a different pace in different partial regimes (Merkel et al. 2003: 21). In many post-communist societies (but not only), a lack of fit between practices and formal institutions persists, where cultural rules and current practices (corruption, etc.) until today perpetuate suspicion toward authorities, reluctance for civic participation, non-participation in elections, etc. (Sztompka 1996: 119; Chandler 1999: 28) So, rather, changes in attitudes and behavior are highly crucial for democratic consolidation so that changes of institutional structures also bring democratic consolidation (Gunther et al. 1996: 152), a process that might take years, if not generations, as several authors hold against, in their view, unrealistic expectations of high-speed democratization. (Comp. Halliday 1995: 217; Sapsin Fine 1996: 566; Talbott 1996: 62; Chandler 1999: 13, 29; Dahrendorf 1990: 99.) An increasing number of distinct classifications for these ‘hybrid’ forms of statehood have been suggested, in some cases attempting to provide more discrete categories for analysis in this ‘gray’ zone, and warns of succumbing to the ‘illusion of consolidation’, if transition and consolidation are uncritically assumed to be stable. (2001) A multitude of terms for what Collier and Levitsky (1997: 431) have called ‘democracies with adjectives’, have been developed

“to capture the essence of regimes that were neither full democracies nor in transition” (Emerson, Noutcheva 2004: 2), comp. also (Merkel et al. 2003: 14; Croissant, Thiery 2000).)

During the last few years, a multitude of terms for the 550 ‘diminished subtypes’ or ‘democracies with

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1 A more detailed discussion on the literature and discussion on ‘democracy’ and ‘hybrid regimes’, ‘defective democracies’ etc. is presented in chapter 2 of this dissertation
2 For more on ‘democratization’ see exemplary Sztompka 1996; Price 2003; Haynes 2005; Ottaway, Chung 1999.
5 In reality the stages are usually not clear-cut and until the final consolidation, institutional insecurity and instability frequently dominate the process. (Schedler 2001)
6 For more definitions of ‘democracy’ see e.g. Dahl 1971; for minimal definitions see e.g. Linz and Stepan 1996, for procedural aspects see e.g. Huntington 1991: 9 and Habermas 1992; for practical functions see e.g. Merkel, Puhle & Croissant 2003: 47.
7 See exemplarily Karl, Schmitter 1991, on factors for the break-up of authoritarianism, see e.g. Huntington 1991; Fukuyama 1989; Pridham 1995a, on achieving successful democratic consolidation compare Linz, Stepan 1996; Diamond 1999; Merkel 2000a; O'Donnell 1996; von Beyme 1994; O'Donnell 1996; Pridham et al. 2001, and on factors that influence possible backsliding or democratic reversal see exemplarily Huntington 1991; Pridham et al. 1996.
adjectives’ identified by Collier and Levitsky (1997: 431) have been developed to describe those “states in-between”, such as “semi-”, “illiberal”, “façade”, ‘pseudo-’, ‘embbeded’ or ‘delegative democracies’ (Emerson, Noutcheva 2004: 2), also referred to as ‘hybrids’, ‘defective’ or ‘ embedded democracies’.\(^8\) (Merkel et al. 2003: 14, see also Croissant, Thiery 2000 and Diamond 2002a)

Until today, the criteria and indicators for when a regime can clearly be defined as authoritarian or democratic are highly contested, depending on whether one adheres to a minimal or more elaborate understanding of democracy. (See exemplary Zinecker 2007) Further, new approaches were developed, so that democracy deficits in different political fields and possible consequences thereof could be better described. (E.g. Merkel et al. 2003) The increasing number of states where democratization is slow and in many of which formal democratic structures have been installed, implies that minimal formal democratic structures do not suffice. They are especially not enough to reach democratic consolidation or may even have counter effects to democratization:

“merely creating democratic institutions and holding elections captures only part of the process through which stable, viable democratic systems come into being” (Gunther et al. 1996: 155) (comp. also e.g. Bliesemann de Guevara, Kühn 2010; Richter 2009b)

As illustrated above scholarly debate today takes into account many institutional and procedural aspects, a detailed analysis of the practical role of civil society’s contribution to democratic consolidation with the support from external actors has not been conducted.

1.1.2 Democratic Consolidation – Civil and Uncivil Society in a Globalized World

The bulk of theoretical and practical literature on external democracy promotion of civil society underlines civil society’s positive contribution to democratization and its crucial role for the completion of democratic consolidation.\(^9\) During the democratic liberalization of many states after the fall of communism, civil society and pro-democratic political parties were rated as decisive factors for the fall of authoritarian regimes. (Yilmaz 2002; Gillespie et al. 2002)

The process of democratic consolidation, is, by scholars and practitioners alike, said to very much depend on the development of a ‘vibrant civil society’ (Król 1995: 39; Croissant et al. 2000; Merkel 2000b; Gillespie et al. 2002; Parrott 1997) This is based on the assumption that civil society is the sphere in which democratic values are internalized (in a Tocquevillean sense) and civil society is assumed to be able to contribute in many ways to democratic consolidation. (Lauth 2003; Diamond 1994: 8) An established civil society is thought to be a precondition for functioning institutions, a gauge of the legitimacy of a democracy (comp. Fukuyama 1995: 8), a protection of democratic institutions, a means to restrict undemocratic behavior of elites and to help the construction of a safe basis in times of crisis for the democratic polity. (Merkel 2000b: 7) Further, civil society is assumed to facilitate the aggregation of interests and influencing of policies by citizens (Kligman 1990: 420), and to create “intermediary groups” (Schmitter 1995a: 1). However, despite the increased significance attributed to civil society, the actual nexus between civil society and democracy remains insufficiently investigated:

\(^8\) Merkel defines ‘embedded democracies’ as “regimes, characterized by the existence of a mostly functioning democratic electoral regime for the organization of access to power, but which lose the complementary support from a disruption in the functional logic of one or several of the partial regimes, that are crucial for guaranteeing the freedom, equality and control in a functional democracy.” (2003: 15), translation by the author, F.B.

\(^9\) Croissant, Lauth, and Merkel elaborate on the role that civil society is assumed to have during transformation processes: Liberalization: Usually, at this point civil society gets more support and becomes significantly more active and influential, often playing a key role in articulation of demands for new freedom; Democratization: The different political/social actors have the most options for action but as soon as a new government and offices are created, new elites and power structures establish themselves; (Democratic) Consolidation: It is not unusual that after civil society actors have been very active and supported by large proportions of the population, there is a phase of ‘desencanto’ (=‘ disenchantment’). (The term goes back to Hirschmann (1970) – comp. Merkel 2001: 102). After resources and power have been redistributed and the dynamics of change have been slowed down and molded into more stable institutional structures, change becomes slower, often causing a decrease in motivation. Croissant et al. 2000
“Associational life may be moving to the center of many democratic theories today, but there has been relatively little theoretical work that specifies what we should expect associations to do for democracy or why we should expect associations to carry out these democratic functions”. (Warren 2004: 4)

And, according to Thania Paffenholz, the frequently held assumption of external democracy promotion that the promotion of civil society contributes to democratization by a “spill-over” deserves to be questioned: Until today, the findings from practical experience have not been integrated into the theoretical state-of-the-art. (Paffenholz 2010; Belloni 2009; Seifija 2006) The largest part of civil society literature draws from approaches based on Tocqueville, for whom voluntary associations represent “large free schools, where all the members of the community go to learn the general theory of association.” (1945: 124)

and various functions of civil society are said to positively affect democracy:

“civil society can be a crucial arena for the development of other democratic attributes (...). These values become most stable when they emerge through experience, and organizational participation in civil society provides important practice in political advocacy and contestation.” (Diamond 1994: 8)

Bruce Parrot takes the argument even further, underlining the important role that civil society plays for assuring the democratic procedures of formal institutions, as

“without key components of civil society, government structures that are formally democratic cannot be expected to operate in a fashion that is substantively democratic.” (1997: 24).

The concept of civil society has been around since the time of Aristotle, has seen changes of meaning over time and seen a recent rise in popularity in the past twenty-five years. Most literature begins by deducing the concept of civil society from the times of Aristotle and concludes with yet another working definition. Dvornik (2009: 103) even writes that not only one can see inflation of new definitions of civil society, but today there is even an inflation of texts talking about inflation of the literature on civil society definitions.

Usually civil society is situated at the intersection of the private sphere and the state, sometimes, however, it is considered as something explicitly separate from them (Cohen, Arato 1992: 5), and sometimes it is thought to partially overlap the two spheres. For Pollack, and also for this study, civil society will be understood as the entire public sphere in which citizens voluntarily – i.e. irrespective of private interests – come together in associations, movements, etc. (Pollack 2003: 46–48), thus civil society is separate from the state but apolitical.

The nature of civil society has been found to depend on the political (and historical) context, so cross-national variation is to be expected. As, thus, in international comparison, and additionally, particularly during transformation the form and functions of civil society are subject to continuous change, it is plausible to approach it as a non-normative analytical category rather than as a distinct historical form. (Pollack 2003: 46–75) Croissant et al. summarize the existing literature into five functions attributed to civil society:

(1) protection,
(2) intermediation,
(3) communication,
(4) socialization, and
(5) community. (Croissant et al. 2000)

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10 Whether or not political associations are part of civil society remains contested in the literature.

11 More broadly on the subject see e.g. Kim 2007: 187; White 2004; Paffenholz 2010, on Eastern Europe see exemplarily Howard 2003; Howard 2012; Forbrig et al. 2007; Dvornik 2009; Seifija 2006, 2008, on the African context see e.g. Jünemann 2004; Gillespie et al. 2002; Kasfir 2004, on Latin America see e.g. Zinecker 2007.
Chapter 1: Disillusions of Civil Society’s Contribution to Democratic Consolidation

Thania Paffenholz develops an approach for the analysis of civil society in the context of post-conflict/divided societies. Drawing from empirical evidence she identifies seven functions\(^\text{12}\) of civil society, of which she particularly highlights the importance of in-group socialization and inter-group cohesion.

However, recent years have seen increasing criticism of this sweeping optimism (Lauth 2003; Paffenholz, Spurk 2006) and instances of ‘bad’, ‘corrupt’ or ‘faked’ civil societies’ or ‘projectitis’ (Seifija 2006) - organizing funded projects in order to secure jobs and follow the annual ‘trends’ of calls for tenders have not been altogether rare. Furthermore, civil society organizations have been found to generate particularized, exclusive social capital, sometimes linked to violent ideas and behavior (e.g. the Mafia, religious radical groups, etc.) – and even though it is obvious that civil society is embedded in the larger society with all of its challenges, this side of interest groups has not been studied sufficiently. (Paffenholz, Spurk 2006; Zmerli 2008; Ogilvie 2004)

Several authors question the widely prevailing assumption that the promotion of civil society will automatically lead to increased democratization by “spill-over”. They call for increased systematic analysis of the practical findings on conditions and obstacles in this field. (Paffenholz, Spurk 2006: 46; Belloni 2009; Seifija 2006; Paffenholz 2010) Usually, civil society is considered intrinsically ‘good’, with its ‘dark sides’ (Paffenholz, Spurk 2006) conveniently overlooked. (Roth 2003, 2004)

In states with weak economies and a difficult employment situation it is no surprise that working for civil society organizations in projects that are frequently relatively well-paid by international organizations have become a very attractive job market, not (always) linked to democratic ideals but more to economic survival. (Seifija 2006; Dvornik 2009) Further criticism points out that civil society has a low degree of legitimacy, is frequently entrenched in politics, has a potential to undermine the development of the state (and thus possibly weaken it), etc. Finally, civil society is assumed to even help strengthening cross-cutting cleavages across societal conflict lines. (Paffenholz 2010)

However, recent civil society research suggests that democratization (before the accomplishing of democratic consolidation) can even negatively affect division and not cooperation between different societal groups. (Letki, Evans 2005: 523; Smooha, Järve 2005; Vorrath, Krebs 2009; Dvornik 2009; Kymlicka 2008) In this context civil society organizations even tend to societal divisions. (See exemplary Belloni 2009; Zmerli 2008; Paffenholz 2010; Zinecker 2007). This implies a particular challenge for civil society’s contribution and spill-over to democratization and democratic consolidation for states with deeply divided societies. Against the presented theoretical background the following contradiction becomes apparent. Deep societal divisions, frequently held responsible for the establishment of hybrid (partial) regimes, seem to be only partly possible to be remedied by a promotion of civil society. (Mungiu-Pippidi 2005; Putnam 1993) Thus the current state of research implies that further investigation is needed to understand more about when civil society contributes to fostering division or cooperation between different groups. (See e.g. Belloni 2009; Zmerli 2008; Paffenholz 2010 and Zinecker 2007.)

1.1.3 Ethnic Divisions and Competition Hamper Democratic Consolidation

One important factor that is frequently suspected to be an important impeding factor for democratization, not only in the post-communist world, which has currently been re-gaining new attention is ethnicity and, connected to it, ethno-nationalism. According to Linz & Stepan

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\(^{12}\) The seven functions are 1. Protection of citizens against violence from all parties; 2. Monitoring of human rights violations, the implementation of peace agreements, etc.; 3. Advocacy for peace and human rights; 4. Socialization to values of peace and democracy as well as to develop the in-group identity of marginalized groups; 5. Inter-group social cohesion by bringing people together from adversarial group; 6. Facilitation of dialogue on the local and national level between all sorts of actors; 7. Service delivery to create entry points for peacebuilding, i.e. for the six above functions. Paffenholz 2010: 24–25
“the more the population of the territory of the state is comprised of plurinational, lingual, religious, or cultural societies, the more complex politics becomes because an agreement on the fundamentals of a democracy will be more difficult” (Linz, Stepan 1996: 29).

This observation is concerning given that almost ninety percent of the world’s countries are ethnically heterogeneous/multiethnic (Brunner 1996: 40), and about half of them display ethnically-defined cleavages (Giddens 1985: 216–220), with growing mobilization further contributing to this trend. Further, recent years have seen a decline of interstate wars but also a simultaneous increase in intrastate wars. (Kaufmann 2005: 168) Fifty-one percent of all internal wars since World War II had at least one party of the conflict recruited mainly along ethnic lines. Additionally, in eighteen percent of all wars, recruiting was also done at least partly along ethnic lines. Only roughly one-third (thirty-one percent) of all wars cannot be labeled ethnic wars. (Fearon, Laitin 2003; Zürcher 2007)

Ethno-national divisions tend to be difficult to channel into democratic functioning and can very easily be (re-)mobilized as a catalyst for conflict. (Chandler 1999: 46) A large share of states experiencing ethno-national conflicts are recipients of external democracy promotion, with many of these states today facing serious challenges with regard to their democratization often linked to their ethnic dynamic (e.g. Rwanda, Kirgizistan, Libya, Kosovo, Afghanistan, etc.). Especially during times of regime change, ethno-national traits can easily be mobilized, as the “rules of the game” and the re-distribution of resources have become matters to be newly negotiated (Agh 1998: 77–78) – and frequently remain contested for some time. Alina Mungiu-Pippidi writes that in many cases ethnic clientelistic networks still dominate all sectors of society. (2006) A number of authors suggest that in fact the process of increased democratization tends to aggravate ethnic conflicts. (See e.g. Horowitz 1985; Letiki, Evans 2005; Smooha, Järve 2005; Vorrath, Krebs 2009.)

Research on the theoretical and practical analysis and implications of the connection between ethno-national divisions and democracy has produced a growing number of writings. Some scholars warn that minimal, formal democratic institutions (democracy understood as “one man, one vote”) cannot cater to the needs of (e.g. ethnically) fragmented regimes and may even cement existing cleavages as an omnipresent category. (Cf. Mullerson 1993: 811; Roeder, Rothschild 2005: 5–6.)

With the rise of the concept of the “nation-state,” the categories “ethnicity” and “nation,” defined on the basis of kin-ship relations, have increasingly gained legitimacy — also in the context of democratization in the concept of self-determination. (Cf. exemplary Zürcher 2007: 4; Brubaker 1996) Scholarly literature has been heatedly debating the advantages and disadvantages of theoretically and practically accepting ethnicity as a political category, also depending on the different theoretical definitions of “ethnicity” from the perspectives of constructivism, rational choice, or primordialism (Kaufmann 1998). Ethnicity per se is frequently not problematic; mostly, it is in the context of ‘ethno-nationalism’ — mobilized and politicized claims to self-determination based on ethnic categories - that ethnicity becomes a category that has conflict potential. The crucial difference between an ‘ethnic group’ and a ‘nation’ is that the latter adheres to a belief of self-determination and/or stately independence. (Cf. e.g. Francis 1965 and Lepsius 1986.)

While frequently ethnic diversity per se is considered to yield a negative impact on democracy (e.g. Bowen 1996b), latest research suggest that in fact it is a question of whether an ethnic distribution of polarization or dominance (fewer larger ethnic groups, often dominated by one majority group) or fragmentation (a larger number of smaller ethnic groups) prevails in a given state. The most deteriorating effect usually results from a setup where there is a second, large, influential ethnic group beside the “titular nation” (cf. Vetterlein 2010: 25). New scientific findings hold that structural ethnic

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13 According to Brunner (1996: 40), states are “ethnically homogeneous”, when all minorities together make up for less than 10% of the total population.


15 This concerns the protection of material or immaterial cultural heritage, minority protection, or, in extreme cases, international interventions to prevent genocide.

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polarization or dominance has a more deteriorating effect on democratization than ethnic fragmentation.17

Some authors argue that the effect of ethnic fragmentation depends more on how the competition between rivaling groups is dealt with. (Putnam 2007; Fish 2005) Especially during radical changes, competing groups will tend to ‘rent seek’. Thus, dealing with ethnic polarization or fragmentation and promoting cooperation across ethnic lines seem to be crucial measures for the progress of democratic consolidation. (Zürcher 2007) This is a crucial question for external democracy promoters, who usually need to choose to what extent they focus on the (important) protection of ethnic minorities (running the risk of over-emphasizing ethnicity as a political category) and if, when, and how they promote de-ethnicization of politics. Under any circumstances, however, to assess the context and possible consequence, many authors of conflict research underline the importance of conducting thorough analysis of ethnic and other societal factors on the ground in order to avoid mistakes and to reduce the likelihood of failing of external democracy promotion. (Hippler 2005a) Without consciously taking into account the practical differences and their implications, politicians as well as external democracy promoters run the risk of underestimating political ambivalence and the potential capacity for the mobilization of the category of national states. (Mannitz, Schiffauer 2002: 67)

1.1.4 External Democracy Promotion of Civil Society – Disillusions and Results

In many of the democratizing states around the world, including those resisting ongoing democratization, legions of international actors (states, inter-, or trans-, national organizations such as the UN, NATO, EU, OSCE, different NGOs, INGOs, GONGOs, political and private foundations, etc.) of the ‘international community’18 have taken on the endeavor of ‘external democracy promotion’ through the use of numerous measures and according to diverse strategies.

The European Union for instance, includes a call for more democracy in its trade agreements since the Lomé Convention (1975). External democracy promotion is sometimes pejoratively called the ‘boom-industry’ of international cooperation, currently disposing of a worldwide annual budget of about 10 billion Euros. (Schraeder 2000 and Grävingholt et al. 2009c: 28) In recent years, however, a growing share of interventions have not brought satisfactory democratization results (e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia-Herzegovina, etc.) or where, despite external democracy support democratization has been stagnating or even receding, doubts about the actual effectiveness of external democracy promotion have risen:

“As time passed, many of the newly democratizing countries evolved into another, intermediate type: the semiauthoritarian state, which proliferated in the former Soviet Union, the Balkans, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East. Such regimes typically attempt an artful political balancing act. Their leaders allow enough political freedoms to gain themselves some credit and legitimacy as reformers. Typically, this means holding regular elections and permitting the creation of a few opposition parties, a scattering of independent civic

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17 For more discussion of ‘ethnic fragmentation’ see exemplarily Alesina et al. 2003; Collier 2001; Reilly 2000; Vanhanen 1999; Bjørnskov 2008; Esteban et al. 2012a, 2012b; Laitin, Posner 2001. They all relate to the idea of Taylor & Hudson’s (1976) ELF index, which has been employed as a standard measure of ethnic diversity; for a critical review of the ethnic fractionalization index see for instance Laitin, Posner 2001: The main criticism referred to the fact that the data the ELF was based on was very old (from 1964) and most likely not collected according to good scientific practices. In general, it was assumed by critics that not so much ethnic diversity, but a tendency of ethnic conflict or ethnonationalist exclusion (N*) posed the biggest threat to democracy. The main conclusion has been that one or two large ethnonational groups with strong bargaining power are much more likely to be harmful for democratic development than high fractionalization with many small groups in on polity.

18 Alcock (2004: 26) rightly points out that the term ‘community’ in this context seems misleading, as the loose coalition of state and non-state structures does not correspond to the sociological notion of “community”.

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Since the early 1990s the interest in the influence of external factors and actors on democratization has been growing. Previously, political scientists tended to concentrate on how democratization is influenced by the political actors and structures at the domestic level. Current developments, however, have resulted in that these scholars are increasingly incapable of explaining current processes without considering the international components. (Haynes 2005) An increasing number of publications investigate the international factors for transition and consolidation (see e.g. Pevehouse 2002; Whitehead 1996a) However, until today, research on the international dimension remains scarce, according to McFaul (2007: 6) for the following five reasons: 

1. Different disciplines either investigate intrastate or international processes (while a small number of publications try to combine both, e.g. Moravcsik 1993; Yilmaz 2002), and there is particularly little exchange between researchers and practitioners (comp. Carothers 1999: 94).

2. Frequently, factors are investigated separately instead of considering their interplay, which particularly applies to the many external and internal factors.

3. Owed to different historical and political events, usually the research focus never lies on the same geographical region for long periods, little is known about democratization over longer periods of time (which, however is changing as certain indices for measuring democratization, such as Freedom House, the BTI, Polity IV, have been around for several years now).

4. External democracy promotion at a larger scale usually only tends to start once a political system has already made democratic progress, and usually mostly cases of successful democratization are investigated.

5. There is too little exchange between researchers from different research foci to know more, whether the same factors have different effects at different phases of transition.

On the domestic level, democracy promotion aims at different spheres – from the state-level to the individual. For decades, it has been a question of highly controversial debate how democracy promotion should work/take place: starting top-down, by establishing formal institutions that provide a frame work democratization, or bottom-up, first influencing and democratizing the political culture and procedures, so that actual changes and local ownership are as high as possible and that institutions do not remain “empty shells”. In reality, while practically formal institutions are faster to establish and to evaluate, usually, a mix of both, bottom-up and top-down measures, has been applied.

Nevertheless, over the past few decades, many international organizations (OSCE, UN, The World Bank, etc.) have increased their focus of top-down state-building measures with broader bottom-up support for the development of a vibrant civil society assumed to be a crucial prerequisite for the democratic functioning of installed democratic structures and thus a completion of democratic consolidation.

For years civil society has been the “star” of successful democratization, praised by transition researchers and practitioners alike, supported with important financial and human resources by a multitude of international organizations around the world. Civil society became one of the fastest growing fields of external democracy promotion. (Lauth, Merkel 1997; Schmitter, Brouwer 1999: 16) David Chandler critically reflects on the possible positive and negative effects of external democracy promotion of civil society: external funding runs the risk of fragmenting society rather than encouraging pluralism. NGOs relying on outside funding seem to have no need to engage in discussion or forge broader links to society. So

“the financing of private bodies, as representatives of democracy and development, without a clear policy may in fact encourage the fragmentation of societies under political breakdown rather than encourage pluralism.” (Chandler 1999: 35) (Compare exemplarily Živanović 2006) and (Howard 2012)

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Until today, the complex field of interplay between external and internal factors for democratization remains under-investigated. (See also Gillespie et al. 2002: 1; Pridham 1995b: 18) Through its diverse functions, civil society is said to be an important link between individual citizens and the state. (See e.g. Schmitter, Brouwer 1999) In this regard, McFaul et al. (2007) advocate researching this particular link, how exactly and through what mechanisms it can and does de facto link the micro- and the macro-level in a political system:

“It is time, therefore, to undertake a comprehensive comparative study of democracy promotion that incorporates both donor and recipient perspectives, that considers both domestic conditions and international tools, that brings together the knowledge of academics and practitioners deeply engaged in these issues, and that looks at both successes and failures over a 30+ year period of attempts to promote democracy abroad.”(2007: 10, comp. also Schmitter, Brouwer 1999)

Some contributions on the role of civil society in peace- and conflict studies contribute to this debate, while, however, the research design and findings are again specific to the research focus and need to be assessed as to the possibility of transferring them to the field of democratization.20

1.1.5 Civil Society and External Democracy Promotion in the Western Balkans

As to empirical literature on the fields covered in this dissertation, the last years have seen a number of publications that have treated one or another relevant aspect, yet, not with the particular focus of this research. Few writings exist in the democratization studies that examine the different levels (external donors, the national level/society, civil society, individuals) and give insight into the interplay between these levels. Due to the diversity in research focuses and approaches taken, it is difficult to come to any analytical conclusion about how the individual micro-level, the associational meso-level, and the socio-political macro-level and civil society promotion are linked, if at all.

With regard to democratization in the post-communist states, in the beginning it was believed that all of them would follow an equal path towards democratization, including similar challenges. Twenty years later, one can observe that in fact the developments in the former communist states are very diverse. However, some similarities, especially with regard to social and cultural dimensions appear to show a degree of significant difference between the post-communist states and the rest of states of the world, notably with regard to the challenges they face during democratization21

A few publications investigate democratization and regime change focusing particularly on the Western Balkans (such as e.g. Dawisha et al. 1997 and Pridham et al. 2000). Several authors explore the dynamics between democratization and ethnic diversity and/or ethnic divisions in the Western Balkans (Evenson 2009; Krastev 2002; Bieber 2005b, 2004; Bowen 1996a; Mungiu-Pippidi 2005, 2006).

Ethnicity was a predominant category in the post-communist states - in the soviet region as well as in Yugoslavia, (Halbach 1992: 34–36) understanding the people more in the sense of a primordial ‘narod’ (the word for “people” in most Slavic languages) than a ‘demos’. (Dvornik 2009: 84–86) Ethno-national categories have proven particularly problematic, as they have been strong loaded with symbolic meaning and leave little room for compromise on the collective level and for deviating behavior on the individual level. Scientific findings suggest that ideas can be a dimension that is preserved in the societal memory over long periods of time. Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (2006) writes about the Western Balkan states that ethnic clientelistic networks still dominate all sectors of society, including civil society.

Seifija argues that for Bosnia-Herzegovina, in fact since its origins in the mid-19th century civil society has a tradition of being made up of a large share of associations promoting ethno-national interests. (Seifija 2008) Until today, civil society ethnicity also continues to be an ever-present topic among civil society activists, as well; ethno-nationalist values and divisions are frequently reproduced

21 Cf. for instance Ismayr et al. 2010; Fish 1995, 2005), on dealing with ethnic diversity comp. Mungiu-Pippidi 2006, 2005), and on (generally weak) civil societies see exemplarily Howard 2003; Freise 2004.
and transmitted. (Hornstein-Tomić 2008: 45) Other authors critically examine the development of civil society (Fischer 2006a; Dvornik 2009; Seifija 2006; Forbrig et al. 2007; Belloni 2001; Fischer 2006b; UNDP 2007, 2009), but they do not really analyze strategies of external donors towards civil society and democratization, except for Živanović (2006) and Howard (2012).

A number of the existing publications look more into general approaches of external democracy promoters (Chandler 1999; Caruso 2007; Sebastian 2010), Grimm 2010; Džihić et al. 2012), frequently on the European Union (Bendiek 2004; Starčević-Srkalović 2010; Kentrotis 2011; Rupnik 2011), the OSCE (Richter 2009b), or they focus on the state-building of external actors (Šelo Šabić 2005).

As to further publications on the two states treated in the case studies (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia) and the links between civil society, ethno-national divisions and democratic consolidation, a small number of writings have been published. Some of these concentrate on the party system (Gromes 2007), political parties (Carothers 2006a) or political institutions and their role in democratic consolidation in the post-communist states (Beichelt 2001), or on the implementation side of externally promoted reforms (e.g. Brunnbauer 2002 on Macedonia Solioz et al. 2004 on Bosnia-Herzegovina, see also Richter 2009a, Richter 2009b; Vetterlein 2010; Bliesemann de Guevara, Kühn 2010.) Additionally, a number of publications from peace- and conflict research can be an inspiring source for approaches in that regard. (See for instance Rear 2008; Paris 2004; Paffenholz 2010; Coletta 2000; Jarstad et al. 2008; Paris et al. 2009.)

1.2 Identified Research Gap and the Research Question

The theoretical overview illustrates that so far, the theoretically suggested functions of civil society and how these in reality can and do contribute to continued democratic consolidation of hybrid regimes have not been investigated in detail. Further, research of democracy promotion usually suffers from a systemic flaw of falling short to integrate knowledge from both theory and practical work – as researchers rarely have time to gain years of practical experience and practitioners usually do not have the time to consult extensive theoretical research. Further, both tend to lament a lack of analytical relevance of the respective other focus.

Consequently, this dissertation contributes to the theoretical debate by examining to what extent previous occurrence of ethno-national war influences, if and how civil society can fulfill the theoretically democratizing functions attributed to it. Civil society in this context faces two-sided challenges, first of external character, such as political and economic non-consolidation and post-conflict situation, and also of internal nature such as strong ethnic division and the strain of limited social and financial domestic support. Further, the dissertation investigates whether external democracy support does or does not really have a positive effect on civil society’s democratic spillover under such conditions, and if so, what areas of activities bring the most promising results with regard to democratization. The figure below illustrates the research field:
The following research expectations summarize the essence of the above given overview in this field of research:

1) According to theoretical research as well as indices for measuring civil society and democracy, civil society significantly contributes to democratic consolidation through numerous important functions and mechanisms.
2) The more ethno-national violence a state has faced, the more challenging democratic consolidation is for that state.
3) Against the background of past ethno-national conflict and in divided societies, “uncivil” parts of civil society tend to block or even counter positive contribution to democratization, thus inhibiting or even negatively impacting democratic consolidation.
4) External democracy promotion can foster civil society’s contribution to democratic consolidation by supporting civil society’s democratic functions and internal democratic structures so that civil society can better surmount possible obstacles for its democratic contribution.

The main research question against this background and examined in the dissertation then is: **Does the scale of previous ethno-national conflict influence civil society’s contribution to democratic consolidation and can external democracy promotion positively support this?**

The underlying main assumption is: **The higher the scale of previous ethno-national conflict the less positive is the effect of civil society’s fulfillment of its theoretically assumed functions to contribute to democratic consolidation - even with the support of external democracy promotion.**

Further questions connected to the main research question and examined in the dissertation are:

(a) To what extent does higher previous ethno-national conflict more strongly hamper today’s democratic consolidation and civil society’s contribution to democratization?
(b) How can civil society contribute to democratization in hybrid regimes?
(c) How can the contribution of civil society be assessed?
(d) What role do the “dark sides” of civil society play with regard to both, ethnic cleavages and regime hybridity?
(e) What impact do the massive efforts of external democracy promotion have on democratization in general and on civil society’s democratization spill-over in particular?
1.3 Research Aim and Theoretical Relevance

The selected approach borrows from methods from cultural studies with the advantage of thus combining a macro- and a micro-perspective in a theory-guided approach that gains from exploratory elements. Further, I dispose of several years of experience in practical work in and with civil society in hybrid regimes, divided society, and in consolidated democracies. This, and also the possibility for comparative exchange and the excursions that the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation made possible with the members of the PhD program ‘Civil Society and External Democracy Promotion in Post-Socialist Europe’ that I had the opportunity to be part of, have provided me with valuable insight and experience to contextualize findings and compare them across states.

This research endeavor provides an analytical framework for assessing how and to what extent civil society can assume its theoretically assumed functions, given that the two frequently concurring factors, deep societal divisions and regime hybridity, both require but at the same time hamper civil society’s contribution to democratic consolidation. This investigation mostly contributes to debates and methods from democratization and transition studies, international relations, comparative political science, peace- and conflict studies, and civil society and third sector theory. In order to make the investigation possible, the research goal can again be subdivided into work on several levels:

**Theoretical:**
(a) Develop theory on civil society and integrate practical knowledge about how civil society can or cannot assume its theoretical functions by bringing together theoretical strands of literature and methods from transformation and democratization research, external democracy promotion, civil society and the third sector, development cooperation, international relations, external peace- and conflict studies. The aim is to understand more about the interplay between ethno-national or ethno-nationalized fragmentation, a factor present in practically all of the target states of external democracy promotion, and about progress or stagnation of democratic consolidation.
(b) Contribute to the black-box of how the promotion of civil society actually does or does not support democratic spill-over fostering democratic consolidation.
(c) The data available for this field of research is limited, often fragmentary and unsystematic with regard to methodology and to the analytical level. Additionally, democratization, and particularly the impact of civil society and of external democracy promotion on democratization are difficult to measure and factors for this are difficult to isolate – which is why knowledge in this area so far is scarce.

**Conceptual:** Analyze civil society’s empirical contribution in an
(a) international context,
(b) in hybrid regimes,
(c) in the context of deeply divided societies, and (d) in the context of external democracy promotion.

**Methodological:** Drawing from theory and practice and bridging the gap between the two, to assemble an assessment tool for civil society in these contexts – to
(a) come up with a basic model which is
(b) further refined based on new empirical data.

**Empirical relevance:** Readers inclined to the practical implications are offered categories of analysis regarding the possibilities and limits of external democracy promotion of civil society in ethno-nationally divided societies.

1.4 Methodological Approach

This dissertation and the research conducted in this context draw on methods having their background in cultural studies. With the aim of gaining new insight into the research field, the dissertation tackles
the boon and bane of interdisciplinarity, of knitting together different theoretical and their corresponding methodologies – notably a more ethnographic approach rooted in cultural studies and a more comparative approach from political science. This has the great advantage that it allows connecting findings from different fields that only in their combination provide new insight into the mechanisms at play between civil society, democratization of the political system and external democracy promotion. The methodology chosen for this research combines structured elements that allow to developing the theory the research field draws on. The proceeding was chosen to be open enough so as to allow for the approach to facilitate new insight and to reveal findings through a combination of focus and methods that previously have not been combined.

With regard to the nature of the research question, a qualitative approach is chosen for the empirical investigation. It looks for answers concerning “what?” and “how?” questions with regard to the research gap identified. Based on this and on the existing lack of quantifiable data, and most of all, as the existing data are not able to provide satisfying answers, the interplay between the factors involved calls for further scrutiny. Consequently, an explorative approach is chosen. The particular method for this dissertation project is to undertake explorative in-depth case studies in the form of a dynamic comparison. The aim is to investigate how the occurrence of a certain phenomenon, in this case higher or lower scale of previous ethno-national violence, affects civil society’s contribution to democratic consolidation. (See exemplarily Gerring 2007a; Yin 2003b; Flick et al. 2008a)

Both cases for the empirical investigation, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Macedonia, were identified based on a “most similar case design”, particularly with regard to democratization path, degree of democratization (non-consolidated democracies), and to similar socio-political structures. For both cases, additional empirical data is collected. The period of investigation for the general research spans 2006 to 2012, and the additional data, particularly the interview data, were collected during three field trips between December 2009 and June 2011.

Using data as well as method triangulation, the data is gathered in the form of (a) semi-structured problem-centered interviews and (b) documents and secondary sources. The problem-centered interviews were conducted so as to allow for a comparison across both cases, but also to gain insight from an additional comparison between respondents from civil society, respondents from international organizations, and from additional “international experts”.

The interviews were analyzed applying the ‘constant comparative method’ (CCM), based on Glaser & Strauss (Boeije 2002: 391, cf. Glaser, Strauss 1967 and Glaser 1992), relying further on qualitative content analysis (QCA) (cf. exemplary Mayring 2002, 2003a; Wirth et al. 2001) supported by the software MAXQDA. First, from the theoretical state-of-the-art of research on civil society, democratization, and external democracy promotion, a preliminary code-system was developed and applied to the data. In a second step, the interview passages were coded based on the preliminary coding system, however, in an explorative manner. This allows developing new categories, to possibly combine existing categories, etc. so as to both work theory-based and theory-developing. Finally, the findings are structured, analyzed and interpreted.22

Finally, for the interpretation of their theoretical implications, the findings are summarized and then contrasted with regard to the theoretical functions and the actual impact of civil society and whether and if so how, external democracy promotion impacts these. For the interpretation, additional data triangulation from reports, documents, websites, etc. of CSOs and international organizations are used and combined with secondary literature about both cases.

1.5 Advantages, Challenges, and Limits of this Research Endeavor

Due to its focus, this dissertation, like any other research, has certain advantages, disadvantages, particular challenges and limits as to what it is able to investigate. The challenges encountered are mostly linked to the research focus and the methodology chosen, partly also owed to certain pragmatic

22 For a critical discussion on explorative coding see exemplarily Kruse 2008: 192–198.
Chapter 1: Disillusions of Civil Society’s Contribution to Democratic Consolidation

or empirical constraints. The study wishes to provide in-depth inside about causal mechanisms, while at the same time, it aims to provide causal inference – thus the number of cases is relatively small, while still a large number of qualitative interviews is analyzed to allow for comparative insight that offers plausible and generalizable results. Even though the interview data are subjective and respondents may well be biased when relating to their own working field, the contrasting of different groups of respondents and the comparison between both states compensates potential disadvantages from this.

The exploratory nature of this study does not aim to bring about causal explanations or test hypotheses. Rather, it provides new understanding about the mechanisms responsible for democratic consolidation or regime hybridity, a field on which no research exists so far. It does this by combining research from different fields of research, and by testing and developing the results by contrasting to empirical investigation. This study is explorative by nature and its results apply to the two case-studies of this dissertation, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. It further does not aspire to make assertions concerning causal relations between the phenomena researched nor does it aim to test or falsify any theoretical hypotheses in a positivist sense.

What the present research project does, however, is provide new, valuable insight into a field of causal relations, that, thus far, has neither been investigated systematically nor been assessed as to the mechanisms at play between the factors under scrutiny. As its predominant advantages, this study combines theory, literature, and methodological approaches from different disciplines, that through their combination can hold important insight into the interplay between civil society and external democracy promotion as well as into the dynamics of why states follow paths of democratic consolidation or regime hybridity, that otherwise would not be possible. Further, through the combination of approaches as well as through the additional data collection, this research further develops the theory and methodology for research on civil society’s theoretical and actual contribution to democratic consolidation. Finally, this research is one of the rare attempts of analytically taking into account the systematic interplay of different analytical levels, including on the one hand the domestic dimension on the micro-(citizens), meso- (civil society), and macro-levels (state/politics), and on the other hand the external dimension (external democracy promotion).

The aforementioned challenges with regard to the possible limitations of a study based on a small number of cases (small-n study) and data from interviews, were countered by including different groups in the interview sample (two different states and CSOs and international organizations from different towns for each case, complemented with experts). The levels of comparison allow for a significant level of deriving well-founded conclusions and insight. Further, the interpretation of interview data was conducted with the support of an interpretational group aimed to reduce the degree of subjective arbitrariness of interpreting the data and the findings were then contrasted with sources from reports and secondary literature. Moreover, as the two cases investigated in-depth have been selected according to theoretically founded criteria, they do aspire inference which allows for theoretically founded conclusions to be drawn for a larger number of cases. (Comp. Yin 2003a: 10)

Thus, this research provides theoretically founded, well-established, plausible assumptions about the generalizability of the research findings. Similar findings for civil society in many non-consolidated, divided states – in post-communist/-socialist states, but also in other parts of the world, e.g. states in Latin America or Africa, suggests the generalizability of important parts of the findings with regard to civil society’s possibilities and challenges to contribute to democratic consolidation in hybrid regimes.

1.6 Structure of the Dissertation

In order to provide an overview of the dissertation, the following chapters are structured as follows: First, the dissertation establishes the research foundations. Chapter two provides a literature review that illustrates why procedural roles of democracy play a decisive role as to whether states develop towards democratic consolidation or regime hybridity – and concentrates on the procedural aspects of democracy. It further discusses the role of ethno-national division, the theoretical
foundations for the role that civil society is ideally attributed and contrasts these with what civil society can realistically contribute to democracy and democratic consolidation, particularly with regard to civil society’s “uncivil” aspects or “dark sides”. While external democracy promotion strongly supports civil society, until today, no systematic analysis is available as to which of its theoretically assumed contributions to democratic consolidation civil society can assume and to what extent – and how external democracy promotion efforts contribute to these in detail. Also, the chapter provides an overview of the currently existing assessment tools for measuring democratization and the impact of civil society and external democracy promotion and discusses their possibilities and limits. Chapter three presents the methodological approach and illustrates the choices made regarding empirical methods for empirical approach by case studies, discusses the identification of the two cases Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Macedonia, and explains the choices made with regard to how the problem-centered interviews are conducted, analyzed, and interpreted. Chapters four and five each present the findings for the two case-studies, based on the interviews in the form of a summarizing overview of the collected data structured by the theoretical functions of civil society. The overview already provides a first comparison between statements from CSOs vs. international organizations vs. experts and secondly between both states of the case studies. Chapter six contrasts the findings with the theoretical state-of-the-art and highlights the most relevant results of the empirical research with regard to the previously formulated research question and theoretical expectations. Finally, chapter seven closes with the conclusions and implications of the research results for theories of civil society’s democratic spill-over particularly with regard to deeply divided societies. It further assesses the scope and generalizability of the findings, and discusses possible further research fields that the results suggest.
CHAPTER 2: CIVIL SOCIETY AND EXTERNAL DEMOCRACY PROMOTION:
DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN ETHNO-NATIONALLY DIVIDED STATES

With the aim of providing a more detailed theoretical background for the following empirical analysis and of illustrating the identified theoretical research gap, this chapter presents the current state-of-the-art research with regards to this study. The real number of states that are today no longer authoritarian has significantly increased since the late 1980s. However, the initial enthusiasm about the “end of history,” that prevailed among many democratization scholars and practitioners who had been under the assumption of a global wave towards democracy, has faded. As early as 1992, several researchers published contributions about the “end of the transition paradigm”, after Carothers (2002) had put forward that the main assumptions long held to be true by transformation researches needed to be re-assessed.\(^{23}\)

Today, many states still authoritarian in 1989 are consolidated democracies. Nevertheless, to this day, a large number of so-called ‘transition-states’\(^ {24}\) cannot be considered democratically consolidated. Rather, an increasing number of states are taking on traits of ‘hybrid regimes’. While some scholars argue that these states were only going through protracted transitions, other researchers argue that this type of regime has very particular characteristics and can in fact be labeled as a stable regime type in its own rights. Many of the states concerned have adapted formally democratic institutions, yet various shortcomings with regards to democracy remain: the formally democratic institutions lack the procedural substance needed to actually make them function according to democratic standards. Several reasons exist, which can help to explain why states become hybrid regimes, such as economic reasons, shortcomings in governance, etc.

While different factors are held accountable in order for democratization to be successful and for democracy to function, one factor which is commonly considered as one of the crucial prerequisites and components of democracy is civil society. Already in 1970, Dahl, in his definition of ‘polyarchy’ underlined the importance of associational autonomy, referring to the importance of civil society’s role. (1989: 221) According to Larry Diamond, civil society

> "can, and typically must, play a significant role in building and consolidating democracy ... the more active, pluralist, resourceful, institutionalized, and democratic is civil society, and the more effectively it balances the tensions in its relations with the state - between autonomy and cooperation, vigilance and loyalty, skepticism and trust, assertiveness and civility - the more likely it is that democracy will emerge and endure." (Diamond 1994: 16)

Bruce Parrott notes that without key components of civil society, government structures that are formally democratic cannot be expected to operate in a fashion that is substantively democratic. (Parrott 1997: 24) Larry Diamond underlines the socializing aspect of civil society when he writes that

> “civil society can also be a crucial arena for the development of other democratic attributes […]. These values become most stable when they emerge through experience, and organizational participation in civil society provides important practice in political advocacy and contestation.” (1994: 8)

However, so far, while there have been many theoretical analyzes underlining the importance of civil

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\(^{23}\) Carothers’ five main assumptions were: 1. any country moving away from dictatorship is moving towards democracy, 2. democratization is a linear sequence of stages, 3. elections can be equated with democracy, 4. context factors (economic development, history, and socio-cultural traditions) would not be major factors in the course of democratization, 5. democratization has a base in coherent, functioning states. 2002

\(^{24}\) Regarding the term ‘transition’ research, while already in 2002 Thomas Carothers called for an end of the ‘transition paradigm’, the term and also the theoretical reference to the concept are still so widely used that the field is taken into account as a distinct field scientific writings refer and contribute to commonly (see e.g. Merkel 2010). A common differentiation between the often synonymously used terms ‘transition’ and ‘transformation’, according to Saltmarsh, is that “while transition is concerned with moving between two known points, transformation can be characterised as a negotiated approach to the unknown, the emphasis being on means rather than ends.” (2001: 3–4)
Chapter 2: Civil Society and External Democracy Promotion: Democratic Consolidation in Ethno-Nationally Divided States

society and its promotion (e.g. Freise 2004), the actual logic and scope of the theoretically assumed democratic spill-over effect of civil society has not systematically been explored.\(^{25}\) In fact, how and the extent to which civil society can really develop in an underdeveloped democracy, and contribute to democratization under difficult conditions, has increasingly been questioned.

In many democratization states, a high number of civil society organizations have developed while, at the same time, political participation remains low and the relative existence of cross-cutting cleavages is high, with the latter tending to enforce societal divisions. (Bjørnskov 2008) This particularly applies to the post-communist/-socialist states. (Howard 2003) In fact, in several contexts, civil society and its organizations have been blamed to actively perpetuate or foster societal divisions or ethnic tensions, for instance religious groups in Northern Ireland or nationalist civil society organizations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.\(^{26}\) This implies that the nature and the ‘constitutive good’ of civil society organizations (Warren 2004) determine whether civil society contributes positively to democracy. (Zmerli 2008: 22)

This chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.1 presents the current state of the art regarding democracy and its different definitions in addition to focusing on the debate between minimalist and demanding procedural notions, which are particularly important when taken into the debate around transformation. As the assessment of democratization processes is strongly based on the understanding of when democracy has actually been achieved and also of different degrees of democratization. Issues connected to the current state of research on democratic consolidation and regime hybridity are discussed in more detail in section 2.2. Section 2.3 examines democratization and its characteristics in ethnically divided society, particularly with regards to democratic consolidation and regime hybridity. Section 2.4 summarizes and outlines only the most important ideas of how civil society and democracy in general and democratic consolidation in particular are linked. Section 2.5 presents different notions of civil society, introduces a functional approach to civil society, and discusses actors and qualities of civil society with particular focus on these in an international context. Section 2.6 then explores the issue of the “dark” or “uncivil” sides of civil society that have gained increased attention in the past few years. In section 2.7 the theoretical state of the art of measuring democracy and civil society, also over time and across cases, is examined and discussed. And section 2.8 discusses both, the role that external democracy promotion can and does play with regard to civil society’s democratic contribution, and also how the influence of external democracy promotion can be measured. Section 2.9, finally, summarizes the chapter and highlights the implications for the empirical analysis.

2.1 Democratization after the End of the Transition Paradigm

This section discusses the different definitions of democracy and the theoretical phases of democratic transition habitually identified by scholars. It investigates how and why democratic consolidation can be reached or why it may not be reached. Further, the relatively recent term ‘hybrid regime’ and reasons why regimes may take on its characteristics are presented, while looking particularly at the role that ethnicity plays in the context of transition and democratic consolidation.

The term ‘democracy’ is widely used today – in research, policy analysis and politics. However, the understanding ranges between very minimal to very demanding notions that both scientific research, and political approaches, frequently implicitly through their work approaches, refer to.\(^{27}\)

\(^{25}\) For research on civil society’s strength see for instance Howard 2003 and Heinrich 2010), see Anheier 2004 on the quality and USAID 2011) on the sustainability of civil society.


\(^{27}\) While the idea of radical democracy or advanced demands for “direct democracy” are again on the rise, they constitute such a different field when compared to other debates, that, due to a lack of space and aiming to concentrate on the research focus of this research, I decided to exclude these debates from this chapter.
Particularly regarding the analysis and support of democratic transitions, the different understanding of the term becomes extremely relevant as one can see for example when international organizations, such as the European Union (EU), demand the respect of democratic standards. Another important aspect is where researchers of democracy measuring indices classify states regarding their degree of accomplished democratization. Finally and very importantly, the understanding of democracy is crucial during international interventions, where foreign troops link their leaving to democratization in the respective country – while benchmarks for this often remain fuzzy, or differ significantly between the local and the foreign decision-makers. This has caused significant resistance or even counterinsurgency during recent years, several cases, such as Afghanistan and Somalia, from certain actors in the states concerned.

2.1.1 Democracy and Democratization: Concepts from Minimal to Procedural

This subsection presents an overview of the most influential and commonly referred to notions and their implications for the analysis of democratization and external democracy support. The break-up of the former Warsaw Pact caused a new wave of literature about democracy and how it can be promoted. Definitions of “democracy” in the literature cover a broad range from minimal concepts centered on free elections to highly demanding procedural ideal-type definitions. (Schedler 2001) Beginning the overview of definitions of democracy on the side of minimal definitions on the continuum, Abraham Lincoln in his ‘Gettysburg Address’ (19 November 1863) described ‘democracy’ as

“government of the people, by the people, for the people”. (Lincoln 1955) The simplest criteria then for democracy, by Schumpeter, for instance, is free elections – for Schumpeter the “democratic method” is

“that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (1950: 269).

For Linz & Stepan as well the minimal threshold of democracy consists in “universal free and fair elections” (Linz, Stepan 1996). Giuseppe di Palma defines democracy as “[f]ree and universal suffrage in the context of civil liberties” (1990: 16) and Smooha states in the same vein, that democracy is a regime that is characterized by “free elections, universal suffrage, change of governments and respect for civil rights.” (2005: 6) Samuel Huntington also considers “elections, open, free, and fair” as the minimal threshold of democracy (1991: 9) and he defines a regime as ‘democratic’

“To the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote” (which requires) “those civil and political freedoms to speak, publish, assemble and organize that are necessary to political debate and the conduct of electoral campaigns.” (1991: 7).

Some authors, whose definitions of democracy are still considered to lean more towards the minimalist side of the continuum, nevertheless demand more than formal minimal requirements to assure a functioning democracy and underline the importance of procedural aspects. For example, Schumpeter states that democracy is

“that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.” (1943: 269)

Robert Dahl defined seven attributes in his concept of ‘polyarchy’ (roughly referring to what many authors denote by democracy):

1. elected officials,
2. free and fair elections,
3. inclusive suffrage,
4. the right to run for office,
Chapter 2: Civil Society and External Democracy Promotion: Democratic Consolidation in Ethno-Nationally Divided States

5. freedom of expression,  
6. alternative information,  
7. associational autonomy. (1989: 221)

While criteria 1-4 refer to electoral aspects, criteria 5-7 relate to the political freedoms of citizens in a larger context. (Comp. Grävingholt 2002)

2.1.2 Democracy as More Than Formal Institutions

For many authors, ‘minimal types’ of democracy are not legitimate representations of democracies, as only the democratic functioning of democratically designed institutions makes them democratic. Almond & Verba for example note in their 1963 book “The Civic Culture” that it is important what values and attitudes the citizens of a given state have. Only through established democratic processes of exchange of opinions and interest aggregation can a stable basis be provided for sustainable and participatory democratic institutions. (Almond, Verba 1963)

Other authors underline the importance of factual accountability between the different parts of the regime that ought to exist on three levels. O’Donnell identifies two levels: vertical (of citizens toward their political representatives) and horizontal (between state institutions) (O’Donnell 1996). Furthermore, Schedler et al. see another, third level, societal accountability (of civil society, interest groups and the media vis-á-vis the state) (1999). For researchers in the tradition of Habermas, a democracy can only fully function, when the public sphere offers open discourse free of force for the exchange of positions and interest aggregation. (E.g. Habermas 1992)

According to Diamond, a democracy is only “real” or a ‘liberal democracy’ when the following conditions are met: (a) there are no reserved domains for actors in the state that are not accountable to the electorate, (b) besides vertical (electoral) accountability, ‘horizontal’ accountability “constrains executive power” and thus protects democratic standards, and it (c) guarantees freedom for political and civic rights of individuals and groups. (1996: 23) Furthermore, for Diamond, many substantial criteria need to be met, such as checks-and-balances, the protection of citizens from arbitrary acts by the state, the inclusion of all groups of the population, etc. (1996: 23–24) He distinguishes between three types of democracies, according to their degree of the functional quality of democracy:

Diamond (1996: 23–24) gives nine specific features of liberal democracies that serve as criteria for the classification of regimes: 1) Real power lies - in fact as well as in constitutional theory - with elected officials and their appointees, rather than with accountable internal actors (e.g., the military) or foreign powers. 2) Executive power is constrained constitutionally and held accountable by other government institutions (such as an independent judiciary, parliament, ombudsman, and auditor general). 3) Not only are electoral outcomes uncertain, with a significant opposition vote and the presumption of party alternation in government over time, but no group that adheres to constitutional principles is denied the right to form a party and contest elections (even if electoral thresholds and other rules prevent smaller parties from winning representation in parliament). 4) Cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups, as well as traditionally disadvantaged or unempowered majorities, are not prohibited (legally or in practice) from expressing their interests in the political process, and from using their language and culture. 5) Beyond parties and intermittent elections, citizens have multiple, ongoing channels and means for the expression and representation of their interests and values, including a diverse array of autonomous associations, movements, and groups that they are free to form and join. 6) In addition to associational freedom and pluralism, there exist alternative sources of information, including independent media, to which citizens have (politically) unfettered access. 7) Individuals have substantial freedom of belief, opinion, discussion, speech, publication, assembly, demonstration, and petition. 8) Citizens are politically equal under the law (even though they are invariably unequal in their political resources), and the above-mentioned individual and group liberties are effectively protected by an independent, impartial judiciary whose decisions are enforced and respected by other centers of power. 9) The rule of law protects citizens from unjustified detention, exile, terror, torture, and undue interference in their personal lives not only by the state but also by organized antistate forces.
Chapter 2: Civil Society and External Democracy Promotion: Democratic Consolidation in Ethno-Nationally Divided States

(1) ‘Electoral democracies’: formal elections are held, but civil rights and a democratic political culture are respected only to a limited degree. (According to Diamond, most states of the “third wave” of democratization today pertain to this particular group of democracies).

(2) ‘Liberal democracies’: The real political power is in the hands of elected politicians, the executive power is controlled by constitutional control, and free elections with open results decide about the composition of the government. Further, the protection of minorities, the free right to association, independent media, freedom of opinion, rule of law and equality before the law are guaranteed.

(3) ‘Pseudo-democracy’: formal democratic rules and a legal opposition exist, but in general not in the form of open political competition with the possibility of changing the political party in power through elections. (1996, see also Sandschneider 2003: 19)

For years, transformation studies held the assumption that democracy was the political regime most conducive for peace and stability. Some scholars warn that minimal, formal democratic institutions (democracy understood as “one man, one vote”) cannot cater to the needs of ethnically fragmented regimes and may even cement ethnicity as an omnipresent category – thus in fact not fostering peace but rather destabilizing and impeding democratic procedures. (Mullerson 1993: 811; Roeder, Rothschild 2005: 5–6) According to minimalist definitions of democracy, though “free and fair elections” would already qualify a regime as democratic, this definition does not suffice in a world with an increasing number of states that are not democratically consolidated. Researchers on hybrid regime instead highlight that more elaborate examinations of different fields of the regime are needed and that ‘minimal types’ of democracy are in fact not legitimate representatives of democracies at all: only the democratic functioning of democratically designed institutions makes them democratic and as a democracy that is faulty in important spheres is not a democracy. (Zinecker 2007) The necessary and ideal state and quality of democracy have controversially been discussed. Some authors, for instance Held, stress that institutions do not suffice and that

“a ‘will to democracy’ and a democratic culture are indispensable supporting conditions”. (1995: 158)

Even though a substantial overview of all notions of democracy would include many more definitions, the given main aspects provide an idea of the main positions regarding democratization, with many of them showing concerns that relate to the sustainability and actual functioning of democratic institutions rather than their establishment and operation.

For Croissant & Thiery (2000) a regime needs to meet the following minimal criteria in order to qualify as democracy: (1) a certain historical-structural understanding of what makes a democracy (as a sovereign territorial state, political representation, etc.), 2) the institutional structures need to mirror the "logic of democracy", which includes the freedom of all citizens. With the aim to provide a model of democracy for better analytical purposes, the concept of ‘embedded democracy’ was established. Merkel, who substantially developed the concept, defines “embedded democracies” as

“regimes, characterized by the existence of a mostly functioning democratic electoral regime for the organization of access to power, but which lose the complementary support from a disruption in the functional logic of one or several of the partial regimes, that are crucial for guaranteeing the freedom, equality and control in a functional democracy.”(Merkel et al. 2003: 15, translation by the author, F.B.)

The model distinguishes between different ‘partial regimes’. The concept is based on the idea, that a democratic regime represents a political order made up of several dimensions and consists of several

---

29 This means that modern democracies can only function if (1) the ‘vertical’ dimension of the sovereignty of the people and autonomy are realized through regularly held elections, (2) a public arena can develop to influence representative and decision-makers, (3) it is guaranteed that democratically elected authorities effectively govern and are not limited by self-legitimized power groups, (4) the horizontal dimension of power control is well developed as a counter-balance to the instrumentalization of the checks and balances of the state and binds them in their actions to particular principles, (5) fundamental barriers are erected against the power of the state in the form of inevitable ‘negative’ rights of freedom that are legally enforceable. (Croissant, Thiery 2000, translation by the author, F.B.)
constituting parts. These partial regimes contain characteristic complexes of interdependent rules, that all are indispensable preconditions for the functioning of a democracy - the concept

“follows the idea that stable constitutional democracies are embedded in two ways. Internally, the specific interdependence/independence of the different partial regimes of a democracy secures its normative and functional existence. Externally, these partial regimes are embedded in spheres of enabling conditions for democracy that protect it from outer as well as inner shocks and destabilizing tendencies.” (2004: 36)

If one of the central criteria does not apply, we can no longer call a case a functioning liberal democracy. Furthermore, depending on the non-functional partial regime concerned, we can distinguish between the different types of embedded democracies. (Merkel et al. 2003: 14–15) (Compare also Croissant, Thiery 2000) The following figure illustrates the concept:

![Fig. 2: The concept of embedded democracy](image)

In more detail, the different partial regimes contain the following elements:

**Tab. 1: The dimensions of embedded democracies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I. Vertical dimension of the power legitimization and control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Electoral regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Active suffrage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Passive suffrage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Free and fair elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Elected representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Rights to political participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Freedom of opinion, of the press, and of information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Freedom of association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Dimension of the liberal legal and constitutional state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Rights of civil liberties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) Individual protection against state and private actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) Equal treatment before the law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10) Free and equal access to courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Horizontal responsibilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(11) Checks &amp; balances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(12) Horizontal responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Dimension of agenda control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Effective power to govern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(13) Elected representatives with real power to govern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(14) No “reserved domains”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(15) No veto-powers against the constitution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Merkel 2010: 34
According to Merkel (2010: 35–37), the better the embedded regimes are mutually institutionalized and the more they are enforced by a “consolidated, and resistant” integration into the three most important fields of context fields (socio-economic, civil society, international and regional integration), the more stable they are and the less they are in danger of external threats.

In the context of research, the different understandings that can be applied as a minimal benchmark for categorizing a “state democratic enough to be a democracy” can have significant impact on the investigation and the research results. While the categorization, indicators, and measurement scales may be the most important with regards to democracy research, in the practical context of democracy promotion, political decision-makers and citizens involved need to take decisions regarding programs, implementation, international cooperation and contracts, etc. In this context, the complex reality of different democratic developments for each state and also in different policy fields need to be assessed and serves as a basis for important decisions: e.g. foreign development assistance, beginning or ending interventions, etc.

In reality, the criteria for democracy and democratization assessment are frequently not easy to set, and in many cases, depending on the decisions at stake, can be highly controversial for the different domestic and international actors involved. The desirable and “ideal” state of democracy and its characteristics may be a matter of debate in every state. However, who gets to decide about and with what results on the indicators and thresholds for “enough democracy” is particularly crucial in states in which democracy is still in the making and where the “rules of the game” are even contested. In democratization contexts decisions about these issues have especially important consequences where they are decisive criteria for the termination of interventions and (renewed) state sovereignty, or access to important international organizations such as NATO or EU.

### 2.1.3 Democratization and the Transition Paradigm

While states are required to meet certain standards in order to be classified as democracies, the process by which regimes transition from authoritarian rule towards democracy has received substantial attention in the scientific literature of the past twenty years. Particularly during phases of regional change, such as what happened in the 1970s in Southern Europe or in the late 1980s and early 1990s in post-communist/-socialist Europe, the phenomenon of democratization has received substantial attention.

The regional developments have been referred to as “waves of democratization”. (Huntington 1991) Although the model of democratic waves is debated since it is based on an assumption of a transition paradigm, it needs to be doubted at the very least in its extreme form; looking today at the former communist states, despite the fact that many of the states are no longer authoritarian, many of them are still far from being democracies. Usually,

> “the path to democracy, mostly referred to as ‘democratization’, is seen as the overall process of regime change from beginning to end, including both stages of what are generally called in the comparative literature

---

30 The idea of democratization waves was introduced by Samuel Huntington and is widely used in democratization research. Even though the concept has been controversial, it provides analytic gain. For more on the third wave (see exemplarily Huntington 1991; Carothers 2002; O’Donnell 1996). According to Huntington’s definition, a “wave of democratization” is “a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period.” (1991: 15) The previous two democratization waves took place from 1828 to 1926 and between 1943 and 1964. (Huntington 1991)
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‘transition’ \(^{31}\) to a liberal democracy and its subsequent ‘consolidation’. (Pridham, Vanhanen 1994: 2, also Chandler 1999: 22)

For analytical purposes, in scientific research ‘democratization’ has been subdivided into several phases. Already in 1970, Rustow proposed a four-phased model for democratization that consisted of:

(1) background conditions (national unity),
(2) preparation phase (changes are started by social conflicts),
(3) decision phase (conflict management in favor of a democratic system based on decisions by elites),
(4) phase of adaption (acceptance of the rules of the new system). (1970) in (Sandschneider 2003: 28)

Later, O’Donnell et al. distinguished between the two phases and introduced the terms ‘transition’ and ‘consolidation’ (1986: 3). Lauth & Merkel (1997) finally introduced a three stage model of democratic transformation that until today remains a common sub-categorization of democratization:

1. **Liberalization**: The elites in power in an authoritarian system try to increase their legitimacy and thus their power by carefully opening the political system and granting new rights to citizens.

2. **Democratization**: Democracy becomes institutionalized. It is said that this phase lasts from the ‘deinstitutionalization’ of the old system to the ‘re-institutionalization’ of the new democracy. The different political/social actors have the most options for action but as soon as a new government and offices are created, new elites and power structures establish themselves.

3. (Democratic) **Consolidation**: Transition has successfully been accomplished when the temporary structures founded during regime-change have been transformed into stable structures. This includes the appointment of actors to political offices and a situation where political decisions follow democratically legitimate and previously and clearly defined procedures. (For more on sequencing of transformation processes see e.g. Przeworski 1991; Gunther et al. 1996; Merkel 2000a, 2010.)

Of course in reality the division between the different stages is not as clear-cut as what the ideal-model by Lauth & Merkel might imply. Frequently, significant overlapping or oscillation between the phases can be observed. Furthermore, different policy fields or parts of the system might show different pace of progress. (Merkel et al. 2003) Finally, at each stage there can be different or newly arising factors of social, political or economic nature that facilitate or hamper further democratization processes.

Usually, the theoretical model applied to the analysis of transition has vast implications for the practical reality during times of transition. During regime transition, all spheres of life undergo immense changes. With regard to the last democratization wave in Eastern Europe for instance, Andreas Wittkowsky illustrates the different fields concerned by transition, as can be seen in table 2.2 below. He distinguishes between three main spheres, economy, politics, and society (nation), that each in turn comprises three main fields: economy = private property, money, market; politics = constitution, state, legal system; society (nation) = public, civil society, national consensus.

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\(^{31}\) While the terms ‘transition’ and ‘transformation’ often are used interchangeably, it is useful to clearly distinguish between (1) ‘transition’: defined as “the interval between one political regime and another… Transitions are delimited, on the one side, by the launching of the process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime and, on the other, by the installation of some form of democracy, the return to some form of authoritarian rule, or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative” (O’Donnell, Schmitter 1986: 6) as opposed to (2) ‘transformation’: defined as “change in the entire societal system” (Hopfmann et al. 1998: 45–46), that can be an ongoing process of changes.
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Tab. 2: Transformation – establishing new basic institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>field of transformation</th>
<th>basic institution</th>
<th>functions</th>
<th>functional indicators (examples)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>economy</td>
<td>private property</td>
<td>responsibility for entrepreneurial activity</td>
<td>clear, guaranteed entitlements to disposal (privatization, assertion of contracts, decrease of shadow economy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>money</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>politics</td>
<td>constitution</td>
<td>checks and balances, representative democracy</td>
<td>checks &amp; balances (free elections, clear competences, transparency and control of political decisions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>state</td>
<td>political assertiveness</td>
<td>functional power hierarchies (high probability that executive acts are implemented, effective possibilities of sanctions)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>order of law</td>
<td>rule of law</td>
<td>jurisdiction (independence of judges, access to courts, liability of laws, containment of corruption)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>society (nation)</td>
<td>public</td>
<td>legitimacy of political power</td>
<td>independent media (pluralism, independence from state encroachment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>civil society</td>
<td>participation</td>
<td>non-governmental organizations (political parties, unions, associations, initiatives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>national consensus</td>
<td>integration</td>
<td>acceptance of the nation-state (common basic values, absence of separatism)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As, of course, the immense structural changes are time and effort consuming the effects on the citizens of the respective transitional state cannot be underestimated. While the liberalization from an authoritarian regime frequently is seen with relief, the ensuing instability in all fields of life, regarding employment situation, political representation, etc. usually is met with a sense of loss and disorientation by many citizens. Generally, it takes a long period of time until the situation settles and is organized according to the new, democratic logic that usually at its beginning is very much contested.

In many cases, there are struggles between elites and citizens: those which adhere to the old system and others who support the new regime. Further, a state monopoly on power is crucial, as otherwise the state can be destabilized and even its existence challenged. Political actors may instrumentalize the citizens’ sense of insecurity, by using, for instance, political veto or outbidding. This can complicate governance and can even aim at intra-state ethno-national mobilization of the population and violent conflict. (Benner 1996: 16) It is then decisive, that a majority consensus in favor of democracy is achieved and that the informal and functional “rules of the game” are applied according to democratic standards. (O'Donnell 1996) According to Linz & Stepan, democratic consolidation can only be achieved when democracy is seen as ‘the only game in town’ (1996: 5) and (Przeworski 1991). The ‘will to democracy’ and a democratic culture also need to prevail. (Held 1995: 158; Gunther et al. 1996: 155)

Although the process of democratization is not an easy one, the transition trajectory is nevertheless frequently applied automatically once a state has transitioned from an authoritarian regime to a more open one. A commonly voiced issue of criticism of this model in recent years has been the underlying assumption that once regimes go through a liberalization phase, they tend to follow a trajectory towards eventual democratic consolidation. Empirical evidence since the development of the transition paradigm has shown however that many states show only slow transition processes; many of these even show signs of reversal, at least in some spheres of the regime (e.g. electoral fraud, checks and balances, civil liberties, etc.) (See exemplarily O'Donnell, Schmitter 1993; Linz, Stepan 1996; Carothers 2002.) According to Pridham,
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“[t]he political cultures of the countries in question do not necessarily provide a reasonable basis for system support. Initial transition may be an occasion for euphoria, but the overall process is usually the source of considerable disorientation at elite and mass levels. But even without any immediate or direct threat from anti-democratic forces, [new democracies may be] vulnerable to collapse or at least involve a lengthy and complicated process of transition.” (1996: 1)

Schedler notes in this context, that ‘transition’ and ‘consolidation’ ought to be considered variables on a continuum characterized by institutional insecurity and instability, so as not to “fall for the illusions of consolidation”. (2001) In fact, while the liberalization of an authoritarian state is difficult, the rising number of non-authoritarian but not consolidated states implies that achieving successful democratic consolidation proves in fact a difficult and complex process.32

2.1.4 Consolidation: The Procedural Functioning of Democratic Institutions

“The biggest danger for democracy today is not sudden but rather slow death, meaning a gradual process of erosion and delegitimation that destroys democratic regimes even as their surface institutions remain in place, much as termites eat the foundations of a house without visibly disturbing its outer walls.”

(Krastev 2002: 44)

While the phases of liberalization and transition are relatively clear analytical categories this is more complicated as to the demarcation line between transition and consolidation: the latter phase is closely intertwined with the establishment of a sustainable political system. (Sandschneider 2003: 33)

This, very importantly, includes democratization beyond formal institutions – this also requires the internationalization and application of democratic norms and procedures, which only truly make the formal institutions function according to a democratic logic. On the level of behavior democratic consolidation requires a certain degree of state cohesion and that

“no significant political groups seriously attempt to overthrow the democratic regime or secede from the state”

and on the level of attitudes applies that democratic norms dominate politics -

“even in the face of severe political and economic crises, the overwhelming majority of the people believe that any further political change must emerge from within the parameters of democratic formulas”. (Linz, Stepan 1996: 5)

Merkel proposes an analytical model that in fact identifies four different levels in which democratic consolidation needs to take place in order for the system to become fully democratically consolidated: Levels of consolidation:

32 While for many years structural approaches dominated the research debate on democratization in comparative politics and international relations since O'Donnell et al. (1986) actor-centered research on democratization has gained popularity, compare exemplarily Geddes 1999; McFaul 2002; Richter 2009a: 59–60 – transformation research can be localized in between these two approaches, frequently looking at both, structures and actors involved.
1. institutional consolidation/constitutional consolidation,
2. representative consolidation,
3. behavioral consolidation,
4. consolidation of civic culture/democratic consolidation of the political culture.

(Merkel 2008: 14) (illustrated in the following figure)

![Fig. 3: Multilevel Model of Democratic Consolidation](Source: Merkel 2008: 13)

In the literature on transformation research abundant studies elaborate on factors that impact the quality of democracy. There is a significant number among these writings which concentrate on democratization, among them many with a particular focus on democratic consolidation. (E.g. Zinecker 2007; Diamond 2002b; Merkel 2004; Lauth, Merkel 1997; Carothers 2002)

Not only is the process of democratization difficult, but it usually also takes a long period of time until democracy has truly become established in all spheres of the social and political life. Scientists are divided over exactly how long the process from liberalization of an autocratic regime to reaching consolidated democracy takes. For Fred Halliday,

---

33 Level 1 - constitutional consolidation: “It refers to the key political, constitutionally established institutions, such as the head of state, the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, and the electoral system. Collectively, they form the macrolevel, the level of structures. Of the four levels mentioned above, constitutional consolidation is ordinarily completed first, and it affects the second, third, and fourth levels through components of norms and penalties that facilitate or constrict action and thereby shape structures.” (Merkel 2008: 14)

34 Level 2 - representative consolidation: “It concerns the territorial and functional representation of interests. In other words, it is primarily about parties and interest groups, or the mesolevel of collective actors. At level 2, the actor constellations and what those actors do help determine both how the norms and structures established at level 1 are consolidated, and whether the joint configuration of levels 1 and 2 positively or negatively affect the behavior of the actors at level 3 in terms of democratic consolidation.” (Ibid.)

35 Level 3 - behavioral consolidation: “It is where the informal actors operate – the potentially political ones, such as the armed forces, major land owners, capital, business, and radical movements and groups. They make up a second mesolevel, that of informal political actors. Success with consolidation at levels 1 and 2 is crucial in deciding whether the informal political actors with potential veto power will pursue their interests inside, outside, or against democratic norms and institutions; if the first three levels have been consolidated, they become seminal for the emergence of the civil society that stabilizes a democracy. (Ibid.)

36 Level 4 - the democratic consolidation of the political culture: “Consolidation of the democratic political system concludes with the emergence of a citizenship culture as the sociocultural substructure of democracy. As researchers of political culture know from the second wave of democratization (Italy, Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, and Japan after 1945), this process can take decades and can be sealed only by a generational change. The culture of citizenship constitutes the microlevel, the citizens.” (Ibid.)

37 Although focus and underlying assumptions in the larger field of literature vary, they can still be counted to contribute to a common field of research, compare e.g. McFaul 2002.
Ralph Dahrendorf, in his influential book, \textit{Reflections on the Revolution in Europe}, writes that democracy in Eastern Europe cannot be considered secure until at least two generations, or sixty years, have elapsed (1990: 99) Therefore, sustainable consolidation lies significantly in the hands of the current and former generations and it will probably take several more years, if not decades, until the effectiveness of (democratic) reforms can be seriously assessed. Nevertheless, particularly with regards to CSOs as being a sphere for supporting democratization through the procedural, attitudinal, and behavioral aspects of the system, it is frequently assumed that civil society’s

\begin{quote}
\end{quote}

and that many of the most important results of democracy programs are intangible, indirect, and time-delayed. (Carothers 1999: 341)

Generally, in the context of minimal definitions of democracy, the beginning of the phase of democratic consolidation is considered to have been achieved once a new constitution has been passed and founding elections have been scheduled. Many authors however underline that this does not suffice and that

\begin{quote}
“merely creating democratic institutions and holding elections captures only part of the process through which stable, viable democratic systems come into being” (e.g. Gunther et al. 1996: 155).
\end{quote}

The actual functioning beyond democratically appearing formal institutions has been found to play one of, if not the, most important role when it comes to whether democratic consolidation is actually achieved. Accordingly, the frequently formal understanding of democracy and its consolidation have come under increased criticism as

\begin{quote}
“[t]he word consolidation implies that the desired ends have been achieved and that the sustainability of these ends is all that matters for the future. Here again, democracy is being identified as a set of institutions which we already have, rather than with a political value, or basket of values, which we will always fall short of realising.” (Baker 2004: 69)
\end{quote}

Lauth (2010a: 49) underlines the importance of examining both, formal and informal institutions, when we examine political processes – while it is worth noting that formal institutions are easier to sanction, informal institutions frequently coexist and significantly determine formal institutions. For David Chandler the phase-distinction and introduction of the term ‘consolidation’ has particularly been invented as it relates to more than only formal democratic institutions:

\begin{quote}
“today, democratisation involves deeper concerns that relate to the sustainability of democratic institutions rather than their establishment and operation, for this the new concept of ‘consolidation’ has been deployed.”(1999: 8)
\end{quote}

Particularly reaching democratic consolidation is based much more on a change of attitudes than only on establishing institutions. (Gunther et al. 1996: 152) In order for democratic institutions to be used by actors according to democratic norms, the new “rules of the game” need to become accepted on the levels of values, norms, attitude, and behavior. Once the democratic structures have been institutionalized, their democratic functioning is strongly influenced by whether the cultural aspects of the regime do or do not fit. Using the example of post-communist societies, Chandler notes, that

\begin{quote}
“the widespread cultural rules still dictate pervasive suspicion toward authorities, reluctance to get involved in public life, ignorance and neglect of public issues, political apathy, and electoral absenteeism.” (Sztompka 1996: 119)
\end{quote}

The set of political rules that determine the political rules of the game, the political culture, is also crucial in how the new institutions are formed and are put to use, as Parrott notes:
“A civic political culture embodies high levels of interpersonal trust, a readiness to deal with political conflict through compromise rather than coercion or violence, and acceptance of the legitimacy of democratic institutions. It stands to reason that political culture affects whether citizens choose to support moderate or extreme political movements and parties, and whether they choose to engage in democratic or anti-democratic forms of political participation.” (Parrott 1997: 21–22)

Much of the practical work in external democracy support and most scientific democracy indices are very much focused on formal institutions when determining the degree of democratization, including possible democratic consolidation. This is partially owed to reasons of feasibility to measure and operationalize indicators. In order to be able to predict the democratization trajectory or the degree of democratic consolidation, formal institutions are very important. More importantly, though, the actual practices of making use of the established institutions, norms, and values that actors apply in a democratization context may be more difficult to measure, they are much more reliable and relevant indicators for the prevailing state of democracy instead of that of its “Potemkin’s façades”.

2.2 Democratic Stagnation and Hybrid Regimes

While many states around the world were ruled in an autocratic manner until the 1970s, between 1974, the year of the beginning of the third wave of democratization, and 2000, the number of democracies in the world quadrupled. (Merkel et al. 2003: 10) The analytic focus on democratic consolidation and the doubts cast in the transition paradigm in the past years originated from an observation that many of the states considered on their way to democracy since the early 1990s, still had not achieved their supposed destiny. Of course, several states today are democratically consolidated and have become members of the European Union and other important international organizations, this applies for instance to the states of Central Europe and Central Eastern Europe, even though developments in late 2011 and 2013 in for instance Hungary or Romania suggest that some democratic changes may rather have happened on a formal level than on the level of practices and values of all important societal and political groups. However, in an increasing number of these states, democratization can be observed to have come to a halt since around 2006; this applies for example to most of the states of the Western Balkans. (Economist Intelligence Unit 2011) Finally, a significant number of states in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia have even seen a retrograde development regarding the democratic quality of the regime, even despite “colored revolutions” in some cases, such as in Ukraine or Kyrgyzstan.

So, while much of the transition literature has suggested that a linear path of democratization exists, transitions in fact offer many junctions where regimes can take a path that does not bring them back into a state of autocracy, but which also does not lead to democratic consolidation, as the following figure taken from Solveig Richter shows:

![Fig. 4: Ideal-type process of transformation](image)

According to Freedom House’s assessment, several of the states of the third wave are currently in a state of democratic stagnation or even reversal. (Freedom House 2010) In fact, by 1999, out of the
eighty-five states that were authoritarian before the third democratization wave, only thirty turned into stable democracies, nine only lasted for a short period, eight are unstable democracies, four collapsed into warlordism, and a whole of thirty-four turned into authoritarian regimes:

“[thirty] surviving and mostly quite stable democracies”, nine “democracies that lasted only a very short time before being overthrown”, eight “cases in which there have been elections and leadership changes but in which either democracy appears to be very unstable or where important groups are excluded from competition”, four “descents into warlordism”, and thirty-four “new authoritarian regimes”. (Geddes 1999: 115–116)

Today, in 2012, the situation remains the same: the total share of authoritarian states is steadily decreasing and currently makes up the smallest share of states. Democracies currently are the biggest groups of states and are still on the rise. Nonetheless, the relative share of ‘hybrid regimes’ (for an extensive discussion see the belwo) – or ‘anocracies’ - today has settled somewhere in the middle between the number of autocracies and democracies, amounting to around forty-five, as illustrated in the following figure (see also Diamond 1996, Gaber 2000) and the tables below:

**Fig. 5: Global Trends in Governance 1800-2012**

**Tab. 3: Freedom status of independent states 1972-95**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Free</th>
<th>Partly Free</th>
<th>Not Free</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>42 (29.0%)</td>
<td>36 (24.8%)</td>
<td>67 (46.2%)</td>
<td>145 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>52 (31.9%)</td>
<td>52 (31.9%)</td>
<td>59 (36.2%)</td>
<td>163 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>56 (33.5%)</td>
<td>56 (33.5%)</td>
<td>55 (32.9%)</td>
<td>167 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>76 (41.5%)</td>
<td>65 (35.0%)</td>
<td>42 (22.9%)</td>
<td>183 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>75 (49.3%)</td>
<td>73 (33.2%)</td>
<td>36 (20.4%)</td>
<td>184 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>72 (27.9%)</td>
<td>63 (33.2%)</td>
<td>55 (20.8%)</td>
<td>190 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>76 (29.8%)</td>
<td>61 (31.9%)</td>
<td>54 (20.3%)</td>
<td>191 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>76 (29.8%)</td>
<td>62 (32.5%)</td>
<td>53 (27.7%)</td>
<td>191 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Diamond 1996: 27*

**Tab. 4: Formal and liberal democracies, 1990-95**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Formal Democracies</th>
<th>Number of Liberal Democracies</th>
<th>Free States as a % of Formal Democracies</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>76 (46.1%)</td>
<td>65 (39.4%)</td>
<td>85.5%</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>91 (49.7%)</td>
<td>76 (41.5%)</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>99 (53.2%)</td>
<td>75 (40.2%)</td>
<td>75.8%</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>108 (56.8%)</td>
<td>72 (37.9%)</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>114 (59.7%)</td>
<td>76 (39.8%)</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>117 (61.3%)</td>
<td>76 (39.8%)</td>
<td>65.4%</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Diamond 1996: 28*
For some states, for instance those in the post-communist world, the likelihood of becoming an authoritarian or a hybrid regime has been even higher than that of achieving democratic consolidation (McFaul 2002; Alexander 2008: 928), as Emerson & Noutcheva show in the next figure

![Fig. 6: Democracy scores in Europe and Central Asia](source: Emerson, Noutcheva 2004: 12)

Although debated, it seems that the post-socialist cases as a group display particular characteristics of transition that set them apart from previous transitions: When looking for the reasons accountable for this, in many of the former socialist states in the context of democratization during the 1980s and 1990s, domestic factors, such as pro-democratic political parties and a developing civil society were thought to be the decisive factors for the demise of the authoritarian regimes and thus for the democratic change. (Yilmaz 2002; Gillespie et al. 2002) And McFaul notes that reasons previously assumed accountable for positive democratization were proven wrong by many cases in Eastern Europe as

> “the causal pathways of the third wave do not produce the ‘right’ outcomes in the fourth wave transitions from communist rule. Imposed transitions from above in the former communist world produced not partial democracy but dictatorship. It is instead revolutionary transitions - the mode of transition thought to be least likely to facilitate democratic outcomes by third-wave theorists - that have actually produced the most stable and consolidated democracies in the postcommunist world. Balanced, stale mates transitions those most likely to facilitate the emergence of democracy-enhancing pacts in Latin American and Southern Europe have instead led to unstable regimes of both the democratic and the autocratic variety in the postcommunist world. In all three of these causal paths negotiation, crafting, and compromise did not feature prominently. Even in the successful transitions to democracy in the postcommunist world, the three components of successful pacts played only a minor role in explaining regime change.” (McFaul 2002: 221)

Data on democratization in the past twenty years suggests that first of all hybrid regimes frequently are not just a transitory state, but that they in fact have proven to take on a rather stable form. (Croissant, Thiery 2000: 14–15; Merkel 2010: 40) This applies particularly in states where the population has a low level of education and is characterized by clientelistic and patrimonial structures (Merkel 2010: 40) which consist of historically rooted practices, such that informal institutions tend to be particularly “sticky”. (Wheatley, Zürcher 2008)

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38 As the regime change outcome for the post-communist states has been so different from the rest of the states of the third wave that were liberalized in the 1970s and 1980s, McFaul argues that the transition of post-communist states should be considered a new, fourth, wave on its own, that lead not only to democracy, but also to dictatorship and protracted democratization. McFaul 2002: 213, 2002
The disillusionment caused by these observations has led to dampened enthusiasm regarding recent regime changes, as was detectable very shortly after the first optimistic prognoses right after the so-called “Arab spring” in several states of the southern Mediterranean in spring of 2011. Practical experiences in several cases where the international community has extensively been supporting regime change and where democratization have proved resistant to these efforts, such as Afghanistan or Iraq, also have lead practitioners of external democracy promotion to be more cautious in the expectations they raise. While for a long time the “carrot” and “stick” approach applied to external democracy promotion, recent experiences have led the EU to formulate their “more for more” principle (and also an implicit “less for less” principle European Commission) with regards to democratization support in the South Mediterranean.

The fact that until today many states liberalize yet over decades do not develop into consolidated democracies has important consequences for transformation research and also for practical approaches of external democracy promotion. Nevertheless, it is important to note that it are in fact the citizens of the states in which the long, troublesome transitions processes usually characterized by economic and political hardships are taking place, who are most directly concerned by possibly stagnating democratization and doubts about ever reaching democratic consolidation. This should be kept in mind when researching reasons for and consequences of regime hybridity and democratic consolidation.

2.2.1 Hybrid Regimes: Not just a Phase but a Stable Regime Type

After the democratic liberalization of the large group of post-communist and post-socialist states, for some time democratization was studied mostly focusing on factors necessary for the break-up of authoritarianism. The number of hybrid regimes significantly increased in the 1990s: in 1990/91, the share of states rated by Freedom House as ‘non-liberal’ democracies was 38% and rose to 46% in 1999/2000, with the level of freedom and participatory rights stagnating in about half of all states and even reversing in 20 % of states; however this happened without transgressing the threshold to authoritarianism (Croissant, Thiery 2000). In 2000, Larry Diamond pointed out that according to Freedom House, only half of the states examined fulfilled the criteria for ‘electoral’ democracies (i.e. liberal democracies), while all others are classified as either ‘semi-liberal’ or ‘illiberal’ democracies. (2000, comp. Croissant, Thiery 2000: 12)

Consequently, in recent years the concept of ‘hybrid regimes’ and its definition have been subject of long debate. One of the first attempts of labeling “states in-between” democracy and dictatorship, at that time focusing on transitions in Latin America, was written by O’Donnell & Schmitter (1986), who coined the terms ‘democradura’ and ‘dictablanda’. Several years later, several publications, focusing mostly on transformation processes in Eastern Europe, investigated the phenomenon, developing new concepts and terminologies: Terry Karl (1995), Larry Diamond (2002b), and Friedbert Rüb (2002) wrote about ‘hybrid regimes’, and Michael McFaul investigated ‘partial democracies’ (2002). Until today, the terminology and publications on the phenomenon are constantly increasing, and terms such as ‘states in the gray zone’ (Croissant, Thiery 2000), ‘defective democracy’ (Merkel 1999), ‘illiberal democracy’ (Levitsky, Way 2002), ‘delegative democracy’ (O’Donnell 1994), ‘anocracy’ (Jaggers, Gurr 1995) and other ‘democracies with adjectives’ (Collier, Levitsky 1997) have been coined. A study by Collier & Levitsky (1997) is frequently quoted to have identified more than 550 subtypes of democracy. Out of these, the majority consists of ‘diminished subtypes’ of democratic regimes, while some others are merely euphemisms for non-democratic regimes. (1997: 431; Croissant, Thiery 2000: 16)

39 On democratization see e.g. Huntington 1991; Fukuyama 1989; Pridham 1995a, on democratic consolidation see Linz, Stepan 1996; Diamond 1999; Merkel 2000a; O’Donnell 1996; von Beyme 1994; O’Donnell 1996; Pridham et al. 2001 and on factors that could stabilize democracy against possible backsliding see for instance Pridham et al. 1996.
According to Beichelt’s literature review on hybrid regimes, literature in this context follows two different types of logics: (a) two different forms of regimes, authoritarianism and democracy, that can appear in “diminished” or “defective” forms or (b) the second variant, which leaves a deliberate gap between democracy and authoritarianism (see also figure 7 below):

“[h]ybridity is not limited to a crossover region but comes along in three variants: B3 indicates the core of the genuine type, B2 and B4 present regimes which are on the edges of the regular types A2 and C2. By idea, the regimes on and around B2 and B4 could also be defined as ‘incomplete’ with regard to the established types. In practice, however, scholars rather tend to focus on B3 as the newly created type and try to include various features into them. Therefore, hybrid types always bear elements which are – in other conceptions – attributed to either democracies or autocracies. Examples are elections, the rule of law, the freedoms of speech and assembly on the one hand and electoral fraud, fragile judicial systems, and tutelary rulers.” (Beichelt 2012b: 2–3)

**Fig. 7: Pure types versus fuzzy types of regimes**

![Diagram 1: Pure types versus fuzzy types](source: Beichelt 2012b: 3)

A clear definition, however, has been difficult. Are hybrid regimes a (stable) regime type of its own account or rather “diminished” subtypes of either autocracy or democracy? And if the latter applies, where does the line need to be drawn?

Situated in the debate around “diminished subtypes”, Merkel’s concept of “embedded democracies” (see above in this chapter) (2003: 14), considers democracy as a complex interplay of mechanisms in several partial regimes and helps to better analytically grasp the idea of democratic shortcomings in regimes. Merkel contrasts (1) democracies, including four types of defective democracies with (2) ‘autocratic regimes’ that again can be subdivided into two types of regimes, (a) ‘authoritarian’ and (b) ‘totalitarian’. (For an extensive discussion see Merkel 2010: 40–54; Merkel et al. 2003; Merkel 2004.) Based on the idea of embedded democracies, Merkel & Puhle developed the concept of ‘defective democracies’, which they define as

“Herrschaftssysteme, die sich durch das Vorhandensein eines weitgehend funktionierenden demokratischen Wahlregimes zur Regelung des Herrschaftszugangs auszeichnen, aber durch Störungen in der Funktionslogik eines oder mehrerer der übrigen Teilregime die komplementäre Stützen verlieren, die in einer funktionierenden Demokratie zur Sicherung von Freiheit, Gleichheit und Kontrolle unabdingbar sind.” (2003: 66)

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40 For a more extensive debate see exemplarily Croissant, Thiery 2000, who identify four strands of research that refer to hybrid regimes as one of the following: (a) subtypes of authoritarian regimes, (b) mixed-type, (c) subtypes of either authoritarian regimes or democracies, (d) subtypes of democracies (or authoritarian regimes).

41 Translation [by the author]: ‘defective regimes’ are defined as systems of government, that are characterized by the existence of a mostly functioning democratic electoral regime for the regulation of the access to power, but that, through disruption in the functional logic of one or several of the other partial regimes, loose the complementary support, which is indispensable in a functioning democracy in order to secure, freedom, equality, and control. Merkel et al. 2003: 66
Chapter 2: Civil Society and External Democracy Promotion: Democratic Consolidation in Ethno-Nationally Divided States

Merkel distinguishes between four types of defective democracies: (1) exclusive democracy, (2) enclave democracy, (3) illiberal democracy, and (4) delegative democracy:

1. ‘exclusive democracy’: defective when for instance an important group or the whole of the population is excluded from elections or suffers from limited political freedom
2. ‘enclave democracy’: this type of democracy is usually characterized by powerful veto-powers, such as the military, guerilla, etc.
3. ‘illiberal democracy’: they touch at the core of the liberal idea of democracy, which is equal freedom for all individuals. The control of the executive and legislative power by the third power is limited. The effect of binding constitutional norms on the government’s actions and legislation is low. Illiberal democracies represent the most frequent type of defective democracies.
4. ‘delegative democracy’: the control of the executive by the legislative and by the third power are limited. The binding effect of constitutional norms on the government’s actions is limited, as is the practice of checks and balances. Governments – frequently lead by a charismatic president – bypass the parliament, influence the judiciary, harm the principle of legality, undermine the principle of the division of powers and change the power balance in favor of the (presidential) executive. (2010: 37–38, compare also Croissant, Thiery 2000)

In empirical reality most regimes take on some sort of a mixed character that usually can be determined as to which one of the types of defective democracy it resembles the closest. (Compare Croissant, Thiery 2000)

Just as Merkel defines several sub-types of defective democracies according to the dominating shortcomings in the different partial regimes, Levitsky & Way (2010) identify several types of hybrid regimes according to their characteristics:

1. ‘competitive authoritarianism’: elections and other formally democratic institutions are in place, while the political regime uses or abuses these for its own interests and against possible political rivaling actors, thus seriously violating democratic procedures,
2. ‘constitutional oligarchies’ or ‘exclusive republics’: these possess the basic features of democracy but deny suffrage to a major segment of the adult population,
3. ‘tutelary regimes’: elections are competitive but the power of elected governments is constrained by nonelected religious, military, or monarchic authorities,
4. ‘restricted or semi-competitive democracies’: elections are free but a major party is banned from the electoral process.

Summarizing, the functioning and effectiveness of existing formally democratic institutions, in fact, is more decisive than the formal institutions of semi-democratic or of autocratic regimes (comp. also Croissant, Thiery 2000: 11–12). The categorization of hybrid regimes in reality proves more complex than a two-sided debate between “diminished pure types” vs. “fuzzy type” debate. The argument is that regimes can in fact display significant differences from the pure types of autocracy and democracy, yet settle as stable regimes in the “gray zone” between the two. Adherents of the “fuzzy type” debate, then, argue that many hybrid regimes do not even fulfill the minimal criteria of democracies, and because of, such should be treated as a distinct category. Schedler puts forward that many hybrid regimes

“... violate minimal democratic norms so severely that it makes no sense to classify them as democracies, however qualified. These electoral regimes ... are instances of authoritarian rule. The time has come to abandon misleading labels and to take their non-democratic nature seriously.” (Schedler 2002: 36; Levitsky, Way 2010: 15)

Linz calls for scholars that they “should be clear that [hybrid regimes] are not democracies (even using minimum standards)” (Linz 2000: 34), and also for Levitsky & Way defining regimes with serious democratic shortcomings as a type of democracy is overstretched the concept of democracy. (2010: 15)
However, for analytical purposes, the criteria for categorizing a regime as “somewhere in the middle” seem difficult to establish. As in reality, many states display different degrees of democratic or non-democratic logic in the various sectors of the system and of policies, it makes sense, to classify states that clearly display significant shortcomings from democracy but are not longer autocratic as belonging to a discrete category, i.e. to hybrid regimes.

Where relevant for research purposes, however, it remains important to clearly state the characteristics of a regime under question and to draw the demarcation lines between the different degrees of democratization. The aim of this dissertation is to gain knowledge about the contribution of civil society to democratic consolidation or the establishing of hybrid regimes. Thus the focus here is on regime hybridity or advanced democratization - located more on the “diminished” democracy side of the regime continuum. This, of course, means applying more of a discrete, empirical and not so much a clear theoretical definition for hybrid regimes. However, if the deficits in one or several embedded regimes were too large, a regime ought to be categorized as what it actually is: an autocratic regime. (Croissant, Thiery 2000; Merkel 2010)

2.2.2 Reasons for the Emergence of Hybrid Regimes

While the debate around hybrid regimes has been very fruitful, at least when measuring this by the number of terms and publications that have developed in this context, the reasons why states settle as no longer authoritarian but not yet democratic, have proven difficult to pinpoint. The development of the literature on reasons for success or failure in democratization reaches back into the 1950s, as activities in the fields of development aid and international cooperation increased and research on democracy strongly centered around linking economic development and democracy (‘modernization theory’ cf. e.g. Lipset 1959). Later, in the 1970s, in the course of what Huntington (1991) called the “second wave” of democratization, the focus of analysis shifted towards what democratic regimes need so they do not slide back into authoritarianism (cf. e.g. (Linz et al. 1978), – but the transition paradigm had been accepted as a crucial foundation of democratization research. At the end of the 1980s, with the beginning of the “third wave” of democratization, the pre-/conditions of democratization gained new attention. (Cf. e.g. Diamond et al. 1989; O'Donnell et al. 1986; Di Palma 1990; Fish 1995.) In the beginning, a more or less direct path towards democratization was still assumed. (Comp. O'Donnell et al. 1986: 3; Gunther et al. 1996)

The prevailing optimism (see e.g. Fukuyama 1989) was gradually reduced in the mid-1990s, when Carothers (2002) put forward that the main assumptions42 long held to be true by transformation researches, had proven wrong, announcing the “end of the transition paradigm”. (Comp. Diamond 1996) Furthermore, the previous optimism has by now been replaced by sometimes rather open skepticism (see exemplary Linz, Stepan 1996; Fish 2005; Mansfield, Snyder 2002; Chandler 1999, etc.)

In recent years, the interest in factors for protracted or reversal and backsliding of democratization43 and particularly concerning factors that lead to a stabilization of hybrid regimes have increased. Many factors have been blamed for state hybridity, to name just a few: economy, corruption, clientelism, post-communist/-socialist path dependencies, violent conflict, strong ethno-national cleavages, lack of effectiveness of external democracy promotion, the effect of regional spill-over effects, socialization into democratic norms, etc.

Merkel (2010: 38–40) discusses ten fields of causal mechanisms, which he states can be held accountable for providing opportunities for defective democracies to emerge. These fields are usually made up by a set of a complex combination of causes briefly summarized as follows:

42 Carothers’ five main assumptions were: 1. any country moving away from dictatorship is moving towards democracy, 2. second, democratization is linear sequence of stages, 3. elections can be equated with democracy, 4. context factors (economic development, history, and socio-cultural traditions) would not be major factors in the course of democratization, 5. democratization has a base in coherent, functioning states. (2002)

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(1) **Path of modernization:** The probability for democratic defects rises, if the socio-economic modernization of a state follows a semi-modern path that leads to blatant imbalance of power, and which makes the owning class perceive of democracy as a threat to its economic and political interests.

(2) **Level of modernization:** The higher the probability of the emergence of a defective democracy, the lower the socio-economic development and the more unequal the distribution of societal resources. The asymmetric distribution of economic, cultural, and cognitive resources promotes a blatant unequal distribution of resources to political action and power between the political actors and impedes the enforcement of legal and democratic standards. (See also Lipset 1959 and Geddes 1999)

(3) **Economic situation:** Economic crises offer situational incentives for the institutionalization of defects in non-consolidated democracies. This is usually the hour of special powers and emergency orders, especially in presidential and semi-presidential regimes, that are frequently stretched beyond constitutional limits and that are often stabilized beyond the urgent emergency situation.

(4) **Social capital:** The probability for a defective democracy is connected to the type and extent of the social capital that is historically accumulated in a given society. Social capital, which exists in an ethnically or religiously segmented form, fosters democratic defects. Social capital of the “Tocquevillean or Putnam’s type”, that bridges ethnic or religious cleavages, has a countering effect on exclusive and illiberal tendencies.

(5) **Civil society:** Low interpersonal trust impedes the development of a well institutionalized system of political parties, syndicates, and civic associations. Consequently, there is a lack of intermediary support for assuming political rights and civil rights. In such a political-cultural situation, the charismatic-populist justification for defective-democratic patterns of decision-making by the executive offers a promising way to alternative generating of consent.

(6) **Nation- and state-building:** The conditions for the development of a defective democracy are greater, when the transformation is loaded with unresolved crises of identity or stateness of the political society. Secessionist aspirations or minority discrimination harm the indispensable standards of civil rights to freedom and political participation.

(7) **Type of previous authoritarian regime:** The longer a totalitarian, post-totalitarian, sultanist, or neo-patrimonial regime was able to institutionalize and/or form the political culture of a given society, the more likely the defects of the subsequent democracy. Such societies tend to bypass the principle of checks and balances by the executive power and to reward the application of “delegative” principles of governance with bonuses in the electoral arena.

(8) **Mode of transition:** The more inclusive the founding compromise of the elites (elite settlement) is directly after the regime change, the more strongly the new democratic rules of the game will be accepted and protected by the relevant actors. The more strongly the new democratic institutions are respected by the elites, the faster they receive legitimizing system support by the population. (Compare also Karl, Schmitter 1991; O’Donnell et al. 1986; Huntington 1991; McFaul 2002: 216)

(9) **Political institutions:** The stronger the patterns of interaction between elites and the population are characterized by clientelism, patrimonialism, and corruption, the more difficult it is for the new “formal” institutions to obtain power of validity and normative processes. Informal institutions threaten to crack, to deform, or to replace the functioning codes of the formal, democratically legitimized institutions. In significant areas of decision-making the democracy then functions
according to the non-legitimized informal institutions and rules, which contradict the basic principles of the democratic constitutional state.\(^44\)

(10) **International and regional integration**: In instances where regional mechanisms (e.g. EU, Council of Europe) to protect the liberal-democratic institutions are lacking or weak, the room for maneuver for governments to harm these is lower, as the trade-offs for such actions are significantly lower.

The research question of this dissertation investigates particularly into how the reasons (5) civil society and (6) cleavages (somewhat linked to what is described under reason (4) referring to social capital) effect development during regime hybridity and whether and how development towards democratic consolidation can be reached.

### 2.3 Democratic Consolidation and Ethno-National Divisions

"The sleeping beauty of ethnicity can, alas, often be awakened with the gentlest and most tender of kisses (...)"

(Gellner 1994: 126–127)

One important factor in the democratization literature, that can have a particularly strong and widespread impact on pretty much all the causes for hybrid regimes, is ‘ethnicity’, which can have an effect in the form of ethnic diversity, strong ethnic cleavages and even previous or current ethnic (violent) conflict. Consequently, the next subsections are dedicated to investigating the impact of ethnicity on democratization, democratic consolidation, and regime hybridity.

Particularly times of turmoil and uncertainty, such as during democratization, state reconfiguration and most of all violent conflicts and wars, have been observed to evoke the question, of who “we” are and who are “the others”, and how to tell apart “friend” from “foe”. Ethnicity is a universally used social category around the world today - around 90% of the world’s states are poly-ethnic – and half of them are divided along ethnic lines. (Giddens 1985: 216–220) Ethnic categories have particularly problematic potential, as they are highly symbolic and leave hardly any room for compromise. The emphasis of ethno-national characteristics can be quickly mobilized during times of regimes change, as suddenly the rules of the game and the distribution of resources are subject to new negotiations. (Ågh 1998) The question of group belonging is a crucial one with regard to democratic transition as well as to democracy. Democratic institutions and procedures can appease or escalate ethnic conflict and competition. Plenty of political instruments have been invented for this aim, as, for instance, reserving parliamentary seats for representatives of ethnic minorities, by allowing the use of minority languages in local administration procedures, through decentralization, and so forth.

Political cleavages, including ethnically defined political cleavages, have extensively been debated referring to the “cleavage paradigm” based on Lipset & Rokkan (see e.g. Lipset 1959; Lipset et al. 1967). As the present research focuses on societal division lines and not so much on the cleavage dimension of the political system, this concept is not debated here in detail, while, in other, possibly

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\(^44\) In this context, Diamond mentions the concept of the ‘predatory state’, in which “the behavior of elites is cynical and opportunistic. If there are competitive elections, they become a bloody zero-sum struggle in which everything is at stake and no one can afford to lose. Ordinary people are not truly citizens but clients of powerful local bosses, who themselves are the clients of still more powerful patrons. Stark inequalities in power and status create vertical chains of dependency, secured by patronage, coercion, and demagogic electoral appeals to ethnic pride and prejudice. Public policies and programs do not really matter, since rulers have few intentions of delivering on them anyway. Officials feed on the state, and the powerful prey on the weak. The purpose of government is not to generate public goods, such as roads, schools, clinics, and sewer systems. Instead, it is to produce private goods for officials, their families, and their cronies.” (Diamond 2008; Risse 2011; and others, e.g. Linz, Stepan 1996; Merkel et al. 2003, highlight the important problematic influence of ‘limited statehood’ and ‘stateness problems’ on democratization.
subsequent, research endeavors connected to the research complex of this study, interesting new results may arise.

Violent conflicts tend to foster group-identification and decrease inter-group-cooperation and trust. This is why identity-ideologies and doctrines are frequently very important conflict components. They can be structured very differently: until a few decades ago they used to be based on the political ideologies of the cold war (e.g. Marxism-Leninism vs. Liberalism). Today, again, they are increasingly based on nationalist, ethnic, or religious ideologies that come in different shapes and also in mixed-forms. (Hippler 1999: 427)

The “ethnic dimension” is frequently debated in the context of democratization. Ethnic diversity and even more ethnic divisions are often referred to as a particular challenge to democracy and to democratization. Many cases of unsuccessful democratization, for instance in Afghanistan, Iraq, Rwanda, and recently Mali, are readily blamed on the ethnic dimension, despite having received support from the international community.

2.3.1 Defining Ethnicity as a Category of Action

Scientific research and theory provide a broad and diverse interpretation of the causes and effects of ethnicity. This subsection discusses the current theoretical state of the art on ethnicity with regard to democracy and democratic consolidation. The phenomenon of ‘ethnicity’ has been long and controversially debated: views on how ethnicity ought to be understood and defined range from entirely primordial kin-ship based understanding of ethnicity, over rational choice views, to purely constructivist views of ethnicity as socially engineered categories of action. The constructivist strand of research especially suggests that ethnicity is not per se a stable and necessary social category, but rather that it can be mobilized and de-mobilized. This is of particular importance in contexts in which ethnic mobilization represents a problem to democracy or democratization and in which options and mechanisms are needed for dealing with ethnic categories and to promote ethnic demobilization.

In a review essay, Chaim Kaufmann distinguishes between four different types of approaches to ethnicity: (1) essentialism, (2) rational choice (3) structuralism (realism), and (4) constructivism, that are presented now in brief:

**Essentialism or Primordialism**

Essentialist or primordialist approaches assume a “natural” or “given” attachment to objectively existing ethnic groups, based on objective traits of belonging of distinct groups. An early proponent of primordialism, Clifford Geertz explained primordialism as that

“by a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the "givens"--or, more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed "givens"--of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves. One is bound to one's kinsman, one's neighbor, one's fellow believer, ipso facto; as the result not merely of personal affection, practical necessity, common interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself. The general strength of such primordial bonds, and the types of them that are important, differ from person to person, from society to society, and from time to time. But for virtually every person, in every society, at almost all times, some attachments seem to flow more from a sense of natural--some would say spiritual--affinity than from social interaction.“ (1963: 109)

The strong form of primordialism has been put into question by results in the constructivist tradition. Eller & Coughlan (1993) for instance criticize that primordialism wrongly ignores the dimensions of social interaction and construction and places them in the arena of emotions without further explanation. Consequently, later, weak primordialist approaches consider psychological and emotional modes of explanation for the need of individual group belonging. (Kaufmann 2005: 184)
Rational choice & Instrumentalism

According to Kaufmann (2005: 170) the core assumption of this approach is that ethnic identification serves individuals to maximize their gain of personal wealth or power or to preserve his resources. A collective dimension is not considered important by this approach. However, this also represents the main shortcoming of this perspective as it falls short of explaining cooperation for which individuals invest risk or even invest net losses for the gain of the group and it also does not satisfactorily explain emotions and beliefs to represent strong ties to ethnic groups, which during times of transitions frequently seems to be the case.

Some authors even note that on a personal level ethnic conflicts are frequently used to access resources, such as employment, housing, etc., or even to settle personal scores, that in fact are only superficially connected to the (ethnic) cleavages of a conflict. However, this would imply, that significant cross-ethnic mobilization and violence, which has not been observed. (Kaufmann 2005: 180) During very significant events of regime change, such as decolonialization or system change, e.g. from communism to democracy and capitalism, however, intra-ethnic tensions between persons cooperating with the former power and their opponents have been observed to even raise intra-ethnic divisions to a certain extent. (Kaufmann 2005: 181)

In a paper that explains interethnic cooperation, Fearon & Laitin for instance put forward that ethnic attachments do not matter and that ethnic groups rather serve as a network for the distribution of information and other resources. (Fearon, Laitin 1996: 724) Recent literature in the tradition of rational choice has developed to also include preferences based on beliefs and values, but until today does not provide a sufficient explanation for the power of norms and beliefs. (Kaufmann 2005: 182)

Structuralism

Proponents of this view on ethnicity consider institutional structures as crucial for organizing ethnicity and how this effects ethnic cooperation or conflict. (Kaufmann 2005: 179) Practically, this can concern intra-state solutions, such as decentralization, or other solutions such as federalism or even state-partition. (Kaufmann 1998) The main argument of this approach to ethnicity is that certain structures are conducive for activating ethnic identification. For instance, during times of structural insecurity, as what occurs during regime change or is the case in failed states, ethnic group belonging is mobilized as it helps members to organize and to watch out for security and for access to resources. (Posen 1993) The power structures and qualifications, seen as access to possibilities and power, of ethnic groups within a state play a significant role in determining the prospects groups see they can gain access to and thus determine the type and scope of demands groups will formulate. (Kaufmann 2005: 187) Structuralism has some leanings towards instrumentalist approaches as it takes into account the collective will to assure access to resources. Weaker forms of structuralism also borrow from constructivism to a certain extent as they acknowledge that violent conflicts can harden and further activate group belonging and ethnically-defined collective action.

Constructivism

The most popular proponents of constructivist approaches to ethnicity today are probably Rogers Brubaker, David Laitin, and Benedict Anderson. Here, what is most important is that members themselves define themselves as belonging to

“a named human community connected to a homeland, possessing common myths of ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of a shared culture, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the elites”

(Smith 2001: 13)

or belonging to

"a distinctive and enduring collective identity based on a belief in common descent and a shared experience and cultural traits". (Gurr 2000: 5)
Ethnic groups are seen as “imagined communities”, who, even though the majority of members of the group will never personally meet, still feel a sense of belonging. (Anderson 1983) This is supported by different factors, some subjective, such as cultural values and symbols, others objective, such as language, clothing, traditions, etc. (Benner 1996: 13) while factors on both levels as well as the feeling of group belonging may in reality be subject of change over time – for instance previous regional differences can gain increased importance and calls for separation may develop, etc.

In the tradition of Fredrik Barth’s influential essay on “Ethnic groups and boundaries” (1969), Rogers Brubaker clearly advocates against the application of “groupism” in the study of ethnicity and to avoid treating ethnic groups as clearly defined and distinct collective entities but rather to see “groupness as an event”. Taking ethnic groups for granted would by no means facilitate answering why ethnically defined collective action happens. Categories of ethno-political practices should not be confused with categories of social analysis. He calls for no longer using terms such as “ethnicity, race or nation” but rather “ethnicization, racialization, and nationalization”. Furthermore, he calls to not see ‘ethnic groups’ as the main protagonists of ethnic conflicts but rather certain institutions and organizations, possibly ranging from the state to political parties to militia and ethnic associations, which base their legitimation on a claim of representing “their ethnic group”. (Brubaker 2002)

According to Laitin, researching ethnicity frequently is a difficult endeavor – as it remains difficult to determine to what extent ethnicity is the cause or the effect of ethnic mobilization:

“members of ethnic groups are not out there to be counted as are votes for political parties. In fact, the clear identification of ethnic groups as entities is often the result of their mobilization... But if ethnic mobilization becomes the criterion for ethnic groupness, there is a problem, as the value of the independent variable becomes dependent on the value of the dependent variable.” (2000: 142)

Consequently, research needs to take into account the possibility of non-salience of ethnic groups as well as the possible consequences of ethnicity being either an independent or a dependent variable. Criticism of constructivism has included, that pertinence of ethnic belonging, for instance in politics, could not really be explained by constructivism, which has been included by theorists acknowledging the “stickiness” of previously constructed identities and connected symbols and the possibility of using this for social engineering.

2.3.2 The Impact of Ethnicity during Democratic Consolidation

Nationalism has been a very powerful, and destructive, category throughout the past two centuries:

“(n)ationalism has been, arguably, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries' most powerful political idea. (...) Adjudicating the legitimacy of claims and counterclaims of various groups for self-determination has emerged as a major challenge for international society. There are many practical difficulties associated with defining a collective self, or national identity. How the criteria defining a nation are arrived at - on the basis of a common culture, language, race, religion, shared historical experience, living in one “historic” lands - has been a constant source of friction.” (Ganguly, Taras 1998: xi)

Although frequently used interchangeably the notions of “ethnicity” and “nationality” or “nationalism” are not the same: ethnicity understood as an ideological category can have a community building function, it does not, however, characterize as a sufficiently political idea to have a socializing effect and to legitimize political power. Ethnic communities are not automatically ‘nations’ as well. Ethnic identity and ethnic sense of belonging are based on the belief in an ethnic community (an "ethnos"45),

45 The term „ethnos” is based on a concept by Carl Schmitter, Smith defines “ethnos” as “a named human community connected to a homeland, possessing common myths of ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of a shared culture, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the elites” 2001: 13.
while a national community is defined by its relation to the state (a “demos”). (Cf. e.g. Francis 1965; Lepsius 1986) For a nation, the development of the stately power on monopoly is decisive for the form that ethnic commonalities can take on and also regarding whether ethnicity as a term of reference of a people can be instrumentalized for nationalist purposes. (Benner 1996: 16) The term “ethno-nationalism” then refers to ethnically defined group belonging connected to the aspiration of political self-determination.

Nations, like ethnic groups, are frequently defined by criteria such as language, kin-ship, etc., that are presented as facts and, by the meaning that members of a community attribute to them, can take on “a power beyond rational calculation and interest” (Smith 2001: 21) In the constructivist tradition, Hobsbawm & Ranger highlight that the investigation of

“invented traditions” is “highly relevant to that comparatively recent innovation, the ‘nation’, with its associated phenomena: nationalism, the nation-state, national symbols, histories and the rest.” (Hobsbawm et al. 1983: 13)

And, in the same vein, Brubaker suggests to not take nations as objective categories, but rather as a conventional dimension of established practice, and

“to think about nationalism without nations [and] nation as a category of practice, nationhood as an institutionalised cultural and political form, and nationness as a contingent event or happening (…)” (1996: 21)

Accordingly, this investigation will pay attention to the notions of ethnicity, nation, and ethno-nationalism that may prove relevant during the course of the empirical investigation.

**Ethnicity during Transition**

Especially during transitional times, the question of who belongs to the nation (endowed with the right to political self-determination) (Mungiu-Pippidi 2006: 4) remains subject to controversial discussion in all modern states. In fact, the process of democratization, between liberalization and until democratic consolidation, has been observed to foster inter-ethnic mistrust, mobilize ethnic cleavages and also to raise the likelihood of ethnic conflict. (Horowitz 1985; Letki, Evans 2005: 523; Smooha, Järve 2005), (Vorrath, Krebs 2009) Times of democratic transition create in particular destabilize societal structures and power relations as

“threatening uncertainties for some groups [open] up a range of transitory political opportunities for ethnic entrepreneurs”. (Gurr 2000: 68)

Especially in the post-communist and post-socialist states the concepts of ‘ethnos’ and ‘nation’ were strongly inter-connected. Ethnicity was a predominant category in the Soviet region as well as in the former Yugoslavia. (Halbach 1992: 34–36; Bianchini et al. 1998) Many politicians of the newly independent states came to power by playing the ‘ethnic card’. The way ethnic belonging was framed served as a basis for access to resources (territory, self-determination, education, etc.). The ‘ethnicization’ is still omnipresent. (Hornstein-Tomić 2008: 2–3) This trend was likely owed to the fact that the Soviet concept of ‘nation’ was largely based on an ethnic definition of group belonging. In addition, the fact that a rising ethno-nationalism was an effective source of mobilization for state

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46 The word ‘nation’ goes back to the Latin word *natio* = lat. "birth, people, kind". An understanding of stately-territorial nationality and individual identity relating to a nation only dates back to the time of the French Revolution. In the 16th century Pierre Bodin already referred to the idea of the “nation” as based on family belonging, but the idea did not truly become prominent as a political category of reference until two centuries later. Until the late 19th century, nations were not a commonly used category of community, but rather a social and local origin which determined a person’s identity. (comp. Kellas 1991: 27) However, after the turn of the century, this changed and the term nation became more political.

47 The concept of “demos” follows the tradition by Rousseau in the vein of a “contrat social”: the common will to the agreement on and adhering to a political order, cf. Heckmann 1993: 10.
independence claims has caused it to still have a strong impact on individual and collective identity and claims. Additionally, the domestic experiences of most Western European countries in dealing with their own ethnic questions in the last decades affected their politics and possible knowledge transfer to post-socialist/communist states. (Kymlicka 2008: 15) Ethnicity can, but does not have to, be formally institutionalized as a relevant, determining category:

“Ethnicity is socially relevant when people notice and condition their actions on ethnic distinctions in everyday life. Ethnicity is politicized when political coalitions are organized along ethnic lines, or when access to political or economic benefits depends on ethnicity. Ethnicity can be socially relevant in a country without it being much politicized, and the degree to which ethnicity is politicized can vary across countries and over time.”

(Fearon 2006: 854)

In practice, during times of regime change and state break-up, ethnicity frequently becomes mobilized when it then, more or less, becomes politicized as a formal, political category.

Ethnicity and Democracy

Since the writings of Rabushka & Shepsle (1972), authors have investigated how ethnic divisions and democratization can or cannot go together. The research on the theoretical and practical analysis and implications of the connection between ethno-national politics and democracy has produced a growing number of writings. \(^{48}\) Habermas underlines the importance of national identification as basis for political activism of citizens:

> “the national self-image builds the cultural context in which subjects could become politically active citizens. It is only the sense of belonging to a ‘nation’ that establishes an interrelation of solidarity between persons who up to that point had been strangers to one another. ... The nation or the spirit of the people ... supplies the judicially constituted state with a cultural substratum”. (Habermas 1996: 135, 137) cited in (Offe 2000: 10)

And, according to Linz & Stepan ethnic diversity renders the political process more complex:

> “the more the population of the territory of the state is comprised of plurinational, lingual, religious, or cultural societies, the more complex politics becomes because an agreement on the fundamentals of a democracy will be more difficult.” (1996: 29)

With the rise of the concept of the “nation-state,” the categories “ethnicity” and “nation,” defined on the basis of kinship relations, have increasingly gained legitimacy. \(^{49}\) (Cf. exemplary Zürcher 2007: 4; Brubaker 1996) Particularly in countries dealing with recent state-reconfiguration and system change, there is a need for institutional state-building \(^{50}\) and societal nation-building. \(^{51}\) State- and nation-building processes are frequently accompanied by violent rhetoric from ethnicized veto players, supported by their kin-states, which take place against the backdrop from the international arena, due to the involvement of third states and international organizations. (Comp. Kymlicka 2008; Taras,

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\(^{49}\) This concerns the protection of material or immaterial cultural heritage, minority protection, or, in extreme cases, international interventions to prevent genocide.

\(^{50}\) Here, ‘state-building’ refers to the installation of institutional structures such as elections, constitutional reforms, etc. For Hippler state-building “presupposes a number of practical abilities (a financial basis for a functioning state-apparatus, an organized police and judicial system, an administrative system that is effective and accepted in the entire state, loyal personnel, that identifies with the ‘nation’ – and the state must be able to exert its monopoly on the use of force on the whole state territory.” (2002: 19)

\(^{51}\) Dave defines ‘nation-building’ as “the measures taken by the state to unify and homogenize its diverse population under a commonly shared civic identity that prevails over ethnic, linguistic, religious or regional markers.” (2004: 123). For more on nation-building in post-conflict societies see Schoch 2007: 61–62.
Ganguly 2006; Saideman 2001.)

The way conflicts are dealt with in a society is directly linked to the structure and logic of the political institutions. (Schmitter 1995a: 24) In this context, it is crucial that the majority of the population identifies with the political community. (Rustow 1970) However, in many cases where powerful and unassimilated national communities must coexist within a single polity, they are likely to use the institutions of democracy to gain preferential access to state power at the expense of their ethnic rivals. The competition to establish their respective national rights is likely to prove sufficiently ferocious to ensure that any commitment to uphold the mere human rights of all citizens will remain theoretical. (Chandler 1999: 46) Empirically, Huntington found that democratic erosion is most likely where democratically elected governments use their power to increase their political power, such that elites foster and instrumentalize ethnic tension with the aim of perpetuating their power. (Croissant, Thiery 2000: 15)

Ethnicity and Democratic Consolidation

With regards to successful democratic consolidation, a state monopoly on power is crucial if the risk wants to be avoided that political veto-players, justifying their acts with ethnic arguments, destabilize the state. (Benner 1996: 16) Newer scholarly literature suggests that the transition from an autocratic towards a democratizing regime seems to foster, rather than appease, ethnic mobilization and violence. (Smooha, Järve 2005; Vorrath, Krebs 2009) In many of today’s reluctant “democratizers”, rivaling actors compete for power and resources and thus hamper democratization. (Rupnik 2011) One crucial factor for successful democratic consolidation is how former or ongoing ethno-nationalist politics are dealt with. Further, according to Schmitter, democratic consolidation is favored “if social conflicts and demands are handled through predictable and broadly accepted procedures that are inclusive of all the relevant groups but are, at the same time, insulated within the narrowest possible boundaries in the terms of the specificity of the issues and the state, political and social actors who are involved.” (Schmitter 1995b: 24 cited in Baker 2004: 58)

Ethnic Fragmentation vs. Ethnic Dominance

Until today, the current debate rarely actually defines when a conflict clearly needs to be considered as “ethnic” by its nature; sometimes, multi-ethnicity is considered problematic per se, even when there is no conflict taking place. As Hippler suggests, the fact that ethnicity plays a role in the context of many violent conflicts or wars is no proof that these conflicts are “ethnic” or that they even represent a certain, or new type of conflict. (1999) Also, in many cases one cannot in fact clearly prove to what extent ethnicity, power interests, or other social variables are constituted as decisive factors. (Hippler 1999)

Zürcher (2007) is skeptical about the frequently stipulated conflict potential of ethnic diversity. However, he identifies the existence of a dominant ethnic majority as one of the six strongest risk factors for the outbreak of inner-state wars. Interestingly, over half of all civil conflicts since WWII have been categorized as either ethnic or religious. (Esteban et al. 2012b; Fearon, Laitin 2003) The following figure illustrates that the largest share of all conflict types are intrastate conflicts while interstate conflicts have significantly decreased over the past decades:

52 For more on veto-players cf. e.g. Tsebelis 2002.
Examples such as Indonesia or Somalia, in which probably economic or political motivations were the motor for the supposed ethnic conflict, strongly suggest that ethnicity may not be the one and only crucial factor in such circumstances. Furthermore, cases like the aforementioned also suggest that ethnicity is at times possibly instrumentalized for other aims. (Bowen 1996b: 11) Other examples, such as Malaysia or Myanmar, suggest that under certain circumstances, political channeling of ethnic diversity and the right “framing” of ethnicity (compare e.g. Derichs 2004: 77) in the context of nation-building processes can lead to positive developments, while similar situations in other states, such as Indonesia, have led to violent conflicts. (Compare Schade 2004: 189–190) Consequently, the question arises whether ethnic diversity per se is the cause or rather the potential consequence of certain situational configurations. (See exemplarily Brubaker 1996; Fearon 2006; Gurr 2000; Ganguly, Taras 1998)

Recent scholarly literature suggests that it is not so much ethnic diversity per se that yields a negative impact on democratization (Bowen 1996b), but rather it is a question of whether an ethnic distribution of dominance (fewer larger ethnic groups, often dominated by one majority group) or fragmentation (a larger number of smaller ethnic groups) prevails in a given state. The most deteriorating effect usually results from a setup where there is a second, large, influential ethnic group beside the “titular nation” (cf. Vetterlein 2010: 25). Reilly underpins ethnic fragmentation (into many small groups) as one of the forms of ethnic diversity that does not necessarily have a bad effect, since, in his opinion:

“The conventional wisdom - that the more ethnically fragmented a state, the lower its chances of democracy - is wrong. In fact, a high level of ethnic fragmentation can actually help democratic consolidation if no group has the capacity to control power alone...” (2000: 184)

Rather, structural ‘ethnic dominance’ (Collier 2001; Collier, Hoeffler 2004) by one strong ethnic majority group or ‘ethnic polarization’ by a small number of competing strong ethnic groups (Esteban et al. 2012b, 2012a) have been found to be significantly correlated to civil conflict. (Montalvo, Reynal-
2.4 Civil Society and Democratization

A large number of publications elaborate on the nature and functions of civil society. Following the democratization processes after 1989, civil society has become a growingly important concept. (See exemplary Anheier et al. 2001b; Anheier 2004; Kaldor 2003; Howard 2003) Król warns that an active civil society is crucial for democracy, as otherwise “popular influence over politics is going to be limited to election day.” (Król 1995) Recent theories of democratization derive much scholarly inspiration from the theories of Tocqueville, who advocates voluntary associations “as large free schools, where all the members of the community go to learn the general theory of association.” (de Tocqueville 1945: 124)

Drawing on Robert Putnam’s reflections, a functioning democracy is based on norms of reciprocity and trust. (Putnam et al. 1993) Civil society through its civil society organizations produces the ‘social glue’ that makes democracies function and enduring. (Croissant et al. 2000: 13) Recent years of unresolved democratic stagnation and ethnic tensions in many states of the world have produced an increasing number of publications pointing to critical aspects of civil society.

Wolfgang Merkel (1997) even argued for an approach to civil society that would require civil society organizations to be subscribed to “civic” values and exclude “uncivil” forms of society organizations. This approach, however, has not taken root in today’s debate. Such a normative approach, moreover, would not be very useful for researching a phenomenon that comes in very different forms and functions which furthermore have different purposes and effects.

Democracy is a multi-sectoral and multi-facetted phenomenon, as is civil society, with its different forms and different positions that, ideally, represent the diversity of interests of the population. During times of changing norms and possibilities, but not only then, these interests can include highly contested claims, sometimes contradictory to democratic values (e.g. regarding the inclusiveness of the “nation”, of contesting the newly established regime, etc.) The most important point then, regarding the degree of “civility” of civil society, is whether civil society organizations pursue their interests through democratic structures and means. The important role that civil society

53 For more discussion of ‘ethnic fragmentation’, see exemplarily Alesina et al. 2003; Collier 2001; Reilly 2000; Vanhanen 1999; Bjørnskov 2008 who all developed the idea of Taylor & Hudson’s 1972 ELF (Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization) index, which has been employed as a standard measure of ethnic diversity. The majority of the publications on ethnic fragmentation or fractionalization is based on discussions that have their roots in the Index of Ethnolinguistic Fragmentation (ELF) by Easterly and Levine. The main criticism referred to the fact that the data the ELF was based on was very old (from 1964) and most likely not collected according to good scientific practices. In general, it was assumed by critics, that it is not so much ethnic diversity, but rather the tendency towards ethnic conflict or ethno-nationalist exclusion (N*), that posed the biggest threat to democracy. The main conclusion has been that one or two large ethno-national groups with strong bargaining power are much more likely to be harmful to democratic development when compared to high fractionalization with many small groups in one polity. For a critical review of the ethnic fractionalization index, the data it is based on, and constructivist objections see Laitin, Posner 2001 and Chandra, Boulet 2005. The main shortcomings pointed out were that the ELF (a) takes ethnic fragmentation as a static, unchangeable characteristic of a state – when empirically it is not, (b) fails to take into account different levels of fractionalization (where ethnicity, religion, language, etc. are not congruent), (c) is built on the assumption of the salience of group-belonging, while, in fact, relevant categories for group belonging, such as religion, race, etc. have been observed to change over time, and finally, (d) uses ethnicity as an independent variable, while in many cases it has been proven that itself depends on political, economic, or other factors. Laitin, Posner 2001

is supposed to play with regards to democracy has been one of the “mantras” of transformation research. As Stepan puts it

“...At best, civil society can destroy an authoritarian regime. However, a full democratic transition must involve political society, and the composition and consolidation of a democratic polity must entail serious thought and action about those core institutions of a democratic political society … through which civil society can constitute itself politically to select and to monitor democratic government.” (1988: 4, see also Pearce 2004: 94)

Croissant, Lauth, and Merkel (2000) elaborate on the role that civil society is assumed to take on during the different stages of the transformation processes:

1. ‘Liberalization’ Usually, at this point civil society gets more support and becomes significantly more active and influential, often playing a key role in the articulation of demands for new freedom;  
2. ‘Democratization’: The different political/social actors have the most options for action but as soon as a new government and offices are created, new elites and power structures establish themselves;  
3. ‘(Democratic) Consolidation’: After resources and power have been redistributed and the dynamics of change have been slowed down and molded into more stable institutional structures, change becomes slower, often causing a decrease in motivation on behalf of civil society, also referred to as ‘desencanto’ (=‘disenchantment’). Civil society actors tend to permeate into the newer political spheres such that the divisions between the spheres become blurred and the role that civil society has vis-à-vis the state changes.

2.4.1 Civil Society and Democratic Consolidation

Particularly during the phase of democratic consolidation, usually once democratic structures and formal institutions have been installed, civil society is considered to play an essential role. Indeed, civil society is assumed to play an important role with regards to consolidation, in while the more democratic the quality of civil society, the more effective its contribution, such that civil society

"[...] can, and typically must, play a significant role in building and consolidating democracy (...) (however) the more active, pluralist, resourceful, institutionalized, and democratic is civil society, and the more effectively it balances the tensions in its relations with the state - between autonomy and cooperation, vigilance and loyalty, skepticism and trust, assertiveness and civility - the more likely it is that democracy will emerge and endure." (Diamond 1994: 16)

Research suggests, however, as the following figure shows, that just before the completion of democratic consolidation, civil society faces particular challenges (e.g. Heinrich 2010: 310–311; Letki, Evans 2005):

![Fig. 9: Non-Linear Relationship between Democratic Longevity and Civil Society’s Strength](https://example.com/fig9.png)

Source: Heinrich 2010: 311

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The difference between the longer transition phase and the consolidation phase particular is contrasted in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democratization</th>
<th>Consolidated Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Developing democratic structures and procedural shortcomings</td>
<td>• Finalized democratic structures and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Developing civil society</td>
<td>• Strong and developed civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Significant relative increase in relative possibilities and impact of civil society</td>
<td>• Relative stagnation or decrease in possibilities and impact of civil society</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.4.2 Civil Society’s Democratic Spill-Over

The idea behind the positive effect of civil society on democracy and on democratic consolidation rests on the assumption that during the democratic liberalization of many states after the fall of communism, civil society and pro-democratic political parties were considered to be decisive factors in toppling authoritarian regimes. (Yilmaz 2002; Gillespie et al. 2002) By scholars and practitioners alike, the process of democratic consolidation is said to strongly depend on the development of a “vibrant” civil society (Król 1995: 39). (Cf. Croissant et al. 2000; Merkel 2000b; Gillespie et al. 2002; Parrott 1997) Civil society is considered the sphere in which democratic values are internalized and which contributes to democratic consolidation in many ways. (Lauth 2003; Diamond 1994: 8) However, despite the increased significance attributed to civil society, limited research to this day has been done on

“What we should expect associations to do for democracy or why we should expect associations to carry out these democratic functions”. (Warren 2004: 4)

In addition to the above described theoretically assumed democratic functions of civil society, Warren suggests four main fields of democratic functioning in which civil society can and ought to contribute:

1. **Democratic Self-Rule as Autonomy**
   a) Individual Autonomy
   b) Political Autonomy
   c) Institutional Empowerments

2. **Developmental Effects on Individuals**
   a) Efficacy
   b) Information
   c) Political Skills
   d) Civic Virtues
   e) Critical Skills

3. **Public Sphere Effects**
   a) Public Communication and Deliberation
   b) Representation of Difference
   c) Representation of Commonality

4. **Institutional Effects**
   a) Representation
   b) Resistance
   c) Subsidiarity
   d) Coordination and Cooperation

The theoretical spill-over effects of civil society can be severely limited in the real life context of non-consolidated states. For instance, the ideal-theoretical spill-over assumptions are likely not to be
applicable to defective democracies or hybrid regimes characterized by flawed democratic institutions and which miss the division between the different spheres of the system (Zinecker 2007), nor where strong ethnic or religious societal partitions remain strong, as Warren highlights, referring to Afghanistan, Iran, and the Western Balkan states. (2004: 15) Thania Paffenholz even suggests that the general assumption of civil society’s democraticness needs to be questions altogether, as practical research remains so scarce, suggesting so far that civil society can also have a very little positive or even negative effects on democratization. (Paffenholz 2009b; Belloni 2009)

Despite the fact that there is not much research that systematically supports the assumption of civil society’s democratic spill-over, there is a large, international “industry” of civil society activities that are advocated as well as financially and politically promoted by international organizations – based on the assumption of civil society’s positive effects. One recent publication by Finkel et al. (2012) suggests a positive effect of civic education on changes on the individual level regarding an increase in civic competences and civic engagement participation. Nevertheless, in relation to the level of democratic values, only sporadic and relatively small effects were detected. Altogether, however, Finkel et al. conclude that their finding of the contribution of civic education on an individual level did factor in a general result to ease an otherwise possibly more extreme democratic backslide after Kenya’s violent 2007 elections, a finding which they suggest may be generalized to other countries during democratic reversals. (Finkel et al. 2012)

The generalizability of the findings of Finkel et al. is difficult, as, it seems that the political context, the nature and programs of CSOs, etc. vary significantly across states. Nevertheless, the findings by Finkel et al. scientifically support the idea of thousands of persons worldwide volunteering and working in the fields of civic education and civil society, many of them taking risks in non-democratic states. They all are very enthusiastic about civil society’s importance during all stages of transformation and also of the positive contribution of civic education against democratic backslide. Recent publications critical of the supposedly little impact of civil society on overall democratization so far still fall short of actually proving the real impact (or not) of civil society. (Compare. e.g. Finkel et al. 2012)

2.5 A Functional Definition of Civil Society for the International Context

There are many different approaches as to what civil society actually is constituted of, what are its actual mechanisms of functioning, and what is its possible impact on, and significance for, democracy. According to Lauth & Merkel, civil society is crucial for democracy, and particularly with regards to successful democratic consolidation. (Lauth, Merkel 1997) In other words, it is difficult – if not impossible – for a state to develop towards democracy without a developing civil society; it is more likely to ‘get stuck’ somewhere along the way without a developing civil society.

Much of the civil society literature agrees on the positive effect that civil society has on democracy. However, despite the significance that is usually attributed to civil society as being the foundation for democracy and democratic consolidation, until today, much of the literature lacks systematic empirical analysis of what civil society is and how to delimit it in practice. (Anheier 2004: 3) However,

“[d]espite the widespread recognition of its potential importance, scholars have not agreed on how to define [civil society], nor are they sure what the specific nature of its contribution can be.” (Schmitter 1993: 1)

The bulk of the literature begins by deducing the concept of civil society from the times of Aristotle and concludes with yet another working definition. Some authors even complain about an “inflation of writings about the inflation of definitions of civil society.” (Dvornik 2009: 103) Owed to the many different understandings of civil society and its nature, this section outlines the most important understandings that can be found in the literature and highlights the most important aspects with regards to the research gap and the empirical investigation.
2.5.1 Definitions of Civil Society

In many definitions, civil society is considered to be a ‘third sector’ either between the private sphere and the state, or between the market, state, and private sphere. Some authors explicitly define civil society as separate from the market (Cohen, Arato 1992: 5 or Hann et al. 1996: 4) or the political society (Hann et al. 1996; Foley, Edwards 1996) or discuss the empirical or theoretical necessity of its overlap with other spheres. Other authors put more emphasis on the functions that civil society can and should fulfill with regards to democracy.

Over the years, research literature has seen waves of increased and decreased popularity of the concept of civil society. The particular focus of the theoretical debates has historically been connected to the at-the-time prevailing assumption of legitimate demands by citizens and their organizations that are well summarized in the overview by Heinrich (2010: 25) (see next figure):

![Fig. 10: Trajectory of Civil Society Concept](source: Heinrich 2010: 25)

It needs to be added, however, that the graph does not include an important, recent rise in popularity of neo-Marxist ideas about the public sphere and the supposed role of civil society in many transition states, notably the post-socialist states. These approaches have become particularly popular in many states of the post-communist/-socialist states in the past twenty years and have a large number of supporters that base their discourse on these ideas, such as e.g. the Slovenian “pop star” philosopher Slavoj Žižek.

Civil Society as an Intermediary Sphere

Some authors have presented very minimal definitions of defining civil society as located between the private and the state. Karl Schmitter, for instance, defines civil society as

“[a] set or system of self-organized intermediary groups” (1995a: 1, see also Kligman 1990)

Other authors put more emphasis on the “private contractual relationships” (Tester 1992: 8). Gellner sees civil society mostly in opposition to the state as an

“institution, which is strong enough to counterbalance the state and, whilst not preventing the state from fulfilling the role of keeper of peace and arbitrator between major interests, can, nevertheless, prevent the state from dominating and atomizing the rest of society.” (1994: 5)

For a number of authors, civil society represents a public sphere between the private realm of the family and the state, as, for instance Marc Howard, for whom civil society is
“a crucial part of the public space between the state and the family, and embodied in voluntary organizations.” (2003: 1, compare Dunn 1996: 27)

Linz & Stepan, putting more stress on public discourse and organized interest aggregation, define civil society as the

“arena of polity where self-organization groups, movements, and individuals, relatively autonomous from the state, attempt to articulate values, create associations and solidarities, and advance their interests” (1996: 7)

For Fukuyama, the nature of civil society, as spontaneous social structures independent from the state and subordinate to democratic political institutions, is most important. (1995: 8) Pollack underlines the nature of the interest organizations consisting of the entire public sphere in which citizens voluntarily – i.e. irrespective of private interests – come together in associations, movements, etc. (2003: 46–48, see also Anheier 2004) Civil society is thus separate from the state but is not apolitical. Santiso (2001: 161–162) on the contrary emphasizes the requirement of civil society’s political independence, however, depending on the definition of “politicalness”, this is hardly realistic, as any organized action of interests may be called “political” and in most states civil society is highly political, consisting of interest groups, who may, due to their ideals, correspond with political groups and try to cooperate with them on certain goals. For Habermas civil society is supposed to mediate the impact of political issues on the private sphere, to condense this and to mirror it back into the public sphere. (1992: 443)

In addition, including the market or business-sector, other authors understand civil society as a distinct public sphere of discourse and interest aggregation located between family, business, and state, which in some definitions may also show situational or personal overlap with any of the other three spheres, as shown in the following figure:

![Fig. 11: Civil society as intermediate sphere](source: Paffenholz, Spurk 2006: 3)

Some authors, finally, particularly refer to the mediating character, as

“civil society represents a sphere of dynamic and responsive public discourse between the state, the public sphere consisting of voluntary organizations, and the market sphere concerning private firms and unions” (Janoski 1998: 12)

**Civil Society as the Third Sector**

The past ten years have seen a rise in the popularity of understanding civil society as a third sector, that is one not in the private sphere and one which is not part of the state sector or the business sector, see the following figure:
Not many authors enter into great discussion on the separation of the third sector and the private sphere. The separation between the third sector and the state, as well as the market, is contested by several authors, also as being based on a very Western view of societal organization. Views range from theoretical descriptions of different functions of the sector over normative calls for separation between them to approaches that find empirical overlapping between the spheres. Some authors even see the independence from other spheres as desirable in order to a society to function and for organizations to be able to take part in democratic procedures. Some authors see substantial overlap between the different sectors and, as for instance Janoski (1998), define the private as a different, fourth sector, as the following figure shows:

Many researchers simply stipulate a certain degree of organization towards a common goal is sufficient for groups (be it formal or not) to qualify as civil society with a political purpose. (Comp. Shaw 1994) For Purdue, the independence from the state and the possibility for common organization are decisive:
“a significant aspect of civil society is that is functions as a realm of free associations, guaranteed by the state through civil rights, but not directly controlled by the state. Yet many institutions straddle the divide. Political parties bring together individuals into free associations in civil society, yet also participate in government within the state. On the frontier of the market, pubs, clubs or shopping malls may belong to large commercial companies, but provide meeting space for a range of social groups and civic organizations.” (2007a: 2)

Thania Paffenholz summarizes the views on the limits and overlapping between the different sectors well in her view on civil society:

“In the literature, civil society is either defined as a sector on its own next to the state, the business and the family sector or as sphere between those states. Both approaches can be summarized in the following definition: Civil society is the sector of voluntary action within institutional forms that are distinct from those of the state, family and market, keeping in mind that in practice the boundary between these sectors are often complex and blurred. It consists of a large diversity of voluntary organizations, often competitive with each other and oriented to specific interests. It is comprised of non-state actors and associations that are not purely driven by the private or economic interests, are autonomously organized, and interact in the public sphere. Additionally, civil society is independent from the state, but not completely, since civil society is oriented towards and interacts closely with the state and the political sphere.” (2009a: 187)

Civil Society and the State

Defining the boundary between state and civil society has been difficult, as civil society is supposed to be separate from the state and closer to the citizens. However, its connection to political interest aggregation and influence on politics is also often assumed, while its independence from stately influence is crucial as well, if civil society wants to criticize politics. (Compare Zinecker 2007; Cohen, Arato 1992: 5; Chandhoke 2004: 150–16256) Consequently, several authors distinguish between state and political society, the latter consisting of all activities in which citizens actively become involved in political matters. (Compare Schmitter, Brouwer 1999, Hann et al. 1996: 5 referring to Tocqueville, or Foley, Edwards 1996: 38 referring to Gramsci) Stepan differentiates ‘civil society’ and ‘political society’ such that he considers the latter to be the decisive factor to achieve full democratic consolidation:

“By ’civil society’ I mean that arena where manifold social movements ... and civic organizations from all classes attempt to constitute themselves in an ensemble of arrangements so that they can express themselves and advance their interests. By ’political society’ in a democratizing setting I mean that arena in which the polity specifically arranges itself for political contestation to gain control over public power and the state apparatus.”(1988: 4 see also Pearce 2004: 94)

Civil Society and the Market

While Cohen & Arato define civil society as distinct from the state, (1992: 5), other authors in the vein of Adam Smith and Karl Marx define civil society particularly by its participation in the market. (Hann et al. 1996: 4) A criticism with regard to civil society’s political independence is that market entrepreneurs will more often side with the state than with civil society, which is why they

“should be acknowledged as part of civil society only if they stand for political and social goals that go beyond their private economic interests” (Jünemann 2004: 210).

Finally, it has been underlined that financial independence is very important for civil society in order to take on political interests, as only this allows them not to be instrumentalized by other actors for purposes based on mere financial power. (Zinecker 2007) Summarizing the complicated overlapping

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56 Chandhoke even gives eight reasons, why the state and civil society are not entirely separate spheres: 1. state as enabler of civil society, 2. limits on civil society autonomy, 3.civil society needs the state’s support, 4. civil society and nationalism ["nationalism in civil society that bears the state’s imprint"], 5. politics and power in associational Life, 6. state, power and society, 7. the darker side of social capital, 8. civil society as defender of state power. (2004: 150–162)
with, and separation from the different spheres that civil society is usually contrasted with, Anheier underlines the negative definition of the limits of civil society. According to him civil society:

“(a) ... is not synonymous with the more general term of society (...); in other words, civil society is part of the larger society.
(b) ... is not identical to the non-profit sector, or other terms such as third, voluntary or NGO sectors, however defined. The third sector and civil society overlap in terms of organizations, and it would be fair to say that civil society includes large parts of the third sector, even though some non-profit organizations can be close to the market firms or state agencies in constitutions and behavior.
(c) ... does not include the market and market firms (...) some institutions, such as the media, while essentially based on market organizations, nonetheless have significant civil society elements.
(d) ... does not include the state and public agencies (...), even though civil society organizations frequently work with government organizations, particularly in the field of service delivery (...).
(e) ... does not include the family. Cross-cultural family forms vary significantly and tend to imply different demarcation lines between the private sphere of the family (...), and the public sphere of the wider society.”

(2004: 26–28)

Functional Approaches to Civil Society

Another approach to civil society has seen increased popularity in the recent years which defines civil society not so much by structural but rather by functional characteristics. Most of this literature is based on democracy theory. On this ground several theoretical functions are attributed to civil society to foster or support democracy on the different spheres of a regime. Basing their summary on historical lines of thought, some authors\(^{57}\) identify a number of theoretical strands, each referring to different theoretical functions of civil society:

1. **protection from the state** (based on Locke (1632-1704): in the liberal tradition, centered around the independence of civil society from the state and the protection of the individual from arbitrary acts from the state, protection of individual property, etc.);
2. **control** (based on Montesquieu (1689-1755): focused on the relation between civil society’s independent organizations and the state with the function of social networks to counter-balance and control the central authority);
3. **socialization** (based on Tocqueville (1805-1859): the emphasis in this approach is put on civil society and its associations to function as voluntary “schools of democracy”, in which citizens learn democratic values, virtues, and behavior and build trust among and between their members);
4. **communalization** (based on Gramsci (1891-1937): somewhat in the tradition of Marx, this view stresses civil society as a “public room”, a separate sphere from the market and the state, that can take the role of opposition to the state and foster plurality and question the state’s hegemony);
5. **communication and intermediation** (based on Lipset (1922-2006): regarding civil society as ‘mediating institutions’ between the state and plural organizations of civil society, in which a democratic political culture could evolve);
6. **public discourse** (based on Habermas (*1929): this aspect focuses on civil society as a public sphere in which different interests are put on the agenda, processed, and negotiated, and channeled back and forth between those being governed and those governing, in its ideal form in the absence of power imbalances between different groups)

One of the first lists of civil society’s functions with regard to democratic consolidation was compiled by Larry Diamond (1994):

1. curb and monitor the state’s powers that might be arbitrarily used and abused;
2. stimulate political participation by citizens;
3. help to inculcate democratic or civic norms of tolerance, trust, moderation, compromise,

\(^{57}\) For more see also Merkel, Lauth 1998; Croissant et al. 2000, Seifija 2006, and Paffenholz, Spurk 2006 for a good summary of the different theoretical foundations.
and accommodation that facilitate the peaceful, democratic regulation of cleavage and conflict through the process of participation and civic education;
4. create ways of articulating, aggregating, and representing interests outside of political parties;
5. mitigate conflict through cross-cutting or overlapping interests;
6. recruit and train new leaders who may get involved into the political arena;
7. improve explicitly democratic process through election-monitoring, human rights monitoring, and public corruption monitoring, disseminates alternative and independent information (which is especially very beneficial in case of state censorship and/or state disinformation especially about human rights abuses);
8. enhance democratic legitimacy and governability by extending the borders of accountability and inclusiveness.

Particularly for the context of post-conflict situations, Thania Paffenholz identified seven very similar, albeit slightly modified functions of civil society:

1. Protection of citizens against violence from all parties,
2. Monitoring of human rights violations, the implementation of peace agreements, etc.,
3. Advocacy for peace and human rights,
4. Socialization of values of peace and democracy as well as to develop the in-group identity of marginalized groups,
5. Inter-group social cohesion by bringing people together from adversarial group,
6. Facilitation of dialogue on the local and national level between all sorts of actors,
7. Service delivery to create entry points for peacebuilding, i.e. for the six above functions. (Paffenholz 2010: 24; 2009c; Paffenholz, Spurk 2006: 13, for an overview of the functional approaches see also annex A)

Functional approaches offer an advantage for research contexts that investigate different forms of civil society organizations in an international comparative perspective of democratization. This allows looking for functional equivalents and also investigating to what degree certain functions are being fulfilled by civil society. Furthermore, thus shortcomings in particular fields can be detected and ideas for possible remedies can be formulated. However, functional approaches have been blamed for being very ideal and thus of limited use when one tries to apply the theoretical functions to empirical situations, particularly, where full democratic consolidation has not been achieved. While providing normative criteria for “good” civil society, the functions are not very useful for assessing the degree of their democratization impact or certain shortcomings in this regard. Only very few research projects have examined this, e.g. (Lauth 2003), (Anheier 2004), and (Paffenholz 2010). In order to say more about the actual realization of civil society’s functions and their real impact, assessment requires to be broader and to take into account important factors and qualities of civil society in a given context.

2.5.2 Actors and Qualities of Civil Society Organizations

Particularly during times of transition which include changing norms and values, actual attitudes and behavior are crucial indicators for determining the actual quality and impact of civil society. CSOs pursuing exclusive, nationalist ideals with the goal of secession, for instance, will rather destabilize than contribute to the democratic functioning of the system that is currently being established.

Actors of Civil Society

Civil society comes in many different shapes and sizes of informal to formal nature, from time-limited, small community-based, ad-hoc formations or large, social movements to specialized formal NGOs.
The World Bank provides numerous types of actors in a definition of civil society developed by a number of leading research centers, for whom

“the term civil society refer(s) to the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) therefore refer to a wide of array of organizations: community groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, and foundations”. (World Bank 2010)

Another definition of civil society by Paffenholz excludes political parties and the media that both frequently in theory of civil society research and in practice of democracy promotion are included in the idea of civil society, assumed to fulfill important functions of interest aggregation and monitoring or spreading alternative information respectively:

“a range of actors, from professional associations, clubs, unions, faith-based organizations, and nongovernmental organizations to traditional and clan groups and other community groups. We do not include member of political parties or the media (with the exception of their associations).” (Paffenholz 2010: vii)

The theoretical literature on civil society research and the literature on practical democracy promotion are full of terms that refer to different forms or actors of civil society. The probably most common term used for civil society groups in this context are ‘NGO’s (non-governmental organizations), or, increasingly, one reads about ‘CSO’s (civil society organizations). Frequently, the number of NGOs is used to determine the strength of civil society in a given context (comp. USAID 2011) – which has been criticized to not be a reliable measure for the actual quality of impact of civil society. (Howard 2012)

In a context of limited democratization, with regards to the actual political independence of NGOs or CSOs, one needs to be careful not to confuse organizations that bear the name and resemblance of NGOs or CSOs with organizations that may be state controlled ‘GONGO’s (government organized non-governmental organization) or ‘QUANGO’s (quasi-autonomous non-governmental organization). Another growingly important form of organizations are ‘INGO’s (international non-governmental organizations).

Another common form of formal civil society are associations, which can be either very small and exclusive, e.g. a small association lobbying for support of a particular rare disease, or very large and inclusive, such as sports clubs. Other forms of larger civil society organizations are religious communities, labor unions, political parties, although especially for the latter it is contested whether they are seen as part of the civil society or the political society. In the discourse of practical external democracy promotion, civil society is frequently used for the overall population of citizens of a given state, or, more appropriately, it refers to the mass of a (potentially) politically mobilized, and more or less formally organized, population of a state. An important question for research purposes then is a clear definition of what types of actors are to be assessed, so as to be able to say something about their actual impact potential for democratic consolidation.

The Quality of Civil Society

The nature of civil society actors and their impact on democracy are closely linked to their qualities and purposes. In order to take the nuances of civil society organizations’ characteristics and purposes into account, some approaches to civil society focus on the quality and goals of civil society organizations (CSOs), and on this ground assess the actual likelihood of CSOs’ potential to positively contribute to democratization. Some authors even define civil society on the basis of its qualities, as Diamond does, as

“the realm of organized social life that is open, voluntary, self-generating, at least partially self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules”. (1999: 221)
Edwards further underlines the importance of the relational quality of civil society that functions based when creating and supporting ties between different groups of society:

“strong and vibrant civil society characterized by a social infrastructure of dense networks of face-to-face relationships that cross-cut existing social cleavages such as race, ethnicity, class, sexual orientation and gender that will underpin strong and responsive democratic governments”. (Edwards et al. 2001: 17)

More normatively even, some authors have called for “uncivil society” and its organizations (such as the Mafia, violent extremist groups, etc.) to be excluded from its definitions. (Lauth, Merkel 1997) This opinion however has been contested and has not been adopted by most authors, particularly since many politically organized social collectives bear many traits of CSOs but not all of them can be said to be promoting democracy or the “public good”, especially when they contest democratic values or undermine democratic procedures. Diamond considers the following five elements crucial for civil society to bring about results for democratization: 1. goals and methods, 2. self-government, 3. organizational institutionalization, 4. pluralism, and 5. identity (1999: 228).

The following four points have been mentioned to be crucial to delimit the qualitative boundaries of the concept of civil society:

(1) Degree of common political purpose,
(2) Degree of legitimacy and membership-base,
(3) Degree of inclusiveness,
(4) Financial independence and profit vs. non-profit purpose.

The next paragraphs provide a more detailed discussion:

(1) Degree of common political purpose: Several authors, such as Cole (1920: 26) or Warren (2004: 44), underline that a degree of political purpose is a basic criterion for civil society – common interests based on kin-ship ties does not qualify, as Cole illustrates in his opposition of ‘associations’ and ‘communities’:

“In order to be a community a group must exist for the good life and not merely for the furtherance of some specific and partial purpose. Thus, a cricket club, or a trade union, or a political party is not a community, because it is not a self-contained group of a particular interest common to a number of persons who have interests outside of it. A community is thus essentially a social unity or group to which human beings belong, as distinguished from an association with which they are only connected” as opposed to ‘associations’, which, for Cole, can be “any group of persons pursuing a common purpose or aggregation of purposes by a course of cooperative action extending beyond a single act, and, for this purpose, agreeing together upon certain methods and procedures and laying down, in however rudimentary a form, rules for common action. At least two things are fundamentally necessary to any association: a common purpose and, to a certain extent, rules of common action.” (1920: 37)

(2) Degree of legitimacy and membership-base: Many authors underline, how the character of CSOs is determined by the extent to which they work towards the common good. This, nevertheless, is hardly the case in a world in which usually no CSOs represents the entire population. Usually, CSOs develop based on a common interest of a certain group. They can remain small or can take on a very large scale with regards to the number of their members of supporters, such as large unions, large football clubs, etc. and may even strongly compete against other CSOs. In many democratically non-consolidated states, the political involvement of citizens remains low. This is due to the fact that for many, public political involvement in organizations has a negative connotation, even where a relatively large share of the population has participated in CSOs’ seminars or trainings, as for instance in Bosnia-Herzegovina. (Seifija 2006) In fact, the degree of the membership base and the scope of political mobilization among the entire population is increasingly seen as a major criterion for political and thus for democratization’s impact. (Howard 2003 and Dvornik 2009) This has even been accounted for by a

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58 For the remainder of this dissertation I will refer to all types of civil society organizations as CSOs, and only when referring to a certain subtype will I explicitly use that term.
change in vocabulary by increasingly differentiating between NGOs and movements or community(-based) organizations. (See exemplarily World Bank 2010)

**3) Degree of inclusiveness:** Closely connected to the degree of membership-base and legitimacy is the degree of social inclusiveness or exclusivity. While some CSOs in the broad sense are very inclusive of many members, such as large religious communities, they may, however, exclude particular groups of persons that are different, i.e. those of a different confession. Other CSOs may in fact be extremely exclusive and work towards very specific purposes, such as fanatic nationalist groups. (Belloni 2009; Zmerli 2008)

**4) Financial independence and profit vs. non-profit purpose:** The financial (and connected to this also, the political) independence, in addition to the degree of profit orientation of CSOs, is often considered to be an important attribute of their quality. Many CSOs in democratically not consolidated states receive substantial funding from external donors. In many states with high unemployment, CSOs have the image to be rather supplying salaries (in a civil sector) than to be promoting democracy (as a civil society). (Seifija 2006)

As a more elaborate approach to defining civil society’s qualities and the resulting impact on democracy, Warren defines civil society and its impact on democratization not on the level of its different organizational or functional characteristics – but on three dimensions:

(1) the degree to which an association is voluntary or non-voluntary,
(2) the kind of medium - social attachments, money, or power - within which an association is embedded or toward which it is oriented; and
(3) the goods or purposes of the association. (Warren 2004: 94)

Especially regarding the latter, the goods or purposes (which Warren also refers to as a ‘constitutive good’) according to him determine to what extent civil society organizations do in fact exert a positive, neutral, or negative impact on democratization and democracy., Warren classifies different types of constitutive goods of associations along four dimensions:

1. **individual vs. social goods:** “Individual goods lose value the more widely they are shared even if possessing the good depends on complex social interdependencies. This is obviously the case with material goods (food, clothing, shelter). But is it also the case with non-material goods that emerge from very small groups, love and friendship for example. (...) The point of this distinction is that social goods can be acquired by seeking them through common action, so that associations devoted to social goods will, all other things being equal, face an imperative to seek and enjoy goods together, with potential implications for the civic virtues of trust and empathy, as well as for cooperation.” (2004: 124–125)

2. **excludable vs. non-excludable goods:** “Nonexcludable goods, such as roads, parks, national security, aesthetically pleasing public spaces, and clean air, can be supplied to single individuals only if they are supplied to everyone. These goods usually require collective action for their provision. (...) All other things being equal, associations seeking non-excludable goods are more likely to induce democratic effects in the area of civic virtues, political skills, critical skills, public sphere effects, cooperation, and subsidiarity.” (2004: 125);

3. **material vs. symbolic/psychological goods:** “Material goods such as food, clothing, and shelter have physical presence and satisfy physical needs alone. Symbolic and psychological goods (...) include recognition, self-identity, and symbolic resources such as language, culture, and lifestyle. Except in cases where these symbolic goods combine with excludability (as in sectarian identity-based associations), associations devoted to them are more likely to induce some civic virtues (such as empathy) and provide public representations of commonality, since the value of symbolic goods very often depends upon inclusion.” (2004: 125);

4. **scarce vs. nonscarce goods:** “Scarce goods are those for which demand is greater than supply in ways that engender potential conflicts between individuals, whether the source of the scarcity is physical
(as in the case of limited supplies of land) or social (as when an individual desires a royal title simply because it is scarce). Nonscarce goods are those for which there is a relatively unlimited supply, such as friendship, self-improvement, or language. The significance of the scarce/nonscarce distinction is that associations devoted to nonscarce goods will tend to pursue cooperative and common strategies, while those devoted to scarce goods will often find themselves in conflictual situations.” (2004: 124–125)

For transitional states, this implies that during times in which procedural aspects of a system may still be contested, civil society and its organizations frequently are a mirror of the existing conflict lines and sometimes dominate not (yet) fully democratic practices. The following table illustrates the eight types of constitutive goods of association:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tab. 6: Constitutive goods of associations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goods that are excludable and material</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scarce</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nonscarce</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Goods that are nonexcludable and material</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Individual</strong></td>
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<td>Nonscarce</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Goods that are excludable and symbolic</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Individual</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Goods that are nonexcludable and symbolic</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Individual</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scarce</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nonscarce</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Warren 2004: 127*

The particular traits of each of these constitutive goods determine the possibility of whether associations with these characteristics and purposes will or will not have a positive influence on democracy, as is theoretically assumed through the various assumptions about civil society. Warren illustrates this (see following table below) and underlines the difference between the democratic purpose and democratic effects of associations. (Warren 2004: 37)
Chapter 2: Civil Society and External Democracy Promotion: Democratic Consolidation in Ethno-Nationally Divided States

Tab. 7: Potential impacts of constitutive goods on democratic effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of purposes/goods</th>
<th>Developmental effects</th>
<th>Interpersonal identity</th>
<th>Individual material</th>
<th>Exclusive group identity</th>
<th>Inclusive social</th>
<th>Public material</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Efficacy/information</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political skills</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>Deliberative skills</td>
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<td>Civic virtues</td>
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<td>Public-sphere effects</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>Public deliberation</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Representing commonalities</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Representing differences</td>
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<tr>
<td>Institutional effects</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subsidary</td>
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<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coordination/cooperation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resistance</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation</td>
<td></td>
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<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Warren 2004: 133

On the basis of his research, Warren criticizes the current state of civil society research, which, according to him, continues to be significantly shaped by Tocqueville’s influence to which the approaches of e.g. Robert Dahl, Almond & Verba, and Putnam added a bit of rational choice theory. He agrees with these authors that the internal structure of associations is a decisive factor for their civic effect. (Warren 2004: 30–31) However, Warren sharply criticizes the main underlying assumptions regarding the nature and impact of associations:

1. the bi-polar model of a state-civil society-model does not grasp the existing reality of power-relations that intertwine the two, consequently
2. all associations are assumed to be political - even sports clubs - which may be taken too far,
3. today, state, the market and civil society are closely entangled and the assumed separation of these does not apply,
4. many associations today take responsibilities that formerly lay with the state, some associations are state-enabled but not state-directed (e.g. unions), and other associations assume state functions where the state deflects problems of its responsibility to be solved by voluntary associations,
5. existing theory very much neglects the ways in which associational life forms the social infrastructure of public spheres,
6. with the focus on cooperation and interest aggregation, the functions that associations have in dealing with diverging interest prevail in any given (democratic) society,
7. contrary to the Tocquevillean generalized assumption of associations as “schools of democracy”, the inclinations of associations and members with regard to the extent to which they focus on and develop civic virtues as trust and reciprocity, inclusive or exclusive values, etc. may in fact vary significantly,
8. the often idealized democratic structure and egalitarian internal structure of associations does often not correspond with their actual structures that reflect hierarchy, who may need to

59 For a classification of different types of associations according to their characteristics and the resulting potential for democratic effects see annexes B and C.
be competitive on the political market and who may also exclude dissenting members. (Warren 2004: 32–37)

Hans-Joachim Lauth finally, presents an extensive compilation of characteristics and functions that determine civil society’s positive contribution to democracy. Lauth uses the following thirteen criteria for an investigation and categorization of different manifestations of civil society:

1. a non conflictive structure of civil society
2. no distinct power hierarchies
3. a civic virtues important
4. internal democratic organization important
5. societal representativity discernable
6. services for the state
7. cooperation with the state
8. a service provision
9. recruiting
10. policy making
11. control
12. cooperation with the state

Based on these criteria, Lauth distinguishes between three different ideal-types of civil society, each defined by a combination of a number of Lauth’s criteria. He identifies three main categories he calls: (1) strategic type, (2) ambivalent type, and (3) reflexive type. He underlines, that these three types of civil society are not only different, but, most importantly, that the effect of each type may be more or less conducive to democratization, depending on the phase of transition that this civil society is active in: During democratic liberalization, a combination of characteristics that define a “strategic type” of civil society is most conducive to democratic opening. Lauth here assumes a combination of certain democratic and not (yet) democratic characteristics and functions. However, with regards to democratic consolidation, a very different logic and different qualities of civil society are needed in order to foster success; while the “ambivalent type” of civil society may pertain, not surprisingly, by hardly fulfilling any of the theoretically assumed democratic functions and qualities, it does not promote democratic consolidation. The “reflexive type” on the other hand, that which is entirely structured and functioning according to democratic standards, has the best chances of positive influence on successful democratic consolidation. (Lauth 2003: 225-228)

(1) In a reflexive civil society (RSC) the conflict intensity between its actors is low, even though conflicts also take place in this context. Organizations are oriented along cross-cutting cleavages and thus are capable of mediating societal conflicts. The hierarchy between civil society actors is reduced by egalitarian relations between actors. Civic virtues are clearly pronounced and are stabilized by democratically structured organizations that subordinate their particular interest to the common good and display a certain amount of societal representativity. Even though a reflexive civil society cooperates with the state in different ways, its self-understanding is that of a critical corrective to the state’s activities. (ibid.) (2) A strategic civil society (SCS) can be understood as a particular mix of the other two variants. It may well be structured by hierarchy, but there is hardly an internal democratic structure and civic virtues are developed only to a limited degree. However, relations between members are not very conflictive and it is structured in coalitions surpassing conflict-cleavages, with several few actors usually taking the initiative. Particular interests are subordinate to the common good. Towards the state it is cooperative to a very limited degree, mostly aiming at the control of political rule. (3) An ambivalent civil society (ACS) displays the dark sides of civil society. There is high conflict intensity between its actors, organized along existing societal conflict lines (work-capital, ethnic and religious ties). Competition, constitutive of democracy in this case, can lead to an intensification of societal conflict and endanger the stability of the young democracy, if demands impossible to intermediate are formulated. Relations among actors are characterized by structures of dominance. Civic virtues, such as tolerance and mutual respect – are weakly pronounced. Mostly, particular interests are pursued and social representativity is low and a democratic internal structure is hardly existent. There is no cooperation with the state. Civil society actors are neither involved in common policy making nor do they facilitate the recruiting of political personal. (Lauth 2003: 225–227)
As a conclusion of his typology of civil society, Lauth bases his typology on empirical, yet not fully systematical evidence and, consequently, calls for an increase in investigation of the different manifestations of civil society and how their, positive or negative, effect during the different stages of democratic transformation is influenced by different context constellations. (Lauth 2003: 230-231)

Finally, based on a combination of reference to the relevant constituting actors and to the qualities of civil society, Heidrun Zinecker formulated a very encompassing definition of civil society. She includes most above mentioned dimensions of civil society, including ideas about different actors and qualities of civil society as well as civil society’s independence from and overlapping with other and connection to other sectors:

“Stripping down the term civil society leaves a core definition: civil societies are all those structures and associations formed by actors, which fill the societal sphere between family, economy, and the state. Civil societies are political and part of the political regime. They can contain democratic as well as non-democratic, civilized as well as non-civilized segments, with either segment outweighing the other. Depending on the balance, civil society as a whole can be configured democratic, non-democratic, civilized or non-civilized. Democratic civil societies are civilized, but civilized civil societies are not necessarily democratic.” (Zinecker 2007: 17)

The remainder of this research adopts this definition, however, focusing in addition on the particular functions of civil society and with regards to the different qualities and functions that are more or less conducive to the different aspects of democracy at the different stages of transition.

2.5.3 Civil Society in Today’s International Context

A growing point of criticism with regard to civil society in an international context of international relations and democracy promotion has become the fact that most civil society definitions and models have been coined by western scholars. Western understanding of the concept of civil society has developed from research of the Western world over the past centuries. It has been coined by a certain understanding and tradition of what is politically and socially desirable, and by the forms and practices of social cooperation and organization that prevail in the Western context today.

International comparison has shown that civil society and its appearance and possibilities very much depend on (1) the type of the political regime, (2) the socio-cultural environment, and (3) the specific economic context. (Lauth 2003) Accordingly, several authors underline that particularly with regards to research on, and practical work with, civil society, cross-national variation is to be expected and must be taken into account. (Kim 2007: 187) This also applies to transformation states: as the appearance of civil society changes rapidly, it makes more sense in this context to analyze it as a non-normative analytical category rather than as a distinct historical form. (Pollack 2003; Seifija 2006: 126)

Jünemann for instance, referring to the Euro-med/Arabic states, notes that in regions with strong family ties or clan relations and loyalties, the anonymous sounding term ‘civil society’ (al-mutjama al-madani) has been replaced by the term ‘citizen society’ (al-mutjama al-ahli) – which denotes more of a reference to primordial structures that are seen as authentic structures. However, the EU’s Euro-Med programs continue to exclude primordial associations from funding. (2004: 211)

The same question is raised with regard to the African context, where Kasfir considers the theoretical

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61 For an international comparison of civil society’s qualities see exemplarily Paffenholz 2010.
exclusion of ethnic groups not to be useful, since some of these groups tend to be skilled and legitimate such that their political inclusion may even ease ethnic fundamentalism. (2004: 131)  

With regard to the post-communist/-socialist context, many authors highlight that civil society is to a large extent made up of professionalized business-NGOs while the general political mobilization and civic activism of the population remain low. (Dvornik 2009; Howard 2003) Further, the general democratization impact of associations following 1989 has been questioned for transitional states, notably for the majority of the post-communist/-socialist states. (Baker 2004: 50–51) Even though in several states there has been a huge increase in the number of formal NGOs or associations, and even if many citizens state to have participated in one or several of their activities, the attitudes and concerns of civil society are considered to be so different from the everyday concerns and politics of many citizens, that the actual democratic spill-over from CSOs to the larger population and thus to the overall democratization needs to be estimated as rather low. (Seifija 2006: 131–133)

In general, there has been growing demand to look less at the forms but rather at the functions of civil society, and to also take into account functional equivalents. Several authors wish to see different types of organizations, based on kin-ship communities, included in the concept of civil society. The degree to which a CSO can positively influence democracy crucially depends on its nature, its “constitutive good”, and its respect for democratic procedures as a minimal criterion. Thus, a more differentiated notion of civil society and its characteristics for a better assessment of the actual democratic contribution of civil society, at many or few political levels and at a low or large scale.

2.6 Disenchanting Civil Society’s Dark Sides in Divided Societies

The assumption of civil society’s democratic spill-over has increasingly been brought into connection with the actual qualities and intentions of civil society organizations and the scope of public support and democratic impact they have. After the initial euphoria about civil society as a “miracle cure” against all undemocratic evils had ebbed, research triggered by empirical findings suggested some CSOs were not so positive and ideal with regards to their democratic character and intentions as normative theoretical assumptions had suggested. Furthermore, in several states where civil society had been developing and also where it had received substantial support for some time already, it seemed that despite a growing number of formal CSOs, political participation of citizens and especially political and democratic spill-over in general remained surprisingly low.

The past ten years have seen a wave of publications on “uncivil society” or civil society’s “dark sides” (see exemplarily Croissant et al. 2000: 19 and Lauth 2003; Paffenholz, Spurk 2006). According to Lauth, the potential dark sides of civil society have the result that it

(1) can aggravate social cleavages (ethnic, etc.),
(2) can be characterized by fundamental ideological differences,
(3) can suffer from internal power struggles,

Kasfir argues in favor of including ethnic or religious groups in a definition of civil society: “ […] While politicians who use strategic resources to build ethnic clienteles do generate demand that the state finds peculiarly difficult to resolve (…), there are many other ethnic associations that present issues of their own. Not all ethnic or fundamentalist interests are so intense that their promoters are unwilling to accept procedural rules, compromises and democratic decisions. If leaders of ethnic or fundamentalist religious organizations perceive that the design of political structures in which they must act are open, that is, will provide them and their constituents with opportunities for rewards in the future, they are much more likely to compromise current claims, even those that involve identities of their followers. […] In some cases, therefore, the causal arrow is reversed: the level of ethnic intensity will be a function of the capacity of the political order to reconcile interests. In order to think clearly about how organizations representing social interests support or undermine democratization, it is essential to stop considering ethnic and fundamentalist religious associations as invariably uncivic.” (2004: 131)
already in 1997 Whitehead underlined the importance of a notion of civil society that is not normative and teleological, but one that takes into account, and does not deny, the existing 'uncivil' elements of associations. (2004 see also Pearce 2004: 104–105)

2.6.1 Civil Society: A Mirror of Larger Society

Beyond its existence as a theoretical model, civil society is also a practical, however complex, category in the real-world context. Most theoretical and practical approaches assume civil society to be miraculously immune against the surrounding 'evils' of the society in which it is embedded. Thorny issues like corruption, clientelism, nepotism, nationalism, etc. are rarely included in civil society assessment. Some authors criticize this naïve view and add further (potential) ‘dark sides’ of civil society to the list, such as a low degree of legitimacy, frequent entrenchment in politics, the potential to undermine the development of the state (and thus possibly weaken it), etc. According to Nancy Rosenblum there is even

“no systematic answer to whether we can depend on the association of civil society to cultivate the moral dispositions liberal democracies require, or whether to use public incentives and the force of law to create and enhance liberalizing, democratizing groups. Associational pluralism and the vicissitudes of personal experience militate against a coherent answer.” (Rosenblum 2000: 15 cited in Warren 2004: 18)

Despite the positive effect that is frequently attributed to civil society organizations, these are naturally embedded in a larger societal context. This entails, that on the one hand, members of CSOs are shaped by the same context, values, norms, that prevail in their given society and, on the other hand, sets a frame for civil society's social and political possibilities – whether a regime is ready to consult with CSOs, whether many citizens are politically active or not, etc. In the same vein Roßteutscher states that

“[i]f the dominant culture is democratic, as is the case in established democracies, then the culture of associationalism will be democratic as well. If, however, the dominant culture is anti-democratic, so will the culture of a country’s associations.” (2010: 752)

Consequently, for civil society it is not only difficult to impact change in a given society, but it also poses a twofold challenge to CSOs: to adapt and spread new values and positions while the majority of the population may be of different opinions, and secondly, to keep up certain values and norms, for instance of democratic procedures and values, when most of the society acts according to a different logic. It is not farfetched that persons who are active in civil society are nonetheless also embedded in the larger society, interacting with it, and as civil society actors wish to cooperate in various fields (private, business, political, etc.), at times they can only but chose to apply certain social and political rules and appeal to gain support by appealing to dominant views in their culture – even if these may be not altogether supportive of democratization at times.

Furthermore, civil society is not one unified actor – it is composed of its members and these are diverse, hold different opinions and attitudes; this applies to states which are democratically consolidated and those which are not. Civil society cannot be assumed to be entirely homogeneous, nor do civil society’s members automatically apply democratic norms and values, as Anheier notes:

“while the individual voices of civil society are part of a democratic social order, they are not necessarily democratic themselves – nor are they necessarily responsible or tolerant, let along supportive, of freedom or citizenship for some group or another. Many of the voices are; but civil society includes a great diversity of views, as the sometimes gray area between some civil society groups and organized violence demonstrates.” (2004: 5), compare also (Warren 2004: 19–20)
However, as a non-democratic environment can be assumed to have a certain effect on its citizens and CSOs, who, whenever one wishes to make a statement about the actual democratic or the possible “uncivil” effect of civil society, particularly in a not democratically consolidated state this requires a close analysis of the composition and context factors. (Paffenholz, Spurk 2006, see also Whitehead 2004: 34; Lauth, Merkel 1997) So even where we find an active civil society and large numbers of existing CSOs, the democratization of the political regime cannot automatically be assumed, if the civil society does not apply democratic norms and ideals. (White 2004: 11)

2.6.2 Uncivil Society, Divided Societies, and Ethno-Nationalism

The potential dark sides of civil society have been described by several authors. Some publications focus more on theoretical assumptions, others present assumptions from empirical research – a systematic comparison of both, however, is missing. Lauth (2003) mentions three important points regarding civil society’s democratic quality and democratization spill-over potential:

(1) civil society may weaken the state’s power,
(2) it may undermine democratic processes by direct influence on politics, and
(3) it may aggravate social cleavages.

Following, each of these points is discussed in more detail:

(1) Civil society may weaken the state’s power: As civil society actors may undermine certain processes, or strong mobilized parts of the population may veto political changes necessary for democratic progress, this can question the power and legitimacy of a regime and thus limits the governing powers. Where powerful veto-players are not part of the (newly) governing regime, this may even entirely question the supremacy of the state, which can be the case where a military, certain regional movements, or even warlords, etc. are powerful. As many transition governments are still developing institutions and establishing their power, they may be well advised to limit the power of such potentially destabilizing civil society actors. (Compare Beichelt 2002) Empirical evidence suggests that this argument, however, is increasingly being misused by authoritarian/reauthorizing regimes, for instance in Russia or Kazakhstan. There, authoritarian leaders state intentions of democratization reforms, while factually decreasing liberties for civil society based on the argument of stabilizing the state.

(2) Civil society may undermine democratic processes by direct influence on politics: This point of criticism is frequently mentioned in the context of civil society, not only with regards to democratization but also in the context of democratically consolidated states. In most cases, civil society is constituted by many different interest groups, each fighting for their own cause, which is why they have been accused of not legitimately representing the population; the term, the “tyranny of the majority”, has even been used in this context. (Compare e.g. Santiso 2001: 163) When comparing civil society of transformation states with that in Western states, this argument can be heard, but, I would argue, in practice, it is rather the possibility for organization of different interests and lobbying for different causes, which is considered to be “a vibrant civil society”. The degree to which certain associations work against a common good, or support opinions that may constitute a threat to democracy and certain laws connected to this (e.g. promote racist-hate-speech, etc.) is what brings us back to the point that it is crucial, what constitutive goods CSOs base their existence and political intentions on and whether these can be assumed to foster or impede the democratic contribution of the particular CSO. (Compare Warren 2004)

That (3) civil society may aggravate social cleavages (ethnic, etc.), is of particular interest for this dissertation: The potentially uncivil nature of civil society or its organizations has particularly been underlined where societies are characterized by significant societal cleavages:

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“Historically, socio-cultural fragmentation (or heterogeneity) has been widely seen as an obstacle to democratic stability, social cohesion and a strong civil society”. (Heinrich 2010: 150)

Sometimes civil society has even been observed to intentionally negatively impact democracy and to

“prohibit the generation of civic norms such as tolerance, public spiritedness and trust” and rather to fuel “ethnic/religious allegiances, violence and intolerance”. (Heinrich 2010: 150)

Furthermore, based on rational choice approaches to ethnicity, civic engagement has been interpreted as a form of securing access to resources for one’s communal group, or, from the perspective of primordialist/culturalist approaches, as a way of expressing and perpetuating socio-cultural identity. In the logic of structuralist approaches, civic and political activism can be motivated to serve the purpose of securing access to political decision-making, participation in institutional procedures, etc. (Heinrich 2010: 150–151)

In fact for civil society in all types of societies, Foley wonders about the paradox of Robert Putnam’s demand for associations to “surpasses social and ethno-clientelistic structures” (1993). Associations are supposed to

“not be ‘polarized’ or ‘politicized.’ They must ‘bridge’ social and political divisions and thus, presumably, be autonomous from political forces. These caveats echo a long tradition of ‘pluralist’ analysis. Yet how can such associations shape political participation and ‘civic engagement’ without engaging in specifically political issues and without representing compelling social interests?” (Foley, Edwards 1996: 41)

Foley thus points to the somewhat contradictory idea that CSOs frequently develop from groups that want to represent and promote certain interests and particular positions, but at the same time, they are supposed to be inclusive and interest mitigating.

Particularly regarding deeply divided societies, the relevant societal cleavages are frequently very virulent, particularly during conflict or post-conflict situations – but not only, as some states rated as consolidated democracies, such as Ireland, etc. illustrate. In fact, civil society and its association have been found to act as interest groups for particular rights and interests, particularly, where the reconfiguration of power relations and resources is taking place – which is usually the case between transition and democratic consolidation. This in turn represents and fosters group-belonging among the members of associations, which also can and frequently does, foster mistrust against other members or groups of society63:

“Similarity and cultural homogeneity provide an initial basis for trust, which in turn is the foundation for successful cooperation. These types of organizations may provide their members with a sense of ontological security, and thus create the conditions for reaching out across the ethnic/national/religious divide. At the same time, ethnic, national and religious groups are often predicated upon exclusivist values and norms that fit uncomfortably with democratic practices. Civil society built on ascriptive criteria is frequently based on exclusion of and conflict with others, particularly in regions with a history of war. A world-view that regards identity as closed, fixed and inherently conflictual underpins a politics of belonging. Separation and exclusion are put forward in the name of national purity and as a pre-condition for neighborly co-existence. When civil society organizations are not civic, multi-ethnic and multi-religious, their contribution to democracy and peace might be spurious. Intra-group cooperation based on a sense of belonging and kinship may become the vehicle of ethnic and parochial interests undermining social cohesion, fragmenting society and pitting one group against another.” (Belloni 2009: 9), compare (Coletta 2000)

63 For a detailed discussion on the connection between civil society and the interpretation of ‘bonding’/‘particularized’ or ‘bridging’/‘generalized’ ‘social capital’ or trust see exemplarily Zmerli 2008, Oglivie 2004, and Paffenholz, Spurk 2006 For a more extensive overview see Westle et al. 2008; RoRueutscher et al. 2008; Lin 2001; Lin et al. 2001; Dasgupta et al. 2000; Franzen et al. 2007. The main proponents of the different notions of the concept of ‘social capital’ have been Bourdieu 1983; Putnam 1995; Coleman 2000. Putnam already distinguishes between ‘bonding’ (‘particularized’) and ‘bridging’ (‘generalized’) social capital, frequently linking to the idea of trust. Only the production of generalized trusts seems to foster a clear disposition for the support of democratic action. However, where a society is strongly influenced and shaped by exclusive values and norms, associations are most likely to foster particularized, exclusive social capital, see Zmerli 2008; Putnam 1995; Belloni 2009; Cox 2009; Bjørnskov 2008; Howard 2003.
Chapter 2: Civil Society and External Democracy Promotion: Democratic Consolidation in Ethno-Nationally Divided States

The unintentional or even very intentional effect aggravates societal divides, such as what occurred with sports or religious associations in Northern Ireland for instance. The following statement illustrates this and also does not fail to state that civil society, even when actively promoting societal divisions, usually in fact still represents important political positions in a given context:

"At the time, when political parties were engaged in the negotiation and then implementation of the 1998 Belfast Agreement, sections of civil society continued to demonstrate a commitment to exclusivist ethno-national politics. It is tempting to conclude that the peace process and the dispute over [...] proceeded along two parallel and apparently separated tracks, with civil society reflecting conflicting and hard-to-change ethno-national relations." [...] A closer look, however, reveals a more nuanced picture [than only civil society stopping all political efforts]. Confrontations in civil society represent an instance in the development of a complex process of positioning and bargaining that involves political society at large. Civil society in deeply divided regions such as Northern Ireland reflects and reproduces the larger political context in which it is embedded." (Belloni 2009: 18)

The distinction between CSOs and primordial groups, then, becomes even more important, though not necessarily easier. It is crucial whether they follow certain democratic procedural standards such as "the ability to question authority" and "willingness to engage in public discourse." (Kymlicka 1998)

and to pay close attention to the nature of civil society and its organizations so that they do not harm democratic processes.

2.7 Qualitative Measuring of Civil Society’s Impact on Democratic Consolidation

This section “translates” the previously presented theoretical foundations of democratization and hybrid regimes and of civil society and its promotion in ethno-nationally divided societies into a framework for the theoretical approach of the empirical investigation. The 1980s and 1990s saw a significant increase in research and the development of mostly quantitative tools to measure democracy. (Pickel, Pickel 2006: 151–152) As of today, several indices have been developed to measure and assess the quality and development of democracy and the role and contribution of civil society with regards to democracy. However, the existing indices very rarely combine both dimensions, democracy and civil society, in a sufficient or systematic manner. Even though for instance some democracy indices, such as the Bertelsmann Transformation Index and Freedom House, factor civil society in their respective democracy indices, the operationalization and evaluation seems very summarized and superficial at best.

Therefore, in order to take into account all relevant dimensions of civil society’s possible contributions to democratic consolidation, a comprehensive assessment is necessary. This is only possible through a broad qualitative investigation, as the relevant information does not exist in the form of sufficient quantitative data. The aim of the present empirical investigation is to offer insight into civil society’s actual democratic spill-over, the possibilities and limits of measuring democratization and the impact of both civil society and external democracy promotion. Currently existing tools for their measurement are presented and assessed after which they are combined into an analytical assessment tool that can be applied for civil society assessment. These serve as the background to the so far existing attempts to measure civil society and democratization. On this ground, finally, existing tools are combined into an assessment tool that, in the research process, serves to summarize and aggregate the findings of the dissertation.

64 This also applies to political society, where ethnic parties have been found to both, politically represent important minority interests but at the same time to have significant destabilizing potential, see exemplarily Chandra 2005 and Bochsler 2010.
Recent years have seen the development of concepts and evaluation tools for the quality and degree of democracy and democratization. Measuring democracy is not an easy task; democracy is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon which is not simple to assess and measure. Lauth (2004a: 10–12) highlights the three most important reasons for why democracy ought to be studied:

1. To assess the states of democracies/non-democracies and to allow for comparison,
2. as most democracies do not fight wars against each other, understanding democracy can help in understanding peace,
3. Democracy assessment allows other states to formulate measures and policies towards democratizing states.

This section summarizes the existing theoretical foundations for measuring democracy, its progress, and also the role of external actors to democracy and democratization in this context is discussed.

The debate of measuring democracy is closely intertwined with the scientific debate on democracy in which definitions vary significantly between minimal and procedural notions, including many details about desirable architecture of democratic systems. This concerns the formal structures and institutions of the state and its actual capacity to govern, including the legal framework, checks and balances, as well as procedures for democratic processes and the output and the outcome of the system. (Comp. Lauth 2010b: 498–502)

While research in recent years has increasingly taken into account the quality of democracy, this development has been paralleled with growingly elaborate quantitative indices for the assessment of political systems usually focusing on the quality of democracy. Most indices in this context today measure democracy on a two dimensional scale between “authoritarian” and “democratic”, with different criteria, scales, and categories applied to this.

Today, there is an increased need for assessment and differentiation of the degrees and qualities of different political systems with regards to their state of democracy. The question of how democracy is measured runs in parallel with theoretical debates of definitions of democracy. As previously illustrated, views on democracy cover a broad range from minimal to highly demanding definitions and from the different dimensions involved (from elections to different partial systems and also procedures, governance, etc.).

Measuring democracy involves stipulating what exactly is to be measured and how this is categorized – as discrete categories from autocratic to democratic, as “diminished subtypes”, based on other typologies, how possible (e.g. Western) bias can or should be avoided, etc. - and the scaling and indicators and their weighing for this, what can or should be quantified, and many more questions. As Beetham notes:

“The project of a democratic audit, then, not only requires a clear specification of what exactly is to be audited. It also requires a robust and defensible conception of democracy, from which can be derived specific criteria and standards of assessment.” (1994b: 26)

In order to say something about democratization of a state, the quality of democracy first of all needs to be measured systematically at a certain time – by qualitative or quantitative methods – which can be applied at a later moment to allow a comparison. Several research teams have taken on the endeavor of designing assessment instruments to develop indices for this purpose. Today, in the context of democracy research, various indices are used for rating or measuring the quality and development of democracy. Some authors, however, criticize that the assessment of democracy is referred to as ‘measuring’, as this suggests oversimplified objectivity and comparability of the findings. (Traine 2000: 207), see also (Pickel, Müller 2006)

While most of the theoretical literature on democratization has been published, in practice democratization is very difficult to quantify and to measure by isolated quantifiable factors. (Carothers 1999: 291) Regarding the possibility for international comparison, the task becomes even more challenging. In the debate about measuring democracy, Lauth identifies five major research strands,

65 See also e.g. Lauth et al. 2000; Lauth 2004c; Munck, Verkuilen 2002; Munck 2009.
based on the underlying assumption of the definition and requirements of democracy, that each concentrates on one of the following main fields:

1. the output or performance of a democratic system,
2. the responsiveness of a democratic system,
3. the (threat of) liberties,
4. the efficiency of a democratic system,
5. the ability of a democracy to control political power. (2004c: 15–16)

Pickel & Pickel (2006: 151) underline that the main challenge of measuring democracy is the development of indicators that allow for systematic comparison of a larger number of democracies. (Comp. also Vanhanen 1997: 32) A number of research teams have developed complex instruments for examining democracy. Some of these are limited to certain regions of the world, such as Latin America or Eastern Europe, but allow comparing for instance Poland and Hungary, while other indices assess all states of the world so that for example Chile and Kazakhstan, or even entire geographical regions of states, e.g. Africa and Asia, can be compared.

There are indices that look into particular fields connected to democracy, such as freedom of the press or good governance. Some scientific publications have critically assessed, what exactly the democracy indices measure, how they go about doing that, and what they actually show as results. One of the first systematic critical assessments of existing democracy indices was presented by Beetham (1994a). Later, Gaber (2000) provided the first systematic critical comparison of several indices, followed by publications by Munck (2002), Pickel (2006), and Müller (2007), and later one by Lauth (2010b).

Today, while several indicators, most of all Freedom House, the Polity IV Project, and, additionally either the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, or the World Bank’s World Wide Governance Indicator, are widely used, one finds a wide range of criticism. (See exemplarily Müller, Pickel 2007; Pickel, Müller 2006; Munck, Verkuilen 2002; McMahon, Kornheiser 2009) For instance, due to the existing indices being relatively new and lacking long-time experience, they are blamed to publish subjective judgments based on Western standards, raising questions about the comparability of different indices. (McMahon, Kornheiser 2009) Munck (2009) criticizes existing democracy measuring indices:

1. Indices use very different (broad and narrow) concepts of democracy. They do not include procedural aspects (even though some qualitative assessments look at how institutions are used)
2. Questions about validity: if comparability of measuring indicators, their scales and aggregation across different states vary – what is measured and is it really the same that they measure?
3. Problem regarding the non-transparency of coding and how coding is applied
4. Changing of the methodology of indices, which undermines even the internal comparability of indices regarding previous rating rounds.66

The most important points of that debate are presented following the summary of instruments. The next subsections offer an overview and a discussion of the existing, most frequently used indices for democracy measurement. However, since the underlying notions of democracy differ very much among indices, and as their indicators and scales vary significantly, the application and frequent use of democracy indices in the context of research and practice for democratization has come under significant criticism.

66 Nevertheless, the index developed by Munck is only developed for and applied to Latin America and he does not provide a test of a comparison with other existing indices.
2.7.1 Compilation of Democracy Assessment Indices

This subsection presents an overview of the existing democracy assessment indices and instruments that have been developed. Subsequently, a few of the most frequently used indices are discussed in detail.

General Indices

The following indices assess the overall quality of democracy on the level of states. Some, such as the World Values Survey or the World Bank Governance Indicators thereby focus on particular levels, values or governance, that they deem essential indicators for democracy:

1. Freedom House (Freedom House 2012)
2. Polity IV (Gurr/ Marshall/Jaggers) (Polity IV 2012)
3. Bertelsmann Transformation Index (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012)
4. Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy (The Economist 2012)
5. Index of Democracy/Polyarchy Dataset (Vanhanen 2012)
6. World Values Survey (Inglehart)
8. The Democracy Barometer, recently developed to assess the quality of consolidated democracies that thus far display a range of differences and also various shortcomings in different democratic fields. (Merkel, Bochsler 2012)

Regional Indices

The list of regional indices is a compilation of indicators that assess democracy on the state level. However, they focus on particular regions, either for reasons of comparability or for conceptual purposes that might allow for the systematic expansion of the assessment to a larger, inter-regional, set of cases:

1. Friedrich Ebert Foundation Press Freedom (Africa) (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2012)
2. Latinobarometro (Latin America) (Corporación Latinobarómetro 2012)
5. Ibrahim Index for Governance (African States) (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2012)

Indices of specific aspects of democracy

The following list names indices assessing the state of particular though deemed crucial, aspects of democracy, e.g. the freedom of the press, and the link between economic progress and the quality of democracy:

2. Data Set of Political Regimes, 1800-1999 (with a focusing on democratic capital, Boix, Rosato 2001)
3. Democratization and Growth (Papaioannou, Gregorios 532)
4. Democracy and Suffrage (Paxton et al. 2003)

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67 The list was compiled from Heinrich 2010: 20–21, by the author, from a discussion thread on the e-mail list “Internationale Beziehungen” (“ib-list”, 05.03.2010), and from http://devecondata.blogspot.com/2007/04/democracy-indices.html.
Tools for self-assessment by persons from the relevant state

Finally, the following indices provide assessment tools designed for citizens for democracy-self-assessment:

1. Idea State of Democracy (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) 2012)

and, a single research project which looks at regime classification based on the dichotomy, democracy vs. dictatorships:

2. Democracy-Dictatorship Data Set (Przeworski et al.) (Cheibub 2012)

Some writings further provide assessments of the causal significance of one or several of the best known indices for democratization (cf. e.g. Munck and Verkuilen provide one of the few comparative overviews on the degree of causal inference of various democracy indices (2002), Treier and Jackman scrutinize the relevance of the Polity IV data set (Treier, Jackman 2003). (See also Cheibub et al. 2009, for an overview of democratic regime indices see annex D, for existing data sets on democracy see annex E.)

Some of the existing indices have become established and frequently used tools and sources for political research and analysis regarding the state of democracy in states around the world, for instance the Democracy Score of Freedom House, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, the Polity IV Index, etc. Many of the existing indices are theoretically well-founded and operationalized and are continuously improved. The proliferation of rating tools has, however and positively, been paralleled by an increasing number of publications that critically compare and discuss the idea of measuring and rating democracy per se. Other publications compare several of the most widely used indices, as discussed in the following subsection.

2.7.2 Detailed Presentation of the Most Important Democracy Indices

Lauth (2010b: 503–521) provides an overview of the most important existing concepts developed for measuring democracy:

1. Freedom House (FH)
2. Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI)
3. Polity IV-project by Gurr, Jaggers & Moore (1990) (Polity IV)
4. Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)
5. The World Bank’s Voice and Accountability Index (VA)
6. Vanhanen’s Index of Democracy (ID)

(1) Freedom House (FH)

This index focuses more on political rights and civil liberties than on the quality of democracy. For this the following dimensions are measured:

1. political rights (including (a) electoral process, (b) political pluralism and participation, (c) functioning of government);
2. civil liberties (including (a) freedom of expression and belief, (b) associational and organizational rights, (c) rule of law, (d) personal autonomy and individual rights).

The index is measured on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 as the highest and 7 as the lowest democratic development. The scale is divided as follows: Consolidated Democracies (1.00–2.99), Semi-Consolidated Democracies (3.00–3.99), Transitional Governments or Hybrid Regimes (4.00–4.99), Semi-Consolidated Authoritarian Regimes (5.00–5.99), Consolidated Authoritarian Regimes (6.00–7.00). (Freedom House 2012) The points of criticism Lauth mentions with regard to Freedom House are as follows: Even though as of today, the transparency of many indicators, including the Freedom House ratings, and how they classify states has improved, still, certain points of the assessment process...
remain unclear or oblique. This potentially reduces the reliability of the results and detailed assessment for the quality of a certain state. Particularly with regard to established democracies the Freedom House Index’s applicability is limited, while, as an advantage, the index examines both, democracies and autocracies.

(2) Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI)

This index assesses 128 transformation states, based on the concept of “embedded democracy” (Merkel et al. 2003), constituting five partial regimes: (A) electoral regime, (B) political liberties, (C) civil rights, (D) horizontal accountability, (E) effective power to govern. These dimensions are assessed by experts via further questions and then rated by comparing the previous results. The overall results of a state are rated on a 1-10 scale: 0-3.99 Hard-line autocracies, 4-5.99 Highly defective democracies/moderate autocracies, 6-7.99 Defective Democracies, 8-10 Democracies in consolidation. The critique mostly refers to the non-transparency of the indicators, categorization, scaling, and the interpretations based on these. Furthermore, the operationalization of certain indicators is somewhat one-dimensional, e.g. regarding the monopoly of power of the state that is not necessarily a direct indicator of the quality of democracy. Finally, the combination of democracy and the economic dimension into a status indicator is not entirely clear.

(3) Polity IV-project by Gurr, Jaggers & Moore (1990) (Polity IV)

The project includes yearly data for more than 150 states since 1800. The indices which the measurement is based on are: (1) Competitiveness of participation (including (a) competitiveness and (b) regulation of political participation), (2) Competitiveness of executive recruitment, (including (a) competitiveness and (b) openness of executive recruitment), (3) Executive constraints. The assessment “examines concomitant qualities of democratic and autocratic authority in governing institutions, rather than discreet and mutually exclusive forms of governance. This perspective envisions a spectrum of governing authority that spans from fully institutionalized autocracies through mixed, or incoherent, authority regimes (termed "anocracies") to fully institutionalized democracies. The "Polity Score" captures this regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). The Polity scores can also be converted to regime categories – by a three-part categorization of "autocracies" (-10 to -6), "anocracies" (-5 to +5 and the three special values: -66, -77, and -88), and "democracies" (+6 to +10)“ (Jaggers, Gurr 2011) The shortcomings noted for this index are that neither the boundaries between the different indicators nor the scaling of the measurement are systematic and clearly defined, which reduces the reliability and validity. Also, this approach falls short of including several important dimensions of democracy, such as civic rights and the rule of law. Furthermore, the transparency of the data used is not sufficient. Finally, the index was not designed to “really assess more detailed aspects of democracy”. (Gurr et al. 1990: 100)

(4) Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)

A relatively recent index (since 2006), the data assesses 167 states. The underlying concept of democracy for this case is broader than that of Freedom House and does not only include political rights and civil liberties, but also the actual political participation and the political culture (measuring the five dimensions: electoral process & pluralism, civil liberties, functioning of government, political participation, political culture). The index measures democracy on a scale from 0 to 10, spanning the following categories: full democracy (10-8), defective democracy (8-6), hybrid regime (6-4), and authoritarian regime (4-0). Points of criticism of this index are that it rates multi-party systems better than established two-party systems and that certain dimensions are simply rated as positive (e.g. the number of involvement in political parties and associations, the share of women in parliament, etc.) Furthermore, the underlying definition of “democracy” is not very precise, and for several dimensions, the indices and categorizations are not entirely transparent. Moreover, stipulations of the positive
meaning of democracy for economic development, or the fact that participation is measured as positive but the actual quality of political participation is not further assessed, have led to questions about the actual assertions of the index. These shortcomings are aggravated by an additional lack of transparency of the rating. Finally and interestingly, the rating of the EIU differs overall, in some cases significantly, from that of FH and Polity IV.

(5) The World Bank’s Voice and Accountability Index (VA)

This index focuses on the dimension of governance, measured via the following six dimensions: “1. Voice and Accountability (VA) – capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. 2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (PV) – capturing perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism. 3. Government Effectiveness (GE) – capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. 4. Regulatory Quality (RQ) – capturing perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. 5. Rule of Law (RL) – capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 6. Control of Corruption (CC) – capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.” (The World Bank 2012)

The data used for this index is based on 37 sources, collected by 31 organizations (including EUI, FH, BTI, etc.). However, Lauth discusses several points that may be critical about this index: The data for democracies is frequently broader than that for non-democracies and the source selection as well as their weighting is not transparently discussed. Furthermore, dimensions as well as their indicators are not clearly delineated and it is not clear to what extent the quality of governance possibly is positively biased towards an overall, e.g. economically, more positive context for governing. Finally, neither the underlying definition of democracy nor of “voice & accountability” are presented nor is the scaling and categorization of democracy vs. non-democracy/autocracy provided.

(6) Vanhanen’s Index of Democracy (ID)

In his 1984 study which with follow-ups included 172 states, he only measures the two dimensions ‘contestation or competition’ and ‘participation or inclusion’, based on Dahl’s 1971 model of Polyarchy. The shortcomings of this approach that Lauth mentions are that the conclusions the index allows about established democracies are limited and that the concentration on only two measuring dimensions is very narrow. Further, Vanhanen disadvantages two-party systems over multi-party systems and discriminates against populations with a large share of young persons who are not eligible to vote. Lauth elaborates on three further indicators: the Bertelsmann’s Sustainable Governance Indicator (measuring the OSCD-States), the NCCR Democracy Barometer (an indicator for established democracies), and the New Index of Democracy (combining several of the existing indices). As these are rarely used and are not (yet) as well established as the other indices, due to a lack of space, I will not present these two indicators in more detail. (For other discussions on and comparisons of the most prominent indices compare also: Lauth 2004c; Gaber 2000; Munck 2003; Munck, Verkuilen 2002; Pickel, Müller 2006, Müller, Pickel 2007) The most important additional points of criticism brought forward are the following:

Particularly the BTI and the Freedom House Nations in Transit Indices are particularly well suited for the transformation context, focusing on change and progress of development. (Croissant 2009) Due to their combination of quantitative assessment through indices and qualitative assessment (extensive
description) they offer a good basis for comparison of democratization processes in different states. (Richter 2009a: 57–58)

### 2.7.3 Critical Discussion of Democracy Indices

The underlying concepts of democracy for different indices seem to vary significantly. The different results of the existing indices for the same states at least raise doubt regarding how they all can refer to the “objective” phenomenon of democracy – for which definitions vary significantly. (Pickel, Müller 2006: 136) I would argue that the most important point for each index should be a high level of transparency regarding how democracy is operationalized and by what indicators it is measured – and how this can be guaranteed for systematic comparison across countries and regions.

Not only do some of the different indices apply minimalist ideas of democracy while others apply much harder criteria. Furthermore, democracy usually is applied with reference to three different dimensions – although frequently not in a systematic or transparent manner:

1. **procedure**: a “quality” product is the result of an exact, controlled process carried out according to precise, recurring methods and timing;
2. **content**: quality inheres in the structural characteristics of a product, such as its design, materials, or functioning;
3. **result**: the quality of a product or service is indirectly indicated by the degree of customer satisfaction with it, regardless of how it is produced or its actual content. (Diamond, Morlino 2004)

Finally, a strong focus on institutions and the lack of attention to procedures has been criticized (Lauth 2004b): particularly, where not only formal institutions, but also changes in attitudes and values are considered in the assessment of democracy or democratization, this is not easily factored into the analysis. The World Values Survey for instance takes “democratic norms” into account, but this is not a tool directly for the purpose of democracy assessment. Most democracy indices approach this quest by either including indicators as proxies to assess the quality of certain institutions, e.g. freedom of the media. Many indices use standardized questions on which experts base their qualitative assessment that is later quantified and aggregated into overall ratings.

Important qualitative criteria that need to be taken into account for “good research” also apply to measuring democracy: the validity, the reliability and the comparability of data need to be guaranteed and made transparent. One point of criticism has been that all the indices which measure democracy at the aggregational state level possibly ignore the significant sub-national variation that frequently exists in large and federal systems. (Munck 2003) The lack of methodological reflection and statements about the definition and operationalization of the “quality” of democracy makes them seem less credible. (Munck, Verkuilen 2002: 5–7) Munck & Verkuilen develop several formal criteria for validity and reliability during (a) conceptualizing, (b) measuring, and (c) aggregating data for measuring democracy. (See annex F, compare Pickel, Müller 2006: 136–137)

Sudden changes in ratings, e.g. as was the case after the rather sudden deterioration in the state of democracy in Georgia after 2008, can possibly be attributed to a collective bias of researchers, whose expertise accounts for a significant share of the data on which indices base their ratings on. Finally, there has been criticism that most indices tend to measure democracy along a democratic-autocratic dichotomy. (Pickel, Müller 2006) This has partly been attempted to be remedied by endeavors to assess consolidated (Merkel, Bochsler 2012) or defective democracies. (Croissant 2009)
2.8 External Democracy Promotion of Civil Society

Since the Lomé II Convention, signed in 1979 between the European Community and the ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States) states, democracy has become a part of the conditions for international cooperation. Political motivations were formulated for the EU’s foreign policy for the first time in the Lomé III convention. Therein, the EU and the ACP undersign human dignity, and economic, social, and cultural rights (preamble, art. 4 and annex I). (Börzel, Risse 2004: 4) While first focusing on the state level, by the late 1980s the dimension of civil society started to become an increasingly significant dimension that was promoted and with which international actors increasingly cooperated.

The European Parliament has increasingly underlined the importance of democracy in their cooperation with other states. Democracy promotion, as we know it today, has been a declared goal of the EU’s foreign policy only since the early 1990s. Democracy promotion in the EU, however is very complex – the EU is a homogenous international organization, and democracy promotion programs are not concentrated in a single administrative unite, but are part of many different programs run by numerous different actors. (Compare Börzel, Risse 2004: 20)

While the concept of civil society has existed for some time, civil society has been the fastest growing sector in the context of democratization processes of the last twenty years. (Grävingholt et al. 2009c) Thomas Carothers (1999: 33) interprets the continued increase in civil society promotion as an indicator for the growing awareness in the practical field of democracy promotion that elections and state-institutions are not enough. In addition to these, a democratic substance is necessary to fill the installed democratic forms. Also, according to empirical observations, it seems that years of inter-state co-operation at the government level have not brought about the desired degree of influence on political change.

Especially since the late 1990s, most international organizations, governments, NGOs and politicians have repeatedly stressed that the promotion of civil society is particularly important for a functioning and sustainable democracy and its consolidation. As all the elements of a long-term democratization strategy are considered crucial for external democracy promotion, at the latest during the phase of democratic consolidation, the main focus usually is shifted towards the development of a functioning civil society, that is assumed to know the political, economic, societal and cultural situation in the state, disposes of personal and institutionalized networks and can be supported by measures of the promotion of research and networking. (Sandschneider 2003: 14–15)

In many of the democratizing states around the world, including those resisting ongoing democratization, legions of international actors (states, inter-, or trans-, national organizations such as the UN, NATO, EU, OSCE, different NGOs, INGOs, GONG Os, political and private foundations, etc.) of the ‘international community’ have taken on the endeavor to promote democracy through the use of numerous measures and according to diverse strategies, such that the call for democracy has become an important condition for international cooperation.

External democracy promotion, sometimes pejoratively called the ‘boom-industry’ of international cooperation, currently disposes of a large annual budget worldwide. According to Peter Burnell

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68 Allcock rightly points out, that the term “community” in this context seems misleading, as the loose coalition of state and non-state structures does not correspond to the sociological notion of “community”. 2004: 26

69 For instance, in the context of the foreign politics of the European Union, one of the politically and financially most important actors of external democracy promotion, conditionality with regard to political practices has been an important element since the Treaty of Lomé III (1985-1990). In the Treaty, the EU and the ACP commit themselves to human dignity, and economic, social, and cultural rights. (Preamble, Art. 4 and Annex I). Börzel, Risse 2004: 4 Sedelmeier and Wallace point out, that in particular the European Parliament has been insisting, that political conditionality ought to have the same importance as economic conditionality. Democracy promotion, as it is understood today, has been part of the binding foreign politics goals of the EU since the early 1990s. Sedelmeier, Wallace 1996: 359–361.
Chapter 2: Civil Society and External Democracy Promotion: Democratic Consolidation in Ethno-Nationally Divided States

“[I]nternational support for promoting democracy has increased substantially over the last two decades, and reported democracy assistance is now in excess of US$5 billion dollars annually. The US government and the European Union (EU) are well-established actors and March 2006 saw the inauguration of the United Nations Democracy Fund: 26 countries pledged an initial sum of $41 million, for distribution through other United Nations (UN) organisations. Meanwhile the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) claims to be the largest spender on democratic governance, amounting to US$1.4 billion in 2005.” The figures “refer only to expenditures on projects and programmes that have been categorised as democracy or democracy related. They do not reflect the much larger cost of the many other ways in which democratic objectives are promoted, such as through diplomacy and political forms of action that extend right up to attempted coercion.” (2008: 414–415)

Although an overall sum spent in this context is difficult to compile, it may amount to around 10 billion Euros worldwide (for 2008), equaling ten percent of the global budget of development aid. (Grävingholt et al. 2009c: 28)

In most programs of the majority of donors, civil society is mentioned as an important factor for political change and advocacy. Many times, however, the donors’ programs remain vague in how they describe the actual functions and tasks of civil society. In practice, service delivery and advocacy work are often mixed in the programs international donors support. (Paffenholz, Spurk 2006: 16) The World Bank e.g. notes advocacy, monitoring, and direct service delivery as the three main functions of civil society. (World Bank 2003: 3) For other donors, the functions are more intertwined, as e.g. service delivery increases the legitimacy through contact with those represented. (Paffenholz, Spurk 2006: 10)

2.8.1 The Concept of External Democracy Promotion

Several terms are used, often interchangeably, for the international endeavor of the promotion of democratic structures and democratic values. Burnell mentions many different terms that are used for the field of democracy assistance such as ‘democracy promotion,’ as well as a host of other variants including ‘development aid,’ ‘political aid,’ ‘democracy support,’ ‘democracy aid,’ and ‘support for democratic development’. (2000a: 3) Commonly, in English a distinction is drawn between ‘democracy assistance’ (referring to direct, positive measures) and ‘democracy promotion’, (also possibly including military or economic (coercive) measures). The working fields of democracy promotion usually include the support of democratic institutions (e.g. parliaments) and procedures (e.g. elections), of human rights, the rule of law, and of civic education. (Grävingholt et al. 2009c: 29)

(1) Defining External Democracy Promotion

The definitions of democracy promotion usually refer to the types and nature of measures by external actors70 that aim at promoting democracy on different levels in a target state:

“Democracy promotion refers to the generally (but not always) ‘peaceful support of democratizing societies by the international community by personnel, technical and financial means that aim at the sustainable improvement of the level of democracy’” (Burnell 2000a: 5)

Julia Leininger defines ‘external democracy promotion’ as

“all non-military measures, aiming at the establishment, strengthening, or restoration of a democratic, political order.” (Leininger 2006)

Schmitter & Brouwer, finally, give a more elaborate definition of ‘external democracy promotion’ as

“all overt and voluntary activities adopted, supported and (directly or indirectly) implemented by (public or private) foreign actors explicitly designed to contribute to the political liberalization of autocratic regimes,

70 Here, ‘external actors’ are considered as all individual or collective actors trying try to influence the democratization processes in a target country from outside of that country. (Comp. Sandschneider 2003: 3–4)
This dissertation adopts this last, most detailed, definition for the remainder of the investigation. According to Leininger, measures of democracy promoters can be classified as negative (e.g. conditionality with regard to the granting of financial credits) or positive (among which falls the building of civil society), and they can use direct (e.g. capacity building of parliaments) or indirect (e.g. the promotion of fiscal transparency) means of support for democratic processes that are undertaken by actors coming from outside of the state targeted by the activity. (Grävingholt et al. 2009c: 29 citing Leininger 2006)

(2) External Democracy Promotion: Diverse Dimensions, Different Actors, Diverse Instruments

The goals and motives of external democracy promotion usually are very diverse, depending on the situation of international politics, on the domestic context, and also on the windows of opportunities and changing trends. Sandschneider (2003: 15) roughly divides the motives and interests of external democracy promotion into three categories:

(1) To promote peaceful interstate behavior, and thus make an active contribution to the safeguarding of peace,
(2) Create and stabilize regimes, with which the West can cooperate politically on a long-term and reliable basis,
(3) Create and support market structures that turn the target countries into enduring reliable economic partners of the West. (Translation by the author, F.B.)

As a complex process, external democracy promotion is comprised of several dimensions and factors that Sandschneider summarizes in the following figure:

Fig. 14: The dimensions of external democracy promotion

Freise (2004: 33), adding two domestic dimensions, extends Sandschneider’s six dimensions to eight: (7) political culture in the receiving state, and (8) expectations of the addressees. These dimensions are now discussed in detail.

(3) Actors and Addressees of External Democracy Promotion and their Expectations

External democracy promotion takes place in a dynamic context under the participation of a multitude of different actors, which are the following, according to Sandschneider (2003: 22):
Chapter 2: Civil Society and External Democracy Promotion: Democratic Consolidation in Ethno-Nationally Divided States

(1) International and multilateral organizations: UN, OECD, IMF, World Bank, etc., but also regional organizations as EU, OSCE, Council of Europe, etc.,
(2) National states: USA, Japan, Germany, etc.,
(3) Non-governmental organizations: in different policy fields.

Hippler gives a more detailed list and distinguishes between:
(1) Domestic actors: 1. The government, 2. The military (which is partly or entirely controlled by the government), 3. Economic interests and interest groups, 4. Ethnic, ethno-religious or similar groups, 5. Independent “warlords”, 5. Political parties, and 6. Elements of the civil society, and

(4) Goals and Motives of External Democracy Promotion

Much of the Western literature on external democracy promotion agrees on the final destiny of its endeavor: democracy. Or, in more detail, according to Held the

“establishment of a cosmopolitan model of democracy [to] strengthen democracy ‘within’ communities and civil associations by elaborating and reinforcing democracy from ‘outside’ through a network of regional and international agencies and assemblies that cut across spatially delimited locales.” (Held 1995: 237).

For Diamond, this implies the underlying assumptions that democracies maintain positive and peaceful relations with each other:

“The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically ‘cleanse’ their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.” (1995: 6–7)

However, one needs to bear in mind that, as previously illustrated, there are many different notions of democracy, from very basic to very demanding. It can thus also be assumed that designers and implementers of external democracy promotion vary significantly in how they see the goals of external democracy promotion, which can be anywhere on a continuum between free elections to very advanced procedural ideas, and what they consider to be the necessary instruments for reaching these aims. Research showed, that external actors in practice do not follow a unitary democracy model (compare Grimm 2010: 77; Burnell 2000a: 20–21) Rather, states tend to promote the model of democracy closest to that of their country of origin. (Carothers 1999: 99–101) Activities of external democracy promotion usually aim at one or several of three levels considered the constituting elements of democracy:

(1) electoral processes,
(2) government institutions, or
(3) civil society. (Chandler 1999)

Sandschneider gives a long list of main areas of influence of external democracy promotion:

(a) Influencing ideological foundations of the target country;
(b) Undermining the political legitimacy of the old regime (sanctions);
(c) Support of democracy-friendly elites (choice of recipients);  
(d) Contact to insecure elements of the supporting coalition of the old regime;  
(e) Sounding out diverging interests after the fall of an old regime;  
(f) Incorporation of military as a decisive factor of the previous regime;  
(g) Increasing contacts on all levels (media, human rights organizations, transnational organizations. (Sandschneider 2003: 30–31, translation by the authors, F.B.)

However, criticism of the practices of external democracy promotion has increased in recent years, as many states have not reached democratic consolidation, or even reversed in their democratic development, despite significant international efforts and support.

(5) The Domestic Dimension of External Democracy Promotion

Despite significant external support, many states have at some point stagnated or even regressed in their democratization. This fact has evoked the increased re-emphasis of a not very surprising, however, much less considered argument in the external democracy promotion debate – the domestic dimension:

“democracy and democratization are by definition based on the relation of the domestic elites with the domestic demos: ‘such processes always are, in a fundamental sense, an essentially ‘domestic drama’’.  
(Beichelt 2010 with reference to Morlino, Magen 2009a: 29.)

Therefore, despite the widespread significance that has been attributed to external democracy promotion, the domestic context represent the dominant and most determining dimension and

“[a]ny analysis of international influence on domestic democratic change (...) must begin with the recognition of an overarching, structural constraint regarding the role of external factors. Since, by definition, democratization involves processes of change in the governing of a demos (...), such processes always are, in a fundamental sense, an essentially ‘domestic drama’. Even in the most extreme cases of external intervention therefore (such as long-term control by an occupying power), democratization in any meaningful sense must entail the free exercise of rights of citizenship in a sovereign entity, all of which depend on domestic actors, institutions and procedures.” (Morlino, Magen 2009a: 29 cited in Beichelt 2010: 4, cf. e.g. Merkel 2010 chapter 7, Grimm 2010; Richter 2009a)

And, while for some time the international dimension of external democracy promotion has been underlined and brought back into the debate, recently, the domestic dimension, while frequently included as a dimension of external democracy promotion that is not yet systematically analyzed, has gained new, albeit so far not substantial, attention. For Schmitter & Brouwer (1999: 15), the effect of external democracy promotion depends on

- The regime situation in the target country,

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71 In situations during and right after the overthrow of an authoritarian regime, the following additional fields of target apply: (h) Fast orientation towards a new democratic leader; (i) Help for the fast holding of the first liberal elections; (j) International legitimization through diplomatic recognition; (k) Financial support of economic buildup; (l) Keeping open windows of opportunity for transformation. (Sandschneider 2003: 31, translation by the author, F.B.)

72 The growing complexity resulting from the international influence on political change has been underestimated. Gillespie et al. 2002: 1 For Geoffrey Pridham, the international structures and actors represent „the forgotten dimension in the study of democratic transition“1995b: 18, and Gillespie and Youngs note that the “the complexities of the international dimension to political change ha[ve] been inadequately factored into studies of democratization” (2002: 1). McFaul et al. examine different explanations for this research deficit. One can find, however, a limited number of writings on the interplay of domestic and international processes, e.g. Yilmaz 2002; Moravcsik 1993; Pridham et al. 1994; Pridham 1995b. They call for more consideration of the interplay between domestic and international processes, of theoretical and practical issues as well as of scientific knowledge from different disciplines. 2007: 9–10. While scholars in comparative political science are only recently discovering the international dimension, an increasing number of studies of democratic transformation and consolidation research have turned to questions beyond the national context. (Pevehouse 2002; Whitehead 1996b)
2.8.2 External Democracy Promotion of Civil Society

In order to not only strengthen top-down the institutional frame of democracy, but also to boost democracy from the bottom-up by strengthening civil society as a “nucleus” of democracy, abundant instruments and programs are run around the world. According to Carothers, civil society, in addition to election and state institutions, is one of the three major institutional foci of US-democracy promotion. (Carothers 1999: 88) This is in contrast with for example German democracy promotion in particular, and in general also with that of the EU, which rather aims at the rule of law, promotion of the police and independent judiciary, and the federalization of the political system. (Grimm 2010: 77) Many programs aim at CSOs and civil society as “schools of democracy”, that also have a multiplying “spill-over” effect on the overall society and the quality of its democratic functioning. In this context civil society is frequently underlined as both the means and the goal for successful democratic consolidation:

“The third and most rapidly expanding pillar of democracy aid concerns civil society assistance, with particular attention to advocacy-oriented non-governmental organisations, civic education groups, policy think tanks, independent media, and trade unions.” (Santiso 2001: 161)

In the past years, the focus on civil society and ‘democratic substance’ beyond formal democratic elections and state institutions was based on strong frustration of the limited impact of high-level diplomacy and state-reforms. (Santiso 2001: 161, compare Carothers 1999: 337) For many years now, civil society has been an important target field of external democracy promotion, even though criticism has become louder regarding to what extent the rhetorical significance of civil society was also embraced by acts of external democracy promoters since the visible financial priorities were rather set on other fields, such as economic aid, institutional support, etc. Frustration about how the support of civil society in many states had not led to the successful achievement of democratic consolidation caused many researchers and practitioners question the actual impact of civil society promotion. Currently, according to Santiso,

“the initial enthusiasm towards civil society organisations appears to be receding: not all organisations of society are as civil as they appear and not all ‘non governmental organisations’ are as non-governmental as they claim. Their representativity, accountability and sustainability are often weak and in many instances NGOs are highly politicized (...) or (...) replace opposition political parties as channels of dissent and discontent.”

This is understandable as authoritarian regimes give only limited possibilities for political participation, but, nevertheless, these practices undermine the state’s institutions. (Santiso 2001: 161–162) As a consequence, actors of external democracy promotion has become increasingly attentive to the quality, impact, legitimacy and accountability of NGOs in their target states, realizing that they need
to be well balanced between citizens’ empowerment and stabilizing the state and making it “a guarantor of constitutional rights”. (Santiso 2001: 162) Only de facto functioning participation mechanisms offers civic political participation, which is why establishing true processes for civil society involvement has been identified to be a crucial component of external democracy assistance. (Cf. Santiso 2001: 167; Stiglitz 1998) Another point is, that, connected to civil society’s potential dark sides, in some cases promotion of civil society may in fact not ease but aggravate competition and mistrust of among CSOs. Further, CSOs may also be motivated to appeal to important social cleavages, by publically supporting populist, extremist opinions they know will gain them support by the larger public and also may lead to funding by external actors that aim to appease conflict. (Chandler 1999: 35)

**NGOization and Financial Dependence of NGOs**

As in all states of the world, CS frequently equaled with NGOs, that are increasingly professionalized and the international funding of NGOs and their activities contributes significantly to an otherwise meager job market with low salaries and high unemployment. However, this fact is not really a surprise as recent literature on external democracy promotion of civil society tries to depict. In OECD countries in 1999, the non-profit sector accounted for around six percent of the total employment or even ten percent with volunteer work included; it can be assumed to make up even more today. (Anheier et al. 1999) So this often lamented development in the post-socialist states in fact may also be seen as a parallel development that has followed an overall increase of the “funding business”. The external financing of NGOs does not provide ideas about the long-term sustainability of NGOs – particularly for times after external support fades. A vicious effect of this trend is that it tends to make democracy accountable not to the citizens of the country, but to foreign donors, when democracy is precisely about increased participation of and accountability to citizens. (Santiso 2001: 163) Ottaway & Chung observe that external democracy assistance “has driven up the costs of democracy for many countries” (1999: 109), as many NGOs but also governments depend on continued financial democracy support. This explains as well why for many CSOs democratization is frequently not only positive – as it also usually means decreased funding from external donors.

Some actors have even complained that this has led to forming a “civil sector” instead of a civil society. This idea is linked to the observation that the changing programs and goals of donors fostered ‘projectitis’, understood as the practice of organizing projects with donor money in order to secure jobs and follow the ‘trends’ of calls for tenders issued each year. (Seifija 2006) The financial dependence of NGOs from donors has also raised doubts about to what extent support of NGOs (as a formal type of CSO instead of larger societal movements) can bring sustainable results and impact to democracy: NGOs’ owed dependency on donor money orients their work focus and approaches to a very large extent towards the latest programs and funding topics and conditions of their (potential) donors; thus they become “donor driven”. This reduces the possibility for domestic citizens and CSO-members to determine their own needs, thematic focuses and most appropriate approaches. These consequences are entirely contradictory to the idea of promoting civil society to increase civic activism and participation. (Santiso 2001: 163)

The dependence on and cooperation with foreign support also makes it easy for not entirely democratic governments to discredit NGOs as “foreign spies” or “traitors” of the national cause among the population. 73 This effect is further aggravated by the fact that many NGOs either do not have a broader membership base (some even none) or have in fact close relations to the government (sometimes as GONGOs or QUANGOs). (Paffenholz, Spurk 2006: 10–11) Frequently, NGOs have a reputation of being just a profit-oriented, “over-trained seminar mafia”, that travels to seminars.

The trend for NGOization, as much as it has been criticized, is not very surprising when taking into account the fact that many states receiving external democracy promotion are also not among the wealthiest economies, particularly, where transition processes have disrupted the market and

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73 While generally the international support of democracy and civil society are seen as positive by Western actors, it may also be questionable to what extent the interference into other states through foreign funded CSOs is truly legitimate or undermines their sovereignty.
employment sphere. In some states, NGOs have become very important funders: for instance, the annual budget of the environmental NGO “Greenpeace” is bigger than that of the environmental protection program of the United Nations. (Klein et al. 2004) In fact, NGOs in any state compete and participate in the overall markets of lobbying, employment, etc. It is difficult to say then, whether international funding of NGOs either overall affects the job-market, as international donors pay better salaries to NGO activists than important domestic institutions, such as hospitals, schools, universities, etc. do – which in turn decreases incentives to work in the domestic market. Or, whether the funding of NGOs rather play an important role for the financing of politically critical, democratically inclined, elites and indirectly contributing to improving the economy in the target state. Most likely, both is the case.

Civil Society in Non-Consolidated Democracies: Unsolicited Advisors Turned Service Providers

Finally, a point which has come under increasing criticism is that a trend has been observed in many non-consolidated democracies: the state privatizes or outsources public service to NGOs. This, on the one hand makes sense, as important social service that the state can no longer assume can still be available for those who depend on them. On the other hand, this may also result in decreased responsibility and accountability of the state to take care of its citizens. (van Til 1988) In fact, it seems that particularly in many post-communist/-socialist states, CSO actors more or less voluntarily turn into service providers, frequently co-opted by the government:

“civic organizations move through a cycle from democratic innovators to service delivery agents and then are tied into tighter forms of control by government and international donors, either as more incorporated service agents or returned to a marginal place in local politics under the banner of civic activism.” (Purdue 2007a: 4–5)

Depending on the socio-political context, the result can also be that access to important service becomes limited to those who have the money or contacts to access them. The fact that external democracy promoters have been “filling the gap” left by the weak economy and the break-down or low development of the social system of many transitional states is also two-sided: while social service provisions are important and access to them can relieve the pressuring needs of citizens, the state can also withdraw from areas that formerly lay in its responsibility of caring and supporting its citizens; and once it becomes established that citizens care for some of their needs by themselves, this is very difficult to reverse. Additionally, while the aspect of increased self-responsibility and self-organization of citizens clearly can have a positive effect on citizens’ participation and ownership, the extent to which external actors develop pragmatic plans for what happens if they leave, and to what extent domestic local or national actors then continue to assume the service delivery without co-opting the projects, is of crucial importance.

2.8.3 Strategies and Instruments of External Democracy Promotion of Civil Society

As of today, evaluation of external democracy promotion has been erratic, different between various donors, and usually changing very much over time and programs. (For more on the challenges and approaches on evaluation see exemplarily Burnell 2007.) One of the debates around democracy promotion and its impact assessment is not only that it is difficult to measure whether direct or indirect effects are what we see, but also, that even intended results can be aimed at directly or indirectly:

“Based on existing theories of democratization, we contend that foreign assistance can promote democracy in two ways: indirectly, by transforming some of the structural conditions that serve as prerequisites for regime transition or survival, and directly, by empowering agents (individuals, political institutions, and social organizations) that struggle for regime change in the domestic arena. Traditional forms of development assistance, although not specifically targeted toward democracy promotion, may promote modernization, encourage better economic performance, and foster class transformations, all of which may have long-term
implications for democratic development. Targeted democracy assistance, by contrast, works to educate and empower voters, support political parties, labor unions, and women’s advocacy networks, strengthen human rights groups, and otherwise build ‘constituencies for reform’; it thus attempts to influence democratic outcomes in both the short term and the medium term.” (Finkel et al. 2007: 410)

The few scientific studies that have been conducted for the impact assessment of democracy promotion have come up with a variety of results. Some publications detect a positive impact of democracy promotion. Other publications are quite critical of the over-all emphasis of donors on stability over democratization (e.g. Burnell 2000c and Sogge 2002). Some authors in their impact assessment of OECD aid even suggest that external democracy promotion does not even have any impact on the Freedom House or Polity IV ratings of the target states (Knack 2004, compare also Finkel et al. 2007.)

One of the big disadvantages of most evaluation processes in the context of external democracy promotion is that they are either conducted via self-evaluation or contracted companies, which live off evaluation of larger organizations:

“The ratchet principle works all the way from Washington to the Georgian village: USAID overstates the success of democratization in Georgia to maintain federal appropriations levels; USAID-funded organizations overstate their successes to USAID; and local NGOs overstate their successes to their international NGO partners.” (King 2001: 103)

The bias leads either towards positive self-evaluation, on which further funding also depends, or towards positive evaluation of the constituent, due to dependency of future evaluation contracts. The impact of external democracy promotion on democratization has been measured on several levels focusing on the following factors:

(1) Strategies of Donors
   (a) Financial investment
   (b) Conditionality
   (c) Strategies and instruments
   (d) Sequencing of democracy promotion

(2) Intervening Factors of External Democracy Promotion
   (a) Domestic and international context
   (b) Goal conflicts and side-effects
   (c) Donor cooperation and coordination

These dimensions and their respective effects are discussed in following paragraphs:

(1) Strategies of Donors
   (a) Financial investment
   Around the world, each year billions of Dollars and Euros are spent on external democracy promotion. In the US,
   “funds for the development of democracy and good governance have risen from US$128 million in the 1990s to US$817 million in 2003”. (Morlino, Magen 2009b: xiv comp. also Beichelt 2012a)

   For 2008 alone then, the United States reported to have spent $2.25 billion on democratic assistance. The European Union through its EIDHR program invested €713.3 million between 2000 and 2006, while for 2006 and 2007 alone, four of the EU’s member states spent more than €400 million each. The United Nations’ UNDP alone spends $1.4 billion every year to promote democratization around the world. (Youngs 2008; Beichelt 2012a)

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74 For instance with regard to US assistance to Eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union Bunce, Wolchik 2006; Finkel et al. 2007; McFaul 2007.
Only a very small number of studies systematically assess the impact of democracy assistance: while Steele & Scott (2005) for instance examine a relatively small section of overall democracy assistance - the NEDs impact from 1990 to 1999 - Knack (2004) investigates the overall impact of external democracy promotion. However, he is criticized to not differentiate between the particular goals of certain programs, including checking whether or not they aim at democracy promotion. (Finkel et al. 2007: 408) Finkel et al. investigated how the money spent through USAID (Democracy and Governance) impacts Freedom House and Polity IV ratings. They detect a positive correlation between financial democracy assistance and democratization:

“(s)pecifically, the positive impact is such that $10 million of USAID DG funding would produce an increase of more than one-quarter of a point (.29 units) on the 13-point Freedom House democracy index in a given year— or about a five-fold increase in the amount of democratic change that the average country would be expected to achieve, *ceteris paribus*, in any given year.” (Finkel et al. 2008: 3)

On average USAID funding of $2.07 million p.a. over 14 years was found to double the democratization that would otherwise have occurred. While Finkel et al. only note that

“(t)he endogeneity of USAID DG assistance is perhaps the main counter-hypothesis to the overall findings.”

(Finkel et al. 2008: 3–4),

Knack (2004) warns that the overall interpretation of money means that democratization needs to be treated with caution. One possible interpretation would also be that increased stability, correlated with democratization, in fact causes increased democratization investment.

(b) Conditionality

Another strand of literature has focused on investigating the impact of the European Union’s democratization efforts, concentrating on the effects of democratization in states bordering the EU or on the EU’s closer neighborhood. They found that the best impact on democratization was achieved by conditionally – which showed the best effects when it offered a credible accession perspective for EU- and Nato-membership (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003), while cultural-religious elements strongly affected the impact of democracy promotion. (Schimmelfennig, Scholtz 2010) Conditionality, however, has its limits, particularly where EU-accession is not a viable option. (Dimitrova, Pridham 2004) Recent years have also shown that the effect of conditionality is stronger before, rather than after accession. (Cirtautas, Schimmelfennig 2010) In addition, in cases where accession loses some of its credibility, other cooperation actors can become increasingly attractive, such as Russia in several post-soviet states or Turkey in the Middle East and parts of the Western Balkans.

(c) Strategies and instruments

The numerous actors of external democracy promotion are very diverse: some actors have a reputation of being extremely bureaucratic, such as the EU institutions, others less so - such as the US-agencies and Scandinavian organizations. Most private foundations are as well said to be more flexible - possibly due to their increased freedom by not having to be accountable how taxpayers’ money is spent. Actors of external democracy promotion use different types of strategies in all types of thematic fields. (E.g. Beichelt 2010) Richter identifies four types of external democracy promoters actors (“Partner”, “Mahnner”, “Besserwisser”, “Versager”, approximately translated as “partners”, “admonisher”, “know-it-all”, “failure”), depending on their effectiveness to reach their goals and their problem-solving capacity, see the following figure:
Fig. 15: Ideal types of "effectiveness"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>problemsolving?</th>
<th>goal achievement?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>partners (effective)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>know-it-all (sub-effective)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Richter 2009a: 53

(d) Sequencing of democracy promotion

External democracy promotion is generally targeted at states that are not democratic or democratic only to a certain extent. While the installation of functioning institutions and state-building is an ongoing challenge, nation-building has proven particularly difficult in many post-communist/-socialist states. This is partially owed to the fact that politics and the economy have been ethnicized by groups competing for their ‘piece of the pie’ during the insecure times of transitional (political and financial) resource allocation. External democracy promotion consists of many different applied instruments and methods. Practitioners and researchers have examined at which stages what type of measures showed the most efficient and most effective results. According to Diamond, the following sequencing is most promising:

1. Financial support targeted at “pseudo-democracies” is only desirable when linked to conditionality regarding other goals of foreign politics (e.g. economic or security aspects), or, where a promising process of transition has been, or is likely to be, triggered.
2. Electoral democracies: The number of these formal democracies has significantly increased in the past few years. With regard to these, external democracy assistance has the potential to counter potential re-autocratization and to promote continued democratization. (Even though promoters need to be cautious as to how they proceed, see below.)
3. Liberal Democracies: These usually do not receive a lot of financial support by other states in order to democratize further. (1996, see also Sandschneider 2003: 19)

In more detail, according to Richter, actors of external democracy promotion can apply different types of strategies (operative, conditional-structural, or normative), that more or less show success at different stages of democratization. (2009a) Particularly in the context of democratic consolidation, it is crucial that the democratic formal institutions that previously were installed are deepened and most of all, that democratic values, norms, and behavior become ingrained and dominant. (Merkel 2000a) If successful, during democratic consolidation, democratic practices fill a democratic political culture in all spheres of life, such as elections, the government, civil society, etc. (Richter 2009a: 110) Supporting this is seen as the most important aspect that external democracy promoters can and ought to do at this point – strengthen democratization and avoid developments that lead to stagnation or even regime hybridity. Thus it is crucial at this point, that external actors increasingly and quickly hand over entirely official and ideological responsibilities to domestic actors, who then become the true determinants of the state. (Sandschneider 2003)

During democratic consolidation, Richter favors a mix of conditional-structural and of normative strategies, consisting of a mix of incentives and capacity building that most importantly over time can lead to a change in the cost-benefit calculation and preferences of domestic elites, leading to the “enculturalization” of democracy. Approaches entirely based on conditionality or incentives will probably not bring about the desired effect, as they usually do not lead to long-term changes in norms and values, particularly where domestic elites are very closely oriented towards external actors and accountability and wishes by the local population are secondary. The same applies when external actors are closely focused on controlling operative instruments of implementation – this usually leads domestic elites to being more accountable to external actors than to their own electors and does not aim at a change in attitude and norms. (Compare Richter 2009a: 109–112)
I would argue, however, despite years of practice and research in the field, there is currently much frustration about the current state of affairs and the lack of solutions, particularly with regard to hybrid regimes. Interestingly, while many states for years have been recipients of external democracy promotion many of these until today have not reached democratic consolidation. Rather, today, a large number of them can be described as ‘hybrid regimes’: no longer authoritarian but not yet democratically consolidated. (Polity IV 2011; Freedom House 2011) Furthermore, when trying to assess likely developments of current (potential) regime changes, e.g. in North African or Middle Eastern states, or in states that have been targets of external democracy assistance, and in addition to trying to determine the adequate measures by external democracy promotion, it is necessary to bear in mind that the democratization trajectory after the opening of an autocratic regime is all but definite. Many external democracy promoters argue that a strong focus on formal structures has given space to autocratic politicians or other actors that they have used to increase their power in undemocratic manners. (Chandler 1999)

(2) Positive and Negative Intervening Factors of External Democracy Promotion

While some critiques of democracy promotion may blame foreign interference per se to decrease local ownership and to be illegitimate, the majority of literature on democracy promotion believes in its good intentions that, nevertheless, frequently in its practical implementation fall short of their ideally possible results or even bring about unintended negative side effects:

“Thomas Carothers and his colleagues, in the most extensive body of evaluative work on the topic, suggest that democracy promotion can work when done well, although much of the time political blinders, misguided beliefs in the “inevitability” of democratic transitions, and a “one size fits all” mentality have undermined USAID’s effectiveness.” (Finkel et al. 2007: 407 see also Fukuyama 2006; Carothers 1999, 2004)

There are several challenges when measuring the impact of democracy promotion, as it is particularly difficult to find indicators for them and to factor out their influence. The following dimensions then need to be either isolated from the analysis or factored into it:

(a) Domestic and international context
(b) Goal conflicts and side-effects
(c) Donor cooperation and coordination

(a) Domestic and international context

Not surprisingly, the context that external democracy promotion aims at has a very important effect on the choice of instruments of democracy promotion, on how democracy promotion can be implemented, and on its effects. Jacoby for instance stresses how important the links are that international actors do or do not manage to establish with domestic actors – who can either be inspired from democracy promotion and its goals, or instead veto, or block external democracy promotion. (2006)

Finkel et al. (2007) focus more on the analytical level and on democratization per se and differentiate between a macro- and a micro-level of domestic and international factors, as the following table illustrates:
Tab. 8: Variables potentially affecting democratization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Analysis (Causal Mechanisms)</th>
<th>Domestic</th>
<th>International</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Macro (structural processes)</td>
<td>economic development</td>
<td>economic dependence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>class structures</td>
<td>free trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>social cleavages</td>
<td>colonial legacies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>economic performance</td>
<td>foreign development assistance (non-DC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micro (agency, values, and strategic incentives)</td>
<td>elite parties</td>
<td>diffusion of norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>individual values</td>
<td>pressure of international organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>social capital</td>
<td>DC elite to democratic agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>institutional design</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*DC: democracy and governance programs; non-DC: programs for agriculture and economic growth, education, the environment, health, humanitarian assistance, and so on.

Source: Finkel et al. 2007: 412

Grävingholt et al. (Grävingholt et al. 2009a), focusing on the perspective of external democracy promotion implementation, distinguish between tasks, challenges, and actors at different stages of the realization process of democracy promotion:

Fig. 16: Challenges to international democracy promotion policy

Grävingholt et al. add the following “ten recommendations for democracy promotion”:

1. **Investment in knowledge**: Democracy promotion policies require (more) reliable knowledge of what triggers or prevents democratisation and how such processes evolve.
2. **Addressing conflicting policy goals**: Democracy promotion is not always the most urgent task, but when it is, other policy goals must be subordinated to it; otherwise, success is unlikely.
3. **Credibility**: Democracy promotion requires that donor countries pursue consistent foreign policies towards target countries and set a good example by acting democratically themselves.
4. **Knowledge of context**: Knowledge or ignorance of the local balance of power and of informal rules and processes determines the success of an intervention as early as the planning stage.
5. **Consistency of strategy**: Democratisation is a long-term, macro-systemic and non-linear process – interventions must be planned according to their overall effects.
6. **Selection of partners**: “Change agents” and actors who contribute to either the establishment or the erosion of a democratic order vary with the situation in individual countries.
Chapter 2: Civil Society and External Democracy Promotion: Democratic Consolidation in Ethno-Nationally Divided States

7. **Timing of intervention**: Opportunities for political transformation change over time. It is essential to be able to react quickly to changed circumstances.

8. **Adequate sequencing**: Human rights, for example, are a priority, whereas free elections often bring decisive progress only at a later stage.

9. **Internal and external coordination**: If incentives for democratisation are to be effective, synergies must be exploited and counterproductive effects avoided, whether they emanate from other policy areas or other international actors.

10. **Evaluation**: Rather than considering project output, evaluation should be undertaken from macro-systemic perspectives and assess the coherence and significance of overall policy input while identifying any meaningful structural changes in the target country’s political system.” (2009b: 4)

(b) **Goal conflicts and side effects**

Another challenge that democracy promoters face is, that most programs that are implemented do not unfold their effects on a “tabula rasa” – rather, they interact with other, or block other, policy fields. Furthermore, they may even affect or be linked to other spheres of socio-political life that were not targeted. The main choices or rather dilemmas that external democracy then faces usually are:

1. democracy vs. stability
2. democracy vs. governance:
3. democracy vs. majority. (Spanger, Wolff 2007)

(c) **Donor cooperation and coordination**

Finally, one field frequently mentioned as crucial is the extent to which external democracy promoters achieve or fail to coordinate their activities towards one or several common goals. Thus, they avoid being outplayed against each other by other international or by domestic actors, they avoid wasting money for reproducing or double funding the same (ineffective) activities, and so forth. In an encompassing analysis of donor cooperation among international organizations in the Western Balkans, Caruso identified the following need for improvement:

1. Improving the exchange of personnel,
2. Improving communication among the actors,
3. Providing for the effective transition of authority,
4. Improving training,
5. Refining the doctrine,
6. Ensuring realistic funding,
7. Ensuring partnership with the local population.” (Caruso 2007: 182–183)

2.8.4 **External Democracy Promotion in Divided Societies: Short-Term vs. Long-Term Effects**

One critical remark international interventions frequently are faced with is that they have accidentally or deliberately contributed to perpetuating ethnic mobilization. They are blamed in order to account for underperformance in previously expected democratization processes. (See exemplary Chandler 1999) Many times, the international community is blamed that it focuses too much on technical aspects and continuously underestimates the necessity to support substantial changes in the functional logic at the level of personal interaction, which is the precondition for the democratic functioning of the structures implemented.75

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Also, as ethno-national mobilization has been on the rise since the late 1980s, mistrust of “others” has grown, resulting in a large part of the links of the social fabric being destroyed.\(^{76}\) So if the development of an ‘ethnocracy’ (Sugar 1995: 174–175) is to be avoided – or reversed – one needs to consider that formal democratically functioning institutions (democracy as ‘one man one vote’) probably do not meet the above requirements and could actually serve to strengthen ethnicity as an omnipresent marker. (Mullerson 1993: 801)

Especially in states where the ‘nation’ is an object of competition between different interest groups and where the question of ‘who belongs to the nation’ has not been adequately solved, the stabilizing and ordering function of nation-building happens under the assumption that it can prevent crises and reduce inter-ethnic violence. Several authors continue to stress the importance of both, “nation-building” and “state-building”\(^{77}\). (Comp. Offe 2000: 10; Francis 1965; Lepsius 1986) While state-building frequently involves mostly formal reforms, nation-building and its external support have proven very complex: in political reality, the alternative to nation-building in many cases is not necessarily its absence but rather a competing model. Similarly, external attempts at nation-building often conflict with internal variants rather than with a situation of fragmentation, disintegration or a lack of rule of law or government. One should not overlook the fact that some violent conflicts result precisely from aggressive nation-building projects: ethnic expulsions and massacres are frequently intended precisely for the purpose of asserting a particular, ethnically “pure” version of a “nation” or breaking resistance against a nation-state government. Other violent conflicts stem from the contradictory nature of two (or more) competing nation-building projects: e.g. from a policy to maintain the “nation-state” in a multi-ethnic context, also by force is necessary, rivaling with one or more (ethnic) groups attempting to homogenize a nation or to gain independence of a new, separate states. (Hippler 2005b: 173) The international arena has become the new, even bigger stage, for more complex ethnically-framed interactions, discourses, dynamics of loyalty and competition.\(^{78}\)

Frequently during times of transition, the importance of the close and extended family as well of that of the kinship group, increases, when the (perceived) risk of unemployment, poverty, etc. grows. Contacts become an important source of access to employment and other resources. (Bjørnskov 2008) New constitutions, frequently negotiated with international actors, become a façade, as the rising level of informality undermines the credibility of equal access and democracy for all. (Bliesemann de Guevara, Kühn 2010: 168–176)

There are several cases in which international organizations have been dealing with ethno-nationalist phenomena for years, yet current research is only now beginning to systematically identify the mechanisms at work in the field of ethno-nationalist divisions.\(^{79}\) The central question that remains however is how to treat ethnicity in the context of external democracy promotion – which means that a choice needs to be made whether to favor and promote a) strategies that are based on ideas of consociationalism\(^{80}\), granting different ethnic groups collective rights to accessing power and other resources (based on Lijphart 1977 and later publications in this vein) or b) the establishment of ethnicity, as a basis for rights based on the idea that minority rights need to be protected. However, strong incentives for cooperation across ethnic cleavages in a polity need to be given in order to


\(^{77}\) ‘State-building’ can be defined as the “installation of institutional structures such as elections, constitutional reforms, etc. a functioning state-apparatus, an organized police and judicial system, an administrative system that is effective and accepted in the entire state, loyal personnel, that identifies with the “nation” – and the ability to exert its monopoly on the use of force on the whole state territory.” (Hippler 2002: 19), while ‘nation-building’ instead can be defined as “the measures taken by the state to unify and homogenize its diverse population under a commonly shared civic identity that prevails over ethnic, linguistic, religious or regional markers.” (Dave 2004: 123) and includes the creation of a ‘national identity’ as a ‘collective community of will’, etc. (Hopp, Kloeke-Lesch 2004: 197).

\(^{78}\) See further e.g. Brubaker 1996; Taras, Ganguly 2006; Kymlicka 2008; Saideman 2001; van Houten, Wolff 2008.


\(^{80}\) This includes different ideas of power-sharing, including territorial solutions, such as partition or decentralization and political representation, such as decentralization, quota, etc.
counter ongoing ethnic mobilization, as e.g. Horowitz suggests in his “integrative approach” (also referred to as ‘centripetalism’).\(^{81}\) It seems so far that the practice of external democracy promotion is still at the stage of searching for lasting solutions to this question because, as Doyle & Sambanis point out (2000; 2006), violent conflict broke out again in more than half of the number of international interventions.

Concerning successful full democratic consolidation, it is important to not only reform state-structures but to transform the functional logic and substance of the previously formal and informal institutions (see exemplary (Hippler 2004; Mungiu-Pippidi 2006), and to promote a “process of creation and integration that leads to shared attributes of identity, values and goals” (Hopp, Kloke-Lesch 2004: 197) in which a homogenous society, rather than the acceptance of a heterogeneity of answers and the facilitation of inclusion of diverse citizens, is most important. Ethnic fragmentation should thus be treated as a crucial factor when designing external democracy promotion programs including the role of civil society therein.

### 2.8.5 Points of Criticism of External Democracy Promotion

The last years have seen a growing skepticism concerning the likelihood of global democratization towards democratic consolidation itself. In parallel, critical remarks about the possible positive impact, or even worries about possible negative intended or unintended side-effects, of external democracy promotion have grown. These developments are closely linked to many empirical cases, among them Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, which after years of external democratization support and interventions, still have not achieved full democratic consolidation.\(^{82}\) These observations were paralleled with a trend in academic literature of a decline of generalized optimism (see e.g. Fukuyama 1989) in the mid-1990s. Today, one can find much, often openly expressed, skepticism about the possibility of supporting democratic development from the outside.\(^{83}\)

Increased empirical evidence of an increasing number of hybrid regimes and of “failed states” has caused a general doubt in transition optimism. During the “Arab spring” since early 2011, the first optimism of democratization was very quickly dampened by voices that were more cautious, basing their reserve on lessons of past (non-)democratization. In the growing bulk of literature, the following points make up for the major criticism of today’s practices of external democracy promotion:

1. Lacking benchmarks when to terminate External Democracy Promotion
2. Unclear legitimacy of External Democracy Promotion
3. Transfer of democratic structures and practices to other states
4. “Faking” of democracy
5. Neo-colonialist discourse

The main arguments with regard to these five points are discussed in more detail in the following paragraphs.

**Lacking Benchmarks when to Terminate External Democracy Promotion**

The fact that in most cases democracy is defined negatively by democratic deficits has been criticized to make it very easy to detect certain deficits that legitimize the need to some type of intervention or to apply conditionality based on certain further demands for improvement. (Chandler 1999: 35)

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\(^{82}\) See also O’Donnell 1996; Puhle 2005; Diamond 2002b, 2002a; Börzel, Buzogany 23-25.04.2009.

However, no real benchmarks are usually determined, as to when to terminate a certain “regulation.” (O'Donnell 1996: 164) During many international interventions and in international diplomacy, the criteria for when democracy can actually be seen as entirely consolidated often remain unclear. Increasingly, they are determined by detected persisting democratic deficits to which important decisions, such as the end of an intervention or membership to the EU or Nato, are tied, but which always continue to fall short of the ideal idea of democracy. (Chandler 1999: 35) This, in several states, for instance Turkey and the Western Balkans, has been cause of significant frustration.

Not only are the effects of external democracy promotion difficult to quantify. The recent years have seen an impressive increase in the monitoring and evaluation of projects run under the label external democracy assistance. However, until today, the actual impact of projects implemented is hard to assess. Most of the donors as well as the recipients use self-evaluation in order to assess the results of their work, making reliability questionable. (Sandschneider 2003: 42–44)

Unclear Legitimacy of External Democracy Promotion

According to The Economist’s Democracy Index, not only have external democracy promoters been learning in the decades of their activities. Also undemocratic and autocratic rulers that either remained or even re-increased autocratic governance over many of the target states of external democracy promotion:

“[a]utocrats have also learned how better to protect themselves; many of them preside over energy-rich states and have been strengthened by sustained high oil prices. A key factor is the delegitimation of much of the democracy-promotion agenda, which has been associated with military intervention and unpopular wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. A combination of double standards in foreign policy (autocrats can be good friends as well as foes) and growing infringements of civil liberties has led to charges of hypocrisy against Western states. Problems in the functioning of democracy in leading Western states diminish the scope for credible external democracy promotion.” (Economist Intelligence Unit 2011: 2)

In the tradition of post-colonial studies, external democracy promotion’s interference in state’s sovereignty, as well as their national and international fate, has seen significant criticism. (See exemplarily Knaus, Martin 2003.) International organizations (the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the United Nations Organizations, World Bank, the European Union, etc.) need to balance between the conflicting priorities of the primacy of national sovereignty (UN-Charta) and the ‘responsibility to protect’. (Chandler 1999) The practice of interventions for the sake of democratization has heatedly been criticized:

“two-thirds of the democracies existing in 1990 owed their origins to deliberate acts of imposition or intervention from without... It is not contiguity but the policy of a third power that explains the spread of democracy from one country to the next.” (Price 2003: 595)

Additionally, the democracy promoting actors or states are blamed to be driven by their own, egoistic purposes and to have “neo-colonial” ambitions, in which techniques used now have been changed from “the ultimate recourse of ‘shooting warfare’ to political, economic and psychological warfare.” (Cottam 1967: 20) Sometimes, the idea of promoting democracy abroad is also used to legitimize covert foreign political goals in the domestic arena (Cohn, Nojeim 1995: 474) or to create new markets and new dependencies. (Ottaway, Chung 1999: 109; Knaus, Martin 2003)

Transfer of Democratic Structures and Practices to Other States

Frequently, many practitioners complain that international organizations and their staff are worrying apprehensive: they lack information about the local norms, and gravely underestimate the cultural dimension, particularly how long it takes for persons in the local context to change their patterns of thought and behavior that had been shaped and practiced for long periods of time. (Sapsin Fine 1996: 573) Many times, the historical legacies of the post-socialist states (or so-called ‘socialist’ legacies) are blamed for various phenomena during the course of democratization – or non-democratization. In many post-communist states, the level of mistrust of authorities is still very high and the reluctance
for public political activity very low, as well as the will to actively engage in political matters, such as elections etc. (Sztompka 1996: 119; Howard 2003) This subjective mistrust is not only based on experience with former elites, but in many states, e.g. Russia, Macedonia, Afghanistan, etc. new elites give good reasons to remain distrustful of politicians and their doings, and to doubt that a person far removed from the circles of power has any impact on questions of political importance.

“Faking” of Democracy

Many states that have received substantial external democracy promotion, including several of the post-communist states (e.g. Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, etc.), that have been stagnating or sliding back in their democratic development (according to e.g. Freedom House) have evoked criticism about a lack of “translation” of Western democratic practices, as being

“copied and transplanted institutions that lack the moral and cultural infrastructure on which the ‘original’ can rely, are likely to yield very different and often counter-intentional results” (Sztompka 1996: 125, comp. Bliesemann de Guevara, Kühn 2010)

Some authors, as Jochen Hippler, put forward that the “formal” appearance of structures and dedication to democracy has become more important than the actual substance. (Hippler 1994: 11)

Marcin Król writes that those who saw the victory of liberal democracy internationally as straightforward were looking at the facade and not the real content:

“... many of the world’s new democracies are currently situated somewhere between real democracy and sham democracy. There is little doubt that if we restricted ourselves to the survey of institutional forms or democratic façades, we should perceive a still rising wave of democratization.” (1995: 37)

In many articles and books, however, it is not so much the ‘cunning states’ that are blamed for the “faking of democracy”. Frequently, the policies of foreign governments and international donors are blamed for the emergence of ‘democratic façades’. (Grävingholt et al. 2009c: 30; Bliesemann de Guevara, Kühn 2010; Chandler 1999; Saideman 1996) Held underlines that institutions do not suffice, and that

“a ‘will to democracy’ and a democratic culture are indispensable supporting conditions”. (1995: 158)

And Król warns that an active civil society crucial for democracy, as otherwise popular influence over politics is going to be limited to elections day. (1995). Bruce Parrot even expresses that without key components of civil society, such as CSOs, government structures that are formally democratic cannot be expected to operate in a fashion that is substantively democratic. (1997: 24) Diamond finally underlines the socializing aspect of civil society when he writes that civil society

“can be a crucial arena for the development of other democratic attributes [...]. These values become most stable when they emerge through experience, and organisational participation in civil society provides important practice in political advocacy and contestation.” (1994: 8)

Neo-Colonialist Discourse

It seems that many missions of external democracy promotion arrive with an attitude that, prior to their arrival, the states were backward and are waiting for “progress”, that is to resemble the models Westerners bring. Local historical structures are not taken into account or are looked down upon. (Bliesemann de Guevara, Kühn 2010: 152–153) The political and financial dominance of external actors frequently makes it difficult for domestic actors to come up with their own propositions and to defend them. (Lauth 2003) Of course, based on experience and pressing need, it seems international actors are increasingly taking these factors into account, which also is difficult, as there is no blueprint for this and the causes and effects are complex. Western authors, as Keitha Sapsin Fine states, have shown a “[...] patent inability of conventional instruments of western politics and legal systems to function effectively” (1996: 560) by frequently using an ethno-centric tone with groups in states, that do not
dispose of experience and tradition in participatory politics and democratic processes. (ibid: 560)
Interpretations by many Westerners of “a lack of capacity” of the “locals”, of “ingrained patterns of
thought, response, and behaviours” and other culturalist interpretations would often result in a feeling
of inferiority towards international actors and promote counter-reactions. (ibid: 566)

According to Hippler, the impression that “anyone, anywhere, could live democratically at all
times, if only the US showed them how”, often produced by external democracy promotion, may even
be dangerous to propagate democracy for others, as this could produce an illusion. (Hippler 1994) This
ideal picture of the results of external democracy promotion by Western actors stands in a puzzling
contradiction to the fact that the decline of Western democracies has been lamented since the early
1990s. (Allison 1994: 8) This is even more interesting as already since the early 2000s, doubts in the
transition paradigm have started to rise. (Compare e.g. Carothers 2002)

2.8.6 Measuring the Impact of External Democracy Promotion on Civil Society

In the context of the majority of donor programs, civil society is mentioned as an important factor for
political change and advocacy. Many times, however, the donors’ programs remain vague in how they
describe the actual functions and tasks of civil society. In practice, service delivery and advocacy work
are often mixed in the programs’ international donor support. (Paffenholz, Spurk 2006: 16) The World
Bank e.g. notes advocacy, monitoring and direct service delivery as the three main functions of civil
society. (2003: 3) For other donors, the functions are more intertwined, as e.g. service delivery
increases the legitimacy through contact with those represented. (Paffenholz, Spurk 2006: 10, comp.
also Blomberg 2012) A study on the impact of democracy promotion by USAID showed significant
impact of civil society promotion:

“Assistance for civil society programs exhibits both contemporaneous and lagged effects on the civil society
factor (...), the only [assistance to democracy and governance] variables that are significant, again indicating
that subsectoral obligations affect the intended democratic outcomes.” (Finkel et al. 2007: 433)

The connection between the two dimensions, civil society and external democracy promotion, so far
has not been systematically scrutinized. Moreover, assessments rarely differentiate between who in
fact is considered “civil society” – for instance, whether e.g. religious, ethnic groups or political parties
are included in the analysis and what their actual characteristics are - keeping in mind, that in
undemocratic contexts frequently the “dark sides” of civil society tend to be more prevalent than in
consolidated democracies. The few so far existing studies that assess the empirical contribution of civil
society to democratization investigate the impact of external support on civil society (e.g. Dvornik
2009; Freise 2004; Mendelson, Glenn 2000) – without assessing democratic spill-over, and most
publications in this context are very critical of the approaches (see exemplarily Belloni 2001; Belloni,
Hemmer 2010; Balkan Civil Development Network 2009; Dvornik 2009). The illustrated prevailing
shortcomings of research on the impact of external democracy promotion and civil society, very well,
are most likely owed to the fact that the actual factoring and research design for this are not easy to
establish and, as discussed above, identifying and isolating adequate factors represents a challenge –
that is tackled by the following empirical investigation.

External democracy promotion in general and of civil society in particular are two dimensions
whose qualities are difficult to isolate, to quantify, and to measure. Consequently, the direct impact of
external democracy promotion also is difficult to establish. As discussed above, democracy promotion
is implemented by many different actors, using a broad range of strategies and instruments aiming at
many fields, ranging from the political system to citizens’ participation. The Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Bank Institute, and other donors in recent years
have developed conceptual frameworks to study democratic quality and to

“assess democracy and governance, [create] guidelines for the identification of appropriate indicators and
more recently [how to create] handbooks containing indicators to assist managers in the selection of
indicators.” (Santiso 2001: 12)
Some authors warn, however, that quantitative measures hardly capture the multifaceted process of external democracy promotion and democratization:

“The international community’s ability to assess the nature of democracy and the quality of governance has tremendous policy consequences as aid policies gradually move towards more selective, performance-based approaches. A worrying phenomenon has been the tendency towards using and even abusing quantitative indicators and abstracts to evaluate the performance of external assistance to democracy and good governance. Substantial research and unreasonable resources are being devoted to the issue. This has led to a multitude of sometimes conflicting indicators of progress and performance.” (Santiso 2001: 12)

Instead, rather a context sensitive, not only quantitative, framework for the impact of democracy promotion is required as

“(t)he consequent overcrowding of objectives and requirements for development aid is increasingly overwhelming recipient countries that may crumble under a misuse or an abusive use of multiple conditionality. Democracy and good governance do not easily lend themselves to quantifiable indicators. Quantitative indicators must therefore be complemented by qualitative ones. More importantly, the manner in which these indicators are devised greatly influence their legitimacy and thus their operability. Little attention has been given, however, to the process by which an agreement could be reached on appropriate and legitimate indicators. Indeed, the process by which quantitative and qualitative indicators are identified, selected and defined is as important as the indicators themselves. This implies establishing a clear and agreed-upon framework to assess democratic governance (assessment criteria), measure progress in democratisation and good governance (performance indicators), and evaluate the impact of the interventions by the international community on these processes of change (evaluation criteria and impact indicators).” (Santiso 2001: 12–13)

Further, Burnell argues to examine in more detail the particular areas targeted by external democracy promotion and how they are affected:

“a more elaborate framework for examining aid’s political impact” which would “differentiate between such objects as the state, political society (including political parties), civil society, society more generally (social structure, norms and national identity), and economy. (2011: 27–28)

According to Burnell (2011: 31), the following four hypotheses summarize the current state of research on the main shortcomings of external democracy aid or assistance:

1. Aid has less overall political impact in large countries with relatively strong states than in small countries with weak states.
2. Aid impacts the state most strongly in the economically weaker and most financially dependent countries.
3. Aid’s capacity to contribute to redistributing power by way of reducing poverty is modest, except possibly in the very long term.
4. Aid can be an effective tool for nation-building but only under certain identifiable conditions whose presence should not be assumed.

Following, the dissertation discusses the current state of research on the possibility and usefulness of measuring democracy promotion and the factors held accountable in this context. The actual impact of external democracy promotion has been an issue of contested debate. Until the early 2000s, studies on the actual impact of democracy promotion were relatively scarce. The very diverse, and not always effective, results of external democracy promotion raised increasing questions about the effectiveness of spending millions of tax money every year. Consequently, recent years have seen increased research about the actual impact of democracy promotion:

“After more than a decade of democracy assistance, the need to measure the impact of external support to democratisation and good governance has become more urgent. In a period of decreasing aid commitments due to budget constraints and a changing international environment with less strategic considerations, the issue of the effectiveness of development aid to alleviate poverty and promote sustainable development is gaining acute significance.” (Santiso 2001: 12)
Early critiques of dominating democracy promotion practices have been Carothers (e.g. 1999) and Burnell (e.g. 2000b). As of today, systematic analyzes are rare and tend to ignore important theoretical foundations that could be imported from other research fields on effectiveness (Burnell 2011: 14–17): frequently, it is not clear, whether truly only effects of democracy promotion are measured, how factors are operationalized or weighted, or how and if other factors are not clearly singled out. (Compare also Schmitter, Brouwer 1999 and Richter 2009a) The questions remains: To what extent are the amount of funding or the way of funding and possibly personal relations of funders on site (including a possibly resulting bias), more important for the result of the assessment than the actual real contribution of civil society’s impact? How can one distinguish democracy promotion or particular sub-fields, such as the promotion of civil society, from overall international assistance? (Compare e.g. Carothers 2009)\(^{84}\) Knack reminds us that

> “obviously the fact that many aid recipients have become more democratic does not by itself imply cause and effect” (Knack 2004: 252)

Frequently, close correlations between economic assistance and the impact on democratic domestic processes complicate this further. Also, democracy promotion can strongly affect and change political processes. This, however, does not always have a positive effect for democracy, e.g. where the development of domestic economy may be difficult and e.g. privatization, theoretically more democratic, in practice may hamper overall democratization. Especially with regards to the non-technical goals (such as constitutional or administrative reforms, infrastructure, etc.), some of the most important goals (changes in values, attitudes and behavior) are frequently not directly visible or

> “intangible, indirect, and time-delayed, their greatest impact often being the transmission of ideas that will change people’s behavior.” (Carothers 1999: 341)

But, partly because of the difficulty to observe the core of democratic changes, partly because of democratic backslide or non-development, it has increasingly become controversial to what extent, and in what ways, the support by the international community is actually promoting development towards an independent and stable democratic state.\(^{85}\) Also, doubts have been raised over to what extent democracy promotion actually contributes to democratization. (Schimmelfennig 2007; Schimmelfennig, Scholtz 2008)

For research purposes, Burnell suggests to structure inquiries based on a differentiation between

(a) policies,
(b) institutions, and
(c) the political culture.

By doing so, external democracy promoters would gain important additional insight on the actual impact of democratization:

> “The effects on public policies might be the most immediately observable and easily measurable, but ultimately an impact on culture and institutions could be potentially more profound. The three variables are of course interdependent: policies might be impacted directly by aid and/or indirectly through aid’s effects on culture and institutions. In respect to policy it is important to distinguish between policy outputs and their outcomes: for example, it is well known that structural adjustment lending has levered economic policy changes in many countries but produced some adverse economic as well as social and political effects.” (2011: 27)

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\(^{84}\) For an extensive debate on the evaluation of external democracy promotion, see Burnell 2007.

\(^{85}\) See exemplary Solioz et al. 2004; Anderson 1999; Bliesemann de Guevara, Kühn 2010; Hughes 2009.
2.9 Chapter Summary and Research Implications

This chapter outlined the theoretical foundations for the research with regard to democratic consolidation and how civil society and external democracy promotion can and do contribute in this regard. The particular focus is set on transition and democratic consolidation – and on the increasing share of non-consolidated democracies which have stabilized as hybrid regimes over the course of the past decades. The chapter also examined the role of ethnicity during the processes of democratization – a highly relevant factor in a world in which over 80% of all states are poly-ethnic and the number of ethnically framed inter-state conflicts has been on the rise. Against this backdrop, the chapter highlighted that during transformation in ethnically heterogeneous states, democracy needs to be crucially thought of as based on more than only minimal, institutional criteria. Rather, procedural aspects are very important also in addition to the quality of their actual functioning.

Transition and democratic consolidation in ethnically diverse states, particularly in a context of ethnic ethno-national polarization or dominance, present a risk to peace and a challenge to achieving democratic consolidation. Particularly with regard to prevailing societal divisions, accepting the democratic “rules of the game” becomes a growing challenge regarding democratic consolidation – designing formal institutions can be a matter of more extensive debate, as questions of citizenship, the political system, possible reserved seats for minorities, questions of territorial self-determination, etc. all are connected to questions of group belonging or not belonging. Further, important institutionalized veto-powers for ethnic groups, or unconstitutional important veto-players, not to mention claims for territorial segregation, etc. can strongly question the integrity of the state.

Since the fall of the iron curtain, in the many liberalized post-communist/-socialist states, around the time of the break-up of the old regime, in many societies identity was framed predominantly as ethnic identity – and frequently linked to claims for access to resources (territory, self-determination, education, etc.). (As also during Communism/Socialism ethnic group belonging had determined access to territorial self-determination, language use, etc.). Until today, the resulting mobilization continues to strongly impact individual and collective identity and claims. Western states have been blamed to be partially responsible for this. In many states, ethnic mobilization continues to this day, for instance in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Uzbekistan, etc. Western states and international organizations are criticized since they lack experience and thus face severe limitations when it comes to knowledge transfer to post-socialist/communist states; since their context was so different – and supposedly much less problematic – they are unable to provide the proper and necessary knowledge. (Kymlicka 2008: 15) As Dowley & Silver warn

“[r]esearchers also need to be cautious about assuming that indicators that apply to the more homogeneous societies work just as well in ethnically plural societies. Social scientists do not yet understand well the conditions under which people’s sub-national loyalties are mutually exclusive with national and state identities. Our message is not that ethnically plural societies cannot democratise but that it is more difficult for them to do so if the majority ethnic groups are exclusive in their post-communist nation-building project, or if a past history of injustice against minority populations mobilises them during periods of uncertainty in a way that makes the national unity condition impossible to satisfy.” (2002: 525)

While Switzerland is often cited as a role model in dealing with ethnic diversity, examples such as Spain and Belgium raise doubt as to whether the West does not face its own questions of how to deal with ethnic diversity. Furthermore, this does not even touch on the increasingly pressing questions raised by the “new” diversity situation, as a consequence of increased globalization and mobility from the past sixty years. Thus, western states also face their own questions as to how to deal with ethnic and other types of social diversity, and the implications of applying a primordial or constructivist approach. As of today, many states have come up with different political institutions and practices that more or less take into account different ethnic distributions and demands. Probably a combination of transmitted views and more recently established political instruments offer the possibility – and tendency – that individuals and political actors can and are pushed to relating to ethnicity as an important category of identity and action. However, it seems that the degree to which ethnicity
Chapter 2: Civil Society and External Democracy Promotion: Democratic Consolidation in Ethno-Nationally Divided States

determines political and individual actions can be considered to be subject to change across individuals, groups, and over time.

Based on the different definitions and understandings of the concept of “civil society” today’s globalized and international context calls for a notion of “civil society” which does not focus on form but on function as this is closer to the actual procedural, finally decisive, dimension of democratization and consolidation. Furthermore, the chapter investigates the supposed “democratic spill-over potential” of civil society. Closely tied to this is a discussion of civil society’s “dark sides” and how this may hamper or even counter democratization by civil society, particularly in the context of divided societies. Finally, the chapter discusses how external democracy promotion has been promoting civil society, even if considerations of “uncivil society” have hampered enthusiasm in recent years. The chapter closes with a summary of the identified research gaps relevant to the following empirical investigation.

With regard to civil society the identified research gap mostly concerns the assumed democratic spill-over and the support thereof by external democracy promotion: While there has been some research on the strength of civil society (Heinrich 2010) or on civil society’s peace-building contributions (Paffenholz, Spurk 2006; Paffenholz 2009c, 2010), publications on the actual democratic contribution of civil society are rare, such as (Warren 2004 or Anheier 2004). Nevertheless, these two publications focus on very different levels of civil society – the quality or a broader analysis of civil society on different dimensions, respectively. What has not really been examined so far is to what extent theoretical models of civil society’s functions, developed in a democratic context, apply in non-consolidated contexts, and whether and how civil society can de facto contribute to democratic consolidation. This question arises particularly in the context in which a mirror of broader society, cannot always be assumed to function according to democratic rules, due to the fact it can foster, or at least struggle with, (potential) “dark sides”. With regards to democracy promotion, this entails the following question: what functions of civil society are more or less promising for civil society support and how and to what extent these interact with the overall democratization process.

For a certain period of time, the focus of transition research shifted from internal characteristics of the political system to the impact of external promotion and interventions on democratization. However, recently, it has shifted back more towards domestic factors for democratization. What has been lacking, however, is an in-depth analysis of the new field of interaction that arises in the interplay between both, external and domestic actors and factors. As this so far has been neglected, it is crucial for the understanding of the actual process and outcome for democratization, particular in cases where obstacles such as unfinished democratic structures, undemocratic practices, or destabilizing interest groups strongly hamper democratic consolidation. The empirical analysis will look into this field, particularly focusing on civil society which is increasingly becoming disenchanted and for which external support has been declining, but also civil society which has been facing recent bouts of encroachment by democratically non-consolidated regimes.

Further, this chapter provided an overview on the current research standards and measuring possibilities for democracy, its external promotion and the contribution of civil society in this context. The chapter discusses the chances and limits of currently existing assessment tools and indices that, until now, usually mainly focus either on democracy and its development or on the qualities of civil society. Yet, until today, existing measuring instruments fall short of both, clearly distinguishing and also of integrating the different levels of analysis, as well as of taking into account cross-national variation in form, function, and possible impact of civil society. Based on a combination of existing measuring instruments, the chapter concludes with providing a new assessment tool that integrates civil society’s qualities, functions, and context factors and allows for impact aspect of civil society’s democratic spill-over in the subsequent empirical investigation.

86 A volume, edited by Paffenholz 2010, investigates the role that civil society plays in the particular context of peace-building and she refers in her study to literature on the functions of civil society. The case studies of the volume, however, do not investigate the democratizing effect that civil society does or does not perform. The study presented in the book looks at peace-building processes in states after violent conflicts, but it does not provide analytical insight into the processes during advanced democratization processes in ethno-nationally divided society.
The research gaps identified in this chapter concern mainly that fact, that there are (a) many indices that measure democracy, however, their assessments of democracy may look into very different issues – and often neglect procedural aspects. (b) Civil society frequently is underlined as crucial for sustaining the procedural aspects of democracy, but only very rarely features in democracy indices. (c) Existing civil society assessment instruments aim at comparability for an international comparison of civil society, however, they frequently are biased towards Western models of civil society and its functions, and (d) frequently are more focused on theoretical forms and functions of civil society than on assessing the actual impact that civil society has on democracy, and (e) where this impact is taken into account, the actual connection between civil society, its direct impact and the connection to democratization are frequently intransparent or neglected. Finally, the nexus between the impact of general democracy promotion and of democracy promotion of civil society in particular have not been investigated as of now.
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH AND RESEARCH DESIGN

The today increasingly important dimension of the support of international organizations to CSOs and their ability to assume democratization functions has not yet been examined in a systematic manner across fields and different aggregate levels of data (of micro, meso-, or macro-phenomena). This research project uses the advantage of gaining new insight by combing approaches and methods mainly inspired by cultural studies leaning more towards ethnographic methods and by political science and international relations, focusing somewhat more on comparative methods and causal relations. The present chapter outlines how the current state-of-the-art and the concrete research question are ‘translated’ into a research design that allows for ‘causal inference’ (King et al. 1994) regarding the possibilities and limits of civil society’s democratic spill-over in ethno-nationally divided states and examines the complex connection of causal mechanisms\(^7\) at play in this context. The ‘research design’ is a plan that “guides the investigator in the process of collecting, analyzing, and interpreting observations” and that “allows the researcher to draw inferences concerning causal relations among the variables under investigation.” (Nachmias, Nachmias 1992: 77–78)

In order to both test and develop theory, the empirical investigation takes on an explorative approach. This chapter presents and discusses the methodological choices made and the application of the selected methods during the empirical investigation. For the sake of scientific quality, each step of the empirical research process is thoroughly planned so as to fit the theoretical foundations of this study and thus in the end provide reliable and valid results. Accordingly, underlying assumptions of each step will be discussed so that the proceeding is transparent and can be reproduced.

This chapter starts in section 3.1 by introducing the methodological approach for the empirical investigation. The method of choice, a dynamic comparison of two most-similar cases, is discussed and the two selected cases and the reasons for their choice are explained. Section 3.2 presents the methodology applied for the investigation which relies on a triangulation of (a) semi-structured interviews and (b) document analysis, contrasting all data against (c) theory analysis. Crucial points for the data selection, availability and collection are highlighted and discussed. Drawing on existing civil society assessment instruments, the section further develops and offers an instrument for the classification of civil society’s activities to the different theoretically assumed democratizing functions of civil society. It also allows conceptualizing a contrast between civil society’s democratic contributions on the one hand and the democratic contribution of the support of international organizations to civil society activities on the other. The instrument later both serves as a matrix for the analysis and interpretation of the collected data, and is at the same time tested and developed for a broader application. Then, possibilities to characterize civil society and, based on this, how to assess civil society’s possible contribution

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\(^7\) Even though widely used in scientific research, the meaning of the term ‘mechanism’ is not as clear as its frequent use may suggest. John Gerring gives a minimalist definition of the term stating the “core meaning of ‘mechanism’ [as] a causal path way or process leading from \(X_1\) to \(Y\)” and who adds that this understanding – “functions nicely as a general definition of the term in methodological contexts across the social sciences.” (2007b: 6) George & Benett hold an even more specific definition of ‘causal mechanisms’ that, in order to avoid misunderstanding, the author follows in her approach. George & Benett define a ‘causal mechanism’ as “ultimately unobservable physical, social, or psychological processes through which agents with causal capacities operate, but only in specific contexts or conditions, to transfer energy, information, or matter to other entities. In so doing, the causal agent changes the affected entity’s characteristics, capacities, or propensities in ways that persist until subsequent causal mechanisms act upon it. If we were able to measure changes in the entity acted upon after the intervention of the causal mechanisms and in temporal or spatial isolation from other mechanisms, then the causal mechanism may be said to have generated the observed change in the entity.” (2004: 137, for a critical discussion of the many interpretations of the term see Gerring 2007b.)
Chapter 3: Methodological Approach and Research Design

to different phases of democratic transition, notably democratic consolidation are presented in section 3.3. Section 3.4 closes with a discussion of the advantages and limits of the selected approaches used for the analysis and interpretation of the collected data.

3.1 Methodology: Causal Inference Based on Case-Studies

Scientific research offers a vast variety of different methods for different purposes. These are usually divided into ‘quantitative’ and ‘qualitative’ methods (see table below):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>qualitative research</th>
<th>quantitative research</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- wants to understand complex social circumstances</td>
<td>- wants to explain complex social circumstances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- reconstructs subjective patterns of interpretation</td>
<td>- provides ‘objective’ definitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- withholds its own preconceptions as long as possible understands interpretations and subjective perspectives</td>
<td>- tests previously formulated hypotheses (hypotheses-testing procedure)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- is designed according to the principle of ‘openness’ open questions, the answers are made up of texts</td>
<td>- measures frequencies and relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- small samples</td>
<td>- is designed according to the principle of ‘standardization’</td>
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Translated from Kruse 2008: 17

Quantitative methods are often very useful to test causal relationships and statistical relevance between variables. They, however, also have several shortcomings, particularly as they are much easier to apply to thoroughly researched fields than when it comes to developing theory related to phenomena which have not been extensively researched and for which the different variables remain difficult to isolate (Flick et al. 2008b: 25). This is the case for the particular interplay of elements under investigation in this study. Most of these elements, e.g. civil society’s theoretical contributions to democratic consolidation, ‘uncivil society’, etc., each have previously been researched separately or in pairs, but the particular interplay under investigation here has not been assessed systematically.

Qualitative approaches have the advantage of offering the possibility to explore complex phenomena that have not been extensively researched or for which causal mechanisms have not (yet) been isolated. When conducted in a scientifically sound manner, qualitative approaches also offer theoretical insight. A less structured research approach even allows the researcher to communicate with the field and his respondents and thus to develop and adapt his procedure during the process. (Comp. Kelle, Kluge 1999: 14)

This is why this dissertation takes on a qualitative, explorative approach. Based on the previously presented theoretical research gap the investigation uses a theoretically well-founded, systematic approach that allows for ‘causal inference’ to test the today existing theoretical assumptions and to further develop them.

Following, a brief summary of the practical implications of qualitative research is given: according to Flick et al. the practical approaches of qualitative research are shaped by the

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**Note:** The amount of literature on the advantages and disadvantages of the application of both quantitative and qualitative methods each have been extensively discussed. (See exemplarily Brady et al. 2004) This is why the author here refrains from an extensive discussion and only highlights the most important conclusions for the research endeavor.
following characteristics:

1. Methodological spectrum instead of a standard method
2. Appropriateness of methods for the subject matter
3. Oriented towards everyday life and/or everyday knowledge
4. Contextuality as guiding principle
5. Perspectives of the participants
6. Reflexivity of the researcher
7. Understanding as the principle of insight
8. Principle of openness
9. Case analysis as starting point
10. Construction of reality as basis
11. Qualitative research as text science

Frequently, adherents of quantitative methods have criticized qualitative methods for being “unscientific” or have degraded qualitative methods to be good enough only to generate theories for later testing with the use of quantitative methods, but not to test theories. (See e.g. King et al. 1994)⁸⁹

Recent years, however, have seen an increasing number of scientific publications, such as Brady et al. (2004) and Gerring (2007a), advocating that qualitative research, if conducted according to scientific standards, can just as well serve to produce reliable, valid, and also generalizable results and thus also qualitative methods allow to test and develop theory. For practical research processes, including the present study, this implies that the research process needs to consider basic quality criteria for scientific standards which, according to Kruse (2008: 17), apply to any empirical research and consist of the following four basic quality criteria: (a) systematic proceeding (“Systematik”), (b) transparency of the process of generating knowledge (“Nachvollziehbarkeit des Erkenntnisweges”), (c) methodological control (“methodische Kontrolle”), (d) critical reflexion (“kritische Reflexion”). Mayring (1999: 116, 119-122) specifies quality criteria that apply to qualitative research in particular and names the following six:

1. documentation of the proceeding (“Verfahrensdokumentation”),
2. argumentative safeguarding of interpretation (“Argumentative Interpretationsabsicherung”),
3. Adherence to rules (“Regelgeleitetheit”),
4. closeness to the object of study (“die Nähe zum Gegenstand”),
5. communicative validation (“kommunikative Validierung”),
6. triangulation (“Triangulation”).

The present study takes these quality criteria into account, discusses at each step the role they play and illustrates how they are considered.

### 3.1.1 Case Studies as the Research Strategy of Choice

There is a plethora of qualitative methods this study could choose from. The challenge is to find the methods and instruments best suited to tackle the particular research question and subject under investigation. Yin (2003a) gives an overview on the different research strategies, the nature of research questions they are best at answering and also assesses the control of events

⁸⁹ Even though the paradigmatic divide seems to experience waves of increasing and decreasing changing popularity to grow and decrease over the past decades, see exemplarily Denzin 2010.
and focus on contemporary events (with the latter two both significantly increasing the complexity for the research process) (see the following table):

**Tab. 10: Methods according to research questions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Form of Research Question</th>
<th>Requires Control of Behavioral Events?</th>
<th>Focuses on Contemporary Events?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experiment</td>
<td>how, why?</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey</td>
<td>who, what, where, how many, how much?</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archival Analysis</td>
<td>who, what, where, how many, how much?</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes/no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>how, why?</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case study</td>
<td>how, why?</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Yin 2003a: 4

Each of the five research strategies distinguished by Yin is best to investigate particular types of questions under investigation. Regarding the mechanisms under investigation for the present dissertation, this study aspires to say more about questions of “how” and “why” (see also Flick et al. 2008a; Gerring 2007a) with a focus on contemporary events in a context for which behavioral events are difficult to control. According to Yin, a specific strategy, in this case a ‘case study’, can have a distinct advantage “if a ‘how’ or ‘why’ question is being asked about a contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little or no control”. (2003a: 9)

Case studies are often identified as “plausibility probes,” “pilot studies,” “heuristic studies,” “exploratory” and “theory-building” exercises” (Gerring 2007a: 41) as they allow for in-depth investigation about whether and if so to what extent, how, and possibly why certain factors of a phenomenon affect each other. A case study is a comprehensive research strategy, defined by Yin as

“an empirical inquiry that (a) investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when (b) the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.”

Further, “(t)he case study inquiry (a) copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result, (b) relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result, (c) benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis”. (Yin 2003 #558: 13-14, cited in Kohlbacher 2006: 6)

As the name implies, the units of analysis of case studies are made up of ‘cases’. John Gerring defines a ‘case’ as

“a spatially delimited phenomenon (a unit) observed at a single point in time or over some period of time. It comprises the type of phenomenon that an inference attempts to explain.” (2007a: 19)

Investigating one or several cases, case studies help to identify causal mechanisms that “link factors to outcomes”. They further “serve to identify the conjunctural effects of factors that are not easily captured by statistical approaches, and they help in identifying missing factors.” (Zürcher 2007: 5)

Another argument in favor of case studies for the purpose of this investigation is that case studies “enjoy a natural advantage in research of an exploratory nature” (Gerring 2007a: 39). Case studies are not limited to exploratory research or to theory building. Further, case study research can reveal complex causal relationships and thus “parse out the independent causal effects of each factor (which may depend on their position in an extended causal chain)”. (Gerring 2007a: 61)

The research question for the present investigation inquires about contemporary events and due to the complexity of the field case studies spare the effort of having to
control for behavioral events. While case studies have often been criticized of providing only limited possibility for generalization, this is rooted in a misunderstanding and one can “avoid the problem of trying to generalize inductively from single cases by not confusing case inference with statistical inference. Case study reasoning should be seen as a strong form of hypothetico-deductive theorizing, not as a weak form of statistical inference. We do not infer things ‘from’ a case study; we impose a construction, a pattern on meaning, ‘onto’ the case”. (Ruddin 2006: 800)

Case studies even can capture reality in greater detail which allows analyzing a larger number of variables than other approaches. (Ruddin 2006: 801)

3.1.2 Securing Quality of Case Studies

As previously mentioned, in order to gain robust and valid results from using case studies, as from using any other method or strategy, it is crucial to respect certain scientific criteria during the research process. The most important quality criteria are the following points:

1. **Construct validity**: establishing correct operational measures for the concepts being studied,
2. **Internal validity (for explanatory or causal studies only, and not for descriptive or exploratory studies)**: establishing a causal relationship, whereby certain conditions are shown to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from spurious relationships,
3. **External validity**: establishing the domain to which a study’s findings can be generalized,
4. **Reliability**: demonstrating that the operations of the study – such as the data collection procedures – can be repeated, with the same results. (Yin 2003a: 19, 34, referring to Kidder, Judd 1986: 26–29, for a discussion of the four quality criteria see Yin 2003a: 33–39.)

These four criteria are usually fulfilled by using certain case study tactics at different stages of the research process as the following illustrates:

---

90 For more on case studies see exemplarily Gerring 2007a; George, Bennett 2004; Ragin 2004; Yin 2003a; Brady et al. 2004; McKeown 2004.

91 More specifically, Yin points out how validity is achieved: “1. Select the specific types of changes that are to be studied (and relate them to the original objectives of the study) and 2. demonstrate that the selected measures of these changes do indeed reflect the specific types of changes that have been selected.” (2003a: 35)
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Tab. 11: Case study tactics for good research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tests</th>
<th>Case Study Tactic</th>
<th>Phase of Research in Which Tactic Occurs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Construct validity</td>
<td>Use multiple sources of evidence</td>
<td>data collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establish chain of events</td>
<td>data collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Have key informants review draft case study report</td>
<td>data collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal validity</td>
<td>Do pattern-matching</td>
<td>data analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do explanation-building</td>
<td>data analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Address rival explanations</td>
<td>data analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Use logic models</td>
<td>data analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External validity</td>
<td>Use theory in single-case studies</td>
<td>research design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Use replication logic in multiple-case studies</td>
<td>research design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliability</td>
<td>Use case study protocol</td>
<td>data collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Develop case study database</td>
<td>data collection</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Yin 2003a: 34

Case studies are particular in that

“case studies, like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes. In this sense, the case study, like the experiment, does not represent a ‘sample’, and in doing a case study, your goals will be to expand and generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization).” (Yin 2003a: 10)

If a case study is conducted with the aim to go beyond descriptive or exploratory insight and to generate explanatory or causal findings, particular attention needs to be paid to the ‘internal validity’ of the case study and specific systematic criteria need to be applied during the selection and the analysis of the case(s). When practically preparing to apply the use of the case study strategy, the following components need to be clearly defined before and re-verified during the research process:

1. A study’s questions – “how”, “why”,
2. A study’s (theoretical) propositions – pointing attention, limiting scope, suggesting possible links between phenomena,
3. A study’s units of analysis – main units must be at the same level as the study questions & typically comparable to those previously studied, (which will be done in the remainder of this chapter)
4. Logic linking the data to the propositions – matching pieces of information to rival patterns that can be derived from the propositions,
5. Criteria for interpreting the findings – iteration between propositions and data, matching sufficiently contrasting rival patterns to data; there is no precise way of setting the criteria. (Yin 1994, 2003a: 21)

While the research question and theoretical propositions have already been defined in the two previous chapters, the remaining points 3 through 5 are developed in the remainder of this chapter.

3.1.3 Choosing the Case- Design for the Empirical Investigation

Generally, depending on the research interest, case studies are conducted concentrating on one single case or on a small number of several cases. Cross-case research, in contrast, usually uses observations across a larger number of cases, so they mostly look at different levels of analysis. (Gerring 2007a: 66) Gerring (2007a) compares the characteristics of a single-case study vs. a cross-case study, as illustrated in the table below.
Chapter 3: Methodological Approach and Research Design

Tab. 12: Case study and cross-case research design: considerations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affinity</th>
<th>Case Study</th>
<th>Cross-Case Study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Research goals</td>
<td>Generating</td>
<td>Testing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Hypothesis</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>External</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Validity</td>
<td>Mechanisms</td>
<td>Effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Causal insight</td>
<td>Deep</td>
<td>Broad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Scope of proposition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empirical factors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Population of cases</td>
<td>Heterogeneous</td>
<td>Homogeneous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Causal strength</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Useful variation</td>
<td>Rare</td>
<td>Common</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Data availability</td>
<td>Concentrated</td>
<td>Dispersed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional factors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Causal complexity</td>
<td>Indeterminate</td>
<td>Indeterminate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. State of the field</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gerring 2007a: 38

The contrast of both variants of case studies illustrates the best purposes each of the two is applied for: for research on fields that remain entirely obscure, a single-case design tends to be best, as criteria for choosing one or more cases for a comparison may be difficult to establish. When, however, research has already determined that a causal relationship between the different factors under scrutiny is present or highly likely, but knowledge about their interplay has not been established, i.e. hypotheses are supposed to be tested, a cross-case investigation is indicated. A study with a small number (small-n) of cases, however, allows for better insight into the details of causal mechanisms than a large-n study would (Gerring 2007a: 73), as it focuses on examining causal relationships based on internal rather than on external validity (Gerring 2007a: 43).

With regard to this present study, on the one hand research has so far not produced knowledge about the exact logic of the interplay of the factors, so the empirical investigation should be limited to a relatively small number of cases, which will allow gaining better knowledge of the processes at play. On the other hand, the theoretical foundations for the research provide enough evidence to use a comparative design of two or more cases and to concentrate on certain mechanisms, namely, democratization, ethno-national divisions and civil society’s democratic spill-over with the help of external democracy promotion. So, following, a small number of cases will be selected for a comparative design, with the aim that a theoretical research design of a small number of cases supports possible theoretical generalization of findings (Yin 2003a: 37) when

“a previously developed theory is used as a template with which to compare the empirical result of the case study. If two or more cases are shown to support the same theory, replication may be claimed. The empirical result may be considered yet more potent, if two or more cases support the same theory but do not support an equally plausible, rival theory.” (Yin 2003a: 32–33),

3.1.4 The Type of Case Study to be Conducted

The research interest is not entirely exploratory or hypothesis-generating - which would call for an ‘X’- or ‘Y-centered’ design. Instead, the endeavor aims to examine a particular causal relationship between a particular cause of an intervention (X: the previous occurrence of ethno-national war) with a particular outcome (Y: civil society’s contribution to democratic consolidation with the support of external democracy promotion. Accordingly, the cases need to be selected according to a hypothesis-testing research design. The present study calls for an
‘X₁/Y-centered’, hypothesis-testing approach (2007a: 72, 132) (see also the figure below), best conducted with a ‘most-similar analysis’. (Comp. Gerring 2007a: 71)\(^{92}\)

Fig. 17: Most similar analysis with two case types

![Fig. 17](image)

Source: Gerring 2007a: 132

Gerring notes that

“(t)he presumed causal relationship between X₁ and Y may be of any sort. X₁ may explain only a small amount of variation in Y. The X₁/Y relationship may be probabilistic. X₁ may refer either to a single variable or to a vector of causal factors. This vector may be an interrelationship (e.g., an interaction term). The only distinguishing feature of X₁/Y-centered analysis is that a specific causal factor(s), a specific outcome, and some pattern of association between the two are stipulated. Thus, X₁/Y-centered analysis presumes a particular hypothesis – a proposition. Y- or X-centered analysis, by contrast, is much more open-ended. Here, one is “soaking and poking” for causes or effects. (…)” (2007a: 72)

The X₁/Y-relationship can be investigated in several different ways. Criticizing Mill’s too fuzzy definition of “most-similar” case designs, Gerring identifies four main types of comparisons (2007a: 151–171, see next figure):

1. Dynamic comparison
2. Longitudinal comparison
3. Spatial comparison
4. Counterfactual comparison

\(^{92}\) Comparing x-/y-centered vs. X₁/Y-centered design, Gerring notes “In most circumstances, the researcher is well advised to strive for a more fully elaborated hypothesis, one that encompasses both sides of the causal equation. Y and X-centered analyses are problematic points of departure. They are hard to pin down precisely because one side of the causal equation is open-ended.” 2007a: 72
Fig. 18: An experimental template for case study research designs

![Experimental template for case study research designs](image)

The type of case comparison best suitable will allow to look at the particular effect of an intervention, in the particular case of this study “the scale of previous ethno-national conflict” on “civil society's contribution to democratic consolidation with the support of external democracy promotion”. According to Gerring’s classification this implies a “dynamic comparison” design that in its ideal form comes closest to a classic experiment in which

“the key independent variable undergoes a manipulated change. One or more additional cases (the control group) (...) are not subject to treatment. Consequently, the analyst observes both temporal and spatial variation.” (Gerring 2007a: 157)

Applying the corresponding template for case selection, cases should be selected as presented in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tab. 13: Case selection design and criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>selected cases</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gerring 2007a: 155
As reality usually is very complex and made up of a multitude of factors, a cautious case selection remains crucial for a dynamic comparison and valuable theoretical insight. Case selection in a ‘real-world setting’ cannot provide experiment-like control of all possible context factors involved (for the X2-variables in the design). When a study investigates a phenomenon that has not be extensively researched,

“at that point there is no identifiable suspect and the crime itself may be difficult to discern. The fact that A, B, and C are present at the expected times and places (relative to some outcome of interest) is sufficient to establish them as independent variables. Proximal evidence is all that is required.” (Gerring 2007a: 41)

If certain factors, e.g. cultural heritage, can be assumed to be similar based on plausible explanations, these variables can be considered constant across the cases concerned and need not be measured. (Comp. Gerring 2007a: 133) However, reflection on possible cross-case similarities or differences is necessary and even very useful when selecting the cases and for the interpretation of the findings and their possible generalizability. (Gerring 2007a: 13)

3.1.5 The Case Selection: Civil Society’s Contribution to Democratic Consolidation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Macedonia

Once the research strategy has been selected, the next step when conducting a case study is identifying the cases to be examined. During the selection process the scientific selection criteria need to be taken into consideration, so that the cross-case comparison will allow for causal inference. Using the previously illustrated criteria for theory based case studies, this subsection discusses the selection criteria to identify the cases for the following empirical investigation. The theoretical foundations and current scientific state-of-the-art concerning the factors of the dynamic comparison to be conducted were presented in the theory chapter.

This subsection summarizes the most important points regarding the criteria applied to select a small number of cases that allow to investigate the effect of the intervention (X1=“previous occurrence of ethno-national war”) on the outcome (Y=‘civil society’s contribution to democratic consolidation with the support of external democracy promotion’). During the case selection, the relevant context factors (X2) present for each of both cases are critically discussed and taken into account with the aim of selecting most-similar cases.

Democratization or democratic consolidation are commonly measured and analyzed looking at the situation at the level of states. Further programs of external democracy promotion very often take a state-level approach. Therefore, the cases or units of investigation taken into consideration here, when investigating civil society’s contribution to democratic consolidation, will naturally consist of nation states. (Comp. Gerring 2007a: 19). The many existing democracy indices, such as Freedom House, Bertelsmann Transformation Index, Polity IV project, etc. also use this approach and publish their analyzes of democratization on the level of state units.

As the comparability of cases for the empirical investigation is crucial, it is important to identify cases that share the highest similarity with regard to prevailing context factors (X2). This can best be achieved by selecting cases that share and continue to experience mostly similar historical and political influences. A very good approach to guarantee this is to choose cases that are located in the same geo-political region. It is highly advisable to select a region in which the development and possibilities of civil society are comparable. Further, the cases should have received equally substantial efforts and comparable programs and instruments of external democracy promotion by a comparable set of actors with similar policies. A region in which

93 In this context John Gerring points to a well-conducted study by Svante Cornell on whether granted regional autonomy causes ethnic assimilation or increases demands for separation. 2007a: 158–159 referring to Cornell 2002.
states share very significant common cultural and political influences is post-communist/-socialist Europe, including the Soviet-Union’s successor states.

The post-communist/-socialist states share many essential features. All of them were shaped by rather similar societal and political concepts and ideas. They all have seen tremendous changes and transformational processes on all societal and political levels after the fall of the iron curtain. Many of them, albeit not all, have achieved significant democratization successes after 1990.

According to Howard’s 2003 study, civic activism in all of these states was very low before 1990 and ever since then has increased relatively slowly in comparison to other regions of the world. Since the fall of the iron curtain, owed to the post-cold war politics and the geopolitical vicinity to Western Europe, civil society and democratization in general have been targeted with very significant amounts of projects and funding for the support of civil society activities in all of these states. This was one of the reasons why, for many years, these factors were assumed to be highly conducive to fast and successful completion of democratic consolidation. Further important similarities among the states of the region include shared influences from in the spheres of politics, economy, society and their transition after 1990, as “[c]ountries of the region share a common history of Leninist political regimes and command economies, and they underwent regime change virtually at the same time”. (Fish 2005: 11)

Further, despite admitted variance, the states as a region share a “specific societal and political order”, shaped by the history of socialism, its crisis and the consequences, as Dieter Segert points out. (2008: 12) Several other renowned studies support this approach, which provides sufficient arguments to limit the case selection to the post-communist states instead of starting with a global investigation. (Fish 1995, 1995; Howard 2003; Mungiu-Pippidi 2006)

Another crucial consideration for the case selection concerning the later generalizability of the findings is the question “What is the case a case of?” (Ragin et al. 1992) As this study focuses on civil society’s contribution to democratic consolidation it is a crucial prerequisite that the units, i.e. states, selected as cases are on the one hand classified as states of advanced democratization so that the system is open enough for civil society to have an impact, but that the states on the other hand have not yet fully completed democratic consolidation, so that civil society’s contribution during the particular phase before achieving democratic consolidation can be examined.

Several established indices provide classifications of democratization of states, e.g. Freedom House, the BTI, etc. may not provide “fully objective” assessment of the situation. Still, they all provide a good idea of the situation, as they all consist of a number of indicators that assess different fields of state developments (electoral process, democratic governance, civil society, etc.) For now, data from the BTI is used to identify the cases - the Polity IV index ratings are too complicated to use for the case selection and the Freedom House index by its scaling has a relatively high tendency – higher than the (“stricter”) BTI to rate states as democracies: while a state needs a minimum of 8 out of 10 points (80%) to be assessed by the BTI as a “democracy in consolidation”, a state needs only a minimum of 2,99 out of 7 points (approximately 57%) to be assessed as a “consolidated democracy” by Freedom House.

The following table shows the BTI’s democracy ranking of the post-communist/-socialist states at the time of case selection and a few years before (from 2006-2010). Additional data for 2012 show that for no state in this classification the categorization changed since 2010.
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Tab. 14: Case selection based on the BTI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>BTI Democracy Status</th>
<th>Selection criteria for possible cases</th>
<th>Previous ethno-national war</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-10 Democracies in consolidation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>8.45</td>
<td>8.70</td>
<td>8.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>9.10</td>
<td>8.85</td>
<td>8.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>9.45</td>
<td>9.55</td>
<td>9.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>9.40</td>
<td>9.35</td>
<td>9.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>8.30</td>
<td>8.70</td>
<td>8.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>9.20</td>
<td>8.80</td>
<td>9.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>8.20</td>
<td>8.55</td>
<td>8.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>9.20</td>
<td>9.20</td>
<td>9.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>9.55</td>
<td>9.70</td>
<td>9.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-7.99 Defective Democracies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>7.25</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>7.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>6.85</td>
<td>6.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>6.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>7.55</td>
<td>7.75</td>
<td>7.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>5.40</td>
<td>6.85</td>
<td>6.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>7.40</td>
<td>7.85</td>
<td>7.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>7.40</td>
<td>7.75</td>
<td>8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>7.10</td>
<td>7.35</td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-5,99 Highly defective democracies/ moderate autocracies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>4.18</td>
<td>4.23</td>
<td>4.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>5.95</td>
<td>4.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>5.70</td>
<td>5.35</td>
<td>5.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-3,99 Hard-line autocracies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>3.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>3.93</td>
<td>4.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>3.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>2.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>2.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bertelsmann Transformations Index 2012

Of all ten states rated as ‘defective democracies’, five cases, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia, and Montenegro, qualify as possible cases: they are categorized as defective democracies for the entire period of time supported by sufficient data (as there is a lack thereof in the case of Kosovo). Two out of these five states, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Georgia, have experienced the intervention under investigation, i.e. X1=occurrence of previous ethno-national war. (For data on incidents of different types of political violence and conflicts, including ethno-national war, see Marshall 2012.)

When selecting if either Bosnia-Herzegovina or Georgia as a case will be paired with one control case or a small number of control cases, next, the context factors (X2) present in the
both states and the remaining respective control cases, Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro, need to be taken into account so as to keep context factors for the comparison as constant as possible. In the bulk of scientific literature the following context factors are considered as the most influential, and thus the following selection process will be based on the following criteria:

- (a) Largely similar historical influences,
- (b) Similar political culture,
- (c) Economic factors (GDP, labor market, etc.),
- (d) Similar influences, actors, incentives (e.g. EU-accession), etc.
- (e) Potential spill-over of norms and values from neighboring states,
- (f) Incentives by (potential) membership in important international organizations,
- (g) Ethnic heterogeneity /fragmentation,
- (h) Situation and possibilities of civil society,
- (i) Situation of external democracy promotion – EU and/or other IOs.

Despite the many common features that post-communist/-socialist states share, there is some regional variance, which is why states from the same region, prior to and after 1990 share closer commonalities than states located in different regions. Consequently, Georgia (as a post-soviet) and Albania (previously not a part of Yugoslavia, thus the most different from the other three states) are singled out. This leaves Macedonia and Montenegro as remaining potential control cases. Montenegro is the youngest, and by far the smallest state in comparison to Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Since independence in 2006 Montenegro’s democratization process and tied to this its Euro-Atlantic integration have been relatively fast. Montenegro’s political system does not, unlike that of Bosnia-Herzegovina, comprise power-sharing arrangements based on ethnic quota, while Macedonia’s does. Further, Macedonia, like Bosnia-Herzegovina, has seen and until today continues to see important presence and support of the international community, also in the area of civil society promotion. On these grounds, having confirmed all criteria that make them a plausible pair of cases for a dynamic case study, Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) and the Republic of Macedonia (MK) are selected as the two cases for the empirical in depth investigation:

Tab. 15: Illustration of case selected for the case studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>selected cases</th>
<th></th>
<th>t₁</th>
<th>t₂</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>civil society’s contribution to democratic consolidation with the support of external democracy promotion</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>previous occurrence of ethno-national war (yes)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X₁</td>
<td>context factors</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X₂</td>
<td>(political, societal, cultural, economic, regional spill-over, external democracy promotion, etc.)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Macedonia</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>civil society’s contribution to democratic consolidation with the support of external democracy promotion</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>previous occurrence of ethno-national war (no)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X₁</td>
<td>context factors</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X₂</td>
<td>(political, societal, cultural, economic, regional spill-over, external democracy promotion, etc.)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing these two cases offers the advantage that

“analytical conclusions independently arising from two cases, as with two experiments, will be more powerful than those coming from a single case (or single experiment) alone.” (Yin 2003a: 53)
If under the slightly varied circumstance of both cases common conclusions from both cases can be drawn, the results are more reliable and their external generalizability is highly increased. (See also Gerring 2007a: 41)

### 3.2 Triangulation of Data and Methods

This section develops and discusses how the data collection was planned and subsequently conducted. First, several important points to take into account are highlighted. Second, the choice of methods for the data collection and the planned proceeding for this purpose are illustrated. They are then contrasted with the actual process of data collection with this includes, such as the choice of sources, accessibility of data, selection of interview method, respondents, etc. In this context the advantages of triangulation for qualitative research processes are discussed.

#### 3.2.1 General Points to Consider for the Empirical Investigation

This subsection critically reflects important points that need to be considered during the planning phase of the investigation. This concerns questions with regard to research quality, but also considerations of practical, technical, and ethical nature. The first most important questions concern the choice of methods for data selection and analysis: they need to be selected so as to fit the research purpose and the type of question investigated. Accordingly, they need to sufficiently refer to the causal relation investigated but at the same time need to be open enough to allow for additional insight to fill the identified research gap. This implies that highly closed research methods, such as questionnaires with very limited choice of answers to choose from that are not open to new information by the respondents, can be ruled out from the beginning. Also, the final methodological choices and decisions made are discussed.

Next, the access to data and the feasibility of the data collection and planned analysis need to be taken into account, which includes a realistic planning of the time needed for field trips, of the possibility to identify and successfully interview a sufficient number of relevant respondents and how to conduct the subsequent data analysis. This step also includes realistically planning and preparing how possible interviews will be conducted and if necessary to acquire additional skills for this purpose. (Roulston et al. 2003)

In general, when researching in a different socio-cultural setting than that of one’s origin, researchers need to tackle a number of additional challenges. Concerning data interpretation, including that for the data triangulation, knowledge of the situational, of political and everyday-life context is crucial. Further, when researching in a context in which a foreign language is spoken and interacting with respondents in a non-native language, it is also very useful to have some understanding of both the social and political context, as well as the language spoken by the respondents. An advantage in this regard for this study is that prior to the research the author had obtained skills in the local languages and had spent time and worked several times in each state. Also, the author spent several extended periods of time in both countries for the data collection itself, which also allowed very valuable insight and context knowledge for the interview and analysis process.

Further, ethical questions need to be addressed and taken into account during the research process, and most importantly during the data collection process. Where data is collected in a process of interaction with persons, their possible concerns and needs during the research process, particularly during conversations, need to be taken into account, e.g. guaranteeing their anonymity in the way questions are asked, etc. and their dignity, concerns and social needs in the interaction process during the interview need to be considered with...
caution. As the interviews partially concern very personal views and opinions that most respondents very much cared about, talking at length about an analysis, that, at this point, does not give rise to particular optimism, at the end of several interviews the interviewer paid attention to have a post-interview conversation long enough for the respondent to deal with certain frustration and to establish a more positive atmosphere again.

For instance, where politically sensitive questions or confidential information about personal opinions are asked, the confidentiality and anonymity of the interview need to be assured and personal opinions, even when very different from those of the interviewer, credibly accepted and respected. (Compare Hopf 2008 on the principle of “do-no-harm” and other ethincal questions in qualitative research.) Respecting the “do-no-harm” principle in the case of this particular study included really guaranteeing anonymity and confidentiality. Both states are rather small and the particular research field of civil society and international organizations is extremely well networked. Information in it travels fast and especially CSOs are often financially dependent on “their” IOs.

3.2.2 A Brief Note on Triangulation

Because scientific research provides some, yet not sufficient, knowledge about the field under scrutiny in this investigation, collection of additional data is necessary in order to develop existing theory. While many researchers insist on method conservatism, recent years again have seen an increased openness to using ‘triangulation’ in order to best meet the needs that any individual research project may require. Particularly Norman Denzin’s writings have been very influential in establishing the triangulation approach. (See e.g. Denzin 1970; Denzin et al. 1994) ‘Triangulation’ or ‘cross-examination’ helps to improve the validity and thus the generalizability of results (Kohlbacher 2006: 26–27), with the specification that

“(t)riangulation (...) the combination of different methods (...) is less a strategy for validating results (...) than an alternative to validation which increases scope, depth and consistency [in methodological proceedings].” (Flick 1992: 227) cited in (Denzin 2010: 419)

Norman Denzin (1970) distinguished between four major types of triangulation:

(1) Data Triangulation (time, space, person)
(2) Method Triangulation (design, data collection)
(3) Investigator Triangulation
(4) Theory Triangulation

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94 Flick defines ‘triangulation’ as follows, underlining the possibilities the method offers to gain additional insight by combing different sources of data and of methodological approaches: “Triangulation beinhaltet die Einnahme unterschiedlicher Perspektiven auf einen untersuchten Gegenstand oder allgemeiner: bei der Beantwortung von Forschungsfragen. Diese Perspektiven können sich in unterschiedlichen Methoden, die angewandt werden und/oder unterschiedlichen gewählten theoretischen Zugängen konkretisieren, wobei beides wiederum miteinander in Zusammenhang steht bzw. verknüpft werden sollte. Weiterhin bezieht sie sich auf die Kombination unterschiedlicher Datensorten jeweils vor dem Hintergrund der auf die Daten jeweils eingenommenen theoretischen Perspektiven. Diese Perspektiven sollten soweit als möglich gleichberechtigt und gleichermaßen konsequent behandelt und umgesetzt werden. Durch die Triangulation (etwa verschiedener Methoden oder verschiedener Datensorten) sollte ein prinzipieller Erkenntniszuwachs möglich sein, dass also bspw. Erkenntnisse auf unterschiedlichen Ebenen gewonnen werden, die damit weiter reichen, als es mit einem Zugang möglich wäre.” (2008: 12)

95 While some authors distinguish between (a) triangulation, (b) mixed methods, and (c) methodological integration, this detailed distinction is not necessary in this context, so, for the sake of simplicity, the author here uses the term ‘triangulation’ as an umbrella term (for a discussion see exemplarily Kuckartz 2010).
Denzin further differentiated ‘within-method’ and ‘between methods’ triangulation. The present study relies on (1) ‘data triangulation’ both (a) ‘within-methods’, i.e. with data from interviews with different groups of respondents, and (b) ‘between methods’, i.e. drawing on different types of sources, such as interviews, background conversations, media, program documents, gray literature, etc. Even though triangulation has been heatedly debated, the combination and interpretation of different sources can provide useful additional information (for an overview on the debate see exemplarily Denzin 2010). Further, for the purpose of reducing large amount of qualitative data in order to arrive at generalizable results, secondly, (2) ‘method triangulation’ is used.

### 3.2.3 Sources for Data-Analysis and Triangulation and Access to Data

As additional data is required to allow for a dynamic comparison that provides new theoretical insight, the selection and the choice of the right sources and the right amount of data are crucial. Yin (2003a: 97–108) highlights three important principles regarding data collection that can increase the quality in case studies substantially:

1. **Principle 1**: Use multiple sources of evidence (from two or more sources) but converging on the same set of facts or findings.
2. **Principle 2**: Create a Case Study Database, a formal assembly of evidence distinct from the final case study report.
3. **Principle 3**: Maintain a Chain of Evidence (explicit links between the questions asked, the data collected, and the conclusions drawn).

Adhering to principle 1, the multiple sources used for the investigation consist of (1) semi-structured interviews, (2) document analysis, and (3) additional sources, e.g. background conversations, media sources, i.e. newspaper and TV-coverage, reports/program documents from CSOs and IOs in both states, statements/presentations at relevant conferences/workshops, etc. Regarding principle 2, a collection of all relevant data, including notes, reports, field research diary, etc. is created that allows to systematize and access all relevant data gathered during the course of the research process. Finally, as to principle 3, maintaining a chain of evidence, this aspect has already been taken into account since planning the design and illustrated during proceeding for this study and it will be continued including the following transparency of the collection and interpretation of data. Prior to data collection it is crucial to verify whether access to all sources targeted is realistic.\(^\text{96}\)

### 3.2.4 Problem-Centered Interviews: Methodology and Proceeding

For the present investigation the approach that appears most promising to obtain new data to reveal insight into the X1/Y-connection is to conduct interviews with persons who have particular insight into the field and yield information that can shed light on the mechanisms under investigation. There are many different types of interviews. They are usually categorized

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\(^{96}\) As an advantage, at the time of contacting interview respondents the author already disposed of many contacts in both case study states. Also, she had been following many of the sources on the internet, and, further, had used prior conference attendance and work contacts to establish an overview of relevant players and activities in both states. Colleagues and friends helped and advised about relevant players in both states and in several cases established contact with important later respondents. Concerning reports documents and additional sources from media, conferences, etc. many sources had already been collected from websites. CSOs and the main international organizations in both states publish regular articles, analysis, reports, etc. that the author has been following for several years via websites, newsletters or Facebook.
either by (a) their degree of high (e.g. standardized questionnaires) or low (e.g. biographic interviews) structuredness/standardization or (b) text-type/type of respondent (e.g. biographic interview, focused interview, expert interview, etc.). (Mey, Mruck 2007: 249–250) (For an overview of different interview methods see Mey, Mruck 2007: 256–257, annex G; and Kruse 2008: 52.)

At this study aspires to test and develop the theoretical debate under scrutiny, on the one hand, the interview type of choice should be sufficiently structured to refer to the underlying theoretical categories. On the other hand, in order to allow new insight into the interplay between the mechanisms under scrutiny, the interviews ought to be open enough to allow for the respondents to mention new issues and interpretations. Taking both into account, the best suitable interview method should be semi-structured by its nature: a highly structured and highly closed method (e.g. a quantitative questionnaire) does not offer the option that respondents mention new categories which they interviewer may not have taken into account previously (as they may not (yet) play a role in the theoretical debate). A highly open and highly unstructured method (e.g. a narrative interview) on the contrary would risk covering too large a field of debate that would make cases and content not comparable and thus not offer generalizability of the categories of analysis and further hamper testing of the relevant question.

A commonly used method to overcome this dilemma of being partially open and unstructured but also partially closed and structured has become the use of semi-structured, usually ‘guideline-based interviews’. Flick identifies five types of guideline-based interviews: (1) focus interview, (2) semi-standardized interview, (3) problem-centered interview, (4) expert interview, (5) ethnographic interview. (2006) Among these five types of interviews, the ‘problem-centered interview’ (PCI), by the proceeding applied, offers the best possibility to both test and develop theory: it is open enough to allow theory-development but also structured enough to allow for possible theory testing. PCIs were originally developed by Witzel. The aim was to design a method to tackle a large number of qualitative interviews which, nevertheless, would also offer comparability of the large amounts of qualitative generated data. (Witzel 1982, 1985, 2000). According to Kühn & Witzel PCIs are characterized by the following particularities:

“[t]he specification of the problem-centered interview (PCI) is that on the one hand pivotal interview subjects are interdisciplinary determined by the guideline. On the other hand, interviewees do have a maximum of creative freedom in working on these subjects. The interviewer, being ideally the researcher him-/herself, introduces the respondent to the subjects in question, focuses in the course of the conversation on a kind of self-organized communication process, and while doing so stimulates the subjective sight of the problem through maximum openness regarding sequence and context of the topics. ”Blind spots” in the communication process should be avoided by letting the respondents choose their own topics and thus enabling them to correct misunderstandings and allegations that may arise by the interviewer’s way to query. This means that there is no rigid pattern, the conversation however should be held in the respondent’s natural environment. It depends on his/her interest and linguistic competence, narrative or dialogue, how the interviewer adjusts according to the interviewee’s train of thought and the major theme of the interview.” (2000: 2)

The three most important characteristic of PCIs are that they are ‘problem-orientation’, ‘subject-orientation’, and ‘process-orientation’. (1982, see also Witzel 2000)97 PCIs are conducted using a theory-based interview guideline that is

“as much open and flexible as possible, and as much structured as necessary with regard to the research interest”. (Helfferich 2005b: 161)

PCIs often take a form that is more dialogical than that of other semi-structured interview forms, which it why it allows for more structuring. (Comp. Witzel 2000: 4) Accordingly, the role of the interviewer during PCIs, compared to narrative interviews for instance, allows her or him to take more initiative at an earlier stage and ask questions or ask for comments or evaluations, or to direct the interview towards a particular topic. The communicative situation during PCIs is

97 For an overview on ‘problem-centered interviews’ see exemplarily Witzel 2000.
usually more similar to a natural setting in their nature than more structured interview forms, which often makes it more comfortable for the respondents.

Frequently, the questions from the interview guideline more or less explicitly refer to “objective” theoretical foundations that the problem under investigation is based on, aiming at problem-oriented understanding. (Flick 2002: 165; Mey, Mruck 2007: 252–254) Usually, the interview guideline is not physically present during the interview situation and the interviewer follows the prepared content of the guideline in a manner that tries as much as possible to adapt to the train of thought of the respondent. The following paragraphs illustrate the proceeding for the preparation, conduction, and analysis of the PCIs.

### Interview Guideline and Interview Pre-Tests

This subsection presents how the interview guideline for the PCIs was developed and then verified during a pre-test to better meet the research purpose. Finally, very briefly the application of the guideline during the field research is discussed.

The interview guideline during PCIs mainly serves the purpose of offering opportunities for the respondent to share new insight into her or his structures of relevance and experiences while, by also delimiting the interview topic, providing at least some degree of comparability. (Comp. Mey, Mruck 2007: 261 and Schnell et al. 1999: 355) Before leaving for the field research, the interview guideline was developed based on the main research question and also with reference to the underlying main expectation of this study. Further, four essential criteria that the interview-guideline should fulfill that are named by Flick were taken into account: (1) non-influence (“Nichtbeeinflussung”), (2) specificity (“Spezifität”), (3) coverage of a broad spectrum (“Erfassung eines breiten Spektrums”), (4) deepness and personal frame of reference (“Tiefgründigkeit und personaler Bezugsrahmen”). (2002: 120 referring to Merton, Kendall 1979)

The interview guideline was drafted during a training-workshop on the preparation and conducting of interviews as a research method. During that workshop, the interviewer, together with four other researchers, developed and organized the most revealing fields of interest for the interviews, based on the ‘SPSS-method’98 developed by (Helfferich 2005a). This process included a brain-storming, and then the organizing and testing of the impulse questions and the corresponding keywords that were developed and combined into the final guideline. (Comp. Mey, Mruck 2007: 269–270)

The interview-guideline draft was tested during a pre-test conducted with altogether five persons, three from Bosnia-Herzegovina and two from Macedonia, who all attended a conference on civil society and international cooperation in the Western Balkans together with the author. The pre-test revealed the following necessary changes to the guideline:

1. The stimulus questions were changed to be even more open and so that the first stimulus motivates the respondent to cover as many of the topics under investigation as possible.
2. The pre-test confirmed that is was good to choose persons from different ethnic backgrounds and from different cities, so this point will be considered more attentively when the respondents are selected.
3. Conversations after the pre-test confirmed that a large number of interviews would be good so as to cover a large range of organizations and persons. Also, all respondents during the pre-tests referred to contemporary political issues. Accordingly, the author decided to plan several field trips to both states, to cover a larger number of respondents, to stay there for a certain period of time to be able to take details of political developments into account. Several field trips to both states allow to analyze the first rounds of interviews and to formulate preliminary interpretations that can be tested and complemented during the next stay.

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(4) Even though respondents during the pre-test interview usually were open and freely shared their opinions, this was slightly less so when it came to possibly criticizing one’s own work or achievements, or to openly criticizing the cooperation between CSOs and IOs (who often are their financial donors) or the situation in their home country in front of a foreigner. Accordingly, such questions were decided to be asked only at a later stage of each interview and to be treated with caution. Further, it was decided to evenly weigh the number of persons working for CSOs and for IOs, as this will allow not only the cross-country comparison, but also a within-case comparison on the basis of several sub-sets of within-case units of observation. (Comp. Gerring 2007a: 21)

The final interview guideline was structured as it has proven best for conducting the PCIs: the guideline consisted of (a) a short biographic information inquiry about the respondent that can be filled out at the beginning or the end of the interview, according to when it suits better the situation and (b) a small number of impulse questions or stimuli that each covers one of the most important aspects of the field under investigation. Each of the four impulse question/stimulus (‘Erzählauftforderung’) is completed with three corresponding groups of inquiry (1. thematic content, 2. questions to continue the information flow (‘Aufrechterhaltungsfragen’), and 3. concrete questions (‘konkrete Nachfragen’)) and the first impulse question also serves as an opening or “ice-breaking” question. (Compare Heffferich 2005a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a) Biographic information inquiry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Place:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization working for and position:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>b) opening question/stimulus I</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Can you please first of all tell me about what exactly you work on and what a regular working day of yours looks like?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>thematic content</th>
<th>continue information flow</th>
<th>concrete questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Background</td>
<td>• And what happened then?</td>
<td>• How did you become involved in that field?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Personal interest</td>
<td>• Can you please elaborate?</td>
<td>• What are important issues in your work?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Motivation</td>
<td>• What do you mean by ...?</td>
<td>• Who are important partners in your work?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Activities and focus</td>
<td>• Can you explain some more, how this works?</td>
<td>• What are important activities in your work?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Networks</td>
<td>• What do you think about ...?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Partners</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>stimulus II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Can you please share with me your personal opinion, what do you think about the development and the work of civil society in [name of the state]?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>thematic content</th>
<th>continue information flow</th>
<th>concrete questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Own background in CS/CSO/IO</td>
<td>• And what happened then?</td>
<td>• What are important context factors of CS?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Opinion on CS/CSOs/IOs</td>
<td>• Can you please elaborate?</td>
<td>• What do you think about the current situation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Development of CS</td>
<td>• What do you mean by ...?</td>
<td>• Reasons for current developments?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Nature of CS/CSO-sector</td>
<td>• Can you explain some more, how this works?</td>
<td>• Factors for democratization?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Context for CS</td>
<td>• What do you think about ...?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Concrete CS-activities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• About (ethnic and other) divisions between CSOs?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Networks/co-operations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Role of inter-ethnic divisions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 3: Methodological Approach and Research Design

stimulus III

I am very much interested in learning more about the cooperation between civil society and international organizations in [name of the state]. Can you, in your own words, please share with me your own personal opinions and personal practical experiences in this regard?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>thematic content</th>
<th>continue information flow</th>
<th>concrete questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Possible networks</td>
<td>• And what happened then?</td>
<td>• More on activities?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Possible network-divides</td>
<td>• Can you please elaborate?</td>
<td>• Aim of activities?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Biggest IOs</td>
<td>• What do you mean by ...?</td>
<td>• More on how activities influenced or not what they aimed at?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Biggest CSOs</td>
<td>• Can you explain some more, how this works?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• CS promotion by IOs</td>
<td>• What do you think about ...?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Conditions for cooperation IO-CSOs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

stimulus IV

What is your personal opinion, what have civil society and international organizations so far been doing in the promotion of democratization in [name of the state]? What is your personal judgment in that regard?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>thematic content</th>
<th>continue information flow</th>
<th>concrete questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• How can and/or do IOs support CS/CSOs?</td>
<td>• And what happened then?</td>
<td>• What do you think about the current situation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Concrete activities (contribution of CS/CSOs to democratic consolidation – or not)</td>
<td>• Can you please elaborate?</td>
<td>• Reasons for current developments?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Democratic consolidation in the state</td>
<td>• What do you mean by ...?</td>
<td>• Factors for democratization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Political developments</td>
<td>• Can you explain some more, how this works?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Context factors for democratic spill-over</td>
<td>• What do you think about ...?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The guideline is not designed to be used openly during the interview situation and the respondent is not informed about its existence. The pre-test showed that the more natural the interview setting, the easier it proved for the respondent to speak openly and without hesitation, even on politically or personally critical issues. The use of the interview guideline during the interviews themselves is described below.

The Sample of Interview Respondents

The next step in the preparation of the data collection consists in selecting the appropriate correspondents for the problem-centered interviews. The respondents best suitable have particular knowledge about the concrete working mechanisms of civil society and their different activities. Further, they have ideas about civil society’s possible contribution to democratic consolidation and how this has been and continues to be supported by international organizations. The situational and procedural knowledge of the respondents is of great interest for the investigation in order to understand more about the mechanisms under investigation.

The author decided to choose respondents working for established CSOs and the important international organizations working and present in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia respectively. The individuals to be interviewed in this study are seen as examples of their groups, thus not the cases themselves. (Gerring 2007a: 35) Based on previous stays in the region, on working and personal contacts, and on from extensive internet search, the author selected persons from (a) the most important civil society organizations and movements and (b) the most important international organizations are selected – so as to include “both sides of the story” concerning the support of international organizations to civil society’s democratization contribution. Contacts to experienced researchers and to persons from civil society organizations in both states helped to establish contacts during that process and positively
influenced the respondents’ motivation to take some of their time for the interview. Where larger organizations were of interest to be interviewed, it was attempted to talk to the particular CSO’s experts for democratization and international cooperation and to IO’s experts for civil society and democratization.

As described in the second chapter, with regard to the theoretical sampling of interview respondents, the sample-pool needs to be defined. It is not easy to clearly define how and to what extent civil society can and does actually contribute to democratic consolidation. So all CSOs from which respondents were chosen state that their activities contribute to democratization, or to the promotion of civil society that in turn contributes to democratization. The author decided to interview the most relevant actors from CSOs and IOs. In order to identify and reach persons from these organizations the author used the ‘snow-ball’ principle, which also strongly improved accessibility of these persons, many of them are very much involved in projects, networking, etc. Attendance of conferences or contacts and recommendations by previous respondents as gatekeepers also proved very successful – and increased the heterogeneity of different CSOs and IOs among the respondents.

At the end of each interview the interviewer inquired whether respondents knew any CSOs or IOs or persons working for either, whom it would be important to talk to and who would very much agree or disagree with what they as a respondent in the interview had just said. One approach was used in the beginning but soon dropped was to establish contact to CSOs through their partner IOs. On the few occasions this approach was applied, respondents from CSOs were very cautious to say anything critical that could get back to the IO – whom they, after all, depended on financially. Where IOs were contacted through their partner CSOs, however, this proved as unproblematic.

One advantage of this choice of respondents was that the author already had extensive experience with the history and the relevant actors and their activities in this field. Thus, it was easier to judge statements and their context. Further, most persons working in this context speak excellent English which made it easier for the author to conduct the interviews in English and thus avoid misunderstandings during the interpretation due to language barrier or lengthy translation processes.

As for both states, most of the largest CSOs and most important international organizations (only) are located in the capitals. In order to balance this and to have access to a more detailed picture of possible “uncivil” society and possible ethnic divisions in the cooperation among CSOs or between CSOs and IOs, the author decided to include respondents from the main cities of the most important other ethnic groups (for BiH: Mostar (Croat) and Banja Luka (Serbian) and for Macedonia: Tetovo (Albanian) in the sample. To have another opinion beside that of respondents from CSOs and IOs, who may have a certain bias towards their own work or that of their partner organization(s), the author decided to conduct additional interviews per state with experts who can provide a more distanced and analytical view on democracy promotion and civil society in the region.

Based on the above criteria, the following matrix shows the targeted number and distribution of interview respondents for the data collection:
In next subsection the actual number and distribution of respondents after having conducted the field research is illustrated and discussed. Possible changes regarding the plans made prior to the data collection and reasons for these are discussed and explained.

It needs to be added that the sample of interview respondents draws from a group of CSOs that are not representative of the entire civil society. However, for both states, all CSOs interviewed declare that they work to contribute to democratization. All CSOs and IOs interviewed cover most of the largest and by many respondents defined as the most relevant and also most influential organizations in their field. Accordingly, the information and recommendations from experts and other respondents may not have led to covering all relevant CSOs. These are also, due to their key position, very influential in coining discourse and trends. So, it can quite surely be assumed that the most important views have been taken into account. The benefits of the chosen research design by far outweigh possible other approaches that could have been chosen. The last chapter of the dissertation discusses possible generalizations and remaining or new questions for further investigation that have developed during the research process.

**Contacting the Interview Respondents**

The next important step in the preparation of the interviews is to contact the interview partners. This needs to be done with caution and potential respondents at best need to be motivated to take time off their working hours. Further, the field trips need to be planned so as to suggest and coordinate appointments. As certain times of the year because of holidays are not conducive to meetings many respondents, the field trips are planned and the prospective interview respondents are contacted for the following dates:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I</th>
<th>BiH:</th>
<th>Sarajevo:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 24 November to 1 December 2009</td>
<td>- 2 to 4 December 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 4 to 8 December 2009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Sarajevo:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 3 to 14 March 2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 20 to 23 March 2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Banja Luka:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 15 – 16 March 2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mostar:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 17 to 19 March 2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK:</td>
<td>Skopje:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 24 to 29 March</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 2 to 9 April 2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 12 to 19 October 2010</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 22 to 25 October</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 23 to 30 June 2011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tetovo:</td>
<td>- 29 March to 1 April</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 20 to 21 October 2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Tab. 16: Number and distribution of interview respondents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil society/ CSOs</th>
<th>Bosnia-Herzegovina</th>
<th>Macedonia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sarajevo/ Mostar/ Banja Luka</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Organizations</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>54</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
All interview respondents were contacted by e-mail. The e-mails included a very brief description of the research topic, so that the relevance of the person’s views became apparent but without revealing too much so that respondents would not be prejudiced before the meeting. In all cases, concerning a meeting place I offered to meet the respondents at their place of work if they wished (while asking for quiet atmosphere favorable for audio-recording) – which holds the advantage of providing additional insight into the working reality of correspondents. Almost potential all respondents answered quickly and were open to meeting the author – while in the end meetings with a small number of very suitable persons could not be arranged. In both states many of the respondents have met a large number of scientists researching on democratization. Thus, when establishing contact with the respondents, it proved successful to convince respondents of the author’s prior knowledge of the situation in the region and of the scientific quality and relevance of the research. Further, particularly in regard to contacting persons from international organizations, recommendations were helpful in order to arrange a meeting.

Concerning establishing contact with respondents from CSOs, it was important to convince them of the author’s independence and impartiality, as respondents were requested to speak about a topic that in some respect concerned their relation to their financial donors. To a surprisingly high extent, many CSO-respondents needed to be re-assured of the guaranteed anonymity of the interviews as they were afraid to critically assess their relation to donors and the work of donors/IOs in general. It is noteworthy at this point, that during the course of the data collection it became ever more apparent, that, with both states having not very large numbers of population and with extremely tightly knit social networks in field of cooperation between CSOs and IOs, usually information travels very fast. Accordingly, in order to speak openly, persons needed to be convinced that in this case information would remain between them and the author only.

Finally, contact was successfully established and interviews conducted with fifty-two persons, distributed as illustrated in the figure below. (For a complete list of CSOs and international organizations interviewed and talked to see annex H.)

![Fig. 19: Actual sample of interview respondents](image)

For a few organizations several persons were interviewed as they covered different fields of interest (e.g. one worked on democratization, one on civil society). Yet, with a few organizations that would have been good to be included in the sample, either contact could not be established or the person responsible for the relevant field was not able to meet during the time of the fieldtrips. Information about them from other actors and their website confirmed that these did not differ significantly from the interview statements by themselves. Thus the author assured that ‘theoretical saturation’ of the sample was achieved. (Compare exemplarily Glaser, Strauss 1998)

In addition to the persons with whom interviews were conducted and recorded, 60 background conversations were held. Several of these persons did not wish to be recorded.
Other persons chose to meet in their offices or at public places that did not offer the necessary audio-recording quality. Yet, the advantage turned out to be that the communicational setting was more “natural”, resulting in the interview persons to be less prone to give socially desirable answers, to do less censorship, to be less afraid of misuse of politically sensitive statements, etc. Further, in several cases, as when meeting with NGO activists, e.g. in their youth-clubs, several impressions of their interaction with their colleagues, target groups, etc. gave very interesting insight, which the author would otherwise not have had access to from a mere interview situation. The information from the background conversations was described in postscript and in the research diary. However, as, without transcripts, they could not be analyzed as those interviews that were transcribed, they are not counted as interviews proper but serve as valuable additional interpretational context for the collected data. Finally, the interviews were complemented with interviews with five experts who analyzed the current situation from their perspectives and gave useful background information regarding the interpretational contexts of both states.

**Conducting the Interviews**

To conduct the interviews, the author organized two long field-trips to each of both states, with one additional short stay in Macedonia. With respect to the possibility of data comparability, the field-trips were organized to all take place within a period of maximum six months per state (from December 2009 to April 2010 - one additional interview with an important CSO in Macedonia had to be conducted in June 2011). It proved useful that the author had previous experience in conducting interviews in ethnically divided, democratically not consolidated settings on politically sensitive topics. Skills from this facilitated conducting the interviews in general but also to establish trust and to address sensitively possibly delicate issues during the interviews.

Regarding the interview setting, the majority of the interviews were conducted in the office of the respondents, which contributed to a calm, trustful atmosphere the respondents felt at ease with. For all interviews, as planned, after a short introductory conversation, the main purpose of the research endeavor and of the interview was outlined and the proceeding for the interview was explained. The author gave only minimal information on the context of the research. In case of questions or interest in hearing more, the author kindly asked the respondent to wait for any further information until the discussion following the interview. Due to the somewhat unnatural, asymmetrical communicative situation during an interview, establishing trust between the interviewer and respondent is essential for the quality of the interview. For this it was favorable to meet at a place the respondents felt comfortable at and to start the interview with a short “warm-up” conversation, finally, most respondents had previous experience of giving interviews so they were familiar with the situation and with being recorded. (Mey, Mruck 2007: 258–260)

After possible questions on behalf of the respondent were answered and discussed, anonymity and strict confidentiality of the interview content were guaranteed. To several respondents this proved highly important, while many insisted that they were not afraid to openly state their opinions. Finally, the respondents were asked for their consent to have the interview recorded. They were also asked for their consent to use the data from the interviews for scientific purposes.\(^{99}\) In order to take away possible shyness from the recording, respondents were familiarized with it and a test was conducted together to lighten the atmosphere. The interview and also its recording started when the respondent felt comfortable.

As characteristic of PCIs, the interviews were structured from open to increasingly specific according to the following steps: (1) interview opening, (2) general exploration, (3)

\(^{99}\) After first considering a written agreement for using the interview data for research processes, which would have been advisable according to German standards, this idea had been abandoned during the pre-test, as it proved very formal and had a negative effect on establishing trust between the respondent and the interviewer.
specific exploration, (4) ad-hoc questions [1. Gesprächseröffnung, 2. Allgemeine Sondierung, 3. Spezifische Sondierung, 4. Ad-hoc Fragen]. (Comp. Witzel 1985, 2000; Mey, Mruck 2007) By providing thematic boundaries to the interviews the guideline increased the comparability of the high number of interviews. During the interviews, the prepared interview-guideline served as a line of orientation. Over the course of the data collection it proved that the more natural the interview setting and the more the author followed the line of thought of the respondent and order of addressing the related issues, avoiding “guideline bureaucracy” (Hopf 1978), the freer respondents spoke. In most cases, few questions for clarification or explanation after the first impulse question were necessary and yet usually most of the relevant fields were covered. Sometimes respondents were asked short questions to keep them talking. At the end of each interview, the author asked the respondents if they wanted to say anything else and if the interview had covered everything that was relevant in the field concerned, or whether the respondent wished to address any further issues or to add anything to the interview.

The duration of the fifty-two interviews varied between 30 and 120 minutes, with an overall average of about 60 minutes. Following the interview and after the audio-recording was stopped, respondents were asked for their feedback. In many cases, the conversations after the interview proper were highly interesting. Several respondents shared very interesting thoughts or questions they had about the matter only after the recording device had been switched off. Many interviewees emphasized some points regarding the topic in a less self-conscious way, thus making their position or some thoughts connected to them clear, once it was “off the record”. (Comp. Mey, Mruck 2007: 264)

Other respondents were very eager to hear more on the background of the research and on that basis, lively discussions arose during which several respondents further elaborated on their background, experiences and personal opinions. In some cases, respondents, mostly from CSOs as they were talking about their home country while many respondents from IOs came from other states, were rather frustrated after describing the (stagnating) democratization process in their home country and how years of, mostly also personal, effort had not contributed to much improvement. So it was important to deal with that frustration and to not finish the interview situation on such a negative note. Finally, the feedback helped the author to always further improve her interviewing skills.

Issues that were of particular methodological concern to take into account when conducting the interviews were, that for instance the author paid attention not to ask suggestive questions or cause socially desirable answers. Further, she adapted the formulation and words to the working and living reality of the respondents and avoided technical or theoretical terms, with the aim of not intimidating respondents or communicating (too) high expectations vis-à-vis their opinions so they could freely state as much of their personal views and explanations as possible. Also, with the aim of not interfering excessively into the train of thoughts of the respondents, the author kept to the low degree of structuring of the PCIs. (For more on different types of interview questions and on forms of questions that ought to be avoided during interviews see e.g. Kruse 2008: 67–70)

The main challenge and task of the interviewer during PCIs consisted in keeping up the flow of the interview. With rather discrete instruments, the interviewer needed to provide openness for the interviewer but also channel the interview so that the answers corresponded to the field of interests. (Comp. Lamnek 1993: 63) At times, when respondents mentioned interesting issues without further elaborating, were vague or refrained from explaining certain statements, it proved successful to further inquire for further details or explanations. This can

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100 The guideline was not physically present during the interview and the respondents were not informed about its existence. The interview guideline and its four impulse questions were freely applied. The impulse question’s purpose was to motivate the respondent to talk freely and to elicit as much information as possible, without the author asking further questions. Accordingly, the impulse questions were asked at a time so as to interrupt the natural flow of the interview the least possible. In many cases, respondents touched so closely upon the topics the stimulus questions referred to, that the author decided to rather continue directly with the corresponding inquiry on thematic content, continue information flow, and if necessary ask concrete questions.
not only help to gain important data, but it also establishes a positive interview setting as it gives respondents the feeling that the interviewer is truly interested in his views and opinions. (Witzel 1982: 94–95) However, here an interviewer needs to proceed carefully and balance between appearing qualified and informed and, on the other hand, genuinely interested in the views and realities of the particular respondent.

On rare occasions, when very general statements or unusual opinions or interpretations were expressed without further explanation, it proved best to ask a short, very informed question, which in most cases elicited a positive reaction and more detailed, and in some cases also more qualified, information. (Comp. e.g. Mey, Mruck 2007: 262) During several interviews, respondents told very biased summaries or interpretations of certain events. When the interviewer then confronted the respondent with concrete details and sometimes also “different views” (direct “corrections” on certain issues were avoided in order to avoid that respondents feel in danger of “losing face”), in all cases after that the result was that the respondents became more open and expressed their sympathy for someone who truly seemed to research the issue and not let himself be fobbed off with only part of the story by someone who surely knew more about it. In order to later be able to take into account impressions beyond the literal meaning of the interviews and also to later remember the conversations after the interview, for each interview a post-scriptum was written.

Overall, it was much easier to hear positive remarks from respondents about CSOs and IOs – nobody wished to talk bad about other organizations, sometimes openly stating that they preferred not to make enemies. Respondents were particularly reluctant to say anything negative about donors – sometimes explicitly saying that it was not a good thing to say bad things about “the hand that feeds you”. A few respondents from IOs in BiH were critical about certain CSOs, but in general, most respondents preferred to speak about positive examples and not to state any names when criticizing. Strikingly, only one respondent, an expert, but nobody, neither from CSO nor from an IO, explicitly criticized any particular CSOs during the interview recording – a few exceptions of references of not so positive experiences were made off the record in the following conversations. A previously planned case study of successful and non-successful CSOs and/or their projects thus had to be abandoned, as it was impossible to obtain sufficient information about non-success of organizations and projects.

**Interview Transcription**

In order to allow for qualified, scientific analysis of all fifty-two interviews, all of them were transcribed. The transcript offers the possibility to take into account the context of the words during the interpretation. (Mayring 1999: 69) All recordings in total made up approximately 60 hours of audio-data. Based on questions of time and work efficiency, the author decided to outsource the transcriptions. Further, having the transcriptions written by someone else than the author allowed that the author gain a distance from the interviews that helped to reduce possible bias for the later analysis (comp. Kruse 2008: 138). All interviews were transcribed by experienced interview transcribers, all familiar with international politics and the Western Balkans. All three used the freeware program “F4” for their work. All transcriptions were written strictly respecting anonymity and confidentiality of the data, for which the transcribers also signed an agreement of confidentiality prior to starting their work.

Concerning the rules and consistency of the transcriptions, several different systems have been developed. (See e.g. Kowal, O’Connell 2008: 438–439) For any particular research project the researcher decides with respect to the analysis what verbal or prosodic elements need to be included in the transcript. (Kruse 2008: 131 referring to Deppermann 2001: 47) However, for the purpose of this investigation for reasons of feasibility of the analysis of the very large amount of data it was decided to not concentrate on linguistic details and to use standard orthography. So the use of a very basic transcription system is sufficient. (See e.g. Kowal, O’Connell 2008 and Dittmar 2004)
Accordingly, all words spoken by interviewer and respondents were transcribed. On the level of prosodic and para-verbal utterances, transcribers only transcribed significant phenomena of long pauses (“-“), laughing (“laughs”), interruptions (“interruption”), broken-off words (“xxx-“), or overlaps of turn-taking (“.../...“). Even though for other purposes of qualitative interview analysis a more detailed transcription may have been useful, for purpose of this study the rules chosen for the subscriptions proved sufficient, as the later conducted qualitative content analysis is based on the literal content of statements made. The decision made to favor a broader analysis of a large number of interviews over a very deep analysis of a small number of interviews, served the aim of gaining more information and for allowing both a within-case (CSOs/IOs) and an across-case comparison (Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH)/Republic Macedonia (MK)).

All transcription together amounted to roughly 1000 DIN-A4 pages of transcribed text. The finalized transcriptions were checked by the author who complemented a few words or short sequences where transcribers were not able to understand certain words, mostly names of organizations or places.

3.2.5 Analyzing and Interpreting the Data

It is noteworthy at this point that the production of transcripts already represents the first step in the process of text interpretation. The transcripts themselves already are an act of interpretation as

“(t)ranscripts are not to be seen as data similar to survey data in a quantitative research project, since an interpretation of data in the form of word and sentences recorded is made by the researcher/assistants while transcribing: ‘[t]ranscripts are not copies or representations of some original reality, they are interpretative constructions that are useful tools for given purposes. Transcripts are decontextualised conversations, they are abstractions, as topographical maps are abstractions from the original landscape from which they are derived’.” (Fink 2000: 6 citing Kvale 1996: 165)

While the author aimed to stick closely to the literal text, in her interpretation she relies on her experience from conducting the interviews. This is why all transcripts were checked for their accuracy and consistency – once prior any next step, and again several times during the process of analyzing them.

The entire research process, from planning the data collection to the end of its interpretation, consists of a mutual exchange between material and theoretical preconception. (Schmidt 2008: 448) According to Yin there are three general analytic strategies for analyzing case study evidence: (1) Relying on theoretical propositions; (2) thinking about rival explanations; (3) developing a case description. (Yin 2003a: 111–115, and Kohlbacher 2006: 9) The present dissertation focuses on relying on theoretical propositions and this subsection presents and discusses the methods and instruments that were applied during the analysis of the data from interviews and documents.

Method: Constant Comparative Method

The overarching approach the author decided to apply to processing the data is the ‘constant comparative method’ (CCM), going back to Glaser & Strauss (Boeije 2002: 391, see further Glaser, Strauss 1967 and Glaser 1992). The goal of comparing here is

“to discern conceptual similarities, to refine the discriminative power of categories, and to discover patterns.” (Boeije 2002: 382–393)

101 For a critical discussion of the challenges caused by the interpretatory influence that the transcription process in itself presents for processing the data see also Tilley 2003.
Boeije summarizes the advantages of CCM as follows:

“Comparisons that are highly regarded increase the internal validity of the findings. One criterion for qualitative research is that the researcher tries to describe and conceptualise the variety that exists within the subject under study. Variation or range exists by the grace of comparison and looking for commonalities and differences in behaviour, reasons, attitudes, perspectives and so on. Finally, constant comparison is connected with external validity. When the sampling has been conducted well in a reasonably homogeneous sample, there is a solid basis for generalizing the concepts and the relations between them to units that were absent from the sample, but which represent the same phenomenon. The conceptual model can even be transferred to different substantial fields that show similarities with the original field.” (Boeije 2002: 393)

Five steps are crucial when proceeding according to CCM:

1. **“Internal” comparison of the interview text:** the content of each text separately is differentiated and coded into categories previously determined, or produces new, not yet established categories.

2. **Combination of codes into a typology:** this happens through a comparison between the texts of the same group (IOs/CSOs from BiH or MK) and from that combining all codes into an overall typology that can be applied to all texts of the same type (interview or document). This step often leads to significant restructuring, combination of previously distinct codes and also to building hierarchies of increasingly general codes and more specific sub-codes. To evade personal bias and to increase objective category building it is advisable to undertake this step of interpretation together with an “interpretation group” that discusses and develops criteria for categorization and coding.

3. **Comparison of interviews and their coded segments from the different groups:** the results for the coding from each group of texts (BiH CSOs vs. BiH IOs vs. MK CSOs vs. MK IOs) are compared. This step can serve to compare information and judgments, it can “complete the picture”, and it allows to validated, cross-check the coding and the information gained from the comparison and to possibly generalize from that.

4. **Paired comparison:** this allows comparing both perspectives on the topics/activities identified through the coding process, i.e. the comparison from the coded segments from (a) BiH CSOs vs. BiH IOs and (b) MK CSOs vs. MK IOs.

5. **Analysis of the results from both previous paired comparisons:** This means comparing (a) BiH CSOs/BiH IOs vs. (b) MK CSOs vs. MK IOs. This step helps to further conceptualize the issues under comparison and the criteria applied to their categorization and comparison. Further, it allows the validation and offers different perspectives or focus, particularly of the (possibly different) evaluation of and reasons for the impact of different activities, while taking into account the different contexts of both case-states. (See also annex I)

The specific proceeding and methods applied during each step of the described process are illustrated in the following subsections.

### 3.2.6 Qualitative Content Analysis: The Method, its Aims, and Proceeding

To analyze the large amount of qualitative data from different text sources, the method of qualitative content analysis (QCA) is selected. QCA as a method has become increasingly established in scientific research. While content analysis first developed as a quantitative method, since the 1950s qualitative content analysis has gained increasing popularity by not only stating content frequencies but by taking into account the context of texts. (Kohlbacher

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102 For an overview and illustration on this five-step proceeding, also based on the use of WinMAX, the predecessor of MAXQDA that was used for the present study see Boeije 2002.
2006: 11) Later, Mayring developed qualitative content analysis (QCA) for the analysis of a large number of guideline-based qualitative interviews. He defines qualitative content analysis as

"an approach of empirical, methodological controlled analysis of texts within their context of communication, following content analytical rules and step by step models, without rash quantification" (2000b: 2)

A strong advantage from a pragmatic point of view but also regarding quality is that, as the object of QCA can be any type of recorded text (interview transcripts, written documents, video recordings, etc.), for a comprehensive case study the same method can be applied to different types of evidence. This

"allows an investigator to address a broader range of historical, attitudinal, and behavioral issues." (Yin 2003b: 97–98)

QCA offers useful advantages as a research method for questions that call for a theory-guided systematic text-analysis that goes beyond

"explorative-interpretive interpretation of the material" (Kohlbacher 2006: 27), see also (Mayring 2002)

QCA further allows to systematically take into account theoretical categories and data from other sources, which can particularly improve the validity of the analysis. (Kohlbacher 2006: 25) Mayring (2000a: 3) puts forward four advantages that QCA preserves from quantitative content analysis while offering a more qualitative text interpretation:

1. **Fitting the material into a model of communication**: It should be determined on what part of the communication inferences shall be made, to aspects of the communicator (his experiences, opinions feelings), to the situation of text production, to the socio-cultural background, to the text itself or to the effect of the message.

2. **Rules of analysis**: The material is to be analyzed step by step, following rules of procedure, devising the material into content analytical units.

3. **Categories in the center of analysis**: The aspects of text interpretation, following the research questions, are put into categories, which were carefully founded and revised within the process of analysis (feedback loops).

4. **Criteria of reliability and validity**: The procedure has the pretension to be inter-subjectively comprehensible, to compare the results with other studies in the sense of triangulation and to carry out checks for reliability. To estimate the inter-coder reliability we use in qualitative content analysis (in contrary to quantitative content analysis) only trained members of the project team and we reduce the standard of coder agreement (COHENs Kappa over .7 would be sufficient).

Bryman defines QCA as

"[a]n approach to documents that emphasizes the role of the investigator in the construction of the meaning of and in texts. There is an emphasis on allowing categories to emerge out of data and on recognizing the significance for understanding the meaning of the context in which an item being analyzed (and the categories derived from it) appeared" (Bryman 2004: 542) cited in (Kohlbacher 2006: 12)

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103 Not to be confused with Qualitative Comparative Analysis (also abbreviated as ‘QCA’), a concept that goes back to Charles Ragin, see exemplarily Ragin 1987, 2000, 2004.

104 Cf. Kohlbacher 2006: 26, see also Mayring 2000a; see ibid. for a summary of the historical development of QCA. Further, QCA offers the advantage of combining both, openness and theory-based investigation. Gläser, Laudel 1999: 3.
For QCA, two approaches are central to developing a category system and finding the appropriate text components: inductive category development and deductive category application. (Mayring 2000b, comp. Kohlbacher 2006)

Fig. 20: Inductive vs. Deductive category application

![Diagram of inductive and deductive category application]

Source: Mayring 2000b

The following figure illustrates the basic proceeding of QCA and how its three core-components (1) summary, (2) explication, (3) structuring are applied during the process of analysis:

Fig. 21: Basic proceeding of qualitative content analysis

![Diagram of basic proceeding of qualitative content analysis]

Source: Kohlbacher 2006: 18, comp. also Gläser, Laudel 1999

Mayring (2003b) suggests more detailed steps for QCA: 1. Determination of the material; 2. analysis of the situation in which the text originated; 3. the formal characterization of the material; 4. determination of the direction of the analysis; 5. theoretically informed differentiation of questions to be answered; 6. selection of the analytical techniques (summary, explication, structuring); 7. definition of the unit of analysis; 8. analysis of the material (summary, explication, structuring); 9. interpretation. (Kohlbacher 2006: 18, with reference to Mayring 2000b: 42–99 and Titscher et al. 2000)

Kohlbacher summarizes the qualities of QCA and highlights that it

"is [the combination of openness and strict methodological control and the analysis of material in a step-by-step process] that fosters its strong ability to deal with complexity. Qualitative content analysis takes a holistic and comprehensive approach towards analyzing data material and thus achieves to (almost) completely grasp and cover the complexity of the social situations examined and social data material derived from them. At the same time, qualitative content analysis uses a rule-based and methodologically controlled approach in order to deal with the complexity and gradually..."
reduce it. The procedures of summary, explication and structuring step-by-step reduce complexity and filter out the main points of analysis in an iterative process. Therefore, qualitative content analysis perfectly fits the credo of case study research: helping to understand complex social phenomena." (2006: 24–25)

With regard to the planned triangulation, triangulation takes place on two levels when using QCA in case study research: the first is on the level of data triangulation and by integrating qualitative and quantitative steps of analysis. Further, at the level of method triangulation, QCA is not traditionally applied to case studies but can reveal valuable insight. (Kohlbacher 2006: 23)

In order to guarantee scientific quality, the core element of QCA is the coding of the material:

"The core and central tool of any content analysis is its system of categories: every unit of analysis must be coded, that is to say, allocated to one or more categories. Categories are understood as the more or less operational definitions of variables." (Titscher et al. 2000: 58)

Kohlbacher further specifies this point noting that

"not all units of analysis (depends on the sort of unit and the concrete technique) must be coded; and inductive categories are not operationalizations of variables; but it is true that the interpretative but rule guided process of assigning categories to text portions is crucial for qualitative content analysis." (2006: 15)

A detailed illustration of the process of categorization and coding is presented in the following subsection.

3.2.7 Categories for the Interview Analysis and Coding Guideline

This subsection presents the proceeding and the results of the category construction, the coding guideline constructed based on this, and the illustration of how the interviews were coded and interpreted. The results of that interpretation, including a descriptive overview and the analysis of the findings, are presented in chapters four, five, and six. Much attention was paid to taking theoretical foundations of the research into account when preparing and conducting the interviews. At the stage of data interpretation the previously developed logic needs to guide the analysis, and yet, provide enough openness to possible new categories and interpretations by the respondents can hold highly informative insight.

One of the biggest advantages of PCIs is that, when producing the interview text, respondents enjoy a significant degree of freedom to address topics not only in different contexts, but often also at several different times during the interview. While offering new angles and interpretations of the larger field under investigation (Kühn, Witzel 2000: 2–3), this also presents one of the biggest challenges for applying QCA to PCIs. Accordingly, classification with regard to theoretical categories is more complex than in less open interview types, which makes the process of analysis more complicated. Good analysis of case studies in general is based on the systematic analysis of fully transcribed interviews, methodological commenting, controlled interpretation and comparative systematization. (Mayring 1999; Flick et al. 2008a)

Thus particular attention needs to be paid to guaranteeing systematic proceeding during the process of coding and comparing, which helps to deal with the large amounts of qualitative data (Mayring 2003a).

Particularly during the process of coding, analyzing, and interpreting data, it is very important to critically reflect the impact that the researcher’s personal reality and categories have on the text interpretation process. Coding has even been called the “‘heart and soul’ of (whole) text analysis” (Kohlbacher 2006: 10, see also Ryan, Bernard 2000: 780) and is the “the process of transforming raw data into a standardized form”. (Babbie 2001: 309, comp. Kohlbacher 2006: 10)

For this study, the author decided, to evade bias or subjective coding as much as possible by involving an interpretive group in the course of developing the codes and the interpretation
of the interview segments (particularly with regard to the grading of how respondents personally assessed their and others’ activities and their impact). The triangulation of theory, interview data, and document data helps to develop appropriate coding categories and plausible assumptions about the generalizability and reliability of the findings of the investigation.

**QCA of PCIs using MAXQDA**

The complex process of systematically analyzing large amounts of qualitative data in recent years has become facilitated as an increasing number of computer software has been developed that can be used for QCA (e.g. MAXQDA (previously Winmax), ATLAS.ti, NVivo/NUDIST). Based on technical criteria and also personal methodological preferences, the author chose to conduct the QCA using MAXQDA (cf. Kuckartz 2005). MAXQDA can process different types of text sources, and also be used to code, compare and analyze the data, supporting all five steps of the CCM. This way, very large amounts of text can be more easily coded with the categories from the literature and new categories identified. The coded passages can later also be more easily retrieved according to the respective categories and connections between codes can be more easily detected. What is more, MAXQDA can process all four types of triangulation (data, investigator, theory, and methodological). Particularly for the last, the ‘methodological triangulation’, according to Kuckartz

> “This is the strongest argument for using the software. Qualitative and quantitative methods can be used to gather data (e.g. questionnaires, expert interview, documents, observation protocols etc.) and the data can be linked, coded and memos can be written and linked to all “objects”, wherever the user likes.” (2010: 6)

With MAXQDA it is possible to attribute in-vivo codes and also to attribute previously established categories (e.g. based on theory) to texts of any type that can be imported into a project. Text passages can be attributed to one or several coding categories. The codes themselves can be changed, divided into several sub-codes, or combined into new codes. For the analysis for each text but also for a number of texts or a text group, the frequency of coded segments for a certain code, combination of codes and all text passages attributed to a certain code can be retrieved. (Kuckartz 2005, 2010) These technical possibilities facilitate the analysis of text segments according to thematic categories/codes and to compare the information from the texts within and across different types of respondent groups (Hafeneger, Schönfelder 2011)

**Preparing the Data in MAXQDA**

As this study aims to develop theory, before the actual process of coding can begin, Kühn & Witzel suggest establishing a preliminary, provisional list of all possible codes in lose order that is taken into account when establishing the interview-guideline (2000). They draw on an idea by Miles & Huberman who note that

> “[o]ne method of creating codes—the one we prefer—is that of creating a provisional ‘starting list’ for codes prior to fieldwork. That list comes from the conceptual framework, list of research questions, hypotheses, problem areas, and/or key variables that the researcher brings to the study.” (Miles, Huberman 1994: 58, cited in Kühn, Witzel 2000: 10, 2000: 10)

Accordingly, a preliminary coding system is developed from the theoretical guiding assumptions of this research and established as a code tree in MAXQDA. (Compare Schmidt 2008; Kuckartz 2010) (For the preliminary code system see discussion next paragraph and annex J.) These theoretical assumptions are the same that the content and questions of the interview guideline for the PCIs were based on: this theoretical set of codes can then be applied to

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105 For an overview on the use of MAXQDA in general and for the purpose of triangulation processes in particular see exemplarily Kuckartz 2010.
Proceeding for the Coding and Interview Analysis

The way Witzel first used problem-centered interviews and in many research examples using them, is to code and analyze the interview material to a certain extent. Then, secondly, on that basis, the cases are grouped into case-types. (Compare Witzel 2000) As the interview respondents were already selected to represent two case types in each of the two states, categorizing them further, this step is skipped. Instead, the statements by the two x two types (CSOs and IOs from both states) of respondents are analyzed in the context of the different theoretical categories they refer to. So the “comparative systematization” of the cases is conducted at the level of theoretical thematic categories of analysis, comparing the each two groups of respondents for each thematic category. The proceeding during the coding and analysis of the interviews entirely followed the steps described above.106

(1) First the “internal comparison of the interview text” was conducted: In order to process the interviews for the analysis several steps were necessary: the first step consisted in repeatedly reading the transcripts and also in comparing these with the audio-recording and correcting possible transcription mistakes or inconsistencies. Next, one after another each interview was read and at the same time text passages were attributed to the preliminary code system. If text passages held relevant information about the field of interest, yet it was impossible to attribute them to any of the so far existing preliminary codes, new codes or sub-codes were established. It is important at this stage, not to stick too closely to the theoretical concepts under investigation but to allow for deductive analysis of interpretation of the respondents and to wait to not make comparisons until a later point. (Schmidt 2008: 449–450)

(2) Secondly, the combination of codes into a typology happened through a comparison between the texts of the same group, altogether interviews among each of the four groups of interview types (BiH CSOs/BiH IOs/MK CSOs/MK IOs) were compared. The aim was to examine the preliminary codes and the codes that were newly established during the internal comparison and to combine them into one coding system that could be applied to all of the interview types and texts. (Comp. Kühn, Witzel 2000: 10) Several meetings with the members of an interpretative group helped to develop and scrutinize criteria for coding so that plausible categories for the code-system were established. After this step, several codes from the preliminary code tree were no longer included in the system, several preliminary codes were combined into one meta-code and also several new codes and many new sub-codes were established. (Comp. Mayring 2003b: 76) (For the code-system after explorative coding see annex J.)

(3) Third, for a comparison of interviews and their coded segments from the different groups: Once the coding on all relevant levels of the fifty-two interviews was completed, the next step was that the

“codes must come together in one overall analysis” and “connect to each other in what can be conceptualised as a web of meanings.” (Fink 2000: 7)

Thus the results for the coding from each group of texts were compared to each and all other groups of texts. This step served to compare information and judgments, helped to “complete

106 For another illustrative summary on how to code and analyze guideline-based interviews see Schmidt 2008. Schmidt 2008 identifies five steps when analyzing guideline-based interviews: (1) construction of categories for the analysis based on the material, (2) combination of the categories of analysis into a coding guideline, (3) coding the material, (4) quantifying overview of the material, (5) in-depth case interpretation. (Translated by the author: Schmidt’s 2008 original terms for the five steps are as follows: (1) materialorientierte Bildung von Auswertungskategorien, (2) Zusammenstellung der Auswertungskategorien zu einem Codierleitfaden, (3) Codierung des Materials, (4) Quantifizierende Materialübersicht, (5) Vertiefende Fallinterpretation.)
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the picture”, and it allowed to validated, cross-check the coding and the information gained from the comparison and to possibly generalize from that. At this point, already a certain degree of interpretation took place and for the specific purpose of this dissertation, all interviews and the coded segments attributed to different codes were compared (BiH CSOs vs. BiH IOs vs. MK CSOs vs. MK IOs) to similarities and differences. This allowed further developing the criteria and content of each code-category. (For an exemplary screenshot from MAXQDA see annex K.)

One particular step the author decided at this stage was, in order to process the data for the data triangulation, the codes were divided into (1) “functions of civil society” on the one hand and (2) (a) “general context of civil society in both-case studies”, (b) “qualities of civil society”, and (c) “external democracy promotion”. For all codes that were identified as corresponding to codes referring to “functions of civil society” (based on theoretical assumptions of civil society’s democratization contribution, see code tree in annex L), or newly established relevant codes, one cross-table for each meta-code for the purpose of better illustrating the comparison was established. The table allowed listing a brief, often for the purpose of generalizability, abstract list of activities or statements per category. Each category-table allowed to illustrate whether a statement and assessment was made by a respondent working for a CSOs or IOs or by one of the two about the respectively other group of respondents. Each code-category further allowed comparing activities and assessments for each BiH and MK and also included the number of statements made about a certain activity in relation to the total number of respondents per state and thus also established a base for interpreting possible relevance of certain points for each group or case-state. The statements in each list were interpreted with the respondents stating negative (-1), neutral (0), or positive (+1) impact of civil society in that particular area. The ratings also took place with the support of the interpretative group to ensure constant weighing of the qualitative and subjective statements of respondents. From these ratings, for each interview group (CSOs or IO) average cross total sums were calculated which again for both states were combined into average cross total sums of CSOs and IOs combined. This, in the next step, allowed a comparison of the ratings of both states.

(4) Fourth, for the paired comparison, the findings for both interview types (CSOs and IOs) for both states each were compared. The aim was to identify similarities and differences in how persons from both groups see the activities and contribution to democratic consolidation by CSOs and the role that IOs play in this context. This allows comparing both perspectives on the topics/activities identified through the coding process, i.e. the comparison from the coded segments from (a) BiH CSOs vs. BiH IOs and (b) MK CSOs vs. MK IOs.

(5) Fifth, as a last step, the analysis of the results from both previous paired comparisons can be conducted: Here the overall findings for BiH are compared to the overall findings for MK ((a) BiH CSOs/BiH IOs vs. (b) MK CSOs vs. MK IOs). This step helps to further conceptualize the issues under comparison and the criteria applied to their categorization and comparison. Further, it allows the validation and offers different perspectives or focus, particularly of the (possibly different) evaluation of and reasons for the impact of different activities, while taking into account the different contexts of both case-states.

Interview Interpretation

The final description and interpretation of the data analysis is presented below. After all data was coded, classified and compared, the final interpretation of the interview data describes the findings of each step. Particular emphasis was put on the case-comparison of the theoretical implications of the findings concerning the codes categorized as “functions of civil society” and civil society’s qualities and context factors relate to these. The findings from the comparison are interpreted at the different levels and the most indicative statements from the interviews are presented.\footnote{For a similar process of analysis compare e.g. Hafeneger, Schönfelder 2011.}
3.2.8 Triangulation of Interview Findings with Document Analysis

The data from the fifty-two PCIs constitute the heart and soul of the empirical investigation. The results from the systematic interview analysis were subsequently compared with reports and other secondary literature from the region. The analysis of secondary interviews and documents from IOs and CSOs have the aim to complement the findings from the interviews and also to serve as data for triangulation of the interview findings. The documents used for the data analysis consist of program and project papers and reports, articles, analyses, gray literature, etc. written by or about civil society or international organizations and their work context and contribution to democratic consolidation in both states. Due to the interdisciplinary character of the research, in chapters four and five I decided to provide an extensive summary of the interview findings – contrasted with current theory on the situation of civil society in both case-states. The next chapter, six, then compares the findings, scrutinizes them and draws theoretical conclusions as to how civil society contributes to civil society’s democratic spill-over to democratic consolidation in the context of divided hybrid regimes.

3.3 An Assessment-Tool for Civil Society’s Context, Quality and Functions

In this subsection the factors for the assessment of civil society, used in other instruments, for democracy indices and functions of civil society from the literature are combined into one instrument. This instrument should improve the possibility to assess, if and to what extent civil society can or cannot contribute to democratization and democratic consolidation in an international context.

Considered an important factor for democracy, many of the democracy indicators do not explicitly include civil society (e.g. the Polity IV Project, the Index of Democracy, or the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators). A number of them, however, for instance the BTI and Freedom House, include the assessment of civil society as one of the factors of democracy. There are several specialized instruments that have been particularly developed in order to measure civil society. The indices applied to civil society frequently measure one or several of the dimensions: characteristics of civil society (quality, e.g. of the purpose of CSOs, or quantity, such as number of active NGOs, or functions of civil society), the context factors of civil society (e.g. economic situation, legal situation, etc.) or the impact (possibility) of civil society.

Measuring the quality of civil society by counting the number of existing NGOs and the share of population active in them might provide some – but far from reliable – information about the state of civil society and democracy in a given country. However, if political participation is used instead of attitudes, there is still little agreement. The fact that Slovakia, normally portrayed as one of the least democratic countries in the region, has one of the largest NGO sectors has begun to raise questions about the usefulness of this approach. (Compare Vejvoda, Kaldor 1997: 77 and Chandler 1999: 34) Other authors, e.g. Heinrich (2010), investigate the strength of civil society, or, as the USAID NGO Sustainability Index, measure the sustainability of the civil society of different states.

The structural approaches of many indices, focusing on formal CSOs have been heavily criticized for not taking into account the fact that civil society is very diverse, and that the possible democratic effect depends heavily on the nature, purpose, and political involvement of civil society organizations, or, as White puts it:

“Depending on context, some elements of civil society would be politically uninvolved, some tolerant or supportive of authoritarian rule, some working towards an alternative conception of democracy radically different from the liberal version, and some ‘progressive’ in the sense that they favour or foster a liberal democratic polity. Thus, any statement to the effect, that a ‘strong’ civil society is more conducive to democratization would be meaningless unless one went further to investigate the precise content of this constellation of social forces.” (2004: 10–11 compare also Warren 2004)
Finally, in the tradition of liberal democracy, another argument for concentrating on measuring the strength of civil society is that too strong of a civil society can in fact undermine the strength of the state and its capacity to govern. (See exemplarily Berman 1997)

3.3.1 Existing Assessment Tools for Civil Society

As discussed above, civil society is widely assumed to have positive effects in the support of democratic consolidation. Researchers in recent years have come up with numerous analytical models and theoretically based functions of civil society particularly important when it comes to the successful completion of the process of democratic consolidation. Practitioners of democracy promotion in general have concentrated more on developing instruments for the assessment of the quality and impact of civil society and factors that influence these.

As civil society has only relatively recently gained importance as a social science concept, there is a limited number of publications available on how to actually quantify and measure the phenomena in this context. (Anheier 2004: 7–9) and (Anheier 2004) Some projects like Freedom House, the BTI, but also projects not directly focused on measuring democracy such as the EUROBAROMETER, Gallup Balkan Monitor, World Values Survey, etc. include data on civil society engagement, civic activism, and so forth. However, first of all, the existing instruments are not internally coherent. They measure different items of cases on different levels and different scales with different indicators such that the questions they each focus on vary considerably. Given the increased attention that civil society has received in the context of international democratization endeavors, one cannot help to wonder how and why the large amounts of human and financial effort are actually assumed to positively impact democratic development.

Secondly, most instruments and the analytic categories tend to be strongly biased toward western values and assumptions with regards to democracy and civil society. The result is, without wanting to enter into the long-standing debate about the universality of certain rights or western hegemonic discourse, that existing instruments tend to have blind spots of not grasping categories that are not found or are insignificant in most western advanced democracies – or ought not to be found according to the dominant western norms in the states under question (dominance of ethnic majority groups, one-party domination of social life, etc.).

Today, civil society’s activities and their promotion take place in a highly internationalized context. On these grounds, the so far existing instruments do not hold up to the necessities for an application in different cultural, social and political contexts. Hence, the empirical investigation does not only aim to answer the research question, but will also compile the results from the investigation process into an assessment tool better apt to consider different dimensions of the international and external factors responsible for the quality and impact of civil society on the basis of a larger and more varied number of indicators.

To address this challenge, a number of comparative research projects and assessment tools have emerged that focus particularly on civil society and related fields. These seek to advance conceptual and empirical knowledge of civil society. Heinrich presents the following compilation of instruments for measuring civil society (2010: 20–21):

(1) Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, which analyzes the scope and economic contributions of the non-profit sector in more than 40 countries. (The Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies 2012)

(2) CIVICUS Civil Society Index Project - a participatory and multi-method approach to assess the state of civil society in more than 50 countries. (CIVICUS World Alliance for Citizen Participation 2012)
(3) Global Civil Society Yearbook, published by the London School of Economics, charts key themes and challenges for global civil society in an annual publication. (London School of Economics 2012)
(4) Civil Society and Governance Programme at the Institute for Development Studies, University of Sussex, which from 1998 to 2001 examined civil society’s relations with government in 22 predominantly developing countries. (Institute of Development Studies 2012)
(5) Citizens and Governance Project, run by the Commonwealth Foundation, which used a participatory methodology to investigate people’s conceptions of a good society and the role of civil society in governance in Commonwealth countries. (The Commonwealth Foundation 1999)
(6) ARVIN Tool, developed by the World Bank, which seeks to assess the enabling environment for civic engagement and has been applied in a number of developing countries. (The World Bank 2011)
(7) USAID NGO Sustainability Index for Eastern Europe and Eurasia, which has been generated annually since 1998 by USAID to assess the sustainability of the NGO sector in the region. (United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 2012)

The following two further instruments, based on analytic models be the respective authors can be added to complete the list:

(8) Mark Warrens analytic framework for assessing the quality via the constitutive goods of associations (Warren 2004)
(9) Hans-Joachim Lauth’s categorization for subtypes of civil society (Lauth 2003)

Finally,
(10) Thania Paffenholz provides an analytic framework for assessing civil society particularly in post-conflict settings.

Just like measuring indices for democracy, the indices for measuring civil society vary greatly in their concepts and operationalization of civil society. They focus on different aggregational levels (organization, society, state) and they apply very different analytical frameworks. Further, connected to the different measuring levels, existing instruments have very different focuses on civil society: its quality, its context, and its impact on democratic consolidation (which includes i.e. procedural aspects and impact assessment.) And finally, an important question arises, of what aspects of existing instruments in fact allow for cross-national comparison of a category that is contested and takes on different forms in varying contexts, a point which several authors underline as being crucial. (Anheier et al. 2001a; Anheier 2004)

3.3.2 Discussion of Existing Civil Society Assessment Instruments

The following three assessment instruments represent the most encompassing and developed models for the analysis of civil society:

(1) USAID NGO Sustainability Index (USAID)
(2) Civil Society Index (CIVICUS/Anheier)
(3) Subtypes of Civil Society (Lauth)

While the first of them, the USAID NGO Sustainability Index, focuses on the quality and character of civil society, the second and the third, the Civil Society Index and the model of Subtypes of Civil Society, also include an impact analysis for civil society. The details are now discussed in the following:
(1) USAID NGO Sustainability Index (USAID)

The USAID NGO Sustainability Index for the post-communist and socialistic states mainly assesses to what extent civil society or more specifically, NGOs, can and do work according to several implicit assumptions, that these dimensions are important for NGOs to assume their positive functions for democracy. According to USAID

“seven different dimensions of the NGO sector are analyzed in the NGO Sustainability Index: 1. Legal environment, 2. Organizational capacity, 3. Financial viability, 4. Advocacy, 5. Service provision, 6. Infrastructure, 7. Public image. In the Index, each of these dimensions is examined with a focus on the following questions: 1. What has been accomplished? 2. What remains a problem? 3. Do local actors recognize the nature of outstanding challenges? 4. Do local actors have a strategy and the capacity to address these challenges?”(USAID 2011: 12)

For its rating the NGO Sustainability Index

“uses a seven-point scale, to facilitate comparisons to the Freedom House indices, with 7 indicating a low or poor level of development and 1 indicating a very advanced NGO sector. The following section elaborates on the characteristics of each level of development:

1. NGO sector’s sustainability enhanced significantly by practices/policies in this area. While the needed reforms may not be complete, the local NGO community recognizes which reforms or developments are still needed, and has a plan and the ability to pursue them itself.
2. NGO sector’s sustainability enhanced by practices/policies in this area. Local NGO community demonstrates a commitment to pursuing reforms and developing its professionalism in this area.
3. NGO sector’s sustainability somewhat enhanced by practices/policies in this area. Commitment to developing the aspect in question is significant.
4. NGO sector’s sustainability minimally affected by practices/policies in this area. Progress may be hampered by a stagnant economy, a passive government, a disinterested media, or a community of good-willed but inexperienced activists.
5. NGO sector’s sustainability somewhat impeded by practices/policies in this area. Progress may be hampered by a contracting economy, authoritarian leader and centralized government, controlled or reactionary media, or a low level of capacity, will or interest on the part of the NGO community.
6. NGO sector’s sustainability impeded by practices/policies in this area. A hostile environment and low capacity and public support prevents the growth of the NGO sector.
7. NGO sector’s sustainability significantly impeded by practices/policies in this area, generally as a result of an authoritarian government that aggressively opposes the development of independent NGOs.”(USAID 2011: 15)

Finally, for every year for each state, the findings are combined into an overall rating for each category which, in turn, is combined into an overall rating of NGO sustainability:

(2) Civil Society Index (CIVICUS/Anheier)

CIVICUS and several authors connected with the project who had been working in the field (e.g. Helmut K. Anheier) borrowed the idea of the “equity diamond” from socialwatch108 and adapted it to serve the measurement of civil society as a Civil Society Diamond (CSD) – in later works referred to as the Civil Society Index (CSI). (Anheier 2004: 12)

“The CSD is information-based and data-driven; it is applied rather than basic research, and it is closer to action-oriented analysis than to pure social science. The CSD is not designed to serve as a methodological tool for rigorous hypothesis testing in the strict sense of social science research. Its primary purpose is to assist civil society representatives, analysts and policy-makers in examining different aspects of civil society. The CSD is first and foremost a method of presenting and interpreting information about civil society in a systematic and structured way.”(Anheier 2004: 14)

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The CSI measures civil society on the country level.\(^{109}\) The civil society assessment is made up of several subcategories, which are then summarized into five larger categories of analysis:

“The CSI employs 66 indicators, which are grouped in 28 sub-dimensions. These are then consolidated into five dimensions of civil society.” (Macedonian Center for International Cooperation 2011: 9)

These five main analytic dimensions are:

1. civic engagement,
2. level of organization,
3. practicing values,
4. perception of impact, and
5. environment.

Usually, the data used for each country analysis includes all types of sources, including literature, case studies, surveys and interviews with persons from CSOs, regional focus groups. (Compare exemplary Macedonian Center for International Cooperation 2011: 9) (Compare also Anheier 2004) The advantage of the CSI is that it already assesses the actual impact of civil society. Nevertheless, this index also provides little criteria to take into account factual implementation or dimensions of informal practices that counter the assumed effect of certain dimensions – however, when it does, it is non-transparent in how this is factored into the rating for that particular dimension.

(3) Subtypes of Civil Society (Lauth)

As briefly outlined in the second chapter, Lauth proposes a model for the assessment of civil society’s overall impact on the different stages of democratization. The model’s strength is that is does take into account several dimensions, qualities, functions, and to a certain extent also, context for the activities of civil society. Therefore, the model proves a good basis for the categorization of an extensive qualitative investigation of whether or how a developing civil society can impact democratic transition – particularly against the background of incomplete democratic consolidation and strong societal divisions.

In Lauth’s model, based on the combination of thirteen characteristics, civil society is compared to its ideal form by the number of characteristics corresponding to the three different types of civil society that are made up of a certain combinations of characteristics. Depending on the extent to which a civil society in a given state fulfills the qualities and functions theoretically attributed to it, civil society can be characterized as one of the three ideal types of civil society

(1) ‘strategic type’ = strategic civil society (SCS)
(2) ‘ambivalent type’ = ambivalent civil society (ACS)
(3) ‘reflexive type’ = reflexive civil society (RSC) (Lauth 2003: 225–227)

The following table summarizes and illustrates this typology:

\(^{109}\) The CSI applies the following research design: “The Civil Society Index (CSI) is an action research project assessing the state of civil society in countries around the world. The project was being simultaneously implemented in around 40 countries and was coordinated by the international civil society network CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation. The goals of the project, as formulated by CIVICUS, are to enhance the sustainability of civil society and to promote and strengthen its contribution to positive social change.” Macedonian Center for International Cooperation 2011: 9.
While the strategic type with its characteristics has the best predisposition to positively contribute to democratization processes during liberalization, the reflexive type with its qualities is most conducive to democratization while the ambivalent type hampers civil society’s contribution to democratic consolidation. (Lauth 2003)

However, as Lauth notes, the model falls short of providing the possibility of a more detailed analysis of civil societies impact in a certain, problematic, context which clearly may prevail during democratic transitions. Therefor, this model is going to serve as a basis to develop a more detailed assessment tool for civil society’s qualities, functions, and also context, in order to allow taking into account all important aspects the literature ascribes as decisive for civil societies possible effect on democratization, or more specificly in this case, democratic consolidation.

3.3.3 Integrating Context, Qualities and Functions of Civil Society into

On the basis of Lauth’s characterization of three types of civil society, existing approaches to assess civil society are now combined into one assessment tool. At the end of the empirical investigation, the findings will be analyzed and compared to the dimensions of this developed tool. This will allow to analyze the nature and possible positive and negative impacts of civil society under the prevailing context factors during the particular phase of democratic consolidation.

Literature offers different approaches to the assessment of the quality and impact of civil society. Developed for their particular fields of research, for most of the existing indices the connection between the functions of civil society is merely theoretically deduced from the literature or concluded from how civil society functions in Western democracies. With the purpose of providing an instrument that combines all these important levels, the following table is compiled – from existing instruments and from theoretical approaches to civil society (as presented in the previous chapter). For each category for context factors, functions, and qualities of civil society, the existing source is indicated. (An extensive overview of the different functions and indicators used for measuring civil society is provided in annex M.)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>type category</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>phase of system change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.a non conflictive structure of civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.b organizational structure across cleavages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. no distinct power hierarchies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.a civic virtues important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.b relevance of particular interests low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. internal democratic organization important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. societal representativity discernable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. functions for the state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.a service provision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.b recruiting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.c policy making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.d control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. cooperation with the state</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lauth 2003: 226, translated by the author, FB
Tab. 19: Theoretical relevance of the categories for the interview analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Authors/Indices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>context factors of civil society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cooperation with the state</td>
<td>Lauth 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>origins and patterns of civil society</td>
<td>Lauth 2003 (internal democratic structure/hierarchy), BTI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regime type</td>
<td>Lauth 2003 (motivation for CS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>legal situation</td>
<td>Freedom House 2011, CSD, USAID NGO SI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>finances and economic context</td>
<td>Lauth 2003 (motivation), FH, CSD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>societal cleavages</td>
<td>Lauth 2003 (motivation), Freise 2004, BTI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organizational involvement of the population in voluntary associations,</td>
<td>Freise 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>public engagement in formal and non-formal organizations,</td>
<td>Freise 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>effect of civil society</td>
<td>CSD, FH 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qualities of civil society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-conflictive structure of civil society</td>
<td>Lauth 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organizational structures across cleavages/particular interests</td>
<td>Lauth 2003, FH 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>independence from state and political parties</td>
<td>Lauth 2003, FH 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organizational capacity</td>
<td>FH, CSD, USAID NGO SI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>functions of civil society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>control the state’s power</td>
<td>Lauth 2003, Merkel 1998, Paffenholz, Diamond 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>service provision</td>
<td>Lauth 2003, Paffenholz 2010, CSD, USAID NGO SI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aggregate common interests</td>
<td>Merkel 1998, Diamond 1994, Paffenholz 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>monitoring and spread independent info</td>
<td>Merkel 1998, Diamond 1994, Paffenholz 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>promote political participation</td>
<td>Merkel 1998, Diamond 1994, BTI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The above compilation of important dimensions of civil society will serve as a basis for the empirical analysis as it provides the possible coding categories for the preliminary code-system.

During the interview analysis, the preliminary code-system is further developed, some categories are summarized, some were identified as not relevant, a few were added to the coding system which were identified as very relevant yet so far not included. The final code system developed then, which was applied to the analysis and interpretation of the interviews is the following:

A. General Context of Civil Society
   A1. Origin and patterns of development of civil society
   A2. Regime Type
   A3. Legal Situation
   A4. Cooperation with the State
   A5. Financial and Economic Situation
   A6. Societal Cleavages

B. Qualities of Civil Society
   B1. Non-Conflictive Structure of Civil Society
   B2. Organizational Structure across Cleavages
   B3. Organizational Capacity
   B4. Independence from the State and from Political Parties

C. Functions of Civil Society
   C1. Control the State’s Power
C2. Monitoring and Diffusion of Independent Information  
C3. Aggregation, Articulation, and Representation of Interests  
C4. Mitigation of Overlapping Interests across Particular Interests  
C5. Diffusion and Socialization of the Importance of Civic Virtues  
C6. Stimulate Political Participation of Citizens  
C7. Recruiting of new Leaders  
C8. Service Provision

On the basis of the interview findings, this final coding system then can again be integrated into a further developed assessment tool based on Lauth’s typology for civil society. For easier visualization “yes” was changed to “+” and “no” was changed to “-”. Additionally, a category was added for the impact of external democracy promotion: “/+” or “/0” or “/-”. Taking into account the complexity of reality and diversity of civil society organizations and their capacities, it makes sense to note a number of dimensions in parentheses. Further, the manifestation of civil society for each type and their positive or negative impact during the different phases of transition (liberalization or democratic consolidation) remain, at closer scrutiny, not purely one-dimensional.
Chapter 3: Methodological Approach and Research Design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tab. 20: Types of civil society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>type</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>category</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A Context of civil society</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>A.1 origin and patterns of civil society</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>A.2 regime type</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>A.3 legal situation</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.4 readiness of the state to cooperate (previously “cooperation with the state”)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>A.5 financial and economic situation</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>A.6 societal cleavages</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B Qualities of civil society</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.1 a non conflictive structure of civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.2 organizational structure across cleavages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>B.3 Organizational capacity</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>B.4. Independence from the State and from political parties</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>B.5 “Shambolic” civil society</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C Functions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.1 Control the State’s Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>C.2 Monitoring and Diffusion of Independent Information</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>C.3 Aggregation, Articulation, and Representation of Interests</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>C.4 Mitigation of Overlapping Interests across Particular Interests</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>C.5 Diffusion and Socialization of the Importance of Civic Virtues</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>C.6 Stimulate Political Participation of Citizens</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.7 Recruiting of new Leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.8 Service Provision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of matches with types of civil society</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(number of congruities per state with type)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average contribution of IOs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lauth 2003, an “*“ indicates that this category was identified as relevant and added to the original assessment matrix by Lauth.

After the application of the coding system and the following interview analysis, the empirical results are compared with a slightly adapted assessment table of three subtypes which Hans-Joachim Lauth identified as conducive to liberalization (strategic type), or more (reflexive type) or less conducive (ambivalent type) to consolidation of democracy (see previous table). Further, it may prove useful, to also include the role of international organizations and their external democracy promotion aimed at civil society and how this possibly affects civil society’s role during democratic consolidation.

The assessment tool is useful to summarize the overall results of the investigation from the case studies. It helps to illustrate an aggregate proxy for the overall possibilities of civil society to influence democratic consolidation. For both cases, the number of congruities of the real impact of civil society for each category of the three types of civil society is assessed, including, to what extent external democracy promotion contributes positively, negatively, or not at all. Thus, by summarizing and comparing the theory-based categories of analysis and their manifestations, the importance and actual impact of civil society is not only tested according to single context factors, qualities, and functions. The additional comparison with the three types of civil society serves as an analytic summary of civil society’s nature and democratization impact during democratic consolidation.
3.4 Strengths and Limits of this Research Design

The here described research design has been chosen because of several advantages it holds over other possible approaches. Of course, as any other research design, the approach chosen also has its limits that will now be discussed. There are several important advantages, why this research design was chosen:

(a) The chosen research design allows for new insight into a field as it provides new, systematically collected data that so far did not exist in this field.

(b) The approach on the one hand is theoretically structured enough to allow to test theory-based expectations, but on the other hand the methods chosen allow for enough openness of the investigation so that also new mechanisms of interplay and reasons for possible impact of civil society on democratic consolidation can be identified that quantitative methods would not allow to reveal. (Comp. Hitzler et al. 1997: 10–11)

(c) Further, this study provides a new, systematic instrument to assess whether civil society does in fact assume each of the theoretical democratizing functions it is supposed to assume and also, how impact in each of the fields can be assessed including the influence of international organizations. The following subsections discuss several points that may be critical but continue to explain how they were taken into account during the empirical investigation.

The data analysis is based on a relatively small number of interviews consisting of subjective opinions of the respondents. This can possibly limit the generalizability of the findings. However, the investigation does not raise a claim to prove universally valid causal relationships. The comparative design, the relatively large sample of respondents with fifty-two interviews for a small-n study, and also the inclusion of different ethno-national backgrounds of respondents, increase the validity of the findings. Further, including persons from both IOs and CSOs in the sample, contrasting statements that respondents from CSOs/IOs made about themselves or the other group respectively and taking that into account during the data interpretation and also the triangulation of the interview data with background conversations, document analysis and theory improve the validity of the results. Concluding, all of the above does allow to, if not make generally valid explanations, to formulate plausible reasons for civil society’s contribution (or not) to democratic consolidation.

Although it would probably have been interesting to know more about the types of CSOs and IOs that expressed certain statements, I decided that the safeguarding of anonymity of the respondents had the highest priority in the context of the presentation of findings. Further, the range of opinions and the similarities and contrasts between IOs and CSOs and between both states are of more importance than specific names of CSOs.

One important way of guaranteeing the validity and thus the generalizability of the findings is the theoretical foundation of the design and to assure the highest possible transparency of the research process. As approaches in qualitative research are often specifically designed or combined to fit a particular research question, guaranteeing very detailed and transparent documentation of the applied proceeding for the methods used and interpretations undertaken is highly important and accordingly this is assured for this investigation. (Mayring 1999: 115, 119)

Even though a qualitative approach based on a small-n study and the analysis of a limited number of qualitative interviews can limit the generalizability of the findings, both the within-case and the cross-case comparison allow for highly interesting new insight that makes it possible to formulate theory-based plausible expectations and explanations for certain empirical phenomena and causal relationships that can serve to develop and refine the current scientific state-of-the-art. (Mayring 1993: 24)

Concludingly, this chapter broke down the research design to the concrete empirical level of the case studies: The method for the further proceeding, case studies, and more particularly a dynamic comparison by a small-n case study, was selected and discussed. Subsequently, based on theoretical criteria, two cases, namely Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, were identified for the study. Next, the method and data triangulation based on
qualitative content analysis of problem-centered semi-structured interviews and documents from both cases, and the planned and later realized proceeding for the data collection were presented and critically discussed. Finally the proceeding for the application of the constant comparative method for the analysis and interpretation of data were discussed and the empirical application illustrated, including a model developed to assess different qualities, functions and context variables for civil society which allow conclusions about civil society’s potentially positive or negative impact during different stages of democratic transition, notably during democratic consolidation.
Chapter 4: Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Civil Society: Mostly Professional, Divided, and Dependent on Foreign Support for Political Impact

CHAPTER 4: BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA’S CIVIL SOCIETY: MOSTLY PROFESSIONAL, DIVIDED, AND DEPENDENT ON FOREIGN SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL IMPACT

As the first of two case-study chapters, this chapter presents a summary of the findings from the interview analysis with regard to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The chapter is subdivided into four subsections: The first subsection provides background information on the history, politics, and ethnic situation, and also on civil society and external democracy promotion of civil society. Sections 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 summarize the findings from the interview analysis for the context, qualities, and functions of civil society respectively, and section 4.5 gives a brief summary of the case findings. For each coding category for the interview analysis (as elaborated in the previous chapter), the findings are presented and contrasted between CSOs and IOs and both states respectively. Accordingly this chapter is subdivided into three main units on A. the general context of civil society, B. qualities of civil society, and finally, C. functions of civil society:

A. General Context of Civil Society
   A1. Origin and patterns of development of civil society
   A2. Regime Type
   A3. Legal Situation
   A4. Cooperation with the State
   A5. Financial and Economic Situation
   A6. Societal Cleavages

B. Qualities of Civil Society
   B1. Non-Conflictive Structure of Civil Society
   B2. Organizational Structure across Cleavages
   B3. Organizational Capacity
   B4. Independence from the State and from Political Parties

C. Functions of Civil Society
   C1. Control the State’s Power
   C2. Monitoring and Diffusion of Independent Information
   C3. Aggregation, Articulation, and Representation of Interests
   C4. Mitigation of Overlapping Interests across Particular Interests
   C5. Diffusion and Socialization of the Importance of Civic Virtues
   C6. Stimulate Political Participation of Citizens
   C7. Recruiting of new Leaders
   C8. Service Provision

Each section further contrasts statements of respondents from (a) CSOs and (b) international organizations. While still respecting the anonymity of the persons, the following tables lists the number of interviews of the different groups of respondents:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>group of respondents</th>
<th>Bosnia-Herzegovina</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSOs</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5, 8, 14, 17, 28, 11, 12, 13, 22, 25, 26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOs</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6, 15, 18, 19, 20, 27, 21, 23, 24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>experts</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(50, 51, 71, 72, 74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>25 (out of 52)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 4: Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Civil Society: Mostly Professional, Divided, and Dependent on Foreign Support for Political Impact

4.1 Socio-Political Background: A Divided Post-Socialist and Post-Conflict State under International Supervision

For a better understanding of findings presented below in this section, this subsection provides background information to interpret the later presented findings from the interviews analysis. Drawing from secondary literature, following, the country-specific context is summarized with regard to five dimensions:

(1) history and political context,
(2) transition and democratization,
(3) ethnic diversity and ethno-nationalism,
(4) civil society,
(5) external democracy promotion of civil society.

4.1.1 History and Political Context

Bosnia-Herzegovina was part of the Ottoman Empire for several centuries: it was invaded and annexed in 1463. More than four-hundred years later, in 1878, the Austro-Hungarian Empire occupied the Turkish provinces Bosnia and Herzegovina which then were annexed in 1908. In 1918, as Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina became a part of the “Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes” that changed its name to the “Kingdom of Yugoslavia” in 1929. From 1943 onward Bosnia-Herzegovina was one of the six constituting republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On 3 March 1992 Bosnia-Herzegovina declared independence. (Boden 1995: 244–255 and Sowards 2008)

Around the time of its independence, the former Yugoslav republic was already drawn into the violent Yugoslav disintegration process. This resulted in a devastating three-year war from 1992 to 1995. Ethnic mobilization and violence between the three warring parties - Muslim Bosniaks, orthodox Serbs, and catholic Croats - strongly driven and supported from the neighboring Croat and Serb republics had already been on the rise in the years before independence. Now, in 1992 the conflict quickly escalated. Soon there was a fully-fledged war taking place on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Serbs and Croats were strongly connected to their respective kin-states and received substantial political and military support. (For an exemplary overview on the course and causes of events see Bougarel 1996; Calic 1995; Gromes et al. 2004) The Muslim Bosniak fraction of the population undertook all possible efforts to defend themselves and to protect the integrity of their territory, as Caruso describes:

“The Serb and the Croat factions’ plan was aimed at securing compact territories, controlled militarily, in the view of attaching them to their respective homelands. That meant a de facto partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina between Serbia and Croatia. However, from their side, the Muslim party sought to ward off such outcomes at all costs by maintaining control of the capital, insisting upon the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, banking on international recognition as a guarantor of survival, and resisting Serb and Croat territorial encroachments wherever possible.”(2007: 34)

On 14 December 1995 the “Dayton Peace Accords” (DPA) was signed. It put an end to the violent conflict and it installed power-sharing institutions to channel ethnic violence that are mostly still intact. The main points of the DPA include for instance the installation of two territorial entities based on the ethnic population distribution (see below), an electoral system based on ethnic quota and representation, including a rotating tri-partite presidency, a Badinter voting option in parliament (a voting procedure where the majority of an ethnic group particularly concerned by a decision is needed

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From 1943 named “Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia”, and then in 1963 re-named, the “Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” consisted of the Socialist Republics (RS) of Bosnia and Herzegovina, RS Croatia, RS Macedonia, RS Montenegro, RS Slovenia, and RS Serbia, and of the two autonomous provinces Vojvodina and Kosovo.
for the decisions to pass in parliament), and mechanisms for international oversight of the reconciliation. (Office of the High Representative 1995 on the Dayton Peace Accords)

The political decentralization that was implemented based on the DPA is a complicated, multi-level structure; today, the state consists of two ‘entities’ (the Croat-Bosniak “Federation” and the “Republika Srpska” (RS)), and the additional independent district Brčko). While the Federation is subdivided into ten cantons, which then in turn consist of smaller municipalities, there is no cantonal level in the RS but a direct subdivision into municipalities. Further, the subdivision into municipalities in the Federation is obligatory while in the Republika Srpska the municipal administrative level may exist on a voluntary basis. The smallest political entity then consists in “local communities” or ‘mjesne zajednice’ (MZs) serving the purpose of increasing citizens’ political involvement.

4.1.2 Transition and Democratization

In non-aligned Yugoslavia political, economic, and personal freedom had been relatively higher compared to other communist or socialist states. This included, in a context of mostly state organized collective organizations, still a relatively high freedom for civic activism, increasing since the 1970s, the freedom to travel – inside of Yugoslavia but also to other countries – which was not the case for the stricter communist states, and other social and economic freedoms.

The break-up of former Yugoslavia saw a reconfiguration of all spheres of the socio-political make-up including geography, politics, economy, general power-relations, etc. In addition to a transition from socialism to a liberal market democracy the state also had to deal with post-conflict reconstruction, reconciliation, and with the immense social and personal consequences of the violent intra-state conflict. A large share of the population had been displaced, suffered the loss of family members, and needed time to readjust after the war.

Also the economy had broken down as a consequence of the war. A large proportion of infrastructure (roads, bridges, railways, factories, cities, etc.) were destroyed. It needed not only investment to repair the damage (estimated to amount to at least 10 billion US-dollars), but reconstruction also took time until the economy could slowly start to recover. In 1994, the productivity was estimated at around 10 percent of the pre-war level, unemployment was at about 80 percent, and the average income was less than 20 percent of the average level. (Calic 1995: 237–245)

Finally, also the political transition towards democratization was not an easy task due to several challenges: the complex political structures coupled with the ongoing high ethno-national mobilization resulted in ethnicity being an omnipresent category for voters’ self-identification and also for politicians to mobilize their voters. It also led to frequent bargaining and veto-playing in the parliament, at times particularly confrontational between the state government and the RS’s government. Furthermore, after 1995 democratic structures needed to be formally installed – and,

111 A note on the nature and purpose of MZs from the OSCE in Bosnia-Herzegovina: “One way to enable citizen participation in local affairs is through the development of a system of neighborhood democracy which allows citizens to actively engage in community affairs and decisions. In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), such a system traditionally existed in the form of community level institutions called local communities or MZs (mjesne zajednice). MZs are defined areas within municipalities which were established under the former Yugoslav socialist system as a means to enable greater civic engagement and public forums. Since the end of the war in BiH, MZs have either remained or have been re-established in over 90 percent of the country’s municipalities. Although the vast majority of municipalities today provide some financial support to such a system of local communities, the skills, resources and capacities of MZs vary significantly across the country.” According to the OSCE, “in an effort to increase the level of citizen participation at the grassroots level, the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina works to strengthen local communities (mjesne zajednice) and to develop their capacity to represent and advocate for the needs of all citizens.” However, “the MZ regulatory framework is not harmonized across BiH. MZs are mandatory in the Federation of BiH (FBiH) and Brčko District while they are only optional in Republika Srpska (RS). They also have diverging legal status. According to the Law on Principles of Local Self-Government of the FBiH, MZs are regarded as a legal entity, but in the RS they do not have a legal status. In Brčko District, MZs are considered to be conventional civil society organizations (CSOs).” (OSCE 2012)
even more challenging – also accepted and used according to democratic norms. Particularly the latter was not a given as political elites of that time had little experience in democratic governance. Thus, until today, trust in state institutions remains low and personal ties, usually in the same ethnic community, serve as access to information, resources and positions – resulting in low legitimacy of the formal state institutions. (Compare Bliesemann de Guevara, Kühn 2010: 13–14) In 2006 an attempt to reform the DPA-constitution failed by two votes, the 2006 elections saw nationalist parties win – and since then the situation has been deteriorating.

According to democracy indices, currently, Bosnia-Herzegovina is rated as a “hybrid regime” (Freedom House) or “defective democracy” (BTI). While the BTI detects small democratization progress, according to Freedom House, progress in overall democratization has been stagnating and even reversing in the state since around 2007, see following table:

**Tab. 22: Democratization of Bosnia-Herzegovina 2002-2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BTI</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>6.80</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>6.70</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>6.50</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: Freedom House 2012; Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012*

As to formal membership in international organizations, notably the EU and Nato, Bosnia-Herzegovina is currently waiting for membership in both: it is a potential candidate for both, for the EU since 2007 and for Nato with proceeding to the Membership in Action Plan in 2010:

**Tab. 23: Bosnia-Herzegovina’s membership status in EU and Nato**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU-membership status</th>
<th>16.06.2008</th>
<th>Nato-membership status</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>since 2007 potential candidate</td>
<td>Stabilization and Association Agreement and Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related issues signed</td>
<td>Currently waiting for full membership</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
<td>Membership Action Plan (MAP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Currently, however, it is unclear, when the next step in membership negotiations for both organizations is going to follow, as both organizations are waiting for a number of reforms to be implemented.

### 4.1.3 Ethnic Diversity and Ethno-Nationalism

Today, according to estimations of the year 2000 (no new census has been conducted since, the next census is planned to be held in 2013), the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina is estimated to be at around 4,622,292. The three largest, constitutive, ethnic groups of Bosnia-Herzegovina make up for the following share of the population: Bosniaks 48 percent, Serb 37.1 percent, Croat 14.3 percent, and 0.6 percent citizens are of other ethnic background. (CIA 02.08.2012) Having been part of several larger empires, newly sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina was a relatively young political entity, and at the time of its independence in the early 1990s political identity of the traditional “small Yugoslavia” (so-called because of the multi-ethnic nature of the population of the RS Bosnia-Herzegovina) was not easy to establish. (Đžihić 2005) Until today, it remains controversial to what extent the Yugoslav population
had been living together or rather living along-side each other – statistics detecting low rates of inter-marriage between persons of different ethnic background tend to point rather at the latter.\footnote{Exogamous marriages” (between different ethnic groups), frequently used as an indicator for the closeness of ties between these, shows that between 1962 and 1989 the general rates for inter-marriage in Yugoslavia remained relatively stable at a rather low 13 percent. For Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular, the rate of Croats and Serbs inter-marrying was relatively low and for Bosniaks comparatively higher than for other groups. (See exemplarily Botev 1994) – However, “in Bosnia-Hercegovina (…) the permeability of this [ethnic] barrier [for inter-marriage] increases until the early 1980s, and then decreases”. Botev 1994: 476 This relatively low rate of inter-ethnic marriage suggests, that while co-habitation historically functioned well, actually close contacts were not so well developed – in Yugoslavia at around 13 percent compared to around 30 percent for the Soviet Union at that time: “Judging from the levels of ethnic endogamy, Yugoslavia has never been fully integrated: Thus, there is no mystery in that country’s disintegration, although the violence accompanying the disintegration remains profoundly disturbing. Rudyard Kipling is also proven right: Although geopolitically the East and the West meet in what used to be Yugoslavia, they were rarely meeting in front of the marriage altar.” Botev 1994: 477}

The intra-state war in the 1990s had tremendous repercussions on the social fabric of the state – the result were high ethno-national mobilization and increased ethnic segregation (by territorial distribution but also through social ties) – that remain in effect until today and that also impede possible attempts to increase political and social cooperation:

“Unlike inter-state conflict that often mobilizes national unity and strengthens societal cohesiveness, violent conflict within a state weakens its social fabric. It divides the population by undermining interpersonal and communal trust, destroying the norms and values that underlie cooperation and collective action for the common good, and increasing the likelihood of communal strife. This damage to a nation’s social capital – the norms, values, and social relations that bond communities together, as well as the bridges between communal groups (civil society) and the state – impedes the ability of either communal groups or the state to recover after hostilities cease.” (Coletta 2000: 1)

Also as a result of the violent conflict today the ethnic groups live in mainly separate areas of the state, while, however, there are mixed settled areas as well – as the following map illustrates - which makes a sometimes debated clear partition of the state still remain a challenge:

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Fig. 22: Map of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina}
\caption{Map of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina}
\end{figure}

\textit{Source: Office of the High Representative 2012}
Chapter 4: Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Civil Society: Mostly Professional, Divided, and Dependent on Foreign Support for Political Impact

Until today, the society of Bosnia-Herzegovina remains deeply divided in many aspects, and the tendency for group-closure that increased around the 1992-1995 war still is very strong:

“In the transition phase, then, social relations tended to be characterised by increasing levels of group-closure, most commonly based on ethnically- defined (or confessional) identification, which reduce the possibility for cross-ethnic (or cross-confessional) social ties. (...) the social sphere remains not only fragmented, but the points of cleavage have become deeper during the 14 years following conclusion of the war”. (UNDP 2009: 18)

The de facto divisions between different ethnic groups are mutually enforcing with the formal political institutions that have been installed: in the preamble of the DPA Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs are written down as constituting people (plus “others”). The political institutions on all levels reflect this by being designed according to ethnic criteria (including veto powers). According to Caruso this has cemented ethnic divisions and the institutionalization of ethnicity as decisive political category fosters the cementation of ethnically defined cleavages in the society, establishing further self-understanding according to collective particular groups rights (as opposed to individual civic rights):

“The ethnic national balance created though the Constitution cemented the divisions by making the three groups ‘constituent peoples’, and robbed them from a possibilities of building a common identity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This situation constitutes the main obstacle towards the realization of the principle of general citizenship. The governmental devolution of powers to the communities in BH reduces the influences of those whose primary identification lies with the state and not with the communities.” (Caruso 2007: 76)

Since 1995, substantial nation-building efforts have taken place in Bosnia-Herzegovina, albeit with limited success. A common national identity remains difficult to establish, despite significant efforts by certain domestic actors, including many CSOs, and despite incentives and pressure from the international community. According to Vedran Džihić (2005: 19–20) nation-building in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been complicated by the following points:

(1) the conflict was ended under strong pressure by external actors – there was no single winning or losing party and none of the conflicting parties was really convinced to have won (or lost) as much as possible,
(2) the stipulations of the DPA are highly contradictory and ambivalent: on the one hand they accepted and installed ethnicity as a political category connected with access to territorial self-determination and political quota, on the other hand the DPA tried to preserve or re-establish the multi-ethnic character of the state and the society (e.g. refugee return, etc.),
(3) the political implementation of ethnic criteria continued the previous ethnicization and ethnic mobilization,
(4) the multi-level administrative structure is highly complicated and extremely costly,
(5) international actors in Bosnia-Herzegovina have missed important chances or their policies even had detrimental effects on the peace-process and inter-ethnic relations,
(6) the DPA does not sufficiently include economic aspects that would have been, and remain to be, crucial for the positive development of the state.

Threats, particularly by politicians from the Republika Srpska, to hold a referendum for independence and also repeated claims from Bosnian Croats to establish an independent Croat entity still question the unitary state. The reactions of IOs to ethnicized rhetoric indicate that particularly the fear of new violence has not altogether faded. In addition to the prevailing ethno-national mobilization, the omni-presence of ethnic belonging results in many situations, in which individuals need to identify as belonging to one ethnic group – a common, civic “Bosnian” identity, or an ethnically mixed identity (e.g. of children from mixed marriages) – are thus difficult to create or to live in practice.

Finally, the political institutionalization of the three largest ethnic communities as constitutive people has led to a discrimination of individuals choosing not to belong to one of these communities or belonging to other ethnic groups. In December 2009 the political foundations for this discrimination were even ruled unconstitutional by the European Court of Human Rights in the case of “Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina” (European Court of Human Rights 2009). Nevertheless, until today,
the Parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina has not included the necessary changes in the state’s constitution – and even as of today, August 2012, fierce political debate takes place whether and how the constitution will be changed to include the required change towards more inclusive political rights.

The existing state structures for power-sharing favor a tri- and not pluri-cultural state and disadvantage smaller communities that are not included in the ethnic equations. (Compare Bieber 2004) For instance in Bosnia-Herzegovina according to many authors the political system based on ethnicity has strongly engrained the idea of ethnic belonging as a dimension to justify (nationalist) claims:

“(t)he irreversible results [of the war and its settlement] have produced concrete population constellations in concrete territories ('constituent' people concentrated in 'entities' and 'cantons'), with concrete interests that are currently conceptualized under the principle of ethnic self-determination, within the existing interest-bearing units ('entities' and 'cantons') (...) which by its built-in logic can only generate, address and legitimize abstract ethno-nationalist claims.” (Hadžidedić 2012: 101–102)

4.1.4 Civil Society’s Development

Civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina is frequently said to have only recent development since the mid-1990s. Yet, in fact, citizens’ associations in Bosnia-Herzegovina date back to the Ottoman times, when in 1862 the population was granted the right to associations. Following, church-based institutions for education and cultural interests as well as guilds were founded. Later, during the time that Bosnia-Herzegovina was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, under the established modern administration, political organizations were prohibited, but national, cultural, religious, or humanitarian associations thrived. (Compare e.g. UNDP 2009: 59–60)

In 1905 the workers founded the first trade union of Bosnia-Herzegovina. (Seifija 2008: 67–72) After having been integrated into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats (the later Kingdom of Yugoslavia), civic associations were recognized in the constitution, their political activity, however, was severely limited. The most active organizations were either sports associations, benevolent or social associations, or associations supporting interests of ethno-national groups.

During Socialism, most civil society organizations were state controlled and instrumentalized. There was however, also room for civic initiative for certain interests, and around 1989 there were around 5000 associations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, many in a dissident position to the state. The Yugoslav socialist regime on the one hand fostered civic engagement in social organizations (unions, sports, etc.) and on the other hand to a certain degree, increasingly from the 1970s on, also tolerated civic activism that to a certain extent enjoyed freedom of organization and expression, mostly thriving in a dissident climate. (Seifija 2008: 72–75) There was, however, no broader, institutionalized tradition of cooperative, voluntary involvement of citizens in political decision-making. (Compare e.g. UNDP 2009: 59–60)

Around the break-up of Yugoslavia and during the war there were numerous civic initiatives that advocated a peaceful transition. Around the same time external actors started supporting and also founding NGOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, leading to a significant increase in registered NGOs. (Seifija 2008: 78, 83-94) The war was followed with a “boom” in numbers of NGOs, rising from 3,000 registered associations in 1995 to over 9,000 in 2000 since when a gradual decline in numbers can be observed. Most NGOs were funded and supported by external democracy promotion actors. Since 2000, the quality and professionalism of CSOs are said to be increasing – particularly with regard to their specialization and networking for issue coalition. Also the number of broader civic movements has somewhat grown, while at the same time, however, also large networks promoting ethno-nationalist causes are active. (Seifija 2008: 103–105, compare also UNDP 2009: 59–60.)

Nevertheless, it was mostly during and especially in the aftermath of the war from 1995

For more on the ethnic dimension in Bosnia-Herzegovina see also exemplarily Belloni, Hemmer 2010; Belloni 2007; Bliesemann de Guevara 2009; Starčević-Srkalović 2010; Evenson 2009; Gromes 2007.
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onward that there was a massive influx of external donor funding. International organizations disposed of significant funding budgets for projects in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They needed counterparts to implement the suddenly massively increasing number of projects in the fields of disaster relief, humanitarian issues and reconciliation. The result was “NGO-mushrooming”, a proliferation of NGOs, as the number of NGOs suddenly multiplied. (Compare Macedonian Center for International Cooperation 2011) In the broken-down economy of Bosnia-Herzegovina working for an NGO for a relatively high salary has been a very welcome opportunity.

Today the number of existing CSOs is still high compared to the 4.5 million inhabitants of the state, even though the number of CSOs today can be assumed to be somewhat lower than in 2008, when there were 9,095 registered CSOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The majority of NGOs are active in the fields of different (political, educational, hobbies, etc.) interest groups, followed by sports associations, trade unions, and associations for social services, as the following table illustrates:

Tab. 24: Number of NGOs in BiH by area of work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA OF WORK</th>
<th>NUMBER IN BIH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social services</td>
<td>1,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business associations, employers’ associations</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional associations</td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade unions</td>
<td>1,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiously oriented organisations</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political organisations</td>
<td>761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other membership organisations connected to political parties, public advocacy, public education, fundraising, special interest groups (leisure clubs, automobile associations), consumer associations, associations aimed at elitist gathering, such as Rotary clubs, etc., youth associations, clubs and societies</td>
<td>3,420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports associations</td>
<td>1,836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>9,095</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Seifija 2008: 101

While IOs are frequently credited with having positively contributed to increased civic activism and participation, there has been substantial criticism of the approaches by international donors that focused very much on NGOs - as these best met the standards IOs needed – and less so on non-formal, more grass-roots oriented civic organizations:

“(…) civil society assistance in the Western Balkans essentially developed in the direction of supporting just one of its common forms - non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The reasons were very practical: being easier to measure and evaluate than a broader vision of civil society, NGOs tend to have better capacity to meet donors’ administrative requirements than do other forms of civil society. Consequently, NGOs were not only seen as the equivalent of civil society, but became the centerpiece of democratic consolidation efforts.”

(Howard 2012: 35)

The high number of newly registered NGOs as a reaction to available international funding cannot be taken as a direct indicator for an increased impact of civil society – the links between CSOs and citizens as well as between CSOs and politics remain weak, limiting the actual political effect of civil society’s supposed intermediary function. Thus the high number of existing NGOs does not mirror the actual strength of civil society but rather its potential, while real political impact remains comparatively low:

"does not reflect the actual strength of civil society, but rather its potential: by and large, the size of the sector failed to translate into its ability to influence government policies or result in a significantly improved level of civic-mindedness among the general public” and “communications channels between the government and civil society throughout the region in general remain weak and their cooperation insufficient”. (Howard 2012: 40)
Until today, for both states, civil society activism is generally limited circle of NGOs mostly located in larger towns and CSOs activists tend to live in the urban centers and be highly educated. (Compare also UNDP 2009) And frequently, civil society is criticized to still be underdeveloped, as for instance, in 2009 the NDI wrote:

“Bosnia’s civil society groups—whether they be established nongovernmental organizations seeking influence at the state level or more informal and ephemeral groupings of citizens who take issue with a particular set of circumstances affecting their community—are significantly underdeveloped from the standpoint of entering the political fray and exercising power as issue advocates, government watchdogs, and generally helping to set the agenda for political debate.” (National Democratic Institute 2009b: 9)

According to USAID’s NGO Sustainability Index, civil society’s sustainability for Bosnia-Herzegovina still is evolving, with the best results in advocacy and public image and the worst result regarding financial viability (see figure below):

**Fig. 23: USAID NGO sustainability Index 2010 for Bosnia-Herzegovina**

![Graph of USAID NGO sustainability Index 2010 for Bosnia-Herzegovina](image)

Source: USAID 2011

Historically, and until today, among citizens there is a low degree of involvement and a certain overall passiveness. Many researchers and practitioners blame this on previous (and current) authoritarian behavior of government (Dvornik 2009: 65–67):

“For it is one of the key features of the societies shaped (or made shapeless) under the communist regimes: In these societies, no particular interests were autonomously formed, nor was a power of their organized public and political advocacy developed. In the apathy and political passivity that returned after the short-lived, massive mobilization around the toppling of the old regimes, there was no pressure from below to at least try to force the political actors to introduce policies of solidary social correction of the effects of the market.” (Dvornik 2009: 50–51)

Overall, the level of associational membership in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been and remains relatively low and citizens are reluctant to become involved in politics or to participate in formal civic organizations. (Compare Dvornik 2009; Howard 2003; Macedonian Center for International Cooperation 2011) The membership in associations thus, is correspondingly low – as the following figure illustrates for Bosnia-Herzegovina:
Additionally, the generally negative image of NGOs among many citizens who distrust NGOs also hampers a stronger membership base of NGOs:

“NGOs tend to lack a solid membership base and strong roots in broader civil society. Across the Western Balkans, citizens tend to be distrustful and suspicious of the actual motives behind NGO work” and citizens often “equate ‘non-governmental’ with ‘anti-governmental’ and see NGOs as well-off sellout to foreign interests.” (Howard 2012: 40)

Equally, the level of volunteering is rather low – partly owed to “working actions” (“radnie akcije”) under communism for which people were “encouraged” to participate in on a (more or less) voluntary basis – and also partly, as formal volunteering is less common than informal cooperation and help among family and friends, regular citizens have little time for volunteer work and it is usually unpaid. (Compare (UNDP 2009: 65–68)

Not only are CSOs criticized for a lack of connectedness with the public and individual citizens. Frequently, their ties to politics are said to not function well enough to actually guarantee civil society’s political participation and impact. On the one hand, civil society organizations frequently are not professional enough to achieve actual political impact while their political counterparts do not view CSOs as a legitimate and relevant partner in decision making:

“Donor strategies for civil society development have largely rested on building high-level, elite nongovernmental groups which are supposed to pry open governmental, legislative, and political space for a variety of issue- or constituency-based groups to participate. But this has proved difficult. The type of advocacy and watchdog initiative that NDI has witnessed at the local level has not been able to find its way up to the entity and state level where it is most certainly needed. Instead, one finds civic elites without the benefit of public connection, or for that matter public endorsement, seeking to engage political elites who view them contemptibly as unelected, well-funded, self-styled representatives of the public interest. Indeed, government tends to see civil society as a controlled, captured appendage rather than separate, nongovernmental bodies organizing and advocating of their own free will.” (National Democratic Institute 2009b: 9)

Furthermore, procedures for cooperation between government and NGOs are not well-established – they lack a formal base and also the tradition, as well as know-how and sheer capacity, of the government to cooperate with civic organizations:

“Currently in Bosnia and Herzegovina there is no clear idea among the governmental sector on the importance of civil society and its contribution towards general social well-being. The governmental sector has very little understanding of the issues of civil society, hence the lack of normative regulations of the terms “public” or “general interest”, not to mention normative regulations of benefits for organisations that frequently take over the implementation of the activities that, without NGOs, would have to be implemented by the central or local authorities. The Constitution and Law on Associations of Citizens and Foundations guarantee the right to free association, but there are no regulations that direct the cooperation between governmental and non-governmental sector in BiH.” (Žeravčić 2008: 47–48)

Another reason lies in the fact that both counterparts, CSOs as well as state actors, are frequently strongly oriented towards their donors and that political actors do not wish to consult with CSOs -
recent years, however have seen some improvement of government bodies to include CSOs in policy formulations. (Howard 2012: 40)

In the period after the war, NGOs were a very lucrative employment market, frequently paying better salaries than other work fields. In fact, this also led to the development of a “civil sector” (as an employment sector, somewhat existing in a sphere of its own), instead of the development of a broader society. (Seifija 2006; Dvornik 2009) When looking at the high percentage of GDP through NGO revenues in Bosnia-Herzegovina (see the following table) and taking into account the high general rates of unemployment, it becomes clear, why so many persons like working for CSOs and why activists care so much about funding – it pays many salaries and there are not so many very good alternatives:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total NGO revenue in GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Seifija 2008: 102

Over the past few years international funding has been decreasing, many donors are leaving for other regions, and a large share of the remaining funding today comes from programs of the European Union that have increased their budgets for the Western Balkans over the past years. International actors have increasingly supported that international funding is gradually replaced by domestic financing, which also aims to motivate the state to better cooperate with CSOs. There has been some success in this regard and domestic funding in real numbers has become quite significant: for 2007, for instance, the governmental sector allocated from the public budgets at all levels of authorities a total of 110,474,802.47 KM for financing civil society. (Žeravčić 2008)

“The analysis of the profile of the non-governmental organisations financed from the municipal budget indicates that most of the funds are allocated for sport associations (40.76%), followed by the associations of war veterans (14.96%), organisations dealing with social protection issues (9.37%) and culture and art (8.92%). The least funds are allocated for human rights (0.02%) and environment protection (0.28%).“ (Žeravčić 2008: 39)

However, as of now, domestic funding has not really developed to step in. Rather, overall government bodies concentrate the majority of their funding towards important, government friendly groups, such as war veterans, or they fund associations that support social services and other organizations that are not too critical of the government’s politics – leaving a financing gap for political and critical CSOs, as the following table illustrates:
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Unclear legislation further aggravates the vulnerability of CSOs to arbitrary tax persecution and how they depend on foreign funding:

“laws still lack criteria for determining whether organizations are eligible for public benefit status, which entitles them to tax incentives. (…) municipalities are nonetheless funding activities that they believe are in the public interest, de facto giving some organizations this designation.” (USAID 2011: 49)

The federal structure of the state continues to complicate the possibilities of CSOs to receive funding from state institutions and also from important international donors:

“Tax laws are still unfavorable to NGOs and do not distinguish between NGOs and profit oriented companies and ventures. Financial relief for NGO activities is available only for customs import duties. Unfavorable tax laws still put additional financial burden on organizations, in particular those that receive European Commission (EC) funds. Organizations are required to pay Value Added Tax (VAT) on all project related financial transactions.” (USAID 2011: 49)

As discussed in the theory chapter, civil society has increasingly been criticized for not only being conducive to but also to impede democratization. In many publications on civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina one finds particular reference to the negative interplay between inter-ethnic divisions and CSOs: Seifija for instance traces back ethno-nationalist associations as one of the dominant forms of civic organizations since the origins of CSOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to his observation, during the last years there has been a dichotomous development of different CSOs, varying in their degree of ethnicization: institutions of multi-ethnic and civil character and the foundation of the authentic, civil NGO sector in BiH vs. associations with ethnic or religious denomination (Seifija 2008: 105–110), as he illustrates in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organisations of War Veterans</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>9.658.246,79 KM</td>
<td>14,96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecological Organisations</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>179.427,62 KM</td>
<td>0,29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Organisations</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>1.812.396,25 KM</td>
<td>2,61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Based Organisations</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1.204.408,63 KM</td>
<td>1,87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art and Culture</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>5.756.727,60 KM</td>
<td>8,92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisations for Protection of Human Rights</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.000,00 KM</td>
<td>0,02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobbying Organisations</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>642.288,40 KM</td>
<td>0,99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Organisations</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>1.085.512,80 KM</td>
<td>1,66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Organisations</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>9.596.766,87 KM</td>
<td>14,67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Organisations</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>482.610,00 KM</td>
<td>0,75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisations of Returnees</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>991.283,02 KM</td>
<td>1,54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Protection</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>6.049.677,15 KM</td>
<td>9,37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports Associations</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>28.315.298,20 KM</td>
<td>40,76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Organisations</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>770.763,18 KM</td>
<td>1,19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>64.559.456,52 KM</td>
<td>100,00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Žeravčić 2008: 39

Tab. 26: Structure of NGOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Recipients of funds from municipal budgets in 2007
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Tab. 27: Dichotomous structure of the NGO sector in BiH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THE NGO SECTOR IN BIH</th>
<th>TRANSITIONAL FORMS</th>
<th>ETHNIC NGO SECTOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIVIL NGO SECTOR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- authentic local civil organisations and initiatives</td>
<td>- open organisations with national denomination</td>
<td>- restrictive organisations with ethno-national denomination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- basic organisations created during socialism with no ethnic markings</td>
<td>- humanitarian organisations with religious or national denomination</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- foreign NGO’s</td>
<td>- organisations of national minorities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- local NGO’s created as daughter organisations of international ones, or with their support</td>
<td>- national cultural societies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Seifija 2008: 110

Živanović in a study summarizes the following main shortcoming of civil society:

“Problems of civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina:
– the insufficient commitment of government to the development of civil society;
– the low level of the financial sustainability of civil society;
– the ethnic division of civil society;
– the low level of the business sector support for the civil society development;
– the lack of cooperation between professional non-governmental organizations and traditional civil society organizations;
– the lack of transparency of civil society organizations;
– the negative public image of civil society.” (Živanović 2006: 51)

Overall, civil society until today faces significant challenges, with regard to its democratic qualities (e.g. with regard to ethno-nationalist tendencies and exclusion), availability of finances, and also regarding its still limited political impact on the government and on citizens.

4.1.5 External Democracy Promotion of Civil Society

The massive post-conflict external support of reconstruction, reconciliation, and of democracy promotion, including the support of civil society development, was taken on by many different international actors, including for instance, the European Union, the OSCE, the UN institutions, political and developmental organizations from many states, e.g. the US, Canada, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, etc., state funded and private foundations, international NGOs, and a plethora of mixed forms, associations, and other actors. (For more on the international intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina see exemplarily Bliesemann de Guevara, Kühn 2010: 76–115; Gromes 2007; Vetterlein 2010; Richter 2009b, 2009a; Grimm 2010; Starčević-Srkalović 2010) Pasic writes how the World Bank, the IMF, and the EU have spent billions of dollars in Bosnia-Herzegovina since the early 1990s:

“It has been calculated that BiH has received more per capita aid than any European country under the Marshall Plan. Since 1996, the World Bank has committed over $1.1 billion, while other World Bank agencies had sent $500 million by 2010. From 1996 to 1999, $3.7 billion were allocated by 48 countries and 14 international organizations, according to a 2005 IMF report. From 1996 to 2002, Bosnia’s annual aid amounted to $730 million, or, $1,400 per person, according to another 2010 analysis. Up through 2005, the US provided over $1.345 billion. And from 1991-2006, the European Union sent 2.6 billion Euros for the reconstruction and refugee return, noted the above-cited National Interest report. The EU is still actively involved in assistance to Bosnia, in the hopes that it will eventually join the Union, through the CARDS program and pre-accession IPA funds, as the World Bank 2007 Country Partnership Strategy for Bosnia and Herzegovina for the period FY08-FY11 notes. All in all, the 2009 IPA allocation to BiH amounted to 89.1 million Euros, reported the Commission of the European Communities.” (2011)
The finances invested in Bosnia-Herzegovina amount to a much higher per capita sum than the money invested in post-WW II Germany:

at least “about $1,200 per person has been made available for the Bosnian reconstruction program - more than four times the Marshall Plan's $275 at today’s prices.” (Belloni 2001: 165 referring to Deacon, Stubbs 1998: 103)\textsuperscript{114}

There is substantial frustration among Bosnia’s citizens and among the international community that until today, the economy and democracy of Bosnia-Herzegovina have not reached Western standards. Moreover, in the past years, there have been reports of billions of Euros of the investments having “disappeared” without a trace without ever having reached their final investment destiny. International actors have contributed high amounts of finances, notably the EU, currently the biggest donor:

“Initially preferring to focus on state institutions, European donors are often seen as relative latecomers to civil society development efforts in the Western Balkans. Today, the European Union is considered to be the single largest and most influential donor to civil society: its Civil Society Facility, with an annual regional budget of up to € 18 million, is only one of its civil society assistance mechanisms.” (Howard 2012: 36)

Also the United Nations already underlined the importance of democratization when they started their presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In following years they increasingly also supported civil society development. (Chandler 2004: 225) Today, according to Börzel & Risse (2004: 1), at least financially Europe is by large the most important actor in the field of democracy promotion – this also applies to the Western Balkans. The following tables illustrate the significant amount of finances, allocated to by the EU to democratization in the Western Balkan since 2002. Between 2002 and 2006, for instance, out of the European Union’s ‘Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation’ (CARDS) program, Bosnia-Herzegovina received around one third (€ 58 Mio. out of € 176.35 Mio.):

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Albania & 1 & 1 & 2.5 & 4 & 8.5 \tabularnewline
Bosnia and Herzegovina & 25 & 20.5 & 7.5 & 5 & 58 \tabularnewline
Croatia & 3 & 3.7 & 3.8 & N.N. & 10.5 \tabularnewline
Kosovo & 9.8 & 5 & 4 & 6 & 24.8 \tabularnewline
Montenegro & 0.5 & 1.5 & 2.5 & 6 & 10.5 \tabularnewline
Macedonia & 3 & 3 & 3 & 2 & 11 \tabularnewline
Serbia & 9.5 & 24 & 21 & 28.5 & 83 \tabularnewline
Regional & 7.6 & 5 & 5 & 1.95 & 14.55 \tabularnewline
Total allocation & 59.4 & 63.7 & 44.3 & 53.45 & 176.35 \tabularnewline
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{CARDS allocation to the Western Balkans 2002-2006}
\end{table}

Since the beginning of the 2007 to 2013 financing period, the EU has established the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) program, which also includes a special ‘Civil Society Facility’. Alone for the years 2007 and 2008 Bosnia-Herzegovina received by far the largest net amount per state in the region amounting to about 17 percent (€ 6.5 Mio. out of a total of € 38.5 Mio.).

\textsuperscript{114} It is worth noting that, as in any context involving international agencies, subcontractors, etc. a substantial amount of finances is channeled back to actors from the states of origin of the funders, thus not really staying in the target state.
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Tab. 29: IPA Civil Society Facility 2007-2008

| IPA Civil Society Facility in million Euros (allocations) |
|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Country        | 2007 | 2008 | Total |
| Croatia        | N.N. | 3    | 3     |
| Macedonia      | 0.4  | 1.2  | 1.6   |
| Turkey         | 3.2  | N.N. | 3.2   |
| Albania        | 0    | 0    | 0     |
| Bosnia & Herzegovina | 3   | 3.5  | 6.5   |
| Montenegro     | 1    | N.N. | 1     |
| Serbia         | 2    | 2.5  | 4.5   |
| Kosovo         | N.N. | 1.7  | 1.7   |
| Multi-Beneficiary Programme | N.N. | 17   | 17    |
| Total          | 9.6  | 28.9 | 38.5  |


For the period 1990 to 2010 in regional comparison Bosnia-Herzegovina received noticeably the highest per capita amount in EU democracy assistance between 1990 and 2010:

Fig. 25: EU democracy assistance per capita for the Western Balkans (1990-2010)

As for overall funding, according to the Balkan Civil Development Network in the period 2010-2011 around 342.8 Mio. Euros of external funding were invested into Bosnia-Herzegovina, out of which 2.5 percent, i.e. 8.5 Mio. Euros were given to civil society, most of which came from the EU, and the second most from USAID:

“In total, 22 donors were included in the survey. According to the data gathered, a total sum of 342.8 million Euros has been allocated by donors in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the 2010 - 2011 period. From this, 8.5 million Euros was for civil society, which makes 2.5% of the total funds allocated in the country. As in Albania, the biggest donor overall is the World Bank, while EU provides the biggest amount of funding for civil society. The EU has allocated 4.2 million Euros for civil society, or 3.9% of the overall amount of funding provided for country. USAID is the second biggest donor to the civil society sector with 1.67 million Euros29. Four of the donors included in the survey have funding only for civil society: NED (approx. 605, 200 Euros), BTD (approx. 160,000 Euros), ERSTE Foundation (77,320 Euros) and CS Mott Foundation (440, 000 Euros).” (Balkan Civil Development Network 2012: 32, see also donor map Bosnia-Herzegovina, annex O)

In addition to investments, particularly the EU provides special incentives to its potential accession candidates. Previously the prospect of membership in EU and Nato provided incentives for political
moderation and issue coalitions for reforms. Currently as EU-prospect has lost significant momentum, it is not clear when exactly there will be a possibility for Bosnia-Herzegovina to join. So far, the international community still remains its political control of the state with the institution of the OHR (Office of the High Representative)/EUSR (European Union Special Representative). (For more on the EU in Bosnia-Herzegovina see e.g. Reiter et al. 2005 and contributions in this volume) and more general Solioz et al. 2004 and Rupnik 2011.)

The oversight of the international community, notably with the Office of the High Representative (OHR), and the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), and various other mechanisms, had the aim of coordinating the peace-building support, of re-building democratic institutions, and also, of the (re-)construction of a “vibrant” civil society. Particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina for several years civil society’s importance has consciously been underlined:

“the rise of civil society as the new ‘buzzword’ for humanitarian and development programs that have flooded into the country since the end of the war.” (Belloni 2001: 167)

Massive support, funding, and trainings have contributed to qualifying NGO activists and of pressuring the government to cooperate with civil society. Due the trainings by IOs, the manifold achieved skills of NGO activists are frequently considered as good qualification opportunity and

“as good training grounds for future government and diplomatic officials”. (Howard 2012: 38)

Nevertheless, already in 2001 Belloni criticized the approach of IOs. According to him the focus on civil society in order to build a better, domestic democracy, however, will not succeed and possibly even do harm: approaches of IOs idealized the concept in itself, without truly understanding the mechanisms at work and they concentrated too much on civil society to mostly only allocate resources and deliver services:

“In Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia), civil society has become an integral component of international intervention. (…) The inter-national community’s idealized conception of civil society differs dramatically from the actual conditions in which Bosnian civic groups and organizations function. By viewing civil society building as a technical task, as a matter of allocating resources and delivering services, the international community misunderstands the struggle to over-come nationalist fragmentation. As a result, it miscomprehends the nature of its involvement and retards the transition towards more substantive levels of democratization.” (Belloni 2001: 163)

Recent years have seen more and repeated criticism of how external democracy promotion have been underlining the importance of civil society, while their approaches have not managed to build a “vibrant civil society” and to consolidate democracy in many of the their target states, including Bosnia-Herzegovina. The following list summarizes a number of points for which IOs are frequently criticized in their civil society promotion in Bosnia-Herzegovina:

- A development approach which favors NGOs, on the account of other forms of civic associations;
- Top to bottom strategies in the development of civil society;
- A number of NGOs developed as a result of international projects and not genuine citizens’ initiatives;
- The majority of NGOs financially depends on international donor organizations;
- A lack of coordination between international donor agencies;
- Presence of competition between domestic NGOs, which as a result lack cooperation between them;
- A lack of partnership between international and domestic civil society organizations;
- A neglect of citizens’ associations with more tradition in Bosnian society;
- Donors interests prevailing over citizens actual needs;
- Domestic civil society organizations unable to influence the definition of civil society’s overall priorities;
- Lack of transparency within civil society;
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– A strong presence of international NGOs acting as mediators between international donor agencies and domestic civil society organizations.” (Živanović 2006: 37)

When compared to the situation of CSOs in many Western states, who frequently also unsuccessfully try to lobby or impact politics, compete for scarce funding, etc., the frequently complaints about the difficulties of civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina about little funding opportunities, about politicians who will not listen, etc. (compare e.g. Chandler 1999, 2004) sometimes seems somewhat disproportionate – even when it is understandable that civil society activists wish for support of their efforts to advance democratization.

On the basis of her analysis of civil society promotion in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ivana Howard gives the following recommendations for future civil society support:

- Remain committed for the foreseeable future: the shifting “trends” of funding away from the region risk undermining the effect of previous support
- Reconsider the meaning of sustainability: a new trend word, usually referring to financial viability, usually achieved through diversifying funding sources, aiming to motivate CSOs to seek domestic co-/funding. This, however, causes a tendency for government institutions to give funding to government friendly CSOs or even to GONGOs/QUANGOs (with not all of them fully embracing democratic norms or behavior), risking that critical or watchdog CSOs no longer find sufficient funding.
- Leave the comfort zone: expand the target groups of CSOs much more beyond the big, urban CSOs and include more small and rural organizations, which would also benefit from less bureaucratic project applications and procedures from the side of the donors.
- Learn more about fellow donors: increase donor coordination to avoid overlap of funding and duplication of activities and to exchange information, foster a division of tasks, and increase leverage of resources.
- Try to be consistent: Mostly through less donor visibility, avoid conflicts of interest that may arise when donors cooperate with both, the government and (government critical) CSOs, and may find themselves needing to decide between the two, which may also result in a loss of their credibility or loyalty/impartiality. This also includes avoiding sudden shifts of policy, which may also undermine the work of CSOs that previously have been cooperating with them towards certain goals that suddenly no longer receive support or even start to be contradictory to official donor policies. (Howard 2012: 42–47)

4.2 The Context of Civil Society in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Civil society’s contributions to democratization are theoretically plentiful. In the reality of non-consolidated democracies, they are, however, frequently constrained by more or less favorable conditions. This section presents the findings of the interview analysis based on the previously developed categories for the context of civil society – of the circumstances and the environment that civil society faces, interacts with, it is connected to, and which it may or may not take on and manage to change towards democratic consolidation, depending on the existing obstacles. The following six categories were identified as most relevant during the interview analysis:

A1. Origin and Patterns of Development of Civil Society
A2. Regime Type
A3. Legal Situation
A4. Cooperation with the State
A5. Financial and Economic Situation
A6. Societal Cleavages
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After a first summary of the main findings for each of the six categories, this section presents the findings in more detail, including the most illustrative quotes from the interviews. For each of the six context dimensions, the findings are categorized with regard to (a) civil society and (b) the contribution of external democracy promotion for the particular dimension, while for both also the statements from respondents from CSOs and from IOs are contrasted.

4.2.1 Roots from the Past - NGOs as Result of Massive Funding after the War

Many respondents from CSOs pointed to the fact that “real” civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina had come into existence only during and after the 1992-1995 war. Numerous among them were positive about increased freedom for civic activism, however, they underlined, that until today, civil society very much depended on external support and was not very much rooted in society – and thus lacked tradition and impact. Particularly respondents with a longer experience of work in the field however also pointed to the fact that certain, controlled types of civil society organizations and a certain degree for civic activism existed already prior to the war:

“(b)efore the war, there was space for some form of civic initiative or civil society, but under a different name (...) and of course there were institutionalized groups like ‘Socijalistički savez radnog naroda Jugoslavije’ and ‘Savez Socijalističke Omladine Jugoslavije’, civil initiatives existed during Socialism (unlike during Communism)” (Interview no. 28).

But then “CSOs were not well developed and mostly connected to the communist party and the government”. (Interview no. 12) Still, some people were active “to a certain controlled extent” and “hundreds of people were active, and many of them still are today” (Interview no. 28).

Today, civil society is usually described as very passive, blamed on the communist past, and is accused to still be “the longer arm of politics” (Interview no. 12). Many respondents juxtaposed “civil society”, referring to general, broader civic engagement, and “NGOs”, referring to donor oriented, professional organizations. A number of interlocutors from CSOs stated, that out of the many, around 8,000-10,000 registered NGOs, only 2000 were “ok”, meaning they function and work towards topics rooted in larger parts of the society. Maybe between 200 and 300 NGOs really worked for general public interests, such as the rule of law or anti-corruption. The rest was said to be only money laundering, supporting nationalist causes, etc. and frequently did not exist for longer than one year. The very high number of existing CSOs also is owed to the fact that also sports clubs and local communities are registered as NGOs/CSOs.

On the one hand, two respondents thought that NGOs should be run by young persons with fresh ideas – and who also had more time and flexibility than older, established persons. On the other hand a number of young respondents were frustrated about a monopoly of certain older CSOs personalities who blocked positions for the younger. According to many respondents there are two general types of CSOs: donor oriented, existing to finance salaries through projects, vs. program oriented, that have genuine interest and competence in a certain political fields and one responded regretted that the strong financial orientation of NGOs was contrary to the idea of genuine civil society. 115

About half of all respondents considered social movements a very positive form of civil society, as a broader base in society probably had more political impact than atomized NGOs. However, movements have proven much difficult to establish - even though the advantage was that they were also harder to manipulate - there were some movements: e.g. Dosta!, but it faded soon. Several respondents noted, that in fact there were both, membership based NGOs (chess clubs, soccer associations, etc.) and also professional NGOs usually without a membership base. Several respondents stated that the massive intervention and funding by IOs had created an NGO-job-sector, and that only now, grassroots organizations and broader initiatives were slowly starting to develop. In

115 “The NGO sector has become a very profit making sector unfortunately. Maybe the professionalization to certain extent is positive, but I cannot fully accept it, because the idea of civil society has by now deviated from the original purpose.” (Interview no. 27)
general however, respondents in this context pointed out that civil society also included politically affiliated interest groups that were easily manipulated by politicians, such as unions, veterans, GONGOs, etc. vs. “real social movements” that were much more difficult to instrumentalize but also much harder to establish. Several respondents further underlined the importance of balancing NGOs and social movements.116

Almost all respondents, from CSOs and IOs, stated that a large share of NGOs were “donor driven” and cared much more about funding than about certain goals such as democracy – while almost every single CSO talked about how they themselves of course were not donor driven. A large share from persons from CSOs, some with much regretted that the general public mostly thought NGOs exist to gain and spend money and most citizens have no knowledge about what NGOs are or do. And also the state did not recognize civil society’s real role.117 One respondent from a CSO said that the fact that civil society worked on “changing things” caused criticism of traditionally oriented parts of the society who feel threatened.

As to respondents from IOs, not many referred to the issue of civil society’s development. Most stated civil society had not progressed as much as one may have liked, yet, they mostly underlined how, also owing to their support, civil society had still seen significant progress since 1995:

“Things are not great, when compared with most Western European countries, but still, when compared here to 1995 or 2000, there has been considerable progress. In both entities, CSOs that are critical of the government and how they work, trying to really move forward.” (Interview no. 18)

Further, a number of persons stated that civil society remained relatively underdeveloped and there is little public protest. Finally, one respondent pointed out that historically civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina had a tradition of organizations based on ethnic belonging which dated back to Habsburg times.118 One respondent from an international organization characterized civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina as mostly atomized or fragmented and as usually having little impact, and was particularly critical of the democratic contribution of NGOs.119

Several respondents underlined the important function of the media among civil society. Others, nevertheless, highlighted very big inefficiencies and even negative effect of the international focus on funding and supporting media – as today, despite significant support media is still weak and civil society remains quite uncritical.120 Respondents from IOs agreed with CSOs that civil society mostly consisted of NGOs and that grassroots and community organizations were rare, difficult to establish, and if they existed were usually wither not competitive for a lack of strategic thinking and were only eager to gain access to funding. Several respondents regretted, that civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina was still very

116 “Some (NGOs) have no members, others very broad membership base (e.g. youth associations, students groups), it’s important to balance between professional NGOs and mass movements.” (Interview no. 12)

117 “Some NGOs do great work and have a great reputation, but NGOs need to work together and become recognized by the state and society as more than just doing workshop and street actions.” (Interview no. 13)

118 “You have at the same time, you have, if you like a civil society based around the different ethnic communities, which actually starts under Habsburgs. If you look at the early newspapers, the raw ethnic newspapers, which is extended into the 1920s and 1930s but also it’s about ethnic, cultural organizations. (...) And this is, that’s where civil society is actually focused. It’s around cultural groups that represent the different communities.” (Interview no. 21)

119 “There are islands of civil society, depending on topics they can also be well organized. But regarding topics that are currently crucial for Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example education, civil society is not very developed. If I see civil society as contributing to democratization, my answer depends on my notion of civil society - if civil society is only NGOs, then here we don’t have that, that they contribute to democracy. But I wouldn’t say that we don’t have democracy here. In certain fields civil society is very weak or it doesn’t exist. In some areas it is highly, and in general still quite deeply fragmented.” (Interview no. 20)

120 “They’re weak. You can’t expect that much of civil society to represent interests outside, non-sensitive issues, like fishing associations, young peoples, and nobles.” (Interview no. 24)
much limited to the cities and was very difficult to establish and sustain in rural areas.\textsuperscript{121}

According to several respondents, currently a “natural selection process” was taking place that improved the quality of NGOs, as their number is decreasing due to fading funding possibilities and increased monitoring and evaluation:

“the number of NGOs is decreasing, they are noticing that quality matters. They all just wanted the big money, but now that it’s difficult, they disappear.” (Interview no. 15)

Many respondents from IOs also referred to a general view of civil society as only interested in becoming rich. Several persons also related to the resulting credibility problem of NGOs being viewed as imported from outside, which led to them to be considered as enemies of society or even as foreign mercenaries of IOs or other states. For instance trade unions in the Republika Srpska were said not even wanting to be part of civil society, due to civil society’s bad reputation.

Several respondents referred to the ambivalence of the huge increase of civil society during and after the war – which supported good things but also led to an unnatural process that produced donor oriented NGOs.\textsuperscript{122} Until today NGOs previously working in humanitarian and infrastructure issues are still struggling to adapt to a new market situation of more competition around less financial resources and higher quality controls with most NGOs being highly donor driven. The huge promotion of civil society by international organizations resulted in a proliferation of NGOs whose purpose of existence was rather based on financial interests than on values and who were mostly donor-driven:

“NGOs are oriented again as the fashion of money, what is the trend based on the needs. Stability and being focused in the certain agenda, based on donor-driven philosophy, is still not providing a focused civil society. The essence of the problem of civil society in the last EU progress report was donor-oriented funding.”(Interview no. 35)

Today, however, an increasing number of CSOs are professionalized and work towards certain purposes.\textsuperscript{123} Another result of civil society promotion by external actors was, as several respondents noted, that this inhibited the development of a genuine, influential civil society, which, after many years now, was finally starting to develop:

“After the war there was a lot of NGOs that emerged and so and so on, and we think that we have been following one concept, that was important. And they used to say, it has been a Coca Cola, very nice but important product. And a lot of us have been entering in this not knowing, really, what is the exact meaning of NGO sectors and so on. So, I think that after this sixteen or, I don’t know how many, but in post-war period, now the NGO sectors arrived at the moment, at the limit when they have to design, to conceive, to develop, its own concept. First of all, of its identity in terms of what is the mission, real mission of NGOs.” (Interview no. 17)

Many respondents admitted small scale success in the development of civil society, but very much highlighted, that despite common pessimism and frustration, the work of CSOs still had positive impact. Even though they regretted that until today no real tradition of a critical civil society had developed.

\textsuperscript{121} “it is easier in large cities to organize civil society, but Bosnia-Herzegovina is mostly a rural state, and most people don’t know what is civil society - that really is a failure, that civil society didn’t spread beyond the city centers, and nationalist images pertain in rural areas. In cities you have seminars, conferences, but in rural areas, there is very little knowledge about many issues.” (Interview no. 15)

\textsuperscript{122} “nothing existed during the war, and after the war they started to create many, great number of civil society organizations that were mostly funded by the International Community and they were primarily dealing with the aid and re-construction and everything, reconstruction and the rebuilding of the society, rebuilding of the country, and a lot of humanitarian organizations. And then, from, let’s say, 2000 maybe, there started to be some other organizations that would be, that would promote for example Human Rights, democracy, etc.” (Interview no. 22)

\textsuperscript{123} “During the war and after the war, there was like a big boom of non-governmental development here, civil society, which is good but also not good in a sense, because many of them didn’t have a clear vision what they want to do in society but was more like, look, let’s form NGO because, for money is here. (...) But now, there are more or less, that thing stopped, and there are more groups, you have, like, profiled somehow civil society groups, who are on a different level working.” (Interview no. 12)
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4.2.2 Socialist Legacies and Current Frustration of “Turbo-Capitalism”

Many respondents from CSOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina underlined that there was a general tradition of relying on authorities and not making own decisions, mistrust of authorities and politics in general, slow and informal decision-making processes, etc. – which they said were similar in all of the Western Balkans. However, as a number of experienced respondents noted, the existing freedom under socialism did bring about some form of civil society activism. After several years of frustration due to stagnation in economy and democratization a number of respondents declared frustration about liberal market-democracy and what they referred to as “turbo-capitalism” – saying, that they were promised very much but are still in constant crisis.

Except for the positive contribution of IOs to peace and democratization, with the latter admittedly currently stalled none of the respondents really made any clear statements about the contribution of IOs to the regime type. However, there were general statements made, that many wished for more strategic and reliable EU-/Nato-integration, saying, that only EU accession could then improve further democratization.

4.2.3 Legal Procedures Remain Complicated Despite Extensive Legal Reforms

The main points the CSOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina referred to were that firstly, overall the procedures for government funding were very non-transparent, which benefitted the biggest NGOs who received the largest amount of funding – without the others being able to compete or for anyone to observe correctness. Secondly, in general the legal procedures for NGOs remain complicated – although they have already improved – also owed to lobbying by CSOs. One respondent from the Republika Srpska underlined that in their entity the laws and support for CSOs were in fact much better than in the Federation. The unclear legal situation was also stated to be one of the reasons why CSOs are still very much dependent on foreign funding: it is still unclear with regard to private funders or does not offer them incentives, therefore these are very reluctant to contribute to CSOs.

Respondents from IOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina stated, that they have been investing significant efforts to improve the legislation for civil society – with limited success however, as a few admitted, as the laws were great on paper, but neither implemented nor monitored.

4.2.4 Capacity Building and Pressure from External Actors Increase Cooperation

Respondents from CSOs highlighted that the processes for cooperation between the government and the state administration and NGOs lacks transparency. Further, both state and society still were suspicious with regard to the intentions of CSOs and they did not see civil society as equal partners to work with. One respondent underlined, how he thinks, that finally NGOs should cooperate much closer with the government (implying, this is so far not working too well). In more detail, this regarded particularly the state-administration that tended to cooperate with a few big NGOs but not with others, which some (of the bigger NGOs) blamed on a lack of professionalism on the side of smaller or less experienced NGOs. While several respondents complained about a lack of political independence of CSOs, several respondents noted that as of today a number of NGOs had been established that had acquired enough skills to be of substantial use and expertise for cooperation with the government – and they still manage to remain politically independent. Several respondents

124 “Civil society is not accepted by the state or by society as equal partners you can plan with and decide about responsibilities together. Rather, they see ‘us’ as people who take money from international donors and should not be working with them.” (Interview no. 13)

125 “But now it is important that time has come that NGOs should cooperate with government to provide constructive solutions, still being critical and independent.” (Interview no. 17)
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mentioned that cooperation between state and civil society was much better in fields of service provision than in politically more delicate fields:

“Civil society in BiH is becoming increasingly relevant, and there is more consultation, for example regarding laws, advocacy and participation in decision-making, and so on. The government says they really need the expertise, not only to show to other countries that they cooperate with civil society. There is a big difference between civil society activities of a) service provision and b) political and societal development, which receives less but growing recognition by the government.” (Interview no. 12)

Further, cooperation between CSOs and the state was better at the local level, particularly in Republika Srpska, where the administration cooperated, gave rooms for rent, sponsored events, etc. as persons responsible knew each other and had direct interests in common.

Respondents from international organizations agreed with CSOs that the process for cooperation between state and CSOs lacked transparency:

“The government, parliament and committees are very closed for civil society, and it is unclear who from civil society is chosen for consultations with the government, and also the quality of NGOs we work with is often a problem with donor oriented NGOs.” (Interview no. 41)

Several respondents blamed this on the fact the politicians rather perpetuated their power than serve their citizens and were simply not interested in a dialogue with civil society.\[126\] Even though also respondents from IOs find that cooperation on the local level can be better than between state and CSOs, this is not always the case due to politicization or non-implementation of procedures.\[127\] Many respondents from IOs agreed that a number of CSOs had become skilled for cooperation with the state:

“(…) we saw quite good work done by some CSOs on the Visa-agenda, of criticizing the government for a lack of action or inappropriate action of government conditions. That's useful work and also travelling in Europe could help these people. Capacity building is good if you can focus really on something concrete. We are now at that stage to really start looking into specific issues like EU agenda, and so on.” (Interview no. 18)

Some NGOs have very good international contacts and networks to experts in their working field and often can provide useful expertise – while the government due to financial and human resource limits not always has expertise ready in all fields it works on.

Many respondents from CSOs underlined that even though pressure by IOs has led to increased consultation between them and the government, the non-transparency of the process of consultation undermined possible positive results:

“The government's declaration reaction on pressure put by the European Commission for more consultations usually is that they involved more NGOs, a council of 32 NGOs, but the procedure for the selection and the consultation is unclear, completely undefined, it exists only on paper.” (Interview no. 8)

Actually, frequently when the government was pressured by IOs to involve CSOs in consultation processes it managed to circumvent a positive effect by selecting government-friendly, politically affiliated CSOs.

4.2.5 Financial and Economic Situation

The vast majority of respondents in Bosnia-Herzegovina at some point referred to the importance of financial and economic circumstances for the work of civil society and international organizations. The economy was mainly characterized as very difficult, with ongoing poverty, high unemployment, a vast and expensive state apparatus – and little hope for improvement. Respondents frequently referred to the still difficult situation of the state economy and also to the fact that money from IOs has been

\[126\] “The problem in Bosnia-Herzegovina is that politics don't care about the real problems of the state, but about perpetuation of power, accumulation of money, and positions. There is not this dialogue with civil society, because political elite is simply not interested. If there was dialogue with civil society, politicians would have to face their responsibility and be reminded of what citizens want.” (Interview no. 15)

\[127\] “Unfortunately, often MZs [the local communities] are not really performing or providing services for citizens to really organize and speak out. Often procedure regulations etc. of MZs or between MZs and municipalities are very outdated, so we help to update them. We try to bring some clarity and introduce some regular procedures through which municipalities can easier and clearly communicate with the local communities. To make the whole system more transparent, and to not only have MZ president or MZ council, which are often political party affiliated, but to have whole community participate and interact.” (Interview no. 19)
decreasing over the past few years – after a vast funding boom during and after the 1992-1995 war. However, several respondents noted, that today in fact from school-age on economic hardships and cleavages, aggravated by the complex and costly power-sharing structures, were much more important and divisive in the society than the ethnic divisions usually referred to as most severe.\textsuperscript{128}

Many interview partners from CSOs underlined the importance of funding activities on their part that only made the work of NGOs possible:

“It is important to have one fundraiser in team. They have no continued funding. The biggest donors now are Soros, OSI, and other fundraised funds (...). As NGO you just cannot function without the fundraising from different donors, who mostly are international.” (Interview no. 25)

Many respondents complained about being forced to constantly change and follow the topics they work on depending on changing funding lines. Some respondents from more experienced NGOs mentioned however, that is was possible to find solutions to working strategically on certain topics and still finding donors for support.\textsuperscript{129} One of the big problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been that funding is mostly concentrated on larger cities, and does hardly reach rural areas – thus allowing for the formation of a truly broad civil society, which, however is slowly changing:

“For a longer time, big NGOs in cities were funded, while small NGOs in the periphery were ignored – this seems to be changing currently. It’s important to balance between professional NGOs and mass movements.” (Interview no. 12)

Respondents from international organizations agreed with CSOs that funding was a very important issue for civil society. Many interview partners also frequently referred to the difficult economic situation and the high level of corruption the state has seen for years. Equally as many NGOs, many persons from IOs stated that NGOs suffered from “donor driven image syndrome” (Interview no. 27) and were mostly perceived as working in the (constantly changing) areas that donors funded, thus rarely specializing or focusing on long-term and real impact in a certain area. Also CSOs were readily accepting to live off money by foreign donors, and were not using possibilities for domestic funding, although procedures still needed improvement. Respondents from IOs also said, that there was enough work that required only little funding – but CSOs had become so very accustomed to receiving much funding, as some remarked very critically as the following quotes show, also pointing out that domestic money is in fact available:

“With 60 million Euros from local authorities these are in fact the biggest donors for civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But their internal budget procedures are too weak and the biggest corruption potential in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It’s ok if NGO sector becomes profitable in terms of job creation, but in talks with national NGOs in BiH they all just care about their salaries, but it mostly needs strategic thinking from this point A to point B.” (Interview no. 27)

Another person stated that currently there was a growing middle-class in the state that could act as potential funders of civil society:

“No you have really people with money here, big companies. I will have a music project my daughter is singing in, funded by some of them, who think it’s important to bring kids together and work against prejudice. E.g. if banks sponsor a competition and also give away bank accounts they can win customers.” (Interview no. 21)

Most respondents from IOs did not mind so much, that NGO work had become a job sector. However, they regretted a general shortcoming of strategies by organizations and networks to focus on solving certain issues instead of only assuring the most of possible funding. Contrary to many respondents from CSOs (possibly understandable due to their different interests) several persons from IOs mentioned, that in their view it was only natural, that the amount of funding and with this the number

\textsuperscript{128} “People would probably say that the biggest divide today is history, but even surveys show that the biggest problems are really poverty and corruption. If people had more money, then nationalist ideas and ethnicity would not matter that much” (Interview no. 22) and “School shows general symptoms of society, where already for kids, money and party affiliation determine possible careers.” (Interview no. 26)

\textsuperscript{129} “Established expert NGOs, like us, can work well for many years, and also make a 2-years master-plan strategy.” (Interview no. 11)
of NGOs was currently decreasing. Three respondents even welcomed this as a natural selection process that improved the quality of the sector.\textsuperscript{130}

A certain number of respondents from IOs underlined that there had been significant improvement of the economy since 1995. Several respondents from civil society very much underlined the importance of IOs for funding. Funding is crucial to assure salaries for activists – and for many activists democratic purposes are secondary in the still overall difficult economic situation:

“NGOs cannot exist without funding, volunteering is ok, but if you want to dedicate yourself, you need to do that as a job. After the war most people in Bosnia-Herzegovina are mostly concerned about jobs and peace and have a small focus - for them it’s hard to imagine some community utopia.” (Interview no. 13)

However, some CSOs also noted that without international funding, that anyhow usually only went to the biggest 15-20 CSOs, one was more free – but usually also poorer.\textsuperscript{131} The downside of the importance of donor money for NGOs is the strong dependency on donor money that most NGOs need to survive, which does not only foster worry, but also very concrete mistrust between NGOs. This is due to non-transparency regarding the distribution of scarce funds:

“Distribution is not transparent in mechanisms, procedure, criteria. It is unclear who is financed by whom, no evaluation of projects. Usually, for funding they said it was enough for project proposals to be against the government.” (Interview no. 17)

The dependency on foreign funding has the side effect making CSOs “donor driven” – having to compromise their goals or at least having to be very creative in combining their goals and criteria that fit the donors’ calls for application:

“Funding in general is the biggest problem. The dilemma when writing project proposals is that it’s the best to write your own wishes for the project, but we also need to compromise and modify because we need funding from the foreign funders who can be very strict. Besides one big foreign donor there are many domestic donors, from the City of Banja Luka and from the Ministry of Republika Srpska, which makes it better to balance with foreign donors. The problem with domestic and local sponsors is that if an administration breaks down, like it happened in Mostar, the funding situation gets very bad and dependency on foreigners grows.” (Interview no. 11)

Also, the dependency on international funding has led to a negative reputation of NGOs. However, while international funding helps NGOs to become established, it also creates dependencies – and overall is currently decreasing.\textsuperscript{132} Decreasing international funding makes more and more NGOs turn to domestic donors, who, in fact contribute more to civil society than IOs – while however, the funding process remains intransparent.\textsuperscript{133} Furthermore, domestic donors are not very much used to cooperation, don’t pay funding on time, etc. but who are increasingly open to suggestions from CSOs. Several respondents mentioned that they cooperated well with the ministry of the Republika Srpska – but only regarding not-politically critical fields, such as youth, women’s rights such as protection against domestic violence (but not empowering women in politics), art, etc.. However, international funding for topics that domestic donors are reluctant about, was currently decreasing and EU projects

\textsuperscript{130} “During the past twenty years, there certainly was growth, which is normal for transitional countries, in the beginning there is a boom, also of funding available, and then like natural selection over time, some organizations disappear, and the really good and strong one remained. In Bosnia-Herzegovina there is still a lot of funding available for local organizations, if they’re smart enough.” (Interview no. 19)

\textsuperscript{131} “It is very important to have funding. Most NGOs only talk about their funding. They usually have big donors and are dependent on those. We are self-driven and free. The price for this is we are not rich and not big. The international community should promote start-ups and strengthen other NGOs than the usual 15-20 big fish.” (Interview no. 8)

\textsuperscript{132} “Usually, NGOs need foreign money to become established and get trust, and then can try to get local funding, that is hard to get, so most NGOs concentrate on foreign donors. Focus on foreign funding is negative, because it creates dependency and the foreign funding is currently decreasing - going to other parts of the world.” (Interview no. 11)

\textsuperscript{133} “In 2005, research by the European Parliament found that already 15 Mio. € were allocated to NGOs from all levels of authorities - more than by donors. However, its distribution is not transparent in mechanisms, procedure, criteria. It remains unclear who is financed by whom, there is no evaluation of projects. (…) the time has come that NGOs should cooperate with government to provide constructive solutions, still being critical and independent.” (Interview no. 17)
were very difficult to apply for. In fact, the majority of respondents stated, that only international funding allowed NGOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina to do critical work, for instance illustrated by the following quote:

“If external funding stopped, the number of NGOs in BiH would certainly decrease, maybe the EU commission would still provide some funding, some NGOs would become professional and sell products - but certainly not all organizations for all topics. And without funding it would become more difficult to offer seminars to skeptical politicians, etc. who come also because it’s free. Donors are currently giving some funding for strategic development, which is good, but really takes time.” (Interview no. 12)

Some NGOs find a “diplomatic compromise” of dealing with (perceived) donor expectations, and manage to combine their own wishes and the donors’ demands in project proposals.

Several respondents from international organizations thought they provide substantial amounts of money, despite frequent complaints about scarcity:

“I don’t think the big question is really about funding. Of course, more can always be used, but in think there is quite some money from the Commission, but also from some member states and others.” (Interview no. 18)

International organizations stated to increasingly focus on evaluation and quality controls.

This, currently, is still very necessary as corruption still is high and many structures still need much improvement:

“Until recently, in Bosnia-Herzegovina there was not much focus on evaluation, quality, project applications, etc. and a lot of money was wasted in the construction of civil society, as NGOs didn’t do what they stood for. Currently it has become more difficult to find funding and EU funds require quality in the proposals and evaluation. The education system is horrible, its quality is bad, teachers not motivated, they get low wages, there is chaos, also there is Bologna, corruption scandals, teachers want bribes, and there are no perspectives. And many leaving school are unemployed, and there are corrupt principals, corrupt ministers.” (Interview no. 15)

4.2.6 Despite Pressure and Incentives Ethno-National Cleavages Prevail

Many respondents from CSOs noted that the high ethnicization of politics has led to that ethnicity is always present as a category and politics also enforced this to distract from other pressing problems, such as needed reforms of the economy or the costly state system. CSOs work against this, trying to bridge existing ethnic cleavages in order to unite citizens toward issue coalition – albeit with very limited success owed to the ethnicization of politics – with similar competition along ethnic lines between CSOs. Many respondents referred to the negative effect that ethno-national divisions had on the work of NGOs who have always take into account possibly sensitive issues, provide printing material in the different official languages of the state, etc. (For more on ethno-national divisions of civil society proper see civil society’s qualities and functions below.)

Most respondents noted that politics still, and again increasingly, negatively affected the state by mobilizing along ethnic lines and fostering ethno-national divisions:

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134 “We receive funding from the government but it is very important to us to remain politically independent. As foreign funding is currently decreasing, donors tell them to turn to domestic donors. These are open for some issues but not for all – e.g. for domestic violence, but not for women in politics. (...) EU funds have very high criteria, including 20% self-participation. There were previous EU projects and co-operations on EU projects – they are difficult but the only thing left in that field.” (Interview no. 12)

135 “When there is a Call for Proposals, we really try to fit the criteria and for that now we are not only doing children’s rights issues but also sustainable environment. Most things we are currently doing, are, not to say trendy, but needed at the moment, including sustainable waste management/environmental issues.” (Interview no. 13)

136 “When we get project proposals, I really care, that they don’t look like it didn’t matter where the for example 1000 Euros come from. But that the ideas correspond to our ideals. And well trained staff in Sarajevo usually gets got jobs - that is not so much of a problem.” (Interview no. 20)

137 “The ruling parties try to show every problem as an ethnic or national question. As an excuse, so they don’t have to deal with some true practical problems with economy, progress, et cetera, this why everybody can leave themselves some space to fight for their own interests. That’s why there are so many levels of government and three presidents.” (Interview no. 22)
One big problem for ethno-national divisions was said to consist in the established segregation in almost all spheres of life, particularly in education. This had the consequence that people of different ethnic background had no opportunity to meet and to establish links with each other. A very high number of respondents referred to the significant role of youth with regard to inter-ethnic divisions. Many respondents stated that they very much regretted that today youth grew up very segregated, much more, than the past generation did in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This lead to further cementing the division lines between youth who even did not have a chance to spend time together, to learn about each other and to decrease prejudice:

“You feel, in language use, and such things that the city is divided and we always need to take this into account when we work with our partners. (...) Growing up under communism, nationalities did not matter that much. But today, youth grow up more nationalist than the older people did. This is also owed to the education system and the segregation in school which is an extremely stupid thing.” (Interview no. 25)

The importance of ethnicity, dominated by the three largest ethnic groups in the state, has also lead to a marginalization of “small minorities” that was even ruled unconstitutional by European Court of Human Rights in 2009 in the case “Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina”. Several respondents stated, that political affiliation, frequently also running parallel with ethnic divisions, had become increasingly important (again) as access to jobs, careers, etc.

Several respondents from civil society were frustrated about IOs that had, probably with the best intentions, done much harm by supporting the ethnic quota in the DPA, had established school segregation with the “two schools under one roof”-project, etc. A number of respondents of non-Bosniak background blamed Bosniaks as the majority of the state and also of the capital Sarajevo to monopolize political negotiations and access to financial resources with IOs – with IOs not trying to work against this. Regarding the view that respondents from IOs held about their own work, a few persons admitted that there had been much work on inter-ethnic relations, but as long as youth grew up under segregation, the effect was limited. A number of respondents from IOs gave examples how activities by them and by CSOs were contributing to improving regional cooperation, and thus inter-ethnic relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina:

“Fortunately, in our programs it has become normal to have professors from Zagreb here in Banja Luka, it is much better than it used to, but not as much as we’d like. Many young persons have strong prejudices about the other groups, have never travelled and met them.” (Interview no. 23)

While IOs admitted that among youth inter-ethnic relations were far from easy, many IOs underlined their success in organizing seminars that bring together youth of different ethnic background138:

“When recruiting our participants, especially among youth, we pay attention to having kids from all backgrounds, depending on topic and venue. After seminars young people admit, that in beginning they were afraid, were told before that they’re going to where the bad Serbs live. Then they spent a whole week together, see, that they like same music, clothes, and so on. Many young people who participated, keep in touch. Many also lose contact - but it’s important that a first step towards each other has happened.” (Interview no. 23)

For many years, many IOs have been supporting reconciliation and good inter-ethnic relations on many levels of society.139 Several respondents from IOs agreed that the power struggle between the three biggest ethnic communities frequently did not even take into account the smaller communities and lead to their discrimination. And while many respondents from IOs underlined their success and

138 “Another approach we try is, especially for youth, to take them out of their context in the divided town. Somewhere else they’re more willing to interact with someone else - from the same town and find out many things they have in common.” (Interview no. 19) and “(s)ome students notice, they actually don’t agree with hardliners of their ethnic group, become more moderate. Finally all very much liked the seminar and would like to participate in more. It’s very important that they can meet, discuss, exchange controversial opinions, have coffee together, some stay in touch.” (Interview no. 6)

139 “We did workshops with the press-council in Bosnia-Herzegovina and we invited students from four cities, for example from journalism and ethics, or ecology. And I was really surprised, how exceptional it was for someone from Banja Luka to meet someone from Tuzla. You know, travelling and contacts between universities, and things like this here are very rare. So we did that and they founded a Facebook group.” (Interview no. 6)
important contribution to reconciliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a few also admitted, that this success until today frequently had to be measured on a small scale and particularly in divided communities inter-ethnic relations were still difficult.\textsuperscript{140}

Even if many IOs organized or supported projects that dealt explicitly with inter-ethnic relations, several respondents liked organizing projects that included participants of different ethnic backgrounds, but that dealt with different issues, that, preferably, were interesting to both – e.g. environmental issues, European topics, etc. As to possible perspectives about the future political structure of the state, several respondents from IOs expressed, that they faced the dilemma of continuing to insist on the states unity, that, however, they could not fathom with the strong resistance from the other two larger communities to surrender any of the gained power in order to be democratically governed by a majority – which would be Bosniak. About half of all respondents hoped for positive effects of EU accession, while the majority by now was very frustrated, that transatlantic integration was very slow and for a long time without progress.\textsuperscript{141}

Respondents from CSOs appreciated much of the work that had been done so far by IOs, but they also thought there was much work left to be done regarding inter-ethnic relations.\textsuperscript{142} And while several respondents were quite critical about the ongoing international presence, many of them emphasized that the IOs’ presence was still needed:

> “Most international organizations do not understand ethnic issues in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They say that language is not a problem, but they don’t really manage to convince the majority of people. The international community helped mostly just after war, also in connecting people. But they have their protocol to follow and reports to write. But we still need their presence here. Like Mostar without a major and city politics blocked show this. And this charade ended with the same major as before. So we still need the international presence here.” (Interview no. 26)

While mostly persons from smaller NGOs complained about difficulties of clientelism between IOs and very few of the biggest NGOs that supposedly received the largest share of available funding, from more established, bigger NGOs there were also remarks about very positive experiences of cooperation between IOs and NGOs:

> “With some donors there is a strategic partnership so no need for always new project applications, but strategies were established and there is really nice and open cooperation.” (Interview no. 13)

### 4.3 The Qualities of Civil Society in Bosnia-Herzegovina

This section presents the findings with regard to the previously identified categories relevant as the qualities and characteristics of civil society. As discussed in the theory chapter, the qualities of civil society strongly determine if and to what extent CSOs in reality can and do assume certain of the theoretical functions that are theoretically attributed to them. For instance, a highly hierarchically organized CSO will less automatically socialize its members in democratic behavior and interaction

\textsuperscript{140} “It’s difficult to design activities to bring them [ethnic groups] together. There is always a game of first they’re interested, then one group doesn’t show up, and so on. This is one of the main obstacles for us to work in these communities, and we try to find ways. One of our biggest questions is what can be done in places like Stolac? For now, our only solution is to be persistent, to find a common ground, a common issue or goal and try to find at least one person, one small group on both sides willing to come together, who doesn’t fear a stigma from their own community of talking to the enemy. For us it’s all trial and error, to keep encouraging our officers to keep trying to bring groups together.” (Interview no. 19)

\textsuperscript{141} The influence of ethno-religious communities is increasingly controlling the political development of the state, who also strongly influence the voters to vote nationalistic, the war has resulted in omnipresent ethno-national and religious identity attribution. BiH is like a small Yugoslavia, it can only getter better once we are a member of the EU.” (Interview no. 8)

\textsuperscript{142} “The most important things for IOs in near future are work on the educational system and on the constitution. To observe and to build capacity, help copy good examples, like Switzerland maybe. And to build a strong political opposition. But in Mostar work needs to be done on bringing people to communicate and to cross the bridge.” (Interview no. 26)
Chapter 4: Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Civil Society: Mostly Professional, Divided, and Dependent on Foreign Support for Political Impact

than an organization that functions according to democratic procedures. The following four categories were identified as most relevant for civil society’s quality and contribution to democratization:

B1. Non-Conflictive Structure of Civil Society
B2. Organizational Structure across Cleavages
B3. Organizational Capacity
B4. Independence from the State and from Political Parties

First, a summary of the main findings for each of the four categories is presented. Subsequently, the findings from the interviews are discussed in more detail, including the most illustrative quotes from the interviews. For each of the four most important qualities civil society, the findings are categorized with regard to (a) civil society and (b) the contribution of external democracy promotion for the particular dimension. Also, the statements by respondents from CSOs and by IOs are contrasted.

4.3.1 Financial Competition and Clientelism Perpetuate Conflicts within Civil Society

Regarding this dimension, there were particularly many statements by respondents from CSOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and most references were negative. Many respondents stated that they viewed civil society as very divided – between big, successful, professionalized NGOs and the rest, and between the different ethnic groups, which strongly inhibited possible positive impact. Several respondents blamed the “few big fish” to actively pursue a monopoly on funding, and to keep out any possible competition – which created mistrust and discontent in the larger civil society. Several respondents put forward, that many CSOs stole ideas from each other, as everyone was competing for the same, decreasing funding lines on a limited market:

“All NGOs need money, they all do the same topics, steal from each other, copy-paste, etc., which is very inefficient and short term.” (Interview no. 11)

The state, and accordingly the civil society scene are quite small which would theoretically facilitate contacts and networks. Nevertheless, issue coalitions are rare - several respondents thought that more efficient networking would be important to have more impact. The strong competition and also the many networks that had previously been installed by IOs, however, resulted in a reluctance of CSOs to be involved in networks. Further, there most CSOs were afraid that their ideas would be used by the strongest NGOs. Several initiatives by civil society to network in big coalitions (e.g. ‘GROZD’ in 2006) soon collapsed due to internal power struggle, mistrust, and possibly also due to a lack of support by international organizations:

“Problems of networking and coalition building are the biggest problems besides the identity search of NGOs. We had numerous networking initiatives, but introduced by donors and before the conditions were ripe. Many NGOs were members of networks just to be members without asking the purpose, their benefits, goals, etc. Today there is better cooperation. But NGOs are tired of networking – which is an effect of the past. Establishing a monitoring commission could also increase trust among NGOs. So far, networks have often collapsed due to institutional problems. Before the 2006 elections there were large platforms: CIVIC AGENDA and the GROZD initiative tried a huge consultation process, but it suffered from lack of cooperation between NGOs. NGOs were afraid they would lose some of their own stakes, and be eaten by GROZD, so they opted out.” (Interview no. 17)

Several respondents blamed the frustration and stagnation as well as the fragmentation on a lack of common vision – that cannot only be blamed on the current complex political structures. Several persons expressed, that they saw the repeated allusion to inter-ethnic divisions and tensions as just another strategy by CSOs instrumentalize ethnicity in order to keep up the flow of funding and also to multiply positions.

143 “With the current structures, civil society can’t do much. Civil society needs to develop from grassroots, but with such emotional feelings about smaller interests here this can’t happen.” (Interview no. 24)

144 “Ethnicity and nationality is an excuse for not dealing with practical issues but in this way everybody can leave themselves some space to fight for own interests.” (Interview no. 22)
Respondents from IOs also agreed, that civil society overall was fragmented but was also “cheering on” the conflict, thus aggravating ethnic divisions:

“The conflictive system, there is no civil society that would stand up and block it, but in fact cheer it on. Civil society is seen as positive, but in fact civil society is a major part of the problem. It is compartmentalized, e.g. the media creating more tension.” (Interview no. 21)

Further, several interview partners from IOs agreed with the negative view of persons from CSOs - they also viewed civil society as quite divided and structured along strong interest groups that were frequently in parallel to ethnic divisions.

Overall, respondents in both countries under investigation stated that they thought international organizations played a role in how civil society had developed. They further blamed past or current policies or approaches of IOs to have led to developing a civil sector that remained focused on the urban centers, suffered from the same strong cleavages that the general society suffered from, i.e. ethno-national and political divisions, and also had not truly adopted a role model function for CSOs, as IOs themselves were not really transparent and seemed biased in favor of always the largest NGOs in their funding priorities – causing mistrust, competition, and jealousy in the civil sector. Years of IOs promoting networks without real success has somewhat led to a “networking fatigue” among many NGOs.

Several respondents from CSOs were quite critical of the role that IOs played in negatively influencing the divisions in civil society, by not being transparent, by not being open to cooperation with new CSOs instead of always the same, already established ones, and also by focusing on the larger cities and thus ignoring civil society in more rural areas. Further, a number of persons from CSOs blamed IOs that they have been trying to build coalitions for years without real purpose or success, which has led to a general fatigue of organized networking. This approach that fostered competition and mistrust by several respondents from CSOs and also calls by IOs for civil society to “speak with one voice” were seen as very unrealistic and undermined the credibility of IOs.

4.3.2 Ethno-National and Political Affiliation and their Institutionalization Hamper Civil Society’s Impact

Several respondents from CSOs said that most CSOs were mono-ethnic and affected by existing ethno-national divisions. Civil society in general did not enough to oppose and to work against these divisions – while, however, doing so at the same time was also considered a delicate issue:

“Civil society in Bosnia is very much conditioned by the non-existence of a Bosnian political nation and by ethno-nations and ethno-nationalism. Civil society does not fight ethno-national lines set-up by political system. Cooperation in the Federation between Croats and Bosniaks in recent years has worsened. Claims for a third entity are increasing and ethnic tension spreads from politics to people - and "others" have no saying. Civil society should, but is doing little to oppose an ethnic notion of citizenship. And politicians always scream, when political nationalism is tried to be pushed. If civil society wants to transcend ethnicity this needs to be done cautiously without mentioning and reinforcing divisions.” (Interview no. 28)

Even though CSOS work in the entire state, true inter-ethnic CSOs were rare and often also mostly created for the purpose of receiving grants available for inter-ethnic projects.145 While some CSOs simply were not inter-ethnic others actually promoted ethnic divisions in the population:

“There are NGOs that support the interests of Bosniaks, others of Serbs, or of Croats, not strengthening the unitary state but a partition of it - and received a lot of money. Many organizations propagated particular interests and the partition of the society and called themselves NGOs. There are many sports associations or culture or religious associations that work with their own religious or ethnic group. Some just ignored the others, some didn't build bridges, some actively fostered hate - with fatal effects. Many organizations after the war and Dayton perpetuated ethnic networks, etc. and connected to the political/ethnic lines. Of course there were also other NGOs that were not nationalist, but promoting cooperation.” (Interview no. 15)

Several respondents pointed out that there were two types of CSOs: unions and other interest groups easy to be manipulated by politics, and also there were a few movements around certain issues which,

145 “Many CSOs work in all of BH need to stress not to lose people, that they don't want melting pot but preserve groups' rights.” (Interview no. 28)
however, usually they did not last very long, e.g. Dosta. Some persons stated that when they wanted to work in all of the state, particularly also in both entities, they needed to avoid being too explicit about their inter-ethnic “mission” as this might make some persons suspicious, see them as traitors and possibly make some possible target groups reluctant to work with them.

Some persons from CSOs critically remarked that if the ethnic divisions were not so deep but if they rather concentrated on cooperating based on certain issues and interests, united efforts could bring about more political impact. Further, strong division between different interests regarding similar issues led to strong competition and countered possible synergy effects. A few respondents also mentioned, that political affiliation was (again) becoming increasingly important for access to politics and decision-making – and political affiliation usually runs parallel with ethnic affiliation – and also access to resources was easier for the ethnic majority that was the majority in the capital:

“Cities in the periphery are disadvantaged with their NGOs, and it’s mostly Muslims from Sarajevo that get the funding and are hated by everyone. Ethnicity is always present in the civil society in BH, like society. Everything, also NGOs, are politically affiliated and politics take place around nationalities.” (Interview no. 8)

While cooperation was said to not function well between NGOs of different ethnicity, there were some areas, where common action was better, notably in issues of service provision or women’s issues.

Even though many persons stated that inter-ethnic cooperation was not easy and not always common, most NGOs proudly explained about large, international networks they were part of and with whom they were organization interregional and international projects, where inter-ethnic cooperation did not seem to present a barrier to understanding, while however inter-ethnic cooperation within the state remained difficult.

Many respondents from IOs agreed that civil society was deeply divided along ethnic lines, also historically and frequently also negatively influencing inter-ethnic relations, rendering their work of improving inter-ethnic relations very difficult.

Even though they agreed that inter-ethnic relations were improving, there are still certain nationalist parts of civil society that have negative impact, and also persons from IOs pointed at the difference between NGOs vs. unions, farmers unions, etc. with

146 “Civil society is compartmentalized within the national groups. And maybe some examples of the recent years show that there ARE ways to transcend the national lines. For professional politicians it is easy to push people in the game along ethnic lines. You have 2 levels of civil society associations: First: unions, interest groups, etc. easy to manipulate, second: social movements, much harder to establish.” (Interview no. 28)

147 “All the time in the work you need to be careful what you say. Politicians make people nationally aware. Colleagues ask stupid questions when we cooperate with Muslims or Croats. Multi-ethnicity, multi-culturality in BH could really be a value, some good starting point for a totally, totally different dimension, to learn to live with differences.” (Interview no. 13)

148 “In civil society there are many organizations with national prefix, like Serb-, Croat-, Bosniak-, in their name. They don’t fight together, but if they would maybe the effect would be better. The same happens with labor organizations. They are more concerned with specific interests of one nation or one ethnicity, one organization, more interested in their own interests than those of the workers. We don’t mind nationality in our work, because it’s not important. We deal with specific problems and that’s the most important thing. Nationality really does not have any importance. The things we deal with are very specific, concrete, visible and have great impact.” (Interview no. 22)

149 “There is cooperation with a network of NGOs in the region. NGOs seem really open and liberal, and truly working across ethnic division lines. People are so attached to their ethno-national politics and representatives, civil society cannot cut across that, and in itself is partitioned by ethnic divisions. Even NGO people from Banja Luka don’t go to Mostar, have also prejudice, also in other fields, for example in gay rights.” (Interview no. 11)

150 “There are small successes of inter-ethnic cooperation. In Gornij-Vakuv Uskoplje, our officer did a project on youth delinquency. Everybody agreed it was very important but meetings had to be Croats and Bosniaks separated and only one group showed up for our workshop. But the big success, a breakthrough, was, that after all that, at least one of the NGOs acknowledged the other group’s participation in the project on their website.” (Interview no. 19)
Chapter 4: Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Civil Society: Mostly Professional, Divided, and Dependent on Foreign Support for Political Impact

the latter being closer to ethno-nationalist politics. Several persons working with CSOs agreed that civil society had less political impact as CSOs were competing about influence instead of cooperating and thus increasing their political impact – however, some persons from IOs also said they thought that there was very little cooperation among civil society, while, the main division line today was no longer ethnicity.

“Now reconciliation is not sexy anymore, but concrete work on concrete fields is now needed – we promote cooperation within sectors around certain fields, for example social development, child protection. There is almost no cooperation and dialogue between the government and non-government sector, there is very poor communication within the civil society sector, almost no sectoral cooperation. With the same project we are promoting communication among NGOs, sector wide approaches. Civil society has overcome the obstacle of ethnic division a long time ago, civil society does not reflect structure of country. They are far ahead in this of the government and some cooperation in development. Civil society is not divided, some organizations have offices throughout the country, regardless the ethnic group in the area.” (Interview no. 27)

Also from IOs, many respondents stated that most CSOs were very good at international co-operation, without inter-ethnic problems across borders.

Even though several IOs stated to be cooperating with religious authorities, only one respondent underlined a very positive role of the church, while most other CSOs were strongly negative – also owed to the bad structures installed and supported by IOs. A few persons from IOs complained that several other IOs knowingly supported organizations that were openly nationalist and thus legitimized them as relevant actors. While most respondents from IOs did not speak about their own role regarding this dimension, several respondents highlighted the important role that they have played in bringing together different organizations from the various ethnic and political backgrounds and try to have them meet and where possible also to cooperate on issues. Some respondents also underlined the positive role that IOs had played in reconciliation:

“One respondent from an IO stated that she had been working on trying to counter the strong influence of political affiliation in her work at the local level:

“We try to make the whole system more transparent, and to not only have the MZ president or the MZ council, which are often political party affiliated, but to have whole community participate and interact.” (Interview no. 19)

While, despite the much more pessimist statements of persons from CSOs on external democracy promotion, most persons from IOs only highlighted their positive contribution. A small number of interview partners from IOs, however, also admitted that they were somewhat disappointed about the relatively small success with regard to inter-ethnic relations after the many years of their work.

4.3.3 Civil Society’s Organizational Capacity has increased yet Varies Significantly

Statements from CSOs about their own work were overall mostly optimistic as to their own organizational skills. Most persons from CSOs had participated in numerous capacity building activities, and many persons in NGOs have acquired substantial experiences and skills in writing applications and

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151 “A big issue after war was ethnic division of the whole civil society, which is a very determining factor still. Things have improved, there is now more cooperation over nationality and entity barriers than before. In the past five, six, seven years we also get some Bosnia-wide NGOs. But this is different than the NGO sector, regarding other parts of civil society like unions, lobby organizations, farmers unions, etc. these are still very much divided between entities and nationalities.” (Interview no. 18)

152 “Election system doesn’t vote as all MPs only seek the votes of their co-ethnics, democracy doesn’t work under such circumstances. If you get these structures right, I think you have created the ground for civil society’s work. Civil society actually represents in many ways the interests of people who stand behind intolerance and persecution, e.g. the war veterans. I’m extremely positively surprised by Catholic Church, their foresight in RS and other parts. They are founding great mixed schools, running anti-drug programs, aimed at building tolerance. Also there is Caritas. - But not same work in Herzegovina. The system here is bad, creates a particular behavior that is not fertile ground for civil society.” (Interview no. 21)
reports and in networking, language proficiency in English, etc.\textsuperscript{153} About half of all respondents also stated that it was very important to be able to write good project applications, to speak good English and to be up to date and well connected, as this was needed for cooperation with donors, which in turn is the precondition to receive funding.

Generally, as networking and contacts to donors constitute the base for the needed funding. These activities take a lot of the NGOs’ work time.\textsuperscript{154} About half of all respondents underlined how networking with partner NGOs and with donors on the local, national, regional, and on the international level, was a very important part of their activities. Not many, however a few, referred to how their everyday work, a few mentioned that is was a lot of work, many different activities at the same time, for several quite a lot of traveling, many reports, project applications, etc. Two respondents mentioned, that others asked them for their advice, as all of this it needs quite some organizational skills that did not come naturally to everyone, and several organizations mentioned that the skills gained in this context were very valuable on the general job market. Usually, also organizational capacity for cooperation between NGOs and between CSOs local administration frequently worked well on a professional level:

“Coordination among NGOs is often very flexible and chaotic and things constantly are in flow and most things take long to get done. A good success was: a now state wide network of high school volunteers. We have a partnership with the local museum for contemporary art, they are happy that we bring funding and projects, so it’s a win-win solution, cooperation not competition. Also, we cooperate with a network of NGOs in the region, and with local institutions.” (Interview no. 11)

A few persons from CSOs, however, noted, that the reluctance of the biggest NGOs to cooperate with NGOs that are smaller or located in more rural areas was a disadvantage – as the big NGOs frequently had the money, and the small and local CSOs frequently had the real contacts to the population and to administration who cared. Despite the mistrust that frequently inhibited coalitions on the national level (see category on the non-conflictive structure of civil society), in some fields related to social service provision, e.g. domestic violence against women, respondents stated that good networks had been created and were running well.

One respondent from an IO regretted that NGOs frequently were organized only around topics and not in broader fields, which, as he said, decreased their possible impact on policy-making and on democracy per se, and he added that civil society is more than NGOs and that the connection between civil society and democracy needed to be strengthened:

“Some CSOs are not weak, but often they are focused on particular topics. And in the region networking is not very developed, due to a lack of awareness or language barrier, as not all are well educated. The image is very, very diverse. There are islands of civil society, depending on topics they can be well organized. But regarding topics that are crucial for Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example education, civil society is not very developed. If I see civil society as though contributing to democracy, my impression depends on my notion of civil society - if civil society is meant to be only NGOs that is there, but then if it is to be more here we don’t have that. (...) But in order to reach democratization it’s important to establish a link between civil society and democracy.” (Interview no. 20)

Several respondents also underlined how for them the organizational capacity of NGOs was important and that they wished for NGOs they cooperated with to be well organized and professional – in writing project proposals and reports, and also in implementing projects. Several respondents stated that there had been improvement in this regard, also through their own support, and that they appreciated good quality work.

\textsuperscript{153} “In previous work I learned how to write project proposals for advocacy actions, and I’m networking all over the Balkans, and I have started to translate to English a lot. For projects it’s important to plan carefully and to involve potential stakeholders, not to plan something imaginary. After 10 years of work experience I don’t like planning trendy projects or what the donors only consider important. It is important for success to network with other NGOs, for the long run and to be sustainable, also it is important to have issue coalitions across divisions.” (Interview no. 12)

\textsuperscript{154} “Very much of the work in the youth center consists of coordination with partners, networks, etc. - besides the work with youth. There are several local partnerships for cooperation, for children’s rights there is a national network, there is the youth council of the city and the entity. They are trying to establish partnership with center for environment. Depending on the donors, there is daily or less frequent communication, depending on the nature of the link.” (Interview no. 13)
Respondents from IOs were in general somewhat more critical about the competencies of CSOs and highlighted how they have been supporting and continue to promote them with numerous measures for capacity training that recently is starting to show more success:

“Currently it is important to work on the capacity of CSOs, the situation is not rosy but considerably better than some years ago. (...) We should focus on building general capacity and also for organizations to focus more on specific issues as well.” (Interview no. 18)

Another aspect that has been promoted for several years is the support of networks. While many networks, possibly those developed out of inherent need and wish to cooperate, work fine, quite a number of the networks promoted by external actors, for instance in rural areas, still need external support and do not function autonomously.

### 4.3.4 CSOs are frequently too Distant or too Close to Politics

Respondents from CSOs were very critical regarding the political independence of civil society and saw many NGOs closely affiliated to (nationalist) political parties. Several persons stated that certain closeness to politics of some NGOs created mistrust among them and reduced political independence that was important for critical work. Moreover, some politicians founded their own NGOs and there was clientelism between the government and certain NGOs. Independence from political parties is also difficult to maintain as particularly the instrumentalization of NGOs or the defamation of politically critical NGOs is difficult to deal with:

“Sometimes, after publishing things not good for the government, the media will attack the NGO to not be independent. There were examples, when the RS’s government launched a media campaign against NGO, but with help of international community, NGO was able to defend themselves.” (Interview no. 22)

Several respondents from IOs said about CSOs, that they thought that many CSOs were politically affiliated, but that it was definitely also possible to be independent from politics. While many NGOs are independent, mostly larger organizations, such as war veterans, unions, etc. are usually close to politics and they have the reputation that at times they are also instrumentalized by politicians:

“Civil society is used here not so much by us but by the international organizations and by political parties, those that are in power or others. Like the war veterans, they often speak for themselves, but just of often they are used to speak for political parties, for example the government of the Republika Srpska is very good at this.” (Interview no. 18)

A small number of respondents from IOs also stated that due to political affiliation of local self-governments and schools cooperation between these and NGOs frequently was mixed with political tendencies.

International organizations for several years have been promoting civil society’s independence through funding – with some success, but still not enough. IOs also have exerted pressure on the government to cooperate with CSOs and to respect their participation – with some success, although not to a degree comparable to Western states.

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155 “Much of civil society is affiliated with political parties, and local funders use stage for political appearances and gaining votes.” (Interview no. 11)

156 “For projects it’s very important to be independent from political and governmental influence. Many political parties also founded their own NGOs to get voters and to be popular. It’s a public secret who works with whom and if you want to be politically independent you can avoid working with them. One sees that some NGO is close to politics when they get money from the government, what values they support, etc. e.g. war veterans, or soldiers, who publicly support politics, so they seem independent but are not.” (Interview no. 12)

157 “(...) half of all NGOs are those working for the ethno-national politics. These are financed by the domestic budget, having same agenda as official politics. And we’ve seen many crucial incidents where other NGOs just kept quiet.” (Interview no. 23)
4.4 The Functions of Civil Society in Bosnia-Herzegovina

This section finally presents the results from the interview analysis with regard to the categories that were identified with regard to the theoretically assumed functions of civil society. As discussed in the theory chapter, the functions of civil society are thought to be accountable for the effect that civil society has in the political system and for the democratic spill-over of civil society. The following eight categories were identified as most relevant for civil society’s functions and democratic spill-over:

C1. Control the State’s Power
C2. Monitoring and Diffusion of Independent Information
C3. Aggregation, Articulation, and Representation of Interests
C4. Mitigation of Overlapping Interests across Particular Interests
C5. Diffusion and Socialization of the Importance of Civic Virtues
C6. Stimulate Political Participation of Citizens
C7. Recruiting of new Leaders
C8. Service Provision

As the previous sections this section first presents a summary of the main findings for each of the eight categories. Following, the findings from the interview analysis are presented and discussed in detail, providing some of the most relevant quotes from the interviews. For each of the eight most important functions civil society, the findings are categorized with regard to (a) civil society and (b) the contribution of external democracy promotion for the particular dimension. Also, the statements by respondents from CSOs and by IOs are contrasted.

4.4.1 Non-Transparency or Political Attacks Limit Control of State’s Power

Respondents from CSOs frequently stated that CSOs were not politically independent and thus not really able to criticize or take on other important functions – unless they had support from international organizations:

“Today, there are two top priorities in the civil society in BH: 1. cross-sectoral cooperation, 2. independence from the government. For this it is important to balance between external funders and local donors: we really have to carefully and clearly choose the government programs that one applies to: which for now are only service oriented - the government understands those issues and doesn't interfere in the projects. While getting government funding for service provision, we apply to foreign donors for sensitive political issues, who will not interfere - and we also chose donors that won’t.” (Interview no. 12)

Several respondents stated political criticism by CSOs frequently resulted in defamation and attacks by the government. Some respondents noted that, also due to the complex administrative set-up of the state and the stagnated economy, the government and political parties were the biggest employer – which was an important incentive for their employees to assure their jobs and to continue voting for “their” political parties.

Respondents from international organizations in general were quite very critical of civil society’s role and impact regarding the control of the state – being aware that this was also partly owed to civil society’s political and financial dependency:

“Our NGO reports and monitors in the RS and on the state level on different issues. Sometimes though, after publishing things that are not good for the government, the media will attack us for not being independent. There were examples, when the RS-government launched a media campaign against us. But with help of international community, we were able to defend ourselves. Usually, politicians lack the will to go against poverty, corruption, and there is a lack of implementation - for their own interests – a lack of order and an inefficient judiciary that suit them to have their space for abuse of their office.” (Interview no. 22)
much more difficult and much weaker, and civil society tends to agree with the political masters from where they come from instead of criticizing them. CSOs know it’s not healthy to criticize in terms of receiving funding and backing if they criticize the only political master in town.” (Interview no. 18)

And also ethno-political closeness of NGOs leads to their support or at least not criticizing of politics.159

Many interview partners from IOs agreed with civil society that politicians refused to take civil society into account, were corrupt – but they partially blamed this on citizens who were unhappy about the government but then went on to vote for them again in the next elections160 - or as another respondent put it

“democracy is really more about limiting and controlling power than about the system being democratic - here power is abused by over-powerful politicians.” (Interview no. 21)

Many respondents were unhappy about still prevailing nationalist politics, relating to corruption of politicians and in other spheres of public life.161

Respondents from IOs revealed only little about how they viewed their contributed to the situation. Only a few respondents mentioned how they in fact supported strengthening civil society vis-à-vis the government, e.g. by a critical sentence in the EU-progress report, and only one person really underlined positive contribution his organization had made with regard to strengthening civil society’s control function:

“We had huge results in connecting citizens, civil society and the government, and opening the local government to citizens and making civil society and building more transparency and more participation in into various mechanisms.” (Interview no. 24)

Civil society did not very much mention the role of international organizations in the context of controlling the state, but mostly underlined examples where international organizations gave critical statements of government attacks against civil society – that, however, had no extensive impact, but at least stopped the attacks:

“Sometimes though, after publishing things that are not good for the government, the media will attack us for not being independent. There were examples, when the RS-government launched a media campaign against us. But with help of international community, we were able to defend ourselves.” (Interview no. 22)

4.4.2 State-Owned Media Limit Monitoring and Diffusion of Independent Information

Respondents from CSOs overall where rather negative as to their own role in how they helped to distribute critical information and information that helped to monitor and control the state. Many respondents referred to the role of the media, frequently considered as part of the civil society, as controlled and owned by politicians – even though for many years the international community had invested huge amounts of money and time in support. Several CSOs also stated it was still important to win the media at times for support and broadcast time on civil society’s issues.162

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159 “The other half of NGOs are working for the ethno-national politics. These are financed by domestic budget, having same agenda as official politics. And we’ve seen many crucial incidents where NGOs just kept quiet.” (Interview no. 23)

160 “The problem in Bosnia-Herzegovina is that politics don’t care about the real problems of the state, but about perpetuation of their power, about accumulation of money and positions. There is not this dialogue with civil society, because the political elite is simply not interested. If there was dialogue with the civil society, politicians would have to face their responsibility and they would be reminded of what citizens want. And also changing legislation, and so on always take painfully long. Since the war, in Bosnia-Herzegovina trust in institutions by the population is very low. And before elections, ethno-national divides are so easily activated. And even those who heavily criticize the government for that finally vote for them. The education system is horrible, its quality is bad, teachers are not motivated, there are low wages, chaos, also you have Bologna, corruption scandals, teachers want bribes, and in general no perspectives” (Interview no. 15)

161 “And many leaving school are unemployed, and there are corrupt principals, corrupt ministers.” (Interview no. 15)

162 “The media gives lots of space to the public that is politically supportive which is bad and manipulation. Civil society groups with time became increasingly visible and less underground than they used to be before. And we have managed to have media space to talk about critical issues. It is important for success to cooperate with the media.” (Interview no. 12)
respondents stated how they thought that the media was used by politicians to promote their views and also to fuel ethnic tensions to raise support for politics among the public:

“In villages different ethnicities live together well, only the media from Sarajevo escalate the situation.” (Interview no. 8)

Some interview partners from IOs however, stated how they were in fact quite unhappy about the still very deep inter-ethnic divisions in certain rural areas. Several persons from IO agreed that the media was used or let itself be used to serve as a platform to publicly attack and defame politically critical NGOs, that sometimes were supported by legal advice from more experienced NGOs. However, several respondents underlined their own contribution of training journalists in good reporting and ethics – with at times limited success however, as also journalists needed to live:

“The media also is strongly affiliated with nationalist party politics, but also journalists need to play along with party politics for success.” (Interview no. 26)

One area that received mostly positive comments was that civil society provided occasions for public discourse, organized round tables, discussion, shadow reports, and conducted research to various questions regarding political (non-)action:

“We do round tables and media appearances on Bosnia-Herzegovina reforms towards the EU.” (Interview no. 14) Or, as another respondent stated: “Our main goal is the fight against corruption. We run an advocacy and legal advice center and give recommendations. We have managed to raise public awareness and also to influence politics on issues.” (Interview no. 22)

Many respondents from IOs positively referred to how their support helped civil society to organize and provide space for public discourse and information:

“We often have anniversaries for events, for example of Dayton with Kreis99, or with ACIPS on eight years of Dayton, to analyze Dayton, with young members, to formulate policy recommendations, to publish that. And we continue in this field, to accompany developments. It’s very important that they can meet, discuss, exchange controversial opinions, have coffee together, some stay in touch.” (Interview no. 6)

Not quite as optimistically, another person from an IO underlined their positive contribution but admitted that the situation for civil society was becoming increasingly difficult:

“We also work with the media, first to disseminate relevant issues to the public, and second we do trainings of journalists and freedom of the media. Regarding EU accession we organize conferences and mainly inform the public about the real consequences of the EU accession. Another field that would be important to promote would be electronic media. Local potential alone is too weak, the media are economically so weak that they very much depend on politics, so media freedom is also going backwards.” (Interview no. 23)

One field of IOs activities on which CSOs were divided was that they supported the publication of information in several local languages – while proponents underlined the importance of easy access to information for everyone; the opponents thought that this would mainly enforce the idea of rightful demands based on ethnic arguments.

4.4.3 Issue Coalitions and Networks are Rare yet Increasing

Interview partners from CSOs were generally not very happy how they were able to represent their interests vis-à-vis the state. However, a large number of CSOs said there has been improvement:

“Civil society here is increasingly relevant and there is more consultation, e.g. regarding laws, advocacy, participation in decision-making, and the government says they really need expertise – not just decorative cooperation with civil society.” (Interview no. 12)

Nevertheless, several respondents also noted that their counterparts in the state administration were usually not very eager to listen to them, to involve them, or to let them have any influence – or was not aware of possible procedures to involve civil society.

Several persons from IOs regretted that the actual capacity of CSOs for cooperation with state institutions still needed to be improved. Concerning the aspect of bringing together different groups in order to aggregate common interests, several persons were not so happy about the results – partly owed to the dominating ethno-political divisions and also due to the common mistrust and a lack of organization. Respondents from IOs shared the opinion that civil society was not enough involved and did not have sufficient impact on policies, except maybe for big, traditionally rooted organizations such as the war veterans:

“There are some organizations that historically or from the war are well organized. And as soon as they're interests are infringed, there is massive resistance, e.g. the war veterans: when they speak out they often impact political
decisions. Other organizations are rather weak, especially regarding questions of reconciliation or communication - particularly in education issues, and also EU accession, visa-liberalization. Some CSOs are not weak, but often they are focused on particular topics.” (Interview no. 20)

Further, the overall impact of civil society was seen as limited by a non-willingness of political elites to take civil society’s interests into account:

“Civil society should be independent from politics, but at the same time also send signals. But in Bosnia-Herzegovina so far there is no voice of civil society and if there is, it gets ignored.” (Interview no. 15)

One respondent an IO was quite positive about cooperation he had had with good NGOs who, by promoting their interests, had also contributed to improving the process of interest aggregation from civil society by monitoring the state administration.163 Most persons from IOs put forwards, however, that frequently the degree of professionalism of CSOs was not sufficient to be successful in negotiations with the government, but it had been improving thanks to their support. One respondent from an IO agreed with civil society, that the impact of civil society of bringing together different groups to find common interests was in fact not as good as he would wish for.

Several respondents from IOs underlined their own active support and their positive contribution in improving the cooperation and interest aggregation from different groups:

“We had huge results in connecting citizens, civil society and the government, opening local government to citizens and civil society and civil society building more transparency and more participation into various mechanisms.” (Interview no. 24)

A number of persons from IOs also said that they set good examples of consulting with CSOs by consulting with them about program planning – while, however, final decisions for funding lines and budget planning were taken at headquarters.

4.4.4 Particular Interest Shape Civil Society’s Structure and Limit Their Impact

Respondents from CSOs were quite positive about their overall contribution to the mitigation of overlapping interests across (ethnic) particular interests, particularly in the context of post-conflict activities they organized, such as reconciliation, providing common interests, etc.:

“Civil society has very much contributed to reconciliation, and also what is positive to the promotion of multicultural life and peace-building, to lowering tension and providing common vision. Networking with other NGOs is very important for the long run and to be sustainable, and one also has to have issue coalitions across divisions.” (Interview no. 12)

Another field that many respondents from CSOs thought they positively contributed to were the fields of multi-cultural life and exchange to decrease stereotypes and to develop common visions, for instance by providing space to meet:

“We provide space for dialogue, but people need to use it. And we support that. Because, when communication stops, cleavages grow.” (Interview no. 26)

One important target group for the work of many CSOs were youth.164 According to several respondents it was difficult at times, though, to actually form issue coalitions across (ethnic) cleavages that existed also in civil society.

Respondents from IOs also positively referred to the role that civil society played with regard to reconciliation. Yet, several respondents were more reserved about the possible positive impact - as

163 “We have been closely working with Transparency International on a law of conflicts of interest. The local authorities’ draft was quite substandard. And also with transparency international we have tried to make improvements in proposals coming from civil society. There is also this CCI, very good and with an overall political basis working mostly in the federation. We have used this organization quite often to promote some concrete initiatives.” (Interview no. 18)

164 “During our human rights course, our rule is to mix high school students from different ethnic backgrounds. They sleep together in one room, and we play games to break groups so they mix. And they start to communicate. You can’t do miracles in one week, but you can give them something to think about, to show there are other ways than ethnic separation and they get to know each other and find similarities, like they listen to the same music, and not always differences. With games, mixing, and so on you can see, after some days, their behavior changes, they break groups, the prejudices lessen, and it can happen that one Macedonian defends an Albanian friend on something and other things.” (Interview no. 61)
civil society in itself was frequently divided and often the impact of their contribution was limited to a small part of the population. Respondents from IOs agreed with CSOs that these contributed to multi-cultural life. However, they were not as optimistic about their actual success: while one respondent was also positive about how civil society managed to build issue coalitions, another respondent thought that civil society in itself was still very much divided as all of the political system.

Respondents from IOs were overall positive about their own contribution to promoting civil society’s working on mitigating overlapping interests, yet many thought that still the level of interest mitigation was not sufficient. Also, with regard to supporting common visions and the promotion of multi-cultural life, a number of persons from IOs emphasized their own positive contribution. Further, respondents from IOs underlined their impact in bringing together young political elites in civil society and also politicians, in order to mitigate common interests and common vision:

“We work in the political sphere, trying to come across the ethnic division of society. For this we work with young political elites and try to bring them together.” (Interview no. 23)

A few respondents from CSOs referred to the positive contribution of IOs to supporting exchange and the promotion of multi-cultural life. A few CSOs thought that with respect to building issue coalitions, IOs were not very helpful and inhibited this by their clientelist and divisive funding politics.

4.4.5 Difficult to Diffuse Civic Virtues Beyond the Realm of Civil Society Activists

Respondents from CSOs were overall quite positive about their own contribution to how and to what extent civil society promoted the diffusion and socialization of civic norms and values. Many felt this field was part of their responsibility – which they, however, should still fulfill better. While in other contexts many respondents from CSOs had referred to internal problems such as power struggles, mistrust, over-powerful directors, etc. a few respondents also thought that in general persons from civil society still were more open to democratic values and willing to reforms and thus also considered it their task to spread these values:

“In general, also in other countries, people from civil society are often more curious than others, they more around a lot, go out, see different things, and have a wider perspective from all that information that they see and hear about. Other people who mostly stay at home are more skeptical whom to trust.” (Interview no. 13)

CSOs raised several issues that they thought they influenced positively, e.g. raise awareness for women’s rights, teach democratic norms, values, and behavior, also in the context of EU-accession, diffuse values of multi-ethnic and diverse society, and also train teachers in these values as role models. There were particularly many statements made about how it was important to pass on new, democratic and multi-ethnic, values to youth:

“Having grown up in a multiethnic society, I refuse to live in an ethnically clean society, and I work against this. It is very important to break stereotypes, also of kids, who, as collateral damage, have grown up in an ethnically clean society after the war, where everyone always tries to find differences between people.” (Interview no. 26)

Another reason for working with youth was, that most persons hoped, that stereotypes were easier to break with younger persons. However, several respondents also noted, this was not easy. One respondent cited a study they had conducted which had revealed that children started thinking in ethnic stereotypes as soon as they entered primary school – one more reason, they said, to work against for a desegregated school system and to train teachers against ethnic stereotyping.

165 “Civil society is definitely a tool to increase democratic values in society and to reach people and political parties as they are close to the field of issue, so they should be longer arm of the system - but are far from that now.” (Interview no. 13)

166 “We offer seminars with teachers from all over the country with new teaching methods, where the teacher is no longer a god. Another project we did was with teachers from a very segregated school in Stolac, but often we need to “hide” ethnic cooperation topics in human rights classes, so that people will participate. After three years of work in this field a good network of teachers has developed.” (Interview no. 26)

167 “Mostly, we do trainings against prejudice are done with youth, but should also work with older people, who’s prejudice often are even harder to change and who are easily manipulated by politics.” (Interview no. 11)
While there were much fewer remarks from respondents from IOs about civil society, these were nevertheless less positive about civil society’s diffusion of civic norms, for instance concerning political culture:

“Civil society really should teach responsible approaches to politics.” (Interview no. 21)

while they thought that civil society did offer important and useful trainings in that regard, particularly with regard to inter-ethnic relations, civil society was not inclusive and did not always contribute to distributing the best values for this.

From IOs there were few statements about their own contribution in fostering civil society’s diffusion of democratic norms. IOs said they supported trainings in democratic values, events on the EU, etc. and also they trained the local administration in anti-discrimination practices. One respondent however, also noted that IOs had not always set the best example for civil society and citizens as to democratic norms:

“Recompensations were paid by IOs to families of war veterans. But there was a lot of fraud by families.” (Interview no. 21)

4.4.6 Old and New Frustrations Cause Low Political Participation among Citizens

Several respondents from CSOs referred to their and other CSOs’ positive contribution in involving citizens in politics. Several also noted that broader, inter-ethnic, movements had formed, although without much continuity, such as ‘Dosta!’ several years ago that by now had become very quiet again. Generally, several persons from CSOs stated, people were passive, reluctant to be involved in politics and lost faith in their own capacity to change things, and did not even vote – or frequently finally did vote but again for nationalist politicians that they usually complained about.168 Several persons stated that in general, people had an extremely negative image of politics and did not wish to become involved. Many CSOs actively promote civic participation, some stated with growing success:

“Since 2008 there is a growing number of real civic initiatives of people who organize themselves and defend their interests, which is real civil society, which is just being born.” (Interview no. 17)

Others were less happy about the results so far achieved.169 Several persons from CSOs stated how they have been working on the local level to increase participation of the general public, of youth, and of NGOs and to make public administration more open for this – while still they wished for more progress.

Respondents from IOs also referred to civil society’s positive role in this context, but also regretted a limited ability to form larger lasting movements. However, a few respondents stated they were under the impression that the young generation had grown up with an active civil society and was increasingly demanding and practicing civic involvement. Several persons confirmed that most citizens thought very low of politics. Differently than CSOs, persons from IOs were not so convinced as to the effect that civil society so far had in fostering civic participation at the local level. Another aspect underlined was that the participation of ethnic minorities was particularly low and not being promoted enough. The same was said for women as particular group and also for youth – who often did not have access to information on how they could even become involved in civil society activities.

Many persons from IOs stated that they supported civic participation, sometimes with success, but overall not with as much as they would like to see – partly owed to very slow if not stagnating democratic development:

“(m)aybe five to seven years after the war there was in fact more political involvement, the election turn-over reflects that. So interest decreased as political parties the situation and effects of IOs didn’t bring good results, especially regarding the quality of life, expectations were disappointed - people can’t wait forever, it’s not improving but getting

168 “We promote participation by citizens by informing them about their rights, to reach information, to wake them up and to ask for their rights. But I also don’t vote, as all parties are nationalist, they don’t do something for the community.” (Interview no. 25)

169 “People in Bosnia-Herzegovina in general are passive, the NGO sector can change some things and others take huge an effort to push people to become active and it is not spontaneous. Sometimes participants almost need to be forced to go on workshops.” (Interview no. 11)
worse. There is nothing like an economy here. Of course, there is a market, but very low production. The political culture in this country is not so well developed, most people are not interested in politics or don’t want to get politically involved. In general in civil society one doesn’t find that many civic initiatives. I wish they would increase. Many people also don’t want to vote, as they don’t want to vote for nationalist parties.” (Interview no. 6)

Many respondents from IOs thought they had greatly contributed to improving skills and procedures to increase civic engagement at the local level. However, some IOs were quite unhappy about the low degree of civic engagement at the local level and said despite their support it was a slow process to involve all relevant actors:

“The aim of [one of our programs], it is an approach to support small initiatives across the country of groups of citizens who felt strongly about some cause, is to really work not only with municipalities but match this with increased awareness of citizens, and their willingness and capacity to engage. We don’t only introduce procedures and commissions on municipal level but also link it to specific needs to have citizens use those measures for participation to solve problems. (...) We try to bring some clarity and introduce some regular procedures through which municipalities can easier and clearly communicate with the local communities. To make whole system more transparent, and to not only have MZ president or MZ council, which are often political party affiliated, but to have whole community participate and interact.” (Interview no. 19)

4.4.7 CSOs Serve as Important Career Entry for Young Leaders

Several respondents from CSOs stated that civil society provided a good opportunity for young people to gain experience, for instance through volunteering, or through project work that opens career opportunities. Some respondents also thought that NGOs should mainly employ young people. Some stated that this was good for them and also was for their own success. Other NGO activists are, however, reluctant to step down and let younger, (potential) new leaders take over (while a certain competition around jobs may also be part of the explanation):

“Civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina started only in the past fifteen years since the war and many changes have taken place since then. Some people in the NGO sector have been around for very long and they don’t want to leave the space for the young people. They make lots of money without much result. Currently, there are struggles in a recently founded NGO-umbrella organization that people over thirty should not be there, but they don’t want to step down. The young should be those running civil society.” (Interview no. 11)

Other respondents, however, criticized the closeness of politics and NGOs and relating to the bad image of politics in the country they said that many persons from CSOs entering politics then became corrupted.

International organizations were more critical of civil society or particularly of political society and the recruiting of young leaders. While one respondent noted how important it was that young political elites had a chance to start and continue dialogue:

“We work in the political, trying to come across the ethnic division of society. We work with young political elites, bring them together. It’s important that the next generation of politicians know each other, also among different ethnic groups, we work on that.” (Interview no. 23)

Another respondent was more critical, like persons from CSOs referring to the bad image that politics enjoyed in Bosnia-Herzegovina and also to the fact that many persons formerly involved in CSOs changed their behavior once they entered politics:

“Politics are not well seen. People who enter politics change their agenda, care about money, and less about previous approaches. And same, many from CSOs want to enter politics.” (Interview no. 15)

170 “And after the war many new NGOs were formed in this part of the country and I joined, at first, an [NGO, part of a large network]. It was not, like, women associated group but it dealt with gender equality also in women’s human rights and youth rights. And primarily I worked on the project [for women’s rights], and I was one of the first coordinators of that project, like, ten years ago. (...) And I worked on that project for five or six years and then I got a scholarship in 1996 and did my master degree on International Human Rights. And it was also very good for me, because it gave me also academic knowledge and skills to work on this - to understand better the situation in my country and to work more focused on advocacy, on different actions, not just social sciences. And when I returned after two years here, I switched to [this NGO] and started working here as Human Rights Advisor and for the past, let’s say since 2003 I work here.” (Interview no. 12)

171 “We have a policy of employing young people, as NGOs are the most creative jobs for them.” (Interview no. 17)

172 “Many persons who started their careers in NGOs later go into politics and become corrupted.” (Interview no. 14)
Respondents from IOs stated that they organize seminars for youth, including on leadership. They do not, however, state much about the effect these have, except for fostering inter-ethnic dialog and decreasing stereotypes.

4.4.8 Civil Society Activities in Service Provision – most Effective and most Broadly Supported

Respondents from CSOs were overall extremely positive about their own contribution and possibilities regarding service provision. In several fields, such as women’s rights, humanitarian issues, services for disabled, etc. civil society was doing good work and there was good cooperation between them and state institutions. While many respondents complained about deep divisions and mistrust between NGOs cooperation in service provision was said to work well:

“There is also more cooperation with public institutions and the police, and growing acceptance of expertise [regarding domestic violence]. Civil society in Bosnia is becoming increasingly relevant, and there is more consultation, e.g. regarding laws, advocacy and participation in decision-making, the government says they really need the expertise, not only to show to other countries coop with civil society. Big difference between civil society’s activities of a) service provision and b) political and societal development, which receives less but growing recognition by the government.” (Interview no. 12)

One of the downsides of the good contribution and cooperation in service provision was, however, that while the government funded and cooperated on service provision, CSOs needed to apply to foreign donors in order to finance projects that were politically critical:

“While getting government funding for service provision, we apply to foreign donors for sensitive political issues, who will not interfere - and we also chose donors that won’t.” (Interview no. 12)

Respondents from IOs agreed with CSOs and also referred to the positive contribution that they thought civil society made to service related fields:

“Now reconciliation is not a sexy topic anymore, but concrete work on concrete fields is now needed. We promote cooperation within sectors around certain fields, for instance social development, child protection and so on.” (Interview no. 27)

Another respondent stated that her IO supported various successful projects in service provision, e.g. garbage collection, rebuild the community center, get a fire truck, etc. Several respondents underlined the big success that women’s projects frequently have:

“Projects aimed at empowering women in society have usually done a lot better. But also I don’t believe that such projects need a lot, or any international funding. Like teaching women to sow, and so on. In Bosnia-Herzegovina you have the Rotarians working, a local branch, and many are doctors, bought a bus to tour and offer health scans, etc. around the country - addressing real needs. They get money from abroad, but also have wealthy members here.” (Interview no. 21)

Supposedly women’s projects did not even require much funding, and from experience, a certain elite of private individuals, e.g. medical doctors, or of businesses, such as banks, in Bosnia-Herzegovina by now also has money, and interest, to support social services.

Since the war, IOs have contributed to post-war relief, such as building houses for refugees, supporting war victims, etc. But nobody really mentioned success in this field anymore.

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173 “(We had) good results with service delivery, human rights defense, humanitarian refugee and displaced persons issue, and such things.” (Interview no. 17)

174 “What worked well last year was project on inclusion with people with disabilities/deficiencies in kindergartens was divided across city.” (Interview no. 26)

175 “We help them to take action on their own or with the municipality. One example where citizens in Ugljevik who opened a health center in their local community, another good example were in ... another MZ, citizens who organized a garbage collection, or we helped them to get funded from the municipality to rebuild their community center – it will maybe later be used as health clinic, another community got a fire truck.” (Interview no. 19)
Chapter 4: Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Civil Society: Mostly Professional, Divided, and Dependent on Foreign Support for Political Impact

4.5 Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Civil Society: Improving yet Still Limited and thus falling Short of its Ideal Functions

Altogether, civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been developing in a rather difficult, transformational and post-conflict environment. Also with the strong support by international organizations, civil society has made significant progress in the past 15 years. The general context for civil society remains challenging - particular the continuously difficult economic situation, remaining ethno-national cleavages in society, and a traditional reluctance of politicians to cooperate with civil society. Particularly the latter, however, seems to have been improving in recent years, also with the help of international pressure and support.

Most of civil society’s qualities, with the exception of organizational capacity, remain a challenge to civil society’s democratization contribution. While for years international organizations have contributed to improving civil society’s organizational capacity, civil society remains divided and quite competitive, causing divisions and mistrust and inhibiting networks and cooperations. The independence from the state is limited, as many large CSOs are closely linked to politics, and undemocratic practices of political actors sometimes encroach on civil society or simply ignore CSOs – however, the presence from international organizations is important to counterweight this and to monitor the government.

The functions of civil society, finally, are fulfilled by CSOs to a certain extent, frequently with the support and help from international organizations. Service provision seems to function increasingly well, and the recruiting of new leaders also tends to be successful (even though there is a risk of clientelism in this context.) With regard to the other six functions, however, civil society is limited by the still not entirely democratic political culture, by existing deep division between CSOs and in the larger society, by a general reluctance among citizens’ to be politically involved.
**Chapter 5: Macedonia’s Civil Society: Increasingly Professional yet still Weak, Politically Affiliated and with Limited Political Impact**

The second of the case-study chapters, this chapter also presents the findings from the interview analysis with regard to Macedonia. The chapter is structured as the previous chapter: section 5.1 provides additional background information on the history and context that civil society and its external democracy promotion take place in, while sections 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 summarize the findings from the interview analysis for the context, qualities, and functions of civil society respectively. Further statements of respondents from (a) CSOs and (b) international organizations are contrasted. Section 5.5 gives a brief summary of the case findings. While still respecting the anonymity of the persons, following the listed interview numbers correspond to the different groups of respondents:

**Tab. 30: Sample of respondents from the Republic of Macedonia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>group of respondents</th>
<th>Republic of Macedonia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSOs</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(33, 41, 43, 44, 47, 48, 61, 62, 63, 75, 36, 39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOs</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(34, 35, 42, 46, 55, 60, 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 73, 38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local government</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>experts</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(50, 51, 71, 72, 74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>27 (out of 52)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**5.1 Socio-Political Background: A Divided Post-Socialist and Post-Conflict State with an (over-)powerful Goverment**

For a better understanding of findings presented below in this section, this first provides an overview of the most relevant background information on the Republic of Macedonia. The aim is to contextualize the history and current state-of-affairs of civil society’s contribution to democratic consolidation, including the support by external democracy promotion. Drawing from secondary literature, following, the country-specific context is summarized with regard to five dimensions:

1. **History and political context,**
2. **Transition and democratization,**
3. **Ethnic diversity and ethno-nationalism,**
4. **Civil society,**
5. **External democracy promotion of civil society.**

**5.1.1 History and Political Context**

Macedonia, like Bosnia-Herzegovina, was part of the Ottoman-Empire for many centuries (from 1317 onwards). Around 600 years later, as a consequence of the Balkan Wars, the territory of Macedonia was divided between Greece and Serbia - the region was integrated into Serbia. Thus in 1918 Macedonia became a part of the “Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes”. After World War II,
Macedonia, like Bosnia-Herzegovina, was one of the six republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, until it declared independence on 18 September 1991, Macedonia. (Boden 1995: 212–223 and Sowards 2008.)

The NATO bombings in Kosovo lead to a sudden influx of refugees to Macedonia. (Woodward 2009: 49) Tensions between ethnic Albanian and ethnic Macedonians, but also between other groups (e.g. Turks, Roma, etc.) increased, leading to a general ethnic mobilization by late 2000/early 2001. The violent conflict broke out in February 2001. (Sandevski 2009: 7) It is contested to what extent the violence was mostly motivated by inter-ethnic tensions, or whether it was in fact an intra-ethnic power struggle over control of the North-Western border with Kosovo. In that region a certain part of Albanian elites controlled illegal trade that the governing Albanian political elites wished to bring under their control. The central government reacted soon and sent police troops to curb the conflict. With international support, a peace-agreement was brokered and on 13 August 2001 the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) was signed, ending the violence. (Compare Sandevski 2009 or Vetterlein 2010)

Soon after the conflict the situation improved rapidly. Multiethnic police forces started entering the former crisis area, facilitated by the OSCE and NATO, and they were mostly accepted and suffered only minor attacks. (Sandevski 2009: 17) International pressure helped the forming of an inter-ethnic alliance in the government that had been a feature of all government formations since 1992. (Jakobsson Hatay 2005: 24) Many of the reforms required in the OFA have been addressed and implemented. However, since 2001 there have been attempts from various actors within the state to counter certain reforms. (Sandevski 2009: 15–16)

In addition to the political situation, the interpersonal level has improved significantly: according to recent polls, the over-all majority of the population identifies highly with the state of Macedonia (Jakobsson Hatay 2005: 62), although, interestingly, 91 percent of respondents thought that politicians contributed to ethnic tensions. (Sandevski 2009: 12)

Declaredly, the OFA introduced a civic set-up of the state’s institutions. In official documents the term “nationality” was replaced by “community”. Most importantly, in the constitution references to ethnic groups were replaced by references to citizens. (Jakobsson Hatay 2005: 36) Important constitutional changes based on the OFA included:

1. The Slavic Macedonians were no longer the constituting nation of the state and all religions were declared to be of equal status;
2. Increased decentralization (based on increased local self-government and a re-organization of municipal boundaries);
3. Increased employment of ethnic minorities in state-institutions;
4. A double majority requirement (Badinter principle) for the adoption of laws directly affecting questions regarding one of the ethnic groups;

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176 Even though the definition of the conflict as Albanian-Macedonian prevails in the literature, there are several indications, that in fact the conflict was a result of power-struggle within different groups of the Albanian elite over the control of the Kosovo-Macedonian border, interview conducted with a journalist 15 December 2010, see also Vetterlein 2010.

177 For instance, the World Macedonian Congress and the VMRO-DPMNE attempted to organize a referendum against decentralization but failed, or, at the same time, a violent take-over of the village Kondovo by Albanians, boarder irregularities with Kosovo in 2007. Sandevski 2009: 15–16

178 For Van Meurs “between 1995 and 1999 Europe has mastered a steep learning curve – from the ethnocentric and dysfunctional Dayton model to the more realistic and workable Ohrid model, from the adhockery of the Bosnian conflict to the concerted conflict-management in Kosovo and Macedonia five years later.” 2006: 125

179 In fact, as Jakobsson Hatay 2005: 37 points out, the OFA re-introduced a number of regulations regarding decentralization and ethnicity-based collective rights that had existed prior to state’s independence.

180 Laws regarding such issues need to be adopted with “[a] majority of votes, within which there must be a majority of the votes of the Representatives claiming to belong to the communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia.” Council of Europe/ERICarts 2010: 14
5. A valorization of the status of minority languages (any language spoken by at least 20 percent of the state’s population is now an official state language)\textsuperscript{181};

6. Ethnic minorities may display their national symbols next to the emblems of the Republic of Macedonia. Besides, Macedonian remains the only official language throughout the country of external relations. (Sandevski 2009: 13; Caruso 2007: 145–146)

International organizations made it clear that membership to the EU and to NATO would depend on the full implementation of the OFA. Additionally, in order to monitor the implementation of the OFA requirements it was agreed upon that NATO, EU, and NATO were to remain in the country. (Caruso 2007: 145–146)

5.1.2 Transition and Democratization

As a former Yugoslav Republic Macedonia also faced a multi-level transition from Socialism to a liberal-market democracy. This involved changes on many levels, including politics, society, economy, etc. Macedonia was the only Yugoslav Republic that seemed to accomplish a peaceful secession. From the beginning of the conflicts in the region the international community undertook large efforts to prevent an outbreak of violence in Macedonia – including a very fast signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU in April 2001. (Caruso 2007: 146–148; Jakobsson Hatay 2005: 12)\textsuperscript{182}

Traditionally, Macedonia was one of the least industrially developed, mostly rural regions of Yugoslavia that had been receiving subventions from the central level. As one of the poorest states in the region, Macedonia was severely hit by international economic sanctions against its main trading partner Yugoslavia (1992–1995, 1998–2000), and a Greek embargo (1992, 1994–1995). (Jakobsson Hatay 2005: 14) Further, since the European economic crisis since 2009, Macedonia has been struggling with finances, and still is very dependent on international loans, e.g. from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Ever since independence, Macedonia has been facing transitional challenges with regard to both, state-building and nation-building, as the state’s institutions were democratized, the prevailing undemocratic culture needed to be transformed, and a new national identity needed to be forged. Further, the ethnic diversity, or rather the polarization between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians resulted in diverging nation-building projects: political elites of the ethnic Macedonian majority population were building on a newly independent autonomous identity that drew for a large part on ethnic Macedonian ideas and symbols, this was met with resistance by Albanian ethnic political elites and citizens, who previously had enjoyed more cultural and ethnic rights – with the result of competing ideas for “the nation” and the “rules of the game”. (Comp. Daskalovski 2004) For many years, however, credible Euro-Atlantic integration was an important factor to motivate (further) cooperation between political elites and common loyalty of citizens in the state (Gromes 2009a: 27–28) – while, however, as years go without EU accession the effect seems to be weakening.

Interestingly, however, generally a majority of ethnic Albanians express a high percentage of identification with the common states. The majority of Macedonians, however, tends to oppose the stipulations of the OFA that increase the rights of and empower ethnic Albanians – while a high percentage of Albanians, not surprisingly, endorse it. (Gromes 2009a: 10) The OFA established several formal mechanisms for power-sharing. While informal power-sharing had been a tradition in Macedonian politics since independence, e.g. by always forming the government as a coalition between one ethnic Macedonian and one ethnic Albanian party, the OFA formally institutionalized

\textsuperscript{181} Languages other than Macedonian spoken by at least 20 percent of the population in a community may be used to address state institutions, higher education is to be provided in languages spoken by at least 20 percent of the population, official state documents also need to be issued in state-minority languages. The only language in the state that qualifies for this is Albanian, cf. Jakobsson Hatay 2005: 36.

\textsuperscript{182} In 1991 the UN International Conference on former Yugoslavia (Peace Implementation Council, PIC) and an ad hoc working group on ethnic and national communities and minorities issued recommendations for Macedonia.
power-sharing (incl. Badinter voting, quota in administration, police, etc. the installation of the Secretariat for the Implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (SIOFA), increased administrative decentralization, etc.) (Compare e.g. Gromes 2009a and Vetterlein 2010)

While frequently the ethno-national divisions in Macedonia are held accountable for the still prevailing democratic shortcomings, according to several authors and experts, current democratic deficits are, however, rather owed to a lack of democratic tradition and undemocratic practices of the political elites and less to possible consequences of insufficient nation-building:

“Most shortcomings however are due neither to the much feared vicious circle nor to inter-ethnic conflicts. It is above all rather the legacy of long authoritarian rule and an absence of democratic leanings that hinder further democratization.” (Gromes 2009a: 25)

In fact, the last years have seen significant increase in a re-centralization of control by the government during the government period 2008 to 2011 when the leading party VMRO-DPMN held a large majority of almost 49 percent of parliamentary seats. The situation has slightly eased since the last elections in 2011, with the majority of seats for the governing party having decreased to 39 percent. However, political power is still strongly centralized and determined by clientelist networks and the overall society is strongly politicized and divided by political affiliation. (Compare e.g. Auer 2011)

Currently, Macedonia is rated as a “semi-consolidated democracy” (Freedom House) or “defective democracy” (BTI). While the BTI detects small democratization progress, according to Freedom House, democratization has been stagnating and even reversing from 2007 to 2009, and since then has been slowly improving, see following table:

Tab. 31: Democratization of Macedonia 2002-2012

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freedom House</td>
<td>4.46</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>3.79</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTI</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>7.55</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>7.75</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>7.95</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>7.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Freedom House 2012; Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012

As regards formal membership in international organizations, notably the EU and Nato, Macedonia is currently a candidate country to the EU since 2005 and is waiting for Nato accession since 1999 after proceeding to the Membership in Action Plan in 2010. Membership to both organizations is currently being blocked by Greece insisting on negotiations on Macedonia’s formal name before allowing the state full membership.

Tab. 32: Macedonia’s membership status in EU and Nato

<table>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU- membership status</td>
<td>Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) is signed.</td>
<td>Council grants candidate status to the country</td>
<td>accession currently pending, NATO’s invitation to the Republic of Macedonia was blocked by Greece at the 2008 Bucharest summit</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As of today, however, dates for the next steps in membership negotiations for both organizations are not yet determined. The negotiations with Greece have been stalling for years despite international mediation, and both organizations are waiting for a number of reforms to be implemented.
Chapter 5: Macedonia’s Civil Society: Increasingly Professional yet still Weak, Politically Affiliated and with Limited Political Impact

5.1.3 Ethnic Diversity and Ethno-Nationalism

Today, according to the last census in 2002 the population of Macedonia is estimated at around 2,082,370 persons. A new census was to be held in 2011 but was never finished - during the process several members of the state census commission resigned and the census was stopped and not repeated as of August 2012. The ethnic composition of the state currently is approximately at Macedonian 64.2 percent, Albanian 25.2 percent, Turkish 3.9 percent, Roma 2.7 percent, Serbs 1.8 percent, and other 2.2 percent (2002 census). (CIA 02.08.2012) Over half the population lives in urban centers that are frequently ethnically mixed, while the North-West is mostly Albanian and the East is mostly Macedonian inhabited, see map below (which may be controversial to a certain extent, however, accurate and up-to-date maps are scarce and most data on the ethnic composition in Macedonia is controversial):

Fig. 26: Map of the Ethnic Composition of Macedonia

The recent history of Macedonia is closely linked to an ongoing ethnicization of relations between the two largest ethnic groups, the Macedonians and the Albanians. Traditionally, in Macedonia inter-marriage between Macedonians and Albanians was relatively low, with

“the permeability [of ethnic boundaries for inter-marriage] (...) decreasing since the early 1970s.” (Botev 1994: 476)

Particularly since independence, and partly until today, the Albanian population (like other non-majority ethnic communities in the region) has been underrepresented and structurally discriminated against regarding various aspects, e.g. in the electoral system, public administration, educational system, the general job market, etc.). (Sandevski 2009: 17)

The 1990s saw ethnicized claims on behalf of the Albanian minority (regarding the referendum on independence, the opening of an Albanian speaking university in Tetovo, etc.) who mostly wished for the rights they had previously enjoyed under Socialism that had been reduced with the independence of Macedonia (Fearon 2006) – but protest did not lead to larger scale conflicts. (Compare also Vetterlein 2010) However, around the time of independence, claims for a “greater
Albania” were voiced and, despite its relatively small size, the Serb population (backed by Serbia), pronounced claims to their own republic in Macedonia. (Jakobsson Hatay 2005: 23)

After the conflict 2001, however, ethno-national divisions ran deep and the inter-ethnic relations deteriorated. (Compare Bieber 2005a) Until today, the population of Macedonia remains deeply divided along ethnically defined lines. (For more on ethnic divisions see Vetterlein 2010; Simkus et al. 2010) Additionally, political affiliation – and thus political divisions – play an (increasingly) important role, also as the state is the biggest employer while general unemployment remains at a very high 30 percent. In fact, according to Merle Vetterlein, today, the society of Macedonia is deeply divided along several mutually reinforcing dimensions:

1. ethnic fragmentation
2. geographic fragmentation
3. linguistic fragmentation
4. educational fragmentation
5. religious fragmentation (Vetterlein 2010: 81–104)

And until today, the ethnicization of politics remains an ongoing challenge for nation-building and for democratization processes. (Gromes 2009a)

5.1.4 Civil Society’s Development

Historically, as in the other Yugoslav republics, Macedonia’s civil society already dates back to the end of the 19th century, also as a reaction to previous colonization:

“Civil society in Macedonia had a significant impact during the period of national renaissance towards the end of 19th Century and the beginning of 20th Century. Literary and cultural circles were important elements in civil society. The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (VMRO) was the key organisation in the independence movement.” (Macedonian Center for International Cooperation 2011: 19–20)

Between World War II and Macedonia’s joining of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, there were faith-based charity associations in Macedonia. During the times of Socialism, while civic freedoms remained limited and civic engagement was mostly state organized, there were certain liberties of citizens organized in the many existing cultural, sports, and professional organizations. (Macedonian Center for International Cooperation 2011: 20)

While in general Yugoslavia slowly liberalized since the 1970s, in the traditionally rural SR of Macedonia there was some civil society activism but mostly limited to community based cultural or social organizations. To a certain extent dissident movements existed in the urban centers. While many of the CSOs that existed during Socialism were regional and thus automatically more or less mono-ethnic, faith-based organizations and religious organizations were mostly suppressed by the Socialist state. (Macedonian Center for International Cooperation 2011: 20)

183 For more on the ethnic dimension in Macedonia see also exemplarily Sandevski 2009; Richter 2009b; Gromes 2009b.

After independence and triggered by massive external democracy promotion a larger number of CSOs developed. Especially during and after the Kosovo crisis (1999) and the outbreak of violence (2001) there was massive influx of external funding for civil society who served as local counterpart for international organizations to implement the suddenly enormously increasing number of projects in the fields of reconciliation, civic education, etc. The result was “NGO-mushrooming” and the number of NGOs suddenly multiplied (compare Macedonian Center for International Cooperation 2011). Today there are over 10,000 registered CSOs, with the largest share of them being associations and foundations (including socio-political organizations, associations for sports, etc.), followed by trade unions, etc. as the following table and figure illustrate:

### Tab. 33: Number of civic organizations in Macedonia in 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Sports</th>
<th>Culture</th>
<th>Professional</th>
<th>DPZ</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>1,004</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1,138</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>41.0%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1,535</td>
<td>30.9%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>45.3%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>3,077</td>
<td>39.9%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>4,203</td>
<td>41.3%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>6,526</td>
<td>43.6%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>3,433</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>5,769</td>
<td>35.4%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>45.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>10,700</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>59.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Macedonian Center for International Cooperation 2011: 20

Fig. 27: Map of civil society in Macedonia in 2009

One consequence of the sudden and externally driven development of civil society was that mostly NGOs were supported as the dominant form of civil society - their formal structure was better suited to the need of donors to control how their funding was spent. (Howard 2012: 35) Furthermore, the large number of NGOs existing in Macedonia today does not reflect the actual size of civil society, as most NGOs have a low membership base, citizens mistrust politics and organized civic activism, many do not exert significant political influence, and the general democratic spill-over effect to the broader population remains weak. (Compare Howard 2012: 40) Also, civil society is strongly focused on urban centers, most activists of CSOs tend to live in the urban centers and be highly educated. (Compare also UNDP 2009)

185 ‘DPZ’ = Voluntary fire associations.
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Today, as for most post-communist or –socialist states, in Macedonia citizens mistrust politics and they are reluctant to become actively involved in anything in relation to politics. This is mostly blamed on previous regime, but also on current authoritarian methods of governance. This has not changed over the past few years, while, however the potential to engage in activism has slightly increased:

“only a minority of citizens participate in civil society and in other socially-based or political activities.” (Macedonian Center for International Cooperation 2011: 25)(Comp. Dvornik 2009: 65–67) and “A small minority of citizens are engaged (as members and volunteers) in one or more CSOs. The involvement of citizens in CSOs is small: 14.9% in social organisations, and 25.4% in politically-oriented organisations. Membership in civic organisations (associations of citizens) in 2010 is 24.7% and there were no significant changes in the course of the last five years.” (Macedonian Center for International Cooperation 2011: 28)

The following two tables illustrate that from 2009 to 2010 membership in most areas of CSOs has mostly decrease. The highest percentage of membership for socially-based CSOs was in sport, hobby, and leisure, with also the largest decrease, while the smallest decrease was in culture and education. For politically-based CSOs the highest percentage of membership was in social and humanitarian organizations that also saw the highest decrease in membership, while the smallest democracy, human rights and rule of law in fact increased:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tab. 34: Membership in different sectors of socially-based CSOs in Macedonia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-sectors</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture and education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport, hobby and leisure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and health care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Macedonian Center for International Cooperation 2011: 26

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tab. 35: Membership in different sectors of politically-oriented CSOs in Macedonia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-sectors</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social and humanitarian organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children, youth and students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment and nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy, human rights and rule of law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women and gender issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer organisations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Macedonian Center for International Cooperation 2011: 27

If citizens decide to become involved in civil society they prefer to participate in informal activities such as peaceful protest, signing petitions, or boycotts. (Macedonian Center for International Cooperation 2011: 28) Volunteering in CSOs is generally rather low as well:

“under one fifth of citizens volunteer in at least one organisation, but hardly any volunteer for more than one.” (Macedonian Center for International Cooperation 2011: 28)

As in many non-consolidated democracies civil society in Macedonia as well faces the challenges of a lack of tradition of civic activism, of weak political procedures for the involvement of civil society, and of a general mistrust of citizens in politics. Furthermore, the existing civic activism is closely linked to political and ethno-religious belonging:

“In the political sphere, parties are the most common vehicles for citizens’ membership, while the most social active membership are based in churches and religious communities, with trade unions and associations of citizens at a similar level.” (Macedonian Center for International Cooperation 2011: 28)
The existing ethno-politicization of civil society, including the media, aggravates the impression of citizens that it is difficult to be political without being affiliated to the main political parties. Even though there have been substantial efforts to privatize the media and to train journalists in investigative and critical journalism, today the media is mostly monopolized by a few politically affiliated owners. Critical media run a risk of being closed by the government which happened for instance with a Macedonian TV station A1 TV: it was closed in July 2011 under the allegation of tax evasions by its owner - there were, however, also speculations about to what extent political interests were involved. According to USAID’s NGO Sustainability Index, civil society’s sustainability for Macedonia still is evolving, with the best results in infrastructure and legal environment and the worst result regarding financial viability and public image (see figure below):

Fig. 28: USAID NGO sustainability Index 2010 for Macedonia

Source: USAID 2011

With regard to the legal environment for civil society in Macedonia, it needs to be said that until today legislation remains intransparent in several important regards. In 2010 the new “Law on Citizen’s Associations and Foundations” replaced a previous law from 1998. The improvements mostly regarded the “public benefit status” of CSOs, which are now allowed to also work for-profit, and also the regulations for international NGOs to register in Macedonia were improved:

“The major development in the legal environment in 2010 was the enactment of the new Law on Citizen’s Associations and Foundations (the NGO Law) by the parliament on April 12. NGOs were closely involved in the design of the law through the NGO Law working group in the Ministry of Justice. The new NGO Law replaced the 1998 Law on Citizens’ Associations and Foundations as amended in 2007. The new NGO Law is important for the civil society sector because it: (1) supports NGO sustainability by allowing NGOs to engage in economic activities; and (2) helps increase the social impact of the civil sector by introducing “public benefit status.” The status is given to NGOs that engage in activities that benefit the public such as protection of marginalized people, humanitarian assistance, and social aid. NGOs that gain public benefit status are entitled to greater tax and customs exemptions than other organizations.” (USAID 2011: 131–132)

Since the passing of the NGO law CSOs have been advocating to address shortcomings of the law, the government and CSOs have trained officials regarding the implementation of the law, etc. Further, a working group has been set up to harmonize the “Law on Donations and Sponsorships” with the new law with the aim to clarify points regarding unclear remaining regulations for donations and tax advantages for CSOs in order

“to simplify legal procedures for donations, and revise tax incentives in order to encourage the further development of philanthropy.” (USAID 2011: 131–132)

Until today, however the existing “Law on Lobbying” continues to be problematic for CSOs, who usually tend to rely on personal contacts if they wish to achieve something:
“when NGOs want to advocate or lobby for certain issues, they do not use the Law on Lobbying to communicate with the authorities; rather they use alternative channels such as personal or business relationships.” (USAID 2011: 132)

Thus, again also in this area personal ties and contacts are more important for CSOs to achieve something than other more formal channels. Altogether, the legal situation in important fields remains unclear and leaves room for politicians to manipulate or blackmail CSOs – but CSOs together with IOs are pressuring for revisions and improvement.

As for Bosnia-Herzegovina, also in Macedonia the development of CSOs was significantly boosted by international funding which is currently decreasing. Most existing CSOs dispose of relatively small budgets – only the largest out of 11,350 associations and foundations receive over one Mio. Macedonian Denars per year (around 20,000 US Dollars), as shown in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annual budget in denars(^{186})</th>
<th>Number of CSOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 – 100,000</td>
<td>9,636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,001 – 500,000</td>
<td>672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500,001 – 1,000,000</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000,001 – 5,000,000</td>
<td>488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000,001 – 10,000,000</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000,001 – 50,000,000</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000,001 – 100,000,000</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 100,000,000</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total associations and foundations</td>
<td>11,350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Macedonian Center for International Cooperation 2011: 32\(^{187}\)

Until today, more than half of all funding for CSOs comes from international and foreign funding (63.6 percent). However, over half of all CSOs (52 percent) also receive a membership fee. Around one third of all CSOs also receive financing from local self-government units (33.8 percent) or from the central government (29.2 percent) as the following figure illustrates:

Fig. 29: Sources of financing of CSOs in Macedonia in 2009

\(^{186}\) Exchange rates on 24 March 2011 according to National Bank of Republic of Macedonia were 1 EUR = 61.5038 MKD, 1 USD = 43.5086 MKD.

\(^{187}\) Annual budgets of political parties, trade unions, churches and religious communities as well as chambers of commerce and associations of employers are not presented.
5.1.5 External Democracy Promotion of Civil Society

Due to the relatively peaceful independence of Macedonia the influx of external democracy promotion to the state was relatively lower than for many other post-Yugoslav states in the early 1990s. Already during the 1990s at the time of the Yugoslav wars, and then massively increasing during the Kosovo crisis and Nato intervention in 1999, there was huge influx of refugees into neighboring Macedonia. At the time, the international community had been present in state, but then quickly and extensively augmented support efforts, successfully preventing conflict spill-over. (Compare e.g. Caruso 2007)

Several years later in 2001 the Republic of Macedonia saw several outbreaks of ethnationally framed violence. Despite international efforts to prevent a conflict, the violence culminated in an armed conflict between Albanians and Macedonians that only lasted several months. Around the conflict the risk of an increase of outbreaks of intra-state violence also saw massive mobilization by the international community that increased its presence and also its funding for civil society. The coordination between donors is frequently referred to as a good example of fast and effective cooperation, possibly also as a lesson from the previous regional conflicts. (Compare Caruso 2007) International organizations have contributed high amounts of finances, notably the EU, currently the biggest donor. (Howard 2012: 36)

Even though the contribution of international organizations to building civil society is highly appreciated by many, IOs, notably the EU, have also been criticized for relying too strongly on the formal cooperation criteria, rather creating an NGO sector than civil society, with NGOs suiting better the EU’s own requirements than the domestic needs:

“The EU embeds its civil society promotion in the larger context of a democratization agenda. NGOs therein play a double-role: 1. They are to increasingly assume democratic functions, 2. They are to help the EU with the efficient realization of her integration plans. While these two roles are not automatically contradictory, in practice they are to a certain extent: as the closer EU-accession becomes, the EU focuses increasingly on the acquis communautaire. For this, a small group of selected NGOs is trained for cooperation with the EU funds and constitutes an NGO-elite which hierarchizes the NGO sectors and decreases the possibility for certain domestic dialog processes. – This decreases pluralism and political participation. So the farther away a state from EU accession, the more the EU is able to take into account particularities of how to promote civil society of a certain target state.” (Stewart 2009: 277–278)

However, the EU, and many other international donors are highly esteemed for their significant support of civil society in Macedonia – through trainings for CSOs and state institutions, and also through significant financing. The following two tables illustrate the important amounts of finances that the EU has allocated to democratization in the Western Balkan since 2002. Between 2002 and 2006, for instance, out of the European Union’s ‘Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation’ (CARDS) program, Macedonia received around six percent (€ 11 Mio. out of € 176.35 Mio.):

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188 Even though the definition of the conflict as Albanian-Macedonian prevails in the literature, there are several indications, that in fact the conflict was a result of power-struggle within different groups of the Albanian elite over the control of the Kosovo-Macedonian border, interview conducted with a journalist 15 December 2010, see also Vetterlein 2010.
When the EU established the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) program for the next financing period (2007-2013), a special ‘Civil Society Facility’ was included. For the years 2007 and 2008 only Macedonia received about four percent of total funding for the region (amounting to € 1.6 Mio. out of a total of € 38.5 Mio.):
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Fig. 30: EU democracy assistance per capita for the Western Balkans (1990-2010)

![Graph showing EU democracy assistance per capita for the Western Balkans (1990-2010)](source: Grimm, Mathis 2012: 23)

According to the Balkan Civil Development Network alone for the period 2010 to 2011 approximately € 206.4 Mio. of external funding were invested into Macedonia. Out of this 2.3 percent, i.e. € 4.5 Mio. were allocated to civil society. The largest share came from the EU, and the second largest amount from the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC):

“Eighteen donor data were included in the survey. A total amount of approx. million Euros was allocated in the period 2010 -2011. The funding provided for civil society for the same period is 4.5 million, making up 2.3% of the total funding. It should be noted that many of the donors were not able to provide concrete amounts of the funds they allocated for civil society. From the data available, the EU is by far the largest donor overall, and the largest source of funding for civil society with 2.1 million Euros, or 2% of the total funds they allocate for Macedonia. SDC is the second largest donor to civil society with 1.2 million Euros, or 15% of their total support provided, while USAID follow as the third with approx. 1.126 million Euros (or 1.473 million Dollars). From all the donors, NED and the BTD fund only the civil society (327,760 Euros and 180,000 Euros, respectively).” (Balkan Civil Development Network 2012: 40, see also donor map Macedonia, annex P)

5.2 The Context of Civil Society in the Republic of Macedonia

Civil society’s contributions to democratization are theoretically plentiful. In the reality of non-consolidated democracies, they are, however, frequently constrained by a more or less favorable context. This section presents the findings from the interview analysis with regard to the context of civil society – of the circumstances and the environment that civil society faces, interacts with, it is connected to, and which it may or may not take on and manage to change towards democratic consolidation, depending on the existing obstacles. The following six categories were identified as most relevant during the interview analysis:

A1. Origin and Patterns of Development of Civil Society
A2. Regime Type
A3. Legal Situation
A4. Cooperation with the State
A5. Financial and Economic Situation
A6. Societal Cleavages

This section first presents a summary of the main findings for each of the six categories, and then continues to present the findings in more detail, including the most significant quotes from the interviews. For each of the six context dimensions, the findings are categorized with regard to (a) civil
society and (b) the contribution of external democracy promotion for the particular dimension, while for both also the statements from respondents from CSOs and from IOs are contrasted.

5.2.1 Civil Society with Origins in the Past and the Result of Massive Funding after 2001

Respondents from CSOs stated, that since 1970s there was some freedom for civic self-organization, but mostly state-controlled (syndicates, etc.):

“Before the early 1990s there were organizations, trade unions, women’s organizations, but civil society as we use it today didn’t exist, mostly there were forms of civic movements in communism, but these were driven by the government, for example youth organizations, student organizations. (...) During communism there was an artificial, controlled civil sector, youth organizations, older people, veterans, women’s associations – that sector collapsed, now we don’t have proper structures here.” (Interview no. 63)

When the system collapsed, it left no real structures for civil society, and even though civil society started developing in the early 1990s, and then there was a boom after 2001 particularly for humanitarian NGOs. The sudden increase in funding for NGOs led to their commercialization and to NGOs being mainly a source of income. Many respondents stated that until today, civil society in Macedonia was still in crisis, and one respondent blamed this on protracted democratic development calling for IOs to invest more time, patience and money in Macedonia as the tradition of civil society was only just developing – unlike in the West that had had centuries for civil society to develop:

“the public sector in the West was developed in two or three centuries, just putting money won’t do it. In Macedonia there is a lack of good leaders and of good managers, nothing is working. People are afraid and expect someone else to solve their problems. (...) While Europe was building democracy and civilization in 18th, 19th century, here was blanko, Ottoman Empire for five centuries.” (Interview no. 63)

Respondents from CSOs pointed to the very high number of registered NGOs of over 8,000. The new law on associations issued in 2010 called for a new registration. However NGOs that had registered in the old register were not deleted, which still did not allow to better identify the real number of active NGOs. Most respondents said the number of active NGOs was declining owed to decreased availability of funding. Nevertheless most NGOs remain donor oriented without time or will to develop strategies. Many respondents pointed out that citizens were suspicious of anything political. Many citizens did not understand that political NGOs do not have to be connected to political parties. Many citizens think NGOs exist only to make money and that nobody cares about the content or quality of the projects. Even if many CSOs had become much more skilled and professional, the NGO sector in Macedonia was not very important or respected by politics and thus had little impact:

“as civil society’s impact is limited, that is not a good ground to discuss civil society and democracy, we still have to empower civil society, it is good that it is separated from politics, it starts functioning as a separate sphere, but the sector still needs more legitimacy.” (Interview no. 47)

The proliferation of think-tanks, as one type of CSOs, in the region was a symptom that many organizations thought like this the direct effect on politics could be increased.

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189 “Today, there are between 6.000-9.000 NGOs in Macedonia. The development of civil society in Macedonia started something after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, it was very popular in 2000 during the Kosovo crisis. NGOs first worked on humanitarian aid, then on inter-ethnic relations.” (Interview no. 61)

190 “Today due to economic hardship civil society is mostly a source of funding (...) the mission of NGOs got lost and goals are unclear.” (Interview no. 33)

191 “[Think-tanks think like this] they will have more impact, directly on central institutions - but they don’t have legitimacy to be equal partner with government or opposition” (Interview no. 41)
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One respondent however underlined the necessity to remain optimist and to persistent and to continue establishing civil society to be heard.192 While most NGOs compromise in order to survive there are a few big and powerful CSOs that can pursue their own agenda:

"some NGOs are very powerful without compromising much: a. e.g. CiRa as intermediate for US or Swiss agency; b. MCMs, very conservative, mainstream, providing infrastructure of local municipalities; or c. an NGO becomes very specialized, with only few people on projects, their role is insignificant; d. they shift their mission, like former art center touring art through villages." (Interview no. 43)

And an established NGO with backing of IOs can be active in many fields and frequently manages to establish important political contacts. The lacking tradition and the strong influence by external support, frequently with good intentions but not enough knowledge, also explained why civil society had little grassroots and also little overall impact.193 CSOs in Macedonia did not say anything about the difference between movements and NGOs - except for one respondent who is frequently involved in informal public activities, stating, it was very difficult to really mobilize many persons for some time and stating that the ruling party always tried to discredit protesters as being “puppets of the opposition”. Many respondents from CSOs in Macedonia wondered that after more than fifteen years values of many CSOs were not really democratic but mostly driven by the interest to find funding.194

This has led to “the phenomenon of NGO-industry” (Interview no. 33). The image that the general public of civil society had by many CSO activists in Macedonia was similar to that in Bosnia-Herzegovina: a large share of the population does not know what civil society is doing, and many people see them as driving big cars, only caring about big salaries, and even as foreign spies or mercenaries.

Respondents from IOs shared the critical view on the development of civil society – before the 1990s there were hardly any CSOs:

“During Yugoslav times, the structure of civil society was basically trade unions, syndicates, media or hobby associations, nurturing culture, folk, etc. but not a meaningful, third pillar, syndicates were a little different, playing a kind of essence of civil society movement or organization in a common interest institution, but organizations mostly promoted the interests of the state. Only during the last years of Yugoslavia civil society’s diversification started.” (Interview no. 35)

However, despite the boom since around 2000 civil society’s development has been slow. Some respondents blame this on the lack of tradition of civic engagement, they think that NGOs do not last long enough to impact policies and that people do not understand the idea of volunteering.195

However, some respondents from IOs also believe that while many CSOs have no impact, there are some CSOs that can influence the government – with the support from IOs:

“there are some CSOs that could influence the government without support of IOs – the real ones with a genuine agenda. With the others, it is a problem from the communist times, they are not very developed, it’s not in the tradition.” (Interview no. 60)

Respondents from IOs also pointed to the very high number of registered NGOs compared to the small population – and the problem that currently it was impossible to find out how many and who of them were actually active. The understanding of civil society on the part of IOs was more inclusive than that of respondents from CSOs but also made a difference between NGOs (donor oriented) and civil society (community oriented):

“Civil society is other actors like religious leaders, women organizations, which cannot be NGOs, what else? These are civil actors, we say. NGOs are more organizations. Because, for instance, religious leaders are (...) not non-profit organizations (...) or, they don’t receive from international community funds. Well, NGOs are more, with the donor

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192 “If our organizations are persistent, strong, loud enough, and lucky enough to sustain themselves long enough, they will be heard and there can be impact, they can change things. Older people are still adapting to the new system and younger still learning how to live. So there are many open questions to discuss, but to be loud enough, to make government do their work and think twice is already a success.” (Interview no. 48)

193 “(T)he civil sector cannot to anything here, because it is not a natural thing, not homegrown, not grassroots, most NGOs were created by foreigners. Millions were invested in the media - and now what is the effect, where the progress? Nothing, no impact. The civil sector story in Eastern Europe is one big experiment.” (Interview no. 63)

194 “There are value-driven NGOs, but only like mushrooms as long as there is money” (Interview no. 43)

195 “(M)any NGOs don’t last long, as many people don’t understand that it often takes a lot of volunteer work. There is no tradition of volunteering in Macedonia or the region.” (Interview no. 60)
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community related. But in general these are all civil society, even individuals, or community leaders can, are civil society actors, belong to civil society sector.” (Interview no. 68)

While many CSOs severely criticized the escalating role of religious leaders and movements in Macedonia, several respondents from IOs stated they cooperated with them – while not always very happy about the success. Regarding the impact of NGOs, respondents from IOs critically referred to a large number of GONGOs or QUANGOs established by political parties, and to the low impact of NGOs:

“Civil society is currently, vis-à-vis the ruling party, completely irrelevant. If they say anything, monitoring organizations that talk about the elections, the EU accession processes, they are just blacklisted and accused of being opposition backed. Like now, big governors, Open Society Institute and George Soros, because they give a lot of money and make up a huge chunk of civil society simply through projects and funding they give to other organizations, that’s just unheard of and unacceptable. And it’s never been like this, civil society has never been in a situation as precarious as this, quite sad.” (Interview no. 70)

Respondents from IOs noted that there was no naturally established civil society that existed for purely civic activism. Some respondents pointed to the fact that in fact in Macedonia there were certain traditional, rooted associations, such as religious organizations, and traditional, natural civil society, like hunting organizations, exist as genuine organizations, but not as numerous as in Western countries. Today however, according to several respondents there were a few recent social movements, yet most of these based on nationalism (e.g. around the project “Skopje 2014”196, that in fact pose a potential threat for political and security matters, and that there was only one “real” democratic social movement:

“There is only one really typical CSO, freedom square, you could feel, you could meet them, they were students, they had really something genuine. Just very few people, they have failed because support from the people was very limited.” (Interview no. 60)

There were a few additional demonstrations after an act of police violence (in June 2011) and after a series of (supposedly) ethnically motivated attacks between Albanians and Macedonians (in spring 2012), but these faded very soon.

A number of respondents from IOs stated that most NGOs did not work for a certain thematic purpose, but rather to assure the salary of their directors and most important employees and/or friends. Also, many persons from CSOs were not able or not willing to understanding the idea of civic engagement – but rather waiting for money and advice from abroad – and changing their work focus constantly, diminishing potential political impact:

“there is such an NGO-sector that is business. NGO equals business. When I’m good a writing project proposals, know what is discussed at the Worldbank, one day I do gender or women, child labor, tomorrow environment, etc. do a project, have my job, car, offices, like a job, like business. That doesn’t necessarily mean bad results, but it’s not political.” (Interview no. 55)

However, several respondents noted that the quality and mission of numerous NGOs was improving to be more democratic and that decreased funding in fact helped to select CSOs that were convinced of their purposes and not only existed to make money.

Respondents from IOs, contrary to CSOs-respondents, underlined, that, significantly owed to their support, since independence, civil society has not only developed but even drastically grown and progressed since 1999:

“Around the bombing of Serbia and Kosovo, only organizations like Soros were here, trying to develop civil society, creating some spin-off organizations, but still under the Soros umbrella. The very popular topics were like Roma, women emancipation, and so on. Soros started to create these organizations and it really boosted the creation of Macedonian civil society and the establishment of a frame for them to work in, teaching them how to apply for grants. But then Soros had mostly the financial power with huge resources. Also USAID was here. Currently it is getting better, money got less for projects, and business here is going better and the state is developing the economy. So internationals kind of laid the ground for a functioning democratic society, and sometimes it takes years between projects to see something. I think, those working in international organizations getting all the applications can tell, when someone is not really motivated and just wants some money.” (Interview no. 34)

196 A big, controversially debated project of the Macedonian government, consisting in the construction of numerous buildings, statues, etc. of historically important symbols and references in the center of the Macedonian capital Skopje. While advocates underline that the project would revive tourism and embellish the city center, opponents criticize the project as nationalist antiquization and as a waste of tax-payers’ money. (See exemplarily Marusic 2012)
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And that, as one respondent stated on a more optimistic note, stability and quality of NGOs was constantly increasing and that for a growing number issues mattered more than mere profit – which she promoted and appreciated in her cooperation with CSOs:

“Civil society is still not that hopeless. Working under the EIDHR, I’m faced with medium size CSOs, they’re growing in capacity and also in stability. And for me these are successful stories, and there are a thousand, or a good number of them. Institutions, that are characterized working at least eight, ten years in the field, that are stable, that are focused in certain area, and their mood is not jumping.” (Interview no. 35)

Many respondents from IOs also highlighted the importance of international support to good CSOs. Nevertheless, several respondents also admitted they were still working on supporting actual cooperation between state institutions and on promoting CSOs that were not affiliated with political parties. Respondents also pointed to the progress made in the development of an increasing number of professional NGOs in international cooperations and in social services. 197

Another respondent highlighted the importance for national institutions to cooperate with the growing number of increasingly professional NGOs – also as CSOs represented a link to the donor community and the big effort that IOs were undergoing to promote cooperation. 198 Several persons from IOs also stated that so far, there had been limited, but however, increasing success of their support of CSOs:

“There is a lot to do, even with civil society, even if it’s not very developed yet. But you need to bear in mind that for almost ten years the doors to politics have been closed with civil society practically working in their own area, without much link with political parties or with institutions. In the last five years maybe they are more opening doors, inviting advisors from civil society in the Secretariat for European Affairs, to more involve people who have really worked and had an opportunity to get those tools in civil society.” (Interview no. 68)

5.2.2 Socialist Legacies and Mostly Current Political Practices Limit Activism of Civil Society and Citizens

Respondents from CSOs in Macedonia also referred to the “communist past” but also a repressive present as a reason for the low general political participation of citizens. 199 Institutional obstacles from the communist past, such as the lack of a public space, hampered the development of civil society and thus its impact on democracy:

“the civil sector does not create state structure, better procedures, pressure from public. Habermas’ idea of the public - we didn't create our public, it’s not a natural thing, communism didn't like competition and civil sector is competition in democracy.” (Interview no. 63)

Many persons referred to a better past under communism/socialism and regretted the strong competition over power and money today. 200

As for Bosnia-Herzegovina, there were no statements that really referred to the role of IOs as to the regime type – only general frustration that international organizations were not doing enough and even blocking further development. A small number of respondents from IOs also highlighted their efforts to support democratization, but no one was very happy about the results.

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197 “There are different types of organizations that work more or less successfully for or in the civil society, with specific working fields. There are some NGOs that are very actively working on questions of national and international, but also social, societal relevance.” (Interview no. 42)

198 “[Civil society] has tools to really present, to give knowledge, and be there anytime that even local self-government needs, or other actors. It’s a kind of tool needed for the development of country and for leading towards democracy. (...) Civil society has links with the donor community, it’s the first layer that comes when it comes to get funds, to support, so using NGOs, civil society is important even for national institutions. I see progress of awareness among institutions, they should use civil society for having the door open to the donor community, to get those tools and, and the knowledge civil society building in last 15 years.” (Interview no. 68)

199 “(...) people are really interested, because they are afraid to get involved. There is pressure, Macedonia is typically former communist country.” (Interview no. 60)

200 “Yugoslav times were in fact our golden age. We were peaceful, save boarders. Macedonian Republic, it was brilliant. And since independence, the problems started, this country did not make a lot of victories since 1990s. During communism there was one ideology and everybody had to follow. Today, there is no ideology, there is just a fight for power, for positions, for money, for young people who want to be something.” (Interview no. 63)
5.2.3 The Legal Situation for Civil Society Remains Difficult with Room for Political Abuse Against Them

Respondents from CSOs mainly hoped that the 2010 newly passed “Law on Associations and Foundations” would improve the situation and lessen dependence from foreign funding. They were nevertheless unhappy that the law left substantial loophole for political control and possible abuse:

“Currently we are waiting for new law for CSOs and foundations that we helped prepare. And we hope we can then to profit activities, to not depend on foreign money anymore and work closer with companies and citizens and make profit with our services. Since 2004 or so we have a law on donations, but it’s difficult, many companies don’t want to be at risk with this law so only a small number of NGOs collect this money.” (Interview no. 39)

Several respondents complained that in general rules of procedure for funding, usually also regarding international funding and particularly funds from state institutions, was very intransparent, and left much power to CSO directors and controlling government bodies without possibilities for their control:

“Another tricky business is, that public benefit organizations are not fulfilling certain criteria, or are not obeying the law, they can be dissolved and all of the properties then are redistributed. The new law has minus and plus, currently civil society is having an initiative to collect amendments and to produce a proposal to the government, it will be interesting to see, to what extent the government will accept the amendments. It may open doors to make the civil society’s environment more vivid and more independent. But some parts also may have counter-effects and give room for pressure and manipulation, if the government decides on a public benefit status.” (Interview no. 35)

This situation led to mistrust and fear of possibly being blackmailed, in case an unwritten rule was not accepted, which is why several CSOs stated to not apply for government funding at all.

A number of interview partners said that while NGOs, albeit only few of the biggest and most influential ones, did have impact in lobbying for changes and certain content in the law of associations – however, the government did not implement changes agreed upon during the consultations. Finally, a number of CSO-respondents working with national minorities, such as Rom or Ashkali, stated, that the legal situation still supports rights for ethnic Macedonians and Albanians – there are no equal laws for ethnic minorities, including their CSOs. Particularly laws of the Ohrid Framework Agreement regarding ethnicity that were formerly installed by IOs today pose big complications, they block democratic functioning and also the rights for national minorities are problematic.

Respondents from IOs agreed about the general legal situation of CSOs in Macedonia: they also had high hopes regarding the “Law on Associations and Foundations”, but were also not entirely optimistic, whether it could keep up to expectations. Also from the side of IOs several respondents noted that the legal situation needed to be improved, as, despite the improvements the law contained, it left very much room that could be used for political manipulation by parties and politicians.201

Another aspect respondents alluded to was that at times cooperation between CSOs and state-administration functioned well, while, as respondents from CSOs also stated, procedures for cooperation between the state and CSOs and connected funding to this were not transparent – and the new law did not really change this:

“If the government is creative and practical, new association legislation can really utilize the expertise of the civil society, won’t pay same service twice, there is a ready-made system now. (...) Good news from the legislation is, that NGOs can work for-profit, ok for their self-sustainability. (...) This can contribute to strengthen civil society once they’re profitable. This can inspire multi-use of their project activities. The new law has minus and plus, civil society is having initiative to collect amendments and produce a proposal to the government it will be interesting to see, to what extent government will accept the amendments. (...) But some parts also have counter-effects, give room for pressure and manipulation, if government decides on public benefit status. Some CSOs in public were criticizing, this is the end of NGO - independence, exaggerating. But many clearly criticize the law.” (Interview no. 35)

201 “The new law on associations will produce some vividness on the civil society environment, especially providing new institutional prospects. It’s more liberal, providing legal opportunities for legal entities, foreigners, minors to register an association. The law can motivate NGOs from the EU, who in the past were reluctant to come here, to start working with local NGOs. (...) The new law provides two novelties: institutions can register as institutions with public interest - to provide public benefits or provide themselves to use benefits. (...)Registered institutions always have to produce their financial report to the government, and also for approval. This is really nonsense. (...)Another tricky business is that public benefit organizations are not fulfilling certain criteria, or not obeying the law, can be dissolved and all of the properties then are redistributed.” (Interview no. 35)
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Further, even though the law has been changed so as to support increased consultations between government and civil society, there were still significant shortcomings in this area, and frequently consultation was symbolic or the results from them were ignored by the government. The recent reforms of laws, that allow for-profit work and offer better conditions for private donations, were supposed to improve the situation for CSOs, but the procedures are still so unclear and intransparent, that the effect is not very positive. Recently, a law was passed that forbids principles to allow for party politics in his school – while this, still, is extremely common everywhere.

Several CSOs were unhappy about clientelism between IOs and “their” CSOs. So even though the new law on associations and foundations and its legal reforms for CSOs and foundations should lessen the dependency on foreign donors and increase cooperation with citizens and companies for profit, because the process is intransparent. One aspect mentioned was that the idea of “the legal concept” in Macedonia still is different than in Western states – good laws on paper are not implemented or respected, despite significant support by IOs:

“We can do empowering, pushing, talking to people, e.g. tell them to see the ombudsman, the police, etc. There is a lot of room for people in power to manipulate the situation. But you can help, in Macedonia they mix up rule of law with dysfunction, what legality is, and what something can be illegitimate, but totally legal.” (Interview no. 60)

This is also connected to the fact that courts are politically not independent, and in general, the legal situation leaves much room for political manipulation and pressure. Several respondents from CSOs stated about IOs, that they wished for more explicit support as the government did not take civil society serious enough to really included them in consultations and to respect and implement the results from consultations with them, while pressure and advice from IOs frequently had more impact: Many respondents hoped that EU accession and supervision will speed up legal reforms.

5.2.4 Cooperation between CSOs and the State: Limited except for Politically Affiliated Organizations

The clear majority of respondents from CSOs referred to problems regarding the cooperation between state and civil society. The majority of CSO respondents strongly emphasized their dissatisfaction about how politicians ignored or abused civil society and their positions always depending on their purely selfish purposes of perpetuating and expanding power and influence. Interview partners stated that cooperation between government and civil society were not satisfactory – partially, because the state did not accept civil society as partners, partially, because CSOs lacked professional skills for consultations. Respondents stated that even when consultations were held, politicians could not be trusted to keep their word about decisions and to included them in legislation and to implement them – and only the minority of counterparts in the administration cooperated well with CSOs.\(^{202}\)

Many respondents said cooperation between political administration and CSOs was much easier at the local level than at the state level. However some regretted that political administration and procedures in general frequently were missing quality and devotion:

“We have no quality public administration. They are just there because party nominated them, and gave them a job. Public administration won't do their job and procedures take forever. Civic sector in the democratic state was never really considered by these young prime ministers. They come to NGO sector, share hands, smile, talk about a strategy, that's all. No cooperation between state and civil society.” (Interview no. 63)

Nevertheless, also at the local level CSOs were frustrated that the administration was not obliged to accept civil society’s demands:

“One good approach is the civil society forum of Skopje. A sectoral approach, sponsored by USAID, nicely implemented by strong local NGO, CIRa. Lady in charge from city was very nice, quick and smart learning in the forum. She then went on in her career. Everything that was elaborated in forum, then goes to the administration, and can be erased at once they are the ultimate power players and can decide on anything.” (Interview no. 43)

\(^{202}\) “The national department for international cooperation and cooperation with NGOs - is learning and connecting with NGO scene. But they still have major socialist characteristics, being decision-makers dictating, not civil servants. Most people working in the liaison-office come from local administration or from party members. And you have to be local and not criticize the state structures or you won’t get any money. And the members of the forum again were chosen by political parties.” (Interview no. 43)
Several respondents stated that they were currently working on involving more CSOs and citizens in local consultation processes, mostly in the field of service provisions, while overall success of CSO influence was still limited. Respondents from IOs referring to civil society agreed, that the cooperation between state and CSOs was not very well, and to a large extent declaratory on the side of the state:

“There is strategy (for cooperation between government and civil society), but, like with most things in Macedonia, there are things on paper, it’s just the implementation and the will that are not there. And for cooperation with civil society that’s indeed the case.” (Interview no. 70)

They had a few more reasons for the low degree of cooperation: the Members of Parliament do not have very big staff and time capacity for consultations, and the simply do not see much of a reason for cooperation, as there is no tradition for this.

One problem was said to be that the government is reluctant to adhere to the legally binding regulations that determine that they ought to consult with NGOs and here, one respondent by IOs admits limits of their influence:

“The other thing is the consultation process. According to law on information, the government is supposed since last year, for further generating officially to put any of the draft policies or legislation - of course I am aware it’s not functioning perfect. Technical assistance is supposed to help the government’s implementation of the strategy for cooperation of NGOs, enacted in 2007, covering the strategy of the government how to cooperate and improve the cooperation with NGOs.” (Interview no. 35)

Several respondents from IOs pointed to the increased, albeit not perfect, cooperation between local administration and CSOs. While several committees for inter-ethnic relations were established on a voluntary basis, not due to obligation based on ethnic quota. Sometimes the lack of cooperation, also by IOs, was attributed to lack of capacity on the part of CSOs. Finally, one respondent noted that today there were several former civil society activists that also were links of CSOs to the government – and with whom cooperation between CSOs and their departments was not only problematic but instead provided a door opener for influence and partnership between the state and CSOs, for instance in the field of environmental protection.

Local government preferred working with NGOs that were already established and that were professional so as to understand the administrative and political procedures. Also the local administration agreed that cooperation between NGOs and the state worked well in social services

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203 “The government will cooperate with NGOs that are public opinion makers or that have many citizens supporting. If all NGOs really had that many members civil society would really be a serious partner. But currently, no CSO is so influential. There are some, like for disabled or health organizations. But civil society with political issues, dealing with democratization issues and their number is not low but their influence is very low.” (Interview no. 41)

204 “The biggest problems in the beginning for CSOs were with government institutions were and still are that these didn’t, and for the most part still don’t, understand the role and tasks of this part of society.” (Interview no. 23)

205 “they (were) established voluntarily because they think it’s a good mechanism” (Interview no. 35) the committees and their cooperation with NGOs and with the local administration was not perfect as “in some places it is functioning like a pro-bono lobby group that nobody is listening to. You have different levels using this mechanism.” (Interview no. 35) and “(o)ne gap for the local level is the still lacking collaboration of NGOs with the local self-government, and CFCRs, Commissions for Inter-Community Relations. NGOs absolutely do not have any clue, what is the purpose of these commissions.” (Interview no. 68)

206 “[Many CSOs are] under-prepared, too jaded, too temperamental when working with politicians. Both sides are – there are exceptions on each side, but there are also exceptions, that’s a problem.” (Interview no. 70)

207 “And, in the frame of action plan and the strategy, we suggest some of the actions which we are suggested in the strategy was to create an NGO forum, NGO city forum. And we created that. We have NGO, city NGO forum. And the problem was how to nominate the members of the forum and who will be the member of the forum. Generally speaking we want to have NGOs which are important in the city of Skopje to be part of that forum.” (Interview no. 49, local government MK) and “(t)he problem is, a kind of way to discuss about something on an informal way, because it is very restricted how to present some issues in front of the council, to adopt some regulation. It’s very formal. But this is informal and the conclusions from the forum comes, officially comes to the council and to the mayor, and very often some issues inside of the conclusions go directly to the city programs of a different department.” (Interview no. 49, local government MK)
and environmental issues. Usually, the professionalized CSOs are NGOs – as the administration has technical and procedural difficulties to work with other forms of CSOs:

“What we learned: First of all, because of the European policy recognize some forms which are for us unrecognizable. For instance, LAG, Local Action Groups. That’s one thing. We still did not know how to organize that. Another thing is, which European Union recognize, that’s the social enterprises. Again, it is for us unrecognizable, because our social enterprises or not-for-profit enterprises are something which means that the second phase of NGOs, for us. Although, now in some changing in the law appear all these forms, but we have not experience. That means that the classical NGO, not-for-profit organization, we have that. We know how they work. We know how to control the money which will give them and how to control the spending of budget etc. etc. But, for instance, how it will be with a not-for-profit enterprise, I am not so sure, because the enterprises exist only for profit. What will be the mission and the vision and the goal of that enterprise to work not-for-profit. It is so socialist.” (Interview no. 49, local government MK)

Finally, frequently, NGOs do not present project proposals that are interesting or innovative enough, maybe thinking donors want those (rather boring) ideas.

Many respondents from IOs related to their support and success of improving the cooperation between state and civil society. However, most said that until today cooperation was not sufficient, also owed to a lack of capacity of MPs, but it was improving as the government increasingly appreciated know-how and contacts of CSOs. IOs cooperate with many government institutions, support cooperation with civil society, and conduct trainings with (mostly local) staff for this purpose. Further, many IOs conduct capacity trainings with CSOs. One respondent stated that efforts from the international community to pressure the government to also take into account results from consultations with CSOs did not lead to much effect:

“After ignoring CSO consultations for anti-discrimination law there were reactions by European Commission and by CSOs. But the government did not change their position and now the discussion has faded.” (Interview no. 62)

Several respondents from IOs noted, just like many from CSOs, that pressure by IOs still proved important and successful for pressuring the government to cooperate with CSOs:

“There have been good examples recently drafting legislations where civil society was included in working groups between ministries, but we helped very much with outside assistance, you know, USAID or our organizations, they still need to get beyond that, this is why the donor community is still here, we have noted, that there’s much left to do.” (Interview no. 70)

208 “And, what have, and we have, again, in this moment, it is very actual. That’s the public announcement for financing the project of NGO projects. And it is actually in this moment. And the priorities inside of the announcement are comes from, for instance from the education issues, the social affairs issues, but also for energy efficiency, for urban, changing the urban face of the city, or give the informatics technology close to the disabled people etc. etc.” (Interview no. 49, local government MK)

209 “We have problems how to choose good projects, because the level of the project proposal. I am not so satisfied how they prepare projects. They are very, very traditional, how to explain. They, they are not so, the ideas are not so attractive. They are not so comfortable to start something unusual, to be something different than usual. I’m not sure, maybe they believe that we are so classic, that we are so traditional administration.” (Interview no. 49, local government MK)

210 “Here there is a vast gap of cooperation, MPs do not have resources to draft legislation amendments, and we are creating a huge institute to provide those resources, but meantime we promote thematic cooperation, there are organizations specialized in X, Y, Z could help. (...) You can only cooperate on a case-by-case basis, if the Chairman or party doesn’t want, sometimes you just can only go so far. In this political environment it’s difficult. (...) Many [CSOs] have experts on standby from UK for example, if one org trying to help drafting of a law on electronic waste management, brand new here, many places have experts on standby from a third-party organization helped in process of bringing same legislation in UK.” (Interview no. 70)

211 “We try to build up, see weaknesses, work through consultancies, trainings, exchanging, in region or beyond, then slowly taking them in parliament and building relationships. We had great examples, when one organization managed to forge close relationship, drafting committee conclusions. What’s normal in any other democratic society, but it’s quite strange here. Now there is cooperation and promotion. (...) There have been good examples recently of drafting legislations where civil society was included in working groups between the ministries, but much was helped with outside assistance, you know, USAID or our organization, we now need to get beyond that, this is why the donor community still here.” (Interview no. 70)
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However, the IOs’ demands that the government cooperated more with CSOs was frequently ineffective and unsustainable, as the government lacked an overall strategy for the cooperation with CSOs.

The high number of positive remarks of respondents from IOs about their important contribution to cooperation between the state and CSOs are contrasted with several statements from respondents from CSOs about them: although IOs managed to set up bodies for cooperation, such as the NGO-forum, the participating NGOs were elected by the political parties in power and politically affiliated and controlled, and thus not critical or representative of other positions. Further, in the same vein, several respondents stated, that the IO insistence on cooperation between CSOs and the government was not properly timed, as currently the government would only abuse cooperation for their own purposes, symbolic acts, etc. possibly only harming the process and credibility of CSOs:

“Because it’s not really ideal there, some things are quite covered, some haven’t moved at all, like drafting on the policy issues and consultation, unfortunately, in the consultation, not everything is going smooth. This situation has to be improved especially in both cases of legislation I’ve mentioned. Once the drafting of the law was finished, between the final version from the draft working group to the submission to the government for first reading, in both cases the law was changed. Not only technical issues were changed by the ministry of justice. But certain decisions, solutions were changed. In a kind of way that is misuse of the involvement of CS. I hope that won’t discourage CS in the future to participate, because, of course, some of them were very angry.” (Interview no. 35)

One respondent from the local administration in Skopje stated that in fact pressure by IOs had increased cooperation between the city and NGOs.  

5.2.5 Difficult Financial and Economic Situation for CSOs – Affiliations with Politics or International Organizations and their Respective Funding Lines

The large majority of respondents referred to the difficult economic situation, high unemployment, etc. the state has been facing for years. Most also mentioned that despite legal improvements, the state was re-expanding its power, ignoring or instrumentalizing CSOs, funding mostly only those that were politically affiliated through intransparent processes. This ongoing difficulty has been coupled with a decrease in the available international funding that is accessible to mostly the powerful, professional NGOs, which aggravates the development of the idea of NGOs as part of a job sector and not as motors for general civil society mobilization. Not surprisingly, as most make their living from funding – which needs to be justified through the difficult financial situation - respondents from civil society in Macedonia in general were the group most critical of the current economic situation. Finances are blamed as a reason why civil society in Macedonia was so focused on money.

Several respondents noted the problem of dependency on international money – partially owed to little funding available from the Macedonian state and also from intransparent processes that they

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212 “And the municipalities, they are not so interested to have a huge collaboration with NGOs. And the whole pictures about NGOs was they want money etc., because the state has not the competence to control NGOs in a strict manner. But now the picture is changed, because the donor association, the donors in Macedonia slowly go out of the state and the funds are much less than, for instance, four years ago. And, the European Union made a kind of pressure to the municipality, the government and to the municipality to start thinking about collaboration with NGO sector. In 2007 city of Skopje and the city council adopt a strategy, a city strategy for collaboration with NGOs. And we realized that strategy together with OSCE, you know about OSCE, and OSCE gives money to CIRa, that's the Centre for Institutional Development, and they manage the methodology of all that issues to realize the strategy which will be on the focus of NGOs, not on the focus of administration.” (Interview no. 49, local government MK)

213 “Ongoing poverty and economic struggle make things difficult. All this public disturbance, lack of knowledge, of practice of patience, of understanding, of forgiveness. Passing bills nobody implements. How can investors come and do something positive? The big problem is economic stability.” (Interview no. 48)

214 “Everybody wants to talk about why civil society in Macedonia is not functioning, but my only concern is about the finances of civil society, as civil society in Macedonia developed like a separate economic sector. People started to work in civil society for earning money.” (Interview no. 41)
feared could be abused to their disadvantage\textsuperscript{215} and domestic donors tended to give only smaller sums of funding, and:

“We are mostly financed by international funding. In 2007 we applied for a small funding amount from Macedonia government but all connected to it was unclear, non-transparent what conditions were, no follow up, etc. So we asked ourselves why risk nuisance with government for so little money? Funding from the city of Skopje is available but the sums are too little, so we do not cooperate with the government or with the city of Skopje, but on the local level sometimes you get rooms, etc. for free. Civil society is struggling - for funding.” (Interview no. 48)

However, being able to choose one’s options raises the question, to what extent the situation is really as devastating as frequently depicted. While many respondents stated concern about dependence on international funding, several respondents however also pointed to the fact that there was not little state money available - about 4 Mio. € per year – but the non-transparency of its distribution made this funding mostly unavailable to politically critical organization. Numerous respondents expressed hopes, that the financial implications of the new law on associations and foundations will improve their situation that previously made private funding difficult and politically risky, as for instance states the following quote:

“Currently we are waiting for the new law for associations and foundations that we helped prepare. And we hope, we can then do profit activities, to not depend on foreign money anymore and work closer with companies and citizens and make profit with our services. Since 2004 or so we have a law on donations, but it’s difficult, not many companies want to be at risk with this law so only a small number of NGOs collect this money. If you want to receive donations, you need to register with the government for a certificate and then they always ask you for reports on the donations, etc.” (Interview no. 39)

The general availability of funding is closely tied to dependence on funding by IOs and by the government, many respondents saw this as problematic and inhibiting to the political impact of civil society.\textsuperscript{216}

And the weak economy cannot compensate for currently decreasing international funding. A number of statements were also self-critical as to how the financial escapades of certain NGOs had led to discrediting all NGOs – and to deteriorating the working practices of many NGO activists and directors.\textsuperscript{217}

Finally, respondents stated that for established, well financed organizations, many of the problems mentioned before did not apply as amply – but they also admitted, that financial security in fact allowed them to be heard by politicians, to remain strong vis-à-vis program planning with donors, easing pressure for being “donor driven” etc. and to in fact fulfill many of the criteria IOs frequently listed for “good NGOs”:

“Our NGO has existed for 15 years with an office and paid staff and it feels, like we really should react to many things, not like NGOs that live from project to project. But with our continuous funding we can afford to be active in many fields. There is a strategic map for this NGO, but our special focus depends on the funds available for Macedonia.” (Interview no. 61)

Respondents from international organizations were comparatively even more critical of the situation of civil society at the moment. They also saw the financial situation as all but rosy, referring to rising costs, poverty, long recession, little investment, etc. However, they also thought that the overall civil society was partially to blame for not actively changing the political situation as the private sector did...

\textsuperscript{215} “The government is giving some money to some NGOs every year, but the process of choosing NGOs is not transparent, the spending is not monitored. And sometimes they will suddenly give you money to spend very quickly. We don’t apply for this anymore, as sometimes money is given just to discredit. So for our image working with this money is not good, we have a transparent and open budget.” (Interview no. 39)

\textsuperscript{216} “Civil society in Macedonia has potential, but as long as we lack financial independence, we also lack political independence. For most projects government support is needed, and money is not enough for big campaigns, only small direct influence on state institutions. Opinion surveys are paid for by the state and serve as basis for recommendations - but the main funding comes from international donors. We work with [several large IOs]. When you’re not financially independent, then it’s difficult to be equal partner with government institutions.” (Interview no. 41)

\textsuperscript{217} “After some years, leaders of NGOs also learned how to get rich, buy new cards, spend foreign money, were manipulating with the funds. And now we have nothing, the media is very much manipulated, the NGO sector - what is that? They are money laundry organizations.” (Interview no. 63)
not provide funding and for citizens in general failing to take initiative even though they seemed to have money to spend on holidays, etc.: 

“high unemployment and no money, cafes and restaurants are full, I see expensive supermarkets, people go on holidays, and so on.” (Interview no. 55)

But, on the other hand, several respondents understood this, as funding from the government was not much and they understood that funding provided salaries for NGO-employees. 218

Several respondents from IOs stated they had funding guidelines of, e.g. not providing salaries, etc. and they paid attention to not increase the NGOs’ financial dependence. Most NGO activists live off (the currently decreasing) international funding and are worried about the difficulty of (still) securing sufficient income that used to be more and now many international donors are leaving:

“There were very big NGOs, much bigger than half of the companies in Macedonia. The true question for civil society development is the financing, after the funding of international donors are gone. Today, Macedonia faces serious problems with most US donors leaving and mostly European donors present in the region. The biggest donor is the European Union, the European Commission, but domestic organizations do not have the capacities to pass difficult application procedures.” (Interview no. 41)

Several persons criticized past misuse of funding money. 219 Many respondents underlined the problem of clientelism in funding – of closeness as a pre-condition to access funding from either politics or international organizations, as the following quotes illustrate:

“And with foundations usually the strong one gets all, and gets even stronger. Demands for getting grants from IOs are often very highly professionalized, need professional staff, etc. it’s like they give you money for water but not the canister. Generally, conditions for NGOs here are very unfavorable, so we always look for money from international organizations.” (Interview no. 43)

Instead, respondents asked for more structural, continued support, as project based funding did not assure development. 220 Several respondents noted that most NGOs followed the always changing funding “trends” of international organizations instead of having their own agenda. 221 Many respondents from CSOs complained about IOs who increased monitoring and hurdles of access to funding. Some interview partners were also more positive about increased quality controls on the side of IOs that helped to improve quality work. 222

According to some persons, the most important financial problem for CSOs currently is not only the overall decrease of international funding but also the changing form of funds available:

“Since IPA funds were established [by the EU], big donors like SIDA [“Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency”] are pulling out of Macedonian, but nothing new has come. Just EIDHR [the EU’s “European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights”] money, but that is not part of IPA. So far we haven’t seen any money from pre-accession assistance.” (Interview no. 48)

Applying for EU grants is very complicated and usually requires professional structures and financial backing, leading to a selection of the strongest NGOs. Several respondents from IOs criticized that NGOs were donor oriented, which they in fact did not appreciate, for instance when NGOs asked them,

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218 “I mean, this is also how people are employed, of course people get involved, people need to earn money, there are jobs to be done, there are things to be said, and there is a genuine interest in having healthy civil society development in Macedonia.” (Interview no. 70)

219 “Due to economic hardships, civil society exists mostly as a source of funding. The past 15-18 years the big problem was that money from calls for applications mostly went to friends, there was a lot of corruption.” (Interview no. 33)

220 “To fulfill some agenda, support should be continuous, structural and should be more democratic, more open. So the sector could be more devoted to a mission than to fundraising and the changing objectives of donors. The demands for getting grants from IOs are often very highly professionalized. There are value-driven NGOs in Macedonia, but only like mushrooms as long as there is money.” (Interview no. 43)

221 “The majority of NGOs follow their financial agenda. So one year work on drugs, then on trafficking, then on child rights.” (Interview no. 43)

222 “Every IO either funds projects related to ethnicity constantly or had a phase of that. And until recently it was a joke that you can always get a project if it’s about ethnic integration and multiculturalism. Lately, more focus on gender, transparency of different fields. The tendency is to fund professionally run projects, not just contemplations on discursive issues but the practical component is more important, also the methods and the visibility of the projects. Maybe ethnic projects are still appealing but if they don’t fulfill the condition of being professionally elaborated, to have good planning, be feasible, sustainable and with certain effects, they cannot pass like years ago.” (Interview no. 47)
what type of projects they wished to them to design. Many respondents from IOs connected to foreign
governments however underlined, that they had partner organizations, but that, other than many
private foundations, they did or could not fund overhead costs, but rather fund activities, material,
conferences, etc. 223

Respondents from international organizations said about their own work in Macedonia that they
were more optimistic about the funding situation for civil society, frequently justifying points that CSOs
had criticized: Several respondents noted, that they substantially contributed to skills, also regarding
funding applications for CSOs, and, that in fact there was still substantial funding available for CSOs,
notably in the field of inter-ethnic relations and Roma-rights, and that the frequent requirement for
co-financing of CSOs in fact helped them to remain independent – even though many IOs have partner
CSOs they fund on a regular basis:

“In general I like co-financing, it costs less for me while realizing a project, and it’s better of Macedonian NGOs to
remain independent. But in general, in this scene foundations do have partners, a little like in a relationship and best
partners are somewhat exclusive.” (Interview no. 55)

Frequent controls and also possible interference in NGO projects were justified by the statement, that
spending money by Western taxpayers required control of spending. 224

However, several respondents stated that the controls, blamed to make NGOs “donor driven” were
not as grave as they were frequently presented: rather, several IOs had taken on the practice of paying
directly for certain events (rooms, catering, etc.) or to provide room for meetings, etc. 225

CSOs stated about IOs that their policies had promoted a dependency on donor money. Further, respondents noted
that they thought that more specific goals for NGO work should be supported by IOs:

“more concrete goals should be formulated instead of global funding.” (Interview no. 20)

Further, respondents from CSOs criticized, that the process for funding selection and amounts was
intransparent, and created mistrust, while one respondent however also noted, that is was very human
and not easy to remain objective when program officers knew their counterparts personally:

“Something problematic, that is very human, but difficult to solve is, that project officers of IOs decide on very
subjective basis, who they drank wine with e.g., on their view of Macedonian society.” (Interview no. 44)

According to a respondent from the local administration, the problem of “donor-driven” NGOs also
originated in false ideas that NGOs had about potential donors, assuming these were not open to
innovative, specific ideas of NGOs in their particular field of activity.

5.2.6 Ethno-National and Mostly Ethno-Political Affiliation Shape Societal Cleavages

Regarding statements from CSOs a large majority of respondents stated that politicians
instrumentalized ethnicity and ethnic divisions for their power-interests and used ethno-national
mobilization to perpetuate and increase their power. They also risked very negative consequences,

223 “And decisions for this NGO sector can be fatal, as there are salaries connected, often only project based, for 1-2
years, and often you will have to choose, between for example a job in university or 800 € in NGO, but then other
opportunities would be gone. And for example we can’t finance overhead. We have strict regulations by the ministry,
and our foundation, it is partnership not sponsoring. Many IOs are sponsors, and I always insist that we don’t sponsor
as a message. I don’t sponsor anything, only what is in my mandate we can do together, our team involved in whole
process. But there are others, many anthroposophic, philanthropic foundations that have money, e.g. Heinz foundation,
who say we got money, you do great things, go ahead. For us it’s important that we share values.” (Interview no. 55)

224 “But also all the tax money spent in the world needs to be justified by successes.” (Interview no. 55)

225 “And we are ready to pay costs like rent for room, or costs connected to a conference. But we don’t just pay money,
but really are partners. And of course many organizations had project proposals, that were all about the money, the
biggest share being for salaries, and unfortunately we cannot support that. So we can take care of the conference,
support them. Accounting abilities of NGOs we work with don’t matter so much, as we only pay their project expenses,
they don’t get money from us. Really, one has to try to teach the people here how to do it, not that money arrives,
they spend it and there is not result. You do it step by step you can even organize events without money. E.g. we
provide a room to bring 20 people and volunteering experts together. The money is not the main issue, but you need
to have the aim in front of your eyes.” (Interview no. 46)
and even sponsoring (supposedly) nationalist campaigns, allocating more money to cities where the ethnic majority governs, etc. Some respondents said that the over-ethnicization has led to an omnipresent emphasis of group belonging defined by ethnicity – instead of citizenship and individual rights.

Many respondents repeatedly underlined the significant negative impact of ethnic divisions while a few respondents also emphasized that according to opinion polls economic divisions and a high degree of corruption were in fact very big problems that frequently ran congruent to ethnic divisions. Several respondents stated, that political affiliation, frequently also running parallel with ethnic divisions, had become increasingly important (again) as access to jobs, careers, etc.

Ethnic segregation in Macedonia was said to be very pronounced – as historically there was not so much mixing, often blamed on the different languages and the concentrated settlement of Albanians and Macedonians. Many respondents underlined that since 2001 the significance of social segregation and political division lines have increased. Most respondents of non-Macedonian background blamed ethnic Macedonians to make no efforts for integration, e.g. to learn another language or to foster integration. Also in Macedonia the media was said to be controlled by the state and to fuel ethnic tensions.

While many respondents praised the peace-fostering effect of the OFA a few respondents from CSOs of ethnic Macedonian background were quite critical of the OFA implementation and the role that external actors played in this context. Several respondents from Albanian CSOs alluded to the current regulations from the OFA based on ethnic quota, stating that in many cases they did lead only to “shambolic” representation, for instance only on lower job levels:

“Some state institutions are better at employing minority groups: post-network, airport. We asked the SIOFA for numbers of representation, but they are not very transparent - or maybe they don’t have the numbers, not all institutions give them the numbers.” (Interview no. 39)

As to the empowering effects of the OFA, several respondents were rather critical, for instance condescendingly calling the SIOFA226 an “Albanian employment agency”, etc. Many also noted that they were under the impression, that since independence of Macedonia were very reluctant of granting non-majority groups equal rights, not only to Albanians but also to ethnic minorities, who were less demanding. The power struggles and political agreements (OFA) between Macedonians and Albanians are suggested to lead to a marginalization of smaller communities – while the level of motivation on their behalf to take initiative and their degree of becoming politically organized is not very high and thus does not show many results. Even though many respondents lamented the deteriorating inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia only one NGO stated successful projects that were organized for students to meet other young persons of different ethnic background, to travel abroad to meet different types of people, to work with teachers to reduce prejudice and change teaching, etc.

Respondents from IOs in Macedonia were particularly critical of the inter-ethnic situation at the moment: many agreed that the now granted powers to the largest non-majority ethnic-community would not be surrendered to being governed by the Macedonian majority. They also considered ethno-religious identity of most people to be very strong and segregation having an even more dividing influence on society. Many respondents stated that ethnic segregation at all levels of civil society and also of the administration strongly affected their work – also, as job positions on all levels were frequently distributed according to political affiliation, not qualification, and for instance also inside of ministries, e.g. the Ministry for Education, Macedonian-Albanian power struggles took place. Recent developments of nationalist rhetoric and “antiquization” (referring to the Skopje 2014 project) made things even worse. In fact, many respondents from IOs were rather critical of the political developments in the country, stated that until today there were (border) regions in which the state did not have full control, and that IOs were the real defender of the multi-ethnic state:

“One idea that is a fundamental problem here, but it can be other problems in multi-, multi-ethnic countries is that, it’s politically incorrect to say that, but it has to be said, is that the real defender of the state, of the multi-ethnic state, is the international community. Because you can feel that areas, the central authority areas, where the minority is the only thing, it’s not more. They don’t pay taxes, whatever. Which is actually very fundamental for a state, because those areas can be border areas. So, so that’s also, also helping in, in that direction, helping people to understand that building a state, you have to put aside your inter-ethnic problems. So that also has improved. There was last year

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226 “SIOFA” is the acronym that stands for the “Secretariat for the Implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement”.

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major agreements, that we were not involved obviously in it, but it was still a major step, this was Kosovo. So, the border agreement recognizing both countries were governing each other, which is very important, and because it creates stability." (Interview no. 60)

Many respondents noted that youth grew up increasingly segregated, which even further enforces divisions and may not lessen but actually increase tension as youth had no chance to spend time together and to build trust. While it was good to grant certain rights to non-majority communities, this could also mean disadvantages for these, e.g. if they did not speak the majority language which hampered a career in public administration.227 Many respondents were particularly critical of both, Macedonian dominance and unwillingness to integrate persons from other ethnic groups, and Albanian traditional views and reluctance to integrate. Several interlocutors presented examples of their colleagues or friends of different ethnicity working together well in the office but not really mixing in private. Several respondents also gave examples of small steps of good inter-ethnic relations on a personal level:

“On the inter-personal level there are good examples of inter-ethnic cooperation for example of my dentists who shares a cabinet with an Albanian colleague and two fruit stands at the bazaar who work well together and the Macedonian vendor even speaks Albanian to the other one – when he thinks no one can hear him.” (Interview no. 69)

Many respondents from IOs underlined how the situation had improved since 2001. Other respondents mostly regretted increasingly institutionalized ethnic segregation and thought that inter-ethnic relations had not improved, even deteriorated over the last few years, e.g. around Skopje 2014:

“Regarding the inter-ethnic relations, I think until now there has been improvement, just at the moment, due to the project Skopje 2014 and other developments, also in the educational system, that a critical point has been reached. At this point many things could be politically deescalated, if one would allow a public debate around the particular consequences of certain government initiatives.” (Interview no. 42)

Overall, many respondents recognized the important contribution of international organizations to inter-ethnic relations:

“They deserve credit for at least trying to stimulate communication between people with different ethnic background, stimulating cooperation between organizations from different ethnicities. (...) The international community stimulates sensitivity towards ethnicity, of not going into discussion on civic or ethnic paradigm, or perpetuating these. And they stimulate research in this field and the diversity in the work environment. Certain foreign organizations or donors insist that researchers from different backgrounds cooperate. I generally see it as positive, they have tried to bridge gaps set by the conflict 2001, which, after such a clash are unavoidable, the consequences are reflected in the low confidence and in not believing in each other. Internationals have helped to overcome this. Organizations good at bridging are the EU, by funding and working in this field, there is one initiative on Balkan-Egyptians, the Balkan Trust for Democracy, the OSI has been good, for instance by translating their publications in seven languages. When organizations translate their publications into many languages, it alludes to ethnicity, but it also reaches more people who are not all fluent in English.” (Interview no. 47)

Recent policies regarding language and religion teaching in school and a newly introduced idea to segregate schooling (by the OSCE that has been trying to undo the harm that this idea has caused in Bosnia-Herzegovina) further escalated tensions regarding schooling. Many parents do not oppose the system as they themselves live in a context of strong ethno-national mobilization, politics and rhetoric. And a number of respondents also stated that even though they were always paying attention to including not only Macedonian participants in their projects, it tended to be more difficult to recruit equally qualified participants from other backgrounds, e.g. students for international seminars,

227 “Everybody goes to school in their own language, but this system brought new generations to segregation. Before they had the opportunity to meet, to talk, to communicate. Now, everyone is divided, they cannot learn the language of the other, let’s say, Albanians now know less of the Macedonian language, because they can attend the school in Albanian language, which is the same for Macedonians. When you do not speak language of the other, then communication is broken. The new generations don’t have contacts, we used to have a lot before. The division is also rural-urban, e.g. Struga, they come to school from a purely inhabited area, the difficulty is they don’t know each other, inter-ethnic disputes can come to the surface and increase. (...) Of course we accepted the OFA standards and everyone is happy now, they can attend the education, but as a side effect we see this segregation of young generations. Were people aware of implementing that this would be a consequence? I don’t think so. Now we should find a way to prevent another cycle of conflict, apparently, everyone is admitting, I am not inventing the wheel, the worsened inter-ethnic relations. But, if you hear the news and talk to people you see that it’s really like that, also in personal contacts.” (Interview no. 68)
scholarships, etc. 228 Several respondents stated that cooperation was easier with younger politicians and women, than with high-level politicians. About their own work a small number of respondents from IOs said they were happy about the progress made in the OFA implementation 229 , and they rather viewed the Albanian protest as an ongoing power struggle. 230 Several respondents from IOs underlined the important impact of their work on the OFA implementation and had high hopes in the EU-accession process:

“I think that is what they can do, and also the EU integration as means of pressure to show, that the inter-ethnic relations can and must be improved in a way that must be possible to be measured. The EU has the biggest criteria to see and to provide incentives to lead to reforms or improvement. Work of the IOs as still consistent, that they keep working determined to improve inter-ethnic relations and still sees need for improvement. A good sign, and shows also the consequences of politics, or the work of various actors.” (Interview no. 42)

Other interview partners, however, also admitted that they were already happy about small steps of contributing to improvement of inter-ethnic relations. 231 Several respondents also noted that they saw themselves as a third party that could mediate between conflicting parties:

“We do basic conflict resolution, put yourself in middle, that’s why we’re internationals, our local staff could do our jobs for us but nobody would trust them because they are either Albanian or Macedonian. My colleague comes from Czech Republic, I come from Ireland, people don’t immediately assume that we have an agenda, we’re very careful as organization to make sure that we’re seen as impartial, always get both sides of any issue.” (Interview no. 37)

Several respondents noted, that seminars with the aim of fostering inter-ethnic dialog were very efficient with women or youth participants – unlike with older persons, particularly those involved in politics. 232 A number of interview partners from IOs considered the results of their inter-ethnic seminars as moderate and still to be in a phase of providing space for discussion and they were already happy, when participants of different background were ready to talk to each other:

“For me best result is that people can talk. You can feel that people are less, are more open in talking to issues, about the real issues. For me that’s, it’s transparency. We have this commission as result of OFA, at local level there is also a committee on inter-community relations. And, basically they are not functioning, for a simple reason. There is no problem. There are too, there are also practical issues, but mainly people are reluctant to, you know, that’s no problem, most of all no problem outside of political parties. And, well, what they feel, what they think, and that’s really bad, is they think there is no problem because people are not killing to each other, they are not at each other’s throats. They can, let’s say, they can sit in a room and talk to each other. For them, that’s good. But, they don’t, but moving from there to moving to discuss, in a transparent manner, the issues - that’s the first step. And then second, be ready to reach a solution.” (Interview no. 60)

228 “All internationals always try to reach out to Albanian organizations, who are not so motivated to participate in conferences. Maybe like this it is more profitable for them.” (Interview no. 34)

229 “I think, that compared to the first years after the OFA, the government definitely supports the agreement (...) And I think that the OFA has really led to an improvement of the situation of minorities, notably the Albanians. When you look at the statistics, you really can see, that the participation of the Albanian minority in the public life on the local and national level has really notably increased, which I think is a definitely positive effect.” (Interview no. 42)

230 “Things are on a positive track, the implementation of the OFA is moving smoothly, some work still needs to be done, but nobody's contesting the implementation, except for the opposition Albanian party, but they just want back more power. The last twenty years they derided everything in state, the agreement in opposition, once they get in power you usually never hear from them again, they make money, steel from public procurement tenders or whatever they do in these local communities.” (Interview no. 70)

231 “It is already progress, when I manage that my landlord learns to respects and talks to my Albanian friends, we cannot “move mountains” coming from the outside.” (Interview no. 69)

232 “We tried to provide a platform to them to get to know each other, and thus to decrease the fear and the ignorance of the other. So they see the other is also human like we are, function the same way, are students as well, have the same problems like us that we’re in the same boat together. Young people and students later also stay in touch. Regarding the older persons, where structures are already established, for example in parties, they always need to be brought together, they don’t stay in contact. Women also stay in touch and we see that between meetings they communicate. So it’s great to see, that when we bring them together that the connections are sustainable.” (Interview no. 46)
Several respondents gave several examples of how they fostered inter-ethnic relations among youth, underlining their important contribution to these by organizing workshops, seminars, etc. A few respondents, however, admitted that their influence was slow and possibly limited, depending on the work position, and they relied on NGOs to work directly with citizens — and at times successfully bridged inter-ethnic divisions. In many references interview partner considered the presence of the international community to still significantly contribute to sustaining peace and avoiding renewed conflict.

Several respondents from CSOs were very critical of the approaches of many IOs who thought they were too idealist and unrealistic, based on unrealistic, Western ideas about ethnicity, and biased towards Albanians. Several persons expressed unhappiness about the ethnic policies of IOs who got entangled in the Macedonian-Albanian power-struggle. Further, some noted that since 2001 IOs have always been funding seminars to improve inter-ethnic relations — but through this focus on ethnicity has also perpetuated the idea of separate ethnic groups instead of one common identity:

“Civil society has to justify itself in front of IOs, also regarding ethnicity. Every international organization either funds projects related to ethnicity constantly or had a phase of that. And until recently it was a joke that you can always get a project if it’s about ethnic integration and multiculturalism. This critical approach has constantly perpetuated the ethnic paradigm, but it was better than not focusing on this area at all. The ignorant approach to this of the 1990s lead to 2001. It’s not bad but it can be improved.” (Interview no. 47)

Education and religion are important factors for the development of the minorities here, once they complete school. There are several initiatives, for example by the OSCE, that strengthen the inter-ethnic councils in the local communities, advising local administration. There are several initiatives, also by the embassies, that promote inter-ethnic dialogue, that are positive and also there are cultural events that facilitate not political but cultural inter-ethnic dialogue. Also in cooperation with the ministry for education which should be more transparent in the implementation of the educational reform, and in this international actors, of course, and esp. embassies and governments can facilitate.” (Interview no. 42)

“International think, the nation is a construction, an imagined community, but here it is perceived primordialistic, it must grow from ethnicity, not coming from economy of citizens. In the West, all are equal – here, people are truly convinced that majorities have more rights than others. These conflicting ideas are the big question until today for international community, what is national minority nowadays?” (Interview no. 33)

“Inter-ethnic relations here are based on wrong base here, failure of internationals when they arranged these things. And until today there are always claims that there should be Badinter decisions, and things like that and the international community is silent. The internationals seem satisfied with the OFA, and I think they are focused on keeping peace at all costs, keeping minorities happy. For the international community ethnicity has become a boring question after 2001, we and internationals are now more focused on other things, but it’s a pity as there are still ethnic Albanian NGOs.” (Interview no. 61)

“The internationals are not dealing with mutual language learning in Macedonia, they are forcing translation everywhere, according to the use of languages in the local municipalities. Albanian administration and others who are politically appointed are insisting on using Albanian all the time, using translators. It’s all about politics.” (Interview no. 61)
Respondents from IOs underlined the positive important contribution that international cooperation with neighboring states had on the quality and cooperation between the different ethnic-groups in the state. A number of respondents also noted, that they thought, the time for inter-ethnic seminars was over, that relations had sufficiently improved: the EU had still included inter-ethnic relations in the third priority of the IPA implementation. Several respondents from IOs also noted that in cooperation their Albanian and Macedonian partner organizations were different and that they took that into account when working with them, e.g. with the different political parties.

5.3 The Qualities of Civil Society in the Republic of Macedonia

This section presents the findings with regard to the previously identified most relevant qualities of civil society. As previously discussed in the theory chapter, the qualities of civil society strongly determine if and to what extent CSOs assume certain theoretical functions theoretically attributed to them. For instance, a very non-democratically functioning CSO will be less likely to pass on democratic behavior and interaction to its members than an organization that functions according to democratic virtues. The following four categories were identified as most relevant for civil society’s quality and contribution to democratization:

B1. Non-Conflictive Structure of Civil Society
B2. Organizational Structure across Cleavages
B3. Organizational Capacity
B4. Independence from the State and from Political Parties

Before presenting the findings from the interviews in detail a brief summary of the main findings for each of the four categories is presented. Subsequently, the findings from the interviews are discussed in more detail, including the most relevant quotes from the interviews. For each of the four qualities civil society, the findings are categorized with regard to (a) civil society and (b) the contribution of external democracy promotion for the particular dimension. Also, the statements by respondents from CSOs and by IOs are contrasted.

5.3.1 Competition and Ethno-Political Affiliation Divide and Inhibit Civil Society

From respondents from CSOs there were many, mostly negative, references to the dimension of non-conflictive structure of civil society. Several interview partners stated that owed to strong competition CSOs stole ideas for projects or parts of project proposals from each other. Further, mistrust had a strongly negative effect on the possibilities of networking and that previous cases of political instrumentalization of CSOs made coalition building for them less attractive.

“Other NGOs are not very transparent, as this is the bazaar, market, is limited, we are actually competing between each other for the very same funds. Sometimes there are NGO coalitions on some issues, but our policy is not to involve in coalitions. Often we prefer consultative or observer status, as often the strongest NGOs tried to impose their opinion in the group we would like to stay objective and independent.” (Interview no. 61)

Several respondents pointed out, that CSOs were mainly fragmented and aligned along a separation line between some of the largest CSOs:

“The Civil sector is two, three giants and all the rest are small. Giants are SOROS, MDMS, now some others trying like MOST, Habitat maybe, and they are split, are very fragmented. They don’t trust each other, don’t trust other people, they don’t trust coalitions.” (Interview no. 63)
Respondents from IOs thought that possibly the “mentality” in the region was to think that through cooperation one inevitably would lose a part of the cake – instead of opportunities for all.\footnote{“What also is a big problem in the Balkans, is that everybody thinks, that a cake your share will reduce my share of the cake. They don’t see the cake as increasing, that everybody becomes a winner. So, if you have more power, or if I give in to your, in a deal, to your decision, I’m losing. If you win I’m losing, automatically. We deal with that by explaining that, no, it’s good also for you.” (Interview no. 60)} According to the respondent from the local administration, the current NGOs’ the need for youth work also pushed NGOs to coalition on this matter:

“And, but, in the frame of forum we have discussion, youth discussion group. Discussion group for youth, and they collect more than ten NGOs which are focused on youth and they organize themselves like a federation and they now come in front of the mayor and insist to, they said, ok, we will prepare the youth policy in a democracy manner. In the, not only, brainstorming but the participative manner. And now we are in the face of preparation of the youth policy from initiative come from the discussion group for youth. And, it’s very strange when they organize a first session, they invite us to participate on the discussion about young, about problem of youth and what will be the priorities.” (Interview no. 49, local government MK)

Overall, however, the person from the city administration agreed that mistrust and competition between CSOs very much impeded coalitions and the combination of different funding sources:

“It is very strange to press them to create the coalitions and consortia, or to present or to nominate some idea together with other NGO. I’m not sure why, I don’t know, maybe it’s a market, but, I believe that is a competence. I believe that if they are together they will lose their competence. I am not sure but, and I said, ok it’s easier to come two or three NGOs to collaborate, and to present the idea and to realize. But, and maybe often we insist to have the co-finance from the proposals and I believe they have problem because they should have not money, they should be in-kind or. But, to recognize that if you want to take, to be funded, you should give something. And, again, everything what is without paying anything, still they believe that it is the way how the municipality should be, should give them money. But, we insist to have, and we, when we evaluate the proposals, we put more than ten points for the co-finance.” (Interview no. 49, local government MK)

IOs promote cooperation between CSOs and between CSOs and state administration on multiple issues/across sectors – so as to bring together interests for stronger impact. However, it was said, that frequently, IOs promoted networking and cooperation without taking into account existing divisions between CSOs from certain CSO networks or ethno-political affiliations, which resulted in the non-sustainability of such networks. Most respondents from IOs agreed that there was much competition among civil society organizations – while many, however, downplayed this point and highlighted the progress that has been made, also thanks to their own support. A few respondents from IOs underlined their positive contribution in supporting the development of the civil sectors and also in bringing together working groups and fostering sectoral cooperation.

CSOs partially blamed IOs and their politics for the financial and political quasi-monopoly of a few big NGOs. IOs were frequently not transparent in how they selected NGOs, how funding was distributed, and who also would always cooperate with a few NGOs:

“Civil society is fragile everywhere, but particularly in the Balkans it is not structurally supported by anybody and poor. And with foundations usually the strong one gets all, and gets even stronger.” (Interview no. 43)

This, as the previous quote from a CSO activist illustrates, lead to competition and a selection process among CSOs, strengthening the large CSOs and disadvantaging small, possibly newer, CSOs.

### 5.3.2 Ethno-Political Cleavages Shape and Hamper Civil Society

Many persons from CSOs considered civil society as deeply divided along ethnic lines. A number of respondents stated that most domestic CSOs were mono-ethnic, some including one or two “symbolic” persons of Albanian or other background as this was advantageous for project proposals to gain access to funding.\footnote{“Few programs are inter-ethnic, like TV ELSA, or very few others, but the rest of mixed projects was foreign installed and didn’t really last.” (Interview no. 36) and “there are structures pretending to be multiethnic, but that often is true only for their driver not on decision making level.” (Interview no. 36)} Another respondent agreed but thought, there were also truly mixed NGOs and said their number was increasing.
“Civil society damages the inter-ethnic relations. Some NGOs really have inter-ethnic themes, but most are mono-ethnic and present only the view from one ethnic side, like a monologue on inter-ethnic dialogue - doesn’t make sense. I know some big NGOs who are ethnically mixed - they need to be - as an asset for project applications. And I think some really understand the benefit of it. So, yes, there is progress.” (Interview no. 44)

While the majority of respondents underlined how activities by CSOs fostered inter-ethnic dialogue and cooperation, a few respondents also criticized, the constant focus on inter-ethnic relations, translations, etc. in fact also had the negative side effect of repeatedly reminding and enforcing ethnic identity and group belonging:

“There have been projects trying to overcome that mindset of strict ethnic communities that cannot cooperate. But most projects, research, recommendations of civil society were perpetuating this idea of ethnically clear groups that should cooperate. The result is that everyone is pro-multiculturalism, but the principles of individualism and citizenship, more important for democracy than ethnicity, has been harmed. I see a big responsibility in many and also the most important civil society actors, like OSI-related institutions that accepted the paradigm of ethnocracy rather than democracy.” (Interview no. 47)

Only very few organizations put forward to follow an “ethnically blind” approach in their work, in order to decrease thinking along ethno-national division lines. While, as for Bosnia-Herzegovina, most NGOs were said to be de facto ethnically exclusive, there were a few examples of issue-related social movements that brought together persons from different backgrounds, e.g. when public services, such as waste disposal, fail.241

Many respondents noted that ethnic divisions diminished the political impact that civil society could probably have if they focused more on issue coalitions. So far, this mostly functioned better in service provision and women’s issues. A small number of respondents from ethnic minorities noted that most CSOs entirely ignored working together with ethnic minorities, maybe sometimes including a “symbolic Roma” to receive from the currently plentiful funds for work with Roma, and several respondents also complained about a blocking-position of Albanians to access resources:

“The political is system divided by ethnic proportions and thirty percent of projects should be done be Albanian organizations, the same for the city of Skopje where Albanians will block project decisions, if not Albanian projects are included, sometimes regardless of the quality.” (Interview no. 43)

While only few respondents in Bosnia-Herzegovina had referred to political affiliation as an important cleavage of civil society, the vast majority of respondents in Macedonia referred to politically affiliation that divided civil society – many also stated that many NGOs were GONGOs or QUANGOs, and that important civil society organizations, such as veterans, unions, etc. frequently were instrumentalized by political parties. Most NGOs were said to be affiliated with either of one of the two biggest CSOs – and mostly they would not cooperate with other organizations loyal to the other of the two NGOs. Many CSOs from Macedonia were proud of their good international contacts and cooperation – and never said that ethno-nationalism interfered in this.

Many persons from IOs agreed, that civil society was deeply divided along ethnic lines, partially aggravating inter-ethnic tensions.242 Some IOs blamed CSOs of usually presenting only one, their

241 “There was a protest about two months ago for a rubbish dump. That was actually both ethnicities. That was like one of the only examples that I know. But it was definitely predominantly Macedonian, but you are right, there was lots of Albanians as well, because it was in Macedonia area. There was the regional rubbish dump to the South that was closed down by the mayor. Because it was you know, dangerously untended, polluting all local rivers and farms. There was no contingency plan from any municipalities in region, just started dumping garbage somewhere, in Tetovo that was by the railway tracks, close to here, piled it up six months of rubbish, horrible, people were burning it and whole town stank. And then there was an inter-ethnic civil movement. It wasn’t an NGO or anything but they kind of, mostly students I think, younger people, started protesting, organized quite nice things, started doing a lot of funny things, going around handing out empty jars filled with fresh air, decorated Christmas tree with rubbish, and a large protest march. About 400, or 500 people. Which, it was raining that day so I was actually pretty impressed.” (Interview no. 37)

242 “At the moment we’re seeing them actually polarize, civil society is now. NGOs which worked towards bringing communities together, those guys are not taking center stage, at the moment we’re having other civil organizations, NGO’s which are lining along ethnic and political grants. And really what we’re seeing is, we’re seeing some major Albanian NGO’s which are really pushing Albanian nationalism. And on the other side we’re seeing some NGO’s in Skopje fighting for more churches. There are some NGO’s who are right there, some members of civil society who tried to resist it, but it’s going the other way, civil society is not doing its job if inter-ethnic reconciliation is their goal.” (Interview no. 37)
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ethnic, perspective on inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia. Several respondents pointed out positive examples of cooperation of CSOs243, but these were mostly limited to service provision and women’s’ projects. While many respondents from IOs also noted the strongly negative effect of political divisions among CSOs, one respondent highlighted that closeness to politics in the West at least also offered opportunity to civil society for policy-making and thus was not entirely bad. A number of respondents from IOs also referred to the CSO sector being divided into two major spheres of influence – both each centered around two of the biggest NGOs in Macedonia – the Soros/Open Society Institute and the MCIC:

“There are two big players: Soros and MCIC [Macedonian Center of International Cooperation] with organizations connected to them. Among them, the two parts of organizations cooperate, but not between each other, unless for very big projects. There are mixed NGOs, and you need to be mixed to get better projects. Some seem founded for getting money, also some of the Albanian youth organizations, that I don’t get good vibes from. ADI in Gostivar, established by Soros, a very mixed community, is a good example of multiethnic co-work, a good example of how things like this should be in such an organization.” (Interview no. 34)

And also several persons from IOs stated that despite inter-ethnic divisions in Macedonia, many CSOs very well cooperated with persons from other nationalities in the region or other countries.

Also in Macedonia, respondents from IOs did not very much refer to their own role in this context. A few also, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina underlined the positive effects of their efforts to promote cooperation across ethnic and political division lines:

“Regarding NGOs we really try not to distinguish, to work with everyone as it is civil society. And we don't see civil society as divided, with ethnic background. Especially when working with students, Macedonian, Albanian or mixed organizations, mixed organizations are not as frequent as ethnically clean organizations. We always try to involve the others, as we are also involved as partners and so we also have a saying, who participates and how we organize it. They mostly are very open to cooperation. So far we've not had any problems, where someone said, no, we don't want to work with them.” (Interview no. 46)

IOs are viewed to promote cooperation seeing Western civil society and their cooperation among themselves and with the government on the basis of the Western ideal of civil society – which some respondents from CSOs stated may not fit in Macedonia. Several respondents from CSOs they felt like IOs, out of simplicity, mostly cooperated with CSOs in the capital, thus neglecting other NGOs and also CSOs of other ethnic background – despite the short distances in the relatively small state. Which several respondents from IOs led back to their opinion that in general ethnic Macedonian CSOs tended to be more professional than ethnic Albania ones (with some exceptions).

5.3.3 Capacity Building has Improved Organizational Capacity, yet Political Influence of CSOs Remains Limited

While not many respondents from CSOs in Macedonia referred to this category, a few mentioned the many capacity trainings they have been to and the many international seminars, conferences, projects, they have been or will be involved in, usually within a large and very active network:

“Our NGO has several branch-offices in the region, and a consultative seat in the [important international body for NGOs], from Macedonia there is only this NGO and [one more NGO] in this [important international body for NGOs]. We are members of the Citizen Platform of Macedonia, the biggest relevant network, informal group of NGOs. Also we are members of network Macedonia without Discrimination.” (Interview no. 39)

Several respondents mentioned how their daily routine was very much determined by networking and organizing and multi-tasking many different activities, project applications and reports, meetings etc. that needed to be organized, and several successful NGOs were proud of the level of professionalism they had achieved in this. Others, with international experience, however, lamented that in other states the general level of professionalism was significantly better. As for Bosnia-Herzegovina, several respondents noted how good skills in writing projects proposals and reports, fluent English and “project prose” were needed to be able to receive funding and to remain in the market.

243 “Some Macedonian organizations promote religious dialogue, e.g. MCMS, and several youth organizations that will speak out and discuss this subject, and to include the other side. So there are initiatives, but maybe not as strong so far, as from external actors.” (Interview no. 42)
There were not many statements made by persons from IOs how they themselves worked on improving civil society’s organizational skills. One respondent said that there was still work to be done, particularly on improving local NGOs and altogether the capacity of NGOs to work with state administration. Some respondents said that they had been supporting civil society to build capacity – and that although there were some improvements, they still would like to see more.

As for Bosnia-Herzegovina, several respondents from IOs noted that frequent contacts, meetings, conferences, etc. with NGOs were important in order to assure good cooperation and also to go beyond mere funding and have true partnership with NGOs and that they highly appreciated good quality work and organizational skills – and one respondent stated that he was waiting for the day that there was so much civic initiative that IOs would no longer be needed:

“That’s the future quality, until the people really take care of their own needs, it’s very difficult for IOs to appoint an outsider to help actually. Or for example in the Lipkovo example that I talked about, they can't get any support really, of value, because of their incapacity. Until the people are ready to help themselves you can’t continue, you can help them to a certain extent, but you have to help them to realize that they have to help themselves.” (Interview no. 60)

Another respondent noted that plans and projects by international organizations to set up nation-wide coordination of NGOs had happened but had not been sustainable:

“Initially, with the European Agency for Reconstruction project, EU funding, there was a project to support the foundation of a so-called civic platform. A project for helping the civil society to organize in a national platform to organize themselves into a serious third pillar, and a meaningful third sector, that can be different and be stronger at negotiating on policy-making, decision-making, and so on. In the beginning, this national civic platform was ok functioning, there were NGO faires during the last seven years, first they took place every year, then every second, and now I’m not sure if they are still organized at all. Also there were 12 NGO-centers supposed to serve as help desks for NGOs, actually supporting local grassroots, giving them the right skills and knowledge to apply for more funding outside their local communities to donor funding. These NGO centers were not really sustainable, just one third of them are still active, but they’re not really playing the original role they were registered for, as help desk or support. But there are NGOs rotating the other middle size NGOs to different donor sources, which of course is influencing their agendas of work.” (Interview no. 35)

Rather, the development in the civil society sector was said to have developed a small number of key actors who, in their powerful positions structured, and possibly also divided, the sector. Many respondents from both CSOs and IOs stated how IOs have been offering countless seminars and workshops for capacity trainings of CSOs. As a consequence, the organizational competencies of CSOs have significantly improved, however, only a limited number of CSOs are considered professional enough to cooperate well with the government. IOs have also been supporting CSO-networks, which, however, only functioned to a limited extent, as mistrust between CSOs impedes cooperation; homegrown networks tend to function better. Most IOs have constant contact, exchange, and cooperation with many NGOs. Particularly with regard to Macedonia IOs tried to coordinate their NGOs support. This functioned very well in the beginning in 1999/2001 but later became somewhat less efficient and some plans have proved not sustainable.

### 5.3.4 Powerful and Externally Supported NGOs can Remain Politically Independent

A very large number of CSOs were extremely critical about an existing lack of independence from the state saying that politics frequently interfered into civil society and that politicization of civil society was a major problem:

“Civil society in Macedonia is following the trends of the main political parties. NGOs should review what’s happening in society, but that’s not possible due to political affiliation. Many NGOs were created by some political party, like think tanks, who are always doing analyses funded by the parties and for the parties. Many NGOs are political parties just with other form. A very small number of NGOs in the region and only 5% in Macedonia are politically independent.

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244 “The European Agency for reconstruction project, with EU funding, there was a project to support the foundation of a so-called civic platform. A national platform for helping the civil society to organize in a national platform to organize themselves in a serious third pillar, and a meaningful third sector, that can be different and be stronger at negotiating on policy-making, decision-making, and so on. Of course you have the committees for inter-ethnic relations in the municipalities, you have experience, some of them are working perfectly well, but not really a great number of them.” (Interview no. 35)
Because of that there are also no good analyses from the NGOs. And people know who is affiliated with what party. Also the media here is politicized, and for discussions for example on TV they invite NGOs all from the same political opinion, they are making the public opinion how they care, one recent example for this is the big issue around the law for persons with different sexual orientation. (Interview no. 33)

And another person from a CSO very critically remarked that the political interference and dependency had very deteriorating effects on civil society and its possible role. Other respondents said, that the links between NGOs and politics were extremely close, with the government also controlling or even founding a number of NGOs – to gain access to funding, to have them stage public support of political projects, etc.: “The government make their own media and NGOs, QUANGOS, GONGOS, they make their own NGOs today and then in the next afternoon they will speak in public, whatever the money can buy they will do it.” (Interview no. 63)

About half of all respondents said, that it was a problem that due to political affiliation and instrumentalization, citizens in general were distrustful of NGOs and not willing to join civil society activities. Other respondents also gave examples of persons who had openly said they could not join certain activities, as they had been threatened e.g. that their daughter would lose her job if they openly protested. For one respondent the existing strong political affiliation was linked with high financial dependency, and inhibited the possibilities of civil society’s impact:

“The government make their own media and NGOs, QUANGOS, GONGOS, they make their own NGOs today and then in the next afternoon they will speak in public, whatever the money can buy they will do it.” (Interview no. 63)

A few statements from respondents from CSOs did not offer an equally bleak perspective, existing overlapping was said to be decreasing. Putting forward another perspective that was not only pessimist, one respondent stated that despite high politicization, it is possible, as an NGO to try to stay out of the game, as everyone knows who is close to whom - and if you are big and have sufficient international funding. Another interview partner (whom several other interview partners stated to have close family ties with and show public support of an openly nationalist politician) said that he thinks that the political and financial pressure on NGOs was very hard and even increasing to “play the political game”.  

245 “The local conditions for civil society are less favorable. Political parties control the whole society, also the judicial system and the state administration. Political parties would like to have just a ceremonial sector, they best support NGOs that don’t criticize and just celebrate certain days. In general, the conservative parties are more distrustful to the NGO sector. And often they stigmatize critical NGOs, even though some NGOs have become powerful enough to make a statement. Most people working in the liaison-office come from local administration or from party members. And you have to be local and not criticize state structures or you won’t get any money. And members of forum again were chosen by political parties.” (Interview no. 43)

246 “With all the problems in Macedonia people are not protesting, they are afraid, can’t organize, lost their faith in politicians. And in fact it’s all a political battle. Only few, maybe one hundred people, demonstrated against Skopje 2014, which was a wrong decision of inexperienced politicians - and they got beaten up by QUANGOS, from the government, now are afraid. Government is controlling more and more, tapping phones, playing security, want people to be afraid. People afraid, as politicians don’t follow logic of political culture, cooperation, ideas but are absolutist, populist leaders who want their power, their people and their position. It’s a very rough game here. And competition is not well developed here.” (Interview no. 63)

247 “Macedonia is a very much politicized society and politics influence some NGOs. You can’t avoid some of these NGOs to be part of certain networks. And then you want to remain aside if they just impose solutions influenced by the government. People know who is connected to whom we are only two millions Macedonians. Also, every year there is a Call for Proposals from the government fund. Many times it goes to NGOs that one cannot find in any register, that are government friendly. We have complained about this and for a first time last year we were very surprised when we even received 4000 Euros to implement a human rights course.” (Interview no. 61)

248 “It’s possible to do good NGO work and to remain politically independent. It really takes time to motivate your staff to stay strong, and so on and you need to have core of good people. In a country with such high rate of unemployment, there are NGOs and people ready to accept the political game, especially with the pressure being very hard. With this government the pressure is even growing, there is the same effect on civil society and in media, and by increasing control and decreasing independent funding the government controls now very much and we have less and less media and NGO still fighting.” (Interview no. 36)
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Most respondents from IOs agreed with persons from CSOs, that politics very much tried to interfere into civil society, and that there were many (too) close ties between the two with the government even sometimes founding NGOs to display public support for their politics or to gain access to international funding:

“NGOs and politicians are often tightly linked, because it’s such a small country. Everything here is connected to ethnic issues.” (Interview no. 34) and “civil society is also politicized, and there is a trend growing, of NGOs with political background, members, registration, and so on. Especially in the last year there are different types of NGOs, like Skopje 2014 or some non-registered or lobbying group or registered but we don’t know when and how, who are actually protecting certain ideas of the government, and amazingly growing like a mushroom from nowhere.” (Interview no. 35)

Another problem of the high importance of political affiliation was, that much of professional and social life was centered around this, as political affiliation, over ethnic belonging, determined, who had access to job positions, work promotions, etc. Several respondents said this was a remnant from the old Yugoslav-structures based on political clientelism. A respondent from an IO even highlighted that certain contacts between civil society and politics were desirable for their democratic cooperation:

“It is partially true that there are NGOs that are more governmental oriented or opposition oriented, and they have more benefits. But in principle the NGO sector can serve a lot, even if they are more favorites of the government, or the local self-government. (...) We are working now to make an open door for everyone equally.” (Interview no. 68)

However, he also highlighted that it was important that civil society respected certain democratic standards and remained independent enough to not be politically instrumentalized. Respondents from IOs stated that they promote the cooperation between government and CSOs. Some respondents also criticized the existing strong political affiliation between many CSOs and political parties. One respondent also underlined, how he thought that a certain extent of political closeness was even a precondition for civil society’s impact, as being isolated from the government would lead to civil society being disconnected from political influence. Several IOs stated that they interfere in the political process only if they perceive urgent (security) threats. One respondent from a different IO said that he was attentive to possible destabilization from certain movements, e.g. for Skopje 2014. At least half of all respondents from CSOs thought that IOs are a very important and in fact the only counterweight to increased pressure on CSOs from their government.

249 “Macedonia very much reminds me of the structures I saw in developing countries: there is high unemployment, low foreign investment, a lot of poverty outside of cities, and a political culture that was very centralized connected to Yugoslav-times, that is still being used by politicians, and clan-based politics in parties – these have one leader and all the others have to follow. If they do they’re rewarded, if they don’t they’re out. And it is easy to understand in work life who will become what and why – for example in order to become a minister you usually have to have a certain uncle, or other people will not get a promotion in hospitals if they are married to the wrong husband who is close to the wrong party, or you won’t get a scholarship for your children. But after elections if the party in power changes, then possibilities for promotions and all that also change. So there are a lot of things that are like nepotism or clan-based.” (Interview no. 55)

250 “Civil society has managed to separate itself from the other arenas, economy and politics. I see allegations of many CSOs being extended forms of political parties as mostly speculations, even though in the past that was different. In fact the cooperation between civil society and politics is not forbidden if certain rules as a line are accepted. Some people were involved in different fields and then finally in civil society, that’s how it goes here. As civil society’s impact is limited, that is not a good ground to discuss civil society and democracy. We still have to empower civil society, it’s good that it’s separated, it starts functioning as separate sphere, but sector still needs more legitimacy. I know, there are some allegations of civil society to be extended arms of political parties. I’d say there is a separate sphere of civil society, which has limited impact, and which is an obstacle in for its democratization effect.” (Interview no. 47)
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5.4 The Functions of Civil Society in the Republic of Macedonia

This section finally presents the results from the interview analysis with regard to civil society’s theoretically assumed functions. As discussed in the theory chapter, these functions are thought to be accountable for the impact that civil society has on the political system and for the democratic spill-over of civil society. The following eight functions were identified as most relevant for civil society’s democratic spill-over:

C1. Control the State’s Power
C2. Monitoring and Diffusion of Independent Information
C3. Aggregation, Articulation, and Representation of Interests
C4. Mitigation of Overlapping Interests across Particular Interests
C5. Diffusion and Socialization of the Importance of Civic Virtues
C6. Stimulate Political Participation of Citizens
C7. Recruiting of new Leaders
C8. Service Provision

As the previous sections this section also first provides a summary of the main findings for each of the eight categories. Following, the findings from the interview analysis are presented and discussed in detail, including the most relevant passages from the interviews. For each of the eight most important functions civil society, the findings are categorized with regard to (a) civil society and (b) the contribution of external democracy promotion for the particular dimension. Further, the statements by respondents from CSOs and by IOs are contrasted.

5.4.1 The State is increasing its Influence, Complicating Control of the State’s Power

A significant number of persons from CSOs stated that the government was currently expanding its control and increasing its power in all spheres, including civil society. It is not always easy for civil society to protect itself from arbitrary acts, attacks, and blackmailing by the government. Due to the governments frequent abuse of power CSOs are confronted with non-transparency and unequal treatment. Politically critical NGOs frequently were attacked and tried to be silenced, while trying to fulfill what they considered an important contribution to improving the political situation:

“Ideally, civil society should be a balance to the general government policy, because, in all societies there is room for better - and general politics don't always have time, money or ideas to do things better. The government and civil servants are not driven to make things better, while civil society is, despite examples of abused funding or ideas for personal gain. During a project of monitoring the National Council for European Integration, on the last session they asked, who the hell is this NGO to monitor their work, to criticize the work? The attack came, as the President of the National council is from the opposition and allowed us to monitor - so it was an attack on her. But the response from media and other NGOs was great: we were heroes!” (Interview no. 48)

“The government is controlling more and more, tapping phones, playing security, want people to be afraid. People are afraid, as politicians don’t follow logic of political culture, cooperation, ideas but are absolutist, populist leaders who want their power, their people and their position. It’s a very rough game here. And competition is not well developed here.” (Interview no. 63)

“Conservative parties are more distrustful to the NGO sector. And often they stigmatize critical NGOs, even though some NGOs have become powerful enough to make a statement. Everything that was elaborated in forum, then goes to the administration, and can be erased at once. They are the ultimate power players and can decide on anything. The small number of inhabitants of Macedonia should be an advantage, but it’s not, they all know everything about you and can totally ignore you, so even good political contacts won’t guarantee projects. There are Kafkaian bodies everywhere.” (Interview no. 43).

“With this government the pressure is even growing, you have that same effect in civil society and in media, and by increasing control and decreasing independent funding, the government controls now much, and we have less and less media and NGO still fighting.” (Interview no. 36)
Many respondents from CSOs underlined how the high percentage of persons employed by political parties and the government intimidated citizens to be openly politically critical of politics:

“Currently the big discussion around Skopje 2014 is whether to build a church or a mosque on the main square, which reflects on inter-ethnic relations. When CSOs protested, there was a violent clash in the main square. Currently, nobody is anymore protesting on the main square, people are afraid, the opposition is weak, and the ruling party is strong and threatens CSOs for defamation. (...) If I say something against the local government they will threaten that my daughter may lose her job in the school that is run by the government. So new ways of doing things and criticism are very difficult. Several other CSOs we cooperate with have received law suits for defamation or have already been trialed, and we are covering their costs for legal aid, provide discussions, round tables, and so on.” (Interview no. 62)

Further, there were many statements as to how the government mostly symbolically, due to pressure by IOs, consulted with CSOs, but later included or ignored the results from the consultations as they pleased. A large number of respondents referred to high levels of corruption, not always related to financial corruption, but very much to blackmailing, clientelism, etc. on which a high degree of mistrust of political participation also depended. Particularly non-ethnic-Macedonian respondents said it was difficult to control the state’s arbitrariness. They further criticized that the OFA’s regulations were not well implemented and that mechanisms for complaints about this were not effective and that they at least tried monitoring, writing shadow reports, etc.:

“Some state institutions are better at employing minority groups, the post-network or the airport. We asked the SIOFA for numbers for representation, but they are not very transparent - or maybe they don’t have the numbers, not all institutions give them the numbers. We make shadow reports of the implementation for example of the framework convention for the protection of minority rights by the Council of Europe.” (Interview no. 39)

Respondents from international organizations agreed with CSOs that the government was expanding its power and influence and also encroaching on civil society:

“How’s cooperation now? Cooperation is not good at all, it was never good but it is at its lowest point now, one party is completely controlling parliament, they all are very defensive, they do not appreciate any monitoring, criticism, or what-not. So, everybody is pretty much on the black list. The only people who are not on the black list are NGOs they created, technically political party NGOs, like Society for Concerned Parents against the Usage of Marijuana, created by the party, so they can justify the illegal arrest of a farmer, and someone else. We are trying to opening up, there has been a lot of progress but still a lot needs to be done.” (Interview no. 70)

Also several persons from IOs pointed to the fact the part of the reason for the strong politicization of society was, that the government and political parties were the biggest employer in the state. Many respondents from IOs underlined the need to strengthen civil society’s counterweight to politics:

“It’s so important to build civil society to reduce spin factor of political parties for their own advantage. Political parties are ethnically based, will try to twist all issues and to turn all issues into an inter-ethnic fight, which most of them aren’t. Here, is really, here you have to be a little Marxist. Here you have the haves and the have-nots, and people who are connected, like the intellectuals and the elite.” (Interview no. 60)

There were only few explicit statements by respondents from IOs about their own dealing with the situation. Most were very frustrated and did not see much leverage – only persistent cooperation with the government trying to pressure for more and fairer cooperation with civil society:

“We are opening parliament transparency, building up capacities for drafting to be a partner in the legislative process, not just a rubber stamp, as well as oversight in constituency relations by developing a network of constituency offices across the country. That’s a first gigantic project we implemented. So where does that leave civil society – at the margins, to be berated and derided, be used abused. How can you position yourself politically?” (Interview no. 70)

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254 “There was a coalition of CSOs that was supposed to equally participate in preparation of law against discrimination - but all their suggestions were erased from the final version. Civil society protesting against anti-discrimination law was labeled enemy to the state and the state criticized civil society, which is totally counterproductive.” (Interview no. 47)

255 “I don’t feel like we live in a democratic society, the media is manipulating public opinion, are pro-governmental. Critics of the government are labeled as enemies and you will have problems with the state-tax-controls. These guys are not ruling in democratic ways. SDSM was not brilliant, but we had a more democratic feeling, could say and do things. Now it’s terrible, they put their matrix into the whole society within four years. The government spends too much public money that they steal through false tenders. They bought most of the media. Whoever criticizes the government from NGOs or media are labeled as enemies close to the opposition, and the government will make their own media, own NGOs. (...) They are lying, they are only interested in power and rule. With all the problems in Macedonia people are not protesting, they are afraid, they can’t organize and have lost their faith in politicians. (...) Only a few, maybe 100 people, demonstrated against Skopje 2014 which was a wrong decision of inexperienced politicians - and they got beaten up by QUANGOS, from the government, and now they are afraid.” (Interview no. 63)
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CSOs mostly said about IOs that these constituted a very important counterweight to attacks from the government and that their presence possibly set limits to actions against civil society. Several persons stated how they thought the support of IOs to civil society’s control and monitoring function was very important.

A number of respondents, however, also criticized that some of the policies of IOs, of insisting on cooperation of CSOs with the government, ran directly contrary to problems that CSOs faced when dealing with the government — that frequently tried to blackmail them, etc.:

“Most IOs provide funds only if CSOs are cooperating with the government (...). If organizations are criticizing politics, they are blamed to belong to the opposition in the government, are labeled as state enemies, viruses, Greek mercenaries and enemies.” (Interview no. 62)

Finally, as way for improvement, several respondents hoped that with advanced EU-accession, there would be increased controls which would stop the states abuse of power.256

5.4.2 State-Owned Media Limit Monitoring and Diffusion of Independent Information

Many respondents from CSOs were negative about how civil society could and did fulfill the function of diffusing independent and alternative information. Media, supposed to contribute to democratization as being part of civil society, in fact by many was stated to be strongly politicized and used by politicians for their interests and to broadcast their opinions.257 Several CSOs noted their own effort in trying to counter the negative effect of the media by providing trainings for journalists, to improve the critical quality of journalism, with not so much success though:

“With this government the pressure is even growing, there is the same effect in civil society and in the media, and by increasing control and decreasing independent funding, the government controls now much, and we have less and less media and NGOs still fighting” (Interview no. 36)

This was aggravated by the difficult economy that increased self-censorship of journalists who otherwise had to fear for losing their work. However, as to being able to foster inter-ethnic inclusion in the media, several respondents regretted only limited impact. As one of the few fields civil society’s own contribution to raising public awareness was evaluated as very positive by many respondents, in that civil society organized round tables, published articles and research, etc. and also monitored the media coverage on certain political topics and raised debate about this, even if, or particularly when, attacked by the government for this:

“Last year we monitored the National Council for European Integration and how media covered EU topics coming from the government and the EU. The attack in the national council did not matter as much as the public awareness and debate afterwards. Critical NGOs of government openly applauded critical incident, but those not critical of government were more silent and just called.” (Interview no. 48)

Concerning direct monitoring of the government, however, several respondents said that this was very important, a few however also stated that this could have negative consequences of being drawn into political fights and competition. CSOs were divided, whether publishing information not only in Macedonian but also in local minority languages (mostly Albanian or Romany), was helpful or only

256 “If we resolved the Greek issue and entered EU, Macedonia would be under full monitoring of economy, justice, rule of law, and corruption. We could not have been in, under more control and they could not play it like this. We have no foreign banks here, the local guys want to be bosses. They say they want development but they are just playing that, don’t want changes, it’s brilliant like this for their populism. This maybe sounds stupid by I have no other idea for this. With EU accession there would be more order, more rules, you will feel safer, more quality of life, right now there are no rules. Like in Bulgaria, where the mafia is trying, but the pressure from the EU is strong.” (Interview no. 63)

257 “The media here is also politicized, and for discussion they invite NGOs all from the same political opinion, thus making the public opinion how they care.” (Interview no. 33) and another person stated that “Whoever criticizes the government from NGOs or the media are labeled as enemies close to the opposition. The media is being manipulated, budget is spent on unimportant things, we have populism, we don’t have nationalism or patriotism. I don’t feel like we live in a democratic society, the media is manipulating the public opinion, they are pro-governmental. The government spends too much public money, that they steal through false tenders and they bought most of the media.” (Interview no. 63)
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cemented ethnic boundaries. Several respondents stated that they thought that distributing alternative information to youth was particularly important, yet at times rather difficult, as youth then had to deal with whether they wanted to be politically critical or not, and also they might get into trouble for that:

“So it’s positive for the young people - as long as you don’t offer alternatives to existing policies.” (Interview no. 47)

Respondents from IOs agreed that the role of civil society, including the media, in theory was very important for democracy:

“Of course, the media are part of civil society. There has been media development, however, freedom of the media is not very developed, nor are objective journalism. Media have still a very strong potential, to disseminate information and to refer to interesting aspects. Democratic awareness of the population is not yet very developed. Even though I think that the new media and internet contribute to people being better informed. (…) We also work with the media in order to professionalize them and to show, that there are numerous thematic fields that are important, also in the context of civil society’s development. (…) The lack of Macedonian-Albanian dialogue on all levels can maybe not be resolved by the OFA but that needs to be changed through the educational system, or public discussions. (Interview no. 42)

Nevertheless, overall, persons from IOs were equally very critical of the role that the media played, as most of it was owned by politicians and used for their political interests and campaigns and also to publicly attack critical NGOs. Further, the current situation in Macedonia was said to not very good and public discourse was said to still need to be increased by CSOs and the media:

“Especially civil society could still make a bigger contribution, and the degree of information and of awareness regarding inter-ethnic questions of the public should be increased. And the media can contribute to this, they continue to diffuse very little or not very balanced on this, and also not on the religious communities and the NGOs. There still is very much potential, if the public were better informed. This would help to solve problems and to advance Europeanization and democracy.” (Interview no. 42)

One field that some respondents from IOs thought they were particularly successful in was the distribution of information to women, particularly about their political and social rights.

Further, IOs were positive about their own support of civil society activities in providing space and spreading alternative information:

“Currently we have three main programs the first Citizens for European Macedonia, second Books for Open society debate, and third Community Forum programs. (…) There is also one project we do with the Citizens of European Macedonia Club, in which we are organizing meetings in a space in the old bazaar for the promotion of civil society and of different thinking, a space for press conferences, with PCs, and all that.” (Interview no. 62)

Respondents from IOs did not state that their translations and publications in different local languages could have a negative effect – they mostly underlined their multi-language publications as positive and conducive to spreading information. Further, IOs stated, that is was difficult for them to work with the media – as most were politically controlled and journalists were afraid of negative repercussions if they were critical – this situation made it difficult for IOs even to start critical work with journalists in order to gradually improve the situation. Some persons from CSOs thought that the attempts of IOs to foster ethnically diverse media had been mostly unsuccessful.

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258 “In the beginning, we organized many seminars in different cities. Also in rural regions, and really, women become more aware, that their voice counts, that they’re not only dependent on the husband. That has contributed to them not only having kids and a job, but also contributing to society.” (Interview no. 46) and “we have many projects that give results in a very short term, like working with women in rural areas. They are very active as citizens, many have husbands working abroad. We inform the women about their rights, e.g. against family voting, and empowering them. And they have now created a voluntary center of legal aid with good results.” (Interview no. 34)

259 “The media in Macedonia currently is much politicized. The biggest media owners have seats in the parliament as rewards for election support of political parties. From my theoretical and professional background I know the media as watchdog of democracy, has to be independent, that requires investigative journalism without fear of being assassinated, here, wife, kids, brothers, all have professional disadvantages if you write something critical. We tried to find partners, journalists union, journalist professional association, academic institute for media development. It wasn’t easy, many say, we can’t tell all we know, that will have negative repercussions on us. What functions well is analysis how media work here, quite scientific, but a contribution to awareness, but we need to be patient.” (Interview no. 55)
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5.4.3 Increasing Aggregation, Articulation, and Representation of Interests to Some Degree Improves Civil Society’s Impact

The majority of respondents from CSOs told about activities they were doing in formulating policy recommendations and try to advocate certain positions vis-à-vis the state institutions, frequently however, the state administration would not listen to them or even accept them as partners. A number of persons, however, gave positive examples where they successfully represented certain interests that were included in government decisions:

“Civil society is good to open problems, to talk with different institutions about OFA-implementation. Also, civil society can push small minorities to ask about their rights and participation in state institutions. The Network “without discrimination” that we are part of now participated in the making of the new law proposal against discrimination, to set up independent body against discrimination. Currently the government has a problem to include in law sexual orientation, but they will have to adopt, the EU requires that. We are working on making the person of the commission for protection against discrimination a strong person who should have long experience in human rights work.”

(Interview no. 39)

The overall impression from statements by CSOs in Macedonia was, that, even though CSOs were frustrated about their limited impact on politics civil society, several organizations, despite admitting possible improvements, also were proud of the degree to which the quality of their work positively affected the possibility for them to represent political interests. One person from a CSO regretted that bringing together different groups, or for instance civil society and the local authorities has not been very successful, also, as most CSOs represented only the interests or at least the views of one ethnic group. One respondent from a minority was unhappy, that small minorities freely succumbed to political assimilation to the ethnic majority, and often did not even try to fight to represent their particular interests. A respondent from a CSO also told about how they successfully tried to represent their interests in consulting with IOs and indicating certain needs for further or new funding – which sometimes also had an impact on budget planning of IOs.

Respondents from IOs agreed it was difficult for civil society to represent their interests vis-à-vis the state who ignored these frequently. Another cause for limited impact of interest aggregation was the lacking tradition of civil society’s interest representation – only a small number of good and strong CSOs with a real agenda managed to influence politics:

“But, this one, the real CSOs, which have a genuine, a genuine agenda, those, those can influence the government. Others, what I think, and this is a problem from a communist country, I found out in other experiences, it’s not very developed, it’s not in the tradition.” (Interview no. 60)

Persons from IOs agreed with civil society that CSOs’ capacity was increasing which made it easier for them to represent their interests in cooperation with state institutions, and in comparison with civil society they were more optimistic about progress made in bringing together different groups and have civil society represent their interests.

With regard to their own work in the context of better interest aggregation, IOs underlined their role in promoting work capacities of CSOs and of pressuring the government to accept interest representation by CSOs:

“The consultations are essential now, we support this with the coming EIDHR call, involving civil society, helping to strengthen capacities of civil society being a meaningful dialogue provider and having a lobby in advocacy skills. Consultation process from the government side, it’s one of the issues in the progress report which really needs to be strengthened. That’s why, the government now with technical assistance that is contracted under the 2007 IPA, and they are helping them actually. (...) There are now good examples where the government is using civil society expertise and relevance, because later on they will actually be the implementers of those legislations to be involved in the process.” (Interview no. 35)

However, a few respondent also noted, that the overall effect of supporting interest representation of CSOs could still be improved.

260 “Policy recommendations have no impact on policy makers, or in the general public debate. There was a coalition of CSOs that was supposed to equally participate in preparation of law against discrimination - but all their suggestions were erased from the final version.” (Interview no. 47)
5.4.4 Successful Mitigation of Overlapping Interests across Particular Interests, yet Segregation Remains

CSOs were positive about the general trend in reconciliation to which they contributed. Several respondents also noted civil society’s success in breaking and overcoming political divides was not sufficient – but at least they were starting to be more daring and to take care of this:

“Publications of many NGOs are in English with Macedonia or Albanian translation - which, on the other hand perpetuates image of national culture. Maybe NGOs should in the future focus more on small ethnic groups. After 2001, people internalized the discourse of the conflict, and it was irresponsible for civil society to address this issue in the same way. There have been many projects on peace-building and conflict resolution and so on, but the first big OFA revision project was done only in 2010 by OSI. Another organization Peace Action from Prilep published a book on the topic. So that was the civil society’s impact and civil society brought the debate about the conflict only after several years. No one but civil society would dare to open the debate, definitely not the politicians.” (Interview no. 47)

While many activities happened, many remained on the level of ethnic representation or folklore – but, however, contributed to meeting each other and to organize common events. While, where civil society tried to promote common interests and mitigate conflicts, the government frequently was not receptive to consultations. Respondents from CSOs were mostly, but not only, positive about their own contribution to the promotion of multi-cultural life and exchange while respondents from IOs said about civil society, that they were in fact not very happy as civil society tended not to (successfully) promote issue coalitions and cooperate for a truly multi-cultural life.

About their own contribution to help civil society mitigate overlapping interests, respondents from IOs were positive, while persons from civil society were critical and said IOs did not really push the government strongly enough for real improvements:

“IOs can try by providing platforms and events to unite people around a table, which doesn't happen usually. There are no real parliamentary debates about certain projects, like there should be, there are not really regular meetings of the cabinet, where Macedonian and Albanian ministers exchange. That could be facilitated if international actors push more to provide a framework for facilitation.” (Interview no. 42)

A number of persons from IOs agreed that it was very difficult to bring together politicians across ethnic division, however, as they stated, particularly established politicians. Also in the field of desegregating education and to push for politics to promote pluri-culturalism IOs tried to influence politics – but politicians would not implement suggestions in this vein. While some CSOs strongly appreciated the support from IOs others criticized that the funding politics of IOs that divided civil society by fostering competition and mistrust.

5.4.5 Some Diffusion and Socialization of/the Importance of Civic Virtues

Persons from CSOs were only moderately positive about their own contribution to democratic norms – most positive examples regarded successful trainings for inter-ethnic relations and anti-discrimination trainings. Some respondents regretted that the ethnic division of the civil sector entirely countered the idea of civil society passing on ideas of democratic values and behavior:

“the notion of the civil sector was never understood here properly, the civic state, the citizens, that concept. We are stuck here with these ethnic stories.” (Interview no. 63)

Another point related to was that civil society and democratic practices were not (yet) so developed on the local level.261 Another respondent noted the importance of including non-majority views in campaigns to raise public awareness and foster democratic norms, but also said this was difficult as many CSOs, including his, were mono-ethnic.262

261 “We do anti-discrimination project in public life on the local level. The big problem we have there is that people either know the local situation or they have project skills.” (Interview no. 33)

262 “With 25 percent of Albanians, like the population share, in an NGO one would be closer to Albanian view of issues and their market; in the end it also would help us to sell our product. And if an NGO like ours sells awareness-raising and things like this then it’s definitely good to have the different views – I would make sure to include more Albanians if I founded a new company.” (Interview no. 44)
Persons from IOs were not so positive about civil society’s contribution to diffusion and socialization in civic norms—they thought that civil society in itself was not entirely democratic and also, as the political heritage and current situation were significantly inhibiting this—however IOs provided trainings in European values:

“The government and the civil society have not internalized the democratic influence, it still requires effort in order to renew and deepen this process. You can see this in the discussions that take place, during our events, when for example we have trainings for young politicians or have discussions with youth about the European integration, how many stereotypes are still active here. Vis-à-vis the other ethnic groups but also towards the geographical neighbors, like Greece. And at the same time, the government and young people set their hopes in the European values, and standards.” (Interview no. 42)

They thought very similarly about the improvements in inter-ethnic relations and non-discrimination as a part of democratic norms.

Several respondents from IOs referred to their own contribution to civic norms’ diffusion and underlined how important the field of promoting different norms was. Politics and the general situation in society made this a challenging task and also IOs had only had limited impact in this regard, and still needed to continue to work on this. One respondent explained this in more detail and also, and how he counted on investing for this in the young generation:

“Politics here are very centered on leader personalities. Our foundation for example organizes a political academy, where young people, inter-ethnic, Macedonian and Albanian are always there together. We also tried to bring Roma and youth from trade unions, but that is not so easy. (...) So we focus on the young generation, to make the political culture more democratic, for this we focus on several things: first, we need to do a generational project, this, secondly needs to be process oriented, third, we need to “use” young new fresh people. (...) Macedonian needs to join the EU for the people the most important is to learn to say: you’re different but still ok, you’re great at football so let’s play together, become friends. (...) With another foundation we’re planning to bring together young political party activist of VMRO, DUI and SDSM. That is the way to a new political culture of more tolerance and respect and not always only talk about divisions, but to fight 60% youth unemployment we need broad coalitions, not party politics but societal politics.” (Interview no. 55)

5.4.6 Old but Even More so New Political Frustration Impedes Political Participation of Citizens

Respondents from CSOs were only moderately optimistic about their contribution to increasing civic participation. Many were rather frustrated about the small number of successful examples of inter-ethnic broader movements that they have been able to foster. Most respondents said that the general public was passive and did not want to participate in civil society activities. Several persons stated most people in Macedonia had very bad opinions about politics and politicians and that out of frustration many people did not even want a minimum of political participation, e.g. to vote in elections. In general, citizens are reluctant to become publicly involved in political action, not only to mistrust but because they are afraid to suffer personal disadvantages from this:

“It is very difficult to understand, why people do not protest. According to our data, they are very, very passive, don’t trust NGOs or political structures, there is a lot of unemployment, we have many rural people. Only maybe 100 demonstraded against Skopje 2014, a wrong decision of inexperienced politicians - and they got beaten up by QUANGOS, from the government, now they are afraid.” (Interview no. 63)

CSOs try to improve civic participation at the local level, with some success – and the same was said for activities aiming directly at youth. While respondents thought it was important that CSOs increased civic involvement, most were rather skeptical about the actual effect of civil society, and

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263 “Currently, nobody anymore is protesting on Main Square, people are afraid, the opposition is weak, and the ruling party is strong. The number of citizens who don’t vote is growing, they don’t see viable options, there is no internal power for change and other opinions. Also corruption and organized crime are big.” (Interview no. 62)

264 “Some kids after seminars or trainings try to raise their voice, some are shut down, some are strong enough to continue, stay in touch with NGO, and such.” (Interview no. 61)
despite a small number of successful examples, usually, broader movements did not develop - particularly not across ethnic lines.265

Persons from IOs agreed that general civic participation and interest in this was generally very low – even surprisingly low in regional comparison:

“with ‘normal citizens’ often you can detect a relative big dislike of politics, also in personal discussions. Political parties here have an extremely negative image, not untypical for Eastern Europe. But high passiveness of citizens is not typical. Maybe passivity is not unusual in Eastern Europe, but there were often times of uprising, solidarność, etc. here, people rather seem to bear their fate than to organize. Election turn-over is about 40% - and parties don’t seem to really investigate why. Part of the reason for that is the constitutional structure, but that question is not discussed. For most parties it’s enough to mobilize their traditional voters, who are usually the more radical, the others, the majority, don’t participate in the political process. Citizens are frustrated, as even if they vote for e.g. a party for change, the same old guys will be there again.” (Interview no. 20)

Some respondents also blamed this on a certain laziness of average citizens.266 Persons from ethnic-minority CSOs pointed out that civic engagement of ethnic minorities also in the implementation of the OFA was (too) low:

“For change, we would need a debate on multiculturalism, but people here afraid of that because of ethnic tensions, problems are put under the carpet - that is a very big carpet now. But lately there seems to be some readiness by people to address multiculturalism.” (Interview no. 33)

Differently than persons from CSOs, several persons from IOs stated, that they actively contributed to civil society’s support of and success in increasing civic participation:

“Our second mail goal is civic engagement in state, society and civil society. This is NGOs, independent scientists at universities, media. Civil society, we try to support the process that political decisions do not bypass civil society, but that civil society can also be heard.” (Interview no. 55)

5.4.7 Recruiting of new Leaders Frequently Perpetuates Ethno-Political Clientelism

Most respondents from CSOs were very positive about the recruiting function of civil society. Many persons said that civil society was a good opportunity for career perspectives, and particularly attractive to youth who frequently started and then remained in civil society. In contrast to criticism of CSO activists becoming corrupted upon entering politics, one respondent also noted that close ties between civil society and politics were in fact positive – for politics, as experts, e.g. on environment, became more influential, and for civil society because it helped the cooperation between politics and CSOs.

One respondent from an IO also positively referred to the fact that civil society served as an entering point for youth, of whom many also start their own initiatives after participating in programs by IOs:

“Also there are a lot of new NGOs that have been founded, which is really interesting, by young people, students, who really represent what they are doing. Young people have had the opportunity to see what is possible, and to found such organizations to truly give something to the society they will live in, not only for their own benefit. There used to not be many organizations where young people were active, there were mainly older structures. But that has changed, and working with young people one really gets more impetus.” (Interview no. 46)

Overall, respondents from IOs were quite positive of the work they did. One field in which IOs judged their own work as very positive were the teaching of practical skills to young elites and future new

265 “There was no contingency plan from any municipalities in region, just started dumping garbage somewhere, in Tetovo that was by the railway tracks close to here, piled it up six months of rubbish, horrible, people were burning it and whole town stank. And then there was an inter-ethnic civil movement. It wasn’t an NGO or anything but they kind of, mostly students I think, younger people, started protesting, organized quite nice things, started doing a lot of funny things, going around handing out empty jars filled with fresh air, decorated Christmas tree with rubbish, and a large protest march, about 400 or 500 people. Which, it was raining that day so I was actually pretty impressed. But now it’s resolved. They were going to organize this concert, they never did. Why? They got what they wanted.” (Interview no. 37)

266 “There is a huge discrepancy between what people expect and what they are ready to invest or apply as standards to themselves” (Interview no. 42)
leaders, like debate, the EU-system, etc. 267 as well as teaching young leaders international skills including rights and responsibilities in an international setting:

“In our seminars and simulations they learn being representative of their or some other country, how the EU functions, how they do not behave egoistically, etc. So they learn to give and take. We repeat every year with new students and update the EU structures. It’s great as they see for themselves, if for example Germany or France behaved as egocentric as they often do, what would happen? So they learn about solidarity with other states and responsibility as politicians. Other students wished to improve debate or how to apply for a good job, those are things we try to provide for students, also to give them future chances.” (Interview no. 46)

Another IO states that they also promoted skills with young political elites with the aim of teaching them democratic skills, networking, etc. 268 The only area that they were less optimistic about was to promote mitigation of political divisions that until today remain strong among young leaders, and that IOs hardly managed to promote inclusion in their programs to recruit young elites:

“And what we do is we have a scholarship program, for which we always encourage minority representatives to submit their applications. We see this program as a tool for networking, so it’s important that there are also Albanians, Roma, and others. In the beginning, the program participants were actually mostly Macedonia, but by now we have very good response from the universities in Tetovo, so we have a good choice of Albanian participants often select some. From the Romas unfortunately we have so far not had a grantee, but we had one or two Turkish.” (Interview no. 42)

**5.4.8 Civil Society Activities in Service Provision Have the best Effect and Broadest Support**

CSOs in Macedonia were relatively pessimist about their own contribution to service provision. They also said that they successfully implemented and promoted various activities and projects related to service provision and that there was domestic funding available. However, several respondents stated, that, in contrast support for politically more critical issues was difficult to find. 269 Another problem mentioned was that impact on politics regarding everything but service provision was not very much:

“Currently, no CSO is so influential. There are some, like for the disabled or some health organizations. But civil society dealing with political issues, dealing with democratization issues, their number is not low but their influence is very low.” (Interview no. 41) And, not very differently, another respondent added that the effect for trainings of young people also perpetuated the problem: “As long as you train young people in debate, work with them in ecology, harm reduction or health related issues, it’s ok for civil society and practical with good effects, it goes smoothly and you can see feedback. But concerning the state’s policies, budget spending, institutional problems, and so on you enter the parallel world no one is actually listening to.” (Interview no. 47)

Another point mentioned was that cooperation among CSOs in service related areas tended to be better than cooperation in more political fields.

Respondents from IOs agreed more or less, that civil society positively contributed to projects in the field of service provision and they also thought it was good, that CSOs could apply to IOs to fund politically more critical projects and also gave examples of how civil society had impact in that area:

267 “(w)e try to offer decision-makers and young people our expertise, so they can better make decisions in their life, in politics. Or just in regular life for students what to study, and such things. We try to give them instruments, also in order to increase the dialogue with Germany, so exchange takes place, so that contacts are established and people can contact each other again.” (Interview no. 42)

268 “There are also many young ministers in the government, but they also function like during old Yugoslav times, they were socialized in that centralized system. We concentrate in our work on four main goals, and each of these has several project goals. The main goal one is that political institutions have become the pillars of democracy, dealing with young politicians in leading positions. We get around two hundred applications for twenty-five positions in our political academy. It is great that the educational level here, from socialist times, is so great and high, without any illiteracy. Most students come to Skopje and stay, and many people here, taxi-drivers, waiters, and others know many foreign languages, went to university, but they have very low income now.” (Interview no. 55)

269 “If companies fund NGOs, they usually want to fund children’s hospitals, people with disabilities, etc. not think tanks or foundations, don’t want to be involved in policy-creation.” (Interview no. 48) And in the same vein: “We need foreign aid to promote a multi-cultural and a multi-ethnic society, internationals are the main donors.- NGOs in Macedonia survive only on foreign aid, not by help of individual philanthropics, or firms, or such things. They will give money but only for people with special needs, after a flood, or a catastrophe.” (Interview no. 61)
“There were some semi-coalitions due to legislative lack: for instance the ministry of social policy was cooperating with NGOs helping people with disabilities outside of Skopje.” (Interview no. 35)

Finally, respondents from CSOs were grateful that they could still apply for funding from IOs for politically critical issues – and that foreign aid kept up political criticism of the government, which otherwise would not be possible.

5.5 Macedonia’s Civil Society: Improving yet Increasingly Limited by its Context and Qualities and thus Increasingly Limited in its Ideal Functions

Altogether, civil society in Macedonia has been developing in the context of limited democratization and ethno-political divisions. Civil society mainly developed after 2001, with the significant initiative and strong support by international organizations. Citizens mistrust politics and are afraid of personal consequences by political actors in case they openly protest. While there has been some progress and a large number of NGOs has developed, overall, civil society remains difficult to establish. This is owed in part to a generally difficult context for civil society: the economic situation is difficult, ethno-national divisions and strongly determining political affiliation divide the broader society but also divide civil society and CSOs. As a consequence issue coalitions are difficult to form which hampers the impact of civil society. Furthermore, while pressure from international organizations has lead the government and CSOs to better trained for cooperation, politicians overall seem reluctant to cooperate with civil society – to a slightly lesser extent at the local level.

Regarding civil society’s qualities, these have improved. Nevertheless, only a small number of CSOs seems to have reached a really professional level in their organizational capacities, CSOs remain divided by conflicts and along ethno-political cleavages. International organizations have been trying to improve the situation. They are however also partially blamed for aggravating competition through intransparent funding procedures and clientelism. One of the most difficult qualities seems to be a very limited independence from the state – a large number of CSOs are politically affiliated or have even been established by political actors, who will also at times threaten critical CSOs. Currently decreasing international funding further aggravates the dependency from domestic politicians as funders. Until today, politically and financially, international organizations remain an important counterweight to support CSOs critical of the government who would otherwise possibly not receive funding or be intimidated by politicians.

The functions of civil society, finally, are fulfilled by CSOs to a certain extent, while particularly controlling and monitoring the state are particularly challenging. Frequently the support and help from international organizations are crucial but only help to a certain extent – as the government increasingly consults with CSOs but not always implements agreements. Service provision seems to function increasingly well, and the recruiting of new leaders also tends to be successful (even though there is a high risk of clientelism in this context.) With regard to the other six functions, however, civil society is limited by the still not entirely democratic political culture, by existing deep division between CSOs and in the larger society, by the general reluctance of citizens to be politically involved, etc.
CHAPTER 6: CASE COMPARISON AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

This chapter brings together the findings from the previously presented case studies and presents the final results of the research. For this aim the chapter compares the findings on two levels – one the one hand civil society and international organizations and on the other hand the overall findings from both cases, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Macedonia.

The first section of this chapter compares the three dimensions of civil society presented in the two previous chapters, civil society’s context, qualities, and functions. For each category of these three dimensions the theoretical implications are deduced. For this purpose the main findings are first compared and in a second step contrasted firstly with the particular background of both cases. Secondly the findings are scrutinized with regard to the research gap identified as the beginning of this research - civil society’s contribution to democratic consolidation and how external democracy promotion can support this. As discussed in the theoretical foundations of the research, civil society cannot always be assumed to be conducive to democracy, in fact, possible deep divisions and “dark sides” of civil society can also block, if not actively impede, certain processes important for democracy that civil society is believed to foster, such as socialization into democratic norms of tolerance and mutual respect or the mitigation of conflict lines.

Subsequent to comparing the theoretical dimensions of civil society in detail in section 6.1 and concluding their implications for this research, section 6.2 analyzes the effect of potential and effective dark sides in divided societies and non-consolidated democracies, section 6.3 summarizes the contribution of international organizations to civil society’s spill-over and illustrates how this can or cannot impact civil society’s democratization impact, and section 6.4, finally, discusses the research implications regarding civil society’s spill-over for democratic consolidation. For both cases investigated civil society is assessed as to what type each civil society resembles most closely and in what fields it is more or less conducive to democratic consolidation. This is done based on the Lauth’s model of three types of civil society (ambivalent, strategic, and reflexive) as presented in chapter two, which has been extended and developed based on the findings from the interview analysis.

6.1 Limits to Civil Society’s Spill-Over to Democratic Consolidation in Divided Hybrid Regimes

This section compares the findings from the two previously presented case studies. For each of the three dimensions context, qualities, and functions and their respective subcategories the interview findings are contrasted between CSOs and international organizations for both cases. Subsequently, the theoretical implications from each category are concluded by contrasting these with the current theoretical state-of-the-art and by analyzing the findings against the theoretical background.

What, then, can be said about the actual democratic spill-over of civil society on democratization in general and democratic consolidation in particular? How can all this, be conducive to democratization in hybrid regimes or defective democracies in a context of weak general political participation, prevailing in many post-communist/-socialist states (comp. Howard 2003)? - Particularly, as during consolidation “unfinished” civil society frequently suffers during times of long, tedious democratization before reaching consolidation (Heinrich 2010: 311). As discussed in detail in chapter 3 (on operationalization and on measuring democracy and civil society), an assessment of democratization and civil society are not easy endeavors. Very briefly summarized, based on the above illustrated findings, the combination of civil society’s context, quality, and how civil society can and does assume its theoretically assumed functions decides to what extent civil society is conducive to democratic consolidation or not. Of course, there are number of factors particularly influential in this context, which are discussed in the remainder of this section. The following list provides a summary of
the most important findings, which in the following is presented and discussed according to the logic of the empirical investigation and systematic analysis:

(1) “The civil society” does not exist, but it is in fact diverse and includes task sharing and increased specialization of CSOs and IOs.

(2) In both states, respondents from civil society, politics and international organizations, stated that the connection between civil society activism and actual social or democratizing impact is not clear either – and frequently, important stakeholders are not involved in civil society campaigns and new laws are not implemented.

(3) Different organizations of IOs and of CSOs have varying underlying assumptions to what they refer to as “democracy”.

(4) CSOs are not truly rooted in the society: Further, frequently NGOs are considered as civil society – which goes much more beyond these and which should be a much more encompassing concept.

(5) Findings suggest, that there is an increasing number of movements: both, broader movements and nationalist ones.

(6) Further, Civil society is frequently disconnected from the state, while cooperation between CSOs and lower state levels functions better.

(7) Civil society is part of the larger society – generally sensitive issues are not attractive for most NGOs, they will not gain them support, and are more difficult to impact or change, the most important issue then is that civil society activists start change from themselves.

(8) Somewhat connected to the previous point, civil society frequently functions as separate sphere – but with a negative reputation to many.

(9) The fact of aligning in opposition to government politics motivates NGO activists to keep fighting.

(10) CSOs are considered to bring good results in service provision, but political activities have little impact with regard to democratization.

(11) IOs remain an important counterweight against the state’s abuse of power against CSOs.

(12) Until today the need for donors to spend their money and of CSOs to gain salaries through funding results more in a project industry-bubble than in overall democratization.

(13) Presence and funding politics of international organizations may have contributed to the state working for IOs instead of for civil society and for NGOs to become donor-oriented, while most NGOs were politically affiliated and not really controlled for quality by the funding IOs – although increasingly so.

(14) Many civil society projects funded by IOs are frequently planned by partners without much knowledge about the local situation, lack impact, always involve the same participants and waste tax payers’ money.

6.1.1 Context: Democratic Spill-Over of Civil Society and the Effect of External Democracy Promotion are Limited by Political and Ethno-National Heritage

Civil society’s contributions to democratization according to theory are plenty. In the reality of non-consolidated democracies they are, however, frequently constrained by more or less favorable conditions. Both states, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, share very important influences of the past and of the present. The important socio-political heritage from the Yugoslav times and to a certain extent also influences from the time of belonging to the Ottoman Empire – and the perceived liberation from the Ottoman rule - until today constitute significant points of reference in many spheres of live. Further, ongoing economic hardships and high unemployment constitute important challenges for civil society’s activities and contribution to democratization. In addition the political and the social sphere of both states remain deeply divided along ethno-political cleavages, but also along economic lines. This is visible in the structures of the political systems dominated by ethnically defined political parties and ongoing ethno-nationalist rhetoric on the one hand and of the social fabric with low political
involvement, increasing social segregation, etc. on the other hand. The details regarding the following six subcategories for civil society’s context are now presented:

A1. Origin and Patterns of Development of Civil Society
A2. Regime Type
A3. Legal Situation
A4. Cooperation with the State
A5. Financial and Economic Situation

A.1 Civil Society Mostly Developed Through “NGOization”, is Strongly Donor Oriented and Broader Social Movements are Rare

According to theory, the actual quality of civil society, the space they can occupy, the ties CSOs have to citizens or the government, possible divisions within civil society, democratic norms, and procedures, etc. are strongly determined by where civil society has come from and also on the current patterns of interaction within and between CSOs and between these and citizens or the government.

The statements for both cases with regard to the evolution and development of civil society were very similar. In both states, a number of more experienced persons underlined a certain tradition of humanitarian, faith-based, and cultural organizations in both states. During socialist times, there was a large increase in CSOs of which most, however, were controlled by the socialist system. Still, particularly since the 1970s, there was increasing freedom for alternative expression and for civic activists to organize. The decisive change in civil society, nevertheless, occurred only after massive support by international organizations in the context and aftermath of the conflicts in both states (1992-1995 in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 1999 and 2001 in Macedonia). (Compare e.g. UNDP 2009: 59–60)

The sudden influx of large sums into a difficult economic context in both states led to “mushrooming” of huge numbers of NGOs (today in Bosnia-Herzegovina there are over 9,000 and in Macedonia over 10,000 registered NGOs): project money available for NGOs provided (comparatively good) salaries and international organizations disposed of funding and needed to find local partners frequently without having much time to select partners or projects they supported. This confirms for both states what Seifija (2008) and the Macedonian Center for International Cooperation (MCIC) (2011) wrote on NGOization.

The majority of respondents in both states said that the general public is very passive, mistrusts CSOs, and many citizens think of NGOs as “foreign agents” or “money laundering machines” – and also of having a negative picture of politics altogether as being “a dirty game”. Further, numbers for volunteering overall are stated to be quite low – despite of a small number of existing youth organizations. Both, general passiveness of citizens and mistrust of CSOs were also detected by secondary literature (cf. MCIC 2011: 28 wrote on Macedonia, UNDP 2009: 65–68 and Howard 2012: 40 on Bosnia-Herzegovina, and what Dvornik 2009: 65–67 even noted to apply to the entire Western Balkan region). However, the interviews imply that not only historical passiveness, but rather quite recent fatigue or “desencanto”, and in the case of Macedonia, also very recent fears of negative personal consequences discourage citizens to participate in civic activities.

Many respondents criticized a disconnect of CSOs, which mostly had a very low membership base – except for traditionally more conservative associations, such as hunters, sports clubs, but also a growing number of nationalist movements in Macedonia. Interestingly, in many Western states currently the number of formal membership in CSOs is decreasing as well – thus this possibly is not only a result of a traditionally weak post-communist/socialist civil society (comp. e.g. Howard 2003) but of a global phenomenon of less institutionalized forms of CSOs. Many respondents noted the limited participation of citizens in civil society limited the potential impact of CSOs.

Several respondents, from both CSOs and IOs, in both states also underlined the emergence of broader civic movements on issues regarding social issues and service provision, such as air pollution, waste disposal, etc., in the past few years – that in fact did have impact – as opposed to few
political broader movements. There are a few truly society based organizations, such as hunters’ associations, etc. and a few recent, ethno-national movements mostly around 2014 - but these do not really have a positive effect on democratic processes.

While the majority of respondents underlined the positive effect of the support from IOs to civil society, including funding and support vis-à-vis the government, many respondents confirmed what has been criticized in secondary literature for many years already: Until today a very large part of civil society is organized in NGOs that are funded by international organizations – “NGOization” as a result of the strategies by donors. The numbers of registered CSOs per capita are very high: over 9,000 Bosnia-Herzegovina and even over 10,000 in Macedonia. Interestingly, secondary literature frequently only refers to the proliferation of NGOs. Several statements of respondents noted, however, that with decreasing funding and increasing quality controls a natural selection process was resulting in a decrease in numbers but also an increase in quality and specialization of CSOs. This gives an explanation for the findings from MCIC (2011) and also intensifies the trend of the end of the “civil society boom” which, according to Seifija (2008), begun as early as around 2000 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. (Comp. also UNDP 2009: 59–60)

Furthermore, NGOs usually are strongly donor oriented, have a low connection of CSOs to citizens, work in a limited public space for civil society, and finally have little or too much connection to politics – and in generally low political impact. This confirms what the National Democratic Institute (NDI) (2009a) and Howard (2012) wrote. Furthermore, many respondents regret that NGOs are very exclusive, are not very representative of society as they mostly consist only of well-educated middle-class, and usually NGOs practically exclusively focuses on urban centers; which has not changed over the years. (Compare also UNDP 2009)

While many CSOs underlined their expertise and competencies, many of them, however, cover many different fields in their work. Due to the low degree of specialization, IOs noted, despite all the capacity training they offered to CSOs, they still had difficulties to find high-quality, specialized NGOs that do not continuously adapt their work focus to donor call for applications, to work with. Overall, IOs stated that development of CSOs in fields of social service provision was easier than the support of politically critical CSOs.

A.2 Inherited Political Frustration and New Frustration about slow Euro-Atlantic Integration and Unreadiness of Official Cooperation with CSOs

The regime type is said to determine the political culture, possibilities and limits of interaction between different political actors and different spheres of a political system. Particularly a socialist past has been held accountable for a weak civil society and low civic activism, while at the same time civil society is crucial to further democratization.

As secondary literature suggest (comp. Marc M. Howard’s analysis of 2003 post-communist civil societies), interview respondents in both states blamed overall low civic involvement of the general public on the previous regime time and “socialist legacies” – such as relying on authorities, little experience of making independent decisions, historical mistrust of political activism, politics, and authorities, a slow and “informal” (if not corrupt) state-administration, etc. Citizens remain politically passive and prefer non-political resistance as opposed to political acts of advocacy, or boycott elections as a political statement – without any result. Further, the governments in both states were said to lack the tradition of cooperation with the larger public or with CSOs – and despite trainings and pressure by IOs was still not up to Western standards in this regard. Nevertheless, several experienced respondents underlined that socialism was less severe than communism and that particularly in Yugoslavia there had been a certain tradition of civic freedom.

While, however, so some extent in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to a larger extent in Macedonia, not only mistrust from the past but very recent worries about threats from the government continue to hamper civic engagement: Many respondents stated mistrust in both, the government (comp. Dvornik 2009: 70) and in the case of Macedonia, numerous respondents worried about threats from politicians when they decided to openly engage in civic activism - that e.g. the daughter may lose her work as a teacher, employed by the local political authority. Further, most CSOs said that many citizens
viewed them as either foreign mercenaries, politically affiliated, or simply “political” i.e. suspicious to the public.

Another aspect of transformation frequently referred to was widely prevailing frustration about slow, since around 2007 stagnating democratization – and the fact that until today, after many years of efforts from IOs and CSOs, complete democratization has not been achieved. Interestingly, for all respondents work in the field of democracy promotion, was, that many used the expression of a transformation towards “democracy and capitalism” – lamenting that the (maybe somewhat mystified) “golden age” of socialism was over and regretting the “wild capitalism” and economic difficulties (further aggravated since the economic crisis since 2009) that followed socialism, in which social security and social networks had eased much of the economic hardships. This may not be surprising - according to theory liberal market economy is widely understood to be positively correlated to democracy. Since 2009 the economic crisis increases doubts among many citizens of states to the East of the European Union that entering the EU would still be pragmatic and really a positive way to take. The economic difficulties that many (prospective) EU states have been facing the past years does not make capitalism seem attractive. The frustration also applies to civil society and to IOs supporting CSOs – which can be interpreted as typical “desencanto” or fatigue (comp. Merkel 2001: 102): many respondents were frustrated but had no solution to why there was so little political protest despite severe frustration about losing the Yugoslav social system and “gaining” many years of economic and political hardships.

Mostly, IOs were blamed for not having focused on the most important issues, such as economic development, and of not truly having promoted international integration, and thus not really having done their best in supporting positive development in the state. In Bosnia-Herzegovina the strongest frustration was voiced with regard to the long ongoing political and economic crisis without seeing real hope for ending soon. From respondents in Macedonia the biggest regret was expressed about a political culture of political protest and criticism which until today were strongly suppressed by the political elites.

In both states respondents had very high hopes regarding EU accession: most respondents from IOs underlined the importance of the accession incentives to implement reforms for the EU’s Acquis Communautaire or a lack of incentive after many years without accession process. A surprisingly large number of respondents from CSOs in both states, in contrast, advocated that the EU become less strict and “to see through their fingers” (ignore possible political and economic shortcomings) so that once an EU member, governments in both states would be forced to be more democratic, respect the rule of law, economy would improve, etc. Recent experiences from other EU members, such as Bulgaria, Rumania, Greece, but also Spain and Italy, however, indicate, that while there is sufficient leverage before accession, that problems for instance in economy and governance still can arise with the EU then having little actual leverage – explaining why this hope by many CSO respondents will probably be disappointed.

A.3 The Legal Situation is better on Paper than in Practice where it Allows Governmental Abuse

The legal situation provides the framework in which civil society can become active, frequently stipulates procedures for political consultations, can serve to protect civil society from state arbitrariness or fail to do so, etc. Further, the possibilities for civil society funding, the right to association, etc. usually depend on the legal situation – and to what extent and how law is implemented or not.

The legal situation in both states has improved over the years, also due to lobbying by CSOs and pressure from IOs on the government. In both states, however, procedures for funding by the government remained highly intransparent, legislation was only partly implemented or not implemented at all. The majority of respondents from Macedonia mentioned that in 2010 the new Law on Citizen’s Associations and Foundations had been enacted; however, most respondents also complained that important suggestions from CSOs during the consultation process had been erased from the draft of the law. Further, the new Macedonian law for associations, but also laws for civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina included unclear legislation. This fostered worries from CSOs that the
state may abuse “gray zones” to blackmail CSOs or persecute them for tax fraud, if they became too critical of politics. Legal procedures for consultation and cooperation between CSOs and the government have been established, yet, frequently they are either symbolic or the government does not implement agreements from consultations in later laws.

While in Bosnia-Herzegovina international organizations had significantly contributed to drafting elaborate legislation, the complicated political system with its many political levels made the legal system very complex, and until a few years ago, for instance, NGOs needed to register in both entities separately if they wanted to work there – this also has led to confusion about the real number of NGOs existing today. Respondents in Macedonia mostly referred to the fact that so far intransparent and unclear legislation offered the possibility that political actors abused legislation and manipulated NGOs or could have them persecuted for fraud if they disliked any of their actions. In both states respondents regretted, that frequently, existing legislation was not implemented, particularly with regard to non-discrimination of ethnic minorities. Recent years have seen growing impact of civil society activities on changes of the legislation, while, however, particularly for Macedonia the government does not always keep the agreements made during consultations with civil society. Yet, years of international organizations exerting pressure on the government and training administration and CSOs in legal procedures seem to show increasing results.

For both cases, the importance of the pressure that IOs exerted on the government to improve and implement legislation and consultation processes with civil society were underlined. Several respondents, the majority in Macedonia, expressed hopes that an advanced EU-integration process could have a significantly positive effect on the transparency and the international control of the government – while in the past years pressure by IOs for reforms has mostly led to formal changes in the legislation but frequently not to a change of practices or arbitrary application of law. In both states, further, respondents from CSOs were also critical of a lack of clear procedures with regard to funding: the procedures by which IOs and the government selected the CSOs they funded were unclear and several smaller CSOs complained that they strongly always favored the few big CSOs.

The interview statements concerning the legal situation confirmed the findings from the latest USAID’S NGO Sustainability Index that detected gaps in the legislation regarding the tax rights of CSOs, while this loophole was sometimes also used in favor of CSOs. During the interviews there were however, unlike several years ago, no references to complicated registration procedures owed to the complex political structure of the state, rather, also as the USAID report found, general dissatisfaction with intransparent funding procedures. (USAID 2011: 49, 131–132)

A.4 Cooperation is slowly increasing with Both Side’s Capacity, yet Clientelism Prevails

Many of civil society’s assumed main functions depend on the possibility and readiness of cooperation between civil society and the state: participation in consultations and decision-making processes, advocacy, representation of interests, etc. Thus it is decisive, to what extent there is a tradition and a current possibility for civil society’s political up- and download.

The large majority of respondents in both states criticized that the state and the larger society did not really accept civil society as an equal partner to be involved in important decisions or ignored results from consultations. This applied even more strongly to Macedonian civil society in their possible cooperation with the state. For both states the low degree of cooperation between CSOs and the state was blamed on the fact that there was little tradition of this – which Žeravčić (2008: 47–48) also suggested and which still, four years later, applies. One point mentioned frequently by respondents from both CSOs and IOs was that while many CSOs were too far removed from the government and from access to political decision making (and also wished to be so for worry from political manipulation, particularly in Macedonia), certain CSOs are (too) close to the government (unions, veterans, QUANGOs, GONGOs, etc.). Only a small number of big, long established CSOs, managed to be independent and to have political impact. Traditionally politically affiliated CSOs, such as war veterans, unions, etc., and strong, established CSOs have the strongest impact. For all other CSOs international support, pressure by IOs on the government to consult with CSOs, as well as capacity training for CSOs and their administrative counterparts until today remain crucial.
Several respondents, also a respondent from the local administration, stated that the state administration is still learning how to cooperate with CSOs. Generally, relatively more in Macedonia than in Bosnia-Herzegovina, cooperation between CSOs and administration proved better at the local level, as there, most actors were directly involved and concerned by activities. In both states on different state levels in both cases there are consultation bodies to involve civil society, but many are not really functioning. On all levels in both states cooperation in service provision was said to function better than politically critical topics and several respondents gave examples of successful cooperation e.g. work with handicapped, children, against domestic violence, etc.

In both states, respondents from IOs, administration, and CSOs stated that many CSOs were not sufficiently professional. However, several interview partners noted that the still not very strong collaboration between state and civil society only partly depended on the government – while several CSOs lack capacities for cooperation with the state administration, a growing number of CSOs are highly professional. The government can increasingly use the expertise of civil society in particular fields – even though most MPs simply don’t have the time and capacity to cooperate. Frequently, however, particularly respondents in Macedonia criticized that the government will work with CSOs – but only with uncritical ones (GONGOs, QUANGOs) – thus the government complies with pressure from IOs but “reinterprets” it. Particularly in Macedonia, CSOs stated that they did not very much appreciate that IOs insisted so much on CSOs to cooperate with the government - so far, they had no legal or other way, to oppose possible political instrumentalization, attacks, and so forth, from the government. In other fields, for example youth or ethnic minorities, bodies were formally established, but, for different reasons, were not truly functioning. This somewhat represents a contradiction with statements from respondents from IOs who were proud of achievements made by having significantly contributed to improving cooperation between civil society and the state: through capacity building on both sides and through pressuring the government to establish consultation processes. While most did not see political affiliation between the state and certain CSOs as problematic, a small number of respondents from IOs in both states were highly critical of possible instrumentalization of CSOs by the state. A few persons also referred to how donor coordination was important in supporting political processes, including civil society policies; several however, though that IOs were not coordinated enough which decreased effectiveness while other respondents underlined how in their eyes donor coordination and task sharing were very much sufficient.

In general, cooperation between state and civil society proved better in activities related to social service provision and on environmental issues – instead of politically critical issues. Fields of service provision were said to be in the interest of the government (who did not appreciate criticism but were short of money to supply all the needed social infrastructure), social services were a win-win solution for both CSOs and the government, and even citizens were more willing to donate for such projects – also as they were reluctant to become politically involved. Only a minority of respondents referred to the fact, that social and environmental issues can in fact be highly political – but such fields usually were evaded during the activities.

Overall, the generally low political involvement of society and also the reluctance of the state to take civil society into account resulted in a generally low impact of civil society on politics – except for certain fields in which the government increasingly relies on the expertise of established CSOs that disposed of experience and a larger international network in their working area, for instance in social service or drafting legislation in certain political fields, e.g. participatory budgeting, etc. (comp. Žeravčić 2008: 39 for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonian Center for International Cooperation 2011: 32 for Macedonia) Particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and somewhat to a lesser degree also in Macedonia, this trend seems to have been increasing in the past few years. (Comp. Howard 2012: 40)

A.5 Whith Abundant National and International Funding Available, Politically Critical CSOs Depend on, Mostly Extremely Bureaucratic, Foreign Funding

As civil society is part of the overall society, the general financial and economic background usually determine the degree to which citizens have time and energy for civic activism or even full-time engagement in civil society. Further, the financial situation also impacts the degree to which CSOs can
allow themselves to be independent from (and thus critical of) domestic and international political and financial support.

The overall difficult overall economic situation was frequently mentioned as one of the main obstacles to civil society’s democratic impact, as funding was never enough to truly organize enough activities – and currently funding is even decreasing. Some respondents stated that according to them, it would have been better to support economy than democracy. One expert also stated that in his view in retrospect possibly more focus on economic support/development would have a better effect than the political focus of IOs. Many persons stated that the overall difficult economic situation in both states had strong effects on civil society.

The difficult economic situation in the early 1990s and particularly after the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina combined with lucrative salaries of NGO-funding by IOs turned CSO-activism into an NGO-sector that provided (comparatively high) income for NGO-activists – but until today has failed to establish a “vibrant” civil society (compare Seifija 2006; Dvornik 2009) Furthermore, on the one hand civil society was an attractive and important job market as international funding frequently provided rather good salaries, on the other hand, civil society was very dependent on foreign funding as domestic funding was still only developing, but not fast enough to replace the currently decreasing funding from foreign donors – now many persons working for CSOs worried about their future salaries. While, further, respondents from CSOs in Macedonia noted that currently decreasing funding aggravated civil society’s dependency on funding from state sources and thus fostered the state’s political control of civil society – also endangering critical functions of civil society. One expert in this context however also highlighted how CSOs have an interest in making the situation appear bleak to justify further funding.

Somewhat critical regarding the many years of huge financial support of CSOs, a number of respondents from IOs and also two experts, stated, that civil society had become so used to high amounts of funding available, that they did not even try to organize projects without using them to apply for funding. Further, they noted, that in fact there was still significant funding available and that they thought it was a good thing that after years of capacity training they started to be more selective regarding the quality of projects they funded – and actually contributing to a “natural selection” through their increased monitoring and evaluation. Several noted that they are fully aware of the importance of foreign funding as a source of salaries, but at the same time they also invest in and increasingly demand certain quality criteria from CSO projects they support.

In fact, after many years of funding from IOs, currently, funding is decreasing, and now international donors frequently stress “sustainability” and co-funding – from other IOs or from domestic, government sources – confirming also for Macedonia what Howard (2012) described with regard to Bosnia-Herzegovina. A general shift of funding is taking place towards larger EU programs that are not easy to apply for and need a high degree of professionalism – which only the most established NGOs have. Further, IOs are increasingly focusing on the quality of projects they fund, which disadvantages younger and smaller CSOs.

The decreasing international funding was regretted by all respondents from CSOs. Alternative domestic funding is not easy to access – particularly not for activities of civil society that are critical of the current government. In fact, while there is substantial money by the administration possibly available, several respondents from CSOs stated that for them the funding from IOs was more interesting – as more reliable and simply much larger sums; and, particularly for Macedonia, did not offer the possibility for abusive manipulation by political actors. Most importantly, while it is certainly a good idea of IOs to shift more responsibility for civil society to the respective governments, interviews confirmed what secondary literature suggested: there is substantial domestic funding available. In fact, for Bosnia-Herzegovina local authorities were stated to be the biggest donor of NGOs – which, however, mostly goes to politically affiliated organizations (veterans, unions, GONGOs, etc.) (comp. Žeravčić 2008 and Macedonian Center for International Cooperation 2011) and is distributed according to transparent procedures. Further, while some CSOs working in service provision cooperate increasingly well with domestic donors, politically critical CSOs have difficulties to obtain domestic funding and remain dependent on foreign funding for this. Thus, until today, for CSOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina as Howard (2012: 38) suggests, but also in Macedonia, international funding remains very important, particularly for CSOs’ activities that are critical of government policies. While in Bosnia-
Herzegovina it was also underlined that foreign funding can help NGOs to become established, develop a reputation, that then helps them to cooperate with domestic donors. CSOs in Macedonia underlined the importance of international funding in supporting politically critical activities that otherwise usually are not domestically supported.

As international funding towards both states is overall decreasing and democracy promotion from large EU programs is growing, this represents the challenge of being increasingly bureaucratic – making it difficult for small, new CSOs to apply and favoring strong, experienced CSOs who dispose of the needed co-financing for the programs, who have skilled project application writers, etc. Another disadvantage is that the EU programs are planned so far in advance, that it is more difficult to adapt them to the local context while, however, EU institutions are aware of this and are working on finding solutions.

Many interview partners agreed, that competition over and non-transparency of funding leads to competition and mistrust between CSOs and also had the effect that civil society had to concentrate more on keeping up with the changing funding priorities than on establishing long term impact in particular areas which then would lead to more effect. Further, respondents in both states agreed that the way international organizations had started their support for civil society/ NGOs had resulted in a constant need for funding, from IOs or domestic sources. The result was a certain degree of CSOs to be donor-driven, compromising their own ideas and goals to a certain extent. Several CSOs managed to somewhat counter this by balancing between several different donors and also by including both, international and domestic donors. Some respondents from IOs supported such approaches, as they said, by insisting on co-funding of projects they supported. Which, considering the difficulties with domestic funding, seems to be a viable option only to some CSOs. One person even opposed “CSOs” as being community-oriented and “NGOs” as donor-oriented – with the majority of organizations in both states referring to themselves as NGOs.

For the local administration it is important to work with the large, influential and established and experienced NGOs – as this assured them they were professional and well networked. Interestingly, while many CSOs said they needed to be donor driven and had little occasion to include their original ideas in project proposals, administration and donors complained that extremely frequently they received very boring project applications that looked if though CSOs tried to guess what donors wanted considering them much more conservative and less creative then they see themselves.

In both states, many respondents from IOs and from CSOs criticized that IOs focused mainly on the two capitals Sarajevo and Skopje (where the largest ethnic group also was the majority, sometimes blamed to monopolize foreign funding) and the largest urban centers, neglecting more community-based, rural organizations, and frequently also working with the same few largest CSOs which also tended to be based in the capitals. Further, most donors were criticized to fund CSOs only on a project base – obviously this was not profitable regarding the need to secure income through CSOs, but also it inhibited strategic planning of CSOs that otherwise could work more efficiently and more effectively.

Several persons from smaller CSOs complained that many IOs were by far not transparent in their funding and continuously funded the same professional NGOs. A number of interview partners suggested establishing an independent, fair, transparent institution to distribute all funding for CSOs, as there is in Croatia for instance. While IOs have tried to establish a system of local funding distribution, this was not sustainable and increased the key-player position of certain large CSOs.

### A.6 CSOs are Strongly Divided along Ethnic and also Political Cleavages - Financial Incentives and Interests in Social Issues Foster Collaboration

The structure and degree of societal cleavages in a society strongly determine the existing cleavages within civil society, to what extent the work of CSOs is generally determined by societal cleavages, and depending on the particular cleavages they also affect the topics and hurdles that CSOs usually face in their work. Further, basic theoretical functions of civil society, such as mitigation of interests, interest aggregation, etc. also depend on the existence and deepness of societal cleavages.
Societal cleavages, finally, were continuously underlined as crucial context category for civil society. The interviews confirmed what many authors wrote about both cases (for Bosnia-Herzegovina comp. e.g. Belloni 2007; Fischer 2006a, and Seifija 2006, 2008 and for Macedonia comp. e.g. Bieber 2005a and Vetterlein 2010.): still existing mutually re-enforcing societal divisions, mostly along ethnic lines, impede many of the supposed democratic contribution of civil society. The existing political structures continuously refer to ethnicity as a category of social action, which makes it very difficult for the work of CSOs themselves, but also for their work with citizens, to work towards a more civic notion of “the nation” and of individual identity. (Comp. Caruso 2007: 76 and Hadžidedić 2012: 101–102.)

Many respondents in both states accused politicians to continue to instrumentalize the situation of ongoing ethnic mobilization, use ethnic rhetoric for ethnic outbidding (comp. Benner 1996: 16), and until today groups of actors are strongly competing over resources, not always fully embracing the democratic “rules of the game”. (Comp. O’Donnell 1996). They were blamed to do this in order to distract from prevailing political or economic problems and to mobilize voters. A high number of interview partners were very pessimist about this. According to them, the young generation has grown up under segregated conditions – living in different towns or part of towns or going to divided schools or attending schools in separate shifts. As a consequence negative stereotypes could easily be transmitted onto them - they had little chances to get to know persons from other ethnic groups so as to learn more about them and possibly to revise their prejudices. The interviews confirmed that until today, the deep societal divisions that a UNPD report detected in 2009 in Bosnia-Herzegovina until today remain intact (comp. UNDP 2009: 18) – and that they also strongly determine the situation in Macedonia – impeding nation-building (comp. Gromes 2009a and Džihić 2005). There were, for both states, also positive examples of good inter-ethnic cooperation, mostly with regard to economic cooperation, social services, and civil society activities.

The ethno-political division lines today are more or less congruent with each other in Bosnia-Herzegovina, whereas in Macedonia ethnic divisions are again superimposed by frictions between the two major ethnic Macedonian political parties (VMRO-DPMNE and SDSM) on the one hand, and the two major Albanian political parties (DUI and DPA) on the other hand. In both states, further, ethno-politically defined affiliation to political parties is becoming increasingly more important as a factor for access to employment, positions, etc. This trend is relatively more pronounced for Macedonia than for Bosnia-Herzegovina – possibly, because the political division lines in Macedonia very visibly divide the two largest ethnic groups, while in Bosnia-Herzegovina to a large extent political divisions run parallel with ethnic divisions – thus distracting from attention for underlying political divisions that are becoming increasingly important. (Comp. Auer 2011) The findings confirm a development that has not been sufficiently been factored into current research. Interestingly, in Bosnia-Herzegovina several respondents from CSOs stated, that today in fact economic inequalities were more determining in society than ethno-national divisions – which, as they stated, usually were fuelled by politicians to mobilize voters (for the voting system based on ethnic quota). Several experts agreed on that matter and also thought this equally applied to Macedonia.

Persons from ethnic non-majority groups pointed to that the current political system favored the largest three (Bosnia-Herzegovina) respectively two (Macedonia) ethnic groups creating a tri-ethnic or bi-ethnic state instead of a pluri-national state. This automatically disadvantaged smaller ethnic communities or persons of mixed ethnic background, the latter particularly noted by respondents in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The majority groups were blamed to (try to) dominate the other ethnic groups, while the 2nd and 3rd (Serbs and Croats)/ the 2nd (Albanian) largest ethnic groups in turn were reproached to have a destabilizing effect on the state.

Practically all respondents in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the large majority of respondents in Macedonia referred to ethnic divisions as strongly impeding civil society’s work and democratization: on all levels, from citizens over media to politics, ethnic belonging and increasingly affiliation to political parties became increasingly important – including for civil society actors, and also was an important factor for competition over funding resources. Interestingly, several respondents in both states said that according to their experience, projects aiming at fostering inter-ethnic relations with women and non-high-level politicians were most benefitting and sustainable, as these frequently had important interest on certain issues to cooperate closely but were not so much in the limelight as to
inhibit their cooperation. Furthermore, frequently, also CSOs, as a mirror of society, are mono-ethnic themselves. Ethnic identity and also increasingly political affiliation play an important role in both states with regard to how social contacts strongly affect possible political impact of certain CSOs. The findings confirm what Coletta (2000: 1) wrote about the consequences of intra-state conflicts: they destroy the important vertical links between different groups in society and also block the horizontal links between communal groups and the state.

Many respondents, from all groups of organizations, referred to approaches of IOs towards dealing with ethnicity: many respondents were very positive about how IOs have significantly prevented a human catastrophe, and still provided inter-ethnic space and foster dialogue, work on reconciliation and desegregation, and acted as a mediating third party in inter-ethnic relations. Interview partners from IOs on the contrary highlighted the big improvements that have been made with regard to the agreements’ implementation. Many IOs stated that they tried to employ ethnically mixed teams which also functions as a role model to the larger society. Several respondents from both IOs and CSOs in both states noted how the presence of IOs still helped to stabilize the situation and to contain nationalist politics.

There were, however, also many negative references from respondents to the role of IOs with regard to ethnic divisions. A number of persons from IOs also noted that, particularly for Bosnia-Herzegovina, they see no real new solutions for improvement as politicians and veto-players insist on remaining the power they have, and, in Macedonia, ethno-political affiliations and clientelism negatively affect their work impact. Many respondents, acknowledging the peace-implementing role of IOs, however, also complained how IOs had mis-designed and also failed then to implement the peace-agreements, the Dayton Peace Accords 1995 in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Ohrid Framework Agreement 2001 in Macedonia, which both now resulted in ethnic segregation and clientelism. Until today, the political structures based on ethnic rights and quota, established by the peace-agreements, the DPA and the OFA, in both states strongly determine the political procedures, ethnicized claims of ethno-politics, segregation in many spheres of life, etc. with youth growing up in segregation. The existing state structures favor a tri-/bi- and not a pluri-cultural state. They also disadvantage smaller communities that are not included in the ethnic equations, confirming what Bieber (2004) wrote about the negative consequences of exclusion of smaller communities.

In dealing with ethnicity IOs were blamed to frequently not understand the influence and logic of the ethnic dimension in the local context and of setting up systems in which a generation grew up in ethnic segregation, aggravating ethno-national cleavages, and also for instance not really assessing the impact of certain of their actions on the wider context, e.g. language policies on inter-ethnic relations. One expert alluded to the strong emphasis that many persons working for IOs attributed to ethnicity; his explanation was, that IOs are so afraid of ethnic conflict – and also regret their misjudgment prior to the conflicts (1992-1995/1999; 2001), that their (over-)reaction partly over-evaluates ethnic tensions.

The interview findings confirmed that especially during radical changes, such as the break-up of former Yugoslavia, powerful groups and actors will compete over access to social, political, and economic resources – thus inhibiting democratization progress. (Comp. e.g. Merkel 2010: 39 see also Karl, Schmitter 1991; O’Donnell et al. 1986; Huntington 1991; McFaul 2002: 216) Since their independence both states have been struggling with the repercussions of the socio-political transformation from socialism to liberal market economy and democracy. Several experts also highlighted, that current international developments and the slow advancing of the EU-accession process of both states potentially could hold rather negative effects, as the EU-perspective strongly determines loyalty of non-majority group(s) to the state - as membership in EU and Nato remain unachieved, and the economy is not so good (in Bosnia-Herzegovina it was devastated as a consequence of the war, in Macedonia the economy is traditionally less developed in regional comparison), suffering particularly since 2009. Many respondents underlined a credible EU-perspective as a very important factor to motivate cooperation between the ethno-political groups. Otherwise, as can be currently observed, political elites may resort to changing their political strategies from European topics to nationalist/populist rhetoric as well as ethnic-outbidding and –competition.
The above summarized findings have important implications with regard to the implications of civil society’s dark sides and their consequences. Overall, the interviews give a mixed picture of civil society in divided societies: while ethno-political divisions have a strongly negative impact on how civil society exerts a democratizing effect, one can also detect very positive effects of civil society. Nevertheless, in general, the quality of CSOs was found to play an important role as to how CSOs did or did not contribute to democratic consolidation. This section takes the analysis of findings one analytical level further, structuring their analytical implications further and drawing conclusions with regard to how civil society’s democratic spill-over is connected to civil society’s “dark sides”. These deficits of civil society can be summarized as follows. The most important findings from the interviews – that explain against the theoretical background, in what fields civil society is limited with regard to its theoretically assumed spill-over for democratic consolidation:

1. Through massive external democracy support, an NGO sector that developed into a job market with the corresponding logic (competition, (closed networks, etc.) was promoted – and not really a civil society (broader, civic mobilization).
2. Civil society is divided in itself – along ethnic, political, and economic lines – and sometimes even fuels ethnic tensions,
3. Clientelism is strong among CSOs while mistrust prevents cooperation and interest aggregation and representation,
4. Some CSOs are GONGOs/QUANGOs/closely affiliated with the government (war veterans, unions, etc.) or instrumentalized by politics,
5. CSOs increasingly depend on domestic donors. This increases vulnerability and dependency making CSOs turn to less critical activities (such as the non-political dimensions of environmental protection, etc.),
6. Protection from state/control of the state is (so far) limited by the presence and attention of IOs,
7. Media is instrumentalized by governments, and has only limited contribution to democracy,
8. CSOs don’t really foster broad linking (between citizens, CSOs, and government each) and bridging (societal) ties.

Thus, civil society’s theoretical functions are limited by certain context factors and qualities of civil society that not only not foster democratic consolidation, but even actively underline it at times.

Not entirely surprisingly, but to an even greater extent than expected, the context of ethno-political divisions has strong implications on how CSOs are democratic themselves and how they, accordingly, pass on democratic norms onto their members of even onto larger society. Ethnicity is both, socially relevant and politicized, in both states. (Comp. Fearon 2006: 854) Particularly the fact that the societies of both states, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, are strongly polarized among three or respectively two large ethnically defined groups fosters strong divisions within civil society (comp. e.g. Collier 2001; Collier, Hoeffler 2004; Esteban et al. 2012b, 2012a): the rivaling actors hamper democratization by competing over resources and power at the state level (comp. Rupnik 2011). Also at the level of civil society political affiliation foster clientelism and the functional logic of regime hybridity. (Comp. e.g. Schmitter 1995b: 24 and Baker 2004: 58)

CSOs and international organizations for years have offered trainings and seminars to improve inter-ethnic relations in an increasingly segregated context. Several respondents noted, that inter-ethnic activities offered by IOs and CSOs had the best impact among youth, women, and lower level politicians (with the first two, however, interestingly, remaining very reluctant to take own initiative, see above) – which they concentrated on increasingly. For both states there are great examples of inter-ethnic CSOs and several CSOs were mentioned as important actors for improving inter-ethnic relations. However, a number of them stated that they functioned “like in a bubble” having very limited impact on the overall society that remained ethno-politically mobilized. In fact a very important number of CSOs in both states were found to be mono-ethnic (comp. (Seifija 2008) – or stated to at
least be reluctant to truly challenge the dominant ethno-political divisions. This does not make them particularly good role models for inter-ethnic cooperation. Some CSOs are even nationalist and fuel ethnic tensions – and those mostly have closer ties to and more impact on the governments in both states while other politically critical CSOs may be attacked by political actors.

In general, civil society is divided by ethno-political cleavages and by political affiliation – instead of mitigating conflict. (Comp. Edwards et al. 2001: 17; Belloni 2009; Zmerli 2008. While the demand for a common political purpose of civil society, formulated e.g. by Cole (1920: 26) or Warren (2004: 44) may be theoretically sound, however, in reality in most states around the world, including in the West, interest groups per se usually constitute around certain particular demands. (Foley, Edwards 1996: 41) The way these are represented and to what extent cooperation with groups with other demands is possible and non-violent, seems to be more decisive and to vary across states – which confirms previous findings also for the two cases investigated. (Kymlicka 1998; White 2004: 11) As the impact of CSOs strongly depends on the links between the state through belonging to political and clientelist networks, or, is limited by low membership base, however, also the degree to which civil society democratically involves in the mitigation and representation of interest is limited. Interestingly, despite the deep ethno-national cleavages of civil society, CSOs in both states stated to cooperate well with CSOs in many states, in the region (also including the kin-states of the other large ethnic communities in their states) and beyond, and in that regard never mentioned problems of nationalism. Summarizing, the main division lines for civil society in both states are the following:

(a) ethno-national divisions  
(b) different political networks in civil society  
(c) professional NGOs (good connection to politics) vs. civil movements (broader membership base)  
(d) networks around different donors or large CSOs  
(e) urban vs. rural CSOs  
(f) inclusive vs. exclusive CSOs  
(g) government friendly vs. government critical CSOs  
(h) service CSOs vs. politically critical CSOs  
(i) different (clientelist) networks in civil society

Thus one can deduce that that civil society assumes several of its theoretical functions (mitigation, socialization, aggregation of different interests, etc.) only to a limited degree, which may also block democratic spill-over to certain groups of society. The following figure illustrates how the degree of inclusiveness, or a lack thereof, of different CSOs influences their democratic spill-over potential to either citizens or politics:

**Fig. 31: Civil Society’s Inclusiveness and Democratic Spill-Over**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>degree of exclusivity (general and ethno-political)</th>
<th>low</th>
<th>high</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>civil society</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>civic movements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>associations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs GONGOS/QUANGOS</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Until today, important political and influential civil society actors do not fully distance themselves from secessionist intentions - more so for the Serb and Croat political elites in Bosnia-Herzegovina than for
the Albanian political elites in Macedonia – thus questioning the democratic system (comp. Linz, Stepan 1996: 5). The impact of ethnointernational categories and claims based on these is repeatedly based on an understanding of primordial group rights, drawing on the ethnically defined rights that communities enjoyed during Socialist times and that were again reinforced by international organizations in order to install peace – the same structures that today have resulted in constituting the basis for ongoing ethno-political veto-playing and as important dimension for civil society organizations.

In both states respondents gave examples of a slowly increasing number of social movements, including examples of inter-ethnic CSOs and inter-ethnic movements. Most social movements aimed at improving certain social or service issues, environment problems, or employment. Nevertheless, most movements in both states where only very temporary and in general still rare (somewhat more pronounced in Macedonia) - larger, political movements, did not develop due to general reluctance regarding civic engagement. Further, frequently the government tries to instrumentalize CSOs as GONGOs etc.

The interview findings also confirm a two-sided quality of (ethno-politically) exclusive CSOs: even mono-ethnic, exclusive CSOs can teach their members democratic norms and practices, for instance participation in decision-making, monitoring of the state and respect for democratic governance, etc. – while at the same time certain democratic, inclusive values, such as mitigation of certain interests, be it networking with other competing CSOs or understanding of CSOs with other ethno-political backgrounds, may be ignored or CSO members may even reinforce each other’s intolerance regarding these. (Comp. Belloni 2009: 9 and Coletta 2000) However, frequently CSOs in a context of high ethno-political mobilization face a dilemma of either promoting minority empowerment based on ethnic belonging or of promoting an “ethnically blind” approach that would foster a “civic image” which they consider conducive to democratic consolidation.

### 6.1.3 Qualities: The Mixed Effect of Cleavages, Competition and Political Affiliation on Civil Society and External Democracy Promotion

The quality of civil society refers to the nature and most determining characteristics of civil society organizations. Linked to the context, also the qualities of civil society are determined by the fact that civil society and its informal and formal organizations mirror the existing society and frequently function according to a similarly more or less democratic logic. (Comp. Roßteutscher 2010: 752) Overall, respondents in both countries under investigation stated that they thought international organizations played a role in how civil society had developed. They further blamed past or current policies or approaches of IOs to have led to developing a civil sector that remained focused on the urban centers, suffered from the same strong cleavages that the general society suffered from, i.e. ethno-national and political divisions, and also had not truly adopted a role model function for CSOs, as IOs themselves were not really transparent and seemed biased in favor of always the largest NGOs in their funding priorities – causing mistrust, competition, and jealousy in the civil sector. The details regarding the following six subcategories for civil society’s qualities are now presented:

- **B1. Non-Conflictive Structure of Civil Society**
- **B2. Organizational Structure across Cleavages**
- **B3. Organizational Capacity**
- **B4. Independence from the State and from Political Parties**

### B1. Competition over Financial and Political Resources and Lacking Capacity Hampers Civil Society’s Impact and IOs are Blamed of Clientelism

A non-conflictive structure of civil society is thought to be a good basis to bring together different interests, also across possibly existing cleavages, to promote tolerance and cooperation among citizens and different groups, etc. Further, the ability or non-ability of CSOs to deal with possible conflicts in a
democratic way also is basis for members of CSOs to learn existing norms and values and to integrate these into their attitudes and behavior.

In both states, the structure of civil society is strongly determined by being part of the overall society, which is determined by a competition across both, ethno-national and political, lines. The prevailing competition and mistrust make it difficult for civil society to function across them and to contribute to democratic processes in an inclusive manner. While a non-conflictive structure is assumed to be conducive to organize society effectively towards common efforts towards successful democratic consolidation, civil society in both states was found to be highly conflictive on several levels: There is a high degree of competition and mistrust across ethno-political lines. This keeps CSOs from forming issue coalitions or networking which reduces the potential and actual impact of civil society on politics. Also, as CSOs say they always need to take into account ethnicity – by stressing inclusiveness, providing translations, etc., this aspect is time and money consuming. Most CSOs are mono-ethnic, with frequent “symbolic” members from another ethnic group. Also, strong competition and conflict over currently fading funding is aggravated by intransparent distribution processes of IOs and the government: so there is stealing of ideas, mistrust and reluctance to coalition, competition for positions for careers, etc. Both, IOs and local government, openly regretted these points as they impeded their work of promoting cooperation between CSOs. Respondents in Macedonia repeatedly stressed the negative impact of political competition lines, that they considered even more negative than competition along ethnic lines. However, in both states, respondents noted that there can be cooperation between CSOs from different ethnic backgrounds if beneficial for all.

Another division line frequently mentioned was the division between a few well-trained, professional, well-funded NGOs in the urban areas that frequently lack a membership-base but are well connected to IOs and politics vs. less trained, less well-off NGOs in rural areas that frequently have more contact to citizens but are less well connected with IOs or (national) politicians. This situation also creates mistrust and competition, also, because most well-funded organizations, particularly in Macedonia, were frequently closely connected to the government. While also in Bosnia-Herzegovina there are certain particularly big and powerful CSOs, in Macedonia it was repeatedly mentioned, that there is a big competition between two big groups of CSOs – linked to one of two large local CSOs - either the Foundation Open Society Institute Macedonia (FOSIM) or the Macedonian Center for International Cooperation (MCIC) – and the respectively affiliated CSOs, who cooperate among each other but only very rarely between themselves.

CSOs critical of the government were reluctant to collaborate with those or to join coalitions or networks with them, as they preferred not to risk being instrumentalized politically by them. Another point highlighted, connected to scarce resources, was that civil society organizations and CSO activists aspiring careers even tended to foster ethnic divisions and instrumentalize ethnicity as a reason to receive funding and to multiply working positions.

IOs were blamed not to be fully innocent of further aggravating division lines by a lack of their funding priorities and by always only including the largest, most professional CSOs that thus had been able to develop a “quasi-monopoly”. On the other hand, however, for many years IOs have also been promoting networks and issue coalitions to bring CSOs together and cooperate for more political impact on their goals. For project purposes many donors insist that they only fund projects that include teams and/or participants from different ethnic groups for funding. During this process, it was added critically, IOs tended not to be sensitive enough about existing ethnic and political division lines, forcing cooperation from which politically critical CSOs did not necessarily benefit, thus not really contributing to easing conflict lines that ran between different civil society groupings.

B.2 Ethno-National and Political Cleavages Remain Determining

Civil Society’s organizational structure across cleavages is closely linked to if and how civil society can mitigate existing conflicts, aggregate interests, etc. and also how values and norms of mutual tolerance can or cannot be passed on to citizens involved in civil society. Particularly, civil society’s “dark sides” are connected to this aspect, as deep societal divisions are frequently reflected in the quality and purposes of CSOs.
For both states a very high number of persons from civil society and international organizations described civil society as divided – along ethnic lines in both states, and, additionally, along political lines in Macedonia, which there subdivide both Albanians and Macedonians in two major groups of political loyalty – frequently not willing to bridge these cleavages. Interestingly also for Bosnia-Herzegovina several persons mentioned that membership in political organizations, again, was becoming increasingly more important for job recruiting, etc. Also in both state respondents said that there existed some truly multi-ethnic CSOs - others CSOs claim to be inter-ethnic (while some seem to be - e.g. the Helsinki Committees for Human Rights in both states. Several respondents gave examples of inter-ethnic movements for social issues such as waste disposal, women’s rights, police violence, etc.) – and cooperation with other ethnic groups from abroad – also kin-states – seems to function fine.

However, most CSOs at a closer inquiry are mostly mono-ethnic, one CSOs by several respondents was even accused of having close ties with radical nationalist and to appear at nationalist gatherings while telling funders how they promote good inter-ethnic relations, Some CSOs were accused of actively fuelling ethnic divisions, with particular mentioning of unions, war veterans, etc. as instrumentalized by politicians to support nationalist rhetoric. The ethnic division lines worked against united effort of civil society and thus diminished their overall political impact. This was said to particularly apply to politically critical issues; civil society initiatives and coalitions in the fields of service provision or women’s issues were said to be more successful and easier to establish cooperation for.

Two respondents also noted that CSOs working inter-ethnically sometimes were labeled as traitors – by certain individuals but also by politicians. A number of respondents also critically added, that the effort that many CSOs made to focus on including different ethnic groups was possibly well intended, but also continuously stressed the belonging to different ethnic groups, which did not lead to an inclusive, civic, image of the individual and of society. Several respondents gave account of rare, although existing, examples of inter-ethnic movements that had formed around for instance issues of police violence, waste disposal, etc. These usually did not last very long but centered on a clearly defined issue of common interest, they managed to unite citizens from different ethno-national background for a certain amount of time. Interestingly, many CSOs mentioned how they cooperated well with CSOs from abroad, including the kin-states of the other ethnic communities in their states.

A number of persons criticized IOs for applying Western standards to procedures of interest aggregation and political processes that could not (yet) be applied in both states. IOs were partly blamed to focus their work on the capital and not to cooperate equally with all ethnic groups – thus favoring the majority group that also represented the majority in the state capital (Bosniaks and ethnic Macedonians).

With regard to Bosnia-Herzegovina one respondent from an IO pointed to the tradition in the state of civil society being based on ethnic interest organizations during the Habsburg times, still partly explaining for civil society’s ethnically divided structure. Opinions of persons from IOs were divided, as to whether they had really contributed to civil society being no longer truly divided or whether their impact on inter-ethnic relations remained on a small scale. In both states, further, some CSOs accused a number of IOs to knowingly cooperate with nationalist CSOs thus legitimizing their claims. For Macedonia on the other hand, the more recent history of the civil society development was seen as more determinating, which has resulted in the NGO sector being strongly divided along lines of political affiliation and of loyalty to two of the biggest NGOs (Soros/Open Society Institute and MCIC).

B.3 Despite Extensive Capacity Training not all CSOs are Sufficiently Trained to be Effective

Civil society’s organizational capacity is crucial for as to what extent civil society manages to organize their own work, how they can cooperate with other CSOs, with donors, with the states, and also with citizens. Since the massive influx of external funding civil society activists in both states have

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270 The ties to the nationalist party are probably also important to be able to work and to be influential as a business-NGO in a certain context. As described above, clientelist and political networks strongly determine access and influence on socio-political life.
experienced very extensive, encompassing, and numerous capacity trainings. This has led to highly qualified CSO activists, sometimes pejoratively referred to as “over-trained seminar-mafia”, who frequently work for successful NGOs in the urban centers, who are highly specialized and professional in different areas from networking over writing reports to consulting with the government, others are said to still need more skills for such procedures. Smaller, less successful CSOs in rural areas, however until today, are stated to be less well trained, which again, decreases their chances to gain access to funding and to have significant impact on politics regarding their interests. Most CSOs are extremely well trained in networking, attend frequent national, regional, and international conferences, etc. and establish cooperation with different CSOs and donors for projects, in general, cooperation on all levels functions better in the different fields of service provision.

Until today, IOs are still supporting networking and other organizational skills, however, “homegrown” cooperation tend to work better, owed to the mistrust of coalitions due to ethnicization or politicization. Respondents from IOs in both states said that in order to effectively cooperate with the states, CSOs, despite improvement, still needed to learn to become more professional in the consultation process with the state institutions, if they really wanted to have political impact. Respondents in Macedonia tended to be somewhat more critical in this regard than IOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, who stated that consultations by CSOs were becoming increasingly professional.

Most interview partners underlined, how good organizational skills, multi-tasking, English, “project prose”, good writing and conceptual skills as well as fundraising and much networking on all levels were important for success on the NGO-market. These requirements for CSOs frequently make grass-roots organizations less competitive, as they are less trained and experienced. Altogether, it was said that organization was easier and more efficient in fields of service provision than in topics in which political positions and affiliations played a more important role, and also that cooperation on the local level, also with the state administration, had proven more fruitful. IOs on their part also mentioned how important it was, that they were involved in frequent networking with and between NGOs and that they tried international coordination of NGOs but that this never really had happened (as was supposed to be done e.g. by the OHR) (Bosnia-Herzegovina) or which was very good at the start in 1999/2001 but has decreased and some plans proved not sustainable (Macedonia).

B.4 Dependency on State Finances and on Political Consent Hamper a Possible Corrective Function of CSOs

In order for civil society to fulfill functions of monitoring, criticizing, and controlling the state power, it is important that civil society is financially independent from the state and from political parties. There may be certain overlapping in positions and in order for civil society to exert impact a certain connection is even between e.g. lobby groups and the political elites working on the particular topic beneficial. However, if civil society depends on finances, etc. then this has a hampers effect. One condition for civil society’s ability to assume its theoretical functions is the degree to which civil society on the one hand needs a certain degree of independence from the state in order to be protected from it and to be critical. On the other hand, civil society also needs access to politics for dialogue and cooperation in policy-making in order to have impact.

Many respondents in both states referred to the (lack of) independence from the state, as it is very important with regard to whether civil society can assume a criticizing, or even corrective function, limiting the state on the one hand, or, whether, on the other hand, civil society is entirely disconnected from the state and thus as no access to political interest representation. In both states CSOs depend on political and financial support from the government – and usually they are either too far removed, such as non-professional social movements, or too close, such as GONGOs or QUANGOs in order to assume a corrective or monitoring impact. Another aspect mentioned, was, that following the international call for increased cooperation by cooperating with politically non-critical CSOs, today there is much symbolic cooperation between CSOs and the government, for which, frequently, the government chooses government friendly CSOs. Some respondents said, CSOs could either be politically dependent and get funding or be independent and poor.

In both state it was said, that ethno-political affiliation strongly determined connections to the political elites and nationalist rhetoric, partly also owed to financial dependence of CSOs which also
creates political dependence. For Macedonia one expert even noted, that all but the largest CSOs depend on politically affiliation for funding and support. This was said to particularly strongly the case for big CSOs, like veterans, unions, etc. who tend to be close to politics and with politicians frequently (and increasingly) instrumentalizing CSOs, or even funding their own QUANGOs or GONGOs, and controlling much of the media who will publically defame critical CSOs. A few respondents, however, noted that if one really tried, it was possible to work around ethno-political division lines and not participate in nationalist agendas. Altogether, however, the frequent affiliations have led to continued mistrust of citizens in CSOs whom citizens do not trust, and thus do not want to be part of social movements, etc. Experts however also underlined, how strongly much of society is determined by clientelism. – These findings confirm, what Zinecker (2007) also wrote about the importance of civil society’s independence in Latin American hybrid regimes – which can be found to apply to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, where civil society is strongly influenced and determined in its quality impact by ethno-national ties or by political affiliation.

With particular reference to Bosnia-Herzegovina, respondents from IOs stated, that they were promoting cooperation between civil society and lower levels of political administration to get around political higher level of administration – and that altogether they were rather optimist about the big progress that had been made in the past fifteen years, despite possible need for further improvement. Regarding Macedonia interview partners positively noted that IOs promote cooperation between government and CSOs – some IOs also criticize high political affiliation, while others see this as natural and a precondition to civil society’s impact. And while one respondent from an IO underlined how they only interfered in political processes where urgent (security) threats are seen, many respondents from CSOs see IOs as the only, and very important, counterweight to increased pressure from their government.

6.1.4 Civil Society’s Qualities as the Basis for its Democratizing Functions

Whether civil society can and does assume the theoretically attributed functions varies depending on the functions: service provision and recruiting of new leaders function relatively well – however, both are not only positive as service provision runs a risk of political co-option as does the recruiting of new leaders. In general, according to the interview findings, civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina seems to have improved noticeably, probably also due to the massive financial support and pressure on the government exerted by external democracy promoters. The interview findings confirm Warren’s classification (2004) according to which the constitutive goods of associations strongly affect the quality, and thus the possible democratization effect, of CSOs. CSOs that support purposes that concern a larger share of the society and are neither individual nor exclusive (e.g. access to certain social services, fight against domestic violence, etc.) or concern non-scarce resources – material (such as tax monitoring of the government) or symbolic (such as overall democratization).

The quality of CSOs varies very much across a whole range from inclusive, democratic CSOs to exclusive, nationalist and clientelistic CSOs. Interestingly, the findings indicate that civil society in Macedonia faces significant, even stronger challenges than civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina, notably regarding internal divisions, strong competition and mistrust, frustration about limited impact, a difficult legal context, political intrusion of civil society, etc. However, according to several instruments for measuring democracy or civil society civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina was said to be doing better: According to Freedom House, for years civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been worse off than in Macedonia. For instance, Freedom House (2011) rated civil society (on a scale of 1 to 7 with 7 as the maximum) in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2002 as 4.5 and in 2011 as 3.5 and civil society in Macedonia in 2002 as 4.00 and in 2011 as 3.25. The USAID NGO Sustainability Index (2012: 1, 6) for 2010 already rated civil society in both states as equally amounting to 3.7 (on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being the maximum). The interview findings however suggest that the democratic reversal Macedonia has a

\[271\] The main qualities of constitutive goods that Warren noted were: individual vs. social goods, excludable vs. non-excludable goods, material vs. symbolic/psychological goods, scarce vs. nonscarce goods, Warren 2004.
strongly impeding impact on civil society while civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina according to interviews has noticeably improved in the past years – thus based on the sources of this research civil society’s quality in Bosnia-Herzegovina seems to be at least as good as the quality of overall civil society in Macedonia.

6.1.5 Functions: Democratizing Effects of Civil Society are Limited or Even Reversed by Civil Society’s Context and Qualities

This subsection, finally, compares and assesses to what extent and how civil society assumes its theoretical functions and thus contributes to democratization. The eight functions identified as most important during the interview analysis are each contrasted for both states and for IOs and civil society. Altogether, until today theory frequently assumes that civil society positively contributes to democratic consolidation. However, research remains opaque as to how civil society can be powerful enough to counter undemocratic structures or establish so far inexistent channels for its activities in contexts of unconsolidated democracies. The details regarding the following six subcategories for civil society’s qualities are now presented:

C1. Control the State’s Power
C2. Monitoring and Diffusion of Independent Information
C3. Aggregation, Articulation, and Representation of Interests
C4. Mitigation of Overlapping Interests across Particular Interests
C5. Diffusion and Socialization of/the Importance of Civic Virtues
C6. Stimulate Political Participation of Citizens
C7. Recruiting of new Leaders
C8. Service Provision

C.1 Strong or Weak Governements and Ethnic or Political Affiliation Limit CSOs’ Impact

In the tradition of Montesquieu, one important function of civil society’s organizations is considered to consist in being a corrective counter-balance and control of state authorities. Theoretically, civil society’s function of controlling the state power is closely linked with civil society building a counterweight of organized citizens against an (otherwise) over-powerful state. This is important so that citizens can participate, upload needs and interests, and thus legitimize the government that is supposed to represent their interests.

Overall, this was the function out of the seven theoretical functions identified, that had a very broad reference by respondents. Civil society in both case studies assumes this function only to a rather limited degree. CSOs today can look back on almost two decades of trainings and practice in activism, and for monitoring and doing watchdog activities. Also, IOs have been informing, training, and reminding state institutions of the importance of transparency and of respecting the law. The success has been limited, however: many respondents perceived independence from the state as highly, and even increasingly, problematic, particularly in the eyes of respondents from Macedonia. For both states, respondents said that political/financial dependency kept NGOs from criticizing the governments, and where this proved not sufficient, political actors attempted to intimidate CSOs.

Repeatedly respondents from CSOs underlined how state institutions were simply not interested in working with them and in involving them in politics. In both states, IOs are considered as a very important counterweight to encroachment of state on civil society, as most respondents from all groups agreed, that without their support, attempts to limit the state’s power and control of society are seen as not very effective, as without much real power. Respondents from IOs noted how they work on involving civil society in political processes to have them take some control, and how they hope that that EU-accession will increase setting limits to domestic politicians.

Particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the omnipresence of ethno-nationalist cleavages determined the fields, in which cooperation with politics is possible. For Macedonia, statements
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referred more to political encroachment by the state, noting how the control of and protection from the state’s power was possibly only within close limits. Many citizens and CSO activists said that they were afraid of open political criticism as they themselves or family members may be discredited or threatened by political actors to lose their work positions. This included ethnic minorities who are particularly disadvantaged as they don’t have the power to even try to voice their concerns. Further, for Macedonia IOs underlined how currently they consider strengthening civil society as an important issue and how they are promoting clear legal rules for the work of civil society.

C.2 Political Intransparency, Political Affiliation and Financial Dependency Hamper how CSOs can Monitor and Diffuse Independent Information

According to theory, an important function of civil society is to monitor the state’s activities – in order to control, to legitimize, and where needed to represent interests and participate in required changes. Furthermore, as a link between citizens/ the public and the state civil society’s role is also to inform citizens by diffusing independent information about the state’s policies and decisions and can also become involved in possibly corrective participation. For both states, this is the case only to a limited extent.

For this dimension, overall, statements from Bosnia-Herzegovina were more positive than from Macedonia. The most positive point was how civil society provides public space and spreads alternative information. The media, in theory and practice of democratization promotion frequently underlined as an important part of civil society, has been substantially supported by IOs in the early years of CSO support in both states, today is highly controlled and owned by government-affiliated actors. The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina seems to be somewhat better than in Macedonia. Nevertheless, in both states respondents stated that the government uses media to publicly attack CSOs and to spread government friendly information. Investigative journalism in both states also is not very common – as journalists depend on income from politically affiliated media. Accordingly, the media do not really assume a role as part of civil society that distributes alternative information. Rather, the media is closely linked to (nationalist) politics, and thus the media sometimes even actively fuel ethnic tension or are used by politicians for defamation of critical NGOs. This is partly owed to journalists being dependent on jobs from media, thus adhere to political affiliations.

Despite the difficult situation regarding the media there are, however, CSOs who spread alternative information (organizing roundtables, monitoring, publishing shadow reports, public debates, etc. – sometimes, also in cooperation with media), for instance Transparency International in both states was said to do good work in this regard. Many CSOs also support translations of publications on critical topics, e.g. minority politics, etc. into the languages of all ethnic groups, including smaller communities. Further, CSOs offer training about civic rights to students, their teachers, etc. Other CSOs provide legal advice or inform e.g. rural women about their rights. The impact frequently influences the information that citizens have, possibly also their opinions and behavior – yet the impact on politics in general can be seen as relatively low. Further, there are numerous CSOs who do not necessarily spread “alternative information” that is based on values of social inclusion and democratic values.

With regard to Macedonia, some CSOs stated how after monitoring of the state’s activities they were attacked when they criticized politics. Others spoke about how they teach youth to be critical and to use different information sources – they stated that as long as they teach youth skills, debate, etc. However, the downside of CSOs’ alternative information distribution is that spreading alternative information to youth is important, but frequently youth with different ideas then face difficulties when they face the broader, more conservative, society. Further, the extent to which CSOs manage to create and use a public space (compare e.g. Habermas 1992) was said to be somewhat limited – “like a bubble” – somewhat independent from the rest of society.

Respondents from IOs also told how they have been training the media for critical journalism and supporting public debate – with great participation with regard to numbers of participants, with little impact on the overall critical role of the media, while some respondents noted that there has been progress however. Further, they have been supporting the distribution of information in several languages in each state – but also were criticized for thus, indirectly, supporting nationalist positions.
C.3 Ethnic and Political Divisions and Competition Hamper Civil Society’s Impact by the Aggregation, Articulation, and Representation of Interests

Another important role of civil society is thought to consist bringing together the diverse opinions from many citizens into fewer positions (aggregation) that can be further channeled into political programs and be formulated (articulation) and to then be represented vis-à-vis the state. In the sense of a public sphere and of intermediation between private individuals and the state, civil society is assumed to aggregate, formulate, and advocate interests of citizens towards the states and to channel information back and forth between the private and the state. This includes the idea to thus increase political participation and legitimation. This function of civil society was somewhat connected to the categories of analysis “cooperation with the state”. However, this function refers to the actual process of civil society for aggregating interests, organizing their representation and also accessing state institutions to be heard.

Overall, many respondents in both states said, that politicians were not interested in civil society’s demands or the interests they represented, rather, they preferred exerting pressure to stay in power. This and deep ethno-national and political cleavages as well as further divisions owed to competition and mistrust decrease civil society’s potential for (successful) interest aggregation. However, several respondents from experienced CSOs noted that even though civil society still needs to develop with regard to interest aggregation and articulation (comp. e.g. National Democratic Institute 2009b: 9), due to the growing experience and much training CSOs’ capacity for and actual interest representation vis-à-vis the government is improving in recent years.

Interview partners from IOs stated, that for years they have been working on improving the capacity of CSOs and of the administration to better take into account interests and demands from civil society, and also on pushing CSOs to cooperate and to aggregate their interests, vis-à-vis the state institutions and their international funders, for more impact. It seems, then, that after much capacity training of CSOs and administration, particularly for some CSOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, increased capacity and professionalism help them to be taken more seriously in consultations with government, particularly at the local level – also due to pressure from IOs. Further, the government increasingly relies on involving expertise of specialized CSOs, while, here as well, the capacity of CSOs to be professional automatically selects the most experienced and successful organizations. In Macedonia, however, while on the one hand a number of large, professional CSOs have well established ties with the government and are included in government consultations, the government, on the other hand, is less inclined to take into account the interests of smaller, society-based organizations. For both states, until today, however, also the large “old” CSOs (unions, veterans, etc.) are best at representing their interests vis-à-vis the government – who are said to be well organized and important lobby groups. Regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina respondents criticized that so far the willingness and the capacity of the state administration to include civil society’s interests was still limited. Other respondents also expressed that in fact some organizations such as unions, veterans, etc. are well organized and have strong impact – but they frequently are politically affiliated and rather represent the interests of politics vis-à-vis the public than vice-versa. Several respondents in Macedonia pointed out that they saw it as their duty to represent and articulate needs, e.g. those of ethnic minorities. Yet, several persons thought that if there are CSOs that successfully represent interests, only the strongest CSOs with a genuine agenda and those politically affiliated have visible impact on politics.

Concerning the link between CSOs and citizens on the other hand, except for unions and war veterans, etc. who enjoy broad support from the public most NGOs only have a very limited membership base. This raises the question of their actual little legitimacy – but that is same for many NGOs around the world – opposed to associations or society-based organizations who may enjoy broader support and have (although only by its members) elected representatives.
C.4 Ethno-Political Cleavages and Competition Perpetuate Particular Interests - Overlapping Interests only Sometimes Form into, mostly Social Issues Related, Collaboration

As one of civil society’s functions, the mitigation of overlapping interests is considered important to that different, possibly conflicting positions become manageable through democratic procedures and that extreme positions become combinable so as to find the best common solution for policy-making and policy implementation. The communalization function of civil society, going back to the theoretical contributions of Gramsci and Putnam, considers civil society to foster conflict mediating abilities and to mediate between different interests in order to process them through democratic, peaceful procedures, thus also creating bridges across prevailing social cleavages. This is particularly important, and especially challenging at the same time, where society is characterized by deep divisions and a conflictive political culture.

Overall, the situation and developments in this field were seen as more or less mixed – stating the need for further improvement. Respondents from civil society were quite positive about their own contributions – more in Bosnia-Herzegovina than in Macedonia. Further, CSOs and IOs were more positive about their respective own contribution than about that of the other group. For both states, generally, while civil society remains still mostly ethnically divided, CSOs contribute to reconciliation, good inter-ethnic relations, etc. – the results of this seemed to be more positive in Bosnia-Herzegovina than in Macedonia with regard to the direct results of civil society activities. This might partially be connected to the fact that the history of inter-ethnic relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina has points of reference of good cooperation and also the three languages are related, even contested to merely represent different dialects with different spellings in detail, as opposed to Albanian and Macedonian that bear no resemblances at all. But for both states several respondents highlighted that CSOs were good to work on certain (critical) issues, for instance minority issues that others would not really address.

For years, in both countries CSOs were said to have significantly contributed to reconciliation and improving inter-ethnic relations by various projects and activities and to provide space and public debate on common visions. Further, they are particularly important to bring young people together to have them get to know each other. A point of criticism expressed was that civil society itself was believed to be too divided among each other to really mitigate conflicts and to promote common visions as effectively as desirable.

Also for both states, however, positive results on an interpersonal level, of e.g. bringing together young political elites together who are growing up in segregation, could not be found to result in better conflict mitigation at the higher, political, or the overall societal levels. And several respondents from IOs noted that CSOs were not so good in their impact and many even fostered particular interests.

Respondents from IOs underlined how they have been promoting cooperation and mitigation across conflict lines and supporting civil society in bringing together different persons and different positions. Some respondents from CSOs however also criticized, that the funding politics of some IOs increase conflict lines and competition among CSOs, thus inhibiting the formation of interest coalitions. Many respondents in both states underlined, how a credible perspective for progress – including the prospect of EU- and Nato-integration were extremely important for hold the states together and to foster cooperation between the different ethnic groups and in particular their political elites. A lack thereof would very likely further divide the societies and fosters a certain undemocratic political culture.

C.5 Civic Virtues Have Increased among CSO Activists – who Mostly Act “Like in a Bubble”

Thought of as “schools of democracy”, civil society organizations are said to teach and socialize its members into civic virtues and democratic norms and behavior, as well as to promote democratic procedures and diffuse the importance of democratic virtues to the broader public and build trust among and between their members. The underlying assumption is that democratic values and norms prevail in CSOs.
Overall, the statements were more positive for Bosnia-Herzegovina than for Macedonia. For both states, IOs were particularly positive about their own contribution. CSOs and IOs again were more positive about their own contribution than about that of the others. In general, statements about the situation in both states were very similar: many persons from civil society and NGOs are believed to be more open - they travel more than average citizens and meet different people, they see and hear a lot of different things and thus potentially can decrease negative prejudice and stereotypes through trainings - They are thought to be able to teach democratic issues, like human rights, etc. and also train persons, e.g. teachers, to pass on these values.

It was not quite clear, as some CSO activists explicitly noted, how civil society is supposed to pass on values to the broader public, particularly given the low connectedness to the broader public. Even while CSOs and their activists are believed to teach important issues and organize important activities, several respondents noted that frequently they themselves may not be the best role models themselves, as many NGOs are one-man shows, procedures are not necessarily democratic and many CSO activists are not automatically tolerant in all fields of life, e.g. regarding homosexuality, etc. In addition, the membership base is highest in sports clubs, etc. which are frequently blamed to be nationalist.

Even those CSOs that are very democratic said that so far civil society is not so good in spreading democratic virtues to the broader public. Several activists highlighted that they particularly focused on training youth who are the future and grow up without much chance for travelling or meeting persons of other ethnicity. With reference to IOs respondents stated, that these have been promoting civil society in diffusing democratic virtues and democratic political culture – both still need improvement. Finally, several persons from CSOs accused IOs of double standards and of not being very democratic, and thus not making very good role models, themselves.

C.6 Inherited and New Political Frustration Inhibit Political Participation of Citizens

In order to increase citizens’ participation and thus also the legitimacy of politics civil society is thought of as a motor to raise awareness and motivation among citizens to actively inform themselves and to participate in political activities that include e.g. participation in elections – but also should go beyond that. As democracy is considered as “government of the people, by the people, for the people”, the direct involvement of citizens is indispensable.

Overall, for both states, the general public was said to be very passive and difficult to mobilize, despite significant attempts of CSOs. The interviews also confirmed, what secondary literature suggested: citizens mistrust politics and do not like to become formally involved in politics – the majority of the population was frustrated about politics, see passivity and non-voting as statements, and particularly disadvantages groups, e.g. youth, women, ethnic minorities, are still not enough involved in activism. Many respondents stated that CSOs are mostly disconnected from the broader public – resulting from a general passivity of citizens and from strong mistrust in politics causing a reluctance of citizens to become political involved. As a result, most NGOs don’t have a membership-base, which limits their sphere of influence on both, the broader public, and the political sphere.

Additionally, several respondents noted how the “normal citizens” simply does not have time to become involved – which is why salaries for NGO activists only allow them to be active on political issues. For Macedonia about half of all respondents also said that it was not only socialist legacies that kept citizens from positioning themselves politically in public, but rather very concrete, recent events of threats or actual violence organized by the political actors or of employment dependency on good political contacts, that kept citizens from political action. (Compare Dvornik 2009; Howard 2003; Macedonian Center for International Cooperation 2011; Howard 2012: 40)

According to CSO activists in both states, civil society stimulates political participation and citizens’ involvement, and while civil society is optimistic about the impact of their contribution, IOs have doubts about this and stated that they have been fostering cooperation and political activism, while the levels of general political activism and its impact remained low. Politicians in both states, further, are not very keen on too much political activism as they do not care about responding.

Several respondents noted that there was some political participation, but frequently as a result from political parties, blamed to use ethnic mobilization to mobilize voters. Respondents from
Bosnia-Herzegovina further said that even though civil society’s divisions keep them from involving larger, crucial masses for political impact, recent years have seen new social movements develop that are more oriented towards issue and less toward money. Several respondents gave accounts of some, albeit few, examples of inter-ethnic social movements, such as Dosta! in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Freedom Square, protests after police killed a young man in spring 2011, and demonstrations against inter-ethnic violence March 2012. But overall, most respondents were frustrated, that CSOs frequently are divided – and thus do not mobilize a broad base of support while ethnic politics manages to mobilize voters. Respondents from IOs said that they continue to improve capacity of CSOs and administration to raise civic involvement, particularly at the local level – but so far were not quite happy about the results.

Respondents from CSOs in both states criticized, that citizens rather endured hardships and complained, instead of becoming active and invest time and energy in activism. Particularly in Macedonia, additionally, citizens were afraid of personal consequences of (critical) political activism. Especially women, youth, ethnic minorities, and other disadvantaged groups are politically underrepresented. Further, many NGOs in Macedonia are blamed to in fact be QUANGOs or in other ways politically affiliated – thus not really interested in representing the public’s interests, while private persons risk personal disadvantages when observed to participate in critical civil society activities.

C.7 New Leaders are Mostly Recruited Based on Ethno-Political Clientelism

With the aim to recruit new political elites, and particularly during political transitions, to recruit (and train) new, increasingly democratic leaders, one role of civil society is thought to consist in the recruiting of new leaders.

Many respondents judged this function of civil society to work particularly well – possibly, because many persons interviewed benefit from recruiting. This function was the only function judged less positive for Bosnia-Herzegovina than for Macedonia. There were many positive remarks from CSOs with regard to this function of civil society – who all benefit from the frequently mentioned prevailing clientelism of CSO and of CSOs as career stepping stones – even more so in Macedonia than in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Not surprisingly, successful CSOs were positive about how new leaders were recruited, less successful complained how they were kept outside the circle of the “chosen few”.

The effect of this, however, is controversial: while persons working for successful organizations were positive about this, many persons critical of current politics, reluctant to become involved with political elites – or without access to these – strongly criticized the high degree of clientelism connected to this. In general, the situation in both states was described as very similar, with some minor differences. Persons from civil society were overall quite positive about that civil society recruited potential new leaders and provided employment.

A number of respondents in both states, some more in Macedonia than in Bosnia-Herzegovina, stated that there was a career competition between CSO activists, as NGOs serve as an important and relatively lucrative job market and generational change can be problematic. CSOs (with support of IOs) are a good way to gain skills and experience and frequently a start for later careers. Some state, however, that activists then become corrupted by the political system. But it was also noted to be good for CSOs to have contacts to former activists in politics – to impact politics.

There were not many statements by IOs on this for Bosnia-Herzegovina and mostly neutral in judgment, while for Macedonia there were more statements of IOs, albeit mixed, and while there were no statements from IOs about their own contribution, there were many remarks by IOs in Macedonia about their own positive contribution to recruiting new leaders. Many persons from CSOs positively underlined, that CSOs provide a good opportunity for young persons to gain experience and skills for future employment and that NGOs are a good stepping stone for a career – in civil society or in other areas, and that NGOs are also a good opportunity for young persons to learn activism and to work towards promoting issues that matter to them. There was, as well, however, criticism on behalf of former NGO activists who use their influence to enter politics – and are said to then become corrupted and lose their ideals.
Respondents from IOs stated that part of their work was to identify and train potential young leaders or young party elites to teach them professional skills, democratic values and practices, and to promote international networking. Especially with a focus on the future elites, they also promoted overcoming ethnic cleavages across ethno-political divisions of young elites – with limited success though, several persons stated, as the general environment made it difficult to act disconnected from ethno-political dimensions. One expert partly blamed IOs for the strong clientelism in the sphere of democracy promotion and civil society as after the conflicts IOs had to react quickly during conflicts and thus hired fast, without controlling and frequently selecting politically affiliated personnel that until today remains in important positions.

With reference to Bosnia-Herzegovina respondents noted that even though some CSOs like employing young persons – to give them opportunity and to benefit from their energy and creativity, there was strong competition in the market, as older CSOs heads were very reluctant to step down and make room for young leaders who demand access to careers and income via CSO positions. Concerning Macedonia respondents stated that close ties between CSOs and politicians are often negative, while a few statements also underlined that this facilitated civil society’s political impact as long as they remained politically independent. One of the experts blamed IOs for being bad examples by strongly relying on clientelism in their recruiting and employment policy.

C.8 The Best Results of Civil Society’s Impact, Cooperation between both CSOs and between CSOs and the State and of Broader Support are achieved in the Field of Service Provision

Service provision by civil society is thought to be important as civil society is closer to local needs of citizens and can at the same time also channel these needs to the state which in turn can cooperate to provide the adequate and needed (social) services to its citizens. Service provision is frequently included in democracy fostering functions of civil society. While this may have a true side – that cooperation between interest groups and the state develops and that this in turn can socialize both sides into collaborating and does have some impact politics in the related fields – on the other side available funding and support from the government thus are channeled into social services and not into politically critical, and thus particularly in times of democratic stagnation, democracy fostering activities. And thus also the government can display readiness for collaboration with civil society towards the international community without admitting criticism.

This function received the highest number of statements from respondents, who stated that civil society’s impact in fields of service provision functioned increasingly well. Actually, this function was the most positively assessed category for Bosnia-Herzegovina and the second most positively assessed category for Macedonia (only recruiting was considered more positive – but also shaded by clientelism). Many respondents stated, that generally, cooperation between state and civil society work well in service provision – but not in most other fields, notably those politically critical, where international presence was considered a crucial counterweight.

For both states, respondents from civil society were very (Bosnia-Herzegovina) or at least rather (Macedonia) positive about their own contribution to and impact on service provision. The findings confirm what Seifija (2008: 101) wrote about Bosnia-Herzegovina and what the Macedonian Center for International Cooperation (2011: 26–27) wrote about Macedonia: That many CSOs focus on service provision and that these receive the largest share of funding from the state budget. According to many statements, overall there is good cooperation between different levels of state administration and CSOs in service provision, for Macedonia, however, with limited impact in political issues. While cooperation between CSOs on issues regarding social services tends to work better than in other fields, several CSO activists regret the still relatively lower impact in all areas but service provision – most blamed it on dependency of foreign funding for political topics – while the state and private funding usually is focused on social services or social projects. While this might seem a “backdoor” entrance for improving the cooperation channels, this is probably true, however, also in this area - the political dimension of social services is frequently very difficult to address or to change if the government does not wish to do so. Further, it was said that training youth in these fields usually causes difficulties for them but little impact on the overall situation. While funding for services/humanitarian issues from
citizens and the government is growing, CSOs rely heavily on IOs for funding for other, political critical, projects.

Several respondents from IOs stated, that they promote civil society’s contribution to service provision and think, common issues are now more important than reconciliation projects, they also support civil society in their cooperation with state administration. IOs considered service oriented projects as frequently more grass-roots oriented and with much potential for sustainable civil society activism. For this, however, it was necessary, as respondents from different groups stated, that IOs and their funding presented a crucial counterweight to the political regime to support civil society’s impact not only on social services but also on politics. Two respondents said with reference to Macedonia, that it was easy and brought good results to train youth in social issues. If youth are trained in politically critical fields they usually face difficulties – or no one is willing to listen to them.

Summarizing, the findings of the interviews show that civil society in both states until today faces significant challenges with regard to overcoming ethno-national (Bosnia-Herzegovina) /ethno-national and political (Macedonia) cleavages, in the general society, in CSOs and in politics. Civil society’s quality in both states further was stated to be a sphere that in many regards positively differed from the broader public – however, many troubles, such as ethno-national/ethno-political divisions, clientelism, etc. applied to civil society just as to the broader society that it is part of. Further, civil society still struggles to assume its functions - including of establishing interest representation vis-à-vis the state (decreasingly so for Bosnia-Herzegovina and only slightly decreasingly so in the case of Macedonia, where the state has an stronger tendency than the state in Bosnia-Herzegovina of currently exerting pressure and control on CSOs and social movements), mitigating overlapping interests, etc. – while recruiting of new leaders and service provision function relatively well, but need to be assessed with caution.

The picture of the actors of external democracy promotion was very diverse, while, however, the European Union institutions are growing in their importance with many other donors fading out their funding, were said to be extremely difficult to access and to apply to. Frequently donors lagged behind the current situation in their program focus, as planning in the EU frequently took so long and then proved quite inflexible; this worried many, particularly the smaller, CSOs. Finally, the overall mechanisms of how to connect civil society to the broader public and thus contributing to general democratic spill-over until today remained a big question to many respondents, even though many of them have been working in the field for many years. Most respondents blamed a general passivity of citizens and their historical (and currently enforced) mistrust of politics as well as a reluctance of politicians to involve the public. While the massive support of civil society apparently has not entirely remedied these challenges, support by external democracy promoters, however, remains crucial as a counterweight to support political criticism and has shown increasing success in certain areas, such as the capacity of certain CSOs to consult with government institutions, of service provision, etc.

6.1.6 The Nexus between Civil Society’s Functions and Regime Hybridity

The socio-political context in both states makes it difficult for civil society to exert positive influence in many of the areas it is supposed to impact - in Bosnia-Herzegovina owed to the federal, weak state system and in Macedonia due to the relatively strong political regime. The strongest limitations for civil society are owed to dependency either on foreign funding or on politically linked domestic funding and clientelism, unclear legal circumstances or unclear procedures for the involvement of civil society, etc. So far, mostly conservative, frequently politically affiliated ethno-nationalist groups, such unions, war veterans, etc. cooperated best with state institutions and frequently were co-opted.

In fact, in both states as of today we find that the majority of potentially dark sides that Lauth (2003) noted apply to civil society and CSOs can be found to

1. aggravate social cleavages (ethnic, etc.),
2. be characterized by fundamental ideological differences,
3. suffer from internal power struggles,
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(4) (to a certain degree) its demand of participation in political decision-making by civil society undermines the democratic logic based on electoral processes,
(5) can transport authoritarian traditions and patrimonial structures.

Nevertheless, overall the democratic experiences of CSOs and the cooperation between the state and civil society has improved over the years – due to trainings that external democracy promoters offered to CSOs and state administration increasing capacity for cooperation on both sides and also due to pressure by IOs to cooperate, and also due to cooperation of CSOs among each other and with partner organizations in many states across the world. However, in both states respondents said that cooperation worked better in fields of social issues and service provision, which were in the interest of the state and that thus also received the largest share of domestic funding. For politically critical CSOs, however, particularly in Macedonia, the situation has become increasingly difficult the more external democracy promoters fade out their funding.

As a consequence, today, many CSOs focus on service provision. Interestingly, service provision is, as in most states, one of the origins of civil society in both states, and also was the first generation of CSOs that developed based on external funding. While service provision is a very important function of civil society, despite its political aspects if CSOs after the fading of external democracy promotion mostly only assumed social services – due to financial and political pressure –, than the assumed positive impact of civil society for democratic consolidation can be assumed to be limited – including with regard to the important functions of monitoring, protection, and advocacy. (Comp. Belloni, Hemmer 2010: 151)

Going back to the theoretical functions of civil society presented in the chapter 2 and comparing the empirical results with the assumed functions of civil society, for both states we find that civil society assumes its theoretical functions to a rather limited extent only – connected to not fully democratically consolidated functioning of the system at different levels and to the ethno-political cleavages within society:

(1) civil society has difficulties to protect itself from stately arbitrariness – underlining the importance of IOs in that regard;
(2) civil society does not really assume a control function, as most government bodies do not cooperate with CSOs or civil society, let alone involve them in decision-making, even more so in Macedonia than in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In both cases, pressure from IOs is stated to support this function to some extent;
(3) the theoretical communication and intermediation role of civil society is limited, as society at all three levels, citizens from different ethno-national groups, the civil society sphere in itself, and the government level are in themselves divided, and also the links between each of the levels are weak (or in some cases too close between CSOs and the government);
(4) to some extent, civil society assumes a socialization function, training youth, teachers, political young leaders, etc. in good inter-ethnic relations and respect, provides trainings in participatory methods and non-formal education, and so forth. On the other hand, civil society’s socialization function is limited, as many CSOs are not really connected to citizens whom they could educate, many CSOs are clientelist and some also run in an autocratic manner, there is a lot of mistrust between different CSOs, and a significant number of CSOs adheres to views that are not always democratic and inclusive and may at times even foster nationalist views.
(5) the communalization function is only partly assumed by civil society – CSOs are frequently not independent but deeply imbedded in the market (of the NGO sector) and dependent on the overall economic situation. The low degree of civic involvement of citizens and threats and attacks from the government in case of critical remarks further result in only a very limited public sphere and room for plurality and expression of opinions.
(6) fostering public discourse is equally difficult for civil society, as the public sphere is limited (see communalization function) and the channels between the different societal levels are either not functioning or characterized by clientelism and hierarchical structures.
6.2 Mixed Effects of External Democracy Promotion on Civil Society’s Democratic Spill-Over

The role and contribution of international organizations with regard to civil society development in both cases and to civil society’s contribution to democratic consolidation can be summarized as a rather mixed picture. It is important to keep in mind that external democracy promotion targets very different but usually specific fields per project or activity – however, in practice the connection to the theoretical functions of civil society is not always systematic, includes certain aspects of one function or of several functions – as in reality the boundaries between different civil society functions, e.g. service delivery and advocacy, are not always clear-cut. (Comp. Paffenholz, Spurk 2006: 16) While several points identified as important by the findings may not be new, until today most of them have not been considered in connection to their implications for democratic consolidation – which I do in the following.

As to evaluating the effect of international organizations to civil society and democratization, it may be characteristic for relations between donors or civil society promoters and recipients or civil society around the world that the first tend to see the “glass as half-full”, focusing on the achievements they supported and the latter tend to see the “glass as half-empty” – seeing all that has not been achieved that they still wish to improve. These views probably then are closely linked with the fact that both, donors and recipients, increasingly control for quality– based on self-evaluation or conducted by contracted companies – a big machine with all actors being interested in showing good results but need for further funding in their area. (Comp. King 2001: 103)

One of the results of this research is a confirmation that quantitative measuring of external democracy promotion is difficult (Santiso 2001: 12–13): while overall democratization in Bosnia-Herzegovina according to e.g. Freedom House is not as advanced as in Macedonia civil society in fact seems to be better off in Bosnia-Herzegovina – also due to massive external democracy promotion. Particularly in advanced democratization before democratic consolidation usually the formal institutions are in place – yet frequently a number of fields lack procedural democratic qualities. This lets me conclude that qualitative approaches of particular target fields of external democracy promotion are more informative of the state of democratic consolidation (comp. (Burnell 2011: 27–28).

6.2.1 Types of Actors of External Democracy Promoters

In general, numerous respondents stated that most big donors cooperated mostly with the largest and most professionalized CSOs. Further, they usually, but not always, were very much focused on working in the capital and neglected smaller cities, and rural areas even more so. Some IOs were also blamed to be biased towards a certain ethnic groups, for instance to mostly work with Albanians and/or Roma and less with Macedonians. Numerous respondents alluded to several categorizations or oppositions:

(1) “old” EU states vs. “young” EU states with a socialist or communist past (mostly Visegrad states, i.e. Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia): smaller states that have a more recent history of socialism/communism are more understanding concerning local concerns regarding transformation, and they fund local NGOs more easily than large EU states.

(2) US agencies & Scandinavia & Switzerland vs. EU-institutions:
Funding by US, and increasingly also by Scandinavian states, is much less bureaucratic, easier to access, and increasingly shifting towards local distribution of funding than extremely complicated and demanding funding procedures of EU. Some respondents noted how continental Europe was rather pragmatic yet not working towards a common goal, while the United States and the United Kingdom were cooperating well.
(3) Private foundations vs. states/international organizations:
As states or international organizations constituted of states are accountable to their citizens who finance them through their tax money, they tend to be more bureaucratic and act more in the interest of their states of origin than private foundations who are more flexible.

6.2.2 Positive Contributions of External Democracy Promotion

Generally, in both states, respondents from IOs were very positive about the contributions of IOs to both, democratization and civil society. According to them, and also according to many persons from CSOs and experts, only the massive support of international organizations to civil society created a larger number of CSOs. While for Macedonia the amounts invested in civil society promotion were not quite as high, IOs are still attributed to have essentially created civil society in Macedonia as we know it today. Also in the field of promoting and supporting civil society in many of its theoretical functions, many international organizations have invested much time and effort. Nevertheless, more experienced CSO activists noted that they wished that IOs had connected their efforts more to the limited number of civic initiatives that had already existed prior to the massive influx of funding. Many respondents expressed frustration that, despite so much (financial) external support for democracy and the proliferation of CSOs in numbers, the democratization but also the (economic) living conditions in both states were still far from Western standards. (Comp. Pasic 2011; Howard 2012: 36) Further, regarding a non-conflictive structure of civil society, organization and networking across existing cleavages, and independence from the state, in both states, the success of external democracy promotion remains limited and strongly determined by the prevailing socio-political structures.

The points that were highlighted as the most important positive contributions by international organizations were: the support for civil society where during Socialist times there was only a very limited tradition of civic self-organization and political criticism, the importance of capacity trainings of CSOs and state administration, and the important counter-weight that IOs provided through their presence in the states as well as through incentives to political elites to cooperate as precondition for increased Euro-Atlantic integration.

Capacity Training Improves Impact of Civil Society

Even though “capacity training” has become another buzzword of the field, and the “seminar mafia” of NGOs frequently attends a high number of conferences, seminars, workshops etc. (compare also Howard 2012), international organizations have significantly and successfully contributed to capacity training to improve organizational skills. The vast amounts of capacity training have trained a certain group of CSO activists in project skills and many important fields for NGO work. Unfortunately, until today many CSOs either have professional skills or a membership base. The increased capacity of CSOs and of the state administration is currently beginning to improve the political impact of CSOs: an increasing number of them are professional enough to be taken serious by political actors who involve them and use their skills and their international contacts to other CSOs and to donors to involve experts in drafting legislation, to implement laws, etc. Particularly with regard to social issues and service provision organizational skills of CSOs help them to aggregate, to formulate, and to represent their interests vis-à-vis state actors.

International Organizations - Corrective to a Weak State and Counterweight to an Over-Powerful State

Very frequently and with much emphasis the importance of IOs as important counter-weight to nationalist politics and on over-powerful state apparatus was underlined – or as authority to improve state capacity and to establish structures for the involvement of civil society where these had not existed. Further, pressure from IOs on the government to improve and implement legislation and consultation processes with civil society were said to be very important. Nevertheless, while many respondents from successful CSOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina underlined the success made in this area,
several, also generally successful, CSOs in Macedonia underlined how the government bypassed international pressure and mostly cooperated with politically affiliated CSOs. Thus, civil society cannot fully assume its “protection” function in both states (comp. also Gellner 1994: 5) – even with the support of IOs only to a limited extent. Also IOs have been promoting civic involvement and capacity of state to involve citizens, they say with success – or that they need to force certain groups to become involved – with limited success.

6.2.3 Negative Contributions of External Democracy Promotion

Regarding both states, but particularly strongly with regard to Bosnia-Herzegovina, there is extensive criticism of the approaches of international organizations in civil society promotion: the criticism mostly regarded how the concept of civil society “travelled” to the Western Balkans – and the civil society should actually relate to the political mobilization potential of the overall society – and not to a “sector” or only small, formally organized share of societal groups. (Compare also Dvornik 2009: 116–117)

**NGOization**

External democracy promoters were blamed to concentrate funding only on large, professionalized, NGOs in the capital, mostly disconnected from the citizens and to be too focused on nice project proposals and reports instead of focusing support on broader, grassroots support. For external actors NGOs have the advantage of being a formal actor with a formal bank account, clear responsibilities, and frequently more professional with calls for applications and reports (and accounting) – yet, as previously illustrated, NGOs frequently lack connections to the broader society. Despite much criticism of the resulting “mushrooming” or “NGOization”, several respondents also noted how currently numbers were decreasing while the professional quality of some CSOs had significantly improved. Several respondents from IOs and experts even regretted that civil society had become so used to large sums of funding, or even become “spoiled”, so that is was rare that anyone attempted activism with prior searching for funding. While the EU is continuously funding democratization and civil society promotion in the Western Balkans, many other donors are leaving the region and thus, funding becomes scarce, NGOs work less profitable, also as legislation for this is unclear and bears potential risks for them, and, finally, also competition over scarce resources increases. (Comp. Chandler 1999: 35)

**Changing Funding Trends and Donor-Driven CSOs**

One point of very frequent and strong point of criticism was that until today external democracy promoters continuously changed their funding lines – and that many CSOs tried to follow these as they depend on the funding – instead of pursuing strategic goals in certain fields. Nevertheless, professional CSOs in both states, as in many states around the world, stated they manage to combine demands and own interests. But, particularly as the many donors are pulling out and the most important share of funding comes from EU-programs, this disadvantages smaller, less skilled, less financially well-off, CSOs, but which are frequently better connected to citizens.

**Lacking Donor Coordination**

One dimension that was frequently mentioned, was, that in Bosnia-Herzegovina since the beginning, an in Macedonia in recent years, donor coordination was insufficient, resulting in overlapping and reproduction of activities. Several respondents from IOs and experts, however, stated that they thought that in most fields, albeit not all, there is some, usually sufficient donor coordination – both states are small and IOs are concentrated on state capitals. So, interview respondents stated, there is donor coordination, maybe task sharing in some areas. However, several persons noted, that it was not easy, that one very important donor, the EU, does not speak with one voice, is very bureaucratic.
and inflexible in their programming. (See also Caruso 2007) IOs were blamed to not sufficiently coordinate among themselves – while this was mostly the case for Bosnia-Herzegovina, several respondents in Macedonia also underlined the exceptionally good cooperation between IOs - that until today however, had somewhat deteriorated, but still seemed sufficient according to respondents from IOs. These points of criticism are not recent - they have been around at least since Chandler’s highly critical book “Bosnia. Faking democracy after Dayton” (1999). The interviews indicate that until today the situation has not really improved. (Compare also Belloni 2001: 163; Živanović 2006: 37 and Howard 2012)

**External Democracy Promotion can Aggravate Civil Society’s Divisions and Clientelism**

Many respondents noted how international organizations through certain practices of intransparent funding or clientelism, IOs have even (unintentionally) fuelled some of the existing division lines – within civil society, between CSOs and between CSOs and the government, creating competition over scarce funding and mistrust among CSOs – undermining efforts of IOs to foster cooperation and networking. Further, external democracy promoters have frequently called for civil society to “speak with one voice” – considering that civil society in Western states per se serves to represent the heterogeneity and different interests in society, this demand seems somewhat out of place – particularly where IOs undermine cooperation between CSOs. Another field that international organizations have been promoting for many years is the identification and training of “young potentials” or “young leaders” – and IOs support young political elites – with skills training and (international) networking, etc. However, as a side-effect, IOs also have exerted strongly negative effects of supporting the careers of several politicians that seem not entirely subscribed to democratic norms, and also IOs are blamed, that through early massive funding of former elites, and by clientelism today, they foster closed networks.

**Successful Social Service Provision – a two-sided Sword for Democratic Consolidation**

With regard to service provision, CSOs in both states in the beginning were supported by IOs to work in humanitarian issues, conflict relief, etc. – so there is a tradition of this and CSOs particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina (comp. Belloni, Hemmer 2010: 150) in parallel with changing funding priorities by donors and CSOs struggle to change their role away from humanitarian towards political topics. While IOs see service provision projects frequently as connected closer to the citizens than other topics, this has also been heavily criticized as (over)liberal approach, relieving the state from its responsibilities and not even holding it accountable in this field (which confirms what Purdue 2007b wrote about the risk of states leaving their responsibilities to citizens): However, in both states, there is increasing domestic funding available for service delivery. Yet, many CSOs prefer not to risk confrontation with the state by involving in critical discourse and prefer less sensitive topics (comp. Belloni, Hemmer 2010: 151) - to what extent this results in increased democratization impact from civil society is not really evident. Some states, e.g. in the field of work against domestic violence for instance, indicate, that in fact there can be increased cooperation and mutual acceptance in certain fields that benefit civil society and improve important fields of the state’s service provision.

**6.2.4 Further Important Aspects of External Democracy Promotion**

A number of important aspects of the influence of external democracy promotion have neither a directly positive or negative impact. They include questions that external democracy promotion has had to deal with, yet for which one direct answer remains difficult and that continue to require constant weighing of possible advantages, disadvantages, goal-conflicts, and side-effects.
Chapter 6: Case Comparison and Theoretical Implications

Economic Aspects of External Democracy Promotion

An aspect repeatedly strongly underlined by the large majority of respondents concerned the economic side of external democracy promotion – the civil society sector developed with significant financial support and has been an important employment market with relatively good salaries. On the one hand, respondents from CSOs were concerned about fading funding, pushing CSOs to cooperate with domestic donors (who frequently are reluctant to fund politically critical work) and the rising share of EU-programs disadvantaged smaller CSOs (who were more closely connected to the public). Respondents from IOs, on the other hand, in contrast noted that in fact there was still relatively much funding available, that it was important to increase the self-reliance of CSOs through increased domestic funding and co-funding. Also, it was said that an increasing number of companies and private persons had enough money to support civil society – but rather contributed to social than to political projects. Moreover, respondents in both states noted that the fading funding led to increase the quality of remaining CSOs through a process of “natural selection”, making the sector less interesting for the purely money-focused, project-based organizations and advantaging a market selection. (Compare also Seifija 2008) The findings from both cases lead to the conclusion that, where external democracy promotion pulls out before the state has been stabilized, as in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or where civil society is strongly limited by the state’s power, as in Macedonia, it is not enough to assure only formal democracy but it needs also support of the procedural aspects of democracy, as otherwise continued democratic consolidation beyond hybridity proves difficult. Unless a credible and accessible incentive is provided that motivates elites to cooperate and reform – as would be a viable perspective for Nato- and EU-membership. Briefly put, as international funding and thus pressure are fading while international integration for both cases has stagnated, elites have changed their strategies to outbidding and competition over domestic resources.

Democratic Formal Institutions vs. Procedures

Closely linked to the always present discussion whether top-down or bottom-up approaches are the most promising for democratization, is the question regarding how civil society can support the procedural functioning of institutions? In both cases, not least thanks to the presence of and pressure from international organizations, the legal code is generally of high quality. Nevertheless, many of the laws are not (sufficiently) implemented, leave room for misuse, political actors abuse their power, checks and balances are undermined sometimes, etc. – Accordingly, civil society’s role in this context is to improve and to demand the functioning of procedural aspects of democracy. This is connected to what Lauth (2010a: 49) for instance underlines: the importance of examining both, formal and informal institutions, when we examine political processes – while it is worth noting that formal institutions are easier to sanction, informal institutions frequently coexist and significantly determine formal institutions. The findings imply that civil society support can positively impact procedural aspects of democracy, even where overall democratization stagnates – however, informal institutions, e.g. clientelistic ethno-political structures, are very influential (Hippler 2004; Mungiu-Pippidi 2006) and difficult to change. International organizations have been blamed to concentrate too much on formal aspects of democracy – for instance international actors frequently insist on consultations between CSOs and the government, but then, it is not sure whether knowingly or not, they ignore that the state cooperates with mostly co-opted CSOs. Which confirms also for both cases, what has been written about a shortcoming of external democracy promotion as too much focused on formal democratic structures than on their real functioning. (Comp. Sztompka 1996: 125; Bliesemann de Guevara, Kühn 2010; Hippler 1994: 11; Król 1995: 37) However, the findings also reveal that it is very crucial to have democratic structures in place – and, where the state is either weak or over-powerful, that international organizations are present to pressure that the rule of the existing laws is respected – a fundamental basis to provide legal certainty for each citizen and for CSOs – which could, eventually, also decrease clientelism as individuals could rely on their own rights instead for relying to collective competition over resources.
Chapter 6: Case Comparison and Theoretical Implications

IOs Promote Cooperation between the State and Civil Society

International organizations promote the cooperation between government and CSOs and strengthen civil society against the government – and also the legal procedures for this, but with limited success regarding the actual functioning. On the one hand, the situation is both states is slowly improving in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Macedonia with highly professionalized CSOs (e.g. Transparency International was mentioned) and pressure for cooperation from IOs was considered to have positive effects: due to growing experience of both CSOs and state institutions and also thanks to trainings by IOs, the cooperation between the state and CSOs is increasing – both sides are becoming more professional. Professional CSOs have in fact become attractive partners for certain political actors – as they have access to donors and partners and linked to them also to funding sources and expertise. Further, cooperation tends to function well at the local level where administration is directly concerned regarding questions of service provision in which they cooperate with CSOs or for which the subcontract CSOs. While most donors, including EU institutions, stress, that CSOs should increasingly cooperate with domestic donors and be funded by these, the result for both cases studies of democratically non-consolidated states is, that results in cooperation in service provision are quite successful – but less so for other fields, that are more directly linked to achieving democratic consolidation. Where state is over-powerful or abuses its power it may instrumentalize CSOs or encroach on them. Thus in Macedonia IOs pressure for cooperation between state and CSOs still is criticized to come too early in the process of democratization: in Macedonia respondents said, that this is not (yet) the time for constructive cooperation with government due to their attacks and low possibility of CSOs to defend themselves – as the rule of law is limited. In this regard IOs constitute an important counterweight against state abuse and as very important counterweight to the (over)powerful state.

External Democracy Promotion and the Ethno-National Dimension

One point of frequent controversy during the interviews was, to what extent international organizations have had a positive or a negative effect on inter-ethnic relations in both states. With regard to Bosnia-Herzegovina the opinions were unequivocally positive regarding that the international community had stopped the war and fostered peace – yet, much criticism was expressed as to how this had been done and of negative repercussions of this. In Macedonia the points of discussion were rather similar: IOs significantly supported and were involved in the design of the peace agreements (the Dayton Peace Accords and the Ohrid Framework Agreement) that until today determine the formal organization of inter-ethnic relations in both states. While these promoted peaceful coexistence, also, since, ethnic, collective and exclusive rights have been an important defining line of most aspects of social and political life. (Comp. exemplarily Hadžidedić 2012 and Vetterlein 2010)

With regard to previous ethnic conflict, for both states, the political logic as a consequence of the DPA and the OFA have had fundamental consequences - until today. For both cases investigated, however, the existing state structures until today foster a tri-ethnic or bi-ethnic state, respectively, instead of a pluri-national state – also excluding other communities from political participation. (Comp. e.g. (Džihić 2005: 19–20 and Bieber 2004) While IOs are frequently blamed to having established irrevocable division lines, IOs have also been massively supporting projects for reconciliation, improving inter-ethnic relations, etc. Also as an experience from the results of approaches that centered on the protection of ethno-national groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia but that since have fostered ethnic outbidding and have been difficult to overcome, it is interesting, how the EU’s documents show increased mentioning of equal individual and human rights – instead of mentioning collective group rights and minority empowerment. (Blomberg 2012)

For civil society less the established quota, but rather, the all-cross-cutting ethnic cleavages coupled with political cleavages at all levels divide society and make cooperation difficult – despite examples of good cooperation at the interpersonal level, political coalitions, or a number of issue coalitions. A significant number of respondents from CSOs, who would like to promote an “ethnically blind” approach, blamed IOs for constantly focusing on ethnicity, thus constantly re-evoking it as a
category of identification and practice (and of eligibility to funding). IOs insist on inter-ethnic cooperation – this works well across national borders – but on the state-level many CSOs have “symbolic” minority members or cooperate for funding but so far mostly on a pragmatic level. Experts suspected that IOs were still so much focused on ethnicity, as they were simply still panicking as they wanted to avoid future inter-ethnic violence at all costs and usually became highly alert at any sign of potential conflict. Other respondents reproached IOs of being too constructivist and not seeing how ethnicity in the Balkans is actually (considered and treated as) a primordial category. Nevertheless, the large majority of respondents agreed, that while the strong interference of IOs in both states was not very much appreciated, the role and presence of IOs as a counterweight to (again increasingly) nationalist (rhetorical) politics, was very important.

**External Democracy Promotion and the Media**

In both states the role of the media was frequently underlined as an important aspect of civil society. In many liberalizing post-socialist states the international community has strongly supported the privatization and diversification of the media, trained critical journalism, etc. The media is attributed an important role with regard to the civil society functions of fostering public discourse, spreading alternative information, and interest representation. Today, however, in both states the situation of the media looks quite bleak: the privatization has led to a monopoly of a few media-owners, who tend to be politically powerful persons with close ties to the government - as, notably, it is also the case for media in most Western states – and political actors frequently use the media and keep critical voices from spreading alternative information. Further, owed to the still difficult economic situation, journalists and media depend on money from either the government or donors, which does not put them in a position to criticize the current situation.

**High Hopes in Euro-Atlantic Integration**

Another important dimension frequently referred to was the (realistic) prospect of EU-and Nato-integration – confirming what research has found about the crucial impact of credible EU accession: Interestingly respondents from both states wished that the EU “sees through their fingers” and applies less strict accession criteria – while respondents from IOs found this idea rather absurd – as the EU had the best leverage prior to accession: As long as political elites in both states see realistic chances of EU-accession, this will be a strong incentive for them to comply with democratic standards, including the involvement of civil society, and it will also be an incentive to cooperate across ethno-political division lines (comp. exemplarily Schimmelfennig, Scholtz 2008; Schimmelfennig 2010: 319, see also Jakobsson Hatay 2005 and Gromes 2009b: 26). Several years of unclear prospect, however, have resulted in increased focus on domestic bargaining chips by political actors and in a rise of clientelism. With e.g. the European Union accession process having lost significant amounts of its previous appeal and with international organizations not disposing of very much political leverage, strategies to deal with this trend so far are scarce. (Schimmelfennig, Scholtz 2008) The same, but on a lower level of incentives and conditionality applies to Nato-accession – that for both states remains unachieved, with Macedonia still entangled in a name dispute with Greece, unsolved despite years of international attempts for mediation.

The following lists summarizes the contributions of external democracy promotion expressed in the interviews:

**positive contributions of external democracy promotion**
- increase skills of CSOs
- constitute an important counterweight against the state’s power abuse

**negative contributions/side-effects of external democracy promotion**
- foster NGOziation and “projectitis”: focus on professionalized, donor-driven NGOs in the urban centers without much contact to citizens, neglecting grassroots CSOs or movements overall but mostly in rural areas
changing funding trends makes CSOs “donor-driven”, impede strategic work of CSOs, and reduces their impact
- lacking donor coordination
- CSOs foster issue coalitions but also increase competition and mistrust among CSOs over (intransparent) funding
- mixed
  - provide funding, build civil society, but fading funding currently increases dependency on unclear domestic funding and lessens chances for funding for politically critical projects – but also leads to natural selection of devoted, professional CSOs
  - IOs do not focus enough on democratic procedures and implementation – for this continued support of civil society is very important
  - IOs foster cooperation between the state and civil society – which is good but frequently they focus on formal procedures and ignore political affiliation and instrumentalization of civil society by the state
  - IOs foster peace and inter-ethnic relations, but also have cemented ethnic group claims and constantly re-emphasize ethnicity as category of action and access to resources – making it a bargaining chip for continued external attention and funding
  - promotion of service provision – important and relatively successful, yet only indirectly linked to democratic consolidation
  - have trained and supported diverse media – yet proved as mostly unsustainable
  - Euro-Atlantic integration could function as important incentive for inter-ethnic elite cooperation – yet stagnation of these processes leads to frustration and increased ethnic-outbidding.

### 6.3 Types of Civil Society in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia and their Impact on Democratic Consolidation

Overall, civil society was found to have developed significant skills and had already successfully promoted democratization, also due to international support. However, democratic spill-over until today falls short off previously prevailing enthusiasm. This, most importantly, is connected to the still dominant cleavages in the socio-political fabric – CSOs are as much divided among themselves, as much as civil society has difficulties to unite different groups of citizens. Moreover, civil society assumes its supposed intermediary function for democracy (comp. e.g. Schmitter 1995a: 1) between the state and the private only to a limited, albeit it seems very slowly increasing, extent - as CSOs are becoming increasingly professional in their cooperation with state institutions, despite still prevailing political affiliation of a high number of CSOs, and as the numbers of civil movements seem to rising, albeit very slowly. Still, a significant number of CSOs and movements were said not to always pursue inclusive and directly democratic values and practices. Nevertheless, the findings that the number of social movements and the political participation of youth are increasing, as well as cooperation between CSOs, although so far functioning better related to service provision, women’s issues and lower political levels, may indicate what several authors noted - that the internalization of democratic norms can take at least one generation – but may be on its way now. (Comp. e.g. Halliday 1995: 217; Sapsin Fine 1996: 566; Talbott 1996: 62)

A number of implications arise from the findings for the so far existing notions concerning the concept of civil society. When comparing to the literature on civil society and abundance of different definitions, respondents usually referred to four different “aggregate” types of civil society: civil society, civic movements, associations, and NGOs (while the last three were frequently summarized under the umbrella term “CSOs”):
(1) **civil society**: the broader society and its theoretical and practical potential to become politically mobilized,

(2) **civic movements** or **society-based organizations**: frequently larger groups of society that are practically politically mobilized, but usually not in a formalized way,

(3) **Associations**: usually formalized groups, that frequently represent a cause of a certain (limited) group of citizens, but usually with a connection to members or persons whose interests they represent,

(4) **NGOs**: formal organizations of citizens, that frequently are self-elected and have a relatively smaller membership base (if any), and who, frequently, represent a hybrid between societal interest representation and income generation for its employees.

While civil society usually refers to the overall (potentially mobilized) population and tends to be rather informal in its organizational structure, the degree of formality as well as the group exclusiveness increase, while at the same time the degree of rootedness in the broader society was said to decrease. However, this is the general observation – nevertheless, at each of these four levels, again, one finds different types of groups that serve different purposes – some more, some less inclusive or democratic-, groups that function more or less according to democratic principles, groups that are government friendly or government critical, etc. This again, has implications for what type of organizations international organizations should target with what type of activity – where aiming at citizens NGOs may not be the best possible and the most effective option.

The interviews reconfirmed that the quality and working purposes of CSOs (with reference to Warren 2004), which were repeatedly stated to be highly important and decisive for the influence but also the legitimacy of the different CSOs. The following table illustrates and summarizes a number of types of CSOs according to their quality and working goals – and how they each then impact politics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation towards</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>donors</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conservative/ service oriented CSOs &amp; political NGOs with IO support</td>
<td>political CSOs without IO support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>state</td>
<td>service oriented/ specialized CSOs/ GONGOs, etc.</td>
<td>CSOs delivering to market niches without good political contacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>citizens</td>
<td>local issue movements for social issues</td>
<td>informal political movements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It would be interesting to further explore the implications of the empirical findings, regarding how certain qualities and purposes or of CSOs certain combinations of these influence the impact of civil society – particularly also when taking into account the sphere, citizens, the state, or donors, there are closest to or dependent on.

Now, when going back to the categories of analysis for civil society’s contribution to democratic consolidation, quality, context, and functions, a good illustration for the actual impact is the model by Lauth (2003), as introduced and discussed in chapter three. In this model, Lauth suggests three types of civil society, with the strategic type being most conducive to liberalization, the reflexive type fostering and the ambivalent type inhibiting the consolidation of democracy.

As presented in the operationalization part of the research, the model was extended by the most important categories found in the relevant literature and existing democracy indices, completed by important additional categories identified during the interview analysis.

Following, the extensive and detailed empirical findings from the case studies are summarized using the categories of the the assessment tool for civil society, developed in chapter three. As explained in the methodological chapter, the table also includes categories identified as most relevant during the interview analysis (the newly included categories are indicated with a “*”). Further, another dimension included in the table, based on the relevance of international organizations identified from the interviews, also shows and contrasts the assessments of how international organizations and their
external democracy promotion influence civil society’s impact on democratic consolidation in the two states.

Summarizing and categorizing the very large amount of data from the interviews, the assessment tool helps to illustrate, at one look, the qualities of civil society, how civil society can and does assume its theoretical functions and the relevant context factors for civil society – and how each of these dimensions impacts a possibly conducive role of civil society during ongoing democratic consolidation.

As, evidently, reality is complex, transition phases and also Lauth’s typology of civil society is based on ideal-types with civil society’s impact on democratic consolidation as so far empirically researched to only a limited extent, the assessment tool may have its shortcomings. Its theoretical foundation and possibility for the characterization of civil society, helps, however, very much to assess and illustrate how civil society’s nature and surrounding can affect the success of democratic transition. Thus, the following table shows how the extensive empirical findings for the two case studies translate into the assessment tool, how civil society in both cases can be compared to the three ideal types of civil society and the role international organizations assume in both cases:
### Chapter 6: Case Comparison and Theoretical Implications

#### Tab. 39: Civil society’s contribution to democratic consolidation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type category</th>
<th>BIH/ IOs</th>
<th>MK/ IOs</th>
<th>Strategic type</th>
<th>Ambivalent type</th>
<th>Reflexive type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase of system change</td>
<td>liberalization</td>
<td>consolidation of democracy</td>
<td>consolidation of democracy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Context of civil society</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*A.1 Origin and patterns of civil society</td>
<td>-/+</td>
<td>-/+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*A.2 Regime type</td>
<td>-/+</td>
<td>-/+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*A.3 Legal situation</td>
<td>+/+</td>
<td>-/+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.4 Readiness of the state to cooperate (previously “cooperation with the state”)</td>
<td>(+)/(+)</td>
<td>(-)/(0)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*A.5 Financial and economic situation</td>
<td>(+)/(0)</td>
<td>-/(0)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*A.6 Societal cleavages</td>
<td>-/0</td>
<td>-/0</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Qualities of civil society</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.1 A non-conflictive structure of civil society</td>
<td>-/(-)</td>
<td>-/(-)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.2 Organizational structure across cleavages</td>
<td>-/(-)</td>
<td>-/(-)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*B.3 Organizational capacity</td>
<td>-/(+</td>
<td>-/(+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*B.4 Independence from the State and from political parties</td>
<td>(+)/(+)</td>
<td>(-)/(0)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*B.5 “Shambolic” civil society</td>
<td>(-)/-</td>
<td>(-)/-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Functions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.1 Control the State’s Power</td>
<td>-/+</td>
<td>-/+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*C.2 Monitoring and Diffusion of Independent Information</td>
<td>(+)/(+)</td>
<td>(-)/+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*C.3 Aggregation, Articulation, and Representation of Interests</td>
<td>(+)/+</td>
<td>(+)/+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*C.4 Mitigation of Overlapping Interests across Particular Interests</td>
<td>+(+/</td>
<td>(+)/+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*C.5 Diffusion and Socialization of the Importance of Civic Virtues</td>
<td>+/+</td>
<td>(+)/+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*C.6 Stimulate Political Participation of Citizens</td>
<td>+(+/</td>
<td>(-)/+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.7 Recruiting of new Leaders</td>
<td>(+)/+</td>
<td>+/+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.8 Service Provision</td>
<td>+/+</td>
<td>+/+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of matches with types of civil society</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSC: BIH 10/ MK 10</td>
<td>ACS: BIH 9/ MK 15</td>
<td>RCS: BIH 12/ MK 6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average contribution of IOs</td>
<td>14x+/2x0/4x-</td>
<td>12x+/4x0/4x-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the table illustrates, an approximation for both cases shows mixed results and civil society cannot be entirely characterized to entirely belong to one of the ideal types of civil society. However, the results clearly show differences between civil society in both states:

For Bosnia-Herzegovina’s civil society the highest number of assessments was found to be similar with qualities of civil society of the ‘reflexive type’, that is, 12 out of 18 characteristics and functions were rated similarly as described for the reflexive type, that in its pure form positively contributes to consolidation. The role of international organizations in Bosnia-Herzegovina appears to be slightly more positive than that in Macedonia, although significant criticism, particularly with regard to the dealing with civil societal divisions and a state that has a tendency to ignore or instrumentalize civil society.

For Macedonia, civil society the clearly highest resemblance with the ‘ambivalent type’ of civil society, with 15 out of 18 categories being assessed as corresponding to the type, possibly indicating, that on the verge of democratic consolidation, civil society there may face significant challenges – as the analysis of the empirical findings has clearly illustrated. The role of international organizations and
their activities in Macedonia were stated to clearly have a clearly mostly, but not only, positive effect on democratic consolidation and civil society’s contribution to that.

Civil society in both states, nevertheless, also bears many resemblances with the ‘strategic type’ of civil society – likely indicating, that for both, the political system and for civil society, the moment of reaching democratic consolidation has not been fully achieved and requires significant further efforts and investment.

The assessment of both cases with the instrument illustrates the fields of achievements and remaining challenges for civil society. It shows, however, also the limits of the model for the assessment of practical civil society – as the pure types of civil society usually cannot be found in realities of hybrid regimes or defective democracies where the context and qualities of civil society strongly determine the possibility of democratic spill-over – but it is very useful to take into account a more nuanced picture of civil society, its functions and the resulting impact.
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS: CONDUCIVE AND LIMITING FACTORS FOR CIVIL SOCIETY’S DEMOCRATIZING CONTRIBUTIONS

This final chapter summarizes and highlights the main findings from this dissertation. First, the main findings are underlined and then analyzed with regard to their implications for the theoretical state-of-the-art. Subsequently, a final conclusion concerning the research question of the investigation is drawn and remaining or newly discovered promising fields for future investigation are presented. The chapter continues with suggesting practical implications of the research conducted and closes with a discussion of possible transfer and generalizations of the results. The aim of this research has been to integrate newly collected empirical data with the aim to allow for inference in the field of civil society and its promotion through external democracy assistance – also aiming to shed light on the so far not sufficiently investigated internal-external nexus of external democracy promotion. Data analyzed based on theoretical categories was used to develop existing theory with regard to the field under investigation – as the field of civil society activities is rather dynamic and as much tacit knowledge from the practical field have not been systematically analyzed.

7.1 Research Findings: How Ethno-National Divisions and External Democracy Promotion Affect Civil Society’s Democratic Spill-Over

This section presents the final result of the research with regard to the research goals formulated at the beginning: the results for the previously formulated theory-based expectations that guided the investigation are assessed in order to answer the main research question

\[
\text{Does the scale of previous ethno-national conflict influence civil society's contribution to democratic consolidation and can external democracy promotion positively contribute to this?}
\]

and to examine the underlying hypothesis:

\[
H_1: \text{The higher the scale of previous ethno-national conflict the more negative the effect on civil society's fulfillment of its theoretically assumed functions to contribute to democratic consolidation - even with the support of external democracy promotion.}
\]

Structured according to the theoretical expectations formulated at the beginning of the research process, the following subchapters briefly outline the main findings:

7.1.1 Limited Possibilities of Civil Society in Hybrid Regimes and Divided Societies

Theoretical expectation (1): According to theoretical research and indices for measuring civil society and democracy, civil society significantly contributes to democratic consolidation through numerous important functions and mechanisms.

A Democratization dilemma exists for civil society and democracy promoters: The theoretically assumed democratizing functions of civil society are particularly important – and particularly challenging - in the context of incomplete democratic consolidation: different parts

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272 These findings were presented and discussed during a conference at the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation on 20 September 2012. A large number of researchers and persons working in the context of external democracy promotion in many different post-socialist but also in other states stuck on the way towards democratic consolidation confirmed that these findings also applied to their working reality.
of the political regime tend to not (yet) be fully democratic (such as low civic engagement, corruption, clientelism, etc.), which hamper the structural possibilities for civil society to become active and have effect.

For civil society it is not only difficult to impact change in a given society, but it also poses a twofold challenge to CSOs: to adapt and spread new values and positions while the majority of the population may be of different opinions, and secondly, to keep up certain values and norms, for instance of democratic procedures and values, when most of the society acts according to a different logic. It is not farfetched that though persons are active in civil society, they are nonetheless embedded in the larger society, interacting with it, and as civil society actors wish to cooperate in various fields (private, business, political, etc.), at times they can only but chose to apply certain social and political rules and appeal to gain support by appealing to dominant views in their culture – even if these may be not altogether supportive of democratization at times. In practice civil society’s democratizing functions and the degree of democratization represent a vicious circle: certain conditions common in non-consolidated states, such as a lack of the rule of law, authoritarian government, low civic engagement, etc. hamper civil society’s democratizing abilities, so that, in turn civil society cannot develop or not really assume its theoretical functions.

There are many positive examples of CSOs becoming increasingly successful and skilled, assuming certain democratizing functions, influencing legislature, monitoring the government, implementing projects, etc. However, in both states, it was said, that this was much more possible in fields that were not critical of the government’s policies, notably in areas of social service provision. In both cases civil society was found to have become more professional and to have had impact on various aspects. Nevertheless, the overall impact on both, citizens and on politics and thus on democratic consolidation in general, remain limited, particularly with regard to the functions of socialization in civic virtues (Tocqueville) as well as of the mitigation of conflicts and bridging particular interests (Putnam) - also, as civil society is not always entirely democratic in itself. (Comp. Belloni, Hemmer 2010: 151)

The vicious circle in which civil society finds itself in defective democracies seems extremely hard to break. Where state institutions are not willing to cooperate or even co-opt CSOs or encroach on them, and where low embeddedness or rootedness in society limits broader support, civil society’s democratic possible pressure on politics is limited. Even with massive support by external democracy promotion, in both states civil society has become a “paper tiger” – much praised in programs and reports, however, with little connection to citizens and with little impact on actual politics. With the state ignoring or even suppressing critical CSOs, the often mentioned support and counterweight from international organizations, that is currently decreasing, remains very important, as the positive influence of the stronger external democracy promotion in Bosnia-Herzegovina indicates.

7.1.2 Societal Divisions Inhibit or Inverse Civil Society’s Democratizing Functions

Theoretical expectation (2): The more ethno-national violence a state has faced, the more challenging democratic consolidation is for that state.

→ Ethno-political cleavages concern more than only post-conflict states: Currently prevailing division lines, such as ethno-political divisions or clientelism, determine more strongly the fostering or impeding factors for democratic consolidation and regime hybridity than does the degree of previous ethnically framed violence.

In general, previous ethno-national violence presents a particular challenge for democratization – particularly, as frequently in the aftermath formerly warring parties remain important political or social actors and veto-players. Despite all good theory, de facto, international organizations in their interventions can only deal with the de facto existing domestic factors, including prevailing power constellations. Thus, frequently structures that dominated during and at the end of inter-ethnic violence become institutionalized – as was the case with the peace-agreements signed in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia – and as is the case in many other post-conflict states around the world, e.g. Iraq, Sudan, etc.
Chapter 7: Conclusions: Conducive and Limiting Factors for Civil Society’s Democratizing Contributions

While overall democratization in Bosnia-Herzegovina can be observed to stagnate since 2007, also based on ethnicized politics, in both states ethno-political, but, interestingly, also economic cleavages, strongly hamper democratization and successful democratic consolidation. So for the present comparison, it is less the characteristic of being a “post-conflict state” but of being a “divided society” which hampers democratic processes, stronger than the potential impact of civil society – and there are many deeply divided states among the many defective democracies and hybrid regimes. In fact, the higher scale of ethnic violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina triggered the enormous amount of funding that was invested in the overall democratization and into civil society.

The findings indicate, that, contrary to research that has found that the amount of external democracy promotion cannot be clearly correlated with democratic progress (Schimmelfennig, Scholtz 2010), in fact, cultural traits proved “sticky” (comp. Wheatley, Zürcher 2008) even if not a primordial approach to culture is applied, and the formal implementation of democratic institutions can still be undermined by a lack of application (Freyburg et al. 2009) – and by procedural undemocratic practices.

Theoretical expectation (3): Against the background of past ethno-national violence, “uncivil” parts of civil society tend to negatively impact ethno-national cleavages, thus inhibiting democratic development.

→ It is not the number of NGOs but the democratic quality of the overall system that makes the difference: Particularly states in which the democratic “rules of the game” as well as the access to political power and other resources are still contested, civil society organizations usually mirror existing conflict lines, are embedded in clientelistic networks and can assume many of their theoretical functions to a limited extent or not at all.

The findings suggest that an ethno-politically divided, non-consolidated context civil society is not an independent, positive, democratic sphere but rather mirrors the existing society. Despite important exceptions, many CSOs were found to be mono-ethnic. While there are many CSOs working in the field of improving inter-ethnic relations with success on the interpersonal level, the overall impact on the societal cleavages remains tedious and difficult, further complicating the impact of CSOs. Mistrust, also based on political and ethno-national affiliation and competition strongly inhibit most of civil society’s theoretical functions (notably control the state’s power, monitoring and diffusion of independent information, aggregation, articulation, and representation of interests, mitigation of overlapping interests across particular interests, diffusion and socialization of civic virtues, recruiting of new leaders) and also strongly determine civil society with regard to its qualities (non-conflictive structure, organizational structure across cleavages, organizational capacity, independence from the state and political parties).

Until today, there has been little systematic analysis regarding the effect of civic education on inter-ethnic relations (with the exception of a recent study by Finkel & Horowitz that suggests a positive effect of civic education on an individual level 2012: 63–64). Most respondents working in this field - CSO activists, persons from international donors, and also participants in civic education - not surprisingly also expressed that they were convinced of the positive effect of their work in civic education, particularly with regard to improving inter-ethnic relations – many also gave convincing practical examples of individual changes in attitude. However, the findings suggest that individual impact was very difficult to translate to a broader improvement of general improved inter-ethnic relations. Still it can be assumed that longer civic education through CSOs does show an impact in attitudes and behavior on the individual level.
7.1.3 External Democracy Promotion Visibly Boosts Civil Society’s Democratizing Functions and Effects

Theoretical expectation (4): External democracy promotion can foster civil society’s contribution to democratic consolidation by supporting civil society’s democratic functions and internal democratic structures across ethno-national divisions.

- **External democracy promotion can positively affect the quality and the influence of civil society**: External democracy promotion can significantly exert positive influence on the democratic functions of civil society. While supporting civil society activities fosters the qualities and functions of civil society, overall democratic consolidation of the political system strongly depends on the support, presence, and incentives by international organizations and their positive effects on the political elites.

- **If external democracy promoters pull-out before democratic consolidation is reached, they risk democratic reversal**: Where external democracy promotion pulls out before completion of democratic consolidation, undemocratic practices of state- and non-state actors can hamper civil society’s possible positive contribution, e.g. in fields of contested interests, and block continued consolidation.

- **External democracy promotion can assume an important corrective function in non-consolidated states**: External democracy promotion is of particular importance in hybrid regimes in order to provide a counterweight to an over-powerful state. This can serve as a crucial precondition that allows civil society to assume its theoretical functions – otherwise critical civil society can be driven back and the state can support and co-opt politically uncritical civil society organizations.

Both cases investigated show that even where the entire range of democratic formal institutions is in place and also where incentives or even control from the international community are high, still, significant procedural shortcomings can be very stable and serve political elites to exercise power and continue undemocratic practices. This confirms what e.g. Schedler (2002: 36), Levitsky, Way (2010: 15) and (Linz 2000: 34) write, how the democratic deficits of hybrid regimes draw a distinction line with formally and procedurally democratic regimes. Until today, in both cases the impact of so-called “communist legacies”, such as mistrust in politics, etc., prevails and continues to stand in the way of larger mobilization of civil society (comp. e.g. Sztompka 1996 and Howard 2003).

Nevertheless, in both states it is not only civil society’s heritage, but mostly the combination of this with current political practices of nationalist, authoritarian politicians, that hamper general political engagement of citizens. Until today: a “lack of fit” between formal institutions and political culture blocks democratic consolidation. (Comp. also Sztompka 1996: 119) Also, in both states, clientelistic and patrimonial structures continue to impede the procedural side of the existing democratic institutions – one of the factors particularly conducive for regime hybridity (comp. Merkel et al. 2003: 66; Merkel 2010: 40) – and a factor that can be found in many of post-socialist states, which until today are more likely to become hybrid regimes than to achieve democratic consolidation. (Comp. McFaul 2002; Alexander 2008: 928 and Emerson, Noutcheva 2004: 12)

External democracy promotion has significantly contributed to the numerical and qualitative increase of civil society organizations – notably in the fields of service provision and organizational and other work capacities of CSOs. International support is significantly accountable for that civil society in both states today is so well-trained and active, and, also with the support of international organizations, assumes a certain impact on politics and the government via consultation processes, monitoring, advocacy, etc. On the other hand, however, international organizations today as well are strongly blamed for having influenced a certain form of “NGO sector” instead of a “real civil society” with more connection to citizens and a broader political mobilization of the public and without being able to connection to previous forms of civil society that existed prior to the massive international support. This is also owed to mistrust of citizens in political involvement – and also to current autocratic behavior of political actors in both states who frequently ignore or block civil society (comp. Gellner 1994: 5). In this regard, the support from international organizations was frequently underlined as important counterweight to power abuse from politicians. Further, despite much disillusionment,
much hope is still set in international politics, mostly EU- and Nato-integration, to foster overall democratization via increased control of the government and for fostering inter-ethnic cooperation on all levels, notably politics.

Concluding, it can be said, that even as recent research cannot detect a direct correlation between external democracy promotion and overall democratization, support of civil society can be found to significantly contribute to improving certain functions of civil society, although, with existing impact, yet at a lower level, as was expected at the beginning of the “civil society boom”. Interestingly, the massive support of civil society seems to have resulted in a “better” civil society, with regard to its functions and impact, in Bosnia-Herzegovina than in Macedonia – while the overall democratization in Bosnia-Herzegovina is assessed as not as democratic in Macedonia (Freedom House 2011) and the qualities of civil society for both states are rated as equal. (USAID 2011) The findings strongly indicate that the massive presence and support of external democracy promotion in Bosnia-Herzegovina, combined with a relatively weaker state apparatus were a more favorable condition to increase civil society’s impact than a lesser extent of pressure by external democracy promotion on a relatively stronger state apparatus in Macedonia – that until today exerts pressure on civil society, co-opts CSOs or simply ignores them.

7.2 Possible Transfer and Generalizations of the Findings

This section, with all due awareness of the possibilities and limits connected to the research methods used for the investigation, suggests to what extent the most important factors involved in the case selection and the empirical proceeding allow for generalizations to similar contexts. The data collected is composed of subjective opinions, that, however, through the high number of interviews and additional background conversation and also through the method of data triangulation do provide solid base to indicate plausible explanations and conclusions of the theoretical field under investigation. This is also interesting, because so far no data exists that investigates the connection between both, external democracy promotion and civil society, and civil society’s theoretically assumed contribution to democratization. So this research project allows identifying commonly held assumptions and explanatory factors of these that agree with or contradict current theoretical assumptions and allows formulating plausible conclusions.

7.2.1 Linking Civil Society’s Democratizing Functions, Qualities, and Context

It seems as though the developments of civil society from both case studies can actually be generalized to apply not only to the larger field of externally promoted civil society, but in fact to the larger logic of the general current development of civil society, including Western states. This allows two conclusions: civil society is internationally so well connected that many trends lamented with regard to civil society promotion and blamed on the policies of Western states need to be seen in relation to a broader field of logic of civil society’s functioning, and, furthermore, the ideal image of civil society in the West also probably needs to be reconsidered when applying standards to civil society promotion.

Civil society’s development in both states, and in fact also in many other Western Balkan, post-communist/-socialist states, and also many other states around the world have been strongly influenced by support of external democracy promotion. Many points of criticism expressed with regard to civil society and how it is supported are blamed on the way Western international organizations have been approaching their support of domestic civil societies, e.g. that civil society is donor-oriented and has little connection to the broader public, that funding of civil society is too scarce for CSOs to really impact politics, politicians ignore demands from CSOs, etc. Yet, civil society in most Western states today faces the same challenges and frequently is blamed for similar shortcomings –
many Western associations and NGOs are dependent on (currently decreasing) international funding - also increasingly from the European Union’s programs that are difficult to apply for -, many Western CSOs serve as employers for (young) activists, and civil society in many Western states is divided between professional lobby groups focused on either a broader membership base or politics – rarely both, frequently also regretting their limited impact on politics while a few CSOs well connected to politics strongly impact policies.

The difficult economic context in both states represents a particular challenge of civil society’s democratic spill-over: citizens who do not have time and are usually organized around their families, for civil society who have little funding from citizens or companies, and only in certain fields, that is the same for state funding in both states. Currently fading external funding has the result that CSOs are worried about their salaries – there is increasing domestic funding but mostly limited to services, associations such as sports clubs, etc. and politically affiliated organizations such as war veterans, unions, etc. – thus funding for corrective function of CSOs is increasingly difficult to find.

In general, it seems that the civil society can mostly assume its positive spill-over on the individual level, maybe also on groups to organize themselves, while, however, the impact on the overall societal, i.e. civil societal, level remains limited, as well as the impact on the overall political situation. (Finkel et al. 2012) The broader public remains passive, not only for historical but also for current reasons – with an indication that the readiness for civic involvement is increasing, as a small number of social movements show – possibly indicating that after one generation democratic practices start to become established. (Comp. Halliday 1995: 217; Sapsin Fine 1996: 566; Talbott 1996: 62; Chandler 1999: 13, 29; Dahrendorf 1990: 99.) The slowly increasing number of social movements may in fact also be part of a more global phenomenon: anecdotal evidence across many post-communist/socialist states, including Russia, Georgia, etc., indicates this may in fact a more general phenomenon – also present in many Western states. In a context of authoritarian backlash, however, such as e.g. Russia or Belarus are currently facing, these movements have difficulties of mobilizing larger parts of the population.

Overall, civil society has developed in certain fields (as organizational skills, advocacy, etc.) And even while many factors are accountable for the democratic development of the Western Balkan states, however, in certain areas, such as advocacy for certain issues or assuming their watchdog function, civil society in some fields did positively affect democratic functioning to a certain extent. (Howard 2012: 42) Yet, where the links between CSOs, between CSOs and citizens, or between CSOs and the government are concerned, these in general are quite weak, or as is the case with (again growing) political affiliation, too strong.

One highly interesting development since conducting the interviews has been that an increasing number of IOs have integrated doubts about civil society’s “magic” abilities into their programs, a number of them shifting support towards political society, e.g. political parties. Findings from the interviews however, suggest, that many of the persons involved in party politics are particularly difficult to unite across social (including ethno-national) cleavages and that young (potential) leaders from these groups in fact tend to be hardliners for opportunistic reasons of ethnic outbidding serving their career purposes.

### 7.2.2 Inherited or New Societal Divisions and Civil Society’s Democratic Spill-Over

Democratization in both states has stagnated since 2006/07 - this may be connected to fading incentives by the EU but also to domestic processes of elections, etc. – and that in 2007 despite clear declarations of potential EU-accession perspective for all Western Balkan states the beginning of the so-called “enlargement fatigue” of the EU began to become visible. Very possibly, the EU accessions of Croatia in July 2013 might lead to new dynamics – it is not clear, however, to what extent these will have a positive effect on the larger Western Balkan region, particularly regarding the future development of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

During the interviews many respondents stated they hoped that EU accession would foster democratization – while in most cases, conditionality of accession had the strongest leverage, and
when taking into consideration political and economic problems in Greece, Hungary, Italy, etc., it is rather questionable whether states will be accepted where, despite institutional democratization, procedural aspects of democracy are not or no longer truly assuring democratic functioning of all parts of the political system.

As theoretically assumed also the findings of this research suggest that an ethno-politically context proves difficult with regard to democratization. The constellation of ethnic polarization of a few large ethno-national groups has a strongly negative effect. (Comp. e.g. Collier 2001; Collier, Hoeffler 2004; Esteban et al. 2012b, 2012a; Montalvo, Reynal-Querol 2005; Reilly 2000 and Cederman, Girardin 2007.) – Smaller ethnic communities are in fact frequently excluded from this process and disadvantages. The current virulence of societal divisions in fact seems to be not directly correlated to the degree of actually occurred ethno-national violence. Rather, currently existing formal institutions conducive for veto-playing and ethnic outbidding, but also informal institutions based on clientelistic networks and inter-ethnic competition and mistrust hamper the democratic procedures. This limits democratic consolidation not only on the state level but it also makes it more difficult for civil society to unite different interests of citizens – and also of different CSOs that united would possibly have more political impact, but who are frequently reluctant to cooperate.

Not surprisingly, scarce resources, notably connected to economy and employment, further aggravate divisions and competition – which can be found to prevail in a majority of hybrid regimes. The findings further show that democratization is not an automatic trajectory: also owed to decreasing financial means of Western external democracy promotion, of erosion of a role model image of EU and USA in their politics and economy, and for states with prospect for joining the EU so much time has passed and still the economy and politics do not seem to have improved in the view of most citizens which causes significant frustration and increased competition.

The context and qualities of civil society as well as how civil society can and does assume its theoretically attributed functions are strongly connected to potential “dark sides” of civil society – and civil society’s possible low or even negative impact on democratic consolidation. As discussed in the theory chapters, particularly divided civil society can hamper democratization and even block democratic consolidation. (comp. e.g. Zmerli 2008; Belloni 2009, 2001) While civil society’s dark sides in hybrid regimes have been assessed for (post-)conflict societies (Paffenholz 2009a; 2010; Paffenholz, Spurk 2006), it has not been examined for defective democracies in particular.

What applies to civil society’s dark sides and negative qualities in developing countries in Latin America, as for instance non-autonomy, and general fragmentation and particularly violent fragmentation (comp. Zinecker 2007: 1), also can be found to apply also to non-consolidated states with more favorable conditions - the two cases in the Western Balkans that were examined. For these, despite massive external democracy promotion, the vicinity to the European Union, assumed to have positive effects such as spill-over, socialization, EU-incentives, economic ties, etc., many of the problems identified for civil society in other hybrid regimes or defective democracies also apply – and not be limited to post-socialist states as e.g. McFaul (2002: 221) suggests: many NGOs are donor-driven (Santiso 2001: 163), a strong NGOization (Stubb 2007: 220–221) has taken place and “projectomania” (Seifija 2006: 134) is the dominant form of civil society activity. Thus not only in hybrid regimes in “developing countries”, for instance in Latin America, civil society is fragmented and not autonomous. (Comp. Zinecker 2007) – Accordingly broader generalizability of this finding can be assumed, but, however, would require further investigation.

The context that civil society has to deal with in both cases can be found in many hybrid regimes where the government limits or even cuts back freedoms and involvement of civil society, for instance in Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, or other states in which we find increased cooptation of CSOs – and increasingly harsh regulations to limit foreign funding of CSOs. Both cases examined display shortcomings with regard to most of Diamond’s criteria for democracies discussed in the theory chapter: the power of the executive is not fully constrained, certain groups (ethnic minorities) are de facto disadvantaged in the political process, many associations are closely linked to political parties, freedom of the media is constrained to a certain extent – mostly through self-censorship or political affiliation, particularly in Macedonia certain politically critical opinions are difficult to express, the judiciary’s independence is not always fully guaranteed, and, finally, the rule of law is not always
Chapter 7: Conclusions: Conducive and Limiting Factors for Civil Society’s Democratizing Contributions

implemented or sometimes even abused by political actors. (Comp. Diamond 1996: 23–24; Merkel 2010: 37–38; Croissant, Thiery 2000; Levitsky, Way 2010) An important number of these states seem to have settled in this state of hybridity. But even beyond, a number of supposedly liberal/consolidated democracies that have already accessed the European Union, show signs of erosion of formal democratic institutions, as we see for instance concerning clan-politics (e.g. in Greece), extreme political competition (e.g. in Romania), or the undermining of checks and balances (e.g. in Hungary). The particular constraints of procedural democratic shortcomings of parts of the political regime can be assumed to represent similar challenges and limits with regard to how civil society can and does assume its theoretical functions and how this spill-over into democratic consolidation.

7.2.3 Positive, Negative and Tolerated Effects of External Democracy Promotion of Civil Society

All of the Western Balkan states received comparable, massive international assistance to NGOs and all of the states today have a stronger and more diverse civil society than before the 1990s. (Comp. Howard 2012: 37) Many phenomena encountered for the cases investigated, such as political passiveness of the broader society, autocratic behavior of the government, etc., can in fact be found in many post-communist or post-socialist states – but also in many hybrid regimes where the situation of civil society is rather similar: a high degree of NGOization, also connected to civil society either focusing on activism rooted in a larger movement or professionalism, and correspondingly better connection to “the public” or to politics, or dependency on international funding and thus being donor-driven, or CSOs without much membership base organizing international seminars for always the same target groups. Thus the developments in the cases examined in these regards may in fact be a problem of the “template” of civil society and the logic of the entire field that was transported to the democratizing states – as practice and as shortcomings of the practical realization of civil society that fosters democratic consolidation.

In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the (currently fading) support by international organizations represents a very important counterweight that is not quite as effective in Macedonia where the international presence has never been so strong. The continued support of international organizations is highly important if civil society is to assume a participatory and corrective role (as watchdog, as advocacy actor, etc.). While cooperation between state and CSOs is functioning increasingly well in service provision fields, democratically critical activities very much benefit from the international attention to the doings of the government and represent an important counterweight – particularly during times of when democratization stagnates or even autocratic backlash – which not only applies in the two cases under investigation, but in many more states believed to be on the democratization trajectory, such as Russia, Kazakhstan, etc.

There are important additional reasons for the mixed results of external democracy promotion, present in many hybrid regimes and recipient states of external democracy promotion: Frequently a lack of knowledge of the local situation on behalf of the IOs is deplored. Many conversations also suggest, that in fact all those involved, IOs, CSOs, state politicians, may at times implement programs without fully taking into account all possible, and sometimes occurring, negative, consequences. However, particularly with regard to civil society in both states, it is plausible to conclude that all actors involved are aware that they work in the logic of a certain field, in which actors at all levels cooperate to a certain degree in order to implement their work goals: IOs promote democracy, CSOs receive funding and implement projects, and governments comply (to a certain degree) with democratic procedures. Some of these acts may be “faked” or “shambolic”. But both, IOs as well as CSOs, are constrained either by their working realities or are so embedded in their organization and in the field of interaction between IOs and civil society, that cooperating, “writing nice reports”, knowing about shortcomings in the implementation, needing to spend annual budgets, etc. are simply “part of the game” – as they are in many other fields of work in which processes are
not always perfect but where actors become established and interact according to their possibilities and limits in the field.

As a consequence, eventually, it can be assumed that socialization in new values is supported, which may become adapted to local context, e.g. of passing on chances and activism onto close kin or friends or of how advocacy is possible in certain networks mostly. Even if this then will have, for the time being, limited effects on broader society, there is strong evidence that important actors of change are trained and that a broader potential for activism and political involvement is established, as recent broader protests have shown in both cases under investigation, but also in many other states, such as Ukraine in early 2014. Finally, the contacts between most actors are frequent so it is highly plausible, that actors in the field are quite aware of the working realities of their counterparts and frequently continuously outweigh the advantages and disadvantages in this context.

7.3 Identified New Research Questions and Limits of this Study

As in most cases, also in this dissertation new insight is coupled with new questions. This section highlights questions that were excluded from the investigation, presents the questions that arose during the research process, and discusses fields identified promising for further investigation. As until today little data existed to say more about civil society’s impact to democratic consolidation and the role of external democracy promotion in this regard, for this research endeavor I chose a comparative approach based on a huge amount of data. For further investigation, different approaches, such as a network analysis (excluded also due to inaccessibility of data), a discourse analysis on particular aspects of this research, or a large-n study on causal relationships regarding the field (which, however, as approach has also been heavily criticized in the context of e.g. Finkel et al. 2007 and 2008) could be interesting. The selection of participants may risk to generate subjective results – which, however, the cross-case comparative approach and the theory-based analysis have strongly limited, allowing for plausible conclusions about the field of research. It would possibly have been interesting to include society based organizations and social movements in this study, yet many statements indicate that the main points regarding them have been considered during the analysis – such as their stronger membership base, frequent better inter-ethnic exclusion where social service are concerned but also frequent stronger ethnic exclusivity or conservatism (e.g. of sports associations, hunters associations, etc.).

Regarding the research focus of the dissertation, it would have been very interesting to research more about the role of social capital and the impact that civil society may and does actually assume with regard to bonding, bridging, and linking capital – concepts tightly linked to several of civil society’s theoretical functions (such as the mitigation or the representation of interests) but also regarding the (limited) connection between CSOs and society or the state respectively. With more resources it could also have been interesting to take into account a larger number of case-studies to further explore the role of different inter-ethnic constellations (polarization, dominance, fragmentation, etc.) or to research how inter-ethnic cleavages are or are not mobilized in hybrid regimes and their civil societies.

Another field that could offer interesting insight is that frequently practitioners and researchers of external democracy promotion or civil society are very interested in “good practices” or “bad practices” – as the investigation has shown, the complex field under investigation makes such conclusions difficult to formulate. However, it would be interesting in the future to research more systematically about what type of civil society organization external democracy promoters should target depending on the function and effect and for what addressees – and how all of this ought to be sequenced during particular stages of democratization. An additional comparative perspective for this, regarding a comparison between different regions, such as hybrid regimes in different regions of the world, or a comparison between civil society’s functions and their impact in post-socialist and Western states, could also prove highly interesting. One more field that could provide interesting insight would
be to compare the approaches and effects of different external democracy promoters. While in the practical context external democracy promoters dispose of much tacit knowledge about many of these fields, is frequently not very systematic and theoretical research knows little about this as of now.

7.4 Closing Remarks

Looking at the situation around the world today, we find the large number of states that formally state to adhere to democratic principles yet who eschew important procedural democratic aspects. Many of them display similar phenomena as the cases under investigation: a struggling civil society, a state that ignores or limits civil society demands, decreasing means from external democracy promotion or a rent-seeking-system from money from international donors going to both, state institutions and civil society organizations. Recent events, among them the “Euromaidan” in Ukraine in early 2014 and also civic protests in Bosnia-Herzegovina and to a certain extent in Macedonia beginning in February 2014, show that after almost 25 years of democratic and economic transition citizens are highly discontent with the situation and with their governments and how they are perceived to ignore their citizens’s needs.

Concluding it can be said that the “strength” of civil society, frequently measured by the number of registered NGOs, is far less reliable an indicator for civil society’s democratic spill-over than the quality of CSOs (USAID 2011) - to which external democracy promotion can positively contribute - and also the inclusiveness (Howard 2012; Warren 2004; Seifija 2008) and the impact through connection to both, citizens and government (comp. e.g. Howard 2003 and Dvornik 2009) – where external funding risks to undermine the actual connection yet can also support capacity for cooperation. External democracy promotion can significantly contribute to professionalizing civil society and it can also improve weak state structures or provide a counterweight to an over powerful state. While civil society engagement connect to social service provision in both states proves to have significantly improved (regarding inter-ethnic cooperation, cooperation between state, society, and CSOs including domestic funding, etc.) funding by external democracy promoters remains important in other, politically more critical fields.

However, the increased capacity of civil society also indicates that with advanced capacity civil society can become increasingly professional – at least in both cases seems that decrease numbers of CSOs but more professional which in turn also positively affects how CSOs are able to cooperate with state administration, also because their skills are important resources for political actors, e.g. for drafting legislation, implementing laws, etc. While it is understandable that after some time external democracy promoters decrease their funding and shift (funding) responsibility towards domestic actors, the increased need for domestic funding increases dependence of CSOs on political actors – and where strong clientelism and corruption there is a risk of losing ground of civil society development; as it is already happening with regard to the media for instance.

It remains crucial that external democracy promotion pays closer, possibly somewhat more, attention to potential negative side-effects of their measures – not only where dilemmas (peace-building and minority protection vs. democratic structures mitigating across ethno-national cleavages) are obvious - but also that they consult with experts coming from the different aspects of measures to be implemented – which is not always the case. Further, as external democracy promotion frequently decreases funding after reaching a certain, advanced degree of democratization, which is frequently still before complete democratic consolidation, credible incentives prove to remain an important criterion for domestic elites to motivate them to cooperate instead of seeking to polarization the population and to further advance the rule of law. Otherwise this can significantly undermine democratic procedures – decisive for continued democratic consolidation. Altogether, civil society has been found to be able to improve democratic values and behavior on an individual level and also to impact democratic procedures – notably with the support of external democracy promoters.
However, during the phase of democratic consolidation, frequently combined with “desencanto”, when civil society and citizens are already tired and frustrated about a long process without having achieved full democratic consolidation - a frequent combination during democratic consolidation – the role, and the support of, civil society are crucial. At this point it can have very negative effects when external democracy promotion is fading without providing viable incentives this has increasingly difficult effects – as the overall civil society is tightly embedded in the prevailing political regime with its more or less democratic political culture. Finally, not very surprisingly, civil society, with all its dark sides and potential for destabilization, is not a panacea against all undemocratic evils – but if states aim at long-term stability and development, civil society assuming its functions in a democratic way is crucial to sustain and develop the procedural aspects of democratic consolidation.
**Annex A: Functions of civil society for democracy and democratization**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Functions of civil society for democracy and democratization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Larry Diamond (1994)          | 1. curb and monitor the state’s powers that might be arbitrarily used and abused;  
                                  | 2. stimulate political participation by citizens;  
                                  | 3. help to inculcate democratic or civic norms of tolerance, trust, moderation, compromise, and accommodation that facilitate the peaceful, democratic regulation of cleavage and conflict through the process of participation and civic education;  
                                  | 4. create ways of articulating, aggregating, and representing interests outside of political parties;  
                                  | 5. mitigate conflict through cross-cutting or overlapping interests;  
                                  | 6. recruit and train new leaders who may get involved into the political arena;  
                                  | 7. improve explicitly democratic process through election-monitoring, human rights monitoring, and public corruption monitoring, disseminates alternative and independent information (which is especially very beneficial in case of state censorship and/or state disinformation especially about human rights abuses);  
                                  | 8. enhance democratic legitimacy and governability by extending the borders of accountability and inclusiveness.                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| Larry Diamond (1998: 209-12)  | 1. assuring the ground for limiting the control of the state;  
                                  | 2. stimulates political participation through “educating” citizens;  
                                  | 3. developing democratic values as tolerance, moderation, compromise;  
                                  | 4. creating channels for articulation and aggregation of interests;  
                                  | 5. unifying interest that helps to move over political polarities;  
                                  | 6. recruiting political leaders;  
                                  | 7. some NGO’s have explicit aims of constructing democracy;  
                                  | 8. information flow and through this;  
                                  | 9. facilitating economic reform and  
                                  | 10. increasing positive implication of citizens in the decision-making process.                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| Merkel & Lauth (1998)         | 1. protection;  
                                  | 2. intermediation;  
                                  | 3. communication;  
                                  | 4. socialization;  
                                  | 5. communalization;  
                                  | (6. public discourse.)                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| Merkel (2000)                 | 1. protection of citizens;  
                                  | 2. monitoring for accountability;  
                                  | 3. advocacy and public communication;  
                                  | 4. socialization;  
                                  | 5. building community/ conflict sensitive social cohesion: i.e., building social capital;  
                                  | 6. intermediation and facilitation between citizens and state;  
                                  | 7. service delivery.                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| Croissant et al. (2000)       | 1. a non conflictive structure of civil society;  
                                  | 1.b organizational structure across cleavages;  
                                  | 2. no distinct power hierarchies,;  
                                  | 3.a civic virtues important; 3.b relevance of particular interests low;  
                                  | 4. internal democratic organization important;  
                                  | 5. societal representativity discernable;  
                                  | 6. functions for the state:  
                                  | 6.a service provision,  
                                  | 6.b recruiting,  
                                  | 6.c policy making,  
                                  | 6.d control;  
                                  | 7. cooperation with the state.                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
Annex B: Associational kinds with high potential for developing civic virtues

Tab. 41: Associational kinds with high potential for developing civic virtues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Examples of associational types</th>
<th>Ease of entry</th>
<th>Source of social reproduction</th>
<th>Orientation toward medium</th>
<th>Goals of association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social clubs, recreational &amp; sports arenas</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Voiced</td>
<td>Interpersonal identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural, knowledge-oriented, &amp; educational groups, instrumental groups</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Voiced</td>
<td>Inclusive social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic &amp; environmental groups</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Voiced</td>
<td>Public material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universities, academic research institutes</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Voiced</td>
<td>Inclusive social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public schools</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Voiced</td>
<td>Inclusive social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market-oriented environmental groups, public interest NGOs</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Non-recessed</td>
<td>Public material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quasi-public, market-oriented NGOs, govt. corporations, nonprofi- t govt. organisations</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Voiced</td>
<td>Inclusive social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unions engaged in social investing</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Voiced</td>
<td>Inclusive social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare rights &amp; child health advocacy groups</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Non-recessed</td>
<td>Individual material</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Annex C: Defining the characteristics of associations

Tab. 42: Defining the characteristics of associations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of definitions of associations</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Voiced</td>
<td>Groups oriented to education &amp; instructional services</td>
<td>Groups oriented to education &amp; instructional services</td>
<td>Groups oriented to education &amp; instructional services</td>
<td>Groups oriented to education &amp; instructional services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Voiced</td>
<td>Groups oriented to education &amp; instructional services</td>
<td>Groups oriented to education &amp; instructional services</td>
<td>Groups oriented to education &amp; instructional services</td>
<td>Groups oriented to education &amp; instructional services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Voiced</td>
<td>Groups oriented to education &amp; instructional services</td>
<td>Groups oriented to education &amp; instructional services</td>
<td>Groups oriented to education &amp; instructional services</td>
<td>Groups oriented to education &amp; instructional services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Voiced</td>
<td>Groups oriented to education &amp; instructional services</td>
<td>Groups oriented to education &amp; instructional services</td>
<td>Groups oriented to education &amp; instructional services</td>
<td>Groups oriented to education &amp; instructional services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Voiced</td>
<td>Groups oriented to education &amp; instructional services</td>
<td>Groups oriented to education &amp; instructional services</td>
<td>Groups oriented to education &amp; instructional services</td>
<td>Groups oriented to education &amp; instructional services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Voiced</td>
<td>Groups oriented to education &amp; instructional services</td>
<td>Groups oriented to education &amp; instructional services</td>
<td>Groups oriented to education &amp; instructional services</td>
<td>Groups oriented to education &amp; instructional services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Annex D: Democratic regime indices

**Tab. 43: Democratic regime indices**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Components</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi, and Przeworski, Political Regimes Index</td>
<td>181 countries, 1950-1990</td>
<td>This data set has been updated through 1999.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/cheibub/data/Default.htm">www.ssc.wisc.edu/cheibub/data/Default.htm</a>, panatth.de/yale/sc/Research.htm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom House's Political Rights Index</td>
<td>172 countries, 1975-present</td>
<td>Disaggregate data are not Freedom House, <a href="http://www.freedomhouse.org">www.freedomhouse.org</a> available</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poly IV Democracy and Autocracy Indices</td>
<td>181 countries, 1800-2001</td>
<td>This index combines components relevant to the democratic regime and democratic governance.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.eiu.com/kw/democracy/">www.eiu.com/kw/democracy/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanhanen Democracy Competition Index</td>
<td>187 countries, 1810–1998</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Munck 2003: 3*

### Annex E: Existing data sets on democracy

**Tab. 44: Existing data sets on democracy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Unit 1: Country</th>
<th>Unit 2: Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>123</td>
<td>1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>153</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom House (2000)</td>
<td>All the world (number varies)</td>
<td>1972-present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadenius (1992, pp. 61-69)</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity IV (Marshall &amp; Jaggers, 2001b)</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>1800-1999</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Munck, Verkuilen 2002: 6*

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a. The citations offered in this table contain the actual data sets.
b. These indexes use countries as their unit of analysis and record one value per year. Thus although we disaggregate these two aspects, the units of analysis are actually country years.
c. Most data sets begin coding countries after a common year, including new cases as countries gained independence. Gasiorek (1996) is an exception, starting the coding not at a common year but rather at the time independence was gained. Thus his starting point varies widely, from 1747 to 1980.
Annex F: A framework for the analysis of data: Conceptualization, Measurement, and Aggregation

Tab. 45: A framework for the analysis of data: conceptualization, Measurement, and Aggregation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenge</th>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Standard of Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conceptualization</td>
<td>Identification of attributes</td>
<td>Concept specification: Avoid maximalist definitions (the inclusion of theoretically irrelevant attributes) or minimalist definitions (the exclusion of theoretically relevant attributes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vertical organization of attributes by level of abstraction</td>
<td>Conceptual logic: Isolate the &quot;leaves&quot; of the concept tree and avoid the problems of redundancy and conflation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measurement</td>
<td>Selection of indicators</td>
<td>Validity: Use multiple indicators and establish the cross-system equivalence of these indicators; use indicators that minimize measurement error and can be crosschecked through multiple sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Selection of measurement level</td>
<td>Reliability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recording and publicizing of coding rules, coding process, and dissipate data</td>
<td>Reliability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregation</td>
<td>Selection of level of aggregation</td>
<td>Validity: Balance the goal of parsimony with the concern with underlying dimensionality and differentiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Selection of aggregation rule</td>
<td>Validity: Ensure the correspondence between the theory of the relationship between attributes and the selected rule of aggregation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recording and publicizing of aggregation rules and aggregate data</td>
<td>Robustness of aggregate data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Munck, Verkuilen 2002: 8
Annex G: Overview of Different Interview Methods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Interview</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Interviewer / Central Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Narrative Interview</td>
<td>Analysis of the development of subjective, informative and communicative processes; awareness of the phenomenon of awareness formation</td>
<td>Off-line, leading to a subsequent question; answer on the list of questions</td>
<td>Schütze 1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactive Interview</td>
<td>To obtain qualitative information in unstructured social situations</td>
<td>Knowing one another, asymmetric communication, spontaneous (in the field) intervention or provocation of situations (resemblance to ethnographic interviews)</td>
<td>Kleinig 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnographic Interview/Fieldwork</td>
<td>Direct observation and description of the life situations of the observed</td>
<td>Overview of the information collected during the observation and interview</td>
<td>Ford 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problematic Interview</td>
<td>Erasure of the subjective experiences, opinions and group-specific differences in the observation and presentation of the event</td>
<td>Situation-specific, non-transparent, potentially revealing questions: contextual, argumentative (Nack) questions; statements</td>
<td>Wittke 1982, 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Episodic Interview</td>
<td>Erasure of the subjective experiences and group-specific differences in the observation and presentation of the event</td>
<td>Situation-specific, non-transparent, potentially revealing questions: contextual, argumentative (Nack) questions; statements</td>
<td>Ford 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thematische Interview</td>
<td>Erasure of the manifest and latent symbols of subjective experiences, experiences, conflicts, feelings, fantasies</td>
<td>Off-line, in-depth discussion of the answers; off-line questions; thematic stages</td>
<td>Schröder 2000; Schröder/May 2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tab. 46: Overview of Different Interview Methods

Source: Mey, Mruck 2007: 256–257
Annex H, List of CSOs and International Organizations Interviewed and Talked to between Dec. 2009 and June 2011 (alphabetical order):

Overview of organizations and/or persons interviewed and talked to in both states:

Tab. 47: Detailed sample of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>group of respondents</th>
<th>Bosnia-Herzegovina</th>
<th>Republic of Macedonia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSOs</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5, 8, 14, 17, 28, 11, 12, 13, 22, 25, 26)</td>
<td>(33, 41, 43, 44, 47, 48, 61, 62, 63, 75, 36, 39)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOs</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6, 15, 18, 19, 20, 27, 21, 23, 24)</td>
<td>(34, 35, 42, 46, 55, 60, 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 37, 38)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local government</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(49)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>experts</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>(50, 51, 71, 72, 74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bosnia-Herzegovina:
1. ACIPS (Asocijacija Alumni Centra za interdisciplinarne postdiplomske studije), Sarajevo
2. Centre André Malraux, Sarajevo
3. Civil Society Promotion Center
4. Delegation of the European Union Commission, Sarajevo
5. Dosta!, Sarajevo
6. European Movement
7. EU Delegation to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sarajevo
8. Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation Bosnia-Herzegovina, Office Sarajevo
9. Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation Bosnia-Herzegovina, Office Banja Luka
10. German Embassy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sarajevo
11. Goethe-Institute, Sarajevo
12. Heinrich-Böll-Foundation Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sarajevo
13. Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sarajevo
14. Local Democracy Agency, Mostar
15. Nansen Dialogue Center, Mostar
16. Naša Stranka, Sarajevo
17. Office of the High Representative, Sarajevo
18. Office of the High Representative, Republika Srpska/Banja Luka
19. OKC Abrašević, Mostar
20. Open Society Institute/Soros Foundation Bosnia-Herzegovina
21. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (Sarajevo/Mostar/Banja Luka)
22. Robert-Bosch-Foundation (“Kulturmanager” Banja Luka)
23. Schüler Helfen Leben, Sarajevo
24. Protok, Banja Luka
25. Transparency International Bosnia-Herzegovina, Banja Luka
26. Udružene Žene, Banja Luka
27. US Embassy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sarajevo
28. University of Sarajevo, Human Rights Center, Sarajevo
29. Zdravo da ste, Banja Luka

Republic of Macedonia:
30. Alliance Française, Tetovo
31. analytika, Skopje
32. Association for Democratic Initiatives, Gostivar
33. Community Development Institute, Tetovo
34. Center for Research and Policy Making, Skopje
Delegation of the European Union Commission

Esperanza - World Culture Center, Skopje

European Center for Minority Issues, Tetovo

Forum Ziviler Friedensdienst (Skopje and Tetovo)

Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation Macedonia, Skopje

Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ, now Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, GIZ), Skopje

Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, Skopje

Heinrich-Böll-Foundation (Office in Belgrade, also responsible for all activities in Macedonia)

Initiative Freedom Square/ Ploštad Sloboda, Skopje

The Institute for Democracy, Solidarity and Civil Society (IDSCS), Skopje

Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation Macedonia, Skopje

Kontrapunkt, Skopje

LOJA, Tetovo

Macedonian Center for International Cooperation (MCIC/MCMS), Skopje

Metamorphosis, Skopje

National Democratic Institute, Skopje

NGO-Infocentar, Skopje

Open Society Institute/Soros-Foundation Macedonia, Skopje

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Skopje

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Tetovo

Partes Social Advertising, Skopje

“Kulturmanager” of the Robert-Bosch-Foundation, Skopje

“Kulturmanager” of the Robert-Bosch-Foundation, Tetovo

Roma Democratic Development Association “Sonce”, Tetovo

Roma Education Fund, Skopje

Union of Balkan’s Egyptians, Skopje

Unit for Cooperation with NGOs and foundations, City of Skopje

United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Skopje and Tetovo

University Ss. Cyril and Methodius, Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research, Skopje

US Peace Corps, Tetovo

Experts:

Kurt Bassuener, Democratization Policy Council

Sebastian Dworack, University of Erfurt/international consultant

Andreas Ernst, Neue Zürcher Zeitung

Dr. Marie-Carin von Gumppenberg, international consultant

Dr. Solveig Richter, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik

Harald Schenker, international consultant

Sunur Verma, previously ECMI
Annex I: Different steps of the constant analysis procedure in keywords,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of comparison and analysis activities</th>
<th>Aim</th>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Comparison within a single interview Open coding: summarizing core of the interview; finding consensus on interpretation of fragments.</td>
<td>Develop categories understanding</td>
<td>What is the core message of the interview? How are different fragments related? Is the interview consistent? Are there contradictions? What do fragments with the same code have in common?</td>
<td>Summary of the interview; Provisional code (code tree); Conceptual profile; Extended memos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Comparison between interviews within the same group that is persons who share the same experience Axial coding; formulating criteria for comparing interviews; hypothesizing about patterns and types.</td>
<td>Conceptualization of the subject produce a typology</td>
<td>Is it talking about the same as B? What do both interviews reveal about the category? What combinations of concepts exist? What interpretations exist for this? What are the similarities and differences between interviews A, B, C, . . . ? What criteria underlie this comparison?</td>
<td>Expansion of code words until all relevant themes are covered; Description of concepts; Criteria for comparing interviews; Clusters of interviews (typology).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Comparison of interviews from groups with different perspectives but involved with the subject under study</td>
<td>Triangulating data sources.</td>
<td>Complete the picture match the information</td>
<td>Verification of provisional knowledge of interclass from group 1; Additional information; Memos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Comparison in pairs of interviews with two partners belonging to a couple</td>
<td>Selecting themes from open coding that concern the relationship; summarizing the relationship; finding consensus on the interpretation.</td>
<td>Conceptualization of relationship issues understanding of the interaction between partners</td>
<td>What is the relationship like from both perspectives? Are there contradictions/agreements between them? What are the central issues and how are they resolved?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Comparing interviews with several couples Feeding criteria to compare couples; hypothesizing about patterns and types.</td>
<td>Find criteria for mutual comparison produce a typology</td>
<td>What are the typical differences between couples A and B? What is the possible reason for this? On which criteria can couples be compared? What patterns exist in the relationships of couples that experience this phenomenon?</td>
<td>Criteria for comparing couples; Clusters of relationships (typology).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Boeije 2002: 6
Annex J: Theory-Based Preliminary Code Tree

A Context of Civil Society (6)
   A1. Origin and patterns of development of civil society (Previously: AA nature and development of CS, including CS vs. Movements vs. NGOs/CSOs
      A1a. Pre-democratic history/tradition
      A1b. Development of civil society (state-driven, grassroots, externally promoted)
      A1c. Patterns of development of CS
   A2. Regime Type
   A3. Legal situation
   A4. Cooperation with the state
   A5. Financial/economic aspects
   A6. Societal/ethno-national cleavages

B. Functions of Civil Society (9)
   B1. Control the state’s power (includes: curb and monitor the state’s powers that might be arbitrarily used and abused; control; improve explicitly democratic process through election-monitoring, human rights monitoring, and public corruption monitoring, disseminates alternative and independent information; cooperation with the media)
   B2. Political participation by citizens (includes: stimulate political participation by citizens)
   B3. Diffusion and socialization of civic norms (includes: help to inculcate democratic or civic norms of tolerance, trust, moderation, compromise, and accommodation; civic virtues important)
   B4. Aggregation, Articulation and Representation of Interests/Policy Making (includes: create ways of articulating, aggregating, and representing interests outside of political parties; policy making)
   B5. Mitigation of overlapping interests across particular interests (includes: mitigate conflict through cross-cutting or overlapping interests; relevance of particular interests low)
   B6. Recruiting of new leaders (includes: recruit and train new leaders who may get involved into the political arena; recruiting)
   B7. Enhancing democratic legitimacy (includes: enhance democratic legitimacy and governability by extending the borders of accountability and inclusiveness; participation in decision-making processes)
   B9. Service provision

C. Qualities of civil society (6)
   C1. Non-conflictive structure of civil society
   C2. Organizational structure across cleavages
   C3. Organizational capacity
   C4. Independence from the State and from Political Parties (includes: political independence)
   C5. Faking/Facades
   C6. No distinct power hierarchies
   C7. Internal democratic organization important,
   C8. Societal representativity discernible

D. External Democracy Promotion (3)
   D1. External Democracy Promotion (includes: good effect EDP of CS; No or bad effect EDP of CS)
   D2. Practical Issues and Policies of IOs
   D3. Effect of civil society (includes: democratization effects of CS)
Annex K: Code Tree After Explorative Coding

A Context of Civil Society

A.1 Origin and patterns of development of CS
   A.1.a Politics and History
   A.1.b Post-conflict structures (OFA/DPA)
   A.1.c Tradition of CS
   A.1.d NGO, CS, movements
   A.1.e Public Image of CS
   A.1.f Social representativity
   A.1.g Size/density of society
   A.1.h Networks, Patronage, Clientelism
   A.1.i Center-Periphery / Minorities
   A.1.j Local/Regional particularities

A.2 Regime type

A.3 Legal situation

A.4 Readiness and ability of state to coop. with CS

A.5 Financial and Economic aspects

A.6 Societal (ethno-national) cleavages

A.7 Faking-Facades

A.8 Democratization, Transformation, spill-over, sustainability

B Qualities of Civil Society

B.1 Non-conflictive structure of CS

B.2 Organizational structure across cleavages

B.3 Organizational Capacity
   B.3.a Financial Viability
   B.3.b Organizational professionalism
   B.3.c Infrastructure
   B.3.d Quality Management
   B.3.e Thematic focus of NGO work

B.4 Independence from the state and political parties

B.4.a Spill-over of CS

B.5 Faking-Facades

C Functions of Civil Society

C.1 Control the state’s power
   C.1.b Watchdog function

C.2 Monitoring and diffusion of alternative information

C.3 Aggreg., artic., represent. of interests/policy making
   C.3.a Participation in decision-making
   C.3.b Advocacy

C.4 Mitigation of overlapping interests

C.5 Diffusion and socialization of civic norms
   C.5.a Ideological orientation
   C.5.b Corruption
   C.5.c Democratic Functioning

C.6 Political participation by citizens

C.7 Recruiting of new leaders

C.8 Service provision

D Donor politics

D.1 International context

D.2 History of EDP

D.3 Practical work of IOs
   D.3.a Learning of IOs
   D.3.b Models assumed/applied by IO staff

D.4 Impact IOs
   D.4.a Good Effect of CS EDP
   D.4.b Bad or no effect of CS EDP

D.5 Locals in IOs

D.6 credibility/double standards

D.7 IOs and locals/NGOs

D.8 IOs and Finances
Annex L: Screenshot coded interview transcripts in MAXQDA

Annex M: Final Code Tree

A. General Context of Civil Society
   A.1. Origin and patterns of development of civil society
       A.1.a Civil Society’s History
       A.1.b Characterization of Current Civil Society/ CSOs
       A.1.c Professional NGOs vs. Broad Societal Movements
       A.1.d Values vs. Purposes of Civil Society
       A.1.e Image of civil society
   A2. Regime Type
   A3. Legal Situation
   A4. Cooperation with the State
   A5. Financial and Economic Situation
   A6. Societal Cleavages

B. Qualities of Civil Society
   B1. Non-Conflictive Structure of Civil Society
   B2. Organizational Structure across Cleavages
   B3. Organizational Capacity
   B4. Independence from the State and from Political Parties

C. Functions of Civil Society
   C1. Control the State’s Power
   C2. Monitoring and Diffusion of Independent Information
   C3. Aggregation, Articulation, and Representation of Interests
   C4. Mitigation of Overlapping Interests across Particular Interests
   C5. Diffusion and Socialization of the Importance of Civic Virtues
   C6. Stimulate Political Participation of Citizens
   C7. Recruiting of new Leaders
   C8. Service Provision
### Tab. 49: Existing Indicators for Civil Society’s Functions, Qualities, and Context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Functions, Quality, Context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Merkel, Lauth 1998) (Croissant et al. 2000: 11–14) (Seifija 2006: 126)</td>
<td>1. protection (Schutzfunktion) (based on Locke); 2. control (Vermittlungsfunktion) (based on Montesquieu); 3. communication and intermediation (Kommunikationsfunktion) (based on Lipset); 4. socialization (Sozialisierungsfunktion), (based on Tocqueville); 5. communalization (Gemeinschaftsfunktion) (based on Putnam); 6. public discourse (based on Habermas and Gramsci)</td>
<td>Functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Diamond 1994)</td>
<td>1. curb and monitor the state’s powers that might be arbitrarily used and abused; 2. stimulate political participation by citizens; 3. help to inculcate democratic or civic norms of tolerance, trust, moderation, compromise, and accommodation that facilitate the peaceful, democratic regulation of cleavage and conflict through the process of participation and civic education; 4. create ways of articulating, aggregating, and representing interests outside of political parties; 5. mitigate conflict through cross-cutting or overlapping interests; 6. recruit and train new leaders who may get involved into the political arena; 7. improve explicitly democratic process through election-monitoring, human rights monitoring, and public corruption monitoring, disseminates alternative and independent information (which is especially very beneficial in case of state censorship and/or state disinformation especially about human rights abuses); 8. enhance democratic legitimacy and governability by extending the borders of accountability and inclusiveness.</td>
<td>Functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtypes of civil society (Lauth 2003)</td>
<td>Including the following dimensions: 1. Organizational structure of civil society (intensity of existing conflict structures and orientation of cleavages and conflict lines) 1.a non conflictive structure of civil society 1.b organizational structure across cleavages; 2. Patterns of interaction and communication of civil society (power hierarchies, power and interests – equality or inequality), 2. no distinct power hierarchies; 3. Basic consensus of civil society and interest orientation of actors (degree of the entrenchment of civic virtues, relevance of particular interests vs. public interests) 3.a civic virtues important 3.b relevance of particular interests low; 4. Democratic internal structure (rootedness of democratic convictions/behavior, scope of authoritarian internal structures)</td>
<td>Functions &amp; Qualities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Bertelsmann Stiftung)</td>
<td>Political participation:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The population determines the rulers and has additional political liberties:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. To what extent do democratically elected representatives possess the effective power to govern? Are there existing veto-powers and political enclaves?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. To what extent are political and/or civil society groups free to form and assembly?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. To what extent are citizens, organizations and media free to openly express their opinions?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensus-building:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. To what extent do the major political actors agree, to strive for market economy and democracy as strategic long-term goals?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. To what extent is it possible, that reformers exclude or include anti-democratic veto-actors?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. To what extent does the government deal with political differences so that they do not escalate into grave conflicts?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. To what extent do the political elite allow the political participation of civil society?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. To what extent can the government promote reconciliation between victims and culprits of past injustices?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Degree of Difficulty** (structural context that determines the leeway for political action)

2. To what degree do civil society traditions exist?

3. How substantial are ethnic, religious and societal conflicts?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Freedom House Methodology (Freedom House 2011)</th>
<th>Civil Society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Does the state protect the rights of the independent civic sector?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Is the civil society vibrant?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Is society free of excessive influence from extremist and intolerant nongovernmental institutions and organizations?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Is the legal and regulatory environment for civil society groups free of excessive state pressures and bureaucracy?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Do civil society groups have sufficient organizational capacity to sustain their work?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Are civil society groups financially viable, with adequate conditions and opportunities for raising funds that sustain their work?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Is the government receptive to policy advocacy by interest groups, public policy research groups, and other nonprofit organizations? Do government officials engage civil society groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functions &amp; Qualities &amp; Context</th>
<th>Functions &amp; Qualities &amp; Context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
by inviting them to testify, comment on, and influence pending policies or legislation?
8. Are the media receptive to civil society groups as independent and reliable sources of information and commentary? Are they positive contributors to the country’s civic life?
9. Does the state respect the right to form and join free trade unions?
10. Is the education system free of political influence and propaganda?

**National Democratic Governance**
5. Do legislators, the media, and civil society groups have sufficient information on military and security matters to provide oversight of the military and security services?

**Local Democratic Governance**
3. Do local governments invite input from civil society, business, trade unions, and other groups on important policy issues before decisions are made and implemented?
   - Do local governments initiate committees, focus groups, or other partnerships with civil society to address common concerns and needs?
   - Are individuals and civil society groups free to submit petitions, organize demonstrations, or initiate other activities that influence local decision making?
   - Do the media regularly report the views of local civic groups, the private business sector, and other nongovernmental entities about local government policy and performance?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Anheier 2004: 32 | 1. Structure: How large in scale and scope is civil society in economic, social and organizational terms?  
2. Environment/Space: What legal and political ‘space’ does civil society have within the regulatory ‘environment’ of the country or region in which it operates?  
3. Values: what are the values, norms and cultural expectations that civil society represents and advocates?  
4. Impact: what are the contributions of civil society in terms of voice, policy-making, service provision or equity? |
| USAID 2011 | 1. legal environment,  
2. organizational capacity,  
3. financial viability,  
4. advocacy,  
5. service provision,  
6. infrastructure,  
7. public image, |
| Lauth 2003 | Factors of motivation of civil society  
1. Type of political regime,  
2. Socio-cultural environment,  
3. Specific economic context |
| Freise (2004: 63–65) | 1. Organizational involvement of the population in voluntary associations,  
2. Public engagement in formal and non-formal organizations,  
3. Interpersonal trust,  
4. Support of communal values and norms. |

### Annex O: Donor map Bosnia-Herzegovina

**Tab. 50: Donor map Bosnia-Herzegovina**

| DONOR | Funding for Belgium (2010–11) | Funding for civil society (2010–11) | Capacity and space development in civil society | Capacity, technical assistance for civil society | Capacity, technical assistance for civil society, public sector institutional capacity building | Civil Society capacity building | EU support to the core funding | Civil Society capacity building | Civil Society capacity building | Media and public information and communication | Media and information and communication | Capacity, technical assistance for civil society, public sector institutional capacity building | Capacity, technical assistance for civil society, public sector institutional capacity building | Capacity and space development in civil society | Capacity and space development in civil society |
|-------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|
| EU    | €107.42bn                      | €6.2m                               | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                           | N                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              |
| OSCE  | €14.5m                         | €100,000                            | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                           | N                               | N                               | N                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              |
| UNDP  |                             |                                     | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                           | N                               | N                               | N                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              |
| World Bank |                         |                                     | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                           | N                               | N                               | N                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              |
| Austrian Development Agency |                         |                                     | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                           | N                               | N                               | N                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              |
| Finnish Government |                         |                                     | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                           | N                               | N                               | N                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              |
| Germany |                         |                                     | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                           | N                               | N                               | N                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              |
| Netherlands Embassy |                         |                                     | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                           | N                               | N                               | N                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              |
| Norwegian Embassy |                         |                                     | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                           | N                               | N                               | N                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              |
| Slovak Aid |                         |                                     | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                           | N                               | N                               | N                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              |
| Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) |                         |                                     | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                           | N                               | N                               | N                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              |
| Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) |                         |                                     | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                           | N                               | N                               | N                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              |
| USAID |                         |                                     | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                           | N                               | N                               | N                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              |
| Balkan Trust for Democracy |                         |                                     | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                           | N                               | N                               | N                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              |
| CS Mott Foundation |                         |                                     | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                           | N                               | N                               | N                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              |
| Erste Foundation |                         |                                     | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                           | N                               | N                               | N                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              |
| Frieda Baert Stiftung |                         |                                     | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                           | N                               | N                               | N                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              |
| Heinrich Boll Foundation |                         |                                     | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                           | N                               | N                               | N                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              |
| Konrad Adenauer Stiftung |                         |                                     | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                           | N                               | N                               | N                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              |
| NDI |                         |                                     | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                           | N                               | N                               | N                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              |
| NED |                         |                                     | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                           | N                               | N                               | N                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              |
| Open Society |                         |                                     | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                           | N                               | N                               | N                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                               | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              | Y                                              |

N = No, not an objective or strategy  
Y = Yes, an objective and strategy  
CC = cross cutting (not a specific objective but an aspect or outcome of other initiatives)  

*Source: Balkan Civil Development Network 2012: 33*
Annex P: Donor map Macedonia

Tab. 51: Donor map Macedonia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DONOR</th>
<th>Funding for Macedonia (2010-2011)</th>
<th>Funding for civil society (2010-11)</th>
<th>Environment</th>
<th>Assistance for local community (NGOs and CSOs)</th>
<th>Capacity / technical assistance for civil society</th>
<th>Capacity / technical assistance for economic and private sector development</th>
<th>Capacity / technical assistance for innovation and technology development</th>
<th>Capacity / technical assistance for democracy and governance</th>
<th>Capacity / technical assistance for human rights and gender-equality cooperation</th>
<th>Capacity / technical assistance for education and training</th>
<th>Capacity / technical assistance for good governance</th>
<th>Regional co-operation and development assistance</th>
<th>Media development and support</th>
<th>Institution-building (including support for political parties)</th>
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Source: Balkan Civil Development Network 2012: 41
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Berlin, 27.09.2012