Intangible Cultural Heritage of Dance as Medium for Intercultural Dialogue: 
Culture Assimilator Reinterpreted

A thesis approved by the Faculty of Mechanical, Electrical and Industrial Engineering at the Brandenburg University of Technology Cottbus-Senftenberg in fulfilment of the requirement for the award of the academic degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) in Heritage Studies

Submitted by

B.A., M.A.

Chee Meng Wong

From Singapore

Chairperson: Prof. Dr. phil. Christer Petersen
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. phil. Marie-Theres Albert
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. phil. Magdalena Droste

Date of Oral Examination: 21st November 2013
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to start by thanking Prof. Marie-Theres Albert as head of the International Graduate School: Heritage Studies, for making all this possible in the first place, with her vision not only in establishing the masters programme of World Heritage Studies that I earlier graduated in, but also this current PhD programme of which I became part of the pioneer batch in 2010. I would also like to thank her as my first supervisor in this thesis, for she has virtually been the grand designer of my research, as she pointed out the directions for me in intercultural studies, hence providing the ground plans to build my thesis. I would also like to thank my second supervisor Prof. Magdalena Droste, whose meticulous manner in art history research and the close reading of texts has always been an inspiration.

In addition, I would like to thank Dr. Muhamad Al-Zekri for acting as my mentor in my earlier semesters, giving me excellent tips in effective writing and presentation. I would also like to thank the support of Dr. Jana-Cordelia Petzold in initiating me into general aspects of academic life, as well as the administrative support of Mr. Robert Rode, not to mention all my fellow students for being there with me through thick and thin.

My thanks also go out to all my associates back home in Singapore, especially all my gurus and fellow dancers - at Nrityalaya Aesthetics Society, which I have worked with for the Arts Education Programme; at Bhaskar’s Arts Academy, which has seen countless productions and performance tours under the Chairmanship of Mr K.P. Bhaskar, who witnessed several decades of development in Singapore’s arts scenes and told me endless stories about it; and at NUS Centre for the Arts, where it all began as artistic director and resident choreographer Mrs Santha Bhaskar first initiated me into a fascinating universe of dance. They have given me the very inspiration and motivation in the first place to embark on a research relating to Indian classical dance in Singapore.

Writing this thesis has been a great learning process for me. The result may be just a humble contribution in the vast fields of research, but I look forward to a further journey from this vantage point on, in a world of great diversity that awaits our discovery and sharing.
# Table of Contents

Abstract ............................................................................................................................... 5

1. INTRODUCTION: CONCEPTS AND APPROACHES ...................................................... 7
   1.1 Background and Motivation of Research ................................................................. 7
   1.2 Epistemology and Conceptual Framework ............................................................ 16
   1.3 Working Definitions of Main Concepts .................................................................... 25

2. CONCEPTS OF CULTURE IN MODERNITY AND BEYOND ........................................ 38
   2.1 What is Culture? – Perspectives in Anthropology .................................................. 39
   2.2 Culture as Orientation System – a Concept emerged of Modernity ....................... 52
      2.2.1 Culture as value orientation in action following Talcott Parsons’ framework .... 52
      2.2.2 Culture as orientation system in intercultural psychology of Alexander Thomas 61
   2.3 Globalisation and Need for Intercultural Dialogue ................................................ 76
      2.3.1 Processes of globalisation as World System of economy without cultural integration .... 76
      2.3.2 Consciousness of cultural differences with intensification of global-local relationship ... 93

3. INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE AND THE CULTURE ASSIMILATOR ............................ 116
   3.1 The Goals of Intercultural Dialogue based on Council of Europe’s 2008 White Paper - “Living Together as Equals in Dignity” .......................................................... 117
      3.1.1 Intercultural dialogue as a means to social cohesion ........................................... 117
      3.1.2 Intercultural dialogue as an ideal of liberalism and value pluralism ..................... 127
   3.2 Culture Assimilator as a Tool for Dialogue – an Intercultural Competence Framework according to Alexander Thomas ............................................................... 147
      3.2.1 Dimensions of intercultural competence for intercultural learning .................... 147
      3.2.2 Culture Assimilator training for intercultural understanding ............................. 162

4. NEED FOR INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE IN SINGAPORE AS A CULTURALLY DIVERSE NATION ........................................................................................................ 175
   4.1 The Social Construction of Cultural Communities .................................................. 176
      4.1.1 Society in a transcultural system as distinct from a multicultural system ............ 176
4.1.2 The social construction of ‘race’ – example of Singapore as a postcolonial nation........ 196
4.2 Need for Intercultural Dialogue in Singapore to Overcome Cultural Differences . 220
4.2.1 Lack of social cohesion in Singapore – civic or ethnic nationalism? ...................... 220
4.2.2 Lack of liberalism in Singapore in the public spheres on issues of racism and stereotyping ................................................................. 234

5. HERITAGE AND DANCE ................................................................. 251
5.1 The Concept and Practice of Heritage .............................................. 252
5.1.1 What is heritage? ........................................................................ 252
5.1.2 Heritage as medium for intercultural dialogue – between a transcultural model and a multicultural model ................................................................. 267
5.2 Dance and Communication and Dance as Heritage......................... 281
5.2.1 What is dance? – perspectives in anthropology ............................. 281
5.2.2 Power of dance in communicating cultural values and embodying social relations....296
5.2.3 Dance as heritage .................................................................... 305

6. DANCE HERITAGE AS MEDIUM FOR INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE IN SINGAPORE . 317
6.1 Dance as Medium for Intercultural Dialogue in a Transcultural Model.......... 317
6.2 Dance Heritage as Medium for Intercultural Dialogue in a Multicultural Model – Adaptation of the Culture Assimilator ......................................................... 334
6.2.1 Cultural differences between Chinese and Indian communities in Singapore in the practice of dance heritage ................................................................. 334
6.2.2 Dimensions of intercultural learning with Indian classical dance as medium........360

7. CONCLUSION: LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS......................... 373
References......................................................................................... 390
Intangible Cultural Heritage of Dance as a Medium for Intercultural Dialogue: Culture Assimilator Reinterpreted

ABSTRACT

This thesis explores two different models in the use of cultural heritage as a medium for intercultural exchange. This role of cultural heritage is discussed under a larger political framework of intercultural dialogue as a policy approach in managing cultural diversity, with specific reference to the 2008 Council of Europe’s *White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue*. This policy approach is analysed here in terms of the goal in social cohesion and the liberal, procedural commitment in democracy towards cultural and value pluralism, with its relevance discussed in the context of Singapore, which claims an approach of ‘communitarianism’ upholding ‘Asian values’. Against the background of racism problems in Singapore, the staging and interpretation of Indian dance heritage in Singapore will be analysed between a transcultural and a multicultural model of intercultural dialogue, the former focusing on creative engagement to overcome differences in cultural identity, the latter focusing on mutual understanding and respect of differences. As part of the multicultural model, one will analyse cross-cultural interaction as ‘critical incidents’ based on the ‘Culture Assimilator’ method (otherwise known as the Intercultural Sensitizer) in intercultural communication training – which German social psychologist Alexander Thomas has repositioned in an intercultural competence framework aligned with systems theory. This framework will be adapted to discuss the aspects of open-mindedness and empathy in intercultural learning through cultural heritage, and to deconstruct cultural differences.
Immaterialles Kulturerbe Tanz als Mittel zum interkulturellen Dialog: Culture Assimilator neu interpretiert

ABSTRACT

1. INTRODUCTION: CONCEPTS AND APPROACHES

1.1 Background and Motivation of Research

‘Intercultural dialogue’ has emerged in the first decade of the 21st century as a new policy approach proposed in Europe for managing cultural diversity under the growing trends of globalisation. The development of its concept, as witnessed from the 2003 declaration by European ministers of education on intercultural education to the 2008 White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue, reflects a concern with conflicts that have been attributed to differences in value systems, for which key reference values such as democracy have been asserted under an “ideology of European interculturalism” (Besley and Peters, 2012, pp. 2-4) in fostering shared experience and promoting mutual understanding. Plurality in society and apprehension for it have characterised contemporary politics worldwide due to reshuffling of cultural, religious and social relations since the fall of the Berlin Wall, further heightened by the events of September 11th, 2001 (Seymour, 2010, p. 4).

While the notion of ‘dialogue’ may have multiple cultural origins in the world, from Chinese and Indian classical literature to scriptural hermeneutics of the Abrahamic religions, it has particularly been venerated as a pedagogical form of philosophical discourse in the Western tradition, tracing its roots to Socrates’ dialogical method of argumentation (Besley and Peters, 2012, p. 14). Western models of dialogue have since developed along different ontological, epistemological and ethical lines of inquiry, from religious communion (Buber), philosophical hermeneutics (Gadamer), rational deliberation (Habermas), radical pedagogy (Freire), dialogical imagination (Bakhtin) to liberal learning (Oakeshott and Rorty), which provide useful approaches for intercultural understanding (cited in Ibid., p. 22). In cultural policy studies, Yudhishthir Raj Isar (2006) has identified six tropes of intercultural dialogue: dialogue of or among civilisations; cultural cooperation; multiculturalism; cultural diplomacy; inter-religious dialogue; and arts practice.

The challenge in this thesis, written under the auspices of an international graduate school in heritage studies, will lie in a transdisciplinary outlook that takes into account how some of the above-mentioned themes and approaches on intercultural dialogue are intertwined, from general cultural policy down to arts practice, as it
considers the potential and constraints of cultural heritage as a medium for dialogue in a culturally diverse society. The practice of heritage involves the use of the past to validate the present through an idea of timeless values and lineages (Lowenthal, 1985); it is most significant that the very notion of heritage has entered the public realm from its original sense in a private realm (Lowenthal, 1998). Heritage in plural societies has become a site where policies of assimilation or multiculturalism are articulated (Ashworth et al, 2007, p. 8). In the globalised era today, cultural heritage is used not only as an economic resource but also as a potent ‘ideological resource’ (Silberman, 2010, p. 1).

The relevance of cultural heritage to intercultural dialogue may also be argued from a perspective of global polity, notably as seen in the legal instruments of UNESCO, from the highlighting of ‘outstanding universal values’ in the 1972 World Heritage Convention to the hope for dialogue as expressed in the 2003 Intangible Heritage Convention. The latter was adopted partly with the consideration that intangible heritage, such as oral traditions, performing arts, rituals and craftsmanship, can play an “invaluable role […] in bringing human beings closer together and ensuring exchange and understanding among them” (UNESCO, 17 Oct 2003, p.2). Furthermore, according to the second of five criteria for the Representative List, inscription of an element should “contribute to ensuring visibility and awareness of the significance of the intangible cultural heritage and to encouraging dialogue, thus reflecting cultural diversity worldwide and testifying to human creativity” (UNESCO, June 2008, p. 8).

With the exploration in this thesis of cultural heritage as a site of intercultural dialogue, one hopes to provide a unique contribution by reviewing and advancing a perspective of social psychology that considers intercultural dialogue in terms of interaction between people of different cultural communities “on the basis of mutual understanding and respect” (Council of Europe, 2008, p. 10), which involves the aspects of one’s knowledge, attitude and action towards the other culture. These may easily be glossed as an issue of ‘intercultural competence’ involving cognitive, affective and behavioural aspects of intercultural communication. “Building intercultural competencies” has incidentally been cited as a major aspect of intercultural dialogue in the 2009 UNESCO world report Investing in Cultural
Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue, alongside specific areas of challenges such as interfaith dialogue and reconciliation of conflicting memories (UNESCO, 2009, p. 45).

But if this renders the impression that the challenge of intercultural dialogue is necessarily geared towards a thematic concern with ‘cultural differences’, one should note that one of the ‘key competence areas’ for intercultural dialogue as cited in the 2008 White Paper takes a more universal outlook of empowerment for all – it speaks of education for democratic citizenship, involving, inter alia, “civic, history, political and human-rights education, education on the global context of societies and on cultural heritage […] particularly the capacity for reflection and the self-critical disposition necessary for life in culturally diverse societies” (Council of Europe, 2008, p. 29).

It is hence desirable that an ‘intercultural competence’ approach based on an intercultural communication framework be critically reviewed in relation to the ideals of intercultural dialogue from a political perspective, not to mention the question of epistemological approach on culture from a psychological or sociological perspective. As a basis for discussion, this thesis will reference a conceptual framework on intercultural competence discussed in Germany that is associated with the Culture Assimilator approach in intercultural communication, first developed in Chicago in the 1960s. Devised as a tool or programme of intercultural training to help overcome cultural differences as observed in ‘critical incidents’, the Culture Assimilator found its basis in the idea of ‘subjective culture’ as defined by Charles Osgood (1977). This refers to human cognitive processes of values, attitudes and norms of behaviour, in other words “intangible elements” (Cushner and Landis, 1996, p. 185; cf. Prosser, 1978, p. 197) as opposed to ‘objective culture’ which refers to artefacts and technologies. Following similar arguments, German social psychologist Alexander Thomas has defined culture as a form of orientation system regulating one’s psychic processes of perception and evaluation as well as one’s ‘internalised dispositions’ for action, as may be observed from critical interaction situations (Thomas, 2011, p. 100).

For an application to intercultural dialogue imagined as a ‘specific form of interpersonal communication’ (Thomas, 2008, p. 14), the intercultural competence framework of Alexander Thomas has claimed its relevance by giving primacy to the
cognitive aspect of ‘intercultural understanding’. However, such ambition has been tentative in terms of philosophical basis, swaying from a leaning towards Ram Adhar Mall’s intercultural philosophy of relativism by emphasising communication over consensus (Thomas, 2003b, p. 137), to an attempt to tie in with Habermas’ theory of communicative action, but ultimately reducing the challenge of an ‘ideal speech situation’ to one of intercultural competence (Thomas, 2008, p. 27) while issues like power imbalance are swiftly left out of the equation since his approach of *Kulturstandard* is not equipped to deal with the complexity of power structures. One may add that it also leaves out the ultimate challenge in intercultural dialogue in terms of differences in morals and ethics. In short, this framework reduces intercultural dialogue to a communication process in terms of attributing others’ intentions appropriately, and simplifies the challenge of intercultural dialogue to a psychological problem of cognition.

This thesis suggests that the complexity of intercultural dialogue, even when seen from a psychological perspective alone, can be well illustrated with the example of dance as a form of intangible cultural heritage. While the choice of dance as a subject of investigation is motivated mainly by this writer’s personal affinity, dance arguably claims an interesting area in intercultural dialogue as it consists of movements and gestures which may be considered as a form of non-verbal communication with multiple meanings (Hanna, 1978, p. 89). As an art form, dance expressions manage to stir one’s aesthetic emotions through what Susanne Langer has described as ‘virtual power’ (Langer, 1953, p. 175). Furthermore, dance as an art form is a form of ‘intentional action’ (Best, 1974, p. 193) rather than a form of ‘internalised disposition’ or psychological phenomenon. It hence poses new challenges in cognitive, affective and behavioural aspects of communication that may otherwise not be taken into account under an intercultural communication framework such as the Culture Assimilator. This would also help to provide new insights on cultural heritage generally if one considers tangible or intangible heritage alike as a kind of ‘cultural tool’ for the ‘performance’ and negotiation of identity and values (Smith and Waterton, 2009, p. 292).

It will be maintained in this thesis that the observation of cross-cultural interaction in critical situations provides a useful point of departure for discussion of ‘cultural differences’ in dealing with cultural heritage, under the premise of respect for culture
diversity. At the same time, one needs to deconstruct any assumption of cultural
differences that see heritage as strictly tied to particular cultural identities, which
would tend towards a form of essentialisation. It will also be part of the interest in this
thesis to explore intercultural dialogue through dance heritage from a perspective of
transculturalism that emphasises creative engagement (Epstein, 1999b, p. 97)
instead of mere ‘understanding’. To serve as a case study, this thesis will analyse
the need for intercultural dialogue as a policy approach in the culturally diverse
society of Singapore, along with the possibilities in using Indian classical dance of
the minority community as a medium of intercultural dialogue with the dominant
Chinese community. The choice is partly motivated by this writer’s place of origin as
a Singapore citizen and at the same time a personal acquaintance with the said
heritage as an amateur dancer.

Singapore in any case provides academic interest per se for three reasons. Firstly, it
is increasingly facing problems in social cohesion, being one of the top three most
globalised economies in the world alongside Hong Kong and Ireland (Ernst and
Young, January 2013, online) and experiencing rapid growths of immigrant
population adding to its existing multi-ethnic composition. Secondly, Singapore
provides a curious case as a diverse society which has notably been praised by
Samuel Huntington for its system of ‘shared values’, under a state ideology
emphasising Asian values in its economic modernisation, which is “at once evidence
of a threat to Western universalism as well as reassuringly familiar” (Devan, 2007, p.
145). The long-time social stability which it has achieved despite its overtly racialised
model of multiculturalism, with a political rhetoric of ‘multiracial meritocracy’ (Lee, 9th
April 2009) championed by the one-party state, is a third aspect of interest.

According to the Sejarah Melayu or Malay Annals which dates back to the 17th
century or earlier, Singapore was founded by Prince Sang Nila Utama from Sumatra,
back in the 14th century. It attracted migrant populations of Chinese and Indians
among others after becoming a British colony in 1819. An independent state since
1965, its resident population consists of 74.1% Chinese, 13.4% Malays, 9.2%
Indians and 3.3% ‘Others’ according to the 2010 census, a proportion similar to the
figures of 77%, 14.8%, 7% and 1.2% respectively in 1970 (Singapore Department of
Statistics, 2010, online). Along with neighbouring Malaysia and Indonesia, Singapore
illustrates a striking “legacy and challenge of cultural pluralism” (Hefner, 2001, p. 4)
and has additionally faced new challenges with immigration in unprecedented scale, in parallel to a similar trend of globalisation in Western countries since the 1990s (Ibid., pp. 2). In fact, Singapore has seen permanent residents rising to 10.7% of total population by 2010, while non-residents have risen to 25.7% of total population (Lai, 2012, p. 4). Separate figures have placed Singapore's population of international migrant stock at 40.7% by mid-2010 (UN Data, 2013, online).

This accelerated immigration, with the inflow of migrant or guest workers for low-skilled and low-wage jobs on one hand and foreign or global talents for economic activities of higher order on the other, reflects a neo-liberal globalisation embraced by the Singapore government, out of a motivation of economic opportunism (Tan, 2012, pp. 85-86). This may be in keeping with the economy bureaucracy in Singapore since the People's Action Party came into power in 1959, which has managed to stimulate economic and industrial development mainly by taming an erstwhile militantly unionised labour force and luring foreign investors and multinational corporations with generous tax incentives, industrial infrastructure and political stability (Ibid., pp. 69-70).

But along with the recent globalisation, Singapore has also experienced a significant increase in inequality, as indicated by a rise in Gini coefficient from 0.430 in 2000 to 0.452 in 2010, which parallels a similar trend in the United States, most European Union countries and advanced Asian economies of Japan and South Korea Bhaskaran et al, 2012, p. 4). As six economists in Singapore assert in a background paper entitled Inequality and the Need for a New Social Compact, such rising inequality, associated with problems of wage stagnation, lower social mobility and reduced well-being (Ibid., p. 3), is not a simple consequence of globalisation: “Domestic policies such as tax, government spending, foreigner worker and immigration policies can and do have a significant impact on a country's inequality patterns. (Ibid., p. 5)”

These problems, along with overcrowding in the island city-state, may be exacerbating xenophobic sentiments which have become a regular feature in the social media. Following the release in January 2013 of a government white paper planning for an increase of Singapore population to 6.9 million by 2030 in order to maintain economic growth, a few thousand Singaporeans held an unprecedented
protest in Hong Lim Park, the designated Speaker’s Corner in Singapore since 2000. Featuring messages on banners such as “Singapore for Singaporeans”, the protest has sparked fresh debates on what may constitute xenophobic expressions (Han, 23 March 2013, online), adding to the existing concerns of racial stereotyping in Singapore.

Singapore has long been claimed as “a place where different ethnic groups live together without the strife that has become a normal feature of many other plural societies” (Benjamin, 1976, p. 115), with credit attributed to the government’s espousal of its multiracial ideology. However, such claims have to be further interrogated. One may question first of all the validity of the government’s racial classification and examine how national policies in Singapore may have in fact led to ethnic groups being “much more ethnically conscious than in a society with a ‘non-racial’ ideology” (Ibid., p. 119), with a tendency to make social reality fit a stereotypical thinking of “an ethnic, or even racial, theory of causation” (Ibid.) as well as to show “concern for boundary definition” (Ibid.) between ethnic groups. Secondly, one may question if the veneer of such a multiracial ideology may have given an impression of social cohesion in Singapore, while the state privileges what John Clammer (1993) has described as a “counter-modernisation” form of ideology legitimised as a revival of Asian values, by way of privileging an outlook of Confucianism, that serves to hide whatever “patriarchal” political agenda behind the government’s 1991 White Paper on Shared Values, with precepts such as ‘nation before community and society above self’ and ‘family as the basic building block of society’ (cited in Lim, 26 March 1999, online). Interestingly, even as the current Population White Paper argues based on an economic logic for more new immigrants due to low birth rate and the increasing ratio of older Singaporeans, it offers assurance on the sustenance of a ‘strong Singaporean core’ with meritocracy and respect for cultures identified as key shared values, but more importantly legitimises that an agenda of procreation is in line with the logic of traditional values: “Strong families are the bedrock of our society, through which we pass on our values and sense of belonging from one generation to the next. (National Population and Talent Division, Jan 2013, p. 2)”
Despite any rosy picture painted of a Singapore society without ethnic discrimination, recent scholarship in the 2000s has presented an alternative picture with reports on racial attitudes, including a few works focusing on the actual practice of racial discrimination or even racially based policies (Gomez, 2010, p. 104). The Indians for instance have commonly experienced name-calling with reference to their body, skin colour and physical appearance (Velayutham, 2007, p. 4). Such concerns culminated in a visit in April 2010 by the UN Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, Mr Githu Muigai, who recommended in his subsequent press statement that Singapore needs a “specific legislation prohibiting racial discrimination in all areas of life, including employment, education and health” (Muigai, 28 Apr 2010, online). He also called on the Singapore authorities “to review any legislative restrictions that may exist in the statute books in order to allow Singaporeans to share their views on matters of ethnicity” (Ibid.), an obvious reference to Singapore’s legal provisions under the Sedition Act, Penal Code and Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act, which may be used against any expression construed as racist comments or insensitive proselytising. He argued that “the protection of racial harmony [should not be] implemented at the detriment of fundamental human rights such as freedom of expression” (Ibid.), that Singaporeans should be able to share views freely and “work together to find solutions” (Ibid.). In other words, one may say that Singapore has been lacking in open dialogues on matters of ethnicity, but the absence of public discussion on such issues does not imply the absence of intolerance or discrimination, which might even be on an institutional level.

The potential of cultural heritage in strengthening cohesiveness among different ethnic or cultural groups in Singapore has been acknowledged to some extent in government reports, notably the Renaissance City Report in 2000 which outlined strategies in developing the arts and cultural scene in Singapore as a globalised city. Much of government support in the cultural industry should be understood as part of a framework of ‘cultural economic policies’ for regeneration of cities, a trend of cultural policies in Singapore which has already been observed in the 1980s and 1990s as a response to global capital restructuring (Kong, 2000, p. 4). It is hence not surprising that the report declared its first aim in terms of positioning Singapore as a cultural centre in Asia and the globalised world, as a conducive environment for
creativity; however, this is followed a second aim “to strengthen Singaporean’s sense of national identity and belonging” by inculcating an appreciation of heritage and sharing stories on Singapore (Ministry of Information and the Arts, 2000, p. 4).

More recently, The Report of the Arts and Culture Strategic Review initiated by the same ministry has outlined a vision to make arts and culture an integral part of the lives of all Singaporeans by year 2025, highlighting traditional arts as ‘cultural heritage’: “We will be conscious of the cultural diversity around us, and the aspects of our culture that unify us all as Singaporean. We will also support the continued growth and development of our traditional arts as part of our cultural heritage. These shall add to a sense of place, community, belonging and opportunity. (ACSR Steering Committee, 31 Jan 2012, p. 16)” Subsequently, from November 2012 onwards, the arts in Singapore fell under the purview of a new Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth, an administrative arrangement which may be interpreted as a move to employ arts and culture for the engineering of social cohesion.

Regardless of the Singapore government’s priority or agenda where cultural heritage is concerned, it is of interest from a political as well as a psychological perspective to explore what factors may come to play in the possible use of a cultural heritage such as dance to promote intercultural dialogue. Cultural shows that feature a series of dance or music performances representing the Chinese, Malay and Indian communities have long been assumed to help Singaporeans integrate through appreciation one another’s traditions, at least in the words of one social affairs minister in the 1970s (Benjamin, 1976, p. 121). The question is whether it serves as little more than a cliché that helps legitimise an ideology of ‘multiracial meritocracy’ in a grand display of nationalism like Singapore’s National Day Parade, or whether it can be fruitfully harnessed for intercultural learning through platforms such as Arts Education Programme in the public schools, instead of merely heightening a sense of otherness with minority art forms such as Indian classical dance. The significance of dance heritage as a site for intercultural dialogue also has to be studied in a larger context of government policies in Singapore’s communitarian approach, which will be evident as one examines different spheres of social life there ranging from education, media, arts to heritage. Social and political stability tends to be maintained based on tolerance through division along racial or religious lines, instead of seeking intercultural understanding. The limitations of current policies in managing the
cultural diversity in Singapore will need to be discussed by considering problems of social cohesion that become manifested in racism, stereotyping and discrimination, as well as the lack of liberal exchange of views among a plurality of cultural values.

To summarise it all as a statement of problem, this thesis is motivated by the consideration that there is a need for an approach in intercultural dialogue to promote mutual understanding and respect among different communities in a culturally diverse nation, that maybe concretised with the medium of cultural heritage such as dance; this is to be tested on the case study of Singapore, with the specific example of Indian dance heritage.

The hypothesis to be tested in the thesis is as follows: Dance as intangible cultural heritage communicates cultural values in its different forms as part of cultural diversity; therefore it can be developed as a medium for intercultural dialogue, as seen in the example of Indian classical dance in Singapore. The testing of this hypothesis may be broken down into a few components, which involve exploring the following research questions:

1) What is intercultural dialogue and why may it be desirable in a culturally diverse society generally and in the example of Singapore?

2) What is dance and how does it communicate cultural values as ‘intangible heritage’?

3) In what ways may cultural heritage be a medium for intercultural dialogue and what aspects of intercultural competence may be relevant, as seen in the example of Indian dance heritage in Singapore?

The next section will explain the conceptual framework to be adopted in this thesis in order to achieve its aim and objectives in relation to the abovementioned hypothesis and research questions. It will also explain the epistemological interests of this thesis in its analyses.

1.2 Epistemology and Conceptual Framework

The aim of this thesis is to analyse how or in what sense cultural heritage may be used as a medium for intercultural dialogue in a culturally diverse nation. Spanning social, psychological and political perspectives in the development of a conceptual
framework, it will culminate in an application of the various disciplines of knowledge to dance as a form of cultural heritage, with a specific case study in Singapore involving Indian classical dance as a medium for intercultural dialogue, considered in two ideal types, namely a transculturalism model and a multiculturalism model. These will be analysed within a framework of Systems Theory, grounded in theories of social and cultural psychology.

The wide-ranging scope of disciplinary perspectives here follows the principle of transdisciplinarity in research and science, “which becomes operative wherever it is impossible to define or attempt to solve problems within the boundaries of subjects or disciplines” (Mittelstrass, 2011, p. 331). But its strategy and interest in the interrogation of knowledge is ultimately one of ‘politics by other means’, following the concern in cultural studies not so much with offering an alternative to or synthesis of existing disciplines, as with scrutinising “the functioning of cultural practices and institutions in the contexts of relations of power of different kinds” (Bennett, 1998, p. 27). The thesis also imagines in its horizon a practical application to cultural policy as Bennett would propose for the project of cultural studies; whether it takes a more critical or a more pragmatic stance ultimately, it would essentially be in keeping with a mission of cultural studies situated within an ethical framework (Zylinska, 2005).

It is not purely incidental that arguments of cultural studies, as represented by Stuart Hall (2005), have found their way to heritage studies, identifying the twin challenges of democratisation and rising cultural relativism against Eurocentric grand narratives, by way of concerns with mainstream and marginalised versions of heritage (cited in Ashworth et al, 2007, pp. 49-50). Heritage studies as a relatively new discipline or field may trace its practical dimension of heritage management to European models in the 19th century, but its first canonical works only emerged in the 1980s, after the creation of legal instruments by international bodies such as UNESCO to safeguard the world’s heritage in the post-World War II era (Carman and Sorensen, 2009, pp. 16-17). The political trend of post-colonialism challenging claims about the past, along with developments of post-structuralism and postmodernity within the academia inspiring critiques of knowledge claims and authority, provided the ground for works like Lowenthal’s The Past is a Foreign Country (1985) and Hewison’s The Heritage Industry (1987), which challenged the use of heritage as part of dominant
ideology, criticising it as a popularisation of the past (see Carman and Sorensen, 2009, pp. 17-18). By the late 1990s, academic discussions on areas such as the value of heritage objects and the ontology of such phenomena were becoming increasingly influential on heritage practice itself (Ibid., p. 21). The 2000s then saw new areas emerging which “reflect a concern with understanding the potentials and roles of heritage in terms of some of the pressing problems the world is encountering” (Ibid., p. 23), such as development policies, climate change and peace-building.

Given such trends, a two-prong approach of cultural studies would arguably be useful in casting a critical look on heritage as constructed knowledge and at the same time keeping a view on the social utility of one’s research with more reflexivity. Stuart Hall (1994) has argued for the necessity of two paradigms in cultural studies, the structuralist strand of Althusser for a conception of structural complexity in how subjective consciousness may be constructed as part of ideology, and the culturalist tradition of Raymond Williams for consideration of specificity in meanings, values and ideals of cultural practices. In terms of research method, cultural studies needs to overcome objectivism by acknowledging subjective elements in the life world and treating “culture as a structure or formation that goes beyond, but embraces, individual subjectivities” (Johnson et al, 2004, p. 48). It requires reflexivity not in an autobiographical sense but in awareness of different aspects of positionality including social and cultural, for self-reflection is about the others as well as the self, it is about Gramsci’s ‘ensemble of relations’, about how power and inequality are negotiated (Ibid., p. 53). As Spivak (2012) notes, there is a habitual belief among most people, “even (or perhaps particularly) when they are cultural relativists, that creation and innovation are their own cultural secret, whereas others are only determined by their cultures” (p. 120). This tendency to think of one’s own culture as dynamic and others as static becomes a political problem when expressed by a powerful group against the less powerful, and that is exactly why cultural studies had to emerge as a subdiscipline in the first place, for “colonisers founded Anthropology in order to know their subjects; Cultural Studies was founded by the colonised in order to question and correct their masters” (Ibid.). Such reflections will also be ultimately crucial in this thesis, as one ponders over evidence of ‘cultural differences’ presumed as the practical challenge of intercultural dialogue, under a certain
perspective of intercultural communication that channels social psychology into the study of cultures.

Notwithstanding this method of critical enquiry from cultural studies, the conceptual framework which forms the basis for discussion in this thesis will engage an epistemological commitment to a naturalistic-pragmatic approach (Faye, 2012) in human sciences, most specifically in the psychological explanations of culture. The mediating factor between these two disciplinary tendencies would be a social constructionist orientation in psychology. While constructionist critiques have jeopardised the claims in the capacity of positivist science to generate transcendent truths beyond history and culture (Gergen, 2001, p. 7), and gone ahead to turn psychology on its head by reconfiguring the psyche as socio-cultural, Gergen would maintain that constructionist arguments, highlighting that language is not mimetic of an independent world, merely remove the privilege of claiming truth beyond community, without obliterating empirical science (Ibid., p. 30). He asserts:

Constructionist metatheory neither denies nor affirms the existence of any mental ‘entities’ or ‘processes’. The constructionist question is not whether the mind ‘really’ exists; constructionism obviates issues of fundamental ontology in favour of questions about the pragmatics of interpretation within communities.

(Ibid., p. 32)

Arguing for a naturalistic reconstruction of human sciences on art, language, history and the like, Faye (2012) grants that it is reasonable if social constructionists hold that humans construct their world in response to social interactions rather than in relation to objective reality, and humans use given concepts of the world not for any instrumental value but to uphold social powers or an established culture (p. 17). However, this by no means implies that the construction of scientific concepts should not be guided by interactions with an objective reality, he contends (Ibid.). In his understanding of naturalisation, “it assumes that phenomena, which are the subject for scientific inquiry, all have an origin in the same natural world and that the methods of one’s investigation shall be consistent with the cognitive capacities that are given to us by nature” (Ibid., p. 32). This means that one can avoid coming into difficulty with the mind-body problem in an ‘epistemological dualism’ (Ibid.), but is not
to be taken to mean that cultures, norms and meanings can therefore be reduced to mental states and hence brain states of individuals, for cultural phenomena are also mediated by communication tools such as language (Ibid., pp. 38-39). Where biology and neuroscience end, human sciences begin, for the latter deal with human thinking, behaviour and expressions which are contingent to nature and evolution, and to be explained only in terms of human intentions and meanings constructed in social norms (Ibid., p. 43). The thrust of this proposed naturalistic-pragmatic approach is that instead of assuming a dichotomy made by Dilthey between explanation in *Naturwissenschaft* and understanding in *Geisteswissenschaft*, interpretation in human sciences can also be epistemically validated by empirical evidence through data which may be textual, pictorial, biographical, historical, psychological or sociological (Ibid., p. 159). This model is naturalistic in its adoption of scientific methods, but also pragmatic since the scientific concepts and theories used to explain the object of study are simply considered as representational tools, not universal categories of the cognitive mind (Ibid., p. 31). Faye’s unification in research practice of human sciences with natural sciences and social sciences is incidentally a refutation of Habermas’ tripartite division which assumed three incompatible interests (Ibid., p. 20).

In a somewhat complementary argument on the fission of sciences, Gergen (2001) would point out that psychology was once kin to hermeneutics as part of *Geisteswissenschaft* in its search of human meanings, and the demise of its humanist discourse on individual intention as well as the rise of behaviourism also marked the impoverishment of cherished cultural institutions such as democracy and ethics under the dominant discourse, in a psychological profession which “has been so captivated by the instrumentalist ethos and its emphasis on problem solving” (p. 33). Mainstream psychology with its implicit support of an individualist ideology not only encouraged an instrumentalist conception which was a perversion of the pragmatist tradition, it often produced a standpoint that human relationships are artificial by-products of otherwise autonomous individuals, suggesting that the social is secondary and derivative (pp. 35-36). In subsequent reconceptualisation however, one saw new families of theories, such as Bruner’s work which drew sustenance from Vygotsky, Bartlett, Mead and others to propose that “it is culture, not biology, that shapes human life and the human mind, that gives meaning to action by
situating its underlying intentional states in an interpretive system” (Brunner, 1990, p. 34; cited in Gergen, 2001, p. 38). In another radical reconceptualisation, Gergen would refer to a perspective on the relational constitution of self, whereby one replaces psychological states and conditions as explanations for action with a “reconstitution of psychological predicates within the sphere of social process” (Ibid., p. 41). His own work is based on discursive psychology (Edwards and Potter, 1992), substituting cognitive for discursive processes in explaining human interaction, including consideration of emotional performances as embodied within language as well as bodily activities, the latter component based on the work Averill (1982) to consider how such performances are embedded in cultural settings.

This diversity of theoretical possibilities leads us to the question of how culture has been dealt with in psychology, over a course of development with much domination by the natural science over the human science paradigm. The journey may be traced back to Wilhelm Wundt’s publication *Völkerpsychologie*, where there was already a concern with alterity in the psychology of people ‘not quite like us’ (Gergen and Gergen, p. 47). Yet interest in cultural context has since waned, with a preoccupation with general laws or principles under empiricist metatheory and behaviourist theory leading one psychologist John W. Williams to opine with confidence that “[i]f modern psychology had developed in, let us say, India, the psychologists there would have discovered most of the principles discovered by the Westerners. (Williams, 1993, p. 102; cited in Gergen and Gergen, 2002, p. 47)”. Empiricist psychology did in fact give way to a form of culturally based inquiry, namely cross-cultural psychology, but an universalising orientation remained, as the vast share of such research attempted either to demonstrate cross-cultural universality of various psychological processes, or to demonstrate cultural variations in some basic or universal psychological process, the latter notably represented by the work of Triandis among others (Gergen and Gergen, 2002, p. 47). The approach of Culture Assimilator, to be discussed at length in this thesis, belongs to this tradition, as its developers Osgood (1977) and Triandis (1972) consider the challenge of ‘critical incidents’ between people of different cultural communities as being essentially one of communication, in terms of making ‘isomorphic attributions’ on others’ behaviour, in other words making appropriate interpretations of others’ intentions which may be due to particular cultural contexts.
Cultural psychology, as represented by Bruner among others on the other hand, is “the study of the way cultural traditions and social practices regulate, express, and transform the human psyche, resulting less in psychic unity for humankind than in ethnic divergences in mind, self, and emotion” (Shweder, 1991, p. 73). It is aligned with cultural anthropology, in particular the conceptualisation of culture as “historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols” according to Clifford Geertz (1973, p. 89). The fact that Geertz has referred to meanings and symbols as the ‘cultural system’, following the usage of sociologist Talcott Parsons in contrast with the social system of norms and institutions, and the personality system in terms of motivations (Ibid.), is significant for the discussion here. In a different perspective, as with social psychologist Alexander Thomas who has come into prominence in Germany in the field of intercultural communication for his adaptation of the Culture Assimilator, culture may also be defined as a system of norms and institutions internalised for one’s behaviour, effectively taking another component in Parsons’ theory of action systems. It begs the questions of how cultural systems and social systems should be differentiated, and whether the latter might be too deterministic, as how criticism has been levelled against Parsons. Incidentally, a more recent perspective in social psychology would be to posit culture as “a set of loosely organised distributed knowledge [as opposed to] a coherent system of meanings” (Chiu and Hong, 2007, p. 788).

For the analysis in this thesis, as to how cultures may be understood across different communities in an interaction process of intercultural dialogue, one shall adopt a conceptual framework based on the Systems Theory of Niklas Luhmann, who has improved on Parsons’ approach by tackling the question of whether systems are open or closed to the environment and in what sense (Holton, 2001, p. 160). More specifically, one shall refer to the Luhmann’s theory of self-referential systems as applied to the construction of social groups (Hejl, 1987; cf. Frindte, 2001, p. 118, cited in Thomas, 2008, p. 20). The concept of self-reference “designates the unity that an element, a process or a system is for itself” (Luhmann, 1995[1984], p. 33), “independent of the cut of observation by others” (Ibid.). A system may be called self-referential “if it itself constitutes the elements that compose it as functional unities and runs reference to this self-constitution through all the relations among these elements” (Ibid.).
Hejl (1987) has subsequently suggested that a social system can be defined as a group of living systems, when two conditions are fulfilled:

1. Each of the living systems must have formed at least a condition in its cognitive subsystem, that is comparable with at least a condition of the cognitive systems of other group members.

2. The living systems must (in their perspectives) integrate with respect to these parallel conditions.

(p. 319)

Or in other words, group members must share some common reality, so as to produce an area of meaningful actions and communication with which one can integrate (Ibid.).

Following the above premises, this thesis argues that a cultural community is a type of social group, which by reproducing itself through the cognitive process of social construction, constitutes a self-referential system which is a closed system in terms of its organisation despite remaining open in interaction with the environment. Furthermore, observation of a system by another “must employ a difference schema whereby the unity of difference is constituted in the observing system and not in the observed one” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 35). This suggests that whether a society or nation forms a single transcultural system or a multicultural system of subsystems is a matter of social construction. The differentiation of a transcultural system from what would otherwise be a multicultural system does not preclude its elements being part of subsystems in a multicultural system at the same time. This model hence accommodates the idea of the plural or postmodern self which may also be supported empirically by psychological science. The concept of the transcultural incidentally follows the concept of Wolfgang Welsch (1994), while the concept of dialogue in a transcultural model in terms of creative engagement and overcoming of identity follows the philosophy of Mikhail Epstein (1999).

With a multicultural model of communities of different cultural values, on the other hand, this thesis will argue that the challenge would be in reaching ‘intercultural understanding’, whether it be through some form of folk psychology, or with the aid of pragmatic knowledge constructed through some modern conceptual tool like the
Culture Assimilator in intercultural communication practice. In the constructivist perspective of Luhmann (1995), understanding happens by social reflexivity through experiencing other systems, “only if one projects the experience of meaning or of meaningful action onto other systems with a system/environment difference of their own” (p. 73). Understanding involves seeing oneself as ‘alter ego’s alter ego’ in every social relation, in order to make others’ behaviour more accessible and easier to anticipate (Ibid., p. 88).

In terms of how another system may be interpreted, it will be argued here that it helps to apply the distinction in Archer’s (1996) sociological framework between Cultural System and Socio-Cultural System which have too often been conflated (p. 7), such that the former would require interpretation of meanings and symbols whereas the latter would involve the causal explanation of how cultural forms come into being. It has to be noted however that with this dualist framework, Archer, referring to Sorokin’s idea of logical and causal integration, has argued that the systems are too complex to assume logical consistency in the former and causal consensus in the latter (Ibid., p. 5) and has criticised the conflation of Cultural System integration and Socio-Cultural System integration in Parsons’ theory (Ibid., p. 35).

These two levels of differentiation, as in the construction of cultural communities as self-referential systems and the interpretation in external observation of cultures as systems of meanings or products of social systems, will be applied to heritage generally and to dance heritage specifically as possible ways of understanding as part of intercultural dialogue. This in principle completes the conceptual framework of analysis in this thesis for intercultural dialogue. Additional components would include political significance in the concept of ‘intercultural dialogue’ as a policy, the psychological aspects and bases of ‘intercultural competence’ in interaction and the semiotic structure of heritage such as dance in the communication of cultural values.

The aim of the thesis in short is to analyse how a cultural heritage such as dance, which communicates cultural values, may be used as a medium for intercultural dialogue in two different models of namely transculturalism and multiculturalism, considering the case study of Singapore involving the heritage of Indian classical dance.
Objectives: 1) To analyse the policy approach of intercultural dialogue in terms of its liberal values, and to analyse the social and psychological dimensions of relevant ‘intercultural competence’, for application to the case study of Singapore as a case study of a culturally diverse nation.

2) To analyse the social and psychological processes in which values are communicated through the material or experiential aspects of cultural heritage, with a specific consideration of dance as a form of cultural heritage.

3) To test the concepts for an approach in intercultural dialogue, based on models of multiculturalism as well as transculturalism, considering the medium of dance heritage, using the example of Singapore involving Indian classical dance.

1.3 Working Definitions of Main Concepts

This section serves to elucidate some main concepts with their working definitions before one proceeds to the thesis proper, and also to provide an overview of the chapters in their actual sequence. The main concepts which still need to be clarified in connection to the theoretical framework described above are namely culture, cultural values, community, heritage and intercultural dialogue.

Given that ‘culture’ is a most contested word and that much of this thesis will involve coming to terms with the question of why it should matter to the modern or postmodern world, it is necessary to rehearse its discussion in cultural studies before coming to a working definition in the main psychological and sociological framework here. Raymond Williams (1961) has identified three major modern senses of the word ‘culture’ – the ‘ideal’ as in certain universal values, the ‘documentary’ as in the body of intellectual and imaginative work, and the ‘social’ as in a particular way of life “which expresses certain meanings and values not only in art and learning but also in institutions and ordinary behaviour” (p. 57). The last sense mentioned would cover what Parsons would mean by culture in a structure of social actions, whereas the second sense provides the focus of a culturalist paradigm in assessing artistic work in relation to particular traditions and societies. Terry Eagleton (2000) however discerns the complications in an all-embracing notion of ‘culture’, as he traces how the word developed from its Latin etymological roots in rural labour, denoting a dialectical relationship with ‘nature’, to the French notion of ‘civilisation’ in terms of
political, economic and technical life, and the German notion of ‘culture’ with “a more narrowly religious, artistic and intellectual reference” (p. 9). “As a synonym of ‘civilisation’, ‘culture’ belonged to the general spirit of Enlightenment, with its cult of secular, progressive self-development” (Ibid.), suggesting an utopian telos, he notes. Whereas ‘civilisation’ would play down national differences, ‘culture’ would tend to highlight them, hence giving rise to a tension (Ibid.). Culture assumed its meaning as a distinctive way of life from the German Idealists onwards, as Herder attacked universalism of the Enlightenment and insisted that culture should refer to a diversity of specific forms of life (Ibid., p. 12). But in such a sense of plurality, culture denotes both fact and value in a “fusion of descriptive and normative” (Ibid., p. 13), which suggests that plurality is a value in itself, rendering the concept powerless against racism or capitalism which can also claim heterogeneity (Ibid., p. 15).

Eagleton hence argues that the idea of ‘culture’, for all the three aspects that Williams observes, lacks a sense of agency and collective project that ‘civilisation’ provides awareness for (Ibid., p. 28). In its specialised sense in reference to the arts for instance, it appears to suggest that intellectual activity in science, philosophy, politics and economics cannot be regarded as creative or imaginative, “that ‘civilised’ values are now to be found only in fantasy” (Ibid., p. 16). He thus criticises the idea of freedom that postmodernism appears to celebrate, whereby “the whole point of art was its pointlessness” (Ibid.), “[a]rt could now model the good life not by representing it but simply by being itself […] offering the scandal of its own pointlessly self-delighting existence as a silent critique of exchange-value and instrumental rationality” (Ibid.). This question of whether or how the arts can avail itself to social significance is also one that is asked in this thesis of cultural heritage.

In the unified theorisation of culture and agency in social structure according to Archer (1996), the Cultural System (CS) also exerts causal influences on Socio-Cultural (S-C) level although the CS is understood here as the register of propositions or ‘libraries’ of what exist in a given social unit at a particular time (pp. 275-277). In the interpenetration of systems, the material interest groups which may be dominant also “become subject to some form of situational logic in the cultural domain” (Ibid., p. 285) in a struggle of belief or ideology, as “no structural advantage which is gained from culture ever comes for free” (Ibid.). In her concept of the
Cultural System, Archer refers to what Popper (1978) denotes as ‘world 3’ knowledge, as in the world of the products of the human mind, including religious myths, scientific conjectures or artistic expressions which may be embodied in physical objects. Luhmann (1999) has a corresponding perspective of culture, which does not follow Parsons’ perspective in terms of a component of action, but instead a historical perspective associated with symbols and signs (p. 32). He speaks of culture as “Gedächtnis sozialer Systeme” (Ibid., p. 47) or the memory of social systems, in other words of societies or communities, which provides meaning in the recursive social communication, not simply as an archive whereby everything of the historical past is saved in proper order, but involving constant renewal from moment to moment with no fixed corpus of signs (Ibid., p. 45).

For the purpose of this thesis, culture may hence be summarised as the knowledge of a community at any given time in the form of symbols, meanings or values, be it in religion, science or the arts, which provides meaning in social interaction, communication or action. This may also be appreciated as an elaboration on Max Weber’s definition of culture as “a finite segment of the meaningless infinity of the world process, a segment on which human beings confer meaning and significance” (1949, p. 81); a definition which suggested, namely, that culture is a value concept (Koch, 1993, p. 130).

Indeed as one proceeds to seek a definition of ‘cultural value’, one has to trace its study in sociology back to Weber in order to consider how subsequent approaches to the topic have diverged in sociology as well as cross-cultural psychology. Weber has suggested that there is no ‘objective’ scientific analysis of culture, as “[a]ll knowledge of cultural reality... is always knowledge from particular points of view” (Ibid.), including the attribution of universal ‘cultural values’ consciously or unconsciously to relevance of knowledge (Ibid., p. 82). He hence proposed to construct ideal types as a means to reveal cultural phenomena in their conditions and significance (Ibid., p. 92), for which the term ‘value’ finds meaning as an ideal type which allows the enumeration of Wertbeziehung or value relation, for example in conflicting interests of agriculture (Ibid., pp. 107-108). The concept of ‘value relation’ which Weber took from neo-Kantian philosopher Heinrich Rickert provided a philosophical basis for methodology of the historical sciences (Bruun, 2001, p. 149).
Weber’s concept of value rationality has been a subject of much speculation and debate among scholars due to its fragmentary nature, which also gave room for Parsons to take this legacy of German sociology to a different direction from Weber’s investigation on the distinctiveness of western modernity (Oakes, 2003, pp. 27-28). Weber has identified six value spheres, namely modern economy, politics, intellectualism, religion, aesthetics and erotic love, but these do not admit the possibility of some fundamental value from which others can be derived, nor any form of hierarchy, such that any position presupposes a plurality of conflicting values and axioms as a consequence of Eigengesetzlichkeit or autonomous logic in each value sphere (Ibid., pp. 29-30). Weber, influenced by Kantian rationalism and 19th-century romanticism in his value commitments (Koch, 1993, p. 124ff), also critiqued modern institutions by creating a fourfold typology of rationality in social life, namely the ‘practical’, ‘theoretical’, ‘substantive’ and ‘formal’, some of which could in turn be configured with anthropological characteristics of individuals in four types of social action, namely traditional, affectual, value rational and means-end rationality. Of these, formal and practical rationality are associated with means-end calculation, and only value-rational action, oriented to substantive rationality, has the potential to introduce methodical ways of life, as only substantive rationalities place psychological premiums on ethical action (Kalberg, 1980, p. 1165). With Parsons’ adaptation of the social action typology, however, the ethical question of value rationality soon turned into one of value orientation into a psychological question of value orientation.

Subsequently, theorists in social psychology and intercultural communication have viewed ‘values’ as “the criteria people use to select and justify actions and to evaluate people (including the self) and events” (Schwartz, 1992, p. 1, online). Under this view, values refer to criteria for action, rather than qualities inherent in objects (Ibid.). This dates back to the definition of value in the 1950s by anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn: “A conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means and ends of action. (Kluckhohn, 1951, p. 395; cited in Hills, 2002, online)” He argued that people typically feel their own cultural beliefs and practices are normal and natural, whereas those of others are strange, inferior or abnormal. Based on his ideas, Florence Kluckhohn and Fred Strodtbeck (1961)
developed their Values Orientation Theory. They came up with questions on five different aspects of universal problems and conditions, to which preferred solutions or views would indicate the values espoused by a society: Time (past / present / future); humanity and natural environment (mastery / harmonious / submissive); relating to other people (hierarchical / collateral / individualistic); motive for behaving (being / being-in-becoming / doing); nature of human nature (evil / mixed / neutral; mutable / immutable) (see Hills, 2002, online; Neuliep, 2012, p. 71).

Since then, there have been other theories developed in cross-cultural psychology as based on the idea of the psychic unity of mankind. Social psychologist Milton Rokeach (1972) for instance has argued that values are beliefs relating to ‘modes of conduct’ and ‘end-states of existence’: “To say that a person ‘has a value’ is to say that he [or she] has an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally and socially preferable to alternative modes of conduct or end-states of existence” (pp. 159-160; cited in Gudykunst and Kim, 2003, p. 60). Rokeach’s Value Survey involves 36 concepts, whereby respondents have to rank 18 end-states of existence as ‘terminal values’ and 18 modes of conduct as ‘instrumental values’ in terms of importance in life, as a means to measure personal and social values among various groups (Brathwaithe and Law, 1985, p. 250). In another model, Schwartz has developed a value structure theory of 11 distinct motivational value types based on three universal human requirements for response: biological needs of individuals; need for social coordination; survival and welfare needs of groups (see Neuliep, 2012, p. 71).

One theorist who deserves mention on the topic of cultural values is Elizabeth Anderson (1993) with her discussion on pluralism in value and rational action. Among other things, she has made an important distinction between the activities of valuing and evaluation: “In evaluation, people determine how far something meets the particular standards they set for it. In valuing something, people meet certain standards for caring about it, although they may be unaware of, may not endorse, and may not try to govern their actions by those standards. (p. 5)” This would have implication on the observation of others’ action as basis for discussion of cultural values.
The concept of ‘community’ has been discussed in different senses from a myriad of perspectives cutting across sociology, anthropology and political science. The first clear sociological definition emerged in 1915 when it was coined by C.J. Galpin in relation to delineating rural communities in terms of trade and service areas surrounding a central village (Harper and Dunham, 1959; cited in Smith, M., 2001). Since then the concept has been approached in range of different ways, including first of all a territorial sense, as in ‘locality’; secondly, in terms of shared common characteristics such as ethnic origins, religious beliefs, or even common interests as in occupations or cyber-communities; and thirdly, in either a strong form of ‘communion’ or a weaker sense of attachment to a place, group or idea (Crow and Allen, 1995, Hoggett, 1997, Lee and Newby, 1983, Willmott, 1986; cited in Smith, M., 2001).

The idea of locality, as one sense in the idea of ‘community’, has generally been associated with “a set of close-knit social relationships based on strong kinship ties and length of residence” (Featherstone, 2003, p. 343). Much sociological research on localities has been influenced by an assumption of social change from simpler, more direct and strongly bonded social relationships, for example in the ideal types of Tonnies’ (1955) *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, used to emphasise the difference between small and relatively isolated integrated communities based on primary relationships with emotional bonding, and more anonymous and instrumental secondary associations of the modern urbanity (Ibid.). Appadurai makes a distinction between ‘locality’ and ‘neighbourhood’, viewing locality as “primarily relational and contextual rather than as scalar or spatial” (1996, p. 178), and seeing it as a complex phenomenological quality, while using the term neighbourhood to refer to “social forms in which locality, as a dimension or value, is variably realised” (Ibid., 179). He argues that the production of locality, as a structure of feeling and as a property of social life, is increasingly a struggle, due to factors such as the modern nation defining all neighbourhoods under forms of allegiance and affiliation, and the growing disjuncture between territory and collective social movement (Ibid., p. 189). The trends of globalisation have also made the imagination of community, as locality, seem problematic.
For the purpose of this thesis, different cultural communities will be assumed as constituting their own cultural systems in meanings and values. This is particular relevant when considering a communitarian perspective that communities should be characterised by “strong bonds and the moral voice” (Etzioni, 1998, p. xiv) as the essence. Coming to the case study of Singapore as a ‘multicultural’ society, the concept of community will also relate specifically to the idea of ‘ethnicity’, which also connotes a kind of social identity as it refers to “an aspect of social relationship between agents who consider themselves as culturally distinctive from members of other groups with whom they have a minimum of regular interaction” (Eriksen, 2002, p. 12). Ethnicity in this case is constructed under a certain ideology of multiracialism, relating to a form of shared characteristics as well as interests. One may concur with the position of Benedict Anderson (1991) that “all communities larger than the primordial village of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined” (cited in Featherstone, 2003, p. 346). Another useful perspective on community to be referred to will be that of social anthropologist Anthony P. Cohen, who deals with community as being symbolically constructed, whereby boundaries of communities, be it physical, religious or linguistics, may be considered “as existing in the minds of the beholders” (1985, p. 12), seen in very different ways not only by people on either side but also by people on the same side. Cohen incidentally also considers the social and psychological effects of rituals in strengthening a sense of identity and a sense of place (Cohen, 1985, p. 50), which may serve as a useful reference in considering the social functions of intangible heritage such as the performance of dance.

Heritage in the framework of this thesis will be considered as objects, sites, performances or other expressions which embody certain cultural values or meanings and provide a sense of the past to a community. This will be further elaborated with reference to recent literature in heritage studies.

Last but not least, some clarification would have to be reiterated with regards to ‘intercultural dialogue’ and related concepts to be discussed in this thesis, to distinguish between the reference to an ideal state and the referring to a social process in a scientific perspective, which may yet be used to justify the agenda of particular ideals. If one is to encapsulate intercultural dialogue as a process of where
cultural differences may be overcome through interaction and open exchange, it may be argued that it involves not only the ‘understanding’ of cultural differences but also the overcoming of perceptions of cultural differences. In either case, one would still face the dilemma between privileging the individual freedom in interpreting or adopting cultures and respecting the rights of communities with their particularities in culture, not to mention an assumption of overriding interest in social cohesion which may be played either way. Hence intercultural dialogue as an ideal state would still have to dissected; in fact, the dilemma as described above is also one found between liberal multiculturalism and communitarianism. That suggests that intercultural dialogue may be better understood as an ideal of normativity proposed for a democratic process of discourse exchange to overcome differences.

Where public policies go, ‘intercultural dialogue’ has been declared as a new alternative in building inclusive societies, placed in contrast to the older policy approaches of ‘assimilation’ and ‘multiculturalism’ which have been deemed problematic or inadequate (Council of Europe, 2008, p. 9). But one has to be careful with falling into a false trichotomy here, for these concepts are not all mutually exclusive. The concept of assimilation in a socio-political sense has long referred to normative expectations and public policies associated in a negative sense with “harshly homogenising state projects” (Brubaker, 2001, p. 533) such as the Americanisation movement after World War I or the imperial effort to ‘Germanise’ a Polish-speaking borderland. The tendency is to see assimilation as social process at an aggregate level rather than at the level of individual persons (Ibid., pp. 542-543). However, one may also understand ‘assimilation’ in a psychological sense in terms of a learning process which involves the assimilation of objects or events into a scheme of action (Piaget, 1967, p. 14; cited in von Glaserfeld, 1996, p. 103), which may be developed as an approach of liberal learning on the basis of individual freedom. What it may in reality imply in an intercultural context, involving an intangible cultural heritage such as dance, would be part of the task in this thesis to explore, as it evaluates and critiques an approach of intercultural competence such as the Culture Assimilator, within a larger framework of cultural and socio-cultural systems.

Considering intercultural dialogue as the pivotal theme, the thesis proper basically consists of two halves in overview. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 serve to configure the
general conceptual framework of intercultural dialogue, by providing a theoretical discussion on the concepts of culture and intercultural dialogue, centring on the perspective of social psychology, and introducing the ideal types of multiculturalism and transculturalism as two possible models in which intercultural dialogue as interaction between people of different communities may take place. Chapters 5 and 6 serve to apply this framework to heritage studies, and then to the specific example of dance as a form of cultural heritage, by analysing the multicultural and transcultural models of intercultural dialogue in contrast. The following is a more detailed account of the chapters to come:

Chapter 2 discusses how culture is defined in a wide range of perspectives from anthropology, sociology, social psychology and cultural studies. It will identify the functionalist perspective in Talcott Parsons’ General Theory of Action Systems as a key moment when the question of cultural values in sociology, discussed by Weber in terms of ‘value rationality’, becomes relegated to a question of social behaviour, as a subcomponent of action systems in terms of ‘value orientation’ whereby modern and traditional values are postulated as oppositional. It will then demonstrate the pitfalls when such conception of culture as ‘orientation system’ is inherited by practitioners in the field of intercultural communication to study cultural differences, legitimised as a form of intercultural psychology.

The last section of the chapter will consider the challenges posed by globalisation, in which culture may be used as an ideological legitimation of power as Wallerstein argues in his World System Theory, while consciousness cultural differences may be heightened through interpenetration of globality and locality as Robertson points out with the example of religious fundamentalism. Perspectives of cultural studies and postcolonial studies will help to problematise the construction of culture that sets the Self against the Other. Such inputs incidentally reflect the relevance of an intercultural studies that incorporates an understanding of the phenomenon of globalisation, beyond a paradigm of intercultural communication that may emphasise on surveying cultural differences.

Chapter 3 comprises two parts, as it considers intercultural dialogue from the perspectives of political theory and social psychology. Firstly, it analyses intercultural dialogue as an ideal state or normative expectation, in comparison with older policy
approaches of assimilation and multiculturalism, in terms of its goal in social cohesion, as well as its liberal values of liberty and pluralism. Following Parekh’s (2000) argument that multiculturalism be understood not as a form of identity politics but as a form of value pluralism, one may consider ‘multiculturalism’ as a basis for intercultural dialogue. This view of multiculturalism may be seen as an expansion and modification from Charles Taylor’s politics of recognition. The call of assimilation on the other hand may be seen as suffering the contradictions of modernity, between the principles of equality and freedom and the function of nation-building. A discussion on the false dichotomy between liberalism and communitarianism will also be included here.

In the second section, intercultural dialogue is considered as a social process of interaction between people of different communities. It examines the assumption that intercultural dialogue may be understood simply as a specific form of intercultural communication, according to Alexander Thomas in *Psychologie des interkulturellen Dialogs* (2008), which outlines the state of the art in Germany and beyond on the topic. While Thomas references the theory of Symbolic Interactionism based on the work of G.H. Mead (1968), the theory of Communicative Action by Habermas (1996), and the theory of Self-referential System by Luhmann (1981), his own approach for intercultural dialogue ultimately falls back on an intercultural competence framework which hinges on the idea of appropriately attributing intentions in any *kulturelle Überschneidungssituation* – translated here as ‘cross-cultural’ situations due to an assumption here of cultural systems being distinctly different, as opposed to having a more dynamic relation. It will be argued that such critical incidents, which have been the source of primary data in the Culture Assimilator method of intercultural training since 1960s, would remain useful as a reference in discussing the challenge of differences in normativity. However, its use as a basis to postulate contrasting *Kulturstandards* (Thomas, 2011) or ‘cultural standards’ would be problematic as it omits other important perspectives, such as cultural psychology and moral psychology.

His listing of aspects in intercultural competence also needs further elucidation, not to mention missing the imagination of intercultural learning in terms of liberal learning following the philosophy of Dewey or Oakeshott. A premise based on ‘intercultural
understanding’ also misses the perspective of intercultural dialogue as transformative practice like what Levinas has proposed in the Self towards the Other.

Chapter 4 introduces the concept of transculturality according to Welsch (1994) who suggests that the imagination of cultures as closed spheres is fictional and not useful for dialogue. Social psychology may in fact provide evidence of the plural or postmodern self in a globalised society. In any case, a transcultural model of culture may be accommodated alongside a multicultural model if one adopts a constructivist perspective in Luhmann’s Systems Theory. Hall (1996) has also argued that identity is contingent and always constructed through relation to the Other, relating it to Lacan’s mirror phase as well as Althusser’s notion of interpellation in the structure of ideology.

One moves on to a view of race-based classification as legitimising tool of colonialism and capitalism, which may be illustrated in the example of the ideology of ‘multiracial meritocracy’ in postcolonial Singapore. It may be argued that Singapore is lacking in an approach of intercultural dialogue, based on the lack of social cohesion in its ‘multiracial’ society and the lack of liberal democracy with its state-dominated ‘communitarian’ policies, which may be observed in different spheres of social life. It will be maintained that Singapore’s ideology of the ‘Asian modern’ should not be understood merely in terms of a conviction in communitarianism but in terms of neo-liberalist policies for economic globalisation. The notion of nationalism will also be analysed with reference to the thoughts of Gellner (1983), Chatterjee (1986) and Hobsbawm (1992) among other perspectives.

Chapter 5 reviews the more recent scholarship in heritage studies to explore the questions of what constitute heritage and how heritage is relevant to identity politics but also provides a medium for intercultural dialogue. First of all, it considers heritage as comprising the aspects of ideals or values as well as materiality (Davison, 2008), tracing it back to Tylor’s study of objects of material culture as manifestation of culture. It will be maintained, following Tilley (2006), that values and social relations do not exist prior to cultural forms, though the relationship between these tangible and intangible aspects in heritage may be understood with the concept of objectification (cf. Byrne, 2008) derived from Hegel, as the embodiment of an idea in material form. The process of objectification may be described as a result of
habitualisation and institutionalisation, from a perspective of social construction according to Berger and Luckmann (1967). But an intangible heritage such as dance, with its performative nature, cannot be reduced to a passive form of habitualisation, but instead has to be understood as analogous to rituals which are communicative action forms of symbols (Luckmann, 2007).

Another aspect of heritage is the sense of the past that it embodies, sometimes criticised as “a travesty of history” (Lowenthal, 1996, p. 121), as it privileges the material and aesthetic aspects of culture (Kuutma, 2009). From a psychological perspective, heritage practice may be understood as active form of remembering (Wertsch, 2002, cited in Smith and Waterton, 2009, p. 293). The political interest in heritage practice may be seen in heritage policies in plural societies which range from an assimilation model to the melting model, the mosaic model and so on (Ashworth et al, 2007). From a survey of relevant literature in heritage studies, the existing concepts for intercultural dialogue have been more centred on the overcoming of differences in cultural identity than on the idea of liberal learning, even where a transcultural model goes.

The second half of the chapter focuses on dance as heritage, beginning with a review of how dance has been analysed through the course of development in social anthropology. It will then discuss the virtual power of dance in transmitting cultural values and meanings as a form of cultural heritage, based on a semiotic approach, also incorporating Turner’s (1982) perspective of dance as ritual drama reflecting social relations. Finally, it will consider the political use of dance in the representation of national identities.

Chapter 6 will apply concepts of intercultural dialogue, as differentiated into the transcultural and multicultural models, to the case study of Singapore, considering in particular the use of Indian classical dance as a medium. For the transcultural model, it will be based largely on the perspectives of creative engagement by Epstein’s (1999), who emphasises not only the fluidity of cultural identities akin to what Homi Bhabha calls the ‘third zone’, but also a principle of self-differentiation following Derrida. Applying these notions to the field of dance, the chapter will then review the imagination of intercultural dialogue in the works of various dance scholars, including Lengel (2005) who focuses on the transcending of cultural identity, and Foster (2009).
who discusses pedagogical practices for dancers in the appreciation of ‘world dance forms’. It will also note how a theatrical practice of ‘interculturalism’ employing forms of dance heritage may indirectly serve a state ideology of the ‘Asian modern’ in the case of Singapore.

Coming to the multicultural model, the chapter will borrow the idea of critical situations from the Culture Assimilator method of intercultural training, in order to highlight potential conflicts that may be heighten a sense of cultural differences between the Chinese and Indian communities through the exoticised heritage of Indian classical dance. Possible themes of cultural differences, based on dimensions of cultural values discussed in the paradigm of intercultural communication, will however be deconstructed. In the last section, one will discuss the concept of intercultural learning considering psychological aspects of ‘intercultural competence’ in empathy and open-mindedness.

Chapter 7 as the conclusion will recapitulate the arguments in the foregoing chapters and propose recommendations for further research on intercultural dialogue and cultural heritage in policy studies.

In short, it is hoped that this humble effort of a doctoral thesis, coming first and foremost from the perspectives of intercultural studies, will contribute to an expanding scope of knowledge in heritage studies, based on the interest in a ‘zukunftssorientierte’ or future-oriented concept for the interpretation of cultural heritage in a globalised world (Albert, 2000, p. 21). In keeping with the interdisciplinary research at the Brandenburg University of Technology Cottbus-Senftenberg, a new paradigm for heritage studies has been thus outlined in *Understanding Heritage - Perspectives in Heritage Studies*, the first in a series of publications: “Heritage today, more than ever, is understood for its relevance to human development. As such, the protection and use of heritage is conceived as a potential that shapes identities and builds peace (Albert, 2013, p. 14).” The analysis in this thesis may hopefully help to suggest some trails for further research on the challenges in heritage policy towards peace and harmony.
2. CONCEPTS OF CULTURE IN MODERNITY AND BEYOND

This chapter aims to explore the concept of culture from some of the major perspectives under anthropology, sociology, psychology and cultural studies, in order to prepare for discussion in the later chapters with regards to the main concern of this thesis, namely the challenges of intercultural dialogue (Chapter 3), for which one may involve dance as a form of intangible cultural heritage (Chapter 5) as a medium (Chapter 6). The chapter here will begin in Section 2.1 with perspectives on culture in the discipline of anthropology as a study of cultural variation. This is presented in a roughly chronological order, or more importantly in order of the theoretical development, explaining each approach as a reaction to whatever previous perspective that may be deemed problematic or inadequate, ending with some considerations of how the Cultural System may tend to be isolated from a larger social framework in anthropological studies.

In Section 2.2, we shall turn to a particular perspective on culture as ‘orientation system’, which may be understood as reflecting an interest in the rationalisation of the modern society, in contrast to the study of culture in terms of the diversity of traditional societies. This will involve a functionalist perspective embedded within a framework of intercultural competence that may be legitimised with the discipline of social psychology, which has to be understood in context with the origins of such a perspective on culture in classical and modern sociology as represented by the work of Talcott Parsons, to be discussed in Section 2.2.1. It will be demonstrated that the study of ‘intercultural psychology’ in Germany, as represented by the work of Alexander Thomas, exhibits particular assumptions of cultural differences in its theoretical framework due to specific research interests. It will also critique the limitations of Parsons’ framework on how the Cultural System relates to social action.

The chapter will conclude with a discussion in Section 2.3 on the need for intercultural dialogue to overcome cultural differences. This is contextualised under the trends of globalisation, caught between modernity and postmodernity, which presents issues not only of conflicts that are heightened through a sense of global consciousness but also of the use of culture as an ideological tool by those in political power. Citing the World Systems Theory in particular, it will present an
alternative perspective on the placing of Cultural System in relation to the Social System. The discussion will also point to the need of perspectives in cultural studies, which serves to re-examine the normative structure in concepts of culture.

2.1 What is Culture? – Perspectives in Anthropology

This section will provide an overview of some theoretical perspectives on culture in various schools of thoughts in anthropology, including culture as learned capability, culture as personality, culture as structural system, culture as social life, culture as adaptive system and culture as system of meanings. These perspectives have been informed by different approaches of other disciplines, such as sociology, psychology and semiotics.

While anthropology is clearly not the only discipline studying culture and society, what makes it unique would be its production of knowledge on actual cultural variation in the world and the methods and theoretical perspectives it uses which enable practitioners “to explore, compare and understand these varied expressions of the human condition” (Eriksen, 2004, p. 7) One may understand anthropology for a start as “the comparative study of culture and society, with a focus on local life” (Ibid., p. 9; cf. Vivelo, 1978, p. 4), though the study of local life in traditional societies through ethnographic fieldwork is no longer its main method as it used to be (Eriksen, 2004, p. 8).

Anthropology has seen many shifts in its long development since the mid-19th century, with the object of its study being humankind in all his biological, historical, linguistic and cultural diversity, as it spanned a range of approaches from the natural scientific and positivistic to the historical and hermeneutic (Gable and Handler, 2008, p. 26). In practice, it developed as the science of people set apart from the Western civilisation, ‘the people without history’ (Wolf, 1982; cited in Ibid.). The discipline was notably institutionalised in North America as containing the sub-fields of archaeology, linguistics, and physical and cultural anthropology, whereas in Great Britain and Europe, social and cultural anthropology or ‘ethnology’ tended to be imagined as an independent branch of sociology (Kuper, 1973; cited in Ibid., p. 26).
The difference between the two outlooks is significant, as practitioners of the British tradition often eschewed the word ‘cultures’ in favour of the word ‘societies’ when they referred to ‘primitive’, ‘rural’, ‘pre-capitalist’ or ‘non-Western’ societies (Gable and Handler, 2008, p. 33). Being ‘social anthropologists’, they tended to divide human actions into the social and the cultural. The social generally takes precedence as it pertains to interests, goals and organisation; whereas the ‘cultural’ is associated particularly with things or practices that were ‘not obviously useful’, such as games, art, myth, beliefs in spirits and practices of ritual and ceremony (Ibid., p. 34). This reflects a perspective characterised by the discourse of functionalism (Ibid.) which also forms a main theoretical reference in this thesis.

A most classic definition of culture in anthropology, one which would also be cited in a discussion on cultural heritage by Jokilehto (2005, p. 4) of ICCROM, has been that by Edward Burnett Tylor in *Primitive Culture* (1871). Culture according to Tylor refers to “that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society” (Tylor, 1871; see McGee ed., 2011, p. 30). It has to be noted, however, that ‘culture’ is used here as a synonym for ‘civilisation’ in “its various grades” (Ibid., p. 31), whereby Tylor considers it the task of ethnography to study ‘laws’ of human thought and action between civilisation of the ‘lower tribes’ and civilisation of the ‘higher nations’ (Ibid.).

The concept underlying Tylor’s definition here is one of culture as learned or acquired behaviour and capabilities. On a positive note, that implies an acceptance of human diversity by understanding culture as a result of nurture rather than nature, under Tylor’s belief in the psychic unity of mankind (Gable and Handler, 2008, p. 28). Yet it also betrays an assumption in the progress and evolution of mankind, which would immediately be deemed problematic today and can best be appreciated as a reaction back then to the humanist and pessimist view of Matthew Arnold, who thought that despite the advance of civilisation in steel and railroads as part of the industrial revolution, ‘culture’, as that inward cultivation, ‘sweetness and light’, had declined (Arnold, 1868; cited in Ibid.). Tylor not only maintained that humanity has progressed in the material as well as the moral realm, he also considered ‘primitive
religion’ and ‘superstition’ as doomed under inevitable progress of civilisation (Gable and Handler, 2008, p. 28).

But this evolutionist bias also has to be understood in the context of Tylor’s attempt to demonstrate that man’s spiritual or cultural life, encompassing religious belief, custom and art, is also a subject for scientific study, that it is also governed by the same natural laws of progress, just as man’s material life in which cultural elements come to a specific group through alternative processes of independent invention, inheritance and transmission (Stocking, 1963, pp. 4-5). Believing in a diffusionist view, that civilisation is more often propagated than developed, Tylor used a comparative method to classifying groups of arts, beliefs and customs as cultural elements, just as one would catalogue species of plants and animals, in order to reconstruct some order of historical evolution (Ibid., p. 5). He also placed different races in a hierarchy of culture in terms of scientific knowledge, moral principles and the degree of social and political organisation (Ibid., p. 6). In summary, Stocking notes that the limitations of Tylor lie on one hand in him taking a humanist idea of culture to fit into a framework of progressive social evolutionism, and on the other hand in his purpose in analysing evolution which resulted in a tendency to place great emphasis on artefacts or objects of material culture as cultural manifestations (Ibid., p. 9). One may say that a comparative method in itself is in keeping with the idea of scientific study, but his assumption in the diffusion of culture from particular centres of civilisation is problematic, as with such interpretations of archaeological evidence based on an interest in demonstrating a hierarchy in evolution.

Such humanist and evolutionist notions of culture in terms of civilisation or progress in scientific and aesthetic knowledge were soon replaced by the argument of Franz Boas that human society is marked by a plurality of distinct cultures or notions, a position which made him a major force in anthropology despite not having developed a culture concept specifically (Stocking, 1968, p. 199; cited in Ulin, 2001, p. 27). Boas, who helped to develop the methods of the four-field approach in American anthropology, used these methods to counter racist attitudes and social inequality of late 19th-century American society, by demonstrating convincingly that there was no inherent relation between race, language and culture, and hence no inferior races, languages or cultures (Ulin, 2001, p. 28).
Where epistemological foundation is concerned, Boas was very much led by a concept of psychological law and methods of natural sciences (Ibid.), for instance in his suspicion that the cultural background of the human subject was an irreducible factor in the perception of colours (Ibid., p. 29). Whether Boas’ epistemology was based on a radical monism for the psychological subject, rather than on a Hegelian philosophy of social life constituted through an intersubjective process, may be left open as a question, according to Ulin (Ibid., pp. 30-31). But Ulin observes that Boas had difficulty in resolving the contradictions between universal psychological laws and the formative activity of human co-subjects, for instance between an assumption of the unconscious nature of linguistic phenomena like grammatical conventions and the question of how possibility of interlocutors reflecting on such formal properties may come about (Ibid., p. 31). For Boas, the simple answer to throwing light on differences in cultural phenomena would also be history (Ibid., p. 32). However, he rejected taking into consideration the native’s point of view in a historical reconstruction, arguing that explanation of customs given by the native is generally a result of speculation and by no means true (Boas, 1940, p. 563; cited in Ulin, 2001, p. 32). He hence established the task of ethnology as the inductive collection of data and their interpretation based on cultural context, oriented towards discovery of psychological laws; yet he was unable to develop general laws as such or to reveal the substantive nature of such laws (Ulin, 2001, p. 33). Ulin hence concludes that by removing self-understanding from the meaning of human actions and by obscuring the intersubjective nature of cultural phenomena, Boas’ approach is one as an anthropologist as well as a natural scientist (Ibid.).

With evolutionists like Tylor, the methodological assumption was that in order to understand people of other cultures, one “must attribute to them aims and motives of the sort that we, too, have” (Cook, 1999, p. 53), and hence Tylor would assume that the myths were produced with the same motivation that led to sciences in the modern society and therefore would soon be replaced as reason prevails (see Ibid., pp. 53-54). But Boas would argue against the assumption of evolutionists that the same phenomenon is always due to the same causes, citing the example of how similar geometrical designs in primitive art may originate from naturalistic forms, from technical motives or from symbols (see Ibid., p. 59). Cook (1999) suggests that the common description of Boas as a cultural or moral relativist is not accurate although
he criticised the placing of cultures in hierarchy; Boas only cautioned against committing a projection error that “the conduct which is condemned in our culture is the same conduct that is condoned in some other” (p. 66), for example in assessing the motive for performing a human sacrifice, which may be very different in motivation for conduct one may declare as murder (ibid., p. 69). It may help at this juncture to clarify that cultural relativism may refer more specifically to a point of view in which one realises “the problem of finding valid cross-cultural norms” (Herskovits, 1958, p. 270; cited in Lukes, 2008, p. 36), or the proposition that “the rightness of what is done by another people follows from their view of things, not from ours” (Redfield, 1962, pp. 458-459; cited in Lukes, 2008, p. 38). Cook (1999, p. 74) cites Boas in writing that “the study of human cultures should not lead to a relativistic attitude toward ethical standards” (Boas, 1938, p. 202). However, that still leaves a difficulty as to how one may gain access to the meaning of conduct in another cultural setting without finding analogy in one’s own culture (Lukes, 2008, p. 74).

Boasian anthropology, with its emphasis on viewing cultures holistically within their own contexts (Ibid., p. 37), has in any case been associated with the legacy of cultural relativism, notably in the work of Ruth Benedict, who represented a perspective on cultures described as personalities. In *Patterns of Culture* (1934), she writes of culture not only in terms of patterns in customs but also as ways of thinking, as notably expressed in her metaphor of vision (Gable and Handler, 2008, p. 31). She describes culture as a lens through which people see the world: “No man ever looks at the world with pristine eyes. He sees it edited by a definite set of customs and institutions and ways of thinking. Even in his philosophical probing he cannot go behind these stereotypes; his very concepts of the true and the false will still have reference to his particular traditional customs. (Benedict, 1934, p. 2)” According to her, a culture becomes integrated over time through key values, though it may also fail to integrate aspects of collective experience (Ibid., pp. 223-226). She claims that one is thus able to describe the pattern of a culture as a scientist, as she imagines culture as being animated by an organising energy to ‘integrate’ the multiplicity of people’s experiences as a coherent way of life (Gable and Handler, 2008, p. 31). She has analysed the ‘primitive cultures’ of the Zuni, the Dobu and the Kwakiutl and labelled them with catchwords of personality types like ‘Apollonian’ and ‘Dionysian’, words borrowed from Nietzsche. Like other scholars of the ‘culture and personality’
movement, she attempted to find general traits, and culture in this way is seen as a closed system that houses finite personalities (Handler, 1986; cited in Ryang, 2004, online). But if one presumed that the major tenet of cultural relativism was to abstain from value judgment, Benedict was certainly unable to prevent such intrusions, as she would describe the Dobu as “lawless and treacherous” while praising the Zuni for their peaceful mode of interaction and freedom from a sense of sin (Selznick, 1992, p. 113; cited in Lukes, 2008, p. 41).

The next major perspective on culture comes from structuralism, an approach derived from linguistics. The influence of structuralism on anthropology first surfaced in the work of Boasian anthropologist Edward Sapir, who developed linguistic anthropology and imagined cultures as non-rational and arbitrary systems of structuring the world in abstract thoughts. He eventually propagated a position, along with his protégé Benjamin Lee Whorf, that language as a system of abstractions of categories allows the human mind to make sense of an infinitely complex natural world, hence language influences cognitive processes, as a logical or deductive system that is arbitrary from the point of view of others (Sapir, 1921, Whorf, 1956; cited in Gable and Handler, 2008, p. 30). Interestingly, whereas their assumptions in structuralism would emphasise that different societies live in distinct worlds due to different language habits, a different perspective in anthropology would emphasise the universal properties despite such differences, as one sees in the work of Levi-Strauss.

Levi-Strauss views cultures as symbolic systems that are creations of the mind, whereby the interest for him lies in discovering the underlying ‘deep structure’ of cultural domains, such as myths, art, kinship and language, or in other words the basic principles of the mind that generate a variety of cultural elaborations (see Keesing, 1974, p. 78). Levi-Strauss holds that the physical environment provides humans with the raw materials which universal processes of the mind elaborate into diverse but formally similar patterns based on logic of binary contrast, relations and transformations just as in the logic of languages (Ibid.) The social significance of this view lies in the rejection of a contrast between the modern and the ‘primitive’ mind, for Levi-Strauss, as evident in his works like The Savage Mind (1966). Arguing against Malinowski’s assumption from a functionalist perspective that ‘primitive’
people are determined by the basic needs of life such as subsistence and sexual drives and all their social institutions, beliefs and mythologies may be explained along such utilitarian or emotional terms, Levi-Strauss seeks to demonstrate with a more universalist outlook that these people are perfectly capable of ‘disinterested thinking’ by intellectual means, just as what a scientist would do (1995, pp. 16-17). He prefers to emphasise on the general opposition of Culture versus Nature that would correspond to a general distinction of humanity from animality, latent in men’s customary and attitudes and behaviours (Leach, 1974, p. 36). His structuralist perspective may be appreciated as an attempt to conceptualise socio-cultural phenomena in terms of meta-linguistic levels of analysis and at the same time in terms of an ethical-moral study (Nutini, 1971, p. 540), but he has been heavily criticised by anthropologists who see a lack in an empiricist approach (Ibid., p. 543). Leach (1974) for one has questioned Levi-Strauss’ assumption in his model of metaphors and metonymy based on a belief in the collective unconscious of the human mind, that cultural categories can simply be read as symbols by the human brain like how it can listen to both harmony and melody in music at the same time (p. 53). He has also criticised Levi-Strauss for being ahistorical, evading any relation between myth and history in his analysis of the structure of myth, searching, like Freud, for principles of thought formation universally valid for all human minds (Ibid., p. 55). Leach would however acknowledge the contribution of Levi-Strauss, despite relying on an inadequate linguistic schema of Jakobson based on binary distinctive features (Ibid., p. 113), for bringing to bear a “truly poetic range of associations” (Ibid., p. 119) in the course of his analysis, which may well reveal something about the structure of aesthetic perception.

It is worth highlighting that the word ‘culture’ here takes on a universal sense as an analytical category, whereas in Benedict’s conception, ‘culture’ tends to refer to a bounded body of beliefs and practices (Sewell Jr., 1999, p. 39). Yet despite this difference of usage, both refer to psychological perspectives, with Levi-Strauss expressing his debt to Boas in the emphasis of unconscious mental processes in the shaping of perceptions and conceptions (Ulin, 2001, p. 34), whereas Benedict’s interest lies in cultures in terms of differences in personalities. Boas, Benedict and Levi-Strauss may hence be seen as forming the same lineage not simply in terms of
similar relativist outlook but in attempting to explain cultural variation in terms of psychological laws or differences.

Not all anthropologists, however, would consider culture as a key concept for analysis of differences among societies, at least not if the focus is on psychic processes. Radcliffe-Brown, a pioneering figure in social anthropology, has remarked that some anthropologists tend to use the word ‘culture’ as equivalent to what he would call “a form of social life” (Kuper ed., 1977, p. 14). He suggests: “In its ordinary use in English ‘culture’, which is much the same idea as cultivation, refers to a process, and we can define it as the process by which a person acquires, from contact with other persons or from such things as books or works of art, knowledge, skill, ideas, beliefs, tastes, sentiments (Ibid.).” His perspective of culture as ‘learning’ may hence call to mind Tylor, except the emphasis is on culture as a process rather than as a grade in capability. He argues that ‘culture’ or ‘cultural tradition’ considered as entity is simply some aspect of social life, the continuity and change of which would be the subjects of social anthropology (Ibid., p. 15).

Somewhat similar to Malinowski, who imagined anthropology as a natural science and took the idea of homeostasis or balance from the biological concept of natural system to explain cultural phenomena in terms of function in the total social system (see Ulin, 2001, p. 36), Radcliffe-Brown adopted a functionalist perspective, under influence of Spencer and Durkheim. However, in applying principles of structural functionalism to study ‘primitive’ societies, he established a science of social anthropology as a kind of comparative sociology (Kuper, 1977, p. 2) which set him apart from Malinowski, who was not only ahistorical in his methodological procedure but also reduced constituents of social life to biological needs instead of normative regulation (Ulin, 2001, p. 38). Radcliffe-Brown’s analysis is aimed at relating various institutions or established norms of a society to each other, thus revealing “both their formal inter-relationships (or structural relationships), and the mutual impact of their activities (or functional relationships)” (Kuper, 1977, p. 4). This would further require comparative research, Radcliffe-Brown argues, in order to establish the ‘laws’ of functional relationships (Ibid.). He defines ‘function’ as “the total set of relations that a single social activity or usage or belief has to the total social system” (Ibid., p. 43). While his earlier work on Andaman Island myth and ritual has been more simplistic,
with a focus on the way in which ‘sentiments’ considered as structurally requisite were maintained in individuals (Ibid., p. 3), his later work shifts away from such simplicity. Apart from seeking a ‘fundamental law of social statics’ to advance the understanding of social life among human societies through typological studies (Ibid., p. 16), he also discusses the study of ‘social dynamics’ to make generalisation on how social systems change (Ibid., p. 17). Citing what Spencer terms ‘co-operation’ as a feature of social life whereby conflict may be restrained or regulated, Radcliffe-Brown (1952) calls this “the institutional aspect of social adaptation” (p. 9), whereas the process in which an individual acquires habits and mental characteristics would be called “cultural adaptation” (Ibid.). ‘Cultural adaptation’ is thus set in contrast to ‘cultural tradition’, which he refers to as a process of continuity constituted by the “transmission of learnt ways of thinking, feeling and acting” (Ibid., p. 5). Radcliffe-Brown would even extend a similar principle to the study of plural societies or what he termed as ‘composite societies’, arguing that their processes of change should not be simplified as “one in which two or more ‘cultures’ interact, which is the method suggested by Malinowski” (Ibid., p. 202), but rather considered in terms of “the interaction of individuals and groups within an established social structure which is itself in process of change” (Ibid.).

The dominant concept of culture in American anthropology since the 1960s is that of culture as a system of symbols and meanings, as popularised by Clifford Geertz. This is a perspective that may be understood as a strategic position in relation to the development of sociology up until to its time. Geertz, along with David Schneider, has used this notion of ‘cultural system’, borrowed from the usage of the term by functionalist sociologist Talcott Parsons – whereby this was considered as a separate component in social relations, distinct from the ‘social system’ as a system of norms and institutions, and the ‘personality system’ as a system of motivations (Sewell Jr., 1999, p. 43). Where this new perspective on culture departs from Parsons is an approach of analysis that aims to abstract the symbolic meanings of human action out of the social interaction, rather than to consider the cultural system merely as a particular level of abstraction of social relations (Ibid., pp. 43-44).

Rejecting a positivist approach associated with sociology, Geertz (1973) cites the methodology of Verstehen in Max Weber’s interpretive sociology instead as an
integral part of the tradition of social anthropology (p. 88). He goes as far as saying that a good interpretation of anything from a history, a ritual to an institution can take one “into the heart of that of which it is the interpretation”. He hence writes in *The Interpretation of Cultures*: “Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning. (Ibid., p. 5)” Adopting a semiotic view of culture, Geertz argues that “culture is not a power, something to which social events, institutions, or processes can be causally attributed” (Ibid., p. 14), that culture consists neither of socially established structures of meaning nor psychological phenomena alone (Ibid., p. 12-13). A cultural analysis to him should look at “symbolic dimensions of social action” (Ibid., p. 30) and his method in ethnography is that of a ‘thick description’ to uncover the context of cultural processes (Ibid., p. 14).

One may say that the most radical move in the approach represented by Geertz is to render the elusive concept of culture a fixed locus and a degree of objectivity (Ortner, 1994, p. 374). The focus of Geertzian anthropology is not in distinguishing and cataloguing symbolic types or in observing how symbols perform practical operations in the social process such as initiation rites, but in dealing with the question of how symbols as vehicles of culture shape the ways social actors, see, feel and think about the world (Ibid., pp. 374-375). In contrast to structuralist anthropology as represented by Levi-Strauss, Geertz’s interest lies more with the ‘ethos’ aspect of culture rather than the ‘world view’, more with affective dimensions than with the cognitive (Ibid., p. 375). Another major contribution of the Geertzian framework was in studying culture ‘from the actor’s point of view’ rather than as some abstractly ordered system, such that the principles of relations are derived from how people operate within institutional orders and have to interpret their situations in order to act coherently (Ibid.).

If one were to apply the umbrella term ‘symbolic anthropology’ to both Geertz’s and Schneider’s theorisation of cultural systems of meanings and symbols, as well as the structuralist approach of Levi-Strauss and his followers, there is yet another model that emerged around the 1960s and 1970s. This is the influential work of Victor Turner, who has a profoundly different approach to the symbolic aspect in social action. Trained in British structural functionalism under Max Gluckman, a
strand influenced by Marxism, the analytical question of society for Turner is not how solidarity is reinforced, as how Durkheim or Radcliffe-Brown would have emphasised, but rather how integration of society is constructed and maintained above all the conflicts and contradictions (Ibid., p. 376). Symbols are of interest to Turner, not as vehicles of culture in a society with integrated ethos and world views, but as operators in the social process, which under certain contexts, such as in rituals, can produce social transformations (Ibid.). Ortner would argue that the British dimension of symbolic anthropology, as represented by Turner, contributes a sense of pragmatics of symbols to the field, whereas the American counterpart in comparison is underdeveloped in its sense of the politics of culture (Ibid., p. 377). Another way to appreciate Turner’s approach is to consider his place in the performative turn of social sciences, whereby he considers social life as being full of ‘social dramas’ (Turner, 1982, p. 11). Turner’s perspectives will be discussed at length in Chapter 5 of this thesis in reference to dance as a form of intangible cultural heritage, in the sense of being a ritual.

In reaction to the concept of culture as system of symbols and meanings, scholarship in social sciences around the 1980s has found a perspective of culture as practice, in which they object to a portrayal of culture as being coherent, uniform and static and prefer to see it as a sphere of practical activity “shot through by willful action, power relations, struggle, contradiction, and change” (Sewell Jr., 1999, pp. 44). This was also transferred to anthropology, as represented by the remark of Sherry Ortner (1984) on the turn to politics, history and agency, and to adopt Pierre Bourdieu’s key term ‘practice’ for the new emerging sensibility (Ibid., p. 45). Bourdieu, both sociologist and anthropologist, was interested not only in the agency of the individual, but also in how power differences in society distributed opportunities unequally (Eriksen, 2004, p. 69). He hence refers to knowledge taken for granted as doxa and embodied knowledge as habitus, in a theorising which been important in several subfields of anthropology (Ibid.) There has since been theoretical discussion on how a concept of culture as system of symbols and meanings seems at odds with a concept of culture as practice (Sewell Jr., 1999, p. 46). But it has also been argued by Marshall Sahlins (1985) that practice and system imply each other (cited in Sewell Jr., 1999, p. 47). Sahlins maintains that society as a symbolically constituted order may be seen ontologically as a cultural formation (see 2004, p. 139) but one may in
turn conceive of agency as “constituted by a cultural order of which it is an idiosyncratic expression” (Ibid., p. 156), hence allowing one to understand history in a dialectic manner.

The question of what should constitute as the cultural system as opposed to socio-cultural systems is one that has long posed a challenge in conceptualisation of culture. If one may summarise according to the classification of Keesing (1974), there is culture on hand as ideational system, such as structural system according to Levi-Strauss, symbolic system according to Geertz or cognitive system according to Goodenough in cognitive anthropology; on the other hand, there is culture as adaptive system, based on foundations laid by Leslie White and recast by Sahlins among others, not to mention Harris’ cultural materialism, whereby scholars generally see cultures as systems of socially transmitted behaviour patterns “that serve to relate human communities to their ecological settings” (p. 75). In Keesing’s perspective, what the cultural adaptionists refer to as culture are sociocultural systems, “the social realisations or enactments of ideational designs-for-living in particular environments” (Ibid., p. 82), such as settlement patterns or subsistence technology. He acknowledges that the distinction he is making does not quite correspond to that made by Harris among others between the economic domain of subsistence, technology and social organisational of production, and the ideational realm of religion, ideology, law, art and so on (Ibid.). Keesing suggests that culture be conceived as “an ideational subsystem within a vastly complex system, biological, social and symbolic” (Ibid., p. 94), without further resolution except to hope for insights from “an emerging understanding of mind and brain” (Ibid.).

At this juncture it is also good to reflect on the limitation of ethnographic fieldwork in understanding culture. While there may have been a dominant view that anthropology involves the practice of ethnography on local life to understand what Malinowski calls “the native’s point of view” (Malinowski, 1922, p. 25: cited in Gable and Handler, 2008, p. 32) through fieldwork at the ‘natural habitat’, this conception has been challenged from the positions of various approaches, which emphasise the reality of social processes as opposed to the ethnographer’s interpretations.

Ingold (2008, p. 70) observes that Radcliffe-Brown has long asserted the distinction between ethnography and anthropology. This was done by citing the distinction
between the *idiographic* and the *nomethetic*, first coined in 1894 by German philosopher and historian Wilhelm Windelband, which Radcliffe-Brown explained as an inquiry that aims to document facts of past and present lives for the idiographic, as opposed to a nomethetic inquiry which aims to produce general propositions or theoretical statements (Ibid.). Likening social structures to structures of living organisms, he has argued for collection of data for comparative study the same way one does for “a typical typological classification” (Radcliffe-Brown, 1953, p. 109; cited in Ingold, 2008, p. 76). More importantly, he emphasised that the concrete reality to be studied by the social anthropologist “is not any sort of entity but a process, the process of social life” (1952, p. 4; cited in Ingold, 2008, p. 77). Furthermore, Radcliffe-Brown’s understanding of social reality was apparently historical, with an idea of continuity through change, though this perspective was often overlooked (Stanner, 1968, p. 287; cited in Ingold, 2008, p. 77).

James Clifford has also criticised the construing of ethnography as ‘fieldwork’ which involves “centering the culture around a particular locus, the village, and around a certain spatial practice of dwelling/research which itself depended on a complementary localisation – that of the *field*” (Clifford, 1997, p. 20, emphasis in original). Whereas Malinowski has defended his style of dwelling and research as a relatively unobtrusive way of sharing the life of locals under study, one may ask questions like who is really being observed, who is localised and what the power relations are (Ibid.). The term ‘field’ or the idea of ‘real fieldwork’ conjures “mental images of a distinct place with an inside and outside, reached by practices of physical movement” (Ibid., p. 54), but the “boundaries of the relevant community have been […] constituted by struggles over the term’s proper range of meanings” (Ibid.).

George Marcus (1995) has further argued for multi-sited ethnography against the long-standing mode of single-site ethnographic practices, as he considers that “[c]ultural logics so much sought after in anthropology are always multiply produced” (p. 97) and hence need to be contextualised in terms of macro-constructions of some larger social order, such as the capitalist world system. The claim in multi-sited ethnography is that “any ethnography of a cultural formation in the world system is
also an ethnography of the system” (Ibid., p. 99) and therefore cannot be understood through the old conventional single-site research.

Following Appadurai’s (1996) perspective that communities and commodities have been deterritorialised through global flows, there has also been much interest in the study of transnational diasporas, but Ghassan Hage (2005) has cast doubts as to whether there is necessarily a strong sense of transnational community among migrants (p. 467). In any case, he advocates the use of reflexive ethnographic analysis to capture the complexities of realities, with a double gaze on “both people’s experiences and the social environment in which this experience is grounded” (Ibid., p. 474).

In Section 2.3, we shall further examine the processes of globalisation in order to scrutinise the relevance of culture in a modern world of interconnected societies. In the following section, however, we shall look at another perspective of culture that attempts to incorporate its psychological aspects into a social structure.

### 2.2 Culture as Orientation System – a Concept emerged of Modernity Society

#### 2.2.1 Culture as value orientation in action following Talcott Parsons’ framework

This section will provide theoretical background on a general concept of culture as a system of value orientation, which is associated with the General Theory of Action Systems formulated by sociologist Talcott Parsons, consisting of culture, personality and social system as three frames of reference for social action. Parsons’ study of value orientation under this framework will be traced back to the epistemological perspectives of Max Weber as part of a sociology of value that contrasts rationalisation in the modern society with traditional values such as religious values.

The significance of Parsons in his study of culture and society may be appreciated first and foremost in terms of his contribution to functionalist perspectives by expanding on the principles of a social system to study social action, and secondly in terms of his interest in studying patterns of social values that characterise ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ societies (Holton, 2001, p. 154).
The quintessential functionalist is sociology has arguably been Durkheim, if one considers the defining features of the approach in structural functionalism as including the following: a view of society as a system, an assumption of tendency towards system equilibrium, an interest in how social order is possible, a view of structures in terms of their contributions to perpetuation or evolution of society, and a view of consensus or commonalities as basis of social order, distinguishing between consensus as normal modus operandi and deviance as pathological but natural (Pope, 1975, p. 361). In Durkheim’s view, the boundary that demarcates a society must be social, not to be explained otherwise by biological, geographical or psychological facts, and the boundary is moral in nature (Cuff, Sharrock and Francis, 2006, p. 63). He hence set about answering the question as to how social order is achieved in an industrial society as opposed to pre-industrial societies which were held together by common ideas and sentiments, shared values and norms – a basic question previously confronted by Comte, Spencer and Tönnies and only partially resolved (Lukes, 1985, p. 141). Instead of exaggerating the role of consensus and conformity like Comte, or assuming a harmony of interests like Spencer, or attributing to regulation from the State like Tönnies and Comte, Durkheim’s main thesis was one of ‘division of labour’ replacing the role previously taken up by the conscience commune (Ibid., p. 147). He therefore emphasised on the positive effects of social institutions.

The work of Talcott Parsons in structural functionalism follows basic principles as well as concerns of modernisation based on an evolutionary perspective similar to Durkheim, but he has developed a much more sophisticated analysis on different value systems with the help of pattern variables, in contrast to Durkheim’s simple dichotomy between traditional and modern societies (Parsons, 1967, p. 32). Although Durkheim also expressed an interest in comparative studies on social structure – somewhat like what Radcliffe-Brown did, he lacked the depth in probing crucial problems of comparative morphological classification which his contemporary sociologist Max Weber achieved, Parsons points out (Ibid., p. 33). Durkheim also relied on a concept of solidarity that was simplistic and sometimes inconsistent, emphasising on a primary core of the social system that is maintained at the general level of an institutionalised value system, and enforced through political order or other means (Ibid., p. 32). Parsons in contrast would investigate problems of the
greater social structure relating to other dimensions such as culture and personality (Ibid., p. 33).

Nevertheless, Parsons has adopted some of the basic premises used by Durkheim, such as the concepts of institution and internalisation. Parsons defines an institution as “a complex of institutionalised role integrates which is of strategic structural significance in the social system in question” (Parsons, 1951, p. 39), to be understood as “a complex of patterned elements in role-expectations which may apply to an indefinite number of collectivities” (Ibid.). Similar to Durkheim, Parsons considers that the ‘sentiments’ which support common values are generally learned or acquired, and as culture patterns, they have to be internalised as “genuine need-dispositions of the personality” (Ibid., p. 42). Parsons considers it noteworthy that Durkheim as a sociologist discovered the same basic phenomenon of internalisation and interpenetration of personality and social system, which Freud and George Herbert Mead did independently (1967, p. 27). However, Parsons (1951) would emphasise in his theoretical framework that the basic theorem of institutional integration explains very little, and is meant rather to provide a point of reference for analysis of complex behavioural processes (p. 43).

While the emphasis in Parsons’ research has in fact shifted through his career, one may summarise the two core theoretical issues in his work as being the problem of social action and the problem of social order (Alexander, 1983; cited in Holton, 2001, p. 153), the former asking why human actors act in a certain way and what consequences follow, the latter asking how a multiplicity of social actions may produce coordination, whether by compulsion or by consensus. Here Parsons’ sociology has been a subject of controversy which may for a start be interpreted in two ways: the first regards him as contributing to a voluntaristic theory of action, where the agency of the social actor assumes primary theoretical position; the second regards him as contributing to a deterministic theory of the structure of social systems, where the structure of social relations assumes primacy (Turner, 1991, p. xxii-xxiii). This is ultimately an age-old problem of agent and structure, for which Giddens (1984) would argue that Parsons offered no final solution, whereas Alexander (1985) would argue that Parsons had made an attempt to reconcile the
contradictions and this legacy may be advanced through a ‘neofunctionalism’ (cited in Turner, 1991, p. xxiii).

One important theoretical background to Parson’s interest in researching on social or cultural values is his attempt to go beyond the dimension of a utilitarian assumption lying at the heart of neoclassical economic theory, which took the ends of social actions as being unknowable apart from the logic of actors implementing means to achieve ends in the most efficient or rational ways (Holton, 2001, p. 153). Therein lies the motivation behind his most deterministic perspectives set to writing (Ibid., p. 154) as seen in *The Social System* (1951) which details his General Theory of Action Systems. According to him, a social system “consists in a plurality of individual actors interacting with each other in a situation which has at least a physical or environmental aspect, actors who are motivated in terms of a tendency to the ‘optimisation of gratification’ and whose relation to their situations, including each other, is defined and mediated in terms of a system of culturally structured and shared symbols” (Parsons, 1951, pp. 5-6). In this conception, a social system is only one of three aspects in the structure of social action, the other two being personality systems of individual actors and their cultural system influencing their action (Ibid., p. 6). As part of an elaborate outline of modes and types of action-orientation, culture patterns and institutions, he identifies three types of culture patterns, namely belief systems, systems of expressive symbolism and systems of value-orientation standards (Ibid., p. 57). The obligations to acceptance of such culture patterns are defined by ‘cultural institutions’, which consist of cognitive beliefs, systems of expressive symbols and private moral obligations (Ibid., p. 58). He also devises five groups of pattern variables in value-orientation, namely universalism-particularism, ascription-achievement, specificity-neutrality, affectivity-neutrality, collective-self (Ibid, p. 105), whereby his conception of modernity can easily be discerned (Holton, 2001, p. 154) in the second term of each pair listed here.

Parsons owes his study of social action and value-orientation to Max Weber, who completed his formulation of a theory of action in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (*Economy and Society*), where he distilled his ideal types of orientation into four fundamental types, to be used for the investigation of all societies and civilisations: instrumental rationality, value rationality, affectual action and traditional action.
Parson's own early classic *The Structure of Social Action* (1937) subsequently incorporated Weber's theory of social action (Ibid.). Parsons, who on his part helped to cement Weber's reputation in American social science with his translation of *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1930), was furthermore instrumental in provoking a debate on the constitution of modernity through his own interpretation of Weber's views on religion and the rise of capitalism in the West (Ibid., p. 60). Parsons framed the issue in the terms of his own social system theory to explain what he regarded as the progressiveness of Western civilisation (Ibid.). Parsons (1966) thus constructed a unilinear evolutionary theory based on his interpretation of selected writings by Weber, whereas Weber has adopted a 'developmental' view of history as *Entwicklungsgeschichte* in many other writings, as observed by Roth (1987) and Schluchter (1981), whereby Weber recognised that although the impetus to rationalisation and intellectualisation may be assumed as universal, the processes of rationalisation have taken different paths in different societies (see Keyes, 2002, pp. 235-236) One may interpret Weber as arguing in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* that 'ultimate' meaning can never be attained by means of reflection and rationalisation, but only through non-rational acceptance of propositions embedded in the salvation ethic of religion, whereby salvation is more psychological than cognitive (Ibid., 241-242).

While there have since been other interpreters of Weber's theory on value, such as Arnold Brecht with his account of Weber's canon in terms of 'scientific value relativism', or Gunnar Myrdal’s approach to premises of value based on Weber’s value orientation, it is still Parson who has remained the pivotal figure with his reading of Weber through Durkheimian lenses (Eliaeson, 2005, p. 6) For that reason it is also important to disentangle what some would consider as Parsons’ own American triumphalism or conservatism (Holton, 2001, p. 153) in his evolutionary perspective from Weber's pessimist view of rational knowledge as ‘disenchantment’ through science (Gane, 2002, p. 21). He not only cites Weber's achievement for viewing the development of Western civilisation through analyses that transcend ideological positions such as the socialistic or Marxian perspectives, but goes further by arguing in reference to America that “the designation of its social system as ‘capitalistic’, even in Weber's highly sophisticated sense, was grossly inadequate” (Parsons, 1967, p. 101). Parsons prefers to refer to 'capitalism' or ‘economic
individualism’ in a neutral sense as a utilitarian system (Ibid., p. 100) and classes Weber as being aligned with the ‘utilitarian’ tradition, especially with British economic theory, against Marxism (Ibid., p. 91). He interprets Weber’s Wertfreiheit or value freedom in social science not only as “freedom to pursue the values of science […] without their being overridden by values either contradictory to or irrelevant to those of scientific investigation” (Ibid., p. 86), but as implying that “a science need not be bound to the values of any particular historic culture” (Ibid.).

Parsons has since been criticised by O’Neill (1995) for not being value-neutral, as his framework assumes “that the social system actually regulates individual conformity without class or psychological conflicts” (p. 35) in its schematic tabulation of societal inputs and outputs, for the functions of pattern-maintenance in normative culture and values, along with functions of personal goal-attainment, adaptation and integration. With a bias towards social control that treats threats to the social system as ‘deviance’ rather than elements of political revolution, using a medical metaphor whereby social control function is seen as the maintenance of health through conformity, the Parsonian social system “is in fact a thoroughly moral system” (Ibid., p. 41), O’Neill argues. Holton (2001, p. 157) has also cited that Parsons’ assumption of convergence between culture and capitalism may be countered by Daniel Bell’s observations in The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (1976).

Sympathisers of Parsons, however, have considered his work as a progress from Weber for constructing a unified framework. In the perspective of Schluchter (1981), Weber’s philosophy of value might have considered it a task to establish an orderly conceptual scheme of values, but had no means for justifying a rank order of hierarchy (p. 17). Instead, Weber simply pointed to a basic experience rooted in history of mankind that is especially true of modernity, namely the possibility of divergent ultimate evaluations, an experience of not only value differences but value collision and value conflict, which no rational or empirical scientific procedure can reconcile (Ibid.). Schluchter hence interprets Weber’s theory of value as one custom-made to the requirements of Kulturwissenschatt as an historical social science, whereby rationalism and rationalisation become essential subjects of investigations only because the development of values towards rationality produces tension and the awareness of tension by destroying the primeval naiveté of human beings about
themselves and the world. He concludes that the viewpoint selected by Weber does constitute a sequence but the sequence provides precondition for identifying analogous developments in other cultures and hence Weber's sociology “offers neither a comprehensive typology of world history not a universal theory of evolution but a developmental history of the West” (Ibid., p. 26).

Schluchter sees it as a weakness in Weber’s typology of four action types that it blurs the difference between structurally possible orientations and their development, by including ‘traditional action’ (Ibid., p. 130). He hence sees an improvement in clarity with Parsons’ alternative in distinction of the cognitive, evaluative and expressive spheres, leaving out traditional action, but assigning instrumentally rational action, where success of action is primary, to the cognitive sphere; value-rational action, where value of an action is dominant, to the evaluative sphere; and affectual action, where affects and sentiments predominate, to the expressive sphere (Ibid., p. 129). However, Schluchter’s analysis of Weber’s action types has also been criticised. Döbert finds it problematic that Schluchter applies the means-ends considerations, as the epitome of rationality, to affectual behaviour which for Weber is non-rational, when the means-ends consideration should only be a characteristic of instrumentally rational action (Döbert, 1989, p. 216; cited in Etzrodt, 2005, p. 92). Allerbeck disagrees with Schluchter applying the means consideration to traditional behaviour and applying means-ends consideration to affectual behaviour, arguing that traditional behaviour should be regarded as unmotivated, and that affectual behaviour should, following Alfred Schutz’s distinction of because- and in-order-to-motives, be separated from instrumentally rational and value-rational action by the category of intentionality (Allerbeck, 1982, p. 673; cited in Etzrodt, 2005, p. 92).

But the crucial point here is how Parsons subsumes instrumental action under the cognitive sphere and how he considers the agency in value-rational action. It may appear that Weber in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschatlehr has been ambiguous in considering value-rational action as referring to ‘commands’ and ‘demands’, to the ‘norm’ as evaluation of action as value judgment, such that it is not always clear whether judgment is made based on the actor’s value or on judgment by other members of society (Etzrodt, 2005, p. 97). Parsons hence attempts to resolve it by considering that other persons’ sanction is only one aspect of normative
or moral action, as he emphasises more that the actors internalise the norms of their social group (Ibid.). However, as Kalberg highlights, while the value content of value-rationalisation processes varies widely across a secular and religious spectrum, a key point for Weber is that only substantive rationalities place ‘psychological premiums’ on ethical action, whereby Weber defines an ethical standard as “a specific type of value-rational belief among individuals which, as a consequence of this belief, imposes a normative element upon human action that claims the quality of the ‘morally good’ in the same way that action which claims the status of the ‘beautiful’ is measured against aesthetic standards” (Weber, 1968, p. 36; cited in Kalberg, 1980, p. 1165). In Weber’s view of man, action cannot be understood simply as an adjustment to given realities, be it daily routines or bureaucratic statutes and human action beyond routine and adaptive behaviour cannot be assigned a residual status, for action motivated by values and resistant to environmental moulding by interests, according to Weber, has been of great historical consequence (Kalberg, 1980, p. 1170). Kalberg has cited Tenbruck (1975) in support of his interpretation of Weber: “His entire oeuvre testifies to his conviction that a comprehensive and continuous rationalisation of reality cannot arise out of interests” (p. 689; cited in Kalberg, 1980, p. 1171).

Parsons (1937, p. 294) however would dissent from Weber’s view that the pursuit of ultimate ends lead not to a single good but to a kind of value pluralism (cited in Turner, 2007, p. 43). Parsons subsequently manufactured out of the writings of Weber and Durkheim a sociological conception of values as action explanations, such that “values could no longer be understood as individual choices, as they were for Weber (and more generally for the economists), but had to be understood as something distinctively ‘sociological’, namely as the contents of a central value system which played the role in regulating action that the conscience collective had played for Durkheim. (Turner, 2007, p. 46)"

In short, Parsons has adapted Weber’s idea of culture from one in terms of value rationality to one in terms of value ‘orientation’, and taken an approach of his own that takes its point of departure from Weber’s interest in explicating the relationships among cultural values and beliefs, social structure and actors’ psychology, by applying an elaborate framework of a systems theory. Parsons’ approach would be
much appreciated by fellow functionalist Luhmann; however, Luhmann would argue that Parsons’ attention to relations between system and their environment was not probing far enough, for there remains the question of whether systems are open or closed to an environment, and in what sense (Holton, 2001, p. 160). In contrast with Parsons’ idea of openness in to physical and metaphysical environment, Luhmann takes a more complex perspective in which he sees social systems as causally open to wider environments but cognitively or operationally closed, as what he refers to as ‘self-referential systems’ (Ibid.).

Parsons’ concept of the social system itself, including all social aggregates small and large, has also been criticised for being ambiguous and “incongruent with the classical concept” (Zafirovski, 2001, p. 241), for in classical sociological theory as with Comte, Spencer and Durkheim, the social system would refer to a societal system, equivalent to the larger society and not its parts (Ibid.). In comparison, Sorokin’s concept of social system as an integral and dynamic cultural-societal complex would be more in keeping with the classical tradition, specifically in dealing with the socio-cultural system qua society, rather than referring to social groups (Ibid., p. 242). Sorokin’s *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (1941) is also remarkable for representing an endeavour to explore the factors, patterns and effects of socio-cultural change, whereas Parsons with *The Social System* (1951) simply denies the possibility in exploring dynamics at its time of sociological knowledge (pp. 239-240).

In short, Zafirovski would argue with a comparison in theory and methodology that contrary to conventional assumptions, Sorokin’s work is far from inferior to that of Parsons, and may prove to be superior in many respects in terms of empirical and historical grounding (Ibid., p. 239). Parsons may be criticised for depending on ‘ambiguous psychologism’ (Savage, 1981, p. 193; cited in Zafirovski, 2001, p. 245) and his incorporation of neoclassical economics whereby social institutions and norms are treated as nothing more than outcomes or aggregations of voluntaristic individual actions (Frohock, 1987; cited in Zafirovski, 2001, p. 246). Zafiroski suggests in reference to such limitations of Parsons’ theoretical methodology, especially in his naïve acceptance of postulates in neoclassical economics, may well be dictated by pragmatic-institutional factors. The success that Parsons enjoyed with such a unified theoretical system, instead of Weber’s original view of social science
as proliferation of paradigms for general sociological theory, reflects a particular ideology at Harvard (Zafirovski, 2001, pp. 230-231). In contrast, his contemporary Sorokin, whose theoretical methodology of integralism was more dynamic and pluralist, also devoid of the individualistic-utilitarian bias (Ibid.), never enjoyed as much intellectual influence.

Parsons’ framework of culture as value orientation, incorporating psychologism into a functionalist perspective leaning towards collective goals in the modern society, would eventually leave a legacy with much influence also seen in intercultural communication, for example in Hofstede’s model in dimensions of cultures. This may be attributed to the ease in application of Parson’s definition of culture, referring to “patterned or ordered systems of symbols which are objects of the orientation of action, internalised components of the personalities of individual actors and institutionalised patterns of social systems” (Parsons, p. 327), whereby culture is seen as providing the normative standards in communication and interaction processes (Ibid.). Such a perspective lends itself well to application in intercultural communication, a variant of which will be discussed in the following section in association with perspectives of social psychology.

2.2.2 Culture as Orientation System in Intercultural Psychology of Alexander Thomas

This section will examine a perspective of culture based on a school of intercultural psychology that is propagated in Germany by social psychologist Alexander Thomas. His concept of culture as ‘orientation system’ may be understood as a combination of basic functionalist perspectives on social systems according to Parsons and Luhmann, with an idea of culture as schema of action based on cognitive psychology and cross-cultural psychology.

Thomas describes culture in his definition as a ‘universal’ phenomenon, implying that he believes in the psychic unity of mankind, but argues that different social groups or communities have their own ‘cultures’ in terms orientation systems for thoughts and actions, cultivated by means of specific ‘symbols’ such as language, gestures, rituals,
values and norms, which are transmitted through the processes of socialisation and enculturation (Thomas, 2011, p. 100; 2005a, pp. 22-23; 2003a, pp. 436-437).

While such equating of culture with a system of value-orientation clearly dates back to Parsons, this conceptualisation of culture, set within a framework of intercultural psychology, is more specifically designed to serve the needs of intercultural communication, targeted at a form of ‘intercultural learning’ which involves assimilating the orientation system of a different culture into one’s schema of action (Thomas, 2003a, pp. 436-437).

The central features of one’s psychic processes in such an orientation system, from the level of perception to the level of action, are regulated by what Thomas would term as *Kulturstandards* or ‘cultural standards’ (Ibid; 2011, p. 100), a hypothetical construct of ‘internalised dispositions’ in the evaluation and control of actions, as may be observed in critical interaction situations through differences in expected behaviours between people of different social groups or communities (Ibid., p. 108).

The term ‘cultural standard’ here appears to be borrowed from cognitive anthropologist Ward Goodenough for Thomas’ theoretical framework of intercultural learning (Moosmüller and Schönhuth, 2009, p. 214), though Thomas’ understanding of culture is probably closer to Parsons’ idea of culture as normative standards. Thomas uses this term as a main concept in his framework of culture, which adopts the methods of ‘Culture Assimilator’, a form of intercultural training programme first developed in Chicago in the 1960s, whereby critical interaction situations are compiled as the basis for training manuals to help people adjust to a different cultural environment (Cushner and Landis, 1996, p. 185).

Goodenough (1957) has said that “[a] society’s culture consists of whatever it is one has to know or believe in order to operate in a manner acceptable to its members. Culture is not a material phenomenon; it does not consist of things, people, behaviour, or emotions. It is rather an organisation of these things. (p. 167; cited in Keesing, 1974, p. 77)”. He has also said that culture “consists of standards for deciding what is, […] for deciding what can be, […] for deciding what to do about it, and […] for deciding how to go about doing it (Goodenough, 1961, p. 522; cited in Keesing, 1974, p. 77)”. His widely cited assertion has contributed to development of
the concept of ‘cultural schema’ as first referred to by Ronald Casson (1981; cited in Quinn, 2011, p. 36).

The importance of cultural schema theory in helping to explicate the phenomenon of intercultural communication has incidentally been highlighted by Nishida (2005, p. 402). In the words of Taylor and Croker (1981), a schema refers to “a cognitive structure that consists in part of a representation of some defined stimulus domain. The schema contains general knowledge about that domain, including specifications of the relationships among its attributes, as well as specific examples or instances of the stimulus domain…” (p. 91; cited in Nishida, 2005, p. 402).

However, Thomas speaks of schema in his framework only specifically in relation to observable action as Handlungsschema or schema of action. He hence cites the definition of culture as a ‘field of action’ according to cultural psychologist Ernst E. Boesch. Boesch has said: “Culture is a field of action, whose contents range from objects made and used by human beings to institutions, ideas and myths. Being an action field, culture offers possibilities of, but by the same token stipulates conditions for, action; it circumscribes goals which can be reached by certain means, but establishes limits, too, for correct, possible and also deviant action. (Boesch, 1991, p. 29, cited in Straub and Thomas, 2003, p. 36; cf. Thomas, 2011, pp. 99-100)"

Boesch compares culture as a field of action to a biotope, in terms of a subjective environment that corresponds to a system of symbols (Boesch, 1980, p. 34). He postulates that action derives its symbolic qualities from three systems of reference: the ‘cultural’, constituted of meanings based on regional and historical variations; the ‘biographical’, constituted by the personal history of actions in a cultural field; and the ‘anticipatory’, aimed at future states of the individual (Boesch, 2001, pp. 479-480). With such variability of inputs, Boesch’s framework of a symbolic action theory creates much methodological complexity in interpretation (Ibid., p. 482).

Alexander Thomas however cites Boesch’s perspective on culture as a field of action, not to explore the complexity with cultural symbolism and personal motivation, but merely to emphasise how culture provides orientation in possible actions as well as sets the limits for proper actions (Thomas, 2011, pp. 99-100). His own model for the interpretation of actions simply makes a conceptual distinction between ‘central cultural standards’, postulated as regulating a wide scope of thoughts, values and
action, and ‘peripheral cultural standards’, postulated as existing only for certain situations or functions (2011, p. 108). Apart from the ease in application, he argues that theoretical support for such a model may be found in the Field Theory model of Kurt Lewin, which sees the human personality as consisting of central and peripheral layers, like an onion (Thomas, 2004, p. 153).

The approach of Thomas as social psychologist comes from his research in *Kulturvergleichende Psychologie* - which he treats as synonymous with ‘cross-cultural psychology’ in the English-speaking world. He has cited, among other definitions, that the discipline is “concerned with the systematic study of behaviour and experience as it occurs in different cultures, is influenced by culture, or results in changes in existing cultures” (Triandis, 1980, p. 1; cited in Straub and Thomas, 2003, p. 33).

Thomas has been known in the German-speaking world of cross-cultural psychology since the 1980s for his work on intercultural interaction, especially from the perspective of cultural exchange programmes (Trommsdorff, 1986, in *The German Journal of Psychology* 10, p. 258). Incidentally, it has been remarked that the development of cross-cultural psychology in the German-speaking world has not corresponded with international development; the 1993 first edition of *Kulturvergleichende Psychologie* edited by Thomas was apparently the first introduction as such to the field in the German language, whereas in journals such as *Psychologische Rundschau* or *Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie*, articles have appeared only sporadically that deal with questions of cross-cultural psychology (Straub and Thomas, 2003, p. 41).

The interest of Thomas however lies most specifically in intercultural psychology, a field which he legitimises in his study *Psychologie interkulturellen Lernens und Handelns* (Psychology of Intercultural Learning and Action) based on the following justifications: firstly, the epistemological interest on human behaviour in international and intercultural encounters; secondly, interest on the part of politicians and pedagogues among others on intercultural learning and exchange in general; and thirdly, the increasing social need for intercultural competence in communication and cooperation with people of different cultural backgrounds (Thomas, 2003a, p. 435).
His conception of ‘intercultural psychology’ corresponds to in a very general sense with the characterisation of the same field by Berry et al, except for two key differences. These would lead to the result that his interest centres on the assumption of distinct cultural differences as the object of study, which provides the basis for the training of intercultural competence, whereas the latter would be more interested in how one’s behaviour may be the result of different cultural influences. Firstly, his emphasis is on challenges of encounters among people of different national cultures, eg. Germans on the one hand versus French, US Americans, Nigerians, Chinese or Indians on the other (Thomas, 2011, p. 105). The latter would however consider intercultural psychology “as doing cross-cultural psychology at home in culturally diverse societies, where numerous cultural groups have come to live together” (Berry, Poortinga, Segall & Dasen, 2002, p. 346). Secondly, Berry et al would not treat such cultural groups as ‘independent’ from one another and would not ascribe cultural influences on behaviour to one specific culture (Ibid.), whereas the distinctness among cultures would remain the working assumption in the model of Alexander Thomas as it seeks to investigate such cultural differences as the challenge to be overcome. The postulation of different cultural standards internalised by members of different cultural groups lies at the heart of Culture Assimilator training which has been a major part of Thomas’ research work.

Their difference in approaches is evident even as one considers how the two relate to the larger umbrella of cross-cultural psychology, which has its raison d’etre in the interest “to extend the range of variation of psychological functioning” (Adamopoulos and Lonner, 2001, in Matsumoto ed., 2001, p. 15). According to the definition by Berry et al (1992), it is “the study of similarities and differences in individual functioning in various cultural and ethnic groups; of the relationships between psychological variables and sociocultural, ecological, and biological variables; and of changes in these variables; and of changes in these variables” (Berry, Poortinga, Segall and Dasen, 1992, p. 2; cited in Ibid., p. 15, emphasis my own). In what may be generally accepted as standard methodological protocol, cross-cultural psychology according to Berry et al involves selecting some psychological principle, test or model in an originating culture and testing it in one or more other cultures to discover new factors or elements (see Adamopoulos and Lonner, 2001, Ibid., p. 15). Thomas on the other hand emphasises that what lies at the centre of cross-cultural
psychology always involves cultural differences: “Im Mittelpunkt der kulturvergleichenden Psychologie stehen stets psychologisch bedeutsame kulturelle differenzen.” (Straub and Thomas, 2003, p. 32) Noting different streams of development in cross-cultural psychology since the 1980s in addition to Berry’s approach which relates to socio-political or cultural contexts (Ibid., p. 50), he has highlighted the approach of Triandis’ in the 1980s with the “individualism-collectivism” construct, and the study of cultural values among different countries by Hofstede (1980), particularly in their contribution towards analysis of intercultural learning and action processes (Thomas, 2003a, pp. 446-458).

In 2003, a discussion of intercultural competence by Thomas in the journal Erwägen – Wissen – Ethik attracted much academic debate among experts in psychology, linguistics, pedagogy, sociology and philosophy. In 2008, he was editor of a book entitled Psychologie des interkulturellen Dialogs, in which he discusses intercultural dialogue as a form of communication to be studied based on principles of communication psychology, and he emphasises on intercultural competence as condition for intercultural dialogue.

While the concepts of intercultural dialogue and intercultural competence in Alexander Thomas’ framework will be further examined in Chapter 3, this section will proceed to analyse his concept of culture in relation to its theoretical bases in social psychology. It would help to begin by understanding his epistemological perspectives in social psychology, in comparison with others. Social psychology has been defined as “the scientific investigation of how the thoughts, feelings and behaviours of individuals are influenced by the actual, imagined or implied presence of others” (Allport, 1954, p. 5; cited in Hogg and Vaughan, 2008, p. 4). As a sub-discipline of general psychology, it may also be considered as much influenced by cognitive psychology, and additionally related to other scientific disciplines such as sociology and social anthropology in its concern with explaining human behaviour (Hogg and Vaughan, 2008, p. 5).

Thomas (1991) however sees social psychology as an interdisciplinary field between psychology and sociology generally, and summarises the central questions in social psychology research thus: “How do real or imagined persons or groups influence perception, thoughts, judgment, sentiments, learning of one in action? What
influence does a particular social environment have on the individual’s behaviour? How does one in action attempt to influence his social environment?” (p. 4; translated and abridged) He argues furthermore that there are two fundamental tasks of social psychology: On one hand, to provide insights on factors influencing social interaction, how individuals influence the environment and how individuals’ behaviour and action are influenced by the environment; on the other hand, to develop training methods for individuals to realise oneself in social situations, or for integration within groups or in whatever social contexts (Ibid., pp. 9-10). If this suggests there is a strong component of practical applications in Thomas’ perspective of social psychology, he has in fact highlighted its relevance for social integration. He describes the aim of social psychology as one of promoting the chances for self-realisation, development of the strength of the ‘I’ (a term borrowed from Mead) as individual on one hand, but also on the other hand the identification of individuals within society, and promotion of a conscious and reflexive ‘integration’ (Ibid., p. 11).

One may appreciate the importance of social psychology as Thomas’ theoretical basis for his research in intercultural communication, if one begins by considering his key concept of communication as social interaction. Citing Watzlawick’s (1967) axiom of communication that “one cannot not communicate”, he has argued that as soon as people take notice of one another, a system of social interaction is formed, whereby some message will be ‘sent’ even if one chooses to ignore a call for social interaction (Thomas, 1991, p. 54).

While communication may generally be understood as a specific form of interaction, which carries the sense of an exchange of information, Thomas argues that a general division between interaction and communication is arbitrary and would not be scientifically fruitful as a perspective (Ibid., p. 55). There have been different models of studying communication. Lasswell’s (1948) model sees the process of communication as consisting of sender, information, receiver, sign/signal, channel, intention and effects; the model of Shannon and Weaver (1949) considers communication as involving the central processes of encoding and decoding between sender and receiver, along with other components such as communication channel, noise and feedback. Thomas would cite here also Watzlawick’s axioms of communication, one of which being that communication has a content aspect as well.
as a relationship aspect. The concepts of ‘interaction’ and ‘communication’ are equally important according to Thomas, under a conception of social system that is to be understood not merely as a structure but also in terms of processes that render an impression of a structure (Thomas, 1991, p. 56). He cites Katz and Kahn (1966) in their perspective of a social system as a system of events with nothing more than a functional structure (p. 31, cited in Ibid.).

What Thomas maintains is that interaction involves more than an anticipation of reaction from another to one’s action, for one might also then anticipate a physical ‘reaction’ from an inanimate object such as a chair following one’s physical action; strictly speaking, there has to be an inseparable dialectic relation, though the interaction may only be empirically investigated in terms of the action and reaction, whereas what causes the relation and what exactly happens during the process of interaction would be missing from the investigation (Thomas, 1991, p. 56).

Arguing that a cybernetic system is developed through such dialectic relationships (Ibid.), he cites Graumann (1972, p. 1115) who considers interaction as constituting of the psychological concept of motivation, whereby people are able to regulate or control one another through ‘reward’ or ‘punishment’ (cited in Ibid., p. 57). This, Thomas comments, is a concept of interaction that may be understood in association with the sociological concept of ‘social control’ (Ibid.). One may see tendencies in interaction and communication of exercising control through sanctions as well as through exchange of material and immaterial ‘goods’; whether one considers interaction in terms of ‘control’ or in terms of ‘exchange’ is just a matter of analytical difference, he suggests (Ibid.). However, Thomas (Ibid., p. 58) cites the argument of Stendenbach (1963) in suggesting with regards to the process in interaction that ‘gratification’ may not necessarily be gained through exchange with others, but rather through fulfilment of an internalised norm within the society.

In fact, Alexander Thomas places much emphasis on behaviour of individuals based on norms and roles in a social system of groups or communities. He argues that a ‘group’ should not necessarily be understood exclusively as a small group, though social psychology tends to deal with the environment of small groups, as Witte (1979) has discussed (Thomas, 1991, p. 93).
A social norm may be defined as the common and shared expectation of members in a social group, community or culture on how one should behave in a particular situation and how one should think (Thomas, 1991, p. 72, 91). There are two characteristics about norms, firstly that they are experienced by a person as something external and not created by oneself; secondly that these social norms, which according to Thomas' interpretation has also been discussed by Durkheim under the term of 'social facts', exercise a kind of compulsion on one's thoughts and behaviour through expectations, whether one recognises the norms or not (Ibid., p. 73). Norms come about through agreement in ways of behaviour in interaction between members of a social group, and norms in turn influence one's behaviour (Ibid., p. 78).

Thomas considers social groups and societies alike as social system, whereby a system is to be understood as any conceptual, physical or behavioural entity consisting of mutually dependent elements (Thomas, 1991, p. 93). Apart from Talcott Parsons' model of social systems, he cites the perspective of Niklas Luhmann (1971) that a system is to be investigated as a combination of processes that maintain boundaries and continuity, that a system serves the reduction of complexity, through stabilisation of a difference between the internal and the external, and everything in a system, from differentiation to hierarchy and so on, may be analysed functionally as reduction of complexity (pp. 10-11, cited in Thomas, 1991, p. 93). Thomas also highlights the perspective that social systems are action systems imbued with meanings, citing Luhmann who has said that the boundaries of a social system are not of a physical nature, but boundaries within which meaningful contexts are relevant (1971, pp. 11-12, cited in Thomas, 1991, p. 94).

Another perspective on social systems as highlighted by Alexander Thomas is that of social systems as open systems. He argues that the model of a closed system would suggest the tendency towards homogeneity and balancing of power, like in the case of entropy according to the second law of thermodynamics, which would not be suitable in social sciences since it suggests a cancellation of differentiation, leading to a breakdown of the system (Thomas, 1991, p. 95). He cites Katz and Kahn (1966), social psychologists in the study of organisations, as saying that in order to survive, open systems have to hold back the process of entropy, by taking up more energy from the environment than what they consume, something which cannot be
maintained indefinitely in a biological organism, whereas social systems are not so constrained, as they are not dependent on physical constants likewise (pp. 21-22, cited in Ibid., pp.95-96). Thomas adds that the taking up of information from the environment is also important for the survival of an open system (Ibid., p. 96).

The open systems perspective was founded by biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1956). In contrast to physical structures, social organisations may be considered as loosely coupled rather than highly responsive systems, with Buckley (1967) noting that “the interrelations characterising higher levels come to depend more and more on the transmission of information” (p. 47; cited in Scott, 1981, p. 103). Although open systems are capable of self-maintenance with throughput of resources from the environment, it does not mean they have no boundaries; indeed energies are also devoted to boundary maintenance just as they are devoted to activities that span boundaries (Scott, 1981, p. 109). Buckley (1967) hence distinguishes between two basic sets of system: *Morphostasis*, referring to processes that tend to preserve or maintain a system’s form or structure, such as socialisation and control activities in a social system; and *Morphogenesis*, referring to processes that elaborate or change the system, such as growth, learning and differentiation (pp. 58-62; cited in Ibid., p. 110).

In Luhmann’s perspectives of social system, what is important is not simply the aspect of self-maintenance as an open system but also the aspect of self-referentiality for which a system is closed. Alexander Thomas would highlight Luhmann’s Theory of Self-referentiality in his discussion of intercultural dialogue, emphasising that social systems come about not through the creation of a commonality as such but through communication between people (Thomas, 2008, p. 17). However, Thomas’ understanding of culture ultimately appears to share more perspectives with organisation theory in the consideration of social systems as open systems, along with a general functionalist perspective that may be traced back to Talcott Parsons.

Thomas considers that whenever people form a social group through free will or coercion, when they think, feel and act as members of the group, and such social framework has significance to their lives, then they would develop a specific system of meaning and orientation, and one may consider that they are forming a specific
‘culture’ (Thomas, 2005b, p. 35). In the sense of social psychology, even two persons in a relationship may arguably be considered as forming a small social group, with common norms and values (Ibid., p. 36).

Thomas extends this basic conception of culture as meaning and orientation not only from small groups to communities or societies, but also to organisations and the level of nations. According to him, what marks ‘culture’ at a national level is that it is considered as a form of collective consciousness that is more abstract than the experience of daily life (Ibid., p. 34). Thomas defines national culture as the culture that is developed in the course of history by a great number of people who belong to a nation by birth or feel belonging to it, who consider it as binding and constitutive of one’s existence; it embodies the transmitted values, norms, customs, laws, practices and ethical or moral systems of conviction such as religion, as well as world views thus derived (Ibid., p. 33).

He also extends this to an international context, whereby encounters with culture may apply in different fields, be it politics, economics, art, science, cooperation for development, or working with youth, and at different levels: he postulates a model whereby the individual in an international context has to deal with three intertwining levels of culture: group culture, organisational culture, national culture (Ibid., p. 40).

Thomas’s view on culture is hence best summarised in his own definition:


(Thomas, 1993, p. 380; also cited in Straub and Thomas, 2003, p. 36; cf. Thomas, 2011, p. 100)
Cultur is a universal, but for a society, organisation and group very typical, orientation system. This orientation system is cultivated from specific symbols and further transmitted in each society. It influences the perception, thoughts, values and action of all members and thereby defines their belonging to the society. Culture as orientation system structures the specific field of action for individuals who feel belonging to a society, and thereby creates the conditions for development of one's own ways of handling the environment.

The study of culture in Thomas’ framework involves the methods of the Culture Assimilator, through interviews with informants with critical interaction situations which have caused irritation due to behaviour in a host culture that is beyond the expectations of one socialised in a different culture.

According to Thomas (2011, pp. 109-111), the researcher may typically collect up to 200 critical interaction situations from 30 informants, and reduce similar cases to between 50 and 70 types of situations. After that, one seeks opinions from between 4 and 10 ‘external experts’ familiar with either or both cultures, on questions like:

1) How do you explain the course of the situation?
2) How should one behave in such situation to avoid misunderstanding?
3) How typical are such situations for encounters with the target culture?
4) Are there particular political, religious or social reasons that lead to such specific forms of thinking and action?
5) Can you recommend literature with regards to these themes?

Thomas adds here that the study of cultural standards as such should also be combined with cultural history, considering that cultural standards are not developed as a form of collective consciousness but through a history of development (Ibid., p. 112). But the ultimate aim of such research is to help train intercultural competence for one to function in a different culture. One way is by generating cultural standards for different national cultures, for example characterising Chinese as placing emphasis on strategies and tactics and maintaining ‘face’, Italians as family oriented and identity-conscious, relative to Germans being rule-oriented, internalising control and emphasising time planning (Ibid., p. 113). Another way, as practised by other proponents in intercultural communication, is to produce ‘Culture Assimilator’ training manuals which describe critical interaction situations along with a multiple choice of
possible explanations on why one behaves in a certain way, which the reader may reflect on.

Thomas’ concept of culture observed in terms of cultural standards may be criticised by some as following similar assumptions of cultural coherence among other scholars, from Kluckhohn’s (1949) characterising of an “internal coherence” in culture, to Hofstede’s (1984) concept of culture as “collective programming of the mind”, as Rathje (2009, p. 84) has cited. This is however not surprising, given that Clyde Kluckhohn was concerned with developing categories of binary distinctive features to study value systems, a work carried on by Florence Kluckhohn and Fred Srtrodtbeck; Hofstede was in turn influenced by this and the separate approach on value orientation in the work of Parsons and Shils. While one may argue for the need of newer perspectives on culture that take account of phenomena of transculturality or hybridity, as Rathje does (Ibid.), one also needs to understand Alexander Thomas from the context of his epistemological interests and practical applications based on the field of intercultural communication.

When criticised in the Erwägen-Wissen-Ethik journal (2003) for the assumption of cultural coherence, in his citing of a situation of misunderstanding between a German interviewer and a Chinese subject as an example of different cultural orientation systems, Thomas’ response was simple: of course there are more than 1 billion individuals in China with their own individuality, but his example was not meant at all to discuss differences between northern and southern Chinese, or differences between Han and non-Han Chinese, it is just to demonstrate cultural influences on a communication situation (Thomas, 2003b, p. 223). His concept of culture is ultimately meant to be part of a framework revolving around the concept of intercultural competence (to be dealt with in the next chapter of this thesis) for practical applications.

Thomas’ definition of culture may in fact be better appreciated in relation to applications in international and intercultural cooperation, in addition to Parsons’ theory on value orientations and the social system as a major source that he draws on. Described in terms of an orientation system with cultural standards that may be typical for a “society, organisation and group” (Thomas, 1993, p. 380), it is meant to
cover cultural differences on the levels of ‘national culture’ as well as ‘corporate cultures’ (Thomas, 2005b, pp. 32-42).

Given the influence of Parsons in organisational theory, it is also not surprising if one sees resemblance between Thomas’ definition of culture relating to cultural standards, and some other definition cited in organisational theory. Kunda (1992) for example has defined culture in terms of “a learned body of tradition that governs what one needs to know, think and feel in order to meet the standards of membership. … When applied to organisational settings, culture is generally viewed as the shared rules governing cognitive and affective aspects of membership in an organisation, and the means whereby they are shaped and expressed. Of particular concern have been the shared meanings, assumptions, norms and values that govern work-related behaviour; the symbolic, textual, and narrative structures in which they are encoded; and – in the functionalist tradition – the structural causes and consequences of cultural forms and their relationship to various measures of organisational effectiveness. (Kunda, 1992, p. 8; cited in Pfeffer, 1997. p. 121)”

Thomas’ conception of social systems as open systems also bears an apparent alliance with organisational studies that is relevant to intercultural communication. The relevance of this to intercultural competence will be evident as one recalls his assumption of culture as being ‘universal’, such that in contrast with investigation in culture psychology, differences across cultures in his perspective would hinge on socialisation and intercultural learning. Thomas regards the process of socialisation, in a community of any respective culture, to involve the task facing an individual, through interaction with other persons, to develop his or her patterns of behaviour so that these would be socially relevant (Thomas, 2005a, in Thomas, p. 23). When the social learning processes are successful in some particular area of activity, then the schemes of perception, thoughts, judgment and behaviour would be so developed and internalised that one no longer needs to think about the functions, dynamics and consequences in one’s action (Ibid.). But when one encounters unexpected reactions in the social environment, then one would require new processes of social learning, whereby one looks for explanations, methods, norms and rules that will provide one with orientation in the new environment (Ibid.). While that is the simple principle, Thomas’ ‘philosophy’ of intercultural learning also assumes that with the adaption into another orientation system, one would be able to work based on an
intention of respect and appreciation of cultural differences, in order to enable productive cooperation (Ibid., p. 31).

Alexander Thomas’ focus in intercultural psychology is in short premised on a predetermined task of highlighting cultural differences based on observation of cross-cultural interaction situations, under an epistemological framework which sees the training of intercultural competence as ultimate goal. With such an approach, there may be a greater tendency to explain behaviour in terms of ‘central’ or ‘peripheral’ cultural contexts, rather than considering situational contexts which are factored in under a ‘contextual’ school of thought in cultural anthropology which considers intercultural interactions as ‘intercultural events’ or ‘intercultural performances’ (Roth, p. 125).

The strength and limitation of such a paradigm may be summarised with what Moosmüller (2004) says of the discipline of intercultural communication: whereas ethnology would not provide definitive answers on the relation between culture and individual actions, intercultural communication has proceeded on a pragmatic and perhaps oversimplifying manner to find answers for itself (Moosmüller, pp. 45-46). He cites the Swedish ethnologist Tommy Dahlen as commenting that one basic problem with intercultural communication may be that it is founded more on the needs of praxis than on pure intellectual curiosity, hence there may be a tendency to exaggerate cultural differences (Ibid., p. 53). However, it has been suggested by Roth (2004) that the usual approach of intercultural communication in investigation of intercultural interactions may in fact be expanded by including not only situational factors but also more elements or sectors of cultural systems (p. 121), the latter referring to material culture, myths or stories and so on according to him.

In fact, in a critique of Thomas’ concept of culture in Erwägen-Wissen-Ethik, Allolio-Näcke, Kalscheuer and Shimada (2003) have similarly pointed the way to an alternative model whereby culture needs not be considered as rigidly separated set from action as such, conceived as something abstract and floating apart from man, imagined as a stable orientation system with one-dimensional influence on actions (p. 151). They cite scholarship in cultural psychology such as Ratner (1996), who has proposed to consider culture not simply as shared conceptual understandings, but
also as socially organised human activity which influences psychological functions (p. 407).

Despite shortcomings of this approach in cross-cultural psychology, this thesis will incorporate in Chapter 3 a consideration of how a study of cultural differences under an approach like the Culture Assimilator may still be adopted as a useful heuristic tool for the development of intercultural dialogue.

2.3 Globalisation and Need for Intercultural Dialogue

2.3.1 Processes of Globalisation as World System of Economy without Cultural Integration

Globalisation poses new challenges for the study of culture to traditional or mainstream frameworks of anthropology and sociology as presented in the previous two sections, as it implies a breaking down of cultural boundaries hitherto assumed, and demands an understanding of societies across the world as part of one single system. This section will hence provide a more comprehensive perspective by taking into account the reality of globalisation as a composite phenomenon of cross-border movements and interconnectedness in the world involving economic, political, social and cultural processes. The focus in this subsection will be on the primacy of economic forces in globalisation as an expansion of modernity, whereby the predicament may be seen in terms of a loss of cultural values instead of the conflict in one ‘culture’ versus another.

In addition to Clifford’s criticism of fieldwork-based anthropology in its spatial practice and Marcus’ advocacy of a multi-sited ethnography, Abu-Lughod (2006 [1991]) has cited the existence of ‘halfies’, people with mixed national or cultural identities due to migration, overseas education or parentage, in her attack on anthropology for continuing to privilege “the study of the non-Western other by the Western self” (p. 467). To mitigate the construction of the ‘other’ and the highlighting of differences among cultures imagined as coherent, timeless and discrete, she has suggested contesting the discursive formation of culture through a strategy of Bourdieu in shifting attention to practice, tracing connections of communities in history and transnationalism, and writing against homogeneity in culture through subversion in ‘ethnographies of the particular’ (Ibid., pp. 472-473).
Meantime on the sociological front, Archer (1991) has presented a case for accepting that “the globalisation of society means that societies are no longer the prime units of sociology” (p. 133; cited in McGrew, 1996, p. 499) as global processes become constitutive of social reality worldwide. The task of international sociology would hence be to specify global mechanisms in regional circumstances, without falling into any ‘false universalism’ of modernisation theory or postmodernism, Archer argues (1991, p. 138). She has separately criticised Parsons’ assumption of a normative functionalism whereby integration of social systems simply follows as a result of value orientations are institutionalised in role expectations (1996, p. 33). With similar concerns, Luhmann (1998) has pointed out that there is a differentiation between the global and the regional societies in goals or norms, despite the fact that the political system of the state has become a worldwide system; the observation of such divergence provides a better perspective, he argues, than an old contrast between tradition and modernity that privileged European rationalism as if it is not a tradition itself (pp. 807-808).

Among several major theoretical perspectives to be discussed, this sub-section will focus on the world system of economy as the main logic of globalisation, in order to consider how globalisation as an expansion of modernity does not imply cultural integration among communities, but may instead tend towards value conflicts among different forms of living. It will follow arguments that globalisation is not a simple process that leads to cultural homogenisation, but instead involves the continuing use of cultures as a form of social control by nation states, as both Wallerstein and Hannerz would suggest. Furthermore, culture may also be devalued with the ‘irrationality’ of modern rationality under globalisation that Ritzer (1993) calls ‘McDonaldisation’, in an adaptation of Weber’s perspectives on modernity. In all of these arguments, culture is not to be understood as a separate and autonomous system along with the social system influencing human action, as Parsons suggests, but placed under a larger framework as being constructed and shaped within the social system.

Tracing contemporary scholarship on the phenomenon of globalisation through what he identifies as three waves of thinking, Holton (2005) has pulled together a definition of globalisation under the ‘third-wave’ thinking which he considers most comprehensive and also balanced or neutral. This definition involves three different
aspects: firstly, the ‘intensified movement of goods, money, technology, information, people, ideas and cultural practices across political and cultural boundaries” (pp. 14-15); secondly, the “inter-dependence of social processes across the globe, such that all social activity is profoundly interconnected rather than separated off into different national and cultural spaces” (Ibid., p. 15); thirdly, “[c]onsciousness of and identification with the world as a single place” (Ibid.), in the forms of cosmopolitanism, religion or environmentalism.

Holton associates first-wave thinking on globalisation with the belief that increased mobility of capital and labour was rendering national economies outmoded, threatening the sovereignty of nation-states (Ohmae, 1990, 1996; cited in Holton, 2005, p. 6), or that global corporate power was creating globalised mass markets and threatening to undermine local culture through homogenisation (Sklair, 1991; cited in Holton, Ibid.). On the edge of this are scholars like Immanuel Wallerstein who explain cross-border interdependencies with the world-system theory, but they may not adopt a similar concept of ‘globalisation’ for analysis (cited in Holton, 2005, p. 7).

The second wave according to Holton was marked by scepticism of first-wave thinking, for example in Hirst and Thompson (1996) who used evidence in the operation of multi-national companies to argue that nations remain alive and well instead of being taken over by an emerging transnational global order (cited in Holton, 2005, p. 8). There were also criticisms against assumptions of global cultural homogenisation, for instance in Huntington (1996) who insisted that the challenge was rather one of wars between civilisations (cited in Holton, 2005, p. 9).

In the third wave, there was a rethinking of the core concepts or very definition of globalisation, as advanced by Hay and Marsh (2000), who saw globalisation as a trend with a range of processes such as cross-border interconnection and interdependence, but a trend reversible by counter-trends (cited in Holton, 2005, p. 10). Globalisation in this perspective is seen as the *explanandum*, that to be explained, not the *explanans*, the explanation of observed change; in other words, it is an effect and not a cause (Ibid.). Another important position in third-wave thinking is to be critical of both first-wave assumptions and second-wave scepticism, by taking globalisation as trans-nationalism seriously while being aware of its limits. This is
represented by David Held and his associates with the idea of ‘global transformations’ (Held et al, 1999; Held and McGrew, 2002), where globalisation is seen as a fluid set of processes amenable to intervention by human agency and re-shaping of social institutions (cited in Holton, 2005, p. 11).

Holton (2005) in his definition of globalisation has meant to articulate a similar position, that globalisation is a set of processes too complex to be embraced by a single explanation and human agency along with institutional attempts also matter in shaping change, for “globalisation is not an irresistible, uncheckable, and completely irreversible force transforming social arrangements in an unparalleled way” (p. 188). By emphasising the dimensions of consciousness and agency in his definition for globalisation, he is effectively incorporating the World Culture Theory of Robertson (1992) with its emphasis on global consciousness (cited in Holton, 2005, p. 14), and indirectly also conceding the World Polity Theory which considers postulates a “system of creating value through the collective conferral of authority” (Meyer, 1980, pp. 111-112; cited in Lechner, 2000, online) with the nation-states constituted as rationalised actors (Meyer, 1997, p. 153; cited in Lechner, 2000, online), except he replaces it with perspectives on global interdependence by David Held (1995; cited in Holton, 2005, p. 14). Out of the three most important perspectives on globalisation which have been cited by Lechner and Boli (2000, pp. 49-51), it is Wallerstein’s World Systems Theory which Holton (2005) turns out to reject, on account of what he considers an “over-deterministic approach to analysis centred on a single systems logic” (p. 57) and a “downplaying of social action and analysis of the strategies and impact of social actors” (Ibid.).

This thesis will however emphasise the merits of Wallerstein’s approach based on the premise, first of all, that the explanation of the phenomenon of ‘globalisation’ in all its different dimensions of human society, is not the purpose in his theory. The approach remains useful in analysing how the structure of the modern world system provides insights on the understanding of cultural values as part of the social system, which is one basis for a framework to be clarified as part of this thesis. Secondly, the immediate incorporation of global consciousness and human agency in a description of ‘globalisation’ under Holton’s third-wave thinking may tend to obscure whatever problems that the structure of the world’s capitalist economy poses generally, be it problems facing cultural diversity, religious harmony or environmental protection. It
may be more fruitful to consider these aspects, as potential reactions to the
dominant logic of globalisation in capitalistic economy, only on the second instance,
which will be done here in the subsequent subsection.

This subsection will meantime continue to seek refinement of the concept of
globalisation by considering the first two aspects cited by Holton, beginning with a
characterisation of globalisation in terms of cross-border movements of people,
goods and ideas. This has posed a difficulty as to when globalisation may be dated
back to, for human beings have been a ‘travelling species’ since their forebears left
Africa, as Kwame Anthony Appiah (2003, p. 192) has pointed out (cited in Holton,
2005, p. 28). Hence Holton argues that movement across borders alone may be a
necessary rather than sufficient indicator of globalisation, a crucial indicator having to
include the element of interdependence between distanciated social organisations
and also the sense or imagination of the world as a single place (Ibid., p. 30).
Whereas anti-global critics would interpret the interdependence in globalisation as
passive or involuntary, one taking into account the role of the global imagination like
Holton may include pilgrims, explorers, colonists and environmental activist all as
part of globalisation as long-distance trade or cultural exchange (Ibid.). It would be
maintained here however that Wallerstein’s perspective may be more purposeful by
distinguishing between mechanisms in world empires of the ancient world which
relied on military and political bonds, and those in the capitalist world-system today,
except that Janet Abu-Lughod (1993) has produced an alternative account of
continuities and discontinuities in world-system development predating the post-1500
European colonial system in Wallerstein’s account and avoiding a fundamental
dichotomy between East and West in world domination (cited in Holton, 2005, pp.
34-35).

A support for the interpretation of cross-border movements being involuntary rather
than free may come from observation of trends in migration, where the “uneven
development of global capitalism sets the parameters of both migration processes
and development prospects in the South or Third World (Munck, 2008, p. 1228). The
World Migration 2005 report by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM,
2005, p. 13) has indicated that all 190 or so sovereign states in the world are either
migrant sending, receiving or transit points, with 190 million people living outside
their country of birth, a figure double to that in 1980 (cited in Munck, 2008, p. 1229).
However, Munck points out that this figure is still less than 3 per cent of the world’s population, up only slightly from 2.5 per cent of total world population classified as international migrants in 1960 (Ibid.). What this suggests that it is necessary to examine more closely why people move or do not, in connection with the question of migration being part of the global process of capital accumulation and labour exploitation (Ibid.). Citing an OECD report by Harrison, Britton and Swanson (2004, p. 4), he notes that only a quarter of international migrants go from the global South to the global North (OECD countries), while not quite two-thirds of migrants move within the global South, though media attention appears to focus exclusively on the 16 per cent moving across the South-North divide, giving an unbalanced impression for the understanding of global migration (Munck, 2008, p. 1230). And despite a focus on the mobility of the new transnational capitalist and professional classes, the International Labour Organisation has declared in the *Stopping Forced Labour* report (ILO, 2001): “Although universally condemned, forced labour is revealing ugly new faces alongside the old. (cited in Munck, 2008, p. 1234)” Based on the definition of forced labour in the IOM convention as all work or service that is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and not offered voluntarily, it is estimated that there are 12.3 million people submitted to forced labour worldwide, of which 2.45 million are trafficked for the purpose (Andeers, 2006; cited in Munck, 2008, p. 1235).

Unfree labour has continued to play a role in the development of global capitalism, in which regard David Harvey has argued that the world is living through a new primitive accumulation of capitalism that he calls ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (cited in Munck, 2008, p. 1235). There has generally been governance deficits in international migration, with slow progress attributed by Stephen Castles to “the fear of labour-recruiting countries that regulation will increase the costs of migrant labour and put social obligations on receiving countries” (2008, p. 19; cited in Munck, 2008, p. 1238). Meantime, migration is not only a matter of economic process dictated by market forces but a key element influencing the politics of culture, as host societies are becoming increasingly fearful of the presence of migrant communities, especially those with unfamiliar cultures, and the arrival of migrants may suddenly prompt a rediscovery of national identity or cultural traditions (Munck, 2008, pp. 1231-1233)
When it comes to cross-border movements of goods and ideas, the concern is often one of cultural homogenisation. The threat, which some may choose to describe as ‘cultural imperialism’, would be one “rhetorically depicted as involving the high-tech culture of the metropolis, with powerful organisational backing, facing a defenceless, small-scale folk culture” (Hannerz, 2000, p. 331). But this ‘cultural imperialism’, as Hannerz argues, has more to do with the market today than with any empire, as “[h]omogenisation results mainly from the centre-to-periphery flow of commoditised culture” (Ibid.). The use of the term here dates back to a heavily criticised theory of cultural imperialism, referring to "how an ideology, a politics or a way of life is exported into other territories through the export of cultural products" (Sturken and Cartwright, 2009, p. 397). This has been expounded notably by communication theorists Armand Mattelart and Herbert Schiller, who argued that television has been a means through which world powers invade the cultural and ideological space of a country with images and messages (Ibid.). Armand Mattelart, together with cultural critic Ariel Dorfman, demonstrated in How to Read Donald Duck (1972) that Disney characters and stories, ostensibly targeted merely at child audiences, actually play a role in promulgating US imperialism in Latin America. But this use of the term ‘imperialism’ has been lambasted for its ambiguity, as it may refer freely to a political system or an economic system, without being clear as to patterns of colonial attitudes and practices or the system of economic relations in global capitalism involved (Tomlinson, 1991, p. 4). Tomlinson also criticises that Dorfman and Mattelart offered a notion of the manipulative power of the media text by assuming a similar interpretation by child or adult audience, without demonstrating how the cultural goods supposedly transmit the values they contain (Ibid., p. 44).

Hannerz (2000) would instead postulate four different frameworks involved in the process of ‘cultural flows’. Apart from the market framework, in which cultural commodities are moved amid competition among the agents which keep innovating to foster new demand, there is a state framework whereby citizens may be provided with ‘good culture’ that meet sanctioned intellectual and aesthetic standards, there is a third framework in ‘form of life’ through everyday practices in production and reproduction of meanings, and there is a fourth framework of movements that may be transnational (pp. 333-335). There may furthermore be two tendencies in the longer-term reconstruction of peripheral cultures within the global world, of which the
‘saturation tendency’ would be a version of the global homogenisation scenario, whereby peripheral culture gradually assimilate the imported meanings and forms as transnational cultural influences “unendingly pound on the sensibilities of the people of the periphery” (Ibid., p. 335). Yet there may also be a ‘maturation tendency’, whereby the periphery reshapes metropolitan culture through some phases, until metropolitan forms become hybridised, as local cultural entrepreneurs master the alien cultural forms to create new forms that are “more responsive to, and at the same time in part outgrowths of, local everyday life” (Ibid., p. 336).

However, Hannerz says that such a creolisation scenario is open-ended and may even be paradoxical: “When the peripheral culture absorbs the influx of meanings and symbolic forms from the centre and transforms them to make them in some considerable degree their own, they may at the same so increase the cultural affinities between the centre and the periphery that the passage of more cultural imports is facilitated. (Ibid., p. 337)” What the ‘end state’ might be, is in his perspective difficult to say. Noting that Hannerz has chosen not to commit to any speculation by ruling out the possibility of a global culture emerging, Tomlinson (1999, p. 72) argues for a more nuanced view not along the line of a monolithic global culture but more of a globalised culture (Ibid). Referring to Raymond Williams’ dictum that ‘culture is ordinary’ (Williams, 1989; cited in Ibid., p. 19), Tomlinson argues that one may understand culture as “the order of life in which human beings construct meaning through practices of symbolic representation” (p. 18), as “practices which do not directly hinge on a relationship between a ‘reader’ and a ‘text’ ” (p. 20). With this perspective, the concern in globalisation is more centred on the question of how it alters the context of meaning construction through connectivity in communication (Ibid.) or ‘cultural flow’, lifting context out of the confines of territory, to constitute what one may call a globalised culture beyond the framework of national cultures (Ibid., p. 105).

The second element of globalisation according to Holton (2005) is interdependence, an aspect referring to human activity transcending borders through agency of global entrepreneurs or regulators as well as social movement activists and cultural practitioners, involving formally organised undertakings or those embodied in networks (p. 15). This is well encapsulated in Giddens’ (1991) description of
globalisation as “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa” (p. 64). He characterises it as a dialectical process, since local happenings as such may move in a reverse direction from the very distanciated relations that are shaping them (Ibid.)

The new efficient manner in which communication takes place in the globalised world, hence facilitating such interdependence in economic, social or cultural organisation, has also been characterised by David Harvey (1996) with the idea of time-space compression. He links the globalisation of time and space with the dynamics of capitalist globalisation, whereby new technologies both speed up the tempo of life and reduce spatial barriers to economic activity for production and exchange (cited in Holton, 2005, p. 82). He traces these technological inputs to the common use of the minute and second from the 17th century, together with the time-conscious regime of industrial production and work discipline (cited in Ibid). In the spatial dimension, they are associated with advances in transportation and communication, what Harvey refers to as ‘the annihilation of space by time’ (cited in Ibid., p. 83). From Harvey’s neo-Marxist perspective, the power of new geographies now deploy such new forms of space-time, stemming from processes of capital accumulation that prompts shorter time-horizons for decision-making, shorter product and fashion cycles, and even changes the structures of feeling to favour the short-term and ephemeral.

One most controversial question on the globalised world economy pertains to the patterns and distribution of global inequality, as to whether it is falling or rising with trends of globalisation. The 2003 Human Development Report of the UNDP has indicated for instance that 54 countries in the 1990s became poorer than they were in 1990, with life expectancy shrinking to 34 and an increased hunger rate to 21 (cited in Holton, 2005, p. 162). Such states of affairs have led to much discontent founded on the view that globalisation is to blame, a view reinforced by images of low-wage workers in sweatshops manufacturing goods for multi-national corporations, and buttressed by an “intellectual assumption […] that the dominant forces affecting economic well-being are exogenous” (Holton, 2005, p. 163). Holton however raises question as to whether endogenous explanations may be replaced
entirely, citing civil conflict in more than half of the world’s poorest countries in the 1990s according to World Bank (2003) report (cited in Ibid.) as example. He argues that in some of such countries like in sub-Saharan Africa, the problem may even lie in too little involvement by external global actors in capital, technology, education and human rights, rather than too much (Ibid.). In any case, the World Bank has also pointed out in the 2003 report that the average income in the richest 20 countries is already 37 times greater than in the poorest 20 nations, with the gap between rich and poor countries doubling in the past 40 years (cited in Ibid., p. 164).

In terms of the world’s income distribution across the world’s populations, the proportion of people living on less than $2 were well over 80 per cent in India and Ethiopia at the close of the 20th century, whereas in China, Nigeria and Indonesia it was nearly 60 per cent, and in Mexico and Turkey over 40 per cent (WB, 1999-2000; cited in Ibid., pp. 164-165). East and South Asia still comprised two-thirds of the world’s very poor (Ibid.; cited in Holton, 2005, p. 165). As for global inequality patterns between and within nations, analyses by Bourguignon and Morrisson (1999) and O’Rourke (2002), which take into account GDP per head and population levels of different countries, have shown that world inequality has increased since 1820, with more rapid increases evident between 1820 and 1910, and again between 1960 and 1980s, both periods of expanding free trade and global market integration (cited in Holton, 2005, p. 166). However, Holton (Ibid.) argues that caution needs to be exercised as two forms of inequality are at play, whereby within-country inequality is likely driven by internal political factors and only between-country inequality is likely to be stronger measure of effects of economic globalisation.

According to the World Systems Theory, global inequality may be explained in terms of an all-powerful global economy dominating politics and culture while creating and reproducing inequality, notwithstanding how inconclusive the interpretation of statistics may be in supporting a single explanation. Holton meanwhile insists on several possibilities, arguing that some causes of inequality may be less to do with globalisation than with protectionism of rich countries, or with local injustice and corruption (2005, p. 183). But one may counter this with a defence that the World Systems Theory that does not completely eliminate the role of nation-states in perpetuating inequality. Holton appears to be assuming a dichotomy between
globalisation and nation-states as causes for inequality, ignoring possibilities such as what Sklair (2000) calls a transnational capitalist class.

The argument in this section is not to claim any single causal logic as the explanation for all the various processes of cross-border movements and interconnections discussed above as ‘globalisation’. The central question is rather how such globalisation, as an expansion of modernity (Giddens, 1991, p. 63) where economic processes take primacy, is posing a dilemma in the conflicts of value, in addition to being linked to issues of human rights and inequality. Giddens considers modernity as inherently globalising due to the basic characteristics of disembeddedness and reflexivity in modern institutions (Ibid.), whereby ‘disembedding’ refers to the lifting out of social relations from local contexts, through mechanisms such as the modern money economies (Ibid., pp. 21-25), whereas ‘reflexivity’ refers to a characteristic in human action which is originally integrated with the organisation of the community in traditional cultures (Ibid., p. 37), replaced in modernity by a new reflexively applied knowledge which has loses the old certitude (Ibid., p. 39). These lead to a problem in modernity which may also be discussed in Weber’s terms as one of disenchantment through rationality.

Webber’s tragic view of modernity, in terms of the differentiation of culture into a disorder of irreconcilable and competing value positions at the same time that rational or scientific knowledge leads to increasing sameness of modern life, has been set in contrast to greater optimism in Lyotard’s postmodern view of culture as comprising an infinite number of local narratives instead of one grand or metanarrative. Charles Turner (1990) is to be credited here for analysing how Lyotard and Weber diverge over the issue of cultural differentiation: Weber according to him has come from a neo-Kantian philosophy in treating individual value spheres as potential sites for reconstruction of an ethical ‘totality’, and is hence unable to embrace pluralism in the multiplicity of local narratives as Lyotard does by way of Wittgensteinian language games (pp. 108-115; cited in Gane, 2002, pp. 95-96). Gane (2002) however highlights the affinities between Weber’s and Lyotard’s position despite apparent differences, for instance in their move away from any narrative of historical progress and any idea of totality underlying the concept of an epoch. Lyotard in particular has claimed that modernity is not a historical entity as
such but the expression of an ethos, and neither do modernity and postmodernity mean a succession of historical periods, for the postmodern epitomises the experimental moment as Lyotard (1984) has proclaimed: “A work can only become modern if it is first postmodern. (p. 79; cited in Gane, 2002, p. 97)"

More importantly, as Gane argues, Weber and Lyotard are both critical of the instrumental reason bearing on Western and modern culture. Against Turner’s perspective, he contends that for Weber it is not a question that the universal has to be extracted or that there is no way for conflicts between values to be resolved, but rather a neo-Kantian statement on the divide between ideal-typical constructs and empirical reality, such that there are possibilities in practice for compromise but one is forced to choose between values that are irreconcilable (Gane, 2002, pp. 99-100).

It is on this finer point that Weber is at odds with Lyotard, who suggests that rationalisation and modernisation are nothing but metanarratives and hence instrumental reason may be dissolved into different positions which are individually determined, whereas Weber himself sees the very freedom of the individual in value-rational action limited by the force of instrumental reason (Ibid., pp. 101-102).

Hence Bauman (1995) would attest to Weber’s observation of modern ‘disenchantment’, whereby one is constantly partial, “decrying and disavowing old strategies [yet extolling] the need for strategy and the promise that the right strategy will be eventually produced” (p. 21); citing at the same time Lyotard’s observation of modern narrative as an idea living in the future yet to be implemented (Ibid.). He adds that modern civilisation “is only ostensibly purpose-oriented […] and always has been not action-oriented, but ability-to-act-oriented” (p. 23), such that modernity easily falls into a ‘globality’ of consuming whatever out there in the global economy (p. 24).

Giddens (1991) identifies capitalism, along with the nation-state, as the main element promoting the expansion of modern institutions (p. 62). Picking up on this main line of argument and avoiding complication with other dimensions that Giddens has included as part of the processes of globalisation, the remaining focus in this subsection would be to adopt a perspective of the World Systems Theory of Immanuel Wallerstein, in order to examine the effects of the world system of economy on cultures in the nation-states. Under Wallerstein’s framework, culture,
despite being mostly regarded as epiphenomenal, has also been presented as an empirical aspect of the world systems order (Wallerstein, 1979; cited in Robertson, 1991, p. 65).

Wallerstein’s World Systems Theory basically refers to the substitution of the national state with the ‘world-system’ as the standard unit of analysis, following a new perspective that began in the 1970s as an attempt to combine “concern with the unit of analysis, concern with social temporalities, and concern with the barriers that had been erected between different social science disciplines” (Wallerstein, 2004, p. 16). A major source in this new approach is historian Fernand Braudel’s idea of structural time, what he termed as longue durée in the 1958 article ‘Histoire et Sciences Sociales. La Longue Durée’.

Wallerstein highlights the significance of this new historical approach by tracing the disciplinary divisions in social sciences back to the 19th century. History was then set apart as the study of the past, whereas the study on social reality of the modern time was differentiated among the three social spheres of the market, the state and the civil society, which consequently fell under the economists, the political scientists and the sociologists respectively (Ibid., p. 4) The 19th-century also saw the emergence of anthropology as the study of ‘primitive’ peoples assumed as having no history, and that of Oriental studies, involving philological skills, to deal with ‘high civilisations’ such as China, India, Persia and the Arab world (Ibid., pp. 7-8). Since the revolutionary movements of 1968, however, social scientists began to raise issues on epistemologies in the older structures of knowledge, not to mention discovering the histories of hitherto neglected groups such as women, minority groups, indigenous populations and so on, Wallerstein argues (Ibid., p. 16). Braudel’s perspective came into the fore here as he criticised the traditional idiographic, empiricist and political historiography as mere ‘event-dominated’ or episodic history, just as he criticised the purely nomothetic work of many social scientists as being mythical in their search for timeless truths (Ibid., p. 15). For a new approach in between these two extremes, Braudel insisted on two other social times that had been neglected, namely structural time as long-lasting basic structures of ‘historical systems’, and the cyclical processes within these structures in terms of expansions and contractions of the world-economy as medium-term trends (Ibid.).
Adopting this perspective in world-systems analysis, the national states are hence replaced by ‘historical systems’ as the object of study. Three variants of historical systems are identified: minisystems, world-empires and world-economies - categories apparently derived from economic historian Karl Polanyi, who distinguished between three forms of economic organisation, namely “reciprocal (a sort of direct give and take), redistributive (in which goods went from the bottom of the social ladder to the top to be then returned in part to the bottom), and market (in which exchange occurred in monetary forms in a public arena)” (Ibid., p. 17). These three forms marked the development from simple societies of agriculture or hunting and gathering, through empires which required payment of tributes as ‘protection costs’, to the world-system today dominated by market trade, with multiple polities and cultures (Wallerstein, 2000, pp. 57-58).

This world-system of capitalist economy is furthermore analysed as being marked by “an axial division of labour between core-like production processes and peripheral production processes” (Wallerstein, 2004, p. 17), which tends to group together around particular countries such that one may for simplicity speak of core and peripheral zones or even core and peripheral states (Ibid.). Wallerstein emphasises that the ‘core-periphery’ is a relational concept, not terms applying to a reified pair (Ibid.).

Combining the above perspectives in the world-systems analysis, Immanuel Wallerstein (2000) traces the current capitalist world system back to the 16th century, when the European world-economy did not transform into a redistributive world-empire but instead into a capitalist world-economy (Wallerstein, 2000, p. 58), with firm connections eventually established in Asia, Africa and the Americas. The Europeans developed an occupational and geographic division of labour in which capital-intensive production was reserved for core countries, whereas peripheral areas provided low-skilled labour and raw materials and the semi-periphery acted as a buffer, in a model which, Wallerstein argues, already started in an early prototype with northwest Europe marked by industries like textiles, shipbuilding and metal wares, Eastern Europe as peripheral areas specialising in export of grains, wood, cotton and sugar, while Mediterranean Europe emerged as the semi-peripheral are specialising in high-cost industrial products such as silk (Ibid., p. 59). He names
three major mechanisms that have enabled such economic systems to retain relative政治 stability in terms of systemic survival: firstly, concentration of military strength in the hands of the dominant forces; secondly, the pervasiveness of an ideological commitment to the system, meaning the degree to which the staff or cadres of the system “feel that their own well-being is wrapped up in the survival of the system” (Ibid., p. 62); and finally, the existence of a majority of the semi-peripheral “middle stratum” as part of “three kinds of states, with pressures for cultural homogenisation within each of them” (Ibid.), next to the upper stratum of core-states and lower stratum of peripheral states.

Despite faulting it for concentrating too heavily on the factor of economic influences on modern transformations and missing out on other dimensions, Giddens (1992) has credited this model of the core, semi-periphery and periphery for helping to explain massive imbalances in the world capitalists economy, and managing to break away from limitations of orthodox sociological thought which tends to focus on ‘endogenous models’ of social change (p. 69).

Under the logic of such a world-system, cultural integration is not required for the system to function and hence ‘culture’ in various forms, is subordinate to the greater order and tied up with racism, sexism and a deceptive form of universalism, for “the world-economy is a complex of cultures – in the sense of languages, religions and ideologies – but the complex is not haphazard” (Wallerstein, 1984, p. 14; cited in Holton, 2005, p. 56). Wallerstein (1990) argues that ‘culture’ in the view of anthropologists, as a collection of traits, behaviours, values or beliefs among people which are neither universal nor idiosyncratic, is “a way of summarising the ways in which groups distinguish themselves from other groups” (pp. 31-32). Culture in this usage is normally attributed to nations, ‘tribes’ or ‘ethnic groups’, but he questions the evidence that any group has a ‘culture’ as such, for it “is surely not that all presumed ‘members of any of these groups act similarly to each other and differently from all others” (Ibid., p. 33) One may at most argue for significant relationship between group ‘membership’ and certain behaviour or value preferences, but this would not get one very far in historical analyses (Ibid., p. 34).

There is also a second usage of the word ‘culture’ according to Wallerstein, but this refers to certain characteristics within the group as opposed to other characteristics
within the same group, such as the higher arts as opposed to popular or everyday practice (Ibid., p. 32). But he argues that both concepts are nothing but some kind of idea-system under the capitalist world-economy that is derived from “our collective historical attempts to come to terms with the contradictions, the ambiguities, the complexities of the socio-political realities of this particular system” (Ibid., p. 38). The reality is one of transformations under the world-economy, which may be conceived of as changes from a local and traditional culture to a world-wide modern culture, but may also be conceived as one of populations within certain geographical boundaries under the pressure to give up their ‘culture’ to adopt that of the Western powers (Ibid., p. 36). The concept of culture in the first usage is hence simply an “assertion of unchanging realities amidst a world that is in fact ceaselessly changing” (Ibid., p. 39), whereas culture in the second usage is merely the “justification of the inequities of the system” (Ibid.). Wallerstein questions the point in using the proclamation of culture to assert a universalist theme such as the ‘high values to the human personality’, as political intellectual Rex Nettleford in Jamaica has done with the assertion of ‘blackness’ as national culture to fight against claims of the privileged view representing a ‘higher culture’ (Ibid., p. 41). The difficulty for him is where one draws the line between ‘race consciousness’ and racism, seeing many clear cases in the world where the assertion of the particularist ‘culture’ of the national majority to the exclusion of the minorities may be seen as oppressive (Ibid.). In short, he sees the construction of culture as an ideological battleground of opposing interests within a historical system (Ibid., p. 39), where culture may be used as a legitimation of power in the absence of monarchical-aristocratic systems, and patriotism based on the idea of culture may be reinforced or transformed into racism against immigrants (Ibid., p. 47).

‘Culture’ may also be used in a universalist sense to help legitimise polarisation in the world, according to Wallerstein, whereby states which make little progress in copying the universal culture of the modern world may be blamed for “being ‘racist’ in rejecting universal ‘modern’ values” (Ibid., p. 49). In short, the premises of ‘culture’ help to befuddle realities of a globalised world under its power structure. The realities of globalisation, as one may point out here, not only include that of inequality under a capitalist economy, but also what Ritzer (2004) has identified as another of the “major motor forces” (p. 162) in globalisation, namely McDonaldisation.
McDonaldisation, refers to a process in which the principles analogous to the fast-food restaurant are coming to dominate more and more sectors of American society and the rest of the world (Ibid. p. 1), based on dimensions of success such as efficiency, calculability, predictability and control (Ibid., p. 12) Part of the groundwork for McDonaldisation has been laid down by the idea of the automobile assembly line which helped lower prices, increase sales and increase profitability for the Ford Motor Company through greater efficiency (pp. 33-35). With the worldwide diffusion of such practices through globalisation, even the ways in which social life throughout the world is organised has been McDonaldised, according to Ritzer (Ibid., pp. 160-161) As an amplification of Weber’s theory of rationalisation, which discusses how people’s value systems have been replaced in the modern world by institutionalised rules to decide or dictate their choices, McDonaldisation with its bureaucracy implies a form of control that places even greater emphasis on the optimal choice in operation, by favouring efficiency and quantity over quality of work (Ibid., pp. 25-26).

Countering criticisms against the World Systems Theory for being one-dimensional in the explanation of ‘globalisation’, one may point out Kellner’s (2009, p. 2) observation that globalisation may be understood as a more neutral replacement term for modernisation with its positive and legitimating discourse. Globalisation theory such as Castell’s and Appadurai’s effectively switches the theoretical frame from analysis of capitalist mode of production to analysis of technological developments, and by producing visions of new freedoms through media and communications technology, may indirectly support an “emancipatory vision of neoliberalism” (Ampuja, 2012, p. 297). One may thus fall to the ideology of neoliberalism, the dominant political and economic dogma since the Reagan and Thatcher revolutions in the early 1980s and the fall of Berlin Wall in 1989, with all its defence of private property and competitive market in the name of individual freedom (Harvey, 2005, p. 3; cited in Ampuja, 2012, p. 296).

In short, globalisation does not imply a simple case of homogenisation in cultural manifestation, as localities may also incorporate global culture into their own forms of life to create some hybrids. Yet as part of a condition of modernity, it produces a globalised culture where traditional practices are disembedded from their earlier contexts and a new form of rationality becomes privileged. ‘Cultures’ in some reified
forms may be used meantime as an ideological tool to legitimise the power of the
privileged, diverting attentions from realities of change or inequality. It would hence
be arguably more pertinent to consider culture as everyday practices of people under
the social system, reacting to changing contexts of a local-global relationship.
However, the rise of a new global consciousness also tends to divert from such
social consciousness to the heightening of problems associated with cultural
differences, an issue which will be explored in the following subsection.

2.3.2 Consciousness of Cultural Differences with Intensification of the
Global-Local Relationship

This subsection will consider another perspective on globalisation, not in terms of
what one may argue as the main logic behind cross-border movements and
interdependence in the modern world, but instead of the how it may be imagined
within a ‘global consciousness’ as discussed in Robertson’s World Culture Theory,
which argues that there is not only a unifying trend of universalism but also
increasing differentiation through a simultaneous process of particularism.

By focusing on the cognitive aspect of culture, Robertson provides an interesting
perspective on how consciousness of cultural differences may be heightened
through global-local interpenetration. He hence argues for the importance of cultural
studies in analysing how culture is represented and how it may be othered, beyond
the question of structure and agency in Archer’s sociological analysis of culture.
Archer on her part has made major arguments in questioning the myth of cultural
integration; crucially, as will be discussed in this section, she has raised questions on
how a culture should be observed and understood, as she differentiates between a
cultural system of meanings in its own and a socio-cultural system in which ‘culture’
would be understood in terms of the social life.

Cultural studies would provide further perspectives on culture, not as social life to be
observed in a positivist sense but as a set of ideals in value systems, and a related
concept of ‘development’. Additionally, one may consider culture under an
institutionalised model of Meyer’s World Polity Theory on globalisation, which
Robertson also aligns with. Meyer challenges modernisation theory with a cognitive
model, a perspective which would eventually lead us to the question of whether the issue of ‘cultural values’ should be studied as part of psychology or as part of ethics.

Robertson (1992) uses the concept of globalisation to refer “both to the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole” (p. 8), with his interest focusing on ‘global consciousness’, tracing its notion back to McLuhan’s imagery of the global village in the 1960s. In contrast with the perspectives of Wallerstein and others discussed in Section 2.3.1, he does not approach globalisation in terms of circumstances of economic factors and processes, or any related problems in modernity related to the capitalist system, as he prefers to emphasise that the reflexive character of modernisation makes it more fluid and ‘subjective’ (Ibid., pp. 8-13). He criticises Weber in his ‘iron cage’ argument for “denying that the charismatic glorification of reason had helped to create definitely modern forms of economic and political individualism” (Ibid., p. 24). To Robertson, Weber had a tendency to see culture in a negative sense in terms of struggles between nations on the preservation of societal values, whereas Durkheim would be more open to is today termed as globalisation, as he spoke of the transcendence of national societies as ‘international life’ (Ibid., pp. 23-24).

In Robertson’s view, there were already openings to the theorisation of globalisation available in the founding period of sociology, since ‘nationalisation’ and ‘globalisation’ were a Janus-face problem facing classical sociologists simultaneously (Ibid., p. 15). He therefore tries to redefine its germination in a history of sociology which has been divided by Albrow (1990, pp. 6-8) under a scheme of five stages, namely universalism, national sociologies, internationalism, indigenisation and globalisation (cited in Robertson, 1992, pp. 16-21). The stage of universalism refers to the aspiration of early sociology to provide a science of humanity based on timeless principles, as seen in Comte or Marx; national sociologies to Albrow were characterised by intellectual hegemony of national cultures, such as Durkheim claiming a ‘French-rational’ synthesis of German idealism and British empiricism; internationalism started after World War II as represented by Parsons’ modernisation thesis; indigenisation was a phase centred on the Third World; and globalisation according to Abrow marked the interaction between nationalism and internationalism (Ibid.) Robertson finds Albrow’s characterisation of the stages helpful to some extent but needing modification, particularly with regards to the significance of Durkheim,
who should be credited for being concerned with the generalised theme of universalism and its relationship with particularism. This involves a relationship between moral relativism and a humanity-oriented moral universalism in Durkheim’s concept (Ibid., p. 23), which Robertson would adapt for delineation of the global circumstances.

A more contemporary source for Robertson in developing his model of globality was social anthropologist Dumont. Dumont argued that the discipline of anthropology was simultaneously committed to the ideas of the ‘unity’ of mankind and the uniqueness of individual societies, and he attempted to resolve the contradiction by arguing that the world in its totality should be regarded as consisting of worldwide relationships between societies on one hand and self-contained ‘windowless monads’ on the other (Ibid., p. 25). The model of ‘global field’ that Robertson subsequently formulates would be more multifaceted, as he considers not two but four major aspects, namely national societies; individuals, or selves; relationships between national societies, or the world system of societies; and in a generic sense, mankind, or humankind (Ibid.).

Despite the ‘totalising’ tendency in this model, Robertson maintains that it does so partly in order to understand different kinds of orientation to globality, as it is conceived as an attempt “to make analytical and interpretive sense of how quotidian actors, collective or individual, go about the business of conceiving of the world” (Ibid., p. 26). Despite such focus on the consciousness of the actors as its reference points, however, Robertson insists that trends towards unicity of the world is inexorable, for even protectionism today are ‘self-consciously’ situated within a system of global economy and regulations (Ibid.). He adds that the model is a flexible one, set out in synchronic terms but also applied diachronically, to take into account changes in each of the four major components, in tandem with shifts in relations between them (Ibid.). He argues that in order to have a ‘realistic’ view of the world as a whole, one has to accept in principle the ‘relative autonomy’ of each of the four components but at the same time “acknowledge that each of the four is in one way or another constrained by the other three” (Ibid., p. 28). Ultimately, he does not completely deny the dynamics of capitalism or other driving forces of globalisation but considers such perspectives a well-trodden ground and the interest in his approach is therefore to demonstrate discontinuities and differences in culture, as opposed to the traditional sociological view of culture as integrating (Ibid., p. 29).
uses the concept of ‘relativisation’ to indicate the increasing challenges presented to the stability of particular perspectives on the overall globalisation processes; application of the model hence involves the view “that processes of differentiation of the main spheres of globality increase over time” (Ibid.). He describes the world as being engaged in a ‘postmodern game’ of constructing histories and inventing traditions, as a world of ‘reflexive interlocutors’ (Ibid., p. 31).

Robertson takes the position that in a world that is increasingly compressed, and in which its most powerful components, namely the nationally constituted societies and the inter-state system, are increasingly subjected to circumstaces of multiculturality or polyethnicity, “the conditions of and for the identification of individual and collective selves and of individual and collective others are becoming ever more complex” (p. 98). While acknowledging that personal and collective identity is largely constructed, Robertson argues that there are nevertheless dominant ways in which this is done in any given period and place, and what happens as the world becomes more compressed is that the bases of ‘doing identity’ are increasingly shared, perhaps at the same time colliding (Ibid., p. 99). His argument would hence be directed towards the aspect of difference as well as the aspect of homogeneity, and his thesis is that with the late 20th century, the world has witnessed and participated in “a massive, twofold process involving the interpenetration of the universalization of particularism and the particularisation of universalism” (Ibid., p. 100; emphasis in original).

Robertson notes that Wallerstein has also insisted correctly on the simultaneity of particularism and universalism, but thinks he has not addressed the issue of interpenetration far enough, and objects to Wallerstein (1984, p. 167) grounding the relationship in “the genius and the contradiction of capitalist civilisation” (cited in Robertson, 1992, p. 100). Robertson prefers to see a differential spread of capitalism which may be explained by its accommodation to how the problematic between the particular and the universal is worked out (Ibid.). To put it in another way, the contemporary market involves an increasing interpenetration of culture and economy (Ibid.).

Robertson further emphasises that the universalism-particularism issue has been a basic feature of the human condition to begin with, citing the example of how Japan
acquired the theme of universality through its encounters and modifications of Confucianism and Mahayana Buddhism (Ibid., pp. 101-102). Secondly, he argues that in more recent world history, this issue has come to constitute something like a ‘global-cultural form’, whereby the global and the local have been tied together as one experience with both the expectation of particularity and the expectation of universality (Ibid., p. 102). What contemporary globalisation has achieved is a form of institutionalisation of the two-fold process, such that any resistance can be regarded as opposition not only to the world as one homogenised system but also, he believes, to the conception of the world as a series of culturally equal and relativised ways of life (Ibid.). Robertson has made an alignment here with a main thesis of the World Polity Theory, as he argues that globalisation involves not only the institutionalised construction of the individual, but also the worldwide institutionalisation of ‘the life course’, which according to John Meyer consists of two dimensions, namely ‘aspects of the person that enter into rationalised social organisations’ and the public celebration of the private or subjective individual (Meyer, 1987, pp. 243-244; cited in Robertson, p. 105).

Robertson has however been criticised for treating social circumstances generally on too abstract a level as such. The essential character of the globality which Robertson addresses in his model, as Friedman (1994) observes, is in fact simply “the universal as a more or less concrete experienced representation” (p. 196), heightened by interconnections among proponents of a global arena through mechanisms of technological speed-up which Harvey has expressed in more precise terms as time-space compression, referring to transport, communication and money economy (Ibid.). But there is a lack of clear limits in the framework, so much so that it yields an impression of discussion on a spiritual level, under some “understanding that we are all part of something bigger” (Ibid.), as Friedman remarks disapprovingly. The linkages among the four components in globalisation that Robertson emphasises are apparently just cognitive or discursive in nature, rather than economic and political processes in any historical perspective; the relativisations in this case might also simply be explained away as processes of differentiation or separation in modernity (Ibid., p. 197). Friedman would summarise the four different terms simply as identity space of modernity, involving the processes of identification, whether it is of the self or of ‘the other’ in the larger system (Ibid.). Robertson in any case is not suggesting
that the world is becoming more identical, but simply that there are two interpenetrating processes, namely the universalization of particularism and the particularisation of universalism (Ibid., p. 198). The inadequacy may be seen when local or localising phenomena of ethnicity, nationalism and indigenous movements may all simply be understood as standard global products without specification of social contexts (Ibid.).

Robertson’s approach has been interpreted partly as reflecting his previous work on sociology of religion, and partly as being influenced by Parsons’ account of social life embodying values and norms, except the system metaphor with its empirical difficulty has been abandoned and replaced by an account in terms of ‘forms of life’ in the global field (Holton, 2005, pp. 62-63). While concurring with Friedman on the limitations of this approach which underplays economic and political processes, he acknowledges Robertson’s attempt to bring some balance with a cultural approach, striking for not treating the cultural domain as a unifying normative force in a quasi-Parsonian manner but rather playing out cultural issues in their complex interactions (Ibid. p. 63). The idea of global-local interpenetration appears to provide some insights, he argues, for instance on a topic drawn from the sociology of religion, namely the revival of fundamentalism, whereby Robertson demonstrates how local knowledge is affected by global relationships in frames of reference on intercultural exchange and conflict (Ibid., p. 65). However, Holton also points out from a theoretical point of view that Robertson is dealing with ontological rather than with epistemological issues and his arguments lack a philosophy of history (Ibid., p. 66).

Where the cultural domain is concerned, Robertson has also contributed to the discussion on globalisation by evaluating relevant concepts of culture in the development of sociology. Robertson attributes the revived interest in culture, as part of a focus on globalisation, to the long decline in sociological interest for it after the period of classical sociology, or after around 1920 (Ibid., p. 32). While there were some efforts in thematising the issue of culture by Talcott Parsons and his followers in between, not much appeared to be done for a long time thereafter, he says (Ibid., p. 35). As reflected in what one likes to call ‘cultural analysis’ (Wuthnow et al, 1984), the subject of culture as typically treated in American sociology textbooks is often set in isolation from political ideology, religious doctrine and other ideational matters, to be limited instead to the idea of culture being a ‘product’ of social interaction,
Robertson observes (1992, p.35). Citing examples such as Parsons, Geertz, Sahlins and Bourdieu, Robertson argues it is not that the study of culture has made no headway, but that little of the vast amount of work done has been admitted as being relevant to ‘normal sociology’ (Ibid., pp. 35-36). Culture as a field of inquiry has generally been of interest to sociologists, it seems, only when it is of use in accounting for variation within the domain of social structure and social action, even described as a form of ‘tool kit’ (Swidler, 1986; cited in Robertson, 1992, p. 37). Otherwise, whatever historical study of the structure and transformation of civilizational patterns of ideas and symbols has largely been marginalised, encouraging “the retreat of sociologists into the present” (Elias, 1987; cited in Robertson, 1992, p. 37).

Robertson sees the concern with culture amplified through a realignment of relationship between sociology and anthropology, whereby social and cultural anthropologists since the 1970s have increasingly incorporated so-called ‘modern societies’ in their purview, including what he would term as the global field (1992, p. 41). Part of the growing concern with culture in sociology actually came from the contribution of Marxist theories, in relation to phenomena of nationalism and ethnicities, or in terms of cultural hegemony holding back economic forces; even Wallerstein has thus taken a cultural turn (Ibid., p. 42). While some regard culture as epiphenomenal, others regard ‘the problem of culture’ as inherent to capitalism, the latter represented by Baudrillard with the argument that commodification has rendered capitalism a fundamentally cultural phenomenon (Ibid.). The politicisation of religion has provided a separate development that helped correct the anti-cultural bias in modern sociology (Ibid.).

Much preoccupation in sociologists’ debates on culture has been along the lines of whether culture is determined or determinative (Robertson, 1992, p. 45). On this, Archer argues in her major work on culture and agency (1988) that the major sociological problems centred on culture can only be amply dealt with through careful analytical recognition of the relationship of autonomy as well as interdependence between culture as the objective existence of thoughts and beliefs, and culture as a factor of action (cited in Ibid., p. 37).
The dualistic approach in which Archer systematically analyses the place of culture in social theory is significant as it resolves to maintain a distinction between social integration and system integration in discussing culture as a system (Archer, 1996, p. xvi). It is consequently also relevant in the consideration of how a culture may be understood by people of a different group, in a globalised world whereby awareness of ‘cultural differences’ is heightened.

Her perspectives on culture as a system on its own avoids assumptions of a ‘Myth of Cultural Integration’ whereby every element is interdependent with every other in a coherent organisation (p. 2), and also avoids cultural conflations of various types. Archer criticises the insistence in functionalist thought on an internal logic of culture combined with the idea of a Parsonian value system for action that guarantees societal integration (p. 3). She also criticises similar assumptions on cultural coherence that may be present in a humanistic strand of Marxism with regards to ‘hegemonic culture’ (Ibid.). The confusion in the myth of cultural consistency implicit in a general view of culture as ‘a community of shared meanings’, she argues, relates to logical consistency and causal consensus (Ibid., p. 4). Logical consistency refers to “the degree of internal compatibility between the components of culture” (Ibid.), components as in ideational elements such as knowledge, belief, norms, language and mythology; whereas causal consensus refers to “the degree of social uniformity produced by the imposition of culture […] by one set of people on another” (Ibid.). The two aspects which may easily be conflated are in fact logically and empirically distinct and may vary independently of one another (Ibid.). Here she credits Sorokin for making a distinction between functional integration in causal interdependence which he repudiates, and ‘logico-meaningful integration of culture’, which she considers still problematic but providing a starting point for examining the systemic level (Ibid., pp. 26-27).

Archer’s improved dualistic perspective involves a fresh discussion of a Cultural System (CS) in terms of characteristics proper to it as being distinct from the Socio-Cultural (S-C) level (Ibid., p. 104). Archer (Ibid.) says that a Cultural System is to be treated as co-terminous with what Popper (1978) denotes as ‘world 3’ knowledge, to be distinguished from that for ‘world 1’ as the physical world or ‘world 2’ as the mental world, referring to the world of the products of the human mind, such as languages, stories, religious myths, scientific conjectures, artistic expressions or
works of engineering, which may be embodied or physically realised in world 1 physical objects (pp. 144-145). In Archer’s definition, a Cultural System at any given time is “constituted by the corpus of existing intelligibilia – by all things capable of being grasped, deciphered, understood or known by someone” (Archer, 1996, p. 104). It follows that there is only one such stem at any time (Ibid.).

In Archer’s analytical framework, the Cultural System not only has an objective existence and autonomous relations among its components such as beliefs and values, but contradictions also exist in it independently of people’s awareness (Ibid., p. 107). This is a very interesting position, for there would be objection to this view from people who deny the existence of contradictions as part of systemic properties in a cultural system, preferring to consider these as entirely derivative from the Socio-Cultural level (Ibid. p. 108). Winch (1958) would argue that “the logical relations between propositions […] depend on social relations between men” (p. 126; cited in Ibid.), an argument that denies the ontological status of the Cultural System by collapsing it with the Socio-Cultural realm (Archer, 1996, p. 108).

One critique that may be levelled against Winch’s position is that while there is plenty of variation in social relations between men, no one has provided a convincing demonstration of the same variability in logical relations (Ibid.). Secondly, the intelligibilia is not necessarily the dependent variable of the Socio-Cultural System as assumed a priori (Ibid.). Finally, Archer argues that since meaning can be separated from use generally, not just used by certain people, meanings have to be granted ontological status (Ibid., p. 109).

With this distinction made between the Cultural System and the Socio-Cultural System, a problem also arises as to what ‘intercultural understanding’ should involve as the object of understanding and how it should be conducted. While ‘understanding’ a Cultural System would centre on a system of meanings or ideational elements, ‘understanding’ a Socio-Cultural System would centre on the interpretation of action or behaviour against rules or standards in social life. The latter also summarises an approach that Winch represents.

Winch represents an idea of a social science which believes that the identification of regularity or uniformity in human behaviour is different from making generalisations in the natural sciences, because “to investigate the type of regularity studied in a
given enquiry is to examine the nature of the rule according to which judgments of identity are made in that enquiry. Such judgments are intelligible only relatively to a given mode of human behaviour, governed by its own rules (Winch, 1958, pp. 83-84: cited in MacIntyre, 1970, p. 114). His view of understanding and explanations in the social sciences may be summarised in a two-stage model, whereby an action is first “made intelligible as the outcome of motives, reasons, and decisions” (MacIntyre, 1970, p. 115), then it is “made further intelligible by those motives, reasons and decisions being set in the context of the rules of a given form of social life” (Ibid.; emphasis in original). What Winch asserts roundly in short is that “all behaviour which is meaningful (therefore all specifically human behaviour) is ipso facto rule-governed” (Winch, 1958, p. 52; cited in MacIntyre, 1970, pp. 118-119). What Winch does not seem to consider, however, is that the concept of a rule may be so broadly applied that different senses of rule-governed become confusing, not to mention the question of whether an account of meaningful action may be plausibly applied to all actions, MacIntyre comments (1970, p. 119).

On the question of ‘understanding’ a different culture, there is yet another dilemma which is the problem of whether its rationality should be elucidated on its own terms or whether one elucidates it in a logical structure of one’s own culture. This is where there has been a stand-off between the positions of Winch and MacIntyre. MacIntyre argues in the paper Is Understanding Religion Compatible with Believing? (1970) that when one detects some ‘incoherence’ in the standards of intelligibility in a society, and attempts to show why it is tolerable to the society’s members, one is already invoking one’s own standards (cited in Winch, 1970, p. 98). Winch (1970) however argues that one may well be simply “doing something in which members of the studied society exhibit no interest, because the institutions in which such an interest could develop are lacking […] or perhaps] the development of techniques of inquiry and modes of argument [of our society is] not to be found in the life of the studied society’ (p. 98). Winch is incidentally making most of these arguments in the context of his paper Understanding a Primitive Society citing the example of the African Azande’s ‘irrational’ belief in witchcraft (Ibid., p. 79). His argument ultimately is that one is required “to consider the relations of a set of rules and conventions to something else” (Ibid., p. 105), whereby in the example of Zande magical rites it may be related to “a sense of the significance of human life” (Ibid.), with one fundamental
aspect being social relations (Ibid.). Hence Winch ultimately returns to social relations as the basis for understanding an alien culture.

With Winch’s notion of social determination of culturally specific criteria, he has been criticised by Luke for being relativistic in his notion of understanding social life, as his criteria of truth and rationality are regarded as internal to the language games shared by a speech community (see Ulin, 2001, p. 93). In Luke’s perspective, criteria of rationality and reality and not norms but standards by which intelligibility and validity of particular beliefs are judged, standards which cannot be viewed as social facts in the Durkheimian sense, for that would reduce them from a transcendental to a conventional status in nature (see Ibid.). While accepting the contention in the Durkheimian tradition that interaction of institution and individual is a non-intentional social fact, Luke improves over the reification of social institution under this tradition as something leading lives of their own apart from human actors (see Ibid., p. 91). However, by divorcing universal standards of logic from the intersubjectively valid language in which they are objectified, he faces a problem in making a transition from a priori criteria, which would be present in cognitive structures before sociocultural learning processes, to intersubjectivity in social life, whereas Winch is able to explain criteria of logic as arising from modes of social life (Ibid., p. 93-94).

If considering the challenge of dialogue or exchange with another culture in the globalised world simply in terms of ‘intercultural understanding’ would fall into a trap of relativism, one may also consider the challenge from the perspective of a universalist project as a form of ‘learning’ or ‘civilising’. It is useful here to consider ‘culture’ in a different perspective beyond the sociological and anthropological, namely that of cultural studies, which Robertson (1992) sees as missing from Archer’s analysis, and deems resourceful as commentary on the global world, with its fluidity in the concerns with culture as representation as well as resistance (pp. 47-48). One perspective missing in a sociological analysis but highlighted in the subsequent discussion here, would be the negotiation of culture as ‘ideal’ for normativity.

Cultural Studies according to Stuart Hall (1994) emerged as “a decisive break: with a certain kind of technological evolutionism, with a reductive economism and an organisational determinism” (p. 521), as seen in the key works of
Raymond Williams and E.P. Thompson (Ibid.). In a dialogue with different positions on culture, Williams engages with the ‘idealist’ and ‘civilising’ definitions of culture, but also, in reaction to Marxist perspectives on superstructures, offers a ‘radical interactionism’ (Ibid., p. 524). He represents a paradigm which conceptualises culture as being interwoven with all social practices, and which instead of adopting a base-superstructure formulation between ideal and material forces, favours a formulation of dialectic between social being and social consciousness (Ibid., p. 527). Hall summarises the paradigm thus: “It defines ‘culture’ as both the meanings and values which arise amongst distinctive social groups and classes, on the basis of their given historical conditions and relationships, through which they ‘handle’ and respond to the conditions of existence; and as the lived traditions and practices through which those ‘understandings’ are expressed and in which they are embodied. (Ibid.)”

What Hall calls the ‘culturalist’ strand in Cultural Studies was followed by a structuralist paradigm linked to perspectives of Levi-Strauss and Althusser (Ibid., pp. 528-529). This arguably marks an advance over culturalism in its conception of the necessary complexity of the unity of a structure (Ibid., p. 533), but Hall argues that neither of the paradigms would be self-sufficient, as culturalism helps to consider the specificity of different practices, and together these two paradigms confront “the dialectic between conditions and consciousness” (Ibid., p. 538). Hall himself has incorporated both intentional and constructionist perspectives on the production of cultural meanings, whereby it depends on the practice of interpretation in encoding and decoding (Hall, 1980) but these codes operate as social conventions even as meanings are constantly changing (Hall, 1997a, p. 62).

Cultural Studies would also be concerned with the issue of cultural differences. Stuart Hall has referred to the structuralist perspective in discussing the common fascination with ‘difference’ and ‘otherness’, citing Derrida’s argument that few binary oppositions are neutral (Hall, 1997b, p. 235). From the perspective of a postcolonial theory such as that from Robert Young (1995), culture may be considered as a dialectical process in the history of difference, of defining itself against what is constructed as outside itself, yet absorbing the excluded as part of its internal intensions (see Bennett, 1998, p. 78). Young argues that culture has always marked cultural difference through producing of the other, as it is a process of “inscribing and
expelling its own alterity” (1995, p. 30; cited in Bennett, 1998, p. 78). For Young, culture also tends to be set in opposition, such as culture itself versus nature or anarchy, high culture versus mass culture, or national versus regional culture (1995, p. 29; cited in Bennett, 1998, p. 91).

Robertson shares similar concerns on ‘othering’, as he sees cultural studies as being useful in challenging the ‘traditional’ procedures of disciplinary inquiry, “declaring these to be conventions which are permeated by all sorts of substantive assumptions and preferences” (Robertson, 1992, p. 164), but he emphasises that it needs not reduce issues of ‘fundamentals’, or questions of ‘ultimate values’, to discourse, ideas of power or mode of production (Ibid., p. 165). He argues that the issue of fundamentals as such involves a significant degree of reflexivity, such as on how traditions may be invented, as well as of choice, in terms of rationality in optimisation or preferences (Ibid., p. 167). Sociology has traditionally operated along an antinomy between the idea of choice in utilitarian terms and in matters of ‘ultimate values’, “[owing much to] Max Weber’s distinction between instrumental (or formal) and substantive (or value) rationality” (Ibid.), as consolidated in Parsons’ action theory and added to Habermas’ critical theory (Ibid.), as he highlights.

In more current practice of sociology, anthropology and cultural studies, however, there has been “an anti-foundational, ‘going native’ shift, which often involves an ‘essentialisation’ of ‘the Other’ ” (Ibid.), with Abaza and Smith (1990, p. 211) noting an increasing claim for ‘indigenisation’ of social sciences (cited in Ibid.). Robertson also cites a similar phenomenon of essentialisation in the academic specialisation of intercultural communication, a field founded on anthropology, psychology and linguistics. There might be a vested professional interest in accentuating difference, as the rapid expansion of this applied science marks a “concrete site of practical communications between cultures” (Ibid. p. 172). Such phenomenon is tied to globalisation as space-time compression, similar to tourism, which is a phenomenon of global capitalism also involving some form of otherness, whether imagined as authentic or otherwise (Ibid., p. 173). Such issues of otherness and authenticity also complicate the matter as one comes to the interpretation of cultural heritage.

Going beyond the issue of othering, Bennett (1998) would emphasise the opposing nature of culture as denoting a normative divide (p. 91), involving a hierarchical
ordering of relations between different spheres of culture that results in some ‘strategic normativity’ (Ibid., p. 92). He attempts to recover what he discerns as “the normative aspect of the concept of culture as a way of life” (Ibid.) which has been inherent in Raymond Williams’ work, in order to argue for its retention to help address concerns in cultural policy studies. He argues that the break from the Arnoldian legacy as accorded to Williams’ concept of culture has in fact been exaggerated, that Williams’ concept remains inextricably normative when considered alongside Tylor’s ‘anthropological’ concept of culture (Ibid., p. 88). To Bennett, one needs to look past the issue of Tylor’s Eurocentrism in the evolutionary ranking of cultures under the process of ‘civilisation’, in order to appreciate how his perspective allows him address “the reforming mechanism that is at the heart of Arnold’s concept of culture” (Ibid., p. 94), whereby Arnold’s interest consisted in identifying ideal norms of human perfection for emulation (Ibid.). In Williams’ (1965) breaking down of culture into three general categories, he has also notably begun with an ‘ideal’ definition that follows Arnold’s concept of human perfection in terms of universal values. While Williams then introduces a ‘documentary’ definition of culture as the body of intellectual and imaginative work, followed by a ‘social’ definition of culture as a particular way of life expressed also in institutions and ordinary behaviour, Bennett points out that Williams has in no way suggested that the documentary or ideal definitions should be displaced (Bennett, 1998, p. 65). While Williams tried to distance himself from the view that social and cultural development can be equated with realising of some absolute values of human perfection, what he was doing effectively was to move away from Arnold’s perspective towards Tylor’s, Bennett argues, citing Williams’ suggestion to think of development not as “human perfection, which implies a known ideal towards which we can move, but human evolution, to mean a process of general growth of man as a kind” (Williams, 1965, p. 59; cited in Bennett, 1998, p. 96).

In his later work Marxism and Literature, Williams (1977) would introduce the concept of residual culture, as distinguished from the archaic, Bennett (1998, p. 96) also cites. Bennett considers the distinction as structurally the same as the distinction Tylor (1874) made between survival and revival. Tylor considers as ‘survivals’ those processes, customs, opinions and so on which have been carried on by habit into a newer condition of culture, whereas Williams considers as ‘archaic’
that which is an element of the past (Ibid., pp. 96-97). However, there is also some important difference, as ‘revivals’ for Tylor comprises cultural forms and practices fallen into disuse but reactivated in an imaginative way, whereas ‘residual’ for Williams refers to traditions which have had a continuing active existence, and the concept serves to identify sources and resources of cultural innovation that may help prod a culture beyond the grip of ossification and hence to undo the hegemony of dominant culture through creative force (Ibid., p. 97-98). The key of the difference lies in the fact that Tylor had no need to identify such mechanisms to destabilise the ossification of dominant culture, as he was writing from a bourgeois and colonial perspective whereby the dominant culture was inherently dynamic, Bennett says (Ibid., p. 99).

Bennett considers that such normative structure of the concept of culture, as a legacy of Arnold and Tylor, and via additional work by Williams, has entered contemporary discourse in cultural policy. He cites Our Creative Diversity, the 1995 report of the World Commission on Culture and Development, which has proposed to expand the concept of cultural policy beyond a narrow focus on the arts, to be “directed at encouraging multi-cultural activities” (World Commission, 1995, p. 18; cited in Bennett, 1998, p. 105). While Bennett characterises this promotion of creative diversity as “a reformist program for cultural policy that is wholly at odds with the universalist aspirations of Tylor” (1998, p. 105), he observes that its mechanism also involves a normative division of culture into two spheres, with “the organisation of a hierarchical gradient between the two to specify the directions in which the reforming impetus of culture must flow” (Ibid.). Here, the division is between ‘tolerant’ and ‘intolerant’ cultures, whereby the latter refers to “some cultures that may not be worthy of respect because they themselves have been shown to be intolerant, exclusive, exploitative, cruel and repressive” (World Commission, 1995, p. 54; cited in Bennett, 1998, p. 105). The crucial difference with Tylor in this mechanism, however, is to be seen in a shift in the idea of cultural development, from one seeking to erase cultural diversity, to one dedicated within limits to the promotion and celebration of diversity (Bennett, 1998, p. 106). With this, Bennett argues that culture, if seen as a reformer’s science, is one that is not neutral.

The normative aspect of culture in terms of institutionalisation has also been discussed, in relation to challenges of globalisation, under the perspective of the
World Polity Theory, for which “world-society models shape nation-state identities, structures, and behaviour via worldwide cultural and associational processes (Meyer et al, 2000, p. 90). This has argued that “realist models can account for a world of economic and political absorption, inequality, and domination”, but “do not well explain a world of formally equal, autonomous, and expansive nation-state actors” (Ibid.: 91). An example cited of world society models taking concrete form in state policies is the way many countries have structured their mass schooling systems around a 6-year primary/3-year junior/3-year senior secondary model following UNESCO statistic reports on enrolments in such a structure. World society models also specify standard cultural depiction of national identity: “Methods of constructing national culture through traditions, museums, tourism, and national intellectual culture are highly stylised. Nation-states are theorised or imagined communities drawing on models that are lodged at the world level. (Ibid.: 88)”

Meyer (2010) places the new institutionalisms on a continuum from more realist to more phenomenological models, whereby actors in realist models are assumed to have boundaries and closely integrated internal structures independent of their participation in institutions, whereas in phenomenological models such as that of Berger and Luckmann (1967), “actor agency, boundaries, and internal structures are legitimated by the wider institutional system and vary with its variations” (p. 3). It is in the latter, he says, that the institutional system, including “the organizations and cultural meanings that write and rewrite the scripts” (Ibid., p. 4), becomes central while actors may be seen as more derivative. Following an argument of Olson (1965) that rational action based on self-interest tends to have difficulty producing collective action compared to religious action, Meyer infers that much of the highly collective action in the postwar world “has some religious characteristics” (Ibid., p. 7). He further argues: “Contemporary phenomenological institutional theories recover the old institutionalist conceptions of people and groups as highly embedded in wider cultural material. The important change is that contemporary institutional schemes operate by building their cultural material into the roles and identities of persons and groups now conceived as highly legitimated and agentic actors. (Ibid., p. 15)”

‘Culture’ as discussed under Meyer’s perspectives of World Polity Theory refers largely to the level of the nation-state as actor which is seen as “embedded in and constructed by an exogenous, and more or less worldwide, rationalistic culture”
(Meyer, 1999, p. 123). He adds: “Culture in this sense is less a set of values and norms, and more a set of cognitive models defining the nature, purpose, resources, technologies, controls, and sovereignty of the proper nation-state. (Ibid.)” This theoretical perspective serves to explain isomorphic change in constitutive and organisational structures of contemporary nation-states (Ibid.) in a way that eschews flaws of Modernisation Theory on development. Modernisation Theory as represented by Rustow (1967) has been met with objections for its methodological procedure in which the traditional is simply defined negatively as opposed to the modern, such that all past societies are placed in a single category of underdeveloped communities, and not only is there an overt ethnocentrism when modernisation is rendered synonymous with Westernisation, there is an assumption that only one ‘destination’ is possible, namely the industrial-capitalist, whereas communism for instance would be characterised as a ‘disease of the transition’ by Rostow (Bernstein, 1971, pp. 145-146).

Meyer (1999) however simply sees a form of ‘modern culture’ as emphasising “a social world made up of bounded, purposive, and rational actors” (p. 124), privileging individuals, nation-states and formal organisations and deemphasising other kinds of social units such as tribes, clans, families, ethnic groups and communities (Ibid.). Noting that the term ‘culture’ in the usage of modern social science and modern rationalistic culture would tend to be reserved for the primordial and particular, set apart from the rules of modern rationality; whereas the modern system is believed to have transcended culture, Meyer considers that this reflects a fundamental myth which is precisely “the grounding culture of the modern system” (Ibid., p. 138).

Meyer considers world polity at a collective level as organised through a set of consultants rather than a set of agents, whereby the discourse is oriented towards higher goods, such as scientific truths about nature and environment or national economic development, moral laws on human and group justice and so on (Ibid., p. 128). He suggests referring back to Mead (1934) in the view that the social world is made up of actors as well as the Others who, in Meyer’s interpretation, “advise actors what to do” (Ibid.), such that in the modern world, actors are rationalised as with the Others “who speak for the rationalised ideals of the universal scientized truth, law, and moral order and apply these considerations to the proper interests and needs of the actors” (Ibid.).
We return hence to the question of how culture should be understood and observed. On one hand, there may be an approach of studying culture as a system of symbols, through interpretations in the manner of Levi-Strauss or Geertz. On the other hand, there is an approach of cognitive anthropology which involves the perspective of culture as a kind of schema, notably adopted in cross-cultural psychology. A theory of culture as schema, like what is defined by cognitive anthropologist Roy D’Andrade in terms of a cognitive structure in identification of objects and events, and as a kind of all-purpose problem-solving device, has in fact been criticised with regards to its explanatory power (Lindholm, 2007, pp. 257-258). Lindholm sees a contradiction here “between an instrumental image of human beings […] as problem solvers and the quasi-Weberian notion that cultural schemas themselves define what life’s problems are” (Ibid., p. 258). The idea of schema tells nothing of impulses that drive human desires, nor explains why certain schemas are more likely to be master motives than others (Ibid.). It also portrays models of cultural learning without factoring individual distinctions, except to return to old notions of socialisation and internalisations (Ibid.). Such a cognitive model leaves out the possibility of unconscious motivations conflicting with conscious or standard cultural motivations (Ibid., p. 260).

Unlike in cross-cultural psychology (as discussed in Section 2.2) which generally presumes universal psychological process, such that culture is viewed merely as a site of variation, the perspective in cultural psychology would be to deem culture as the site of birth for psychological processes, and hence its investigation would be inseparable from anthropology as what Bruner argues (Gergen, 2002, p. 48). In this view he is joined by cultural anthropologists such as Shweder, who proposes that the mind “cannot be extricated from the historically variable and culturally diverse intentional worlds in which it plays a co-constitutive part” (Shweder, 1990, p. 13; cited in Gergen, Ibid.). Many cultural psychologists hence cite the work of Vygotsky who proposes that every process in the development of higher mental functioning occurs twice, “first on the social level, and later, on the individual level” (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 57; cited in Gergen, Ibid.). Theory and research have subsequently moved in more radical direction, locating processes of thought, memory and emotion within the very processes of social interchange (Gergen, 2002, p. 61). Gergen cautions in any case that “[t]raditional research in both cross-cultural and cultural psychology
tends to appropriate ‘the other’ – making him or her intelligible in terms of the home culture. (Ibid., p. 59)"

As partly mentioned in the previous sections, the aspect of history has also to various extents been considered in Boasian anthropology, in Weberian sociology and in cross-cultural psychology as explanation for cultural variations. Where psychology is concerned, Gergen (2001) has noted an increasingly prevalent trend of research whereby mental states and expressions considered as effects of particular historical conditions, as in historical contexts are viewed as shaping the content, character or expression of psychological processes such as the cognitive, emotional or motivational (p. 85). He cites a wide range of works such as Elias (1978) on the civilising process and Kessen (1990) on processes of child development situated within historical milieus.

The factoring of history in relation to cultural difference in heritage will be further explored in Chapters 5 and 6. One has to note however of different basic positions in anthropology with regards to the relevance of historical ‘development’, as identified by Shweder (1984) from the perspective of cultural psychology, namely universalism which emphasises likeness, and developmentalism as well as relativism which emphasise differences (p. 59). Among them, there are also different positions with regards to mental processes and debates over rationality, of which those associated with a view of enlightenment generally tend towards discovery of universals, “the idea of natural law, the concept of deep structure, the notion of progress or development, and the image of the history of ideas as a struggle between reason and unreason, science and superstition” (Ibid., p. 28). There are two camps here under the enlightenment view, namely universalists and developmentalists, divided on the question of whether valid knowledge of what reason dictate is equally possessed by all – universalists such as Hobbes and Voltaire would argue that moral virtues are not only dictated by reason but also obvious to reason, whereas developmentalists such as Tylor, Frazer and Piaget hold that all peoples have normative standards, but knowledge of proper standards and “knowledge of those norms worthy of universal respect, is achieved by only a few cultures” (Ibid., p. 31). A similar argument has been made by Kohlberg (1981) with specific reference to morality from the perspective of psychology (Ibid.; cf. Gergen, 2001, p. 185).
On the other side of the debate over rationality, according to Shweder, is a romantic perspective as represented by Levy-Bruhl, Whorf, Schneider, Sahlins and Geertz among others, with a central tenet “that ideas and practices have their foundation in neither logic nor empirical science, that ideas and practices fall beyond the scope of deductive and inductive reason, that ideas and practices are neither rational nor irrational but rather non-rational” (Ibid.; emphasis in original). The nonrational position in this ‘romantic rebellion’ would be associated with an interest in investigation of culture as “the arbitrary, the symbolic, the expressive, the semiotic” (Ibid., p. 38). Symbols, following the argument of Peirce (1955), may be understood as bearing no intrinsic relationship to properties of their referents, unlike icons which bear resemblance and indexes which are co-occurrent with referents (cited in Shweder, 1984, p. 46; cf. Jaeger and Selznick, 1964, p. 661). From a functionalist perspective, one may also make a distinction between the expressive function of actions and instrumental function of actions as Parsons (1968) has made (cited in Shweder, Ibid.).

Jaeger and Selznick (1964) have in fact proposed a formulation of culture that would bridge the gap between perspectives of social science and the humanities by arguing within a normative theory of culture for the centrality of expressive symbolism, such that elements of culture, which range from language, norms, values, knowledge, religion to art, contribute to the order of ‘symbolic-meaningful systems’ (pp. 654, 668). Against what they consider a crude anthropological definition by Kroeber of culture as “that which the human species has and other social species lack” (Kroeber, 1948, p. 253; cited in Jaeger and Selznick, 1964, p. 654), they highlight a humanist view of culture as that which is normative and evaluative, committed to a view “that at least some universal values exist and that objective judgments of value may be warranted in inquiry” (Jaeger and Selznick, 1964, p. 654). A normative view of culture to them takes the idea seriously “that culture is an adaptive product, a result of individual and social striving for symbolically meaningful experience” (Ibid., p. 666) such that culture being “a problem-solving achievement, it cannot be uniformly successful” (Ibid.). In short, they tend towards a developmentalist view of culture, while acknowledging an ‘unevenness of socialisation’ (Ibid., p. 656) and the consideration of culture as a ‘product of adaptation’ (Ibid., p. 659).
But further to this, they consider man as existential and creative, both “meaning-seeker and meaning-maker” (Ibid.). Here, they draw on the philosophical perspective of Dewey’s pragmatism for a normative theory of culture that would take into account the continuity of culture as well as high culture including aesthetics (Ibid., p. 654). They cite: “For Dewey experience and meaning are emotional as well as cognitive. Meaning is not to be taken in a rationalist sense, as a product of merely cognitive awareness and interpretation. Meaning is meaning for the organism in its subjective wholeness, as a responsive unity. (Ibid., p. 660).” Citing also Dewey’s argument that the expressive act tends to assume the features of aesthetic or artistic forms, they further argue that “there is a tendency for the vehicles of symbolic meaning, the true artefacts of culture, to take on aesthetic form” (Ibid., p. 664).

They add that the relation between moral orders and the development of culture is complicated: “To the extent that symbolisation of persons and groups occurs, there is cultural enrichment. But symbolisation can be demonic and go hand in hand with cruel and inhuman moral systems. Moral enlightenment often depends upon the weakening of symbols, upon making profane what was formerly sacred, upon taking people for what they are and not for their symbolic status and value. … On the other hand, a moral order may be weak and precarious if it does not produce cultural symbols, and is not sustained by them. (Ibid., pp. 666-667)

The aspects of moral value and aesthetic value as part of culture as a system of symbolic meanings would tend to be neglected under a perspective of culture as an internalised schema of orientation for action. How such shortcomings may be corrected will be further discussed in the following Chapter 3 on intercultural dialogue and in Chapter 5 on cultural heritage.

This chapter has begun by considering a range of perspectives on how culture may be understood based on different schools of anthropology, such as culture as social life and culture as system of meanings. It then turned to the question of how cultural differences may be surmised, by analysing one particular approach of cross-cultural psychology with applications in the field of intercultural communication. One observes a tendency here, as illustrated in the case of German social psychologist Alexander Thomas’s framework, of inheriting the concept of culture as value orientation from the action theory of sociologist Talcott Parsons, only to reduce
cultures to schemas of behaviour instead of rational choices. In this final section of the chapter, one takes into account the challenges of globalisation based on Wallerstein’s World Systems Theory and Robertson’s World Culture Theory. This raises the question of the extent to which a focus on ‘cultural differences’ is useful, whether it might encourage racism through stereotyping and lend itself to nationalist propaganda, when the real focus should be on a negotiation between universalism and particularism. According to Meyer, modernity may be considered as just another culture in terms of its cognitive model, rather than privileged as fundamentally different from particularistic cultures; world polity would hence be simply a question of institutionalisation.

Whereas Parsons’ incorporation of value orientation in his action theory may be seen as an attempt to integrate the more voluntaristic or subjective factors of human action along with the structural factors under a grand theory with a rigour worthy of positivism, an application of such a framework of culture as orientation system as propagated in the field of intercultural communication is expressly geared towards pragmatic applications in international situations, whereby postulated ‘cultural standards’ help provide a sense of control in dealing with a different socio-cultural environment. Cultural studies however presents a different endeavour, one that can be free from assuming Wertfreiheit of positivist science in dealing with the question of cultural values. Zylinska (2005) has argued that cultural studies has always been an interdisciplinary project situated within an ethical framework, what with Stuart Hall’s conviction of intellectual work as political practice or Tony Bennett’s proposal for applications in cultural policy (pp. 28-29), with a particular duty towards the ‘others’ or the marginalised (Ibid., p. 35).

If the real subject in studying cultural differences is not to solve the puzzle of random face-to-face situations per se but to understand cultural values in terms of the rationality embedded and institutionalised in a community, then a reduction of these to psychological processes would not be adequate. It has been written a century ago in Ethics, a treatise by Dewey and Tufts (1908): “To study choice and purpose is psychology; to study choice as affected by the rights of others and to judge it as right or wrong by this standard is ethics. (p. 3)” Bauman (1995) has similarly argued that ethics is “more than a mere description of what people do” (p. 10) for it is meant to say “what really ought to be done so that the good be served” (p. 11), such that “the
need for ethical experts depends little, if at all, on whether the experts can or cannot deliver on their promise [but] solely on the condition in which one cannot do without seeking such delivery” (Ibid., p. 12).

A two-prong approach will hence be adopted in the discussion of intercultural dialogue in the following chapter, considering both the question of pluralism in ethics as well as the aspect of social psychology in the actual processes of interaction between people of different cultural communities.
3. INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE AND THE CULTURE ASSIMILATOR

The preceding chapter has examined different concepts of culture which have been developed in accordance with different epistemological interests and theoretical bases under the disciplines of anthropology, sociology, psychology and cultural studies, with subsequently divergent approaches in observation and analysis. Considering the phenomena of globalisation which have not only manifested in migration trends and long-distance connectivity but also in a global consciousness that heightens the sense of cultural differences, a main challenge in promoting ‘dialogue’ across cultures would be to distinguish among various concepts of culture and to specify their usefulness and limitations.

Understanding a culture as a system of meanings in terms of its internal logic and contradictions would be different from understanding a culture as a system of value-orientation for social action, which would again be different from understanding the causal explanations of how ‘cultural patterns’ in social behaviour come about through domination by one set of people over another. Such distinctions would be crucial to the question of how ‘intercultural dialogue’ may be imagined if it is framed as ‘understanding’ between different cultural communities, as will be discussed in this chapter. The common problem of conflation between the Cultural System (CS) and the Socio-Cultural System (S-C) has already been discussed within Archer’s (1996) dualist framework. Perspectives of cultural studies have turned our attention to issues not only of power structures, but also the positioning of culture as ‘strategic normativity’ as proposed by Tony Bennett (1998) oriented towards relevance in cultural policy. This opens the way to a discussion on developmentalist views of culture, which may be traced back to Tylor and Arnold, and begs us to reflect on what capabilities or competence may be relevant to the ideals of intercultural dialogue.

This chapter will build on the abovementioned frameworks in the study of culture for an exploration of intercultural dialogue, to analyse how or whether some of challenges in the common underlying aims of intercultural dialogue in cultural policy – identified here as social cohesion and liberalism in value pluralism - may involve a
challenge between social integration and cultural integration, as well as a dilemma between universalism and relativism. With such difficulties in mind, the second half of the chapter will then turn to the psychological aspect in social interaction, to examine the potential and limitations in the consideration of intercultural dialogue as a form of intercultural communication, for instance with the application of the Culture Assimilator training approach as interpreted by German social psychologist Alexander Thomas’ framework of intercultural competence. The critique of such communication approaches will provide the point of departure for further exploration on how competence may be developed for intercultural dialogue, considering that democratic participation has also been cited as a key aspect in the European policy framework. This would also involve the question of what ‘intercultural learning’ may entail as part of a liberal education.

3.1 The Goals of Intercultural Dialogue based on Council of Europe’s 2008 White Paper - “Living Together as Equals in Dignity”

3.1.1 Intercultural Dialogue as a Means to Social Cohesion

This section will begin by discussing the concept of ‘intercultural dialogue’ in the current European policy approach as a means of dealing with cultural diversity that would help ensure social cohesion (Council of Europe, 2008, p. 4, 8, 13). Intercultural dialogue under this framework is considered as a new and better approach, set in contrast to the older approaches of assimilation and ‘multiculturalism’, for achieving inclusive societies with a diversity that “unprecedented and ever-growing” (Ibid., p. 9). The implications of these three concepts will be compared in this subsection and it will be argued that they are not entirely exclusive and antithetical to one another, but may each be understood in different senses at the level of public policy, of normative expectations or of informal practice.

The notion of intercultural dialogue, as defined in the Council of Europe’s White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue – “Living Together as Equals in Dignity” (2008), refers to “a process that comprises an open and respectful exchange of views between individuals and groups with different ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic backgrounds and heritage, on the basis of mutual understanding and respect. It requires the freedom and ability to express oneself, as well as the willingness and
capacity to listen to the views of others. Intercultural dialogue contributes to political, social, cultural and economic integration and the cohesion of culturally diverse societies.” Intercultural dialogue thus elaborately described appears to encompass several purposes, including “the overriding objective to promote full respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law” (Ibid.). But as it has been observed, the emphasis appears to be one of social cohesion (Igbino, 2012, p. 167), considering its significance in the sense of how it has been deemed more favourably than the notion of ‘multiculturalism’ which was an earlier approach towards diversity.

The concept of social cohesion may be traced back to Durkheim, who saw it as an ordering feature of society and defined it in terms of the interdependence between members of the society, shared loyalties and solidarity (Jenson, 1998; cited in Berger-Schmitt, 2000, pp. 2-3). Aspects often mentioned in description of social cohesion include the strength of social relations, shared values, feelings of a common identity or sense of belonging to the same community, trust among members of society, as well as the extent of inequality and disparities (cited in Berger-Schmitt, 2000, p. 3). In the 2008 White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue, the term ‘social cohesion’ is used to refer to “the capacity of a society to ensure the welfare of all its members, minimising disparities and avoiding polarisation […] in a mutually supportive community of free individuals pursuing these common goals by democratic means” (Ibid., p. 11). This may be placed against a broader range of five dimensions for social cohesion which Jenson (1998) has identified, namely belonging or isolation, inclusion or exclusion, participation or non-involvement, recognition or rejection of differences, legitimacy or illegitimacy or institutions as mediator in conflicts (cited in Berger-Schmitt, 2000, p. 3). One may then understand the definition in the White Paper as primarily emphasising ‘inclusion’ in equal opportunities of access as opposed to disparity; the next aspect in the definition apparently refers to a sense of ‘belonging’ through shared values specified in terms of freedom and democracy. For the purpose of this thesis, ‘social cohesion’ will be used to refer more specifically to a general sense of solidarity or belonging through shared values, for which the question would be the extent to which cultural heritage may serve to mitigate differences among communities, on top of more general questions such as equality in social opportunities.
Such interest for the question of social cohesion in Europe should come as no surprise considering that ‘intercultural dialogue’ has been articulated on a level of regional politics in Europe since the 2005 Faro Declaration on the Council of Europe’s Strategy for Developing Intercultural Dialogue, out of concern for the ‘clash of civilisations’ and the determination to strengthen social cohesion (Council of Europe, 2005, p. 3). It was as part of a follow-up to this strategy that the 2008 White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue was eventually produced. The white paper explains ‘intercultural dialogue’ as a new policy approach in dealing with the existence of different cultures in society, as opposed to older approaches like ‘assimilationism’ or ‘multiculturalism’. Assimilation is described as “unity without diversity… an enforced homogenisation” (COE, 2008, p. 14), whereas multiculturalism is described as advocating “political recognition of what was perceived as the distinct ethos of minority communities on a par with the ‘host’ majority” (Ibid., p. 18). Intercultural dialogue, in contrast, is imagined as an approach that “operates at all levels – within societies, between the societies of Europe and between Europe and the wider world. (Ibid., pp. 10-11)”

In the course of this section, one will begin by taking these three models of policy approach at face value as markedly distinct from one another, but slowly progressing into analysing the underlying concepts of ‘assimilation’ and ‘dialogue’ on a deeper level, in order to disentangle their social processes from related ideologies.

Evidently, the concept of ‘intercultural dialogue’ in the 2008 white paper does not refer simply to a social process of interaction as such, but to an ideal state. It is also not free of implicit cultural values or political ideology, even though it lays claim to universality in its European standpoint. The Faro Declaration in 2005 has already reaffirmed a “vision based on the principles of the universality and indivisibility of human rights, democracy and the rule of law” (COE, 2005, p. 3). The subsequent White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue again emphasises “the universal values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law” (COE, 2008, p. 18), which are upheld as “a condition for intercultural dialogue” (Ibid., p. 19). There is an insistence that such democratic values are universal and “not distinctively European” (Ibid., p. 14). The only instance where negotiation may be permitted on the issue of universality, is limited to the context of higher education and research, whereby the university is
characterised by ‘universality’ in the sense of “commitment to open-mindedness and openness to the world, founded on enlightenment values” (Ibid., p. 31).

There has been criticism that this management philosophy of ‘intercultural dialogue’ is ultimately a colonial model of dialogue, as it tends to dismiss the viewpoints of other cultures or even subcultural elements within its own community, as it lays down the rules as precondition for participation in dialogue with the dominant culture (Igbino, 2012, p. 165). In a diversified society which makes the White Paper necessary in the first place, there may be various philosophical positions on the meanings of democracy and different interpretations on democratic values and principles which exist outside the purview of the European political traditions, but such contestations are easily precluded in a policymaking process underpinned by the White Paper, given such an assumption of universalism of meanings which are translated into legal terms (Ibid.).

In order to judge whether this new model of managing diversity is indeed a progressive solution, it would ultimately require a comparison with earlier models such as ‘assimilation’ and ‘multiculturalism’, along with related issues of social integration. It would also help to interrogate the general meanings of a term like ‘intercultural dialogue’ in order to understand in what ways it may relate to ideas of liberalism or of pluralism, but this will be left to the next section.

Assimilationism has been discussed as a kind of social ideology, often linked to the ‘melting pot’ metaphor popularised in the USA since early 20th century. It relates to the sociological paradigm which has provided the most prominent perspective on immigrant group adaptation, namely the classic assimilation theory dating back to the Chicago School in the 1920s. This theory sees immigrant and majority groups as following a ‘straight-line’ convergence, becoming more similar over time in norms, values, behaviours and characteristics, the assumption being that immigrants residing the longest time in the host society as well as members of the later generations would display greater similarities with the majority group, compared to immigrants who have spent less time (Brown and Bean, 2006, online). Sociologist Milton Gordon (1964) postulated several stages of assimilation that follow acquisition of culture and language, such as identification with host society and ending of
prejudice and discrimination. But other theoretical models since then have factored in ethnic disadvantages and other social contexts.

In intercultural communication research, concepts of sociology and anthropology have been employed to analyse individual experiences in adaptation. Assimilation may be seen as an end-state in the process of cross-cultural adaptation, the term ‘adaptation’ referring to “the dynamic process by which individuals, upon relocating to an unfamiliar cultural environment, establish (or re-establish and maintain a relatively stable, reciprocal, and functional relationship with the environment” (Kim, 2002, p. 260). Whereas ‘acculturation’ has been defined as a process in cross-cultural adaptation, whereby “individuals acquire some (but not all) aspects of the host culture” (Ibid.), the term ‘assimilation’ is used to emphasise “acceptance and internalisation of the host culture by the individual” (Ibid.). Most theories in intercultural communication on adaptation are framed in a way such that models and research findings “would help ease the transition and facilitate the eventual functioning in the new environment” (Ibid., p. 268). The common premise underlying this is an affirmation of adaptation, seeing it as desirable, a position that some scholars would see as reflecting an assimilationist ideology (Ibid.).

Different immigration policies also reflect different beliefs or assumptions on the process of ‘assimilation’. Some have claimed that it would imply that all parties involved abandon certain elements of their culture and identity while retaining others, which then amalgamate with elements of other immigrant and non-immigrant cultures, giving rise to an entirely new culture, in a process described as the ‘melting pot’ (Entzinger and Biezeveld, 2003, p. 7). Others consider assimilation to be more unilateral and claim it would come down to conformity to mainstream or dominant cultural patterns (Ibid.)

The assimilation model is discussed as a policy approach to immigration especially in relation to the concept of integration, whereby ‘integration’, sometimes alternatively replaced by the concept of ‘social cohesion’, refers to a characteristic of a society in terms of how closely and intensely groups and individuals as its constituent parts relate to one another (Ibid., p. 6). Entzinger and Biezeveld have identified four dimensions to integration, namely socio-economic; cultural; legal and political; and the attitude of recipient societies towards migrants (Ibid., p. 5).
France is usually cited as a prototype for the assimilation model (Ibid., p. 14), a model in which the permanent nature of immigration is not disputed, unlike the Gastarbeiter system in Germany till 1998, but immigrants are expected to assimilate to their hosts. Some have disputed the characterising of the French approach as an assimilationist model, since private association and cultural practice are guaranteed and second generation immigrants may “contest what it means to be French and organise to push ‘French’ culture in a pluralistic direction” (Bloomfield and Bianchini, 2004, p. 57). However, a crucial point is that immigrant communities are not recognised as relevant entities by the public authorities (Entzinger and Biezefeld, 2003, p. 14). On a political level, members of parliament do not represent any specific group other than the entire abstract body of all members of the nation, and no political community or ethnic group can be recognised as such in the public domain; on a social level, the migrant population is also encouraged to internalise French norms and values and to mix with the general population (Schnapper, Krief and Peignard, 2003, pp. 16-17).

Many original French citizens argue that being French entails “learning the French language, adopting French cultural and societal norms, being able to accept a strictly secular state and developing the desire to integrate on a psychological level” (Vladescu, 2006. p. 5). But in the process of assimilation, instead of addressing politically sensitive issues of race, religion and ethnicity, the French government has taken a different approach such that its national census does not enquire on religion or ethnicity for the reason that this type of information would be considered inappropriate for the state to have (Ibid., p. 8). In 2006, the French government also passed a law prohibiting headscarves from being worn by Muslim girls in public schools, along with prohibition of the Jewish yamaka and Christian crosses deemed too large. Such measures in banning display of religious identity have since fuelled debates as to whether it serves to promote assimilation of the Muslim minority into such a secular society, or becomes a form of discrimination that pushes younger Muslims into embracing more racialised Islam that is even more difficult to reconcile with European values (Ibid., p. 9).

Based on such observations, that there is neither legal representation of any minority ethnic or religious community in the public sphere, nor social norm of asserting the individual’s minority identity socially, one may argue that the French approach is
more assimilationist than pluralistic. One may even argue that there is an attitude among the French, as reflected in the laws, of a “conviction that possessing the French nationality and adopting a French identity are privileges and that those people lucky enough to arrive in such a developed and cultured part of the world should strive to do what they can to imitate the native culture and customs” (Ibid., p. 6), which implies a belief in assimilation that requires abandoning of one’s minority identity.

In contrast to this assimilationist model or what one may prefer to characterise as ‘civic integration’ (Bloomfield and Bianchini, 2004, p. 50) in France, there is the model of multiculturalism most notably in Canada, as constitutional in its law, as well as what may be characterised as ‘corporate multiculturalism’ (Ibid.) in Britain and the Netherlands. One has to disambiguate here between a ‘multicultural’ and a ‘multiculturalist’ society, for one refers to a fact of diversity while the other refers to a normative response to that fact, as Parekh (2000, p. 6) points out. A multicultural society refers to one that includes two or more cultural communities. There can be two different ways for the society to respond to the diversity, “it might welcome and cherish it, make it central to its self-understanding, and respect the cultural demands of its constituent communities” (Ibid.), in which case it is multiculturalist, or “it might seek to assimilate these communities into its mainstream culture either wholly or substantially” (Ibid.), in which case it is monoculturalist in orientation and ethos. The ambiguity may be dated back to a definition of multiculturalism in the Oxford English Dictionary tracing back to a 1957 article about Switzerland, as “[t]he characteristics of a multicultural society; (also) the policy or process whereby the distinctive identities of the cultural groups within such a society are maintained or supported” (cited in Eriksen, 2006, online). Parekh remarks that the “failure to distinguish between a multicultural and a multiculturalist society has often led to an agonised but largely unnecessary debate about how to describe a society” (Ibid.). Conservatives in Britain have resisted calling the country multicultural for fear that it would “imply that its traditional culture should not be given pride of place, that the minority cultures are equally central to its identity” (Ibid.).

The existence of various practical and theoretical understandings of multiculturalism across national and local contexts has often made general discussion of the concept difficult. In Germany for instance, the terms ‘integration’ and ‘multiculturalism’ have
often been used in loose connection with each other without concrete definitions (Klopp, 2002, p. 23). In one view, ‘multiculturalism’ is depicted as a lifestyle or image without committed political belief or practice, let alone any programme or policy; detractors refer to multikulti as merely a form of superficial pandering to folklore and traditions of other cultural groups (Ibid., p. 25). Some, from the left, criticise multiculturalism as a “misguided focus on cultural practices and categories to the exclusion of economic factors in addressing societal problems (Ibid.). Left proponents of multiculturalism, on the other hand, regard it variously as a description of reality, as a progressive non-nationalist possibility for German society, or even as a radical social utopia (Ibid.).

In this thesis, multiculturalism is to be discussed in terms of a policy approach in dealing with diverse communities or populations, including issues of identity and rights. Multiculturalism may be enshrined constitutionally, as in the case of the multiculturalism law in Canada which proclaims: “The recognition and strengthening of multiculturalism as an expression of the cultural and ethnic diversity of Canadian society and as confirmation of the freedom of all members of Canadian society to preserve, strengthen, and share their cultural inheritance” (Ibid., p. 24). But in the second instance, we shall also consider multiculturalism on a social level as a perspective on human life based on convictions of cultural pluralism, as discussed by Parekh (2000).

We shall now compare criticisms against the models of assimilation with criticisms against multiculturalism, starting with the former. As Glazer (1993) has noted, assimilation, in what was the dominant liberal view until at least the 1950s in the USA, was deemed desirable for contributing to the reduction of racial discrimination and prejudice (p. 133). However, the word has since fallen out of grace: “Neither liberals nor neoliberals, conservatives nor neoconservatives, have much good to say about assimilation.” (Ibid., p. 123) While social mechanisms underlying a belief in assimilation have not simply gone away, the social scientists no longer expect natural effects of assimilation manifesting in the ethnic and racial reality, while the failure in incorporation of the African American community under the banner of ‘Americanisation’ – which for decades referred exclusively to the concern for immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe to acquire the English language and American customs, has led to criticism on the ideology of assimilation (Ibid.). As with
the Hispanics and the Asian Americans, the African American community has come to see it as their own choice as to how they will define their place in American society, be it the choice of resistance against forces of assimilation or the choice of opposing stronger tendencies of multiculturalism (Ibid., pp. 135-136).

Brubaker (2001) however has suggested that ‘assimilation’ as a concept should not be consigned to the dustbin of history (p. 533) along with the earlier, ‘assimilationist’ theoretical understanding of assimilation as being inevitable and desirable (Ibid., p. 541). He suggests that there may in fact be a ‘return of assimilation’, not in the sense of a “return to the normative expectations, analytical models, public policies, or informal practices” associated with the ideal of Anglo-conformity or Americanisation movement after World War I, or with similar practices especially language policies in France or Germany (Ibid., p. 541), but in the abstract sense of the word ‘assimilation’ as a general process of becoming similar (Ibid., p. 542). He argues that this designates a direction of change rather than a particular degree of similarity, unlike the meaning of the transitive verb to ‘assimilate’, which in a biological sense is to convert something into a substance of its own nature, such as food into blood, to absorb something into a system (Ibid.). The word ‘assimilation’ used in this ‘assimilationist’ sense has been discredited due to association with negative connotations of homogenising state projects, in the case of Germany suggesting forcible Germanisation (Ibid., p. 533). A more current term used in the European context is integration (Ibid., p. 540), which often refers to much the same thing although it may also refer to socio-economic dimensions instead of mere cultural dimensions (Ibid., p. 544). But Brubaker proposes to retain ‘assimilation’ as a useful concept to observe how the idea may have shifted in public discourse, in public policy and in scholarly research (Ibid., p. 535).

One sociologist and philosopher who has critiqued the assimilationist ideology is Zygmunt Bauman. He traces the term ‘assimilation’ with its biological sense to the 16\textsuperscript{th} century when it referred to the acts of absorption and incorporation performed by living organisms, when it unambiguously "stood for conversion, not a self-administered change; an action performed by a living organism on its passive environment" (Bauman, 1991, p. 103; emphasis in original). The contemporary and metaphorical use of the concept since the 19\textsuperscript{th} century captured a drive to uniformity and coincided with rising nationalism in the modern states which formed a new type
of power dismantling local or corporative mechanisms in traditional ways of life, according to Bauman (Ibid., p. 103). Just as modernity may be understood as a time “when order – of the world, of the human habitat, of the human self, and of the connection between all three – is reflected upon” (Ibid., p. 5; emphasis in original), when “the substance of modern politics […] is the effort to exterminate ambivalence” (Ibid., p. 7), assimilation in the modern state is a “declaration of war on semantic ambiguity” (Ibid., p. 105) as it assumes authority in classifying things that do not fit into its scheme as being foreign, and it assigns the superiority of one form of life and the inferiority of another (Ibid.).

Bauman sees the liberal call to assimilate, being a specifically modern component of nation-state policies, as suffering from tension like the contradictions within modernity itself, whereby principles like equality of opportunity and freedom of self-constitution are upheld on one hand, yet the function of ‘nation building’ as an artificial production of collective identities is also part of the task of the modern nation-state (Ibid., pp. 68-69). On the surface, the liberal message of cultural assimilation is an open invitation to all minorities or newcomers to escape any stigma – a social institution which has been analysed by Erving Goffman, a word which originally denoted bodily signs that mark inferiority or wickedness of character, used as “a convenient weapon in the defence against the unwelcome ambiguity of the stranger” by emphasising difference (Ibid., p. 67). Yet it becomes a contradiction as the nation-state holding the task of homogenising its territory has to reaffirm indirectly “the superiority and the benevolence of the native rulers” (Ibid., p. 70).

However, in a transformed concept of ‘assimilation’ as proposed by Brubaker (2001), one may see a shift in focus from one on the end state of complete absorption to one on the process of becoming similar in certain respects (p. 542); one may shift from seeing populations of immigrant origins as mouldable objects to seeing them as active subjects (Ibid.); from thinking in terms of homogeneous units to thinking in terms of heterogeneous units (Ibid., p. 543), and so on.

The concept which has been readily contrasted with assimilation is multiculturalism, a term much contested and over-used with the turn of the new century. What constitutes multiculturalism is often confusing due to its use in both an analytical and a normative sense, the boundary of which is not clearly demarcated (Hage, 2008, p.
Multiculturalism, whether as political policy or as social reality, has been criticised in the West for everything, “from a cultural relativism that valourises ‘valueless’ if not outright ‘evil’ and destructive cultural traditions such as female circumcision, to ghettoisation and social fragmentation via the promotion of anti-democratic and intolerant customs and practices” (Ibid., p. 489), not to mention being accused of allowing terrorism to flourish (Ibid., p. 490).

Hage (2008) traces the emergence of multiculturalism in the Western developed nation-states to a trend of migrants from elsewhere, whose cultural impact was minimal until the 1950s, such that ‘assimilation’ to dominant European cultures was assumed (p. 491). With the growth in numbers and other factors however, the migrants developed a more communal or ‘ethnic’ mode of inhabiting their host societies, projecting their cultures into the social and physical public spaces (Ibid.). Against views of social policy in multiculturalism as a matter of voluntary ‘choice’ and critics calling for a ‘return’ to assimilation, Hage argues that “it was not because of multiculturalism that people strived to maintain their cultures; rather, it was because people were striving to maintain their cultures that multiculturalism was needed” (Ibid.). He cautions against attributing too much potency to a multicultural policy in its effect on social life, arguing that it is minimal compared to the factors of major social, political and economic transformations, such as the decline or diversification of western empires in cultural dominance, or the effects of globalisation as ‘time-space compression’ allowing migrants to remain connected with home cultures (Ibid., p. 492). He hence emphasises, somewhat echoing the view of Parekh (2000), that multiculturalism is not simply the existence of cultural diversity in the form of communal ethnic groups, but a sensibility or mode of evaluating cultural differences thereof (Ibid.). That would suggest that the use of ‘multiculturalism’ to refer a kind of value pluralism as a basis for intercultural dialogue, which is to be discussed in the following section.

3.1.2 Intercultural Dialogue as an Ideal of Liberalism and Value Pluralism

This subsection will discuss intercultural dialogue in terms of an ideal that emphasises on the procedural commitment of liberalism in equal respect of views,
which may accommodate some substantive commitments underlying value pluralism. An understanding of ‘intercultural dialogue’ as a liberal approach for an open ‘exchange of views’ shall begin with an interpretation of the common meanings of the word ‘dialogue’ itself and a consideration of the range of different paradigms that may be relevant. The bulk of the subsection will then focus on Bhikhu Parekh’s political theory of value pluralism and intercultural dialogue based on the positive value of cultural diversity, contextualised with communitarian and liberal arguments among political theorists, as represented by Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka on the issue of multiculturalism as a politics of recognition and difference.

According to the Oxford Dictionary, a dialogue is “a discussion between two or more people or groups, especially one directed towards exploration of a particular subject or resolution of a problem” (2012, online). A more elaborate look at the functions of dialogue in daily life may include conviviality function, meant for sheer pleasure of company, or to overcome emotions such as fear, anxiety or boredom; practical deliberative function, to perform an action together or arrive at a decision for some practical course of action; and function of gaining knowledge, to articulate and communicate knowledge (Rao, 2010, p. 166). Based on such categorisation, one may already differentiate between possible social value of intercultural dialogue imagined as deliberation and conflict resolution, and the alternative value of it in gaining of knowledge, more specifically “as an effective form of self-reflection, and thereby of liberal education” (Ibid., p. 175).

However, the range of paradigms for dialogue in the Western philosophical discourse has been much more complicated than what such a categorisation may suggest. Since the days of ancient Greece when Socrates first defined the dialogical method of argumentation, dialogue has taken many different forms and significance, including religious communion (Buber); philosophical hermeneutics (Gadamer); rational deliberation (Habermas); radical pedagogy (Freire); ‘dialogical imagination’ (Bakhtin); ‘awakening of consciousness’ (Bohm); and dialogue as conversation and medium of liberal learning (Oakeshott and Rorty); the use of a philosophy of dialogue to promote intercultural understanding being a relatively recent development (Besley and Peters, 2012, p. 14).
How intercultural dialogue is defined naturally reflects what one considers as the challenge of cultural differences and what the goal of dialogue is. Some may define it as a form of liberal learning as mentioned above. Others may see it as a negotiation of cultural values in the spirit of pluralism (Parekh, 2000). In the context of the Council of Europe’s white paper, it refers to a particular policy approach with an implied association with the goal of social cohesion (Igbino, 2012, p. 167) as mentioned earlier. The latter two views are most relevant to political concerns regarding diverse social and cultural groups.

Parekh has discussed concerns of cultural pluralism under the moniker of ‘multiculturalism’, coming from the concerns of “how societies can be held together, develop a common sense of belonging, and reconcile the demands of political unity and cultural diversity” (Ibid., p. 12). His theoretical framework may be understood along two threads, one is a philosophy of cultural pluralism based on a critical appraisal of development in Western philosophy from monism to pluralism, the other involves his conceptualisation of human nature and of cultural communities, whereby a case for cultural diversity is made.

Parekh hence in the first instance bases his own theorising of what he calls ‘multiculturalism’ much on the philosophy of cultural pluralism, which he traces to ideas of Vico and Herder that required modification. Vico saw it as a rationalist fallacy to think that a society may be fully understood in terms of a universally shared human nature, for human nature is a product of history, developed and expressed differently in different epochs and society. The limitation in his perspective according to Parekh was that he valued cultural diversity, yet saw it as a transitional stage to what would ultimately be a culturally homogeneous world (Ibid., p. 55). Herder saw each culture as a product of the collective efforts of the relevant *volk*, as a unique expression of the human spirit, to be judged by its own standards. The problem Parekh sees is that he thus essentialised cultures as self-contained, each of them a ‘harmonious whole’ on its own (Ibid., p. 73) and hence teetered over the edge of cultural relativism as he could not explain how one can understand other cultures or communicated across cultural boundaries, and neither could he give any ground for condemning practices like slavery if it is accepted by members of the society (Ibid., p. 75).
Parekh criticises such limitations of relativism, for its “ignores the cross-culturally shared human properties and is mistaken in its beliefs that a culture is a tightly integrated and self-contained whole, can be neatly individuated, and determines its members” (Ibid., p. 127). At the same time, he faults monism for a substantive view of human nature that is untenable in the assumption that moral values are derived from human nature and cannot be reconstituted (Ibid.). He also sees a problem in an idea of minimum universalism that assumes universal values as being uniform in how different cultures relate to them, and therefore never coming into conflict. In brief, Parekh hence concludes that “a dialectical and pluralist form of minimum universalism offers the most coherent response to moral and cultural diversity” (Ibid.), and he calls it ‘pluralist universalism’ (Ibid.).

It should be noted here that ‘cultural pluralism’ as coined by Parekh does not carry the same connotations as terminology like nationalism, ethnicity, communalism or identity politics which have often been used interchangeably with it (Toffolo, 2003, p. 4). If there is a tendency by some to equate multiculturalism with the assertion of minorities, especially non-whites, on their own specific cultural values and special rights, Parekh refutes that, for he insists that no majority culture should be uncritically accepted in the first place, as he suggests that multiculturalism is about involving different cultural communities in exchange, and building “proper terms of relationships” (Parekh, 2000, p. 13). His idea of cultural pluralism takes objection against privileging a perspective of liberalism, which to him is “a substantive doctrine advocating a specific view of man, society and the world and embedded in and giving rise to a distinct way of life” (Ibid., p. 14). Parekh’s idea of cultural pluralism may be compared with Isaiah Berlin’s ‘value pluralism’ in terms of its opposition to monism, with a departure in view from Berlin’s arguments for liberalism. The notion of value pluralism as advanced by Berlin basically refers to an idea of ‘incommensurability of values’ which is yet compatible with a conception of the common good (Crowder, 2008, pp. 925-926)

Berlin has argued against the wish to found ethics on any objective basis, as he asserts that normative statements on values, unlike logical or descriptive statements, are neither subjective nor objective, but are sui generis in nature (Cherniss, 2006, p. xlii-xliii). He insists that values are human creations and he considers any form of essentialism claiming that human nature is unalterable, or that values are facts which
can be discovered through knowledge of human nature, as posing a threat to human liberty (Ibid., p. xlv). Based on the argument that choosing between different ends is an inescapable characteristic of the human condition, he further concludes that a political order which acknowledges and protects this freedom would be the most legitimate kind of state and hence value pluralism entails liberalism (Talisse, 2012, p. 33). This reasoning of his may in fact be criticised, for the inference from an inescapability of choosing between different incommensurable goals to the value of freedom in choosing is a weak one; one may also be indifferent to the choosing if what matters is not the preference of one option over another, the need to value freedom in choosing thus becomes psychological rather than logical (Ibid.). Furthermore, the idea that pluralism is therefore anti-authoritarian is also problematic, for monists who defend autonomy and individuality are most likely to defend liberalism, whereas a pluralist ruler may still limit the ideas of the good life to just a few choices such as religious devotion and loyalty to tradition and the regime would still be illiberal (Ibid., pp. 35-36).

In contrast to this, Parekh believes in the possibility of a cultural pluralism that “neither confines multiculturalism within the limits set by liberalism and suppresses or marginalises nonliberal values and cultures, nor confines liberalism within the limits of multiculturalism and emasculates its critical and emancipatory thrust” (2000, p. 340). He attempts to offer a coherent theory to justify moral and cultural diversity that does not depend on naturalism or culturalism alone (p. 114). He starts with a minimalist view of human nature with properties that are universal in the sense of being shared by all human beings in all eras and societies (p. 115), such as common physical and mental structure and capacities such as rationality and self-reflection (p. 116). He then adds that “human nature does not exhaust all that characterises human beings as a species” (p. 118) for they are also shaped by their geography and history in a dialectic of human struggle as well as “culturally embedded in the sense that they are born into, raised in and deeply shaped by their cultural communities” (p. 120). Hence human nature “is also culturally reconstituted and diversified” (p. 123), and furthermore human beings should be cherished for their sense of self-worth and self-respect with the ability to enter moral relations and their individual and collective achievements, and should be accorded a dignity above the status of animals (p. 130). Given differences in history and traditions, Parekh argues,
“it is both inevitable and desirable that different societies should differently interpret, prioritise and realise great moral values and integrate them with their own suitably revised thick and complex moral structures” (p. 141). One is hence able to attain higher levels of moral universality, except that all too often governments and dominant political groups “might misuse their legitimate interpretative freedom to undermine these values” (Ibid.).

The remaining challenge for Parekh is then to justify the positive value of cultural diversity. He cites four arguments based on his interpretation of the cases made by John Stuart Mill, Humboldt, Herder as well as Berlin, Raz and Kymlicka. The first argument would hence be that “cultural diversity increases the available range of options and expands freedom of choice” (p. 165), but that gives little reason for one to value cultures of indigenous people or minor religious communities such as the Amish or the Gypsies which present no realistic option to most (Ibid.). The second argument would suggest that human beings have a right to their culture since they are culturally embedded, and hence cultural diversity is “an inescapable and legitimate outcome of the exercise of that right” (p. 166), but this only demonstrates the ‘inescapability’ and not ‘desirability’ of cultural diversity as the dominant culture or wider society may not wish to make accommodation with its institutions (Ibid.). Thirdly, from the perspective of romantic liberals such as Herder and Schiller, cultural diversity “creates a rich, varied and aesthetically pleasing and stimulating world” (Ibid.), yet the problem as Parekh points out is that cultures are more than mere objects of aesthetic contemplation, they are also moral systems which can lead to conflicts. Finally, cultural diversity may be linked to individuality and progress from the perspective of Mill, Humboldt and others, such that “it encourages a healthy competition between different systems of ideas and ways of life [and] facilitates the emergence of new truths” (Ibid.). Parekh criticises this however for being an instrumentalist view that does not appreciate intrinsic value of cultural diversity (Ibid.).

Parekh concedes that a convincing case for cultural diversity would ultimately need to include the abovementioned arguments, but suggests it can be best approached from a different perspective, whereby one recognises that “no culture embodies all that is valuable in human life and develops the full range of human possibilities” (p. 167) and hence different cultures “correct and complement each other, expand each other horizon of thought and alert each other to new forms of human fulfilment” (Ibid.)
Furthermore, cultural diversity may also be considered “an important constituent and condition of human freedom” (Ibid.). Parekh uses a similar line of argument for the case of intercultural dialogue, citing that while the “constitutional, legal and civic values represent society’s public culture” (p. 269), such operative public values do not form a coherent whole and “lose much of their meaning when dissociated from the procedures and practices in which they are embodied” (Ibid.). Hence they cannot be static but have to respond to changes in circumstances, and they necessarily would be interlocked in different interpretations in public discourse (Ibid.). In short, Parekh’s concept of multiculturalism is concerned more with value pluralism than with a politics of recognition for cultural identities; it is not an approach that is imagined as diametrically opposed to the approach of ‘intercultural dialogue’ as proposed in the Council of Europe’s 2008 white paper, but rather one that takes value pluralism as a basis for intercultural dialogue that would further shape a common multicultural society. Intercultural dialogue as discussed by Parekh involves the evaluation of values and practices across cultures, at the level of public discourse (p. 268-269), that may appeal to particular cultural contexts as well as to universal values (p. 293).

But the tenability of value pluralism as such still needs to be further elaborated through comparison of communitarian and liberal principles in the political structure, as these may involve different priorities across value spheres. Parekh’s position has also been read by Amitai Etzioni (2009) as a form of ‘radical multiculturalism’, ascribed with a view that the state should abolish particularistic values of nations and adopt a normative neutrality, and that may be criticised for impeding state-wide policy formation (cited in Hand, 2011, pp. 350, 353). Elsewhere, Parekh has been criticised by Morgan (2002, p. 274; cited in Sackville, online) for being guilty of a form of monism himself in proposing a solution that can only be fully justified when one accepts his account of a culturally open way of life, which is similar to the monistic liberal. One might add that classical liberalism has “often treated forms of cultural plurality as acceptable in the purely private domain, but not in the public square” (Young, C., 2003, p. 240). But most importantly, what has led to the state framing of cultural pluralism as a ‘problem’ is “the incurable propensity of ruling institutions to engage in projects of codification of group identities and simplifications of patterns of
collective consciousness” (Ibid., p. 246), not to mention that the state is never culturally neutral (Ibid., p. 245).

In terms of outlook, Parekh’s position has been interpreted as coming from a postcolonial perspective in seeking to develop a model of constitutional and political dialogue (Song, 2010, online) by way of his historical approach in considering the development of pluralism in the Western world beginning from Vico and Herder, in place of monism in the Western tradition from classical Greek rationalism and Christian universalism to monism of liberal thinkers such as Locke and J.S. Mill. His manner of reasoning thus forms an independent approach in the arguments for multiculturalism, next to justification based on communitarianism or liberalism (Ibid.).

Issues of values as well as rights will have to be factored in as one proceeds here to analyse this idea of value pluralism further by considering the communitarian arguments for multiculturalism, encapsulated in the thoughts of Charles Taylor, as a counterweight to monist values of liberalism, before considering how liberal arguments may in turn be worked into multiculturalism as represented in the thoughts of Will Kymlicka. One may begin here with Locke’s conception of the ‘rational’ man and society, grounded on the assumption that God created human beings with equal dignity and rights, in particular the right to labour with nature and satisfy needs with its products and the duty to develop natural resources to the full and to maximise conveniences in life (Locke, Second Treatise, 1963, pp. 33-34; cited in Parekh, 2000, p. 36). Parekh criticises Locke’s bias in his ideal of a civilised society, whereby the English colonisation of America would be justified in Locke’s argument that the Indians did not enclose the land and lacked the desire to accumulate wealth, hence failing to produce an international market for maximisation of the earth’s potential (Parekh, 2000, p. 37).

Mill’s liberalism would differ from Locke’s, by being a utilitarian rather than natural-law theorist, teleological rather than deontological, secular rather than Christian, and instead of prescribing the moral minimum in the value of civil society, he would advocate a substantive view of the good life (Ibid., p. 40). By upholding the ideal of individuality, self-determination and autonomy, Mill arguably made a powerful case for diversity through an appreciation of the richness and complexity of human nature, except that his conception of diversity remained embedded in an individualist vision.
of life (pp. 41-44). He maintains that “the free development of individuality is one of the leading essentials of well-being” (1978, p. 346), for which he recognises the intrinsic worth of individual spontaneity. He does not deny that one has to be trained and taught in the youth of human experience, but argues that the “traditions and customs of other people are, to a certain extent, evidence of what their experience has taught them [but] their experience may be too narrow; or they may not have interpreted it rightly” (pp. 347-348), or secondly “their interpretation of experience may be correct, but unsuitable to him” (p. 348), and thirdly even if the customs may be suitable, merely conforming to them “does not educate or develop in him any of the qualities which are the distinctive endowment of a human being” (Ibid.).

Mill’s emphasis on individuality somehow led him to the conviction that a more civilised nation or group has the right to rule over primitive societies or absorb inferior groups. He believed for instance that the Breton and the Basque stood to benefit by being “bought into the current of ideas and feelings of a highly civilised and cultivated people” (Mill, *Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government*, 1964, p. 363; cited in Parekh, 2000, p. 46) under French nationality, and similarly the Welshman or the Scottish Highlander as members of the British nation, for gaining access to a superiority in artistic, philosophical and other achievements. This seems to be the extent of neutrality one would have to go in order to guarantee individual autonomy for general happiness. From the perspective of human rights theory, this is not just an issue of prioritising individual rights over group rights. Utilitarianism in the thinking of Mill as with Jeremy Bentham basically implies a criterion that the public good should be whatever produces greatest happiness in society, such that no extraneous value like equality, freedom or human rights can override it (Fields, 2010, p. 68).

The question of whether freedom is intrinsically valuable, or only valuable if it serves other values, is one which Joseph Raz (1986) has discussed in a framework of political theory, dealing with political morality alongside a theory of institutions (p. 3). As proponent of a perfectionist liberalism or comprehensive liberalism – which bases political principles on ideals of the good life and not only the role as citizens, Raz asserts that freedom is valuable because it is “a concomitant of the ideal of autonomous persons creating their own lives through progressive choices from a multiplicity of valuable options” (p. 265). He argues against the limitations of consequentialist morality as represented by utilitarianism, citing John Rawls’
objection in *A Theory of Justice* (1971) that utilitarianism disregards the separateness of persons in its willingness to take from one person and give to another depending on the greater net benefit from the allocation (pp. 27-29; cited in Raz, 1986, p. 271). Robert Nozick in *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (1974) would go a step further by invoking the “Kantian principle that individuals are ends and not means; they may not be sacrificed or used for the achieving of other ends without their consent” (p. 31; cited in Raz, 1986, p. 273).

Raz maintains that personal autonomy is about being part author of one’s life, and is not to be confused with moral autonomy in the Kantian idea of the will as a subject making the law for itself (p. 370). The value of personal autonomy according to Raz is a ‘fact of life’, not dependent on choice (p. 394); though bound up with availability of valuable options, it does not mean it is not a distinct ideal (p. 395). Valuing autonomy also commits one to a weak value pluralism according to Raz, who does not pursue a strong value pluralism according to Raz, who does not pursue a strong value pluralism which would commit one to the creation of value (p. 398). He sees autonomy ultimately as form of capacity in terms of mental and physical abilities and availability of adequate options, which may also be referred to as ‘positive freedom’ (p. 408).

Parekh would situate Raz in the Western tradition as taking the Aristotelian view that the pursuit of human well-being is the *telos* of human life (Parekh, 2000, p. 90). He goes on to fault for Raz’s perspective that modern western liberal society is based on the idea of personal autonomy, such that his case for autonomy is first and foremost is premised on it being central to Western self-understanding (Raz, 1986, pp. 369-370, pp. 391-394). This suggests to Parekh that it is an intrinsic value not per se or universally, but only for western people due to the way they are historically constituted, as if there is no other good reason to cherish other than for history (Parekh, 2000, pp. 92-93), with Raz seeing autonomy in terms of a capability rather than a rights-based morality. Parekh also objects to Raz’s second argument that autonomy is a functional requirement of modern society, which makes it no different from amoral skills such as literacy and numeracy (Ibid., p. 93). This poses a problem with Asian immigrants to Britain, whom as Raz observes do not value autonomy, yet are remarkable in their material success (Ibid.). In a later work, *Ethics in the Public Domain* (1994), Raz incorporates a new argument that since liberals value human well-being they should also value cultural membership, in structuring the members’
perceptual and moral world and giving meaning to their activities, and in giving a sense of rootedness and identification (pp. 177-179, cited in Parekh, 2000, p. 95). Yet he maintains at the same time that the love of one’s culture should be ‘rational and valid’ and based on the ‘right reasons’ (1994, p. 184; cited in Parekh, 2000, p. 98). Parekh criticises this as universalising a liberal view of culture and implying that one’s relation to culture is contingent and conditional. Parekh argues that this is problematic: “To love a culture […] for the good in it is to love the latter not the culture itself” (p. 98).

A major alternative to Mill’s and Raz’s comprehensive liberalism would be the view narrowed down to the realm of ‘political liberalism’, as developed by John Rawls in his more recent work Political Liberalism (1993) and Charles Larmore in The Morals of Modernity (1996), which Martha Nussbaum has professed to sharing, counting her own works Women and Human Development (2000) and Frontiers of Justice (2006). This involves essentially the idea of a liberal political order which may be described as an ideal of neutrality, not in terms of being neutral with respect to morality but “neutral with respect to controversial views of the good life” (Larmore, 1990, p. 341) as a minimal moral conception of liberalism. It may hence be further argued that “for real freedom to live according to one’s view also requires protecting the spaces in which people may leave one view and opt for another” (Nussbaum, 8th November 2008, online).

Rawls in A Theory of View considered plurality as both inescapable and desirable, but insisted that citizens were the ‘primary subject’ of justice whereby principles governing them should be arrived at rationally and settled one and for all (see Parekh. 2000, p. 81). His more recent work abandons the grounding of justice in a comprehensive doctrine to produce a more free-standing and political conception of justice as distinct from a metaphysical conception; but in the assumption that democratic public culture as a basis for justice is neutral, he appears to suggest that it is not self-validating as he then falls back on a philosophical argument that citizens are free and equal persons because of their moral powers in a sense of justice and the capacity to pursue conception of the good (see Ibid., pp. 82-83). From Parekh’s angle, Rawls’ limitation lies in taking much account of moral plurality but little of cultural plurality (Ibid, p. 89).
Liberal political theory, especially Rawls’ earlier emphasis on the universal demands of justice and his underlying view of man as free and rational being, has long been the target of criticism by thinkers classed as ‘communitarians’. Charles Taylor, in a 1985 essay entitled ‘Atomism’, has notably attacked the atomistic view of man as being self-sufficient outside of society, which serves to privilege “the priority of the individual and his rights over society” (cited in Gutmann, 1999, p. 246). It is however necessary here to trace communitarian thought back to the Aristotelian idea that justice is rooted “in a community whose primary bond is a shared understanding both of the good for man and the good of that community” (MacIntyre, 1981, pp. 232-233; cited in Gutmann, 1999, p. 246; cf. Etzioni, 1998, p. ix). In that regard, one may also defend Rawls for holding a vision of community which is anchored in cooperation and harmony, marked by a central principle of dependence whereby the individual has to obey the norms regulating his or her group, or he would be found “unworthy of his associates upon whom he depends to confirm his sense of his own worth” (Rawls, 1971, p. 445; cited in Alejandro, 1999, p. 298). But the key divergence would apparently be on the point of rationality. The objection against Rawls from Alasdair MacIntyre, coming from the position of virtue ethics which may also be traced back to Aristotle’s moral philosophy, is that the particularistic demands of patriotism are no less rational than the universalistic demands of justice (MacIntyre, 1984, pp. 15-18; cited in Gutmann, p. 247). MacIntyre criticises that liberalism lacks foundations when its basis for moral judgments cannot be rooted in social life and instead becomes a matter of individual opinion (1981, p. 52; cited in Gutmann, 1999, p. 247). Sandel would make a case for communitarian politics in raising concerns against the corporate economy and the bureaucratic state eroding forms of community (see Gutmann, 1999, p. 318). Against the latter critique, Gutmann argues that communitarians are not distinguished from liberals in either opposing or defending the market or welfare state, they may only differ in policies related to moral issues such as pornography (Ibid.). She suggests in summary that the worthy challenge to be posed by communitarian critics is “not to replace liberal justice, but to improve it” (Ibid., p. 260).

The ‘communitarian’ label as such may not always be useful, as critics against Rawls’ devaluation of community, like MacIntyre, Sandel, Taylor and Walzer, do not identify themselves with it, and the line between communitarianism and liberalism has also
been blurred. There are thinkers who may identify themselves as ‘liberal communitarians’, such as Selznick (1998, p. 3) who argues that liberalism may refer to commitment to political freedom and the rule of law but also to special concern for the poor and the oppressed, citing Dewey’s philosophy of combining a spirit of liberation and quest for social justice with responsible participation in ‘communities’. The difference to him is that liberalism suggests more emphasis on ideals of equality, liberty and rationality whereas communitarianism may refer to the ‘common good’ in terms of issues like allocation of resources, substance of education, problems of discrimination and poverty as well as the environment (Ibid., p. 11). While the arguments of four aforementioned thinkers may centre on the importance of particular social contexts and the social nature of the self, the second wave of 1990s communitarianism as represented by Amitai Etzioni among others would emphasise social responsibility and communal life (see Bell, 2012).

With the foregoing discussion of moral foundation introducing the ideal of liberty and concern for the common good, one may now move on to the fine differences between communitarian and liberal justification on the value of multiculturalism, with regards to difficulty on issues like equal respect among diverse social contexts. The tension may be better appreciated with the help of the distinction made by Dworkin in his paper ‘Liberalism’, between two kinds of moral commitment, one relating to views on what constitute a good life, which is ‘substantive’, and the other relating to how members of society can deal fairly and equally with each other, which is ‘procedural’ (cited in Taylor, 1994, p. 56). This poses a challenge given the diversity of modern society, as discussed by Charles Taylor as a political philosopher who is representative of communitarian concerns in his justification for multiculturalism. His key thoughts shall be presented progressively here in the three following points: a critique on individualism in modernity; a grounding of morality and identity in social life, tied to a discussion on the modern ideal of authenticity; and the advocacy for a politics of recognition.

Firstly, Taylor in The Ethics of Authenticity (1991) has described individualism as one of the “malaise of modernity” (p. 1), expressing the experience of loss or decline in culture even as civilisation ‘develops’. Despite the fact that many people in the world today enjoy the right to choose their own patterns of life in many ways which their ancestors had no control over, and one may argue this achievement is yet
incomplete considering the economic arrangements and hierarchy that still exist, Taylor sees a price being paid. With modern freedom, people are breaking loose from a sense of cosmic order whereby people used to be locked into given roles from which it was unthinkable to deviate, but the predicament is that such orders were precisely what gave meaning to the world and to social life: "The things that surround us were not just potential raw materials or instruments for our projects, but they had the significance given them by their place in the chain of being. (p. 3)"

As Taylor argues in a paraphrasing of Max Weber’s argument, the discrediting of such orders leads to a ‘disenchantment’ of the world, for it then implies “the primacy of instrumental reason” (p. 5). Since social arrangements are no longer grounded in a sacred order, society is ‘up for grabs’ and can be reconfigured towards the goal of individuals’ happiness and well-being (Ibid.). The danger of this is that much social planning is “dominated by forms of cost-benefit analysis that involve grotesque calculations, putting dollar assessments on human lives” (p. 6). He also highlights the problem of commodification, emphasis on technological solutions and deterioration of the environment under capitalist development, citing Hannah Arendt’s observation that “the reality and reliability of the human world rest primarily on the fact that we are surrounded by things more permanent than the activity by which they are produced” (see Ibid., p. 7).

From there, Taylor comes to the consequence for political life: the institutions and structures of an industrial-technological society severely restrict one’s choices by forcing societies and individuals to give weight to instrumental reason instead of moral deliberation (p. 8). The example he cites is how private automobile is favoured over public transport in the modern cities despite the thinning of the ozone layer (p. 9). Taylor suggests that such a structure of society can be seen as “imposing a great loss of freedom” (Ibid.), using a different sense of the word as individualist freedom. He further suggests that there is yet another loss of freedom in the sense of what Tocqueville calls ‘soft’ despotism, as such a society produces individuals who are ‘enclosed in their own hearts’, with few willing to participate actively in self-government, as people prefer to stay at home and enjoy whatever satisfactions of private life that the government distributes (Ibid.). The atomism of the self-absorbed individual hence contributes to a vicious circle in the ‘iron cage’ of the bureaucratic state through an alienation from the public sphere, such that people are losing
political control over their destiny, or what Tocqueville would call 'political liberty' (p. 10).

The second aspect in Taylor’s thought involves a discussion of authenticity in morality as well as in identity. He traces the ethic of authenticity to the end of the 18th century where it was originally built on Descartes’ individualism of disengaged rationality and Locke’s political individualism, with a conflict coming from a later form in the Romantic period which was critical of disengaged rationality “and of an atomism that didn’t recognise the ties of community” (p. 25). The idea arising was that human beings are endowed with a moral sense or intuition for what is right or wrong, against the view that knowing right and wrong was a matter of dry calculation. (p. 26).

This idea then of an ‘inner voice’, of being in touch with one’s own moral feelings, was also tied to the idea of an ‘individualised identity’, (1994, p. 28). Taylor refers here to Rousseau’s presentation of the issue of morality as following a voice of nature within us, a voice which may also be “drowned out by the passions that are induced by our dependence on others, the main one being amour propre, or pride” (p. 29). He also cites Herder’s idea that every person has his or her own ‘measure’: “Jeder Mensch hat ein eigenes Maass, gleichsam eine eigene Stimmung aller seiner sinnlichen Gefühle zu einander. (cited in p. 30)” With this perspective comes a powerful moral ideal, Taylor says, as “[i]t accords critical moral importance to a kind of contact with myself, with my own inner nature, which it sees as danger of being lost, partly through the pressures towards outward conformity, but also because in taking an instrumental stance to myself, I may have lost the capacity to listen to this inner voice (1991, p. 29).”

The argument that Taylor takes from here is, however, that contrary to any assumption which may thus be made, the individual’s original way of being is not inwardly generated without social influence. The crucial feature of human life, he asserts, is its ‘dialogical’ character. By that, he refers specifically to George Herbert Mead’s idea of the ‘significant others’, whereby the self is constituted through the social experience of interaction with others (1994, p. 32).

In the modern ideal of authenticity described by Taylor, Herder’s conception of originality is applied not only to the individual person among other persons, but also
to a Volk among others (p. 31). Given the perspective from social psychology that one’s identity depends on one’s dialogical relations with others (p. 34), it makes the politics of identity stressful, for oppression can result from refusal of equal recognition (p. 36).

Taylor’s discussion in ‘The Politics of Recognition’ (1994), as a third and most crucial aspect in his political philosophy, involves a struggle in the politics of equal recognition, between a principle of equal citizenship and dignity on one hand, and a politics of difference on the other. The difficulty stems from the development in the modern notion of identity, whereby it may be argued that everyone should be recognised for his or her unique identity, and it follows from there that an assimilation to a dominant identity would be “the cardinal sin against the ideal of authenticity” (p. 38). Such a politics of difference in fact grows out of the politics of equal dignity, based on the idea that all human beings are equally worthy of respect. This refers to the term ‘dignity’ as used by Kant in *Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten*, which suggested that what commanded respect in human beings are their status as rational agents, with the capacity or ‘universal human potential’ of directing their lives through principles (see Ibid., p. 41). Taylor argues that the potential of forming and defining one’s own cultural identity is, by the same token, a universal potential to be accepted (p. 42). But to those fighting for universal dignity and non-discrimination by insisting on being ‘difference-blind’, such a politics of difference may seem like a form of betrayal of the principle as it seeks to redefine non-discrimination as “requiring that we make these distinctions the basis of differential treatment” (Ibid., pp. 39).

Furthermore, in an intercultural context of recognition, there may be another demand, that equal respect be accorded only to “actually evolved cultures” (Ibid.). One may cite the instance of Eurocentrism in a statement like “When the Zulus produce a Tolstoy we will read him,” as attributed to the writer Saul Bellow, which suggests that the Zulus, despite having the same potential for culture formation like anyone else, has nevertheless produced a culture that is less valuable than others (Ibid.). By indirectly forcing people into a homogeneous mould that may be seen as reflecting a hegemonic culture, “the supposedly fair and difference-blind society is not only inhuman (because suppressing identities) but also, in a subtle and unconscious way, itself highly discriminatory” (p. 43). Taylor hence disputes Dworkin’s assumption that
a liberal society is simply one that adopts no particular substantive view about the ends of life (p. 56). He points out: “Political society is not neutral between those who value remaining true to the culture of our ancestors and those who might want to cut loose in the name of some individual goal of self-development.”

In short, Taylor sees a problem with “a form of the politics of equal respect, as enshrined in a liberalism of rights, that is inhospitable to difference, because (a) it insists on uniform application of the rules defining these rights, without exception, and (b) it is suspicious of collective goals” (p. 60). He puts forward a politics of ‘recognition’ based on Hegel’s argument that human beings can only flourish to the extent that they are recognised (p. 50). This apparently departs from Rousseau’s attempt to convert human equality into identity (Gutmann, 1994, p. 6). But Taylor re-interprets Rousseau’s new discourse of esteem as inaugurating an age of dignity to replace the traditional and inegalitarian way of thinking on honour. In contrast with _amour propre_ as a source of evil in its concern for others’ opinion, caring about esteem in a perfectly balanced reciprocity is also compatible with Rousseau’s idea of freedom and social unity, Taylor (1994, p. 48) argues. Hegel in contradicting the old discourse on the evil of pride as a lack of virtue hence arguably follows Rousseau by seeking the struggle for recognition in a regime of equals.

On this, Parekh (2000) would concur with Taylor’s observation that social recognition in a culturally diverse society is central to the individual’s identity and self-worth, and misrecognition can severely injure these; but he doubts that one may persuade a dominant group rationally to change its views, without countering the misrecognition “by both undertaking a rigorous critique of the dominant culture and radically restructuring the prevailing inequalities of economic and political power” (Ibid., p. 343). Parekh therefore proposes an ‘interactive and dynamic’ model of multiculturalism whereby a society develops a common sense of belonging not based on shared ethnic or cultural characteristics, but as a community bound by common good and collective will that is ‘dialogically constituted’ (Ibid., p. 341). Bhargava (2010) would appreciate Taylor’s Hegelian approach in helping to grasp the notions of dignity and self-esteem as collective values which is lacking in the Kantian treatment, but emphasises the importance of dignity in labour. Applying Hegel’s master-slave dialectic to the case of the _Bhangi_, the lowest segment in the ‘untouchable’ caste in India for their dirty work as ‘manual scavengers’, he argues
that beyond cultural autonomy, cultural communities also “must be open to critical
evaluation” (p. 42).

A liberal justification of multiculturalism, as represented by Will Kymlicka among
others, argues similarly for a politics of recognition, except for a key difference that
the cultural rights of individuals are argued as providing a source of self-respect and
material for leading a meaningful life, such that one may describe the focus as being
on instrumental rather than inherent value of communitarian identities (Kaul, 2011,
pp. 510-511). Kymlicka has argued for in Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory
of Minority Rights (1995, p. 81) for the basic principles of human beings’ interest in
leading a good life, which entails firstly that they should lead their lives in accordance
with their beliefs on what gives value in life, and secondly that they should be free to
question and revise their beliefs (cited in Parekh, 2000, p. 99). In comparison with
liberal thinkers like Mill and Raz, Kymlicka’s view on autonomy may be described as
a modest one, as it is based simply on the ability or condition for leading a good life,
not by argument that autonomy is desirable because it expresses one’s moral nature,
individuality, progress or happiness (see Ibid.). Kymlicka’s achievement lies in
effectively taking over the Rawlsian theory of justice and extending it to relations
between cultures, enabling him to argue that enforced assimilation never works and
only leads to disorientation (Ibid., p. 101).

Kymlicka (2003) has outlined three general principles of the multicultural state:

“that the state is not a possession of the dominant national group, but belongs
equally to all citizens; that assimilationist and exclusionary nation-building
policies should be replace with policies of recognition and accommodation;
and that historic justice should be acknowledged”

(p. 154)

However, he emphasises that there is no single model of the multicultural state, as
there are great variations on state reforms that may be demanded, from country to
country as well as from group to group within the same country, such as immigrants
versus indigenous peoples (p. 153). Another interesting facet in his theory is on the
conception of the ‘intercultural citizen’, whereby he notes that individual citizens may
fully accept the political commitment of state without believing in possessing
intercultural skills themselves (p. 154). Some multicultural reforms may indeed result in a reduction in the need or incentive for intercultural skills or knowledge on the part of the individual, especially in federal multination states or self-governing territories, which allow minorities to create ‘parallel societies’, for instance among the Flemish- and French-speaking groups in Belgium or among the German-, French and Italian-speaking groups in Switzerland (Ibid., pp. 154-155). In conclusion, Kymlicka suggests that the ideal of an intercultural citizen, with robust levels of intercultural skills in dealing with diversity, or intercultural knowledge on other traditions and identities, “does not fit neatly or simply into our ideal of a multicultural state that deals justly with ethnocultural diversity (p. 166). He identifies three possible areas of tension, namely that the intercultural citizen may prefer global rather than local interculturalism, that intercultural exchange may unfairly burden isolationist groups, and “that the model of the intercultural citizen requires a level of mutual understanding that is either tokenistic (if focused on superficial cultural differences) or utopian (if focused on deep cultural differences)” (Ibid.). Ultimately, Kymlicka is inclined to fall back on Rawls’ assertion that ‘justice is the first virtue of social institutions’, that the emphasis on intercultural skills should not imply undermining of justice (Ibid.). In Parekh’s perspective, however, this is a limitation on the part of Kymlicka, whereby he is able to demonstrate why human beings need a stable culture but unable to provide reason as to why they need access to other cultures (2000, p. 108).

But perhaps the most problematic component in Kymlicka’s multicultural theory is his differential approach towards the cultural claims of minorities. According to his logic, national minorities have the strongest cultural claim and moral weight while voluntary immigrants have the weakest, by reason that their country of origin is their cultural home and by leaving it, it implies that they have chosen to live by the culture of their adopted country – an argument which Parekh (2000, p. 103) questions for its sharp distinction between immigrants and citizens. Modood (2007) calls this a ‘multinational bias’, as Kymlicka seems to suggest that individual autonomy depends on membership of a ‘societal culture’, and since migrants do not have any distinct one, they cannot claim multicultural rights (p. 34). Modood also sees a ‘secularist bias’ in Kymlicka’s theory, by treating groups formed by religion differently from ethnic groups (p.29). Kymlicka’s argument (1995, pp. 35-38) may be valid in principle
wherein he says that giving a group the right to restrict the behaviour of its members can be potentially unjust, and therefore multicultural citizenship should be primarily about giving groups the right to protect themselves from external forces, as one would grant (2007, p. 29). However, Modood sees a flawed logic in Kymlicka supporting multicultural rights based on language, but ruling out the possibility of a multi-religious state and too readily dismissing religious groups’ claims in relation to policy as ‘exemptions’ (pp. 26-27), when denial of individual autonomy is not limited to religious groups. Modood cites that the German state has institutionalised fiscal support for both Roman Catholic and Lutheran Churches, while the Indian state regulates several organised religions and their legal principles, even though state officials and citizens need not subscribe to any of the faiths (p. 28).

The 2008 Council of Europe’s White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue cites that the European Court of Human Rights has recognised pluralism built on “the genuine recognition of, and respect for, diversity and the dynamics of cultural traditions, ethnic and cultural identities, religious beliefs, artistic, literary and socio-economic ideas and concepts” (p. 13). It stresses however that intercultural dialogue is needed as a ‘major tool’ in managing cultural diversity in order “to safeguard freedom and well-being” (Ibid.) of all living on the continent. If this is taken to suggest that the approach of ‘intercultural dialogue’ is a procedural approach of deliberative democracy that may accommodate cultural and value pluralism without compromising on principles of freedom and human rights, the test of its application in any region of the world would be how its ‘neutrality’ is defined and what moral commitments ultimately carry more weight.

But meantime the term ‘multiculturalism’, instead of being equated with value pluralism as a positive ideal, has been attached with more stigma than ever in Europe. As Charles Taylor (2012) observes of the recent years in 2010s, the heads of government in three major European countries, namely Merkel, Cameron and Sarkozy, have echoed one another in announcing the end of ‘multiculturalism’ as a failure, a regrettable experiment (p. 414). He writes: “The underlying assumption seems to be that too much positive recognition of cultural differences will encourage a retreat into ghettos, and a refusal to accept the political ethic of liberal democracy itself. As though this rush to closure was the first choice of immigrants themselves, from which they have to be dissuaded through ‘tough love’ (Ibid.).” One problem
seems to be that politicians do not understand the dynamics of immigrant societies and fail to realise the natural tendency for immigrants to cluster with people of similar origin or background in the first instance (Ibid.). But Taylor also recognises the tendency of a host society to fear being changed by the newcomers: “The notion that ‘they can be equal collaborators in remaking our common culture rings alarm bells in all who share this anxiety. It seems safer and more sensible to insist that they conform first to what we consider the basics, before we let them become co-deciders (Ibid., p. 420).”

Bearing that in mind, one may deem it understandable if the search for a social or communication tool to promote a sense of community among people of different cultural backgrounds may also be constrained by the need to retain one’s core as an individual belonging to a particular cultural group. The discussion in the following section will also reflect such challenge as to how open-ended an intercultural dialogue can be at a personal level.

3.2 Culture Assimilator as a Tool for Dialogue – an Intercultural Competence Framework according to Alexander Thomas

3.2.1 Dimensions of Intercultural Competence for Intercultural Learning

We now turn to look at ‘intercultural dialogue’ in another sense, not at the level of public policy, but as a process of intercultural communication at the level of day-to-day life whereby ‘mutual understanding’ poses a challenge. We shall begin with an explanation of the philosophy behind intercultural dialogue under such a perspective, and then proceed to discuss the dimensions of intercultural competence that support intercultural dialogue in a framework proposed by Alexander Thomas (2003, 2008, 2011) based on Culture Assimilator, an approach developed in Chicago in the 1960s. It will be argued here that the relevance of this framework hinges on the idea of ‘intercultural learning’.

Unlike in the discussion of the preceding section, intercultural dialogue as discussed within a framework of intercultural communication is concerned basically with face-to-face interactions, where the challenge, at a personal or organisational level, lies in mutual understanding of intentions communicated through actions that may be
culture-specific. If the sense of intercultural dialogue on a political or societal level may be understood as a challenge of cultural differences in moral judgment, then its sense on a personal level may be understood as a challenge of cultural differences in terms of norms, which is the focus of the Culture Assimilator framework to be discussed in relation to critical incidents of cross-cultural interactions. The question is how the experience in the latter sense of intercultural dialogue may contribute to dialogue in the community at large.

One may begin here by examining the theoretical basis for intercultural dialogue within a framework of intercultural communication. One early philosophy for intercultural dialogue would be that of Martin Buber as cited by Gudykunst (2003). Buber (1965) sees dialogue as necessary for the development of a community, which he considers not in terms of a group of like-minded people, but in terms of a group of individuals differing in minds but complementary in nature (cited in Gudykunst, 2003, p. 392). Unlike monologues which do not take into account the needs of others as unique human beings, but only serve to confirm one’s self-reliance, and unlike technical dialogues which are aimed only at exchanging information, the goal of the dialogue as defined by Buber is to understand others and seek mutuality rather than one’s own feeling of control and ownership (cited in Ibid.). Buber (1965, p. 19) says that in dialogue “each of the participants really has in mind the other or others in their present or particular being and turns to them with the intention of establishing a living mutual relationship between himself [or herself] and them” (cited in Ibid.). Buber advocates walking a ‘narrow ridge’ which involves taking in both the view of one’s own and that of the other, not as in taking non-judgmental or relativistic attitudes towards others but to be ready to maintain or modify one’s opinions according to the arguments (Gudykunst, 2003, p. 393).

There has incidentally been some attempt to compare Buber’s philosophy of dialogue, originally derived from a mystical tradition, with sociological perspectives in communication, such as those of Mead and Schütz, to explore the aspect of relations in communication or that of intersubjectivity in social action (Bidlo, 2006). One interesting fact is that Buber’s dialogue philosophy of the ‘I- Thou’ includes not only the relation between man and man but also between man and nature, and between man and spiritual existence; Buber has extended the encounters with spiritual existence to artistic creations too (Ibid., pp. 65-66). From a perspective of
cultural psychology as discussed in the previous chapter, dialogue through the arts may be understood as a kind of mediated communication. Where philosophy of dialogue goes, there has also been comparison between Levinas and Buber in their similar approach to dialogue. Levinas (1998) would emphasise the contrast between the ‘I-It’ approach based on the idea of experience and the ‘I-Thou’ approach based on relations, such that he sees dialogue as a transformative practice, not in terms of a notion of ‘experience’ or self-consciousness as lessons that converge into a unity of knowledge, but in terms of a kind of transcendence with a dialogic sense of oneself encountering another (cited in Keller, 2012, p. 116).

Coming to the focus in this section, the philosophy of Ram Adhar Mall in intercultural dialogue has once been cited by Alexander Thomas to support his model for intercultural learning and intercultural understanding based on a framework of intercultural competence. Mall (1993) has expressed that the task of an intercultural philosophy should be to take relativism seriously and to reject any tendency that would treat any particular metaphysics, religion, culture, logic or ethic as absolute (p. 10). A further argument of Mall would suggest that in intercultural dialogue, communication is more important than consensus, and this is taken as a basis for Thomas’ (2003b) model of intercultural competence in communication (p. 137).

Dialogue in Thomas’ (2008) broader survey includes an aspect of content as well as an aspect of relation, and it can be influenced by formal communication elements such as social roles as well as by informal communication elements as in the dynamics between participants in terms of mood, sympathy, motivation, open-mindedness and so on (p. 20). In Psychologie des interkulturellen Dialogs (2008), he cites various communication theories as useful references, including the theory of symbolic interactionism according to Mead (1968), the model of Perspektivenübernahme according to Rosemann and Kerres (1986), the axioms of communication according to Watzlawick and Beavin (1972), and also Habermas’ theory of communicative action (1996). He cites in particular Luhmann’s (1981) theory of self-referential system, whereby social systems are understood as being constituted of processes of communication, in order to suggest that the key to intercultural dialogue is not about the mutual creation of some unity as such but instead the continuation of communication provided by ‘understanding’ as a self-referential decision (Thomas, 2008, p. 17). However, his discussion on intercultural
dialogue ultimately centres on a model of intercultural competence which follows largely an approach of intercultural communication involving the Culture Assimilator as a tool for intercultural learning.

Under this framework, which deals with situations of misunderstanding stemming from cultural differences in orientation system, Thomas (2003b) appears to adopt a relativist perspective in arguing that a person who behaves differently is in fact correct in his behaviour as corresponding to his own cultural orientation system (p. 140). However, this line of argument has been criticised for it on one hand limits itself in the exploration of cultural psychology by assuming the structure of cultural orientation systems as universal, and on the other hand seemingly suggests that cultural transfer or change is undesirable if not impossible (Allolio-Näcke et al, 2003, p. 151). Mall (2003) himself has cautioned that knowledge or information on other cultures is necessary but not sufficient for mutual understanding and intercultural dialogue, as it may also turn out as a form of ethnocentric assumption that one can understand another culture better it does itself, and the framing of intercultural competence by Thomas, with reference to practical motives of making one’s life easier in business joint ventures, may tend to privilege a particular rationality such as that of neoliberal economy (pp. 196-198).

In other words, this sets itself apart from motives of intercultural dialogue for transcendence in mutuality, as in the philosophy of Buber or Levinas, not to mention being more trivial or instrumental in scope compared to intercultural dialogue as discussed in Parekh’s sense of negotiating on differences in cultural values or practices. The challenge in intercultural competence, following Mall’s arguments, would be to go beyond cultivating a kind of competence that results in self-transformation of merely a normative sense, that seeks consensus at the expense of a duty to remain true, that ultimately remains within the confines of egocentrism (Ibid., pp. 197-198). The kind of relativist attitude that Thomas appears to be promoting may risk degenerating into a matter of convenience, a relativism that Charles Taylor (1991) would call “an offshoot of a form of individualism” (p. 14), whereby everybody is thought to have a right to develop his or her own form of life for one’s own self-fulfilment. In that case, there would be no further need for ‘intercultural dialogue’, especially if the purpose of intercultural competence is simply to find the easiest way for one to operate in a different environment to fulfil one’s own purpose.
This thesis will nevertheless continue to explore the potential in such a framework of intercultural competence with an argument of how certain components may be relevant in a humanistic context of intercultural dialogue through the medium of heritage. It would help to begin with an overview of the discourse on intercultural competence in the general field of intercultural communication and the academic discourse in Germany relating to its concept, then zooming into the conceptual framework of German social psychologist Alexander Thomas, in which intercultural learning is considered as a process for the achieving of intercultural understanding and ultimately intercultural competence (Thomas, 2003b, pp. 142-147). Eventually, a selection of more specific dimensions in intercultural competence will be discussed, namely open-mindedness, reflexivity, resilience and empathy, out of a range of general competence cited (Thomas, 2008, p. 27), with reference to their psychological bases and their implications for social relations in intercultural dialogue.

The term ‘competence’ has been used in different ways in the literature of intercultural communication, one of the ways being to equate it with ‘appropriateness’, which is also the main sense of competence as discussed in the Culture Assimilator model, which will be dealt with in the next section. In such a model, appropriateness may refer to legitimacy, acceptance or ‘assimilation’, the last typically used to represent “the extent to which a sojourner blends in with or becomes similar to the host culture”. (Spitzberg and Changnon, 2009, p. 6). Spitzberg observes various other senses equated with the term ‘competence’ in the literatures, summarised as follows: “understanding (eg., accuracy, clarity, co-orientation, overlap of meanings), relationship development (eg., attraction, intimacy), satisfaction (eg., communication satisfaction, relational satisfaction, relational quality), effectiveness (eg., goal achievement, efficiency, institutional success, negotiation success), appropriateness (eg., legitimacy, acceptance, assimilation), and adaptation” (Ibid.). Competence may also be conceptually equated with a set of abilities or skills, or at times a subjective evaluative impression (Ibid.).

Just as ambassadors and diplomats throughout history have recognised the importance of familiarity and competence with cultural practices of their destinations, the need to train individuals to serve in programmes such as the Peace Corps stimulated a new government and social scientific interest in the concept of intercultural competence after World War II, as the United sought greater
involvement in foreign lands and businesses (Ibid., pp. 7-8). Ezekiel (1968) for
instance found that more competent Peace Corps volunteers tended to be
characterised by a wider range of interests, valuing intellectual matters, higher
aspirations, cheerfulness, verbal fluency, valuing of autonomy, ability to create and
exploit dependency in people and so on (Ibid., p. 8). Terms such as ‘intercultural
competence’, ‘intercultural effectiveness’ and ‘intercultural adaptation’ came into
currency in the 1970s (Ibid., p. 9). Intercultural competence may be seen as “the
appropriate and effective management of interaction between people who, to some
degree or another, represent different or divergent affective, cognitive, and
behavioural orientations to the world” (Ibid., p. 7), orientations most commonly
reflected in normative categories such as nationality, race, ethnicity, tribe, religion or
region (Ibid.).

According to a review by Spitzberg and Changnon (2009), models of intercultural
communication competence may be divided into 5 different types: compositional
models, which identify components of competence without specifying relations
among the components; co-orientational models, which conceptualise interactional
achievement of intercultural understanding or its variants, focusing on
communicative mutuality and shared meanings; developmental models, which
specify stages of progression through which competence is hypothesised to evolve;
adaptational models, which typically envision multiple interactants and emphasise
their interdependence, and see adaptation itself as a criterion of competence; and
finally causal process models, which reflect specified interrelationships among
components which can be formalised into testable propositions with a downstream
set of outcomes marking criteria of competence (Spitzberg and Changnon, 2009, p.
10)

These five types are however not all mutually exclusive in their compartmentalisation
of intercultural competence. For instance, among those classified under
compositional models, whereas the intercultural competence components model of
Hamilton, Richardson and Shuford (1998) consists of attitudes, knowledge and skills
as 3 separate realms, the facework-based model according to Ting-Toomey and
Kurogi (1998) sees conceived with mutual influences among the knowledge
dimension (eg. power distance and communication styles), mindfulness dimension
(eg. reflexivity and empathy), facework competence criteria (eg. perceived
appropriateness) and interaction skills (eg. mindful listening and trust-building) (Ibid., pp. 10-13). Deardorff’s pyramid model of intercultural competence (2006) views requisite attitudes (eg. respect of cultural diversity, openness to intercultural learning) as enhancing knowledge and comprehension as well as skills on a higher level, which in turn enhance desired internal outcome (adaptability, flexibility, empathy) and finally desired external outcome (behaving and communicating effectively and appropriately) (Ibid.).

In Germany, where research in intercultural communication saw its development in the 1980s from international management to education, psychology, linguistics and other social sciences, the discourse on intercultural competence has been multifaceted and often characterised by critical reasoning, a notable example being the reactions to Alexander Thomas’ 2003 paper in the Erwägen-Wissen-Ethik journal on his model of intercultural competence (Moosmüller and Schönhuth, 2009, p. 209). On one hand there were pragmatic questions on the validity of the model in itself, on the other hand there were criticisms fielded at the theoretical assumptions of the model, coming from some totally different discipline (Ibid., p. 210). Generally, there is a divide between an ‘efficiency approach’ that aims to make intercultural communication more efficient, and a ‘growth approach’ that emphasises on further development and growth of individuals and groups; related questions are whether intercultural competence is conceptualised on the level of individual actors or organisational actors, in a multinational organisation context or a multicultural society context, and whether there is reference to equality of power (Ibid.).

Apart from a psychological approach to intercultural competence as discussed here, there are also other approaches in Germany under the discipline of education and social work as ‘intercultural education’ (Auernheimer, 1996; Nieke, 1995), under cultural sociology with regards to issues of stratification (Geenen, 2002), ‘othering’ (Reuter, 2002) or migration (Han, 2005; Hoffman-Nowotny, 2005), or under cultural anthropology in terms of understanding and translating the ‘cultural other’, as Moosmüller and Schönhuth observe (Ibid., pp. 215-217). In terms of applied research in intercultural psychology, there has been focus on international transfers (Kühlmann, 1995), intercultural assessments to select personnel for international assignments (Deller, 2000), criteria and instruments to evaluate intercultural trainings (Kinast, 1998; Podsiadlowski and Spieß, 1996) and so on (cited in Ibid., p. 214).
However, Thomas (2003b) has been most notable in summarising a learning model for intercultural competence (Moosmüller and Schönhuth, op. cit.).

One may summarise intercultural competence in short as a profile of capabilities and proficiencies that allows a subject to behave appropriately in situations of contact with other cultures, in the aspects of perception, thinking, understanding and action in the encounters, so as to enable positive intercultural exchange (Antor, 2007, p. 112). But one problem with an approach of equating intercultural competence with a set of abilities or skills though, is that the same behaviour or skill may be perceived as competent in one context but another, or by one perceiver but not another, hence no particular skill or ability is ever likely to be universally “competent” (Spitzberg and Changnon, 2009, p. 6). Another question is where that ‘competence’ in question is located, whether it is in the person, or it is in the situation or social relation (Ibid., p. 44). Thomas (2003b, p. 143) himself has cited a perspective of Furham and Bochner (1986) that intercultural competence is “not simply a personal trait or learned skill, but a social phenomenon. Any social interaction is a mutually organised, skilled performance … [resulting] from the participants having a shared, although often only implicit understanding of the bases on which the interaction is taking place (p. 217)”.

However, in Thomas’ framework based on critical interaction situations, his theorising of intercultural competence is ultimately based on an assumption of cultural differences investigated in cross-cultural psychology.

With this, it means that intercultural competence is assumed to be located in the person, which allows Thomas to concentrate on the concept of intercultural learning, beginning with the idea of learning itself. Learning is generally conceived of as involving a change which has taken place relative to an earlier state; it should by definition be based on experience and/or practice, and should be lasting, by effecting a change in behaviour and change in cognitive structure (Schermer, 1991, pp. 10-22; cited in Thomas, 2005, p. 70). Furthermore, one may argue for the concept of a ‘proactive’ learner whereby that one not only selects and assimilates a stimulus, but also explores material for one’s experience and influences it actively (Bandura, 1978, p. 344; cited in Thomas, 2005, p. 71).

The emphasis here on the active learner may be contrasted with a concept of participation in learning process as socialisation, which would refer not only to
“mastering a set of knowledge or skills, but also a matter of learning how to work together with the other people in the group according to one’s status as a member and the level of expertise one has attained. (Scollon, Scollon & Jones, 2012, p. 164)"

A theory of social learning according to Bandura posits that people learn from others through, observation, imitation and modelling. He divides the process of such model learning into two sections, namely acquisition and performance (see Edelmann, 1996, p. 286), the former requiring attention in the observation, dependent on characteristics of the model in emotional engagement among other factors, whereas the latter involves mechanisms of reinforcement and motivation. Thomas (2003b) however argues that a gradual process of ‘learning by doing’ in a monocultural context is not realistic in an intercultural context, and hence postulates a cybernetic model whereby intercultural learning may be stimulated (pp. 146-147).

Based on an idea of culture as a field of action according to Boesch, Alexander Thomas says: “Intercultural learning takes place when a person in contact with people of a different culture, attempts to understand its specific orientation system of perception, thinking, values and action, to integrate it in one’s own cultural orientation system and to apply it to the thinking and action in the field of action in the other culture. Intercultural learning involves, apart from the understanding of the orientation system of the other culture, a reflection of one’s own cultural orientation system. (Thomas, 1988; cited in Müller & Thomas, 1991, p. 8)” This three-tier model of intercultural learning, understanding and competence, as formulated by Alexander Thomas, is conceived based on his framework of intercultural psychology (2003b, p. 146) It forms the principle behind the Culture Assimilator as a tool for training intercultural competence using critical situations as source of knowledge for learning. He argues that intercultural learning would thus go beyond the recognition of some exotic features of other cultural systems or the comparison between the different orientation systems, to include intercultural encounters in one’s planning and evaluation of communicative and cooperative processes, to realise the potential for reliability, flexibility and creativity in intercultural exchange – *Handlungssicherheit, Handlungsflexibilität, Handlungskreativität* (Ibid.).

This concept of intercultural learning, conceptualised on a cybernetic model, is hence ultimately directed towards training flexibility in action (behavioural aspect of competence) for intercultural situations. However, the strength of this framework, as
will be argued in this thesis, is precisely in its focus on situations of potential conflicts or misunderstanding, which may be developed in its efficacy to zero in on problems framed in terms of culture differences. This approach sets itself apart from a developmental model which is centred on observing and analysing attitudes of people towards cultural differences, as proposed by Milton J. Bennett. Bennett's (1986) elaborate model postulates ethnocentric stages to ethnorelative stages in progressive categories of denial, defence, minimisation, acceptance, adaptation and integration (Ibid., p. 182). Integration for instance is described as a state involving “the ability to evaluate phenomena relative to cultural context” (Ibid., p. 186), such that a person is able to “construe himself or herself in various cultural ways” (Ibid.). He has referred to a concept of intercultural learning used for a conference on educational exchange, defined as “[a]cquiring increased awareness of subjective cultural context (world view), including one’s own, and developing greater ability to interact sensitively and competently across cultural contexts as both an immediate and long-term effect of exchange” (Bennett, 2009, online, p. 2).

Such emphasis on awareness (cognitive aspect of competence) and sensitivity (affective aspect) of differences in world views may be seen as akin to an approach of cultural anthropology in understanding and translating an unfamiliar culture. However, Bennett (2004) has argued from a different perspective that being knowledgeable about a culture may not necessarily be associated with a feeling of acceptance, people may need to have a ‘critical mass’ of information about another culture in order to appreciate its world view, and be ready to abandon an ethnocentric view that assumes one’s own cultural patterns as the universal reality (pp. 68-69). In other words, enhancing the cognitive aspect in intercultural competence may not necessarily lead to an effect in the affective aspect. Studies have also suggested variation between culture-general and culture-specific assimilators, whereby the former appears to have positive effects on attitude towards others or empathy, in terms of importance given in considering other people’s feelings before making a decision, recognition of there being more than one way of getting things done, the inclination to defend others’ viewpoints and so on; whereas the benefits of the latter are reflected mainly in the decrease of stereotypes, development of complex thinking and isomorphic attributions about the target culture,
greater enjoyment, better adjustment to everyday stresses and better job performance (Cushner and Landis, 1996, pp. 191-194).

Generally, one may argue for the ultimate importance of intercultural contacts. Bennett (2009) has discussed the positive effects of international exchange for students or training of primary and secondary school teachers, and a multicultural campus to help model citizenship in multicultural societies at large (pp. 13-14, online). Auernheimer (2007) argues based on research in intercultural education that intercultural learning could be facilitated in school environments where pupils are not segregated according to cultural origins even in primary school (p. 25). They may be involved in interactive role plays that deal with images of the self and others and collective experiences (Ibid., p. 26). There is incidentally another model of intercultural learning according to Weber (2005) which sees it as ‘identity negotiation’, based on the framework of Ting-Toomey in intercultural training, and the theory of ‘expansive theory’ developed by Engeström in the context of activity theory (cited in Teräs, 2007, p. 36). In yet another concept, intercultural learning may be understood as a form of liberal education and enrichment, through reflection on the varieties of ‘ethos’ available as human heritage or legacy on the globe (Rao, 2010, p. 174). This would be in line with dialogue in the paradigm of Oakeshott. Chapter 6 in this thesis will take into account a perspective of intercultural learning in an intercultural communication framework according to Robert E. Young (1996), which considers it in terms learning through conversations with other cultures, such that one may find in other cultures what one feels has been ‘lost at home’ (p. 144).

We shall now shift our focus to consider intercultural competence in direct relation to intercultural dialogue as a whole. Intercultural dialogue is considered by Thomas (2008) as a form of interaction between people of different cultural communities for the purpose of reaching understanding. It is largely seen as a specific form of intercultural communication, whereby the divide between interaction and communication is arguably not considered particularly useful scientifically (Thomas, 1991, p. 55; Frindte, 2001, p. 95). In the perspective of Thomas, intercultural dialogue as with other forms of intercultural communication can be enhanced through aspects of intercultural competence such as open-mindedness or curiosity, ability to adopt a different perspective, reflexivity, flexibility, tolerance of ambiguity, empathy, and physical and psychological resilience (Thomas, 2008, p. 27). While
these aspects were listed there as an overview with little elaboration on their precise relevance to intercultural dialogue, the discussion below will attempt to expand a little on the psychological relevance of a selection of them, through comparison with perspectives on intercultural dialogue by other scholars.

Where intercultural dialogue is concerned, the relevance of open-mindedness in the perspective of Thomas apparently refers back to the philosophy of Ram Adhar Mall in terms of intercultural understanding as Verständigung by way of intercultural discourses (Thomas, 2003b, p. 145). Thomas interprets this to mean that mutual understanding is not about producing consensus, but rather the acts of desire to understand and desire to be understood, via the process of communication (Ibid.). Mall (2000) has said that in the spirit of intercultural philosophy, one should be ready to renounce any perspective of absoluteness, for this would lead to breaking up of communication, especially when differences in approach are involved (p. 347; cited in Ibid.). Referring to Mall’s motto “Einheit angesichts der Vielfalt” (unity in a view of diversity) (Ibid., p. 346), he argues that the minimal ‘consensus’ needed here is simply that communication is meaningful (Thomas, 2003b, p. 145). Thomas expands this principle from a psychological viewpoint to general contexts of intercultural encounters, including intercultural cooperation, as “die Realität interkultureller Begegnung, Kommunikation und Kooperation” (Ibid.). Given the emphasis on flexibility of action in his framework of intercultural competence, and on overcoming of misunderstanding in cross-cultural situations as the aim of the Culture Assimilator method in intercultural training, one may say that Thomas’ interpretation of open-mindedness is largely a cognitive component in intercultural competence geared towards effective understanding of intentions for the purpose of cooperative action.

There may be another position on the quality of open-mindedness, however, that is based on a logic presuming an intrinsic value in the diversity of cultures instead of highlighting cultural differences. Heinz Antor, while sharing a similar concept of culture with Thomas in terms of patterns of thinking and action (Antor, 2007, p. 115), hence cites the philosophy of Charles Taylor, who suggests it makes sense “to demand as a matter of right that we approach the study of certain cultures with a presumption of their value” (Taylor, 1994, pp. 68-69; cited in Antor, 2007, p. 116). Antor (2007) argues that a view of the anthropological basis for cultural diversity would help to mitigate the concept of otherness, for mutual understanding, or even
communication itself, is unthinkable with a radically ontological other imagined as sharing little in common (p. 116). He acknowledges however that such a rational form of the cognitive component in open-mindedness is no guarantee for positive effects, and hence adds that an affective component in open-mindedness has to be cultivated through benevolent intercultural encounters (Ibid.).

Instead of emphasising how open-mindedness may lead to flexibility in intercultural exchange, Antor argues that intercultural competence in intercultural dialogue should mean not only being open and tolerant towards the other, but also, paradoxically as it may sound, being committed to one’s own position (cf. Buber, 1965; cited in Gudykunst, 2003, p. 393) and representing one’s own identity while opening up to the other (Antor, 2007, p. 118). Intercultural dialogue, he reasons, requires two sides or more, hence intercultural competence in this context should not be a wrongly motivated act of mimicry to adapt fully into the other culture, for that would be as absurd for a dialogue as a xenophobic rejection of the other (Ibid.).

Another cognitive component of intercultural competence would involve reflexivity. Reflexivity in the sociological perspective of Giddens would refer not only to self-consciousness but also to the monitored character of practices as part of social life (Giddens, 1993, p. 90). He has argued that it is a quality built into the system, whereby the “[c]ontinuity of practices presumes reflexivity, but reflexivity in turn is possible only because of the continuity of practices that makes them distinctively ‘the same’ across space and time (Ibid.).” In modernity, however, reflexivity extends into the core of the self, for unlike in traditional cultures where things stayed more or less the same at the collective level from generation to generation, the self in modernity has to be explored and constructed in connection with social change. One may therefore argue in a transcultural model of society that reflexivity is already an in-built process. Under an intercultural model, however, one assumes cultures as closed systems of orientation, and the quality of reflexivity or reflexionsfähigkeit in one’s rationality would refer instead to reflections on cultural differences as part of intercultural learning, under the model of Culture Assimilator as will be discussed in detail in the next subsection.

The aspect of intercultural competence best associated with the affective dimension would be empathy. The word ‘empathy’ has been traced back to its Greek origin as
empathia, meaning insight into another person’s reactions, but the concept referred to as Einfühlung, came from the theory of Theodor Lipps around 1900, which was used to explain how people experience inanimate objects or understand the mental states of other people (Rasoal et al, 2011 p. 2). This was also applied to philosophical and psychological analysis of aesthetic experiences. In the definition of developmental psychologist Martin Hoffman, it is an emotional response involving “psychological processes that make a person have feelings that are more congruent with another’s situation than with his own situation” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 30). For social psychologist Mark H. Davis, it is a multi-dimensional phenomenon of feeling similar feelings as the other, having feelings of empathic concern, and understanding the other (Davis, 1994; cited in Rasoal et al, 2011, p. 4).

Although empathy research would have important implications for intercultural interaction, it seems to have focused almost exclusively on empathic ability among individuals of the same ethnic or cultural background (see Rasoal et al, 2011, p. 2). In a rare exception, the term ‘ethnocultural empathy’ has also been coined by Wang et al (2003) with regards to the challenge of cultural differences. They postulate that ethnocultural empathy has four components, namely intellectual empathy, communicative empathy, ethnocultural empathy, and acceptance of cultural differences (see Rasoal et al, 2011, pp. 6-7). These involve the theoretical aspect of considering an individual within his cultural context, the need to control one’s prejudices, and practical experiences of contact (Ibid.).

In relation to the issue of how art forms or intangible heritage such as dance may be used as a medium to develop empathy for intercultural dialogue, there is much room that may be explored in psychology of aesthetics. It would suffice for now to point out that artistic activities can generate psychological functions and hence mediate to shape individuals’ thinking, according to the Activity Theory as cited by Ratner (1996, p. 414). Incidentally, some concept of empathy has also been discussed in a phenomenological approach to intersubjectivity, though some of the most far-reaching phenomenological analyses of intersubjectivity actually go beyond this question of empathy (Zahavi, 2001, p. 153).

Another related dimension of intercultural competence would be Belastbarkeit or resilience, which has been cited by Heinz Antor (2007) as important especially in the
case of dissent or the threat of conflicts, as there may be tendency to idealise intercultural exchange before one experiences the complex reality (p. 117). One therefore has to be cognitively informed and affectively equipped for such realism as part of one’s competence (Ibid.).

But if the discussion thus far renders the impression that the challenge of intercultural dialogue is mainly geared towards a thematic concern with ‘cultural differences’, one should note that one of the ‘key competence areas’ for intercultural dialogue as cited in the 2008 White Paper takes a more universal outlook of empowerment for all – it speaks of education for democratic citizenship, involving, *inter alia*, “civic, history, political and human-rights education, education on the global context of societies and on cultural heritage […] particularly the capacity for reflection and the self-critical disposition necessary for life in culturally diverse societies” (Council of Europe, 2008, p. 29).

In this regard, one may consider the relevance of competence for intercultural dialogue from a more universal and less static perspective of moral psychology like that discussed by Kohlberg (1999) regarding “culturally universal stages of moral judgment” (p. 50) based on a psychological theory of development derived from Piaget on the claim “that both logic and morality develop through stages and that each stage is a structure which, formally considered, is in better equilibrium than its predecessor” (p. 52). ‘Equilibrated moral judgments’ as such involve principles of justice or fairness, which Kohlberg allies with the ethics of Kant and Rawls (p. 53). Hence according to Kohlberg, one progresses from a ‘preconventional level’ of the child oriented towards punishment-and-obedience followed by an instrumental-relativist attitude, to another two stages of ‘conventional level’, and finally to the autonomous level with social contract legalistic orientation in Stage 5 and universal-ethical-principle orientation in Stage 6, governed by a role-taking according to the Golden Rule (p. 63). However, a more recent perspective of social domain theory has departed from Kohlberg’s and Piaget’s description of moral development in terms of increasing differentiation between moral and non-moral concepts, by proposing that moral, conventional and psychological domains are separate developmental systems which are self-regulating (Smetana, 1999, online). This perspective would focus on experiential origins in the construction of knowledge in morality.
3.2.2 Culture Assimilator training for intercultural understanding

This subsection will provide an overview of the psychological principles behind the model of the Culture Assimilator which has been developed as a tool in intercultural communication to help stimulate intercultural learning. Its strengths and limitations in training intercultural competence will be discussed, along with the question of how or in what sense it may be adapted for the purpose of this thesis in helping to enhance intercultural dialogue with the medium of cultural heritage.

It will be argued that this framework is useful as a heuristic model for the discussion of cultural differences which may be perceived by members of different cultures in a form of ‘folk psychology’, but one needs to be careful with the assumption that cultural differences can be deduced from actors’ behaviour in cross-cultural situations as being representative of their cultural systems. It will be discussed as to what aspects of intercultural competence connected with the Cultural Assimilator are most relevant to the process of intercultural dialogue and what perspectives remain beyond the scope of this framework.

The basic principle of the ‘Culture Assimilator’ is about training a person to make proper attributions on behaviour observed in a different cultural group out of multiple possibilities. This involves exercises in interpreting the cultural standards of an unfamiliar culture on the examples of different cross-cultural situations, which have been collected through interviews and presented in text form as training material.

The Culture Assimilator, otherwise known as the Intercultural Sensitizer (ICS), has apparently been “exposed to the most intense scrutiny and analysis and has repeatedly demonstrated positive impact on people’s cognitive, affective, and behavioural processes” (Cushner and Landis, 1996, p. 185), in short the three domains, which intercultural training generally aims to influence as part of its overall goals. ‘Positive impact’ here refers to various aims of intercultural training, which includes not only the attempts to help people communicate more effectively, but also to help people deal with stresses that accompany intercultural encounters, to enable people to develop and maintain interpersonal relationships with those of a different background, and to enable people to accomplish tasks that they set out to do in a new setting (Ibid.). It hence goes beyond what one may consider as the main
challenge of intercultural dialogue as a form of open exchange for mutual understanding, and is centred on personal development in an unfamiliar environment.

The efficacy of the Cultural Assimilator would be better appreciated when placed in the context of different models in training intercultural behaviour as discussed in the field of intercultural communication. Following the conceptualisations of intercultural training in an overview by Brislin, Landis and Brandt (1983), intercultural behaviour is considered as “an action that can produce significant change in the judgments of the actor’s social or skill competence” (Landis and Bhagat, 1996, p. 2), whereby such changes might be positively or negatively reinforced through the process of interacting with people of different cultural backgrounds. One framework compares distal-proximal views of intercultural behaviour, whereby the most proximate set of variables influencing intercultural behaviour is made up of image of the self, abilities and aptitudes, personality traits and so on; social-psychological related variables then includes constructions of the in-group and the out-group, norms and roles; most distal would be cultural variation including dimensions such as individualism-collectivism and power distance, as discussed by Hofstede or Triandis (Ibid., pp. 2-3). Another framework presented by Landis and Bhagat (1996) includes the potency and direction of influences in a complex of variables. This includes the three dispositional components, namely the affective, cognitive and behavioural, jointly predictive of a characteristic called arousal seeking (Ibid., p, 5). The latter is also influenced by what they call centrality of goals, which has its theoretical origin partly in Bem’s work (1967) suggesting that cognitive dissonance effect only occurs when behaviour is viewed as a central part of self-perception (Ibid., p. 4). Landis and Bhagat also modify a formula by Triandis (1977) on behavioural intention, such that it becomes a function of past experiences of the individual, the affective responses to both the behaviour and the target, as well as the extent to which the behaviour is consonant with the self-image or centrality of goal and the level of desired arousal seeking (Ibid., p. 6).

Based on this framework by Landis and Bhagat and their classification of cross-cultural training into different emphases on changes in people’s thinking (cognitions), changes in people’s affective reactions (feelings), and changes in people’s behaviour (Ibid., p. 10), the Culture Assimilator approach is seen to fit in best with cognitive goals, though such an assignment may also arguably be considered an over-
simplification (Ibid., p. 8). As will be explained, the strategic goal of the Culture Assimilator is to improve intercultural understanding by making ‘isomorphic attributions’, but it has also been argued that this has positive impact in the affective and behavioural dimensions too.

The Culture Assimilator as a cross-cultural training strategy is based on a critical incident approach which may be traced back to the 1950s technique first described by John Flanagan. The critical incident technique consists of a set of procedures for collecting direct observations of human behaviour in order “to facilitate their potential usefulness in solving practical problems and developing broad psychological principles” (Flanagan, 1954, online, p. 1). An ‘incident’ refers to any observable human activity that is “sufficiently complete in itself to permit inferences and predictions to be made about the person performing the act” (Ibid.), whereas being ‘critical’ means the incident must occur “in a situation where the purpose or intent of the act seems fairly clear to the observer and where its consequences are sufficiently definite to leave little doubt concerning its effects” (Ibid.). The Culture Assimilator subsequently involves the use of critical incidents as short vignettes or accounts on interaction between individuals from different cultures with the intent of pursuing some common goal. Trainees reading these scripted accounts of situations are presented with a number of alternatives to explain the problem, and are asked to select the one that best explains the problem from the other’s point of view (Cushner and Landis, 1996, p. 185). The work of Andrea Müller and Alexander Thomas in Interkulturelles Orientierungstraining für die USA (1991) is an example of such training material developed in Germany, following studies by Thomas and others on Youth Exchange Programmes in the 1980s (Moosmüller and Schönhuth, 2009, p. 214).

The development of Culture Assimilator as a training tool in intercultural communication may be traced back to the University of Illinois in 1962, where researchers led by Larry Stoulrow, working with Osgood, Fiedler and Triandis, proposed the creation of a computer programme to provide cross-cultural training to students, and the term ‘Culture Assimilator’ was hence proposed (Cushner and Landis, 1996, p. 185). The first assimilator developed was to address communication and interaction between Arab and American students. Arab students were asked to relate a variety of culture clashes they had encountered with their American peers.
and to explain the problem to the best of their perspective, whereas American students were then asked to review the incidents and to explain them from their perspective. Episodes were hence constructed with four or five alternative explanations or attributions, one of them provided by the Arab respondents and the rest mostly presented by American respondents; such has been the general format for most Culture Assimilators (Ibid.).

Osgood (1977) and Triandis (1972) suggest that the greatest problems in intercultural understanding and communication occur at the level of people’s subjective cultural differences, for unlike what they refer to as ‘objective elements of culture’ such as artefacts, food and clothing which are relatively easy to visualise and analyse, “intangible elements of a group of people [such as] values, attitudes, and norms of behaviour” are more difficult to visualise and analyse (Ibid.). The behaviour of other people can seem meaningless when one has no adequate knowledge of the cultural context, and hence one may misunderstand the reasons or motivations for people’s behaviour, or in another words make wrong attributions (Ibid.) A main goal under the Culture Assimilator is hence for people to make isomorphic attributions, or similar judgments about the causes of another’s behaviour (Ibid.).

The term attribution in social psychology refers to the “process of assigning a cause to our own behaviour, and that of others” (Hogg and Vaughan, 2008, p. 80). There are several main theoretical perspectives in the general body of attribution theory, the earliest being that of Fritz Heider (1958), who held that people are intuitive psychologists or ‘naïve psychologists’ in constructing causal theories of human behaviour (Ibid.). Heider made an important distinction between ‘internal (or dispositional) attribution’ and ‘external (or situational) attribution’, as he believed that people distinguish between personal factors (eg. personality, ability) and environmental factors (eg. situations, social pressure) (Ibid., p. 81; Thomas, 1991, p. 176).

The attribution process is subject to bias, and one of the best known thereof is correspondence bias, also called the fundamental attribution error, as originally identified by Ross (1977), referring to a tendency for people to make dispositional attributions for others’ behaviour even when there are clear external or environmental causes (Hogg and Vaughan, 2008, p. 91; Thomas, 1991, p. 178).
Pettigrew (1979) has suggested that the fundamental attribution error may emerge in a slightly different form in intergroup contexts where groups are making attributions on ingroup and outgroup behaviour, and he calls this the ultimate attribution error. He argues that negative negative outgroup behaviour is dispositionally attributed, whereas positive outgroup behaviour is externally attributed or explained away in other ways to preserve an unfavourable outgroup image (Hogg and Vaughan, 2008, p. 98). Such bias in attribution is also closely related to another form of bias, namely essentialism, as discussed by Haslam, Rothschild and Ernst (1998) and by Medin and Ortony (1989), referring to a pervasive “tendency to consider behaviour to reflect underlying and immutable, often innate, properties of people or the groups they belong to” (Ibid., p. 92).

Alexander Thomas has emphasised that Kulturstandards or cultural standards - a term apparently borrowed from cognitive anthropologist Ward Goodenough (1964) for the framework of Culture Assimilator (Moosmüller and Schönhuth, 2009, p. 214) - are hypothetical constructs. They are useful as such in critical interaction situations, whereby interaction partners from a different background may not behave in ways as expected by someone who is socialised in different values and norms (Thomas, 2011, p. 108). He recognises that globalisation has led to diversity in ways of life and what some refer to as hybrid culture, but points out the challenge of an Überschneidungssituation or cross-cultural situation for people who have not experienced similar challenges in monocultural conditions (Ibid., pp. 104-105). Under such circumstances, a tool like the Culture Assimilator can help one understand happenings and interactive behaviour by finding proper causal attribution, as to why things occur in a particular way in the social environment, and final attribution, as to what goals the interaction partners may be following (Müller and Thomas, 1991, p. 9).

Müller and Thomas have also remarked with regards to their training programme as an example of Culture Assimilator that to enhance its effectiveness, the critical interaction situations presented in the form of ‘multiple choice’ may be further used as basis for role play or group discussion (Ibid., p. 12). Secondly, given that the Culture Assimilator method seeks to emphasise the difference between cultures, one would also need to moderate that by discussing commonalities or similarities between the cultures, in order to lessen the divide between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Ibid.). Thirdly, such training should not be limited to acquaintance with an unfamiliar cultural
orientation system, it should also help stimulate reflection on one’s own cultural
orientation system, as part of awareness on cultural differences; activities of role play
and simulation would hence be meaningful in complementing an otherwise purely
cognitive approach of the Culture Assimilator (Ibid.). Fourthly, it is noted that the use
of such training material may trigger off culture shock, such that the trainees may
experience a sense of insecurity and anxiety as what they have assumed to be valid
ways of behaviour, strategies, values and norms are suddenly put into question
(Ibid.), and hence a trainer would have to be able to recognise and deal with such
reactions, and group work may also be more conducive.

Thomas cites Fiedler et al (1971) in the following criteria that critical interaction
situations should fulfil as material for the Culture Assimilator: it should be a quotidian,
authentic situation of encounter between two or more persons of different cultural
backgrounds; it should be experienced as a situation of conflict or a situation that is
incomprehensible; it should be able to be interpreted with the help of knowledge on
the target culture, that is the conflict should be based on cultural differences; it
should be easily described, not too complicated and should be restricted to a
particular area or topic; there should be sufficient background knowledge for the
situation to be grasped; the situation should be typical and plausible (Thomas, 2011,
pp. 102-103). Thomas suggests that based on experience, around 30 interviews on
critical interaction situations would be sufficient to cover the range of situations, any
number higher than that would not yield noteworthy addition of information, the
accounts would just seem repetitive (Ibid., p. 109).

The “Culture Assimilator” approach of Alexander Thomas may be considered as a
‘culture-specific assimilator’, in contrast to ‘culture-general assimilators’ as
developed by Brislin and others, which are meant to prepare individuals for
intercultural encounters with people from a variety of backgrounds. However, as
mentioned, Thomas’ approach emphasises that it serves to develop reflection on
one’s cultural orientations and awareness of cultural differences.

There has been various attempts to expand this approach for wider applications in
intercultural dialogue, judging from the work in Psychologie des interkulturellen
Dialogs (2008) edited by Alexander Thomas. The definition of culture here appears
not to be tied particularly to ethnicity as such, but more heuristic as a concept, with
the flexibility of being tied alternatively to a national culture, a religion or even a
corporate culture. Stögbauer and Müller (2008) for example use the framework to
discuss ‘interreligious competence’ for intercultural dialogue, whereby sensibility and
respect for religious views may be developed (p, 74). It has also been suggested that
Culture Assimilator as a tool for intercultural learning can be used to help create a
space for dialogue in the schools, by combining with interactive activities such as
cross-cultural family exchange and annual events or projects (Ponte, 2008, pp. 98-103), such interaction being arguably important in order to avoid too much emphasis
on cultural differences.

The theoretical framework of Alexander Thomas on intercultural dialogue, centred on
the conceptual too of the Culture Assimilator, is in short built on the following main
premises. Firstly, culture can be seen as an orientation system which is transmitted
from generation to generation, and which influences the values and the actions of
the members of the relevant group or community. Secondly, cultural differences
manifest in situations of intercultural encounters whereby actions of people
according to their own cultural standards may be misunderstood or not attributed
properly. This is due to the lack of similar contexts and hence the lack of mutual
expectations, which in the words of Parsons et al (1953, p. 35ff; cited in
Vanderstraeten, 2002, p. 79) would be the problem of ‘complementarity of
expectations’ which social interaction is dependent on. Thirdly, the Culture
Assimilator as a tool may help train one to recognise and assimilate an orientation
system different from one’s own, through exercises in making proper attributions.
Finally, given that intercultural dialogue is the interaction between people of different
cultural communities for the purpose of mutual understanding, the Culture
Assimilator can help facilitate conditions for such exchange by training aspects of
intercultural competence such as open-mindedness, reflexivity, flexibility and
resilience.

The critique by Mall (2003) among others on Thomas’ perspective of intercultural
dialogue based on a framework of intercultural competence has been mentioned in
the preceding subsection. But there are further problems to be resolved with such an
approach to intercultural dialogue, when the approach of Culture Assimilator is used
to frame the problem of cultural differences that are to be overcome through training
of intercultural competence. One may begin by looking at difficulties or gaps at a
theoretical level as one attempts to reconcile this framework with Luhmann’s theory of self-referential system, which Thomas (2008) has cited as relevant for intercultural dialogue.

The main incongruity comes from the fact that a self-referential system according to Luhmann’s Systems Theory is constituted not of persons but of processes of communication, as a closed system of meanings (Luhmann, 1995, p. 37), whereas culture in Thomas’ Cultural Assimilator model is an orientation system imagined as being internalised by each member in the cultural group, implying that each person becomes a unit as carrier of the culture. Thomas (2011) considers cultural standards as highly generalised and culturally specific ‘dispositions’ which are ‘internalised’ and hence influence the evaluation and the steering of actions by the individuals (p. 108). The perspective of Luhmann’s self-referential system suggests that individuals, which are not elements of any system as such, would by default play multiple roles in different systems; this hence accommodates the imagination and operation of both transcultural and multicultural systems at the same time without affecting the unity of any cultural system. The model of the Culture Assimilator however may lean towards a perspective of individuals as members of a uniform and bounded cultural group, by assuming that they behave according to the same unity of cultural standards in an orientation system.

Thomas prefers to explain any variation in behaviour not in terms of situations or social roles, but by postulating ‘central’ cultural standards as regulating wide-ranging areas of one’s thinking, evaluation and actions, whereas ‘peripheral’ cultural standards only have regulating functions for particular situations or certain groups of persons (Ibid.). The main assumption under this model is that people have different cultural standards due to different socialisation, but it too easily labels people by their ethnicity or country or origin, with little attention as to how people vary regionally or how people may have been socialised in culturally diverse environments. Thomas himself appears to concede that his framework is designed for a pragmatic purpose mainly to help people of a monocultural background who need to encounter a cultural environment of another country (Ibid., pp. 104-105). This model may hence lend itself to easy stereotyping of people identified as a certain cultural group, which is especially problematic considering Thomas’ (2003a, 2011) simultaneous use of two definitions of culture – one may unwittingly tend to ‘understand’ members of the
other culture as mere products moulded in culture as an ‘orientation system’ in the Parsonian sense, while considering oneself as a free agent in culture as a ‘field of actions’ in the sense of Boesch.

Another issue is that the way intercultural dialogue is theorised in his intercultural competence framework does not seem to factor in the dynamics of cultural meanings between individuals and groups. Thomas has acknowledged that in analysing the conditions for intercultural dialogue from a psychological point of view, the observation is not to be limited to dialogue between two persons, as it involves also dialogue between groups and within groups (Thomas, 2008, pp. 20). However, the Culture Assimilator has largely been conceived around face-to-face interactions between two persons in cross-cultural situations or kulturelle Überschneidungssituationen (Thomas, 2011, p. 103). Minimally echoing Luhmann’s concept of interpenetration between systems, Thomas has also spoken of dynamics within the ‘intercultural’ as an area of intersection between culture of one’s ‘own’ (Das Eigene) and of the ‘other’ (Das Fremde), in terms of what is observed in cross-cultural situations (Ibid.). But Thomas’ emphasis in intercultural dialogue seems tied to a narrow interpretation of Mead’s theory of symbolic interactionism, in terms of the ‘subjective’ manners in which persons and situations are defined by the communicators in interaction (Thomas, 2008, p. 16). In fact, his basic framework of intercultural competence appears to justify itself philosophically by citing Mead’s conception of the self, whereby the ‘I’ consists of the response of the individual to attitudes of the others, the individual’s action against the social situation (Mead, 1934, p. 175). Borrowing from Mead, Thomas (1991) propagates the ultimate aim of social psychology as the development of the strength of the ‘I’ and the promotion of a conscious and reflexive integration in society (p. 11). Instead of exploring how symbolic meanings may be modified through social interaction, like in the perspective of Herbert Blumer’s symbolic interactionism, the assumption in such a framework of intercultural competence is that the system of meanings does not change. The assumption in fact seems that there may be two distinct and separate cultural systems that may never change, and the question is simply how an individual can navigate from one to the other with the help of pragmatist knowledge on cultural differences to avoid discomfort in cognition or conflict in action.
On this aspect of cultural differences, one needs to caution that an attempt to deduce ‘cultural standards’ based on critical situations is an oversimplification, omitting the difference between evaluation and valuation which Anderson (1993, p. 5) would identify as distinct aspects, in terms of how people decide if something meets the given standard versus how much cares for the standard in practice. Hence ‘cultural standards’ as observed from behaviour reflect a matter of norms rather than a matter of value rationality, the latter being the real concern in any public policy in the discussion of ‘cultural differences’ especially where it comes to the issue of different moral values. It is not sound to deduce core values of any culture based on observation of a random sample of behaviour among members of a community, instead of considering how cultural values are articulated or institutionalised.

Furthermore, to borrow the sociological expressions of C. Wright Mills, these critical situations remain at the ad hoc level of day-to-day ‘trouble’ and not ‘issues’ where intercultural dialogue is concerned, since they are limited to the character of individuals and their immediate relations with others, and have not transcended into public matters (1959, p. 8). Why is it important to talk about ‘reflexivity’ stimulated by material of the Culture Assimilator, if it is not in the sense of Dewey’s (1932) reflexive morality, for instance? If the result of such reflexivity would be flexibility in action, that may suggest there are no fundamental conflicts and what one learns through the Culture Assimilator is simply instrumental reasoning which has nothing to do with intercultural dialogue as an open exchange of views.

It may hence be more useful to think of the function of Culture Assimilator as giving confidence to people who need to work in a different cultural environment and prefer to maintain some sense of control by keeping to one’s centre in what Thomas calls an ‘orientation system’ for actions while assimilating a different system of actions. The ‘reflexivity’ which Thomas refers to as a competence does not imply having to relativise one’s value system like what Milton Bennett suggests in his developmental model, but simply means awareness of cultural differences to help one survive in a different environment through ‘flexibility’ in action. It also has little to do with intercultural dialogue in terms of liberal learning in principle, except it may help build confidence for social interaction with people of a different community and may provide an experiential basis for more interest in intercultural learning.
The Culture Assimilator would therefore be more meaningfully used not as a conceptual tool to derive any cultural standards in a way which may suggest a hierarchy among cultures, but as a training programme or teaching aid to build confidence for intercultural encounters and at the same time direct learners away from forming easy stereotypes about the others’ cultural habits or moral character, while solving day-to-day troubles in dealing with a different set of cultural or social norms.

There are in summary many limitations to Alexander Thomas’ adaptation of the Culture Assimilator framework in an ambition for intercultural dialogue, which will be listed as follows. First of all, the cross-cultural situation as a starting point does not describe a situation of intercultural dialogue with mutual intentions to learn from each other on the basis of mutual respect for each another as rational beings. Instead it takes a behaviourist perspective as it describes a situation where challenge is posed by the lack in mutual expectations of intentions, such that the behaviour of the other tends to appear irrational and is assumed to be a problem of cultural differences. The features of ‘intercultural dialogue’ in Alexander Thomas’ definition basically evolve around situations of face-to-face communication as such (2008, pp. 19-20). Secondly, going beyond such an assumption of cultural differences, there are aspects of intergroup features or social-structural context which may influence attitude and behaviour in intercultural situations, including asymmetry in power relation (Auernheimer, 2007, p. 18). This is not taken into account under the Cultural Assimilator approach, whereby Alexander has preferred to distinguish any variance in behavioural patterns in terms of central and peripheral cultural standards. Thirdly, by attributing differences in behaviour not to other psychological factors of the circumstances but to ‘cultural standards’, this may lend itself to a construction of cultural stereotypes. The circumstances may not only be socially influenced as mentioned in the second point, but also personal. As Searle (2001) has argued, action may be independent of desire, and it may also be caused by a weakness of will which makes it a form of irrationality (p. 24ff). An assumption of ‘orientation system’ for action that lumps beliefs and desires together with internalised dispositions would make no difference between whether an action is rational or irrational, and may even lead to the impression that ‘cultural standards’ of the community in question might well be irrational. Fourthly, the Culture Assimilator has
been developed and applied mainly as a tool to prepare managers who need to work in a foreign environment overseas or to help students who need to encounter peers who have come from a different background, hence the assumption is one of distinct or different national or organisational cultures which have never mixed or established any pattern of interaction. It may be more relevant for those who come from a predominantly monocultural background than those who already grow up socialising with people of other cultural communities; its application in Singapore for instance would have to be justified for the Chinese community as a dominant ethnicity which can easily live according to its own cultural standards with little need to accommodate perspectives of other communities. Fifthly, the Culture Assimilator highlights encounters that reveal cultural differences which imply the need for reflexivity in cognition and flexibility in the norms or habits of action on an individual level as contingency to minimise conflicts in situations. It does not focus so much on competence in open-minded dialogue on a community level for future-oriented mutual understanding in moral decisions or cultural practices. ‘Cultural standards’ in this framework are simply accepted contingently into one’s own orientation system for the sake of functions in social or business life, instead of becoming an issue for exchange of views and progress of society. It reduces ‘dialogue’ from the challenge of resolving differences in cultural values to one of communication in instrumental values. Sixthly, this is a learning tool for a one-sided classroom setting rather than a real-life situation, which means it may prepare a participant for possible scenarios through pragmatist knowledge, but it has not opened up to the possibility of exchange in alternative views from both sides in intercultural learning. Seventhly, it focuses on cognitive learning of behavioural action, not on cultural expressions and meanings, and also omits the affective aspect in intercultural learning, for instance through arts education, which may help promote empathy across cultural communities. This aspect will incidentally have to be explored with cultural heritage and expressions on the example of dance in this thesis.

Lastly, a key aspect remaining is that the original Culture Assimilator in fact is arguably useful as an approach with much potential for investigating cross-cultural situations where misunderstanding often occur. Through interviews with members of the other culture, one may be able to discover a range of different explanations for similar behaviour, which may be attributed to circumstantial factors of the situation,
to the social role of the person, or simply personality which varies among individuals; one may even be able to discover very different behaviour by members of the other culture in the same situation, hence debunking any stereotype, if one does not assume situations of misunderstanding as the norm.

The biggest problem with Alexander Thomas’ re-interpreting of the Culture Assimilator is that he has taken the feature which is the greatest asset in the approach, and turned into a liability. Instead of attempting to diffuse typical actions into different possible explanations, he has latched on to a Parsonian grand theory of culture as ‘orientation system’ and used it to characterise people of certain cultural groups identified by default according to their nationalities or ethnicities. This may lead to a danger of producing a new racist discourse that is transferred from physical traits to “cultural norms, values, traditions and lifestyles of outsiders” (Lentin and Titley, 2012, p. 50), which would run counter to the liberal spirit in intercultural dialogue.

The most interesting contribution which Alexander Thomas (2011) has introduced to the study of critical incidents is his suggestion to validate findings with ‘external experts’ that may relate historical development in political, religious or social aspects (pp. 110-112). However, the problem is that this procedure involves a certain characterisation of culture in dispositions of thinking and actions already assumed as representative of the community, without questioning who should be speaking for the culture.

To avoid unnecessary stereotyping, it would be more meaningful if cross-cultural situations can be studied instead using a strategy along the lines of anthropologists Geertz and Abu-Lughod in an ethnographical approach focusing on the particular and the polysemic. The coherence of culture needs to be deconstructed, one way being through a re-interpretation of history. Beyond that, it would be more useful to find practical application of cross-cultural situations not by deducing ‘cultural standards’ postulated as ‘internalised dispositions’ of the other, but by using these as references for dialogue to discuss ‘intercultural standards’ in particular situations. Chapter 6 of this thesis will attempt to demonstrate how some of these ideas of modification to the Culture Assimilator may be applied to situations involving intercultural communication in cultural heritage.
4. NEED FOR INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE IN SINGAPORE AS A CULTURALLY DIVERSE NATION

The preceding chapter has considered intercultural dialogue as a form of policy approach, in relation to its goal in social cohesion and an ideal of value pluralism which may lean towards premises of liberalism. It has also analysed the process of intercultural dialogue as a form of intercultural communication where cognitive and affective aspects like open-mindedness, reflexivity and empathy may be desirable.

The first half of this chapter will begin with a consideration of how the distinction of cultural communities in a multicultural system of society from a transcultural system, may be understood as a form of socially constructed knowledge. Both of these models may hence be accommodated under a constructivist perspective whereby cultural communities reproduce themselves as what Luhmann refers to as self-referential systems. These two models may however imply different ways of imagining intercultural dialogue, with emphasis on ‘understanding’ and respecting another culture in a multicultural model where differences in cultural identities are salient, and emphasis on participation and creativity in a transcultural model where the community transcends cultural differences.

Considering the challenge of increasing cultural diversity in a nation, the chapter will then consider how the notion of race as basis of identity has been socially constructed, especially as a form of social control in a colonial system. The specific example would be postcolonial Singapore, where the regime has inherited its current race-based classification as a legacy from the British colonial rulers, and propagated such consciousness in a politics of difference under an ideology of ‘multiracial meritocracy’. Furthermore, one will study public policies in Singapore more concretely against ‘measures’ of intercultural dialogue in terms of social cohesion among different cultural communities and open exchange of views in the public spheres. Discussion will also centre on how a description of Singapore based on a scale or spectrum between civic and ethnic nationalism may provide insight on the tension between interests, and how one may go beyond a description of Singapore as prioritising communitarian values over liberal values in its public policies, to analyse what lies within its ‘Asian modern’ ideology and how it is manifested in the socio-political structure. An additional aspect would be the latest challenges in
Singapore with a neoliberal migration policy as part of globalisation, which has led to debates on whether rising opposition voices constitute a form of xenophobia.

4.1 The Social Construction of Cultural Communities

4.1.1 Society in a Transcultural System as distinct from a Multicultural System

This section will introduce the concept of ‘transculturality’, as an alternative imagination of modern culture with all its differentiation and complexity under globalisation (Welsch, 1999, 2012), and as an alternative model for promoting dialogue. It will also discuss observations in social psychology of the ‘plural’ or ‘postmodern’ self which may support such a model for the understanding of how culture as a system functions across socially ascribed boundaries among communities. In order to accommodate multicultural as well as transcultural perspectives on what intercultural dialogue should entail, this chapter will begin with a discussion on how Luhmann’s constructivist perspective in his Theory of Self-referential Systems can provide an overall conceptual framework here.

As a most important social theorist of the 20th century though relatively unknown in the Anglo-Saxon world, Niklas Luhmann has been noted for his unique contribution in a systems theory that characterises modern society in terms of social differentiation and system formation, whereby one takes a post-ontological position that questions the distinction between the natural sciences and the humanities (2002, pp. 68-69). Taking positions that swing between realism and radical constructivist, he has suggested that a knowing system has no entry to the external world but one may as well claim the external world as it is, since “there is no way of deciding between them” (Luhmann, 1990, p. 67; cited in Christis, 2001, p. 329). What he offers effectively is a pluralistic solution to the mind-body dualism (Moeller, 2012; cited in Lee, D.B., 2012, p. 479). There are also major implications on an epistemological level with Luhmann shifting the traditional unit of sociological analysis from the individual actor to differentiated social systems, in a theory which has provided a way to understand various aspects of social life ranging from the financial crisis, the mass media, to the ‘plurality and incommensurability’ of meaning in contemporary society (Ibid.).
The significance of Luhmann to this thesis may be best appreciated by considering his model on the constitution of social systems as an innovative departure from Parsons’ theory, which has been criticised by Wrong (1961) as an ‘oversocialised conception of man’, contrary to a Freudian view that man is never a fully socialised creature. The context of this cultural determinism in Parsons is his classical solution for the problem of ‘double contingency’, related to the analysis in *Toward a General Theory of Social Action* (Parsons and Shils, 1951) on the neo-Kantian, transcendental question of minimal conditions for social stability (see Vanderstraeten, 2002, p. 81). The problem is how the ego and the alter are able to anticipate each other’s expectations and actions, to which the assumed answer is that available options “have some measure of stability in two respects: first, as realistic possibilities for alter, and second, in their meaning to ego” (Parsons and Shils, 1951, p. 105; cited in Vanderstraeten, 2002, p. 81). The further presupposition is that the actions, gestures or symbols hold a function transcending particular situations of interaction, such that one may speak of “a common culture existing between them, through which their interaction is mediated” (Ibid.; cited in Vanderstraeten, 2002, p. 82).

Separately, Parsons writes that the “most important single condition of the integration of an interaction system is a shared basis of normative order” (1968, p. 437; cited in Vanderstraeten, 2002, p. 82), which he equates with ‘a common culture’. Parsons also emphasises elsewhere on the regulative role of culture and the importance of “socialisation to the grounds of consensus” (1966, p. 14; cited in Vanderstraeten, 2002, p. 83). In short, Parsons employs a ‘negative’ conception of double contingency, as Vanderstraeten (2002, p. 83) notes, one identified with the non-social or non-adapted which has to be eliminated through values and norms.

It is exactly such a negative constitution of interaction that Luhmann refers to when he questions in *Soziale Systeme* (1984): “Is it enough to conceive social order as a boycotting of boycotting, or must one not know from the beginning how it is generally possible and sufficiently probable? (English: *Social Systems*, 1995, p. 116; cited in Vanderstraeten, 2002, p. 83)” Luhmann would look instead on positive aspects of double contingency, arguing that this cannot be eliminated if social interaction is conceived as the encounter between the ego and the alter as two autonomous systems. His critique is also directed against the work of George H. Mead as founder of symbolic interactionism, whereby the problem of contingency is addressed only.
from one side of the interaction, confined to the ego’s actions, reflections and expectations, assuming that the same is true on the other side (Vanderstraeten, 2002, p. 85). To Luhmann, the solution to the double contingency problem does not lie in human nature, social consensus or cultural value with prior validity, but within the chance of meaningful selection:

What the experience of contingency achieves is the constitution and opening up of chance for conditioning functions within the system, thus, the transformation of chance into structural probabilities. Everything else is a question of selecting what proves its worth and what has further usefulness.

(1995, p. 120; cited in Vanderstraeten, 2002, p. 87)

In short, Parsons’ and Luhmann’s accounts of double contingency diverge as the former considers the ego and the alter as solving the problem not by communication, but by introspection (Vanderstraeten, 2002, p. 88). Furthermore, Parsons considers the constitution of social system as bound to cultural forms manifested in normative order, maintained through the mechanisms of socialisation and internalisation, whereas social systems in Luhmann’s theory consist of communications, not of human beings (Ibid.), and human beings as psychic systems also have an autonomy in selectivity that allows them not to accept what is communicated or how it is communicated (Ibid., p. 89). Hence whereas Parsons’ account may lead to a deterministic, monolithic and bounded view of culture when adapted in a conceptualisation of ‘orientation system’ under the Culture Assimilator framework, the theoretical formulation of Luhmann is free from such limitations as it provides an account of social systems as “a reality sui generis” (Ibid., p. 89).

In Luhmann’s theoretical perspective, a social system comes about through the capability of producing relations to itself and of differentiating these relations from relations with the environment (1993, p. 31). The notion of self-reference according to him describes a unity of processes and elements within a system for itself, independent of the observation by others (Ibid., p. 58). The system is nevertheless a construction, as the observed distinction between self-reference and reference on the other does not exist in the environment at large, but only in the system itself (Luhmann, 1996, p. 6 f; cited in Berghaus, 2011, p.45). In Luhmann’s perspective on how the world is constructed, meanings are made out of such differentiation in the

The versatility in Luhmann’s theory of self-referential system lies in short in moving away from Parsons’ constitution of social system in action or interaction and his reliance on a cultural explanation for normative aspects of the actions, to situate the constitution of systems instead in the communication of meanings. He is hence able to combine both psychic and social systems in a perspective of “psychic systems constituted on the basis of a unified (self-referential) nexus of conscious states, and social systems constituted on the basis of a unified (self-referential) nexus of communications” (1995, p. 59). Psychic and social systems are thus considered as evolving together in a common achievement of ‘meaning’ (Ibid.). Referring to what in general systems theory is already spoken of as ‘mutualistic’ or ‘dialogical’ constitution, he argues that the mechanism involves coordination by means of communication which is not to be equated with social action (p. 138). Communication is also not to be understood with the usual metaphor of transmission which involves too much ontology (p. 139). Instead, he adapts what Karl Bühler refers to as three ‘performances’ of human language, namely presentation, expression and appeal, into three aspects of selectivity (p. 142). In a somewhat uncustomary way of referring to the addressee as ‘ego’ and the utterer as ‘alter’, Luhmann centres the unity of communication on the observation of alter by ego: “Ego is in a position to distinguish the utterance from what is uttered. If alter knows that he is being observed, he can take over this difference between information and utterance and appropriate it […] to steer the communication process” (p. 143). In short, communication in Luhmann’s perspective is possible “only as a self-referential process” (Ibid.).

Luhmann’s concept of self-referential system, along with his mix of realist and constructivist epistemology, hence lends itself to adaptation for discussion of social groups as a social construction. Hejl (1987), in his reinterpretation of Luhmann, would suggest that a social group as system is constructed by ‘living systems’ which are free in choosing to participate in the constitution of any specific system (p. 326). The assumption is that each living system with its cognitive subsystem would have a
condition that is comparable to those of other group members and from its point of view is interacting in relation to such parallel conditions (p. 319). Without wallowing in problems of ontology, one may take this to suggest, following Luhmann’s abstract model, that human beings as psychic systems are autonomous and can be functioning in connection with different cultural systems at different moments. Culture, conceived as a self-referential system of meanings, works more autonomously unlike in the concept of an ‘orientation system’ which assumes that each person is internalised with certain cultural values through socialisation, as a specimen in the mould of his or her cultural group. With this new and more flexible model of culture, one may say that participation in a multicultural or a transcultural system is more a matter of one’s construction. Such a model is also supported by psychological theories that suggest the existence of the plural self.

Before discussing what implications this holds for intercultural dialogue, it is necessary to delve into what ‘transculturality’ means. The concept has notably been propagated by Wolfgang Welsch based on a doubt as to whether ‘interculturality’ is the right concept for the intention of dialogues under conditions today (Welsch, 1994, p. 147). He argues that instead of what one has always imagined as national or regional cultures, there are diverse ways of life nowadays, with cultures after the end of traditional cultures that do not follow the boundaries of the old cultures but cut across them, hence the term ‘transculturality’ (Ibid., pp. 147-148).

Welsch argues that the traditional concept of single cultures, like what developed in the late 18th century by Johann Gottfried Herder, has become untenable, for modern societies are very differentiated within themselves, and the imagination of cultures as closed spheres or autonomous islands are highly fictional. He also criticises interculturality for being unable to arrive at any solution, as the separatist character of cultures remains the problem; and he argues similarly with multiculturality that a mutual understanding or a transgression of separating barriers cannot be achieved. He is for ‘transculturality’, which he describes as “a consequence of the inner differentiation and complexity of modern cultures” (Welsch, 1999, online, emphasis in original), as cultures today are characterised by hybridisation. Transculturality, he says, “is gaining ground moreover not only on the macrocultural level, but also on the individual's micro-level” (Ibid.).
There seems to be support in social psychology for Welsch’s perspective on the level of the individuals. Peter Adler has discussed this phenomenon of the ‘transcultural’ individual (otherwise somewhat confusingly also referred to as the ‘multicultural’ or ‘intercultural’ individual) as a new type of person “whose orientation and view of the world profoundly transcends his or her indigenous culture [...] developing from the complex of social, political, economic, and educational interactions of our time” ([1977] 2002, online). The terminology refers to an individual whose “essential identity is inclusive of different life patterns and who has psychologically and socially come to grips with a multiplicity of realities (Ibid.). The ‘transcultural’ or ‘multicultural’ individual is one with “the experience of having been exposed to and having internalised two or more cultures” (Nguyen and Benet-Martinez, 2010, p. 89), and one may say the individual has a ‘multicultural identity’ when this individual “expresses an attachment with and loyalty to these cultures (Ibid.).

Further to this, Ulric Neisser (1993) has pointed out that the term self may have several meanings, excluding the simplistic notion of an inner self postulated in much folk psychology and in religious traditions in terms of a ‘real me’ responsible for all behaviour, and rejecting also any imagination of the self as a special part of the person or the brain (pp. 3-4). Instead, based on different psychological processes, he identifies the ecological self as the individual considered as “an active agent in the immediate environment” (p. 4), the interpersonal self that is established through face-to-face interaction with others (Ibid.), the conceptual self which depends on cultural forms including expectations and obligations and is derived through reflective self-consciousness (Ibid.), the temporally extended self which is established through the recounting of life narratives to others or oneself (p. 5), and the private self which may be the focus for some people whom Jung would term as introverts (Ibid.).

On the word ‘identity’, a basic distinction has similarly been made in sociology between social identity and self-identity according to the process of identification and relevance, though there have been differing views. Generally, the former refers especially to the characteristics attributed to an individual by others, marking individuals as the same as others, such that there may be collective or shared identities predicated on common goals, values or experiences; whereas the latter refers to the process of self-development through which we formulate a unique
sense of ourselves and our relationship to the world around us (Giddens, 2001, pp. 29-30).

In a different perspective, the social identity may also be considered as inextricably tied to the self-concept instead of being attributed by others. Tajfel has thus defined social identity as “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel, 1981, p. 255). This is a concept at the core of the Social Identity Theory which relates specifically to intergroup relations.

The notion of self-identity draws on theoretical perspectives of symbolic interactionism in relation to the ‘me’ and the ‘I’. This dates back to Mead, who has discussed how the individual becomes a self “in so far as he can take the attitude of another and act toward himself as others act” (Mead, [1934] 1967, p. 171) through a social process of interaction in a group whereby one becomes an object to one’s self. Consciousness of the self is not simply about organic sensations or affective experience, but feeling of the attitude of the other towards oneself, such that the self is essentially a cognitive phenomenon (Ibid., p. 173).

A social constructionist perspective on identity has been applied in psychology as well as cultural studies to consider it as a matter of identity politics. Stuart Hall has analysed identity or the process of identification as a process of articulation or signifying practice subject to the play of difference (Hall, 1996, p. 3), advocating a concept of identity that is “not an essentialist, but a strategic and positional one” (Ibid.; cf. Gergen, 2001, p. 169f). This concept “does not signal that stable core of the self, unfolding from beginning to end through all the vicissitudes of history without change” (Ibid.), nor is it that “collective or true self hiding inside the many other, more superficial or artificially imposed 'selves' which a shared history and ancestry hold in common” (Ibid. pp. 3-4). Hall maintains that identities in late modern times are “increasingly fragmented and fractured, never singular but multiply constructed across different, often intersecting and antagonistic, discourses, practices and positions.” (p. 4). Recognising the role of ‘difference’ in one’s psychic life, whereby “the ‘Other is fundamental to the constitution of the self, to us as subjects” (Hall, 1997b, p. 237), he argues that ‘difference’ as such is ambivalent and “can be positive
and negative" (Ibid., p 238), whereby it may be it used in a racialising discourse of othering, but 'difference' is also needed "because we can only construct meaning through a dialogue with the 'Other' " (p. 235). On the last point, he (Ibid.) cites Mikhail Bakhtin (1935) on how meaning is established and sustained through dialogue.

Such a view on social identity as a process of articulation and dependent on context is vindicated in the study of immigration by way of applied psychology, for instance in the work of Carola Suarez-Orozco (2003). Observing that social spaces are more discontinuous and fractured than ever before for youths in the era of globalisation, she argues that identity formation is not simply a process of passing through different stages to achieve a stable identity, but rather a process that is fluid and contextually driven (p. 3). She cites the example of a person raised in Beijing and discovering that he or she is ‘Asian’ for the first time only at age 30, for the same individual may never have considered his or her racial or ethnic identity within the context of Beijing, only the neighbourhood identity; in the Chinatown of the host society, one’s identity would be one of urban mainland China origin as opposed to Cantonese speakers from Hong Kong, whereas relative to the heartland of the host country, the identity becomes a more complex ‘pan-Asian’ construct (Ibid., pp. 3-4).

The question of ‘transcultural’ or ‘multicultural’ identity is also intertwined with the question of acculturation, which includes not only social affiliation but also language use and value system, among other things. Whereas traditional views of acculturation have asserted that to acculturate means to assimilate, as in a uni-dimensional, one-directional and irreversible process of rejecting one’s ethnic or original culture and adopting the new or dominant culture, a wealth of acculturation studies conducted since the mid-1980s have supported acculturation as a bi-dimensional, two-directional, multi-domain complex process not limited to assimilation into the mainstream culture (Nguyen and Benet-Martinez, 2010, p. 91). There is support for the idea that individuals can simultaneously hold two or more cultural orientations, as provided by socio-cognitive experimental work showing that bicultural individuals shift between cultural orientations in response to cultural cues, a process known as ‘cultural frame-switching’ (Ibid.). Furthermore, perspectives on acculturation do not presuppose that individuals internalise their different cultures
uniformly, given that acculturation may take place in many different domains of lie
including language use or preference, social affiliation, communication style, cultural
identity and pride, and cultural knowledge, beliefs and values (Zane and Mak, 2003,
cited in Ibid.). Nguyen and Benet-Martinez cite the example that a Japanese
American may endorse Anglo-American culture behaviourally and linguistically, yet
remain very ‘Japanese’ in values and attitudes, in terms of ethnic culture; a Mexican
American on the other hand may behave in ways that are predominantly Mexican, as
in Spanish-speaking and living in a largely Mexican neighbourhood, yet displaying
great pride and attachment with American culture (Nguyen and Benet-Martinez,
2010, p. 91).

Hence with such a transcultural outlook, an attempt to adopt framework of culture as
orientation system for behaviour in intercultural communication, as discussed in
Chapters 2 and 3, would have to be modified by postulating that individuals may act
or react according to norms and values of one cultural system or another, depending
on the situation. One may maintain a multicultural framework for the consideration
that there are cultural systems with different values and norms that are in
intersection, but these systems are not embodied in each individual as a single
identity. One may even choose to think of ‘cultural standards’ or even ‘culture’ itself
not as anything with ontological status in itself, but rather as a heuristic or ‘tool for
thinking’ (Scollon et al, 2012, p. 3). The question would not be whether any given
moment is an instance of ‘intercultural communication’, but “what good does it do to
see a given moment of communication as a moment of intercultural communication?
(Ibid., p. 2)”

Welsch’s perspective may in short find support through evidence in social
psychology of transcultural formation of individuals. But instead of emphasising
observation of globalisation trends, he has also gone the other way of insisting that
transculturality is not completely new historically. He criticises Herder’s envisaging of
cultures as closed spheres or autonomous islands, in which each corresponds to a
folk’s territorial area and or language, such that culture is supposed to mould the
whole life of the people concerned. It remains his main argument that the
subsequent multicultural and intercultural models are obsolete and deficient whereby
multiculturalist perspective sees society as being composed of such spheres of
culture while the interculturalist perspective imagines relations as being between
such spheres (Welsch, 2012, p. 32). This would constitute a fundamental argument, preceding an account of the temporal trends of globalisation.

When argued in terms of a manifestation of globalisation, transculturality may be understood not only in terms of the issue of identity but also in terms of boundaries of ‘cultures’ in the sense of anthropology, or in the sense of media communication, may be analysed with the concepts of deterritorialisation and hybridity (Hepp, 2006, p. 64). Deterritorialisation is a term used by many theorists, among them Appadurai (1990) and Featherstone (1995). According to Tomlinson, it involves a sense of ambivalence in cultural condition, not only due to what Auge (1995) describes as ‘non-places’ created by contemporary capitalist modernity, such as airport lounges and supermarkets, as opposed to ‘anthropological places’ that provide cultural and memory through repeated ‘organic’ social interactions like in provincial towns (Tomlinson, 1999, pp. 108-109). It also has much to do with new media technologies availing a range of perspectives on events beyond that of the ‘home culture’, enabling people to situate themselves at a distance from the national or local viewpoint (Ibid., p. 116). Another aspect of deterritorialisation is “the lifting out of locality that occurs in this intertextual realm of the imagination” (Ibid., p. 119) notably with examples of in Hollywood movies and popular television series whereby one relates to environments that one has never experienced at first hand, that exist instead in one’s cultural imagination.

The importance of a historical perspective for deterritorialisation has been emphasised by Tomlinson. Whereas Appadurai has argued, somewhat echoing Welsch’s view, that “natives, people confined to and by the places to which they belong, groups unsullied by contact with a larger world, have probably never existed” (cited in Ibid., p. 129), Tomlinson prefers to argue on the basis of the acceleration of globalisation that deterritorialisation is a valid way of grasping “a mode of cultural experience which is particular to global modernity and distinct from the general properties of fluidity, mobility and interactivity that can be attributed to all historical cultures” (Ibid., p. 130, emphasis in original). Another pertinent aspect of culture under deterritorialisation, as Tomlinson points out, is that it may be uneven in its effects, such that under social differentiations of race, class, gender and age within developed societies, some would clearly “live a deterritorialised culture more intensely, actively and (on balance) enjoyably than others” (Ibid., p. 132).
Another concept related to transculturality is that of cultural hybridisation, which may partly be understood from a deterritorialisation perspective as “the mingling of cultures from different territorial locations brought about by the increasing traffic amongst cultures” (Ibid., p. 142). Canclini (2005) celebrates the notion of hybridisation, which “as a process of intersection and transaction, is what makes it possible for multicultural reality to avoid tendencies toward segregation and to become cross-cultural reality” (p. xxxi). However, Tomlinson (1999) would caution that the very structure of the hybridity argument may summon implicit myths of origins, for hybridity is after all derived from notions of breeding in plants and animals and is carried over to the cultural sphere with negative notions of racial mixing and creolisation (p. 143). Jonathan Friedman (1995) would simply trace the ‘confused essentialisation’ of the discourses of hybridity or creolisation to the inappropriate ‘substantialisation of culture’ in the first place (1995, p. 82). Nederveen Pieterse (1995) suggests that the idea of hybridisation is meaningful only as a critique of essentialism (cited in Tomlinson, 1999, p. 144). The notion of hybrid cultures may otherwise be considered useful more specifically for grasping the new cultural identifications that are emerging, such as in youth culture built around popular music forms like hip-hop (Gilroy, 1993, cited in Ibid., p. 147).

The difference between a multicultural system and a transcultural system, when considered as self-referential systems, basically lies in different boundaries defined according to one’s rationality in relation to values and identity. They may be considered here as two different kinds of social system that reproduce themselves with their own internal logics. Understood in terms of a constructivist social theory, such systems as constructs serve to explain perceptions of social phenomena, and the criteria in testing such a theory lies not in whether it corresponds with ‘the reality’ but in its capacity in problem-solving, its consistency and its linkage with other disciplines (Hejl, 1987, p. 305). Understood at the level of social constructionism which accepts the system as a form of living reality, a social system is constituted and integrated through members who have each cultivated a state of cognitive subsystem at least comparable to that of other group members (Ibid., p. 319). Social systems as such does not consist of closed groups of individuals, for individuals are free to take part in a group or leave without leaving one’s character, and individuals considered as living systems on their own are always part of a number of different
social systems at the same time (Ibid., p. 326). Luhmann has notably stressed that a
social system consists of a network of communication, not of human bodies and
brains (1989, p. 12). Self-reference of elements in a system is ensured through
reproduction of the actions, not reproduction of units like cells, molecules, ideas and
so on (1993, pp. 61-62). Following Luhmann’s argument, action is constituted as
information in a social system by means of communication and attribution of
intentions, hence the fundamental process that produces a social system is one of
communication (Ibid., p. 192).

One may also propose here to understand intercultural dialogue, based on the
paradigm of Luhmann, by considering it on a social level as an interaction system in
which the engines of ‘interpenetration’ are activated, as opposed to the case of
society as a different kind of social system, where communicative events form a self-
referential closure (1995, pp. 416-417). Luhmann would reformulate the
transcendental consciousness of intersubjectivity discussed in a phenomenological
approach under what he calls a psychic system (Ibid., p. 146).

It will be argued here that intercultural dialogue may be seen as involving similar
social processes of interaction or interpenetration in both transcultural and
multicultural contexts but in terms of different system structures, whereby cultural
differences and group identities are salient in a multicultural system but not in a
transcultural system. As suggested above, these systems are constructed by the
observer and the key to a system is the unity of communication, not the fixed
membership of any group. One may therefore imagine a psychic system as co-
situated with a transcultural system when cultural identity is assumed to be irrelevant
to the meanings that it relates to, whereas a multicultural system may come into
picture when one considers two or more systems that are differentiated in cultural
values or meanings, that may come into in interaction. The differentiation in systems
here between the transcultural and the multicultural here should in the first instance
be understood as a construction for explanatory power, as a descriptive statement,
without judgment of ethical superiority in one over the other, or of redundancy in
either model. It simply acknowledges that individuals as psychic systems have an
autonomy and their functioning in different cultural systems of meanings is
contingent and hence there is no need to essentialise individuals as having only
unique memberships in culturally defined groups, or cultural groups as being homogeneous.

It would be argued here that ‘transcultural’, as a description of the social system in which one imagines himself or herself to function in, is as such a term relative to ‘multicultural’. It should not be so understood that being ‘transcultural’ means one is absolutely ‘free’ from any form of belief or valuation, whereas being ‘multicultural’ means one only acts according to cultural values of one's community. One is only ‘transcultural’ in the sense that one decides that the boundaries of the cultural community ascribed to him or her is irrelevant to his or her meaning making. One who imagines himself or herself as ‘transcultural’ may equally be subscribing to some other form of ideology while claiming to renounce any cultural value embedded in a community, just as one who considers himself or herself part of a ‘multicultural’ system may in fact be subject to a similar or different kind of ideology that cuts across cultural differences.

This dualistic perspective is hence neutral in the sense that it accommodates both a policy of multiculturalism as politics of recognition, and a policy of transculturalism promoting interaction that transcends any reification of cultural differences, without assuming that the two are mutually exclusive.

For a perspective of multiculturalism, one may follow the argument of Modood (2007), citing Wittgenstein’s perspective of language-games with overlapping ‘family resemblances’, to emphasise that one can speak of “there being ethnic groups or a cultural plurality without having clear-cut ideas of what is an ethnic group or a culture” (p. 97). Against an argument of Berger and Luckmann (1967) that may suggest any culture and ethnicity per se is no more than a kind of reification, Modood asserts that “ethnic groups are not natural but simply a feature of society and so have no higher – but no lower – ontological status than, say, class or gender” (2007, p. 114), hence there is no need to understand the distinctness of a group either as a fiction or as an essence.” (Ibid.) He adds: “Those who insist that ethnicity, groups and multiculturalism cannot be saved without essentialism, and so must be left behind, are themselves essentialists (Ibid.).”

The issue of multiculturalism has been raised in relation to the politics of recognition, in a theoretical discussion which scholars like Charles Taylor (1992) as well as Axel
Honneth (1992) have traced back to Hegel’s work on dialectical relation particularly in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807), leading to much debate in the 1990s and 2000s on whether individuals and cultural groups alike should be the object of a recognition policy (Seymour, 2010, pp. 1-3). On the concept of ‘recognition’ with its polysemic nature, Seymour cites Ricoeur (2004) who has identified three meanings: firstly, a reference to repeated action of identifying a single object or an individual; secondly, an application to oneself in what one does or in things that others do, providing some continuity in one’s life; thirdly, a reference to mutual acknowledgement that individuals or groups decide to give to one another (see Seymour, 2010, p. 4). It is the third meaning, Seymour points out, that is of interest in the context of multiculturalism, for the first is purely epistemological, the second may have ethical consequences additionally, but the third has a practical dimension and is a moral action with illocutionary force (Ibid.). There is an element of recognition in Habermas’ communicative ethics, to the extent that one speaks of exchange between persons in accordance with normative procedures, whereby protagonists accept dialogue with one another in an ideal communication situation (Ibid., p. 5). But it is in Honneth’s work that the theme of recognition is taken beyond this framework of dialogue, to consider conflicts, power relations and struggles operating out of institutionalised spheres; assuming a perspective of social psychology, he sees mutual recognition in terms of three psychological effects, namely self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem (Ibid.). The distinction between respect and esteem here is significant as it opens up a dimension that is overlooked in liberalism with an equal respect policy. The politics of recognition admitting the sense of esteem concerns measures to ensure a differentiated status for individuals and persons in the political sphere, hence it would consist of “a set of statutory rules aiming to ensure the social conditions of self-respect and self-esteem” (p. 6) whereas Rawls would not distinguished between primary social goods providing these different social conditions, Seymour notes. In short, the question of recognition may be one “in the sense of respect (equal treatment) or of esteem (difference)” (p. 8), and it may also be understood “in a broad sense (tolerance-respect) or a narrow sense (politics of difference)” (Ibid.).

Transculturalism needs not be seen or used as a suppression of esteem for the difference that one or the other cultural group decides to articulate. As it is defined
here, a transcultural outlook denotes a perspective of one’s function in a cultural system larger than what external observers may associate him or her with. This larger cultural system may be imagined as the multicultural nation, or may be imagined as global culture. In the former case, it would involve what Benedict Anderson would refer to as an imagined community of the nation; in the latter case, it would be an imagination which in Roland Robertson's term would be a kind of global consciousness. In the model of symbolic interactionism, the self as human acts towards others on the basis of meanings one has for others, which arise out of social interactions with others; but in the model of a self-referential system, where the external observer is irrelevant, the self would construct the boundary of one’s system for such meanings and interactions.

In an optimistic view, a transcultural outlook should lead to a kind of cosmopolitanism, “a concern with forms of belonging that go beyond the community into which one is born to a concern with the wider world of a global humanity” (Delanty, 2009, p. 20). It may thereby, ideally, contribute towards a consciousness for global governance that is much needed to deal with ‘collective issues’ such as management of global warming or human development targets like poverty reduction, health or educational provision (Held, 2006, pp. 157-158); or for that matter, contribute to the protection of cultural and natural heritage of the world.

But in reality, a transcultural outlook denotes nothing but an emphasis on individual autonomy, over traditional networks of community, in the making of one’s meanings while functioning in the world. One is still given to whichever other social trends that may prevail; one may, for instance, integrate in the sense of Ritzer (1993) with a McDonaldised system in material and cultural consumerism. Welsch (2012) is hence right to note that transculturality which has intensified today does not in reality take place in a space free from power, that it is above all the capitalist economy with its global tapping of material and human resources which has changed the structures of traditional relations and the economic structures between the rich and the poor, leading to massive migration (p. 36). Consequently, individuals may not be free to choose elements that form their identity, but at the same time, social identities between the rich and the poor are becoming a transcultural phenomenon (Ibid.).
In fact, an indulgence in individual autonomy just means that one may be free in consuming cultures from around the world, eating Chinese takeaway, practising Yoga and Pilates, listening to Reggae music, having fun with Japanese Cosplay and watching Korean drama, flying to Bali or Bangkok for a holiday, and does not feel limited by one’s socialisation in a geographical location or by one’s language competence, given the availability of Youtube and Google Translate where one can learn enough of everything for one’s own purpose. But that does not necessarily imply that one therefore sees no differences among these various cultures and the communities associated with them. Hence a transculturalist as such does not believe in boundaries or taboos among cultures where he is concerned, but he needs not believe all cultures are equally valid or share a universal kind of rationality. Spivak would note: “Most people believe, even (or perhaps particularly) when they are being cultural relativists, that creation and innovation are their own cultural secret, whereas ‘others’ are only determined by their cultures. (2012, p. 31)”

What would ‘intercultural dialogue’ mean in a transcultural model then? Following Delanty’s (2009) argument, intercultural dialogue in cosmopolitan terms should be “Self- as well as Other-directed” (p. 261; cf. Levinas, 1969, cited in Zylinska, 2005) in deliberative reasoning of cultural and political standpoints, in that it involves social actors on all sides to reflect on their assumptions and standpoints, instead of a conventional sense of “[seeking] only the understanding of the perspective of the Other without further reflection on the implications of the dialogue for one’s own position” (Ibid.).

But it may otherwise also be assumed as intercultural communication that becomes “simply communication for its own sake” (Ibid.) if it is neither deliberative nor reflective nor critical, if it does not involve societal learning (Ibid.), but seeks flexibility in action only to survive in an unfamiliar environment with minimum stress, in which case a simple device such as the Culture Assimilator would suffice. ‘Understanding’ another culture in such intercultural communication practice may be assumed as a kind of cultural relativism equated with a “notion that our understanding of other cultures should be internal” (Hanson, 1975, p. 62) - whereby ‘internal understanding’ is constituted by Ryle’s notion in The Concept of Mind (1949) of ‘knowing how’, which may be interpreted simply in terms of dispositions. ‘Intercultural understanding’ or ‘internal understanding’ would then amount to this: “when the natives can tell us
the rules they follow, their rationale for acting, we understand their behaviour in those terms. When the natives cannot articulate the rules they follow, we make formulations or statements of them by inference, statements which we evaluate by their ability to account for or predict behaviour which natives accept as appropriate. (Hanson, 1975, p. 65)“ Taken in this sense, there is no difference between intercultural understanding based on a transcultural or a multicultural model, and likewise for ‘intercultural dialogue’ if it reduced to such a process of ‘understanding’, if cultural differences are assumed as the issue in any case. (Incidentally, ‘intercultural understanding’ in English may also be taken to refer to a quest for common ground, as Verständigung in the sense of Habermas.)

The distinction will be made in this thesis however with regards to intercultural dialogue as cultural exchange between people of different cultural communities through the medium of arts or heritage. It will be assumed that under a transcultural approach of intercultural dialogue, the performance or interpretation of an intangible heritage such as dance may tend to focus on creative work to transcend differences in cultural identity, whereas the same under a multicultural approach may tend to focus on affirming and respecting differences in cultural identity in presentation and an understanding of the dance heritage may tend to focus on cultural difference. These approaches are not mutually exclusive, and ‘intercultural learning’ as a component of dialogue may involve both approaches if it strives to appreciate aesthetic values of the heritage and to respect social values of its institutionalised practices at the same time. The discussion of intercultural dialogue on a transcultural model will be further developed in Chapter 6 with reference to the concept of Russian philosopher Mikhail Epstein. This will be followed by discussion of a multicultural approach that adapts the Cultural Assimilator framework on critical incidents, for an improved concept of intercultural learning.

The concept of intercultural learning to be proposed here on the example of dance heritage as medium of dialogue will be based on a philosophy of liberal learning that aligns with Parekh’s argument for appreciation of cultural diversity, considering that no single culture exhausts the full range of human possibilities (2000, p. 167), while highlighting the need for respect in terms of a recognition of difference, an aspect which tends to be overlooked in an intercultural competence framework involving the Cultural Assimilator investigation of critical incidents. The argument is that such
investigation of cross-cultural situations should not be used to essentialise cultural differences. ‘Cultural differences’ that are constructed to place cultural communities on different ranks of hierarchy need to be deconstructed with the help of some historical perspective that situate differences in context. The choice to be different in alignment may be articulated by a cultural community, but otherwise the community should not be stereotyped on basis of external observation.

It is hence significant that Homi Bhabha has made a distinction between ‘culture as epistemology’ which focuses on understanding of function and intention, and ‘culture as enunciation’ which focuses on signification and institutionalisation (1994, pp. 177). Whereas the epistemological “is locked into the hermeneutic circle, in the description of cultural elements as they tend towards a totality” (Ibid.), the enunciative is more of a dialogic process “to track displacements and realignments that are the effects of cultural antagonisms and articulations” (p. 178), “subverting the rationale of the hegemonic moment” (Ibid.). In his postcolonial perspective on “the historical and epistemological condition of Western modernity”, he has cited how Foucault’s spatialising of historical time has helped to reveal a game of ‘double and splits’, where one can see “how modernity and postmodernity are themselves constituted from the marginal perspective of cultural difference” (p. 196), and how a ‘dehistoricised figure of Man’ is produced at the cost of the ‘others’ becoming peoples without a history (p. 197).

In cultural psychology, Shweder et al (2003) have used a study based on interviews in the city of Bhubansewar, Orissa, India to identify three coexisting thematic clusters of ethical discourse, namely autonomy, community and divinity, whereby each area of experience in domains such as education or healthcare may be represented by multiple discourses (pp. 140-142). This makes an interesting alternative to a Culture Assimilator approach which privileges the selection of critical incidents by one party as observer with personal instrumentalist interest, and makes generalisations of cultural standards on such basis. Being more objective in this procedure of selection, not to mention its observation of moral standards through institutionalised discourse instead of individuals’ behaviour, this method would also arguably have more legitimacy as basis for ‘reflexivity’ through comparison. Most significantly, the three themes involve major moral goods and obligations which hold universal relevance and pertinence for the world as “they all relate to the kinds of responsibilities persons
have to take care of themselves and others, and to treat the environment, the ecological matrix of personal life, with respect” (p. 150). These three themes, along with the issue of tradition versus modernity, will also come into focus in Chapter 6 in the discussion of dance heritage as medium of intercultural dialogue.

The real challenge of intercultural dialogue involving the idea of communicative ethics, following Habermas’ principle of public participation which he has been espousing since his essay *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1962; trans. 1988), should rightly lie in restoring a sense of agency and efficacy to individuals despite the trend of modern societies being dominated by the principles of money and power, as Benhabib (1992, p. 80) would point out. In such dialogue as a conversation of moral justification as envisaged by Habermas in his deontological ethics, individuals need not view themselves as ‘unencumbered’ selves for the sake of adopting ‘the view from nowhere’ (Thomas Nagel) that Kantian liberalism would demand, for Habermas himself has also formulated, in the language of G.H. Mead, an insight on the intersubjective constitution of the self as ‘I’ through interaction with others in a community of speech and action (Benhabib, 1992, p 71). Based on such an argument which is shared by communitarians, there is no need to imagine a transcultural model as basis for intercultural dialogue.

Yet the issue of cultural identity above all else appears to remain the battleground in the European ideological discourse of ‘intercultural discourse’, in political “debates about cultural diversity in the context of immigration [whereby] class tends to be drowned out thanks to a widespread eagerness to discuss cultural differences” (Eriksen, 2006, online). Contrasting the concept of cultural *difference* with that of cultural *diversity*, Eriksen notes a trend in the European discourse whereby diversity is largely associated with phenomena such as rituals, food, folktales, arts and crafts, whereas difference in cultural values expressed as ‘multiculturalism’ is immediately seen as a cause of social problems from immigrants (Ibid.). With such highlighting of *difference* in the public life, a neo-liberalist ideology, associated with individualist values in the freedom to choose and with the ethos of consumerism, also plays a part in stigmatising minority communities (Ibid.). One may hence argue for the need of better precision in the agenda of ‘intercultural dialogue’ discussed in the EU, as a guiding concept and as a political instrument, if “the EU’s view on diversity seems to be more about food and language than conflicting morals and divergent
interpretations of freedom of speech (Näss, 2010, online). If one considers the perspective of Laclau (2007, p. 35), the challenge of intercultural dialogue democracy should be to displace any particular claim as the true body of universalism, in order to accommodate different groups with their particularisms of values in a competition to find universal representation.

While “[l]iberal-democratic capitalism has imposed itself as the only rational solution to the problem of organising modern societies” (Mouffe, 1999a, p. 3), the model of consensual politics or deliberative democracy seems to presuppose an eradication of political antagonism, which the German political philosopher Carl Schmitt would describe as friend-enemy relation (Ibid.), in his thesis that the criterion of the political lies in such distinction. As Mouffe argues, denying anatagonism in theory does not make them go away; Schmitt’s essay ‘Ethic of State and Pluralistic State’, published in an English translation by Dyzenhaus in 1999, may thus contribute to a debate on how to save the state from discredit by acknowledging the limits of pluralism (Ibid.)

Observing that the individual in many states “feels that he is in a plurality of ethical bonds and is bound by religious communities, economic associations, cultural groups, and parties” (Schmitt, 1999, p. 198), Schmitt asserts that political unity is “the highest unity” (p. 203) as it prevents opposing groups from dissociating into extreme enmities such as a civil war. Against the liberal emphasis on the universalistic ‘humanity’, Schmitt provides the insight that democracy always entails relations of inclusion-exclusion: if the people are to rule, it is necessary to decide who belong to the ‘people’ as ‘demos’ (Mouffe, 1999b, pp. 42-43).

In asserting the need for homogeneity in a democracy, Schmitt has made “[an important point that] the democratic concept of equality is a political one which therefore entails the possibility of a distinction.” (Ibid., p. 40; emphasis in original). Contrary to some interpretations, Schmitt never postulated that a sense of belonging to a people could only be envisaged in racial terms; instead he insisted on a multiplicity of ways in which homogeneity could be manifested, for example in saying that the substance of equality “can be found in certain physical and moral qualities, for example, in civic virtue, in arte, the classical democracy of vertus [vertu]” (p. 41). However, his problem lies in presenting a false dilemma between pluralism and unity of the people, as Jean-Francois Kervegan (1992) has pointed out: “for Schmitt, either the State imposes its order and its rationality to a civil society characterised by
pluralism, competition and disorder, or, as is the case in liberal democracy, social pluralism will empty the political entity of its meaning and bring it back to its other, the state of nature” (cited in Mouffe, 1999b, pp. 49-50).

Mouffe hence rejects Schmitt’s dichotomy and proposes to replace ‘homogeneity’ in democracy with what he prefers to call ‘commonality’, one that would be “strong enough to institute a ‘demos’ but nevertheless compatible with certain forms of pluralism: religious, moral and cultural pluralism, as well as a pluralism of political parties” (Ibid., p. 50). Dyzenhaus on the other hand would cite a sense of social homogeneity as advocated by Hermann Heller in ‘Politische Demokratie und Soziale Homogenität’ (1992, p. 34), bound by the ‘We’ as community despite conflicts of interest, without which a political unity may cease to exist, as people can no longer recognise one another as part of the unity, and no longer identify with symbols and representatives of the state (cited in Dyzenhaus, 1999, p. 87). Modern democracy, as Heller argues, should therefore be based on two ideas in the rule of law, namely that the law binds the rulers to the rule, and that the rulers must find immanent justification for their rule (cited in Ibid., p. 89).

With these challenges in mind, the remaining sections in will examine the social and political structure in the case of Singapore, a culturally diverse nation with a high proportion of foreign population under its neoliberal economic and migration policies. The ‘people’ in Singapore is very much defined in the official discourse by the notion of ‘races’, conflated with the notion of ‘cultures’. This has led to a racially defined approach of ‘communitarianism’ with differentiated policies in various spheres of social life, and to some extent divisions among the people in social interaction.

4.1.2 The Social Construction of ‘Race’ – example of Singapore as postcolonial nation

As part of a larger framework on cultural policy, this section will consider the social construction of ‘race’ as a notion which has been entangled with ideas of cultural differences, such that ‘culture’ is not imagined in terms of meanings or values that may be freely adopted and acquired by individuals through learning, but as something embodied in individuals akin to biological traits. Apart from reinforcing
racial stereotyping on a societal level, its legitimation of race-based communitarian policies may also have negative impacts on social cohesion in a nation.

This will be illustrated in the rest of the chapter here with the case of Singapore under its ideology of ‘multiracial meritocracy’. However, instead of limiting to a perspective of downward conflation such that divides between cultural communities are assumed to be structured along a particular ideology of nationalism through what Althusser calls ‘Ideological State Apparatuses’, one will also include the perspective of how the local communities in Singapore transcend the official classifications in making their own meanings through social interactions. This may be seen for example in the rise of nationalist sentiments against the government’s race-based rhetoric for its neoliberal migration policy, a tension which may have contributed to the ruling party’s slide in votes during General Elections in 2011, when much discontent was voiced in the social media online, an aspect where parallels have been drawn with the Arab Spring (Hodal, 6 May 2011, online).

This section will however begin its discussion on the relation between ‘race’ and ‘nation’ by examining the idea of nationalism in Singapore’s context with the help of Hobsbawm’s general historical analysis of the nation as a modern institution and Chatterjee’s analysis on nationalism that is more specifically applicable to postcolonial situations in Asia.

Singapore has developed from a British trading colony established in 1819 into one of the world’s most globalised economies today, with a high non-resident population of 25.7% as of 2010 while the citizen population stands at 63.6% (Yeoh and Lin, April 2012, online). Based on a perspective of World Systems Theory, Singapore’s development as a periphery or semi-periphery state, like South Korea or Taiwan, may be seen in terms of its function in distributing products from cheap labour to the core states, though it has also been able to combine such an economic model with some improvements in welfare and infrastructure, which helps provide popular legitimacy (Chase-Dunn and Grimes, 1995, p. 396). More specifically, based on Sassen’s (2009) analysis of specialisation among global cities, Singapore’s significance in the world economy is underscored by its number one ranking in indicators of ‘ease of doing business’, ‘contract enforcement’ and ‘investor protection’ (p. 213). Hobsbawm (1992) has compared Singapore and Hong Kong to Lübeck and
Ghent in the 14th century, as independent mini-states with economic significance out of proportion to their size and resources (p. 25). The raison d'être of Singapore's nation-building may hence be best explained by way of its colonial history. But before that, it is necessary to start with an understanding of how the modern concept of the 'nation' began in 19th-century Europe.

The political meaning of 'nation' started with an equation of 'the people' with the state, after the manner of the American and the French Revolutions (Ibid., p. 18). But in reality, not all states would coincide with nations that are homogeneous in ethnic, linguistic or other terms, or vice versa. Ernest Renan hence famously asked: “why is Holland a nation, while Hanover and the Grand Duchy of Parma are not? (1939; cited in Hobsbawm, 1992, p. 24)” On conditions in the establishment of the national state, John Stuart Mill would make the observation that it had to be feasible and that it had to be desired by the nationality itself (cited in Ibid.). This would be translated into the ‘principle of nationality’ and the ‘threshold principle’, the former dominating the peace treaties after World War I in the Wilsonian formulation, immediately resulting in a Europe of 26 states (Ibid., p. 32). But based on a study of regionalist movements in western Europe, Hobsbawm suggests that it could have numbered 42 if only the ‘threshold principle’ was abandoned. National heterogeneity was accepted, as it was assumed then as Mill did that smaller nations stood to gain by merging with bigger ones. It was arguably not out of place in mid-19th-century thinking when Frederick Engels predicted the disappearance of the Czechs as a people (pp. 34-35).

According to Hobsbawm there were in practice only three criteria which allowed a people to be classed decisively as a nation: firstly, a “historic association with a current state or one with a fairly lengthy and recent past” (p. 37), such as the English and the Russian people; secondly, “the existence of a long-established cultural elite, possessing a written national literary and administrative vernacular” (Ibid.), such as the Italian and German peoples despite the lack of a single state; thirdly, “a proven capacity for conquest” (p. 38).

Hobsbawm argues, perhaps somewhat hastily, that nationalism has become less important in the late 20th century, “no longer, as it were, a global political programme” (p. 191). With regards to the apparent explosion of separatism in 1988-92, specifically in Yugoslavia, he would dismiss it simply as “unfinished business of 1918-21” (p. 165). However, he seems astute in noting that it was “[not] the desire
for German unity [that motivated] the political opposition in the DDR” (p. 168) but unexpected events outside Germany. Similarly, with the USSR, he argues it was not internal national tensions that led to the collapse, but a matter of economic difficulties, citing that the case for nationalist movements would be stronger in western Europe (Ibid.).

Gellner (1983) begins his arguments on nation and nationalism with Max Weber’s celebration definition of the state, “as that agency within society which possesses the monopoly of legitimate violence” (p. 3), going on to say that a definition of nationalism may be parasitic on that of the state, as nationalism seems to emerge “only in milieux in which the existence of the state is already very much taken for granted” (p. 4). He also argues that nationalism is not an awakening of a pre-existing cultures, but “the consequence of a new form of social organisation, based on deeply internalised, education-dependent high cultures, each protected by its own state” (p. 48). It is a crystallisation not of natural units, but of new units using cultural, historical and other inheritance as “raw materials” (p. 49). Describing the state as an elaboration of division of labour (p. 4), he explains that state and culture have to be linked due to the rise of industrial society which creates a norm in ‘exo-socialisation’ as “the production of men outside the local intimate unit” (p. 38). That is why “the age of transition to industrialism was bound […] also to be an age of nationalism” (p. 40) and there is also a link between nationalism and processes of colonialisation and decolonialisation (p. 42).

In a postcolonial perspective, Chatterjee (1986) finds himself having to address the perspective that there is, in contrast to the pure and original form of nationalism emanating from ‘western’ culture, an ‘eastern’ type of nationalism which is “both imitative and hostile to the model it imitates” (p. 2). One possible response to this, in a Marxist perspective picking up from theoretical questions left off by Lenin’s idea of ‘self-determination’, would be Horace B. Davis’ proposition, that “Nationalism … is not in itself irrational, but it may be irrationally applied. (1978, p. 25; cited in Chatterjee, 1986, pp. 18-19)” But for some perspective in history, Chatterjee would refer to a more sophisticated treatment of the subject in Anderson’s (1983) consideration that third-world nationalisms in the 20th century came to acquire a ‘modular’ character, drawing from the examples of earlier models in ‘creole nationalism’ of the Americas, ‘linguistic nationalism’ of Europe and ‘official
nationalism’ like in Russia. As Chatterjee (1986) notes, Anderson’s argument of nations as ‘imagined communities’, superseding previous ‘cultural systems’ of religious community and dynasties, is more nuanced than Gellner’s argument that nations are an invention of nationalism rather than a matter of self-consciousness awakened (p. 19). However, he argues there is ultimately no substantive difference between approaches of the two, as one relates 20th-century nationalism to a change to requirements of ‘industrial society’ while the other refers to the dynamics of ‘print capitalism’, but both invariably see third-world nationalisms as shaped by historical models, instead of acknowledging the possibilities that may be afforded by the intellectual process of creation (p. 21).

The main focus of Chatterjee’s postcolonial critique would however be a ‘liberal-rationalist dilemma’ in talking about nationalist thought, as seen in the work of Hans Kohn, whereby nationalism has its birth assumed in universal history, in a development that is part of the same historical process which brought about the rise of industrialism and democracy (p. 2). While this suggests that nationalism represents in essence a universal pursuit of liberty and progress, there has been undeniable evidence that “it could also give rise to mindless chauvinism and xenophobia and serve as the justification for organised violence and tyranny” (Ibid.), Chatterjee points out, citing the case of Fascism. But the issue to him becomes even murkier with an attempt to resolve this dilemma by means of Kohn’s distinction between ‘western’ and ‘non-western’ nationalisms. The liberal-rationalist’s paradigmatic form whereby nationalism goes hand in hand with reason, liberty and progress has also led to the assumption that any special type of nationalism “[which] emerges under somewhat different historical circumstances [is therefore] complex, impure, often deviant” (p. 3). The typical solution to this is to construct sociological conditions as cause for any type of deviation, with the assumption that the world is swept by a ‘tidal wave of modernisation’, in which the essence lies in the awareness of man’s ‘capacity to contribute to, and to profit from, industrial society’, but the problem then lies in the ‘structure’ of traditional society being eroded (p. 4). Hence the liberal dilemma is circumvented by sociology, in which modernisation is considered a positive fact of contemporary history tied to psychological aspects of dignity and self-respect, and all that the liberal conscience of the West needs to adopt is an attitude of sympathy as “backward nations will find their own chosen
paths to independence, freedom and progress” (Ibid.), in a teleology of political development. But curiously, with such empiricist sociology, even the relation between nationalism and illiberal regimes may be justified by a theory of stages of development, such that for new nations struggling to modernise, “it might be a perfectly rational strategy for them... to postpone the democratic consummation of their efforts until the economic structures of their society are sufficiently industrialised and their social institutions modernised” (p. 5), Chatterjee notes, citing David E. Apter’s *The Politics of Modernisation* (1965) and Samuel P. Huntington’s *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1969). Such arguments easily play into the hands of a relativised position expressed by Kedourie, with the suggestion in *Nationalism* (1960) that nationalism is a doctrine invented in early 19th-century Europe and hence an import fundamentally alien to the non-European world (cited in Chatterjee, 1986, p. 8).

Chatterjee sees both sides of these arguments as sharing the Enlightenment view of rationality and progress. But as the conservatives see problems in the colonial world of ‘traditional loyalties clothed in the garb of modern political organisations’ and the liberals assert that those ‘irrational and regressive features are only a hangover from the past’, one question is missing: “why is it that non-European colonial countries have no historical alternative but to try to approximate the given attributes of modernity [when that means] their continued subjection under a world order which only sets their tasks for them and over which they have no control? (p. 10)” This question, Chatterjee argues, is one that is simply not possible to pose in the bourgeois-rationalist thought without landing oneself in a precarious discourse of power (p. 11).

The problem as Chatterjee sees it, is that nowhere in this discussion of nationalism has anyone challenged “the legitimacy of the marriage between Reason and capital” (p. 168). Instead, the conflict between metropolitan capital and the people as nation is resolved “by absorbing the political life of the nation into the body of the state” (Ibid.), and with the state acting as “the rational allocator and arbitrator for the nation” (Ibid.), capital continues to be protected in its continual exploration of possibilities in investment and production. Such is the reality “that has been suppressed in the historical creation of post-colonial nation-states” (p. 170). The next question, if one may add here, would nevertheless be how a state may manage to preserve its
functions in a capitalist system while absorbing the political life from a plurality of values and identities. Would the strategy be to suppress some of these values, or to create new identities? The answer might be a mix of both.

The challenge of the multi-ethnic society in Singapore, or Malaysia for that matter, is something that few countries of the non-Western world have illustrated (Hefner, 2001, p. 4) in terms of its diversity. Developed from a British colonial legacy since the 19th century, it consists of 74% Chinese, 13% Malays, 9% Indian and 3% ‘others’ in resident population according to the census of 2010 (Singapore Department of Statistics, 2010, p. v). These racially defined groups, assumed for the purpose of public policies as distinct and separated from one another and homogenous in themselves, may in fact be further differentiated according to language or religion. The official discourse and administration has long maintained a simplified impression of a ‘homogenised’ existence of bounded groups, despite the existence of some hybridity in cultural practices among the groups (Chua, 1998, p. 190), which it represents by the simple formula of ‘CMIO’ as four ‘races’ of the nation (Siddique, 1989; cited in Ibid.).

The past legacy of Singapore may be characterised as the challenge of a ‘plural society’, to adopt the term dating back to the 1940s, which incidentally made particular reference to colonial territories such as British Malaya and Dutch East Indies. British administrator and political writer J.S. Furnivall defined a plural society as one that comprises “two or more elements or social orders which live side by side, yet without mingling, in one political unit” (Furnivall, 1944, p. 446; cited in Hefner, 2001, p. 4). He had assumed that the Chinese, Malays and Indians in British Malaya for instance were socially segregated and lacked a “common social will” (Hefner, 2001, p. 4) such that different ethnic and religious groups had little in common apart from market interests (Ibid., p. 5).

But further to that, the current challenge for Singapore in multiculturalism also stems from recent trends of immigration which has parallel with the unprecedented increase in immigration to Western countries in the 1990s and 2000s, a period which has seen the largest immigration to the United States since the Great Immigration of the 1890s, and in Europe, immigration of a massive scale without modern precedent (Ibid., p. 2). The period of 2000s has incidentally seen the emergence of ‘bi-
culturalism’ in Singapore’s political rhetoric and national narrative, promoting an idea that Singapore’s citizenry is comprised of descendants of immigrants and Singapore should have a core elite with the ability to work well “in the Singapore context as well as in the land from which their forebears had come, namely China, India, the Malay Archipelago and the Middle East” (Heng, p. 28). To put it simply, this is an extension of a race-based communitarian ideology, but one motivated by the development of a neoliberal economy.

Before proceeding to further analyse Singapore’s race-based ideology as an illiberal form of multiculturalism, it would help to be equipped with a general view on how the notion of ‘race’ has emerged in the history of colonialism. The history of the construction and reproduction of the idea of ‘race’ has been analysed exhaustively by authors like Barzun (1938), Montagu (1964) and it is hence well understood that this idea of ‘race’ first appeared in the English language in the early 17th century and became used in European and North American scientific writing in the late 18th century to identify and explain certain phenotypical differences between human beings (Miles, 1993, p. 28). The related concept of ‘racism’ came from the title of a 1933/4 book in the German language (published in English in 1938 as Racism) by Magnus Hirschfeld, who refuted 19th-century arguments on existence of a hierarchy of biologically distinct ‘races’ (Ibid., p. 29).

Following scientific and political critique of fascist ideologies, dispute on whether the term ‘race’ should be used within science to refer to populations characterised by particular genetic profiles has continued, with some arguing for the need to discuss ‘race’ as an analytical concept in order to formulate a theory on ‘race relations’, or how different ‘races’ interact with one another (Ibid.). It is hence that a theory of racism also becomes entangled in a theory of ‘race relations’ (Ibid.). O.C. Cox for instance constructed a Marxist theory of ‘race relations’ in Caste, Class and Race (1970), whereby ‘race relations’ are regarded as a variant of class relations, considering that whereas this has not arisen in the process of proletarianisation within Europe, ‘racial antagonism’ has taken place in the Caribbean and the USA as what was essentially class conflict (see Miles, 1993, p. 32). Sivanandan (1982) on the other hand has referred to the idea of ‘race’ in his analysis of South Africa in terms of a capitalist formation whereby racist classification has been legitimised in an ideology that grades such differences in a hierarchy of power (see Miles, 1993, p.
38). Noting that the race struggle is also the class struggle, he argues that racism cannot be abolished by rejecting the idea of ‘race’ and hence defends the common-sense definition of ‘race’ as a reference to a group of persons who share the same descent or origin (Ibid.). Stuart Hall (1980) recognises that it is not biological characteristics in themselves, real or imagined, which have determinate effects, or even the perpetual distinction of such being made, but rather the question “what are the specific conditions which make this form of distinction socially pertinent, historically active” (cited in Miles, 1993, p. 44).

But the work of Hall and the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) may still be criticised for reifying the idea of ‘race’, Miles (1993, p. 44) argues. He cites Guillaumin (1980) to point out that the idea of ‘race’ is essentially ideological, for while one cannot deny considerable somatic variation between individual human beings, the use of phenotypical features to classify human beings into groups, and the description of ‘racial’ relations as ‘natural’, rather than socially determined, is created in certain historical and material conditions to represent the world as such for political interests (Miles, 1993, pp. 44-45). Guillaumin asserts: "Merely to adopt the expression implies the belief that races are ‘real’ or concretely apprehensible, or at the best that the idea of race is uncritically accepted; moreover, it implies that races play a role in the social process not merely as an ideological form, but as an immediate factor acting as both determining cause and concrete means. (1980, p. 39; cited in Ibid., p. 45)"

Following a Marxist perspective that all social relations are socially constructed and reproduced in specific historical circumstances which are alterable by human agency, Miles argues that the task would then be to deconstruct ‘race’ and detach it from the concept of racism (1993, p. 49). He writes: “By deconstructing the idea of ‘race’, the effects of the process or racialisation and of the expression of racism within the development of the capitalist world economic system are more clearly exposed because the role of human signification and exclusionary practices is prioritised. (Ibid.)” He cites the example that it was only after Africans were enslaved that they became represented in negative terms as an Other and certain phenotypical characteristics of theirs were signified as expressive of them being an inferior type of human being (Ibid., p. 50). In short, he argues that “through a process of racialization, racism became an ideological relation of production: that is to say, the ideology of
racism constructed the Other as a specific and inferior category of being particularly suited to providing labour power within unfree relations of production” (Ibid.).

We now turn our attention back to Singapore, a territory under Malay rule since the 13th century, before the advent of the British. Sir Stamford Raffles, Lieutenant Governor of the British colony at Bencoolen, Sumatra, was searching for an island as a new port in the region to rival the Dutch, when he arrived in Singapore in 1819. As the incumbent Sultan of Johor then was in alliance with the Dutch and the Bugis, Raffles smuggled in the sultan’s elder brother Tengku Hussein to be recognised as the rightful Sultan of Johor, in exchange for which the British East India Company was granted the right to establish Singapore as a trading post. Singapore was promoted as a free port with no taxes and a strategic waypoint between India and China, and population steadily increased within four years, to over 10,000 with Straits Chinese, Arabs and Indian coming for trade; the free market philosophy envisaged by Raffles would remain the foundation of Singapore’s economy ever since (Hunter, 24th March 2013).

More migrant workers from China and India settled down in the subsequent decades as labourers, traders and soldiers. Under urging of the merchant community, Singapore was declared a British Crown Colony in 1867 to bypass British Indian rule. Singapore saw substantial rise in trade with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. By then there was already a wealthy Anglicised elite growing out of the Straits Chinese, Indian and Malay traders assimilating Victorian values. Singapore also became a centre of rubber shipment and tin trade. The British began a special relationship with the English-educated Straits Chinese known as baba, with the help of whom they squashed secret societies (Ibid.).

During anti-colonial movements in the 1950s, Chinese-educated activists and students started allying with a multicultural ‘Malayan culture’ despite their cultural affiliation often being identified with communist China. The Malay language was included in Nanyang University, the Chinese-medium university established in 1956 out of a community initiative, whereby the manifesto of the university’s establishment dated 7th April 1953 stated the dialogue between eastern and western culture along with the development of Malayan culture as its two main features (see Wang, 1997,
pp. 176-177). Students in Chinese middle schools also had much cross-cultural exchange that included watching and learning Indian classical dance (Wong, 2011).

Meantime, the People’s Action Party (PAP) quickly grew in popularity under the charisma of its co-founder Lim Chin Siong, a Chinese-speaking left-wing politician and trade union leader. However, it was another co-founder, Lee Kuan Yew, born to a prominent Straits Chinese family and graduated as a lawyer from Cambridge University, who rose to become the Prime Minister of Singapore in 1959 when it gained self-government. Lee was allegedly in collusion with British authorities and Chief Minister Lim Yew Hock in imprisoning Lim Chin Siong as union leader prior to that (Tan and Jomo, 2001). A left-wing party Barisan Sosialis was subsequently formed by Lim in 1961 following his release, but ahead of elections to be held in September 1963, he and more than a hundred others were detained without trial in February that year, under the new Internal Security Act 1960, an instrument derived from the Emergency Regulations Ordinance earlier used by the British against communist uprising. The charge of communist subversives against them was consistently denied (Hong and Huang, 2008, p. 18), as with the case of Chia Thye Poh, who was elected as MP in 1963 but similarly detained and eventually became one of the world’s longest-serving prisoner of conscience in the last century, living without freedom for 32 years. Tan Lark Sye, founder of Nanyang University, was notably deprived of his citizenship in September 1963, while the leftist Singapore Association of Trade Unions collapsed the same year following detention of its leaders.

After a brief political manoeuvre of joining Malaysia in 1963 as part of a new federation along with Sabah and Sarawak, Singapore was expelled and hence declared its own independence in 1965. While the move by Lee and his faction of PAP in pushing for merger was clearly in calculation that the rightist Malaysian federal government would have little hesitation in putting their leftist rivals in detention indefinitely (Hong and Huang, 2008, p. 18), the expulsion from Malaysia is an episode shrouded in more mystery. Racial tension between Chinese and Malays culminating in the 1964 riots is the main factor cited in official textbooks, but PAP was also accused of being double-tongued and two-faced by rivals in the Malaysian government (See, 28th July 2005, online). Singapore led under PAP thus “declared itself a constitutionally multiracial state – possibly the first such state in the world”
The imperative of establishing Singapore as a multiracial society was outlined at the First Session of the First Parliament on December 22, 1965 by then Minister for Law and National Development, Mr E.W. Barker. He stated:

*One of the cornerstones of the policy of the government is a multi-racial Singapore. We are a nation comprising people of various races who constitute her citizens, and our citizens are equal regardless of differences of race, language, culture and religion… To ensure this bias in favour of multiracialism and the equality of our citizens, whether they belong to majority or minority groups, a Constitutional Commission is being appointed to help formulate these constitutional safeguards.*


Multiracialism was eventually implicitly constitutionalised through the Official Languages and National Languages Act [Article 153A], with Malay, Mandarin, Tamil and English instituted as the four official languages (Ibid.). The term ‘race’ was hence conflated in Singapore with divisions along the line of language, in a way that reflects Benedict Anderson’s analysis of nationalism in relation to print capitalism. ‘Race’ has however also been conflated with religion through similar mechanisms in administration, for example all Malays are by constitutional definition Muslims whereas Hinduism is identified with ‘Indians’ (Chua, 1998, p. 190). Such simplification of ethnic categories under the one-party rule of the PAP is basically an extension and intensification of British colonial administrative practice in erasing social and cultural differences among the immigrant population and regrouping them into a smaller number of categories with bigger numbers of individuals (Purushotam, 1998; cited in Chua, 2005, p. 4).

Apart from such assurance in equal recognition of the citizens as separate racial communities, the Singapore government also re-configured the local communities through urban development and relocation to high-rise buildings, under schemes of its Housing and Development Board which quickly rose into prominence after a mysterious fire that devastated the Bukit Ho Swee area (Loh, 2009, online). With the elimination of rural kampung as well as slums in urban quarters, unwanted social networking that might harm political stability was also dismantled. Meantime, considering itself surrounded by potential hostile countries, Singapore was receiving...
help from the Israeli forces as early as 1965 in establishing the Singapore Armed Forces (Barzilai, 2004). The SAF was to adopt a cautious approach whereby citizens of Malay descent would not be enlisted, and despite later relaxation, it was disclosed in 1987 that placing of Malays in key position is avoided (Yong, 26th June 2009).

Singapore’s first Culture and Foreign Minister Rajaratnam would reflect without irony in 1969 on the PAP’s shift in the course of its ascent to power: “We started off as an anti-colonial party. We have passed that stage: only Raffles remains. (cited in Hong and Huang, 2008, p. 16; cf. Lim, Jan 2013, online)” Rajaratnam has earlier said, when quizzed on what a common Singaporean or ‘Malayan’ culture means, that it was one that would have “new beliefs and social behaviour… common to all [ethnic] communities” (see Lim, Ibid.). But by the time that Singapore celebrated 25 years of self-government in 1984, when the first ever set of school textbooks on Singapore history was issued, Rajaratnam went well beyond rehabilitating Raffles as an ‘imperialist’ who ‘did not loot the country’, but produced “a vision of Singapore as a great trading centre, open to all who are enterprising and willing to take their chances on the basis of merit and hard work” (cited in Hong and Huang, 2008, p. 16). One may say that Singapore’s legitimation of a neo-colonial model as ‘multiracial meritocracy’ was thus completed through a sense of continuity in history.

Goh (2008) has argued that postcolonial nationalism should not be viewed as derived directly from ethnic identities, “but from the engagements of the intellectual, political and economic elites of formerly colonised peoples with the racial representations and racial state of colonialism” (p. 239). Citing Bhabha’s (2009) argument that the nation is a rhetorical manifestation of such complex engagements which maintain the symbolic bounds of the colonial state while threatening to undermine it, Goh argues “it is not that the imagination of Malaya could not contain a Chinese-dominated Singapore, but that the complex engagements of the nationalist elites with the colonial racial state and its pluralism clashed” (2008, p. 240). In short, the tensions and conflicts “resulted not from natural antagonisms between culturally different peoples but began in political disagreements in these engagements” (Ibid.). Following Maiello’s (1996) perspective that ethnic conflicts arise when the postcolonial state fails to resolve international tension between the ‘multiple national consciousness’ and the ‘singular nationalism of the nation-state’, Goh suggests that
this was the problem during merger and separation of Singapore and Malaysia between 1963 and 1965 (2008, p. 241).

But returning the focus to the postcolonial discourse on race, one may relate this in Singapore as in Malaysia back to the issue of labour power as well as to the political project under the British colonial administration to govern diversity in a region with extended history of migration (Amrith, 2010, p. 301). Back in the 19th century, he points out, colonial discourse on race was used to characterise and differentiate between migrant groups, with the Asiatic population classed under ‘Chinese’, ‘Mahometan’ and ‘Hindoo’ in an official report in Malaya in 1856, even as the same report would acknowledge that “no correct opinion can be formed of its composition from these distinctive appellations” (Ibid., p. 302). The Dutch administration in the East Indies would mark the Chinese as homogenous and different from the rest, requiring them to carry passes and imposing restrictions on their movements and places of residence (Ibid.). The European colonial administrations formed opinions on the racial diversity as a way to naturalise the economic division of labour, hence the Chinese were held to be industrious but fractious whereas the Tamils were held to be docile and good for hard labour (Ibid.). But the first explicit discussions of heredity were in connection with the creolized or hybrid communities. John Crawfurd (1783-1868), a Scottish administrator and amateur ethnographer, would describe the ‘Jawi Peranakan’, a community that came about from intermarriage between south Indian Muslim men and Malay women, as a “motley race… of no very amiable description, partaking of the vices of both parent stocks” (Ibid., pp. 302-303). Peranakan Chinese families were similarly described as an inferior race, except for the Anglophone Straits Chinese elites, who were often Christian and were viewed by colonial officials as highly educated and loyal and effective collaborators (Ibid., p. 303).’ The late 19th century also saw new anxieties about racial mixing as increasing numbers of European women arrived in colonial Southeast Asia and unions between European men and local women were becoming widespread (Ibid.).

When the census was first introduced in Malaya in 1871, the desire to erect firm boundaries around race was apparently one rationale, given the idea then that peoples were different not only in appearance and culture but also in inherent capacities (Ibid.). By 1891, the census already listed the various ‘races’ and ‘tribes’ under the main headings that continue to shape official conceptions of race in
Singapore as well as Malaysia to this day: Chinese, Malays, Indians and others (Ibid.). Interestingly, the most significant creole communities no longer appeared in the census by the turn of the 20th century, as the Straits Chinese were merely listed as ‘Chinese’; from 1911, the Jawi Peranakan were simply listed as ‘Malay’ (Ibid.).

The Chinese in Singapore are incidentally a heterogeneous population even in terms of ‘dialect’ origin alone, with more than 20 ‘dialect’ groups known (Lee, 2000, in Statistics Singapore Newsletter, p. 2). Based on population census in 2000, the Hokkiens make up 41% of the Chinese population, Teochews 21%, Cantonese 15%, Hakkas 8%, Hainanese 7%, not counting other groups such as Foochows, Henghua, Hockchia and Shanghainese which make up less than 2% each. The identity of the Peranakan Chinese, however, has become hidden amidst such statistics, for though their unique cuisine and costumes are known to Singaporeans and their artefacts have been represented in the museum, their own language, the Baba Malay which is a fusion of Chinese and Malay, has become extinct or unused today (Swee, 2008, p. 1, online). Frost has shown that in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the permanently settled Straits Chinese represented a transcultural diaspora, “transcultural in the sense that the hybridity or creolisation evident in their domestic lives were carefully separated from their performance of a very Chinese ethnic identity in public” (Frost, 2003, p. 2). Straits Chinese were noted for speaking in the English, Malay and Chinese languages, and they not only played a role as commercial go-betweens between the Chinese community and the European settler elite, they were involved variously as cultural agents in the transmission of modernity, Confucian revival and even overseas Chinese nationalism (Ibid.). However, their plural identities soon become faded, partly because modern education in Singapore after 1900 became broken down into polarised camps, with former Anglo-vernacular schools becoming solely English and dialect schools becoming superseded by Mandarin institutions, such that a whole new generation of local-born Chinese were increasingly forced to choose between one of two educational options (Ibid., p. 34). Government policies in Singapore since independence were to assimilate them into mainstream Chinese culture, such that they are not only classified as ethnically Chinese but also receive formal instruction in Mandarin Chinese as a second language instead of Malay (Swee, 2008, p. 2, online)
It is similarly through the standardised use of Mandarin Chinese, in education as well as in the broadcast media and official transaction, that the Chinese population in Singapore is eventually homogenised as one race after independence. Though the Hokkiens, Teochews, Cantonese, Hakkas, Foochows, Henghuas and Hockchias are all from the same southern Chinese regions of Fujian and Guangdong province, their languages are not mutually comprehensible despite having similar syntactic structures and sharing the same Chinese scripts. Their linguistic differences cannot be reduced to one of accent, and their reduction as ‘dialects’ is in fact ideological (Chua, 2005, p. 5). Nevertheless, the Singapore government saw it fit to launch a Speak Mandarin Campaign in 1979 among the Chinese, and the hitherto broadcast of Hong Kong movies and television serials in original Cantonese was also banned since then from public television. On 23 November 1979, the Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew appeared in a discussion with three journalists, whereby he set two targets: “five years for all young Chinese Singaporeans to drop dialects and use Mandarin and 10 years for Mandarin to be established as the language of the coffee-shops, hawker centres and shops” (Platt, 1985, p. 23)

Hence Chinese languages which are non-Mandarin became confined to home use, but some parents also began to speak Mandarin at home in the interest of helping their children’s academic achievement, with a side effect that communication was destroyed between grandchildren who speak no Chinese other than Mandarin and the illiterate grandparents who speak no Mandarin (Ibid.). Whereas 30.7% of the Chinese resident population above age 5 in 2000 spoke Chinese dialects most frequently at home, the percentage has dropped to 19.2% in 2010, whereby 32.6% prefer English and 47.7% (Singapore Department of Statistics, 2010, p. 26). However, some dialects remain socially significant in certain segments of Singapore. The success of Worker’s Party, a main opposition party in Singapore, in the Hougang constituency, has partly been attributed to the fact that its leader Low Thia Khiang campaigns in Teochew, and the ruling People’s Action Party has been forced to follow suit, ban or no ban on dialects (Seah, 22nd Jan 2006, in The Sunday Star, online). Apart from this, Hokkien has been a lingua franca in Singapore since colonial days, especially when at least one of the participants in verbal communication has little or no formal education (Platt, 1985, p. 17), and this may still hold true even if this aspect is not reflected in census surveys.
According to definition in the census, Malays in Singapore refer to persons of Malay or Indonesian origin, such as Javanese, Boyanese, Bugis and so on (Singapore Department of Statistics, 2010, p. 185). However, though some of these categories continue to be enumerated in the census, cultural differences are suppressed under the single category of ‘Malay’ as a community that is represented for electoral purposes by Malay members of parliament (Chua, 2005, p. 5). Historically speaking, the ‘Malay world’ as it is understood today comprises peninsular Malaysia, the east coast of Sumatra, the west and southwest coast of Borneo and the Riau archipelago, where the Malays traditionally settled on the coast and river enclaves, deriving their livelihood from trade and other resources (Lian, 2001, p. 862). K.W. Taylor (1992) has highlighted that the beginning of Malay history as traditionally remembered in recent centuries is marked by the founding of Melaka as an entrepot and the adoption of Islam by its rulers, so much so that the Malay annals (Sejarah Melayu) do not consider the pre-Islamic Malay past to be of interest (Ibid., p. 863). The term Melayu was once used exclusively to refer to those of royal or noble descent, but Munshi Abdullah, a language teacher of mixed descent in the first half of the 19th century, and an early critic of the Malay aristocracy, used the name to refer to the common people (Ibid., p. 865). He also used the Malay term bangsa (race, or nationality) to refer to collective identity, and this came, as Milner (1995) describes it, at a time when British Malaya saw a mass influx of Chinese and Indian immigrants coming to work in the tin mines and on the rubber plantations (Ibid.). The Utusan Melayu newspaper established in 1915 then used the term bangsa to refer to the Malays, as a concept that distanced itself from the sultanate and even the Islamic community, at the same time without the biological-genetic overtones of Darwinism (Ibid.).

Prior to this rise of nationalism, there was already a linguistic dimension to what Hefner describes as the ‘permeable ethnicity’ of the Malayo-Indonesian peoples which displayed resemblances in dress, dance, music and social etiquette when the 16th-century Europeans discovered the trade networks in the archipelago that included most notably the great entrepot of Melaka (Hefner, 2001, p. 13). He argues that the spread of the Malay language in virtually all major trading ports of Southeast Asia suggests a kind of pluralism whereby ethnic division was not strictly bounded or harshly oppositional, such that there was a “transethnic sense of Malayo-Indonesian
civilisation’ (Ibid., p. 14). Many among the Chinese immigrants, the most numerous of minorities in the archipelago, used to be culturally close to natives and some were already Muslims, but from the late 19th century onwards, the sheer scale of Chinese migration, their economic success and their role as designated intermediaries for European enterprises all reduced the incentives for them to accommodate to local customs (Reid ed., 1996, cited in Ibid., p. 17). By the early 1920s, the Chinese already outnumbered Malays in the peninsula (Hefner, 2001, p. 18). Hence identities became more oppositional with the rise of nationalism in Malaya, and even Javanese and Sumatrans who migrated to the peninsula well into the 20th century became identified as ‘Malays’ in the new ethnic structure, as long as they were Muslims and were willing to adopt Malay airs (Roff, 1967, p. 111, cited in Ibid., p. 19).

Eventually, religion developed into an important marker of the Malay identity in Malaysia and Singapore. The difference with Indonesia here lies partly in the colonial policies. Missionisation was given the green light in Indonesia under Dutch rule as they viewed Javanese rulers as only superficially Islamic and hence decided to have Christian enclaves carved out in an otherwise continuous Islamic expanse. The British on the other hand viewed the Malay chiefs as ‘Muhammadan Monarchs’ and hence took a cautious approach to maintain “intact, so far as was compatible with other aims, the internal structure of Malay authority and social organisation” (Roff, 1967, p. 11, cited in Ibid., p. 21). There was hence a linkage of royal and religious authority leveraged by colonial control, with profound effect on subsequent Malaysian pluralism. In British Malaya, the sultans’ authority over Islamic education and organisations limited opportunities for religious experimentation, as seen in the 1904 Muhammadan Laws Enactment forbidding public teaching on Islam without the sultan’s approval in writing, and an amendment in 1925-26 providing severe penalties for anyone publishing literature concerning the religion without similar permission (Roff, 1967, p. 80, cited in Ibid.). This not only led to less dynamism for religious reform compared to Indonesia, but also had an impact on identity politics. As the Malay elite came to see themselves being in competition with immigrant Chinese and Indians, they also gave their profession of faith a narrow expression tied to ethnicity, as noted by Nagata (1984), such that to be Malay was explicitly marked as being Muslim and implicitly marked in opposition to Chinese and non-Muslim Indians (Hefner, 2001, p. 22). During contestation of the concept of the
Melayu nationality between the forming of the Malayan Union in 1946 and the independence of the Federation of Malaya in 1957, there was in fact a proposal from the Malay Left for an ethnic identity based on historical and cultural origins, whereby members of other groups, such as Chinese and Indians, could be admitted if they were prepared to renounce any tie outside the peninsula (Lian, 2001, p. 867). However, the traditional elite spearheading the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) rejected this and favoured an exclusive bangsa Melayu nationality, and this was adopted for the formation of Malaysia’s modern nation-state (Ibid.). In Singapore, a similar approach of inclusion and exclusion has thus been adopted and a Malay is defined as “someone who is Malay, Javanese, Boyanese, Bugis, Arab or any other person who is generally accepted as a member of the Malay community by the community” (Rahim, 1998, p. 18, cited in Chua, 2005, p. 5), with Malay as the language to be taught in schools and the Islamic religion taken as an additional ‘defining element’ for all ‘ethnic’ Malay population (Chua, 2005, p. 5). Constitutionally, all Malays are Muslims, such that ‘Malays’, especially descendants of Indonesian extraction, who are Christians just become an anomaly (Ibid.). On the other hand, conversion to Islam by a Chinese through intermarriage has been referred to as masuk Melayu, and a Chinese woman would tend to refer to herself as a Muslim and “no more a Chinese” (Ackermann, 1997, p. 56).

The Indian minority in Singapore is defined in the census as referring to persons of Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi origin, such as Tamils, Malayalees, Punjabis, Bengalis, Singhalese and so on (Singapore Department of Statistics, 2010, p. 185). Indians began arriving into Malaya in 1786 when the British took control of Penang, and they were among the first migrants to arrive in Singapore after British colonial officials Sir Stamford Raffles and William Farquhar landed in Singapore in 1819 (Periasamy, 2007, in BiblioAsia, Vol. 3, Issue 3, October 2007, pp. 5-6). Indian labourers were employed in the sugar, pepper and gambier cultivations in the 19th century, and many settled down also as shopkeepers, cow keepers, milk sellers, or as public works employees, along with South Indian traders, financiers, money changers and so on (Ibid.). A trend soon developed such that whereas one would see mostly English-educated South Indians and Ceylonese Tamils employed in the railways, as clerks in government offices, in businesses and so on, the North Indians and specifically the Punjabi Sikhs would be employed as policemen, watchmen and
caretakers (Siddique, 1990, cited in Ibid., p. 10). After the Second World War, three linguistic groups became especially discernible, namely the Tamils followed by the Malayalees and the Punjabis (Mani, 2006, cited in Ibid., p. 10). Due to its predominance, Tamil was named one of the four official languages when Singapore proclaimed self-government in 1959 and Tamil schools became fully aided by the government (Tamil in SITE!, 2012, online). It was after a prolonged period of this south Indian language being imposed as the official Indian language that other South Asian languages such as Bengali and Hindi have been accepted as mother tongues for ‘Indian’ students (Chua, 2005, p. 6), due to demand. The proportion of Tamil speakers among the Indian population has apparently been on the decline, whereby Tamils constituted 58.3% of the total Indian population in Singapore in 2000 (Periasamy, 2007, in BiblioAsia, Vol. 3, Issue 3, October 2007, p. 10), whereas the use of Tamil as the most frequently spoken language at home among Indians declined from 42.9% in 2000 to 36.7% in 2010, whereas speakers of other languages (not counting English or Malay) increased from 9.9% to 13.8% in the same period (Singapore Department of Statistics, 2010, p. 26), suggesting a growing trend of immigration by non-Tamil Indians into Singapore. Nevertheless, ignoring some class divide between Tamils and non-Tamils in the Indian community, the preservation of Tamil as an official language has long helped to unify much of the Indian community, by cutting across caste and religious lines (Chua and Kwok, 2001, p. 104). The Indian population is incidentally also diverse in terms of religion, with Hindus comprising 59% in 2010, Muslims at 22% and Christians at 13% (Singapore Department of Statistics, 2010, p. 29).

The use of different bases for assembling of the three ‘racial’ populations, the Islamic religion as overriding marker for the Malays and the prominence of Tamil language in representation of the Indians, shows that the construction of these categories is far from ‘natural’, as Chua (2005) argues. He notes: “The governmental simplification and homogenisation obviously operated instrumentally on a set of convenient elements – language, religion and geography - rather than with a consistent singular principle of ‘race’.” (Chua, 2005, p. 6) Such inconsistent mode of organising the population into three races, accepting no hybrids, was entirely for the ease of governance (Ibid.).
The word ‘race’ is hence constantly used in political and popular discourse and assigned the same meaning as ‘ethnic group’ by the Singapore Department of Statistics (Ho, 2009, in *The Social Studies*, Nov/Dec 2009, p. 287). ‘Race’ as such is inherited by patriarchal descent, as all Singaporeans are automatically assigned a particular race at birth as determined by the race of the father (Ibid.). Although the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority introduced a flexible option beginning from January 2011 for parents of different races to reflect their child as a ‘double-barrelled race’, for example as “Chinese-Indian” or “Indian-Chinese”, the initial assignment to mother tongue education in schools has to refer to the first component of the stated ‘double-barrelled race’ (ICA, 29th December 2010, online). It does little in altering the fact that “the racialised culture is assumed to be embedded in the language of the race which is assured continued existence through compulsory school instruction as the ‘mother tongue’ language of the student” (Chua, 1998, p. 190).

Benjamin (1976) has postulated that if the concept of multiracialism reflects a functioning social and cultural organisation in Singapore, then one might expect certain consequences, namely that a ‘same’ ethnic group would be much more ethnically conscious than in society with a ‘non-racial’ category, and that there would be a tendency to make the social reality fit an ethnic or racial theory of causation (Benjamin, 1976, p. 119). He then goes on to cite observations that “Singaporeans are inclined to show particular concern for ethnic identity is especially apparent to visitors from countries where the ‘same’ ethnic group is represented” (Ibid., p. 120), whereby a Singaporean would normally wish to know it is a ‘Chinese’ from Hong Kong or Taiwan, ‘Indian’ from India, Pakistan or Ceylon, and ‘Malay’ from Indonesia, rather than other possible criteria such as class, age or degree of educational attainment (Ibid.). Furthermore, ‘culture’ in public discussion in Singapore has usually referred not to any new Singaporean synthesis or innovation but simply an agglomerate of the separate Chinese, Malay, Indian and European traditions, each as “a traditional, ethnically delimited culture, a Golden Age to which each ‘race’ can look back separately for inspiration” (Ibid.). Incidentally, Benjamin uses the word ‘culture’ to refer loosely to “a socially derived complex of ideas quite different from actual behaviour” (Ibid., p. 117), citing it as similar to the Durkheimian notion of ‘conscience collective’. He subsequently also discusses how each constituent ‘race’ is ascribed “a stereotyping list of defining behavioural characteristics” (Ibid., p. 124).
for instance government ministers who are Malay by ethnicity would urge Malay audiences to be more positively oriented towards urban life, “despite the lack of evidence that Singapore Malays exhibit a ‘rural’ world view” (Ibid.), whereas in Chinese circles, there would be a tendency to propagate a Confucian view of morality and even a ‘return’ to extended-family pattern of residence though this had been rare among ancestors of the Singapore Chinese community (Ibid.).

There is arguably also a strong conflation of race with religion in Singapore perpetuated by government statements, despite the difference by degrees, with 99.6 of Malays being Muslims, 55.4% of Indians being Hindus and 64.4 per cent of Chinese being Buddhists or Taoists according to statistics of the year 2000 census (Ng, 2010, p. 93).

In terms of changing trends, the percentage of Muslims and of Hindus among the resident population has been stable between 2000 and 2010, while the percentage of Buddhists/Taoists has dipped from 51% to 44.2%, whereas the percentage of Christians has increased from 14.6% to 18.3% (Singapore Department of Statistics, 2010, p. 29). The attraction of Christianity has been thus represented: “One important factor for the increasing popularity of Christianity seems to be a general dissatisfaction among young Chinese Singaporeans with their parents’ religious practices which they perceive as ‘illogical, unrealistic and superstitious’. Christianity in contrast is considered to be ethnically neutral, unlike Islam and Hinduism. It represents western influence and is associated with modernisation and the English language. Christianity there is supposed to be ‘rational, orderly and systematic’…” (Ackermann, 1997, p. 55). A growing trend of mega churches identified as evangelical or charismatic has in particular been a subject of sociological study in recent years.

Chua (1998) has argued that there is much hybridity in cultural practices of everyday life in Singapore, though there has been an attempt to erase such hybridity through construction of the different ethnic cultures within racialised boundaries. One aspect is the mixture of languages that developed historically through inter-ethnic economic cooperation, for instance a mix of Malay and English as a medium between Indian traders who spoke no Chinese and Chinese brokers who spoke no Indian languages (Chua, 1998, in Chen, 1998, p. 187). There has more recently been a patois of
English known as ‘Singlish’ which has emerged among the local population, including the tertiary educated who speak grammatically proper if not grammatically perfect English (Chua, 2005, p. 14). A blending of English with Chinese syntax and vocabulary, particularly Hokkien which has been a lingua franca in Singapore for a long time, “Singlish has been defended by middle class, proficient-English-speakers as an identity marker of being ‘Singaporean’ (Ibid.)”. Another aspect is that of food, for example the street-food known as *mee goreng*, whereby “*mee* is Chinese made noodle [and] *goreng* is the Malay word for frying”, and it is served generally by Indian Muslim hawkers (Chua, 1998, in Chen, 1998, p. 187). Finally, there is absorption of elements across religious practices, for example Malay indigenous animistic practices relating to local spirits, which have been adopted by Chinese as *datuk gong* (Ibid.). Such hybridity has been signified locally with the term ‘rojak culture’, whereby *rojak* is a dish that mixes together disparate cultural ingredients (Ibid.).

One may argue also that the local communities of Singapore were not mutually exclusive along ethnic lines of ‘race’ to begin with, but tended to be more fragmented with the process of Singapore’s drastic urbanisation into Housing and Development Board (HDB) estates, among other measures. This social construction of ‘race’ has permeated the social organisation in Singapore since its nation-building days, and is a key to understanding the political ideology of communitarianism under the current regime, whereby different ethnic groups tend to be segregated in spheres of social life such as housing, education, media and so on through differential policies.

However, one may also grant the local communities more agency, to consider that life in the state-planned HDB needs not be conceived as non-authentic but instead as a world where meanings are made through “local experience [mediating] national identity”, like what Lai (1995, p. 5) argues in a study on inter-ethnic relations in Singapore, citing A.P. Cohen (1982, p. 13) argument on the co-existence of local collectivity and wider social contexts. Lai observes in the housing community of Marine Parade how identities may be transformed through quotidian activities of shopping, eating, chatting and playing, how cultural boundaries may be redefined and how there may be tension between spontaneous grassroots interaction and top-down bureaucracy in the management of pluralism (see Pearson, 1997, p. 453).
Lai (1995) also notes there that despite an official discourse under the government’s attempt of sinicisation whereby ‘Chinese = Mandarin = Confucian culture’, there remains a demarcation between the English- and Chinese-educated Chinese populations in language, education and culture, related to differing political orientation whereby the Chinese-educated elite has historically seen the English-language as language of the colonial oppressor (pp. 143-147). In the recent online dissent against the PAP government’s neoliberal population policy, one may observe a new shift in identification, with challenges against the official racialised justification that new citizens from China are cultural interchangeable with Singaporean Chinese. One local Chinese blogger who notably expressed such a view was a train officer with the pseudonym of Gintai, whose blog first went viral when the Singapore Mass Rapid Transit (SMRT) system experienced its first major train disruptions in December 2011, prompting angry Singaporeans to complain of overcrowding in the city-state. He also commented on MP Seng Hang Thong’s discriminating remarks suggesting that SMRT’s emergency preparedness was hampered by English skills of Malay and Indian staff. A few months later, Gintai turned to the topic of his camaraderie with a Malay colleague: “I feel much closer and at ease with Train Officers like Anak Abu even though those PRs are Chinese. We are Singaporeans. We grew up together sharing the same ideals in schools and living environment and even been through NS together. (Gintai, 23rd April 2012, online)” The serving of national service (NS) has incidentally been a sore point among male Singaporeans who lament their disadvantage in the job market while carrying the burden of such obligations as citizens. (The blog was discontinued some months later, after the blogger’s invitation to a meeting with Law Minister K. Shanmugam.)

In August 2011, the simple local dish of curry came into spotlight as it turned into a symbol of Singapore identity. It followed from a newspaper report about a newly arrived mainland Chinese family who took offence to their Indian neighbours’ habit of cooking curry, forcing a mediation centre to rule that the Indian family should only cook curry while the Chinese family was out. Incensed by the incident, 40,000 Singaporean netizens vowed to mark the weekend of 21st August as Curry Day by cooking the dish (Moore, 16th August 2013). This attempt to signify the Singapore identity seems to vindicate Stuart Hall’s perspective that “identities are constructed through, not outside, difference” (1996, p. 4)
Within the Indian community or, more accurately speaking, communities, one may also observe how the local Tamil-speaking community may be identifying themselves more as local Singaporeans and citizens than as ‘Indians’ when it comes to issues of employment and quality of living. In a Tamil television forum of *Idhayam Pesugirathu* (Series 2, Episode 7, 28th February 2013), participants have distinguished themselves from foreign talents and foreign labour coming from South Asia under Singapore’s current manpower and migration policies, as they lament the problem of overcrowding in the city among other issues. In short, there is much contestation in Singapore over the issue of whether ethnicity identities as defined by the state are relevant to Singaporeans, who are increasingly identifying themselves as locals instead of the reified races. Indeed, “ethnic identity is a highly relative concept that the political morality of nationalism seeks to transform into an absolute one” (Herzfeld, 1997, p. 43).

The next half of the chapter will discuss the lack of approaches for ‘intercultural dialogue’ in Singapore in terms of a sense of social cohesion and public spheres for liberal open exchange, under such a differentiated communitarian approach. Peaceful coexistence among different ethnic groups, referred to as ‘racial harmony’ in Singapore’s National Education programme, is achieved with the help of draconian legal measures, in a delicate form of ‘tolerance’ in the public sphere maintained by way of censorship and punishment. The CMIO model of racialised multiculturalism hence functions as a Hobbesian model focusing on conflict prevention (Taib, 11th October 2012, online), which also serves to legitimise continued authoritarian rule rather than to promote communal relations among the local people.

### 4.2 Need for Intercultural Dialogue in Singapore to overcome Cultural Differences

#### 4.2.1 Lack of Social Cohesion in Singapore – Civic or Ethnic Nationalism?

This section will consider the issue of social cohesion in the example of Singapore, not only in terms of the challenge by virtue of de facto diversity in its ethnic plurality, but in terms of the adoption of a differentiated approach under the framing of a multiracialism as defined by the state in its ‘CMIO’ formula. It also examines whether
the nation can truly be considered civic rather than ethnic, whether some groups may be disadvantaged in lieu of assimilation through education, and whether the housing policy in Singapore serves to promote integration.

With the compartmentalisation of racial categories in Singapore under the neat CMIO formula, it creates a paradox. The sense of nationhood, with a correspondingly differentiated policy, has been tied to an idea of Singapore as a meritocratic society that claims equality while constructing and perpetuating racial differences (Purushotam, 2000, pp. 13). A characterisation of Singapore as a ‘multiracial meritocracy’ (Lee, 9th April 2009, online), as part of the political rhetoric in Singapore by its statesmen, has underlined its claims of being a superior model in contrast to what it criticises as the favouring of the indigenous peoples in Malaysia and Indonesia – unlike in Singapore, the Chinese on the other side are a minority instead of a dominant ethnicity.

Such state-defined multiracialism, where ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ are used interchangeably, has “permeated all levels of society and is now common among officials, policy makers, academics and the public alike” (Lai, 2004, p. 9), such that most Singaporeans have also become “quick and proficient in racial categorisation and interpretation in both their public and private lives” (ibid), with “direct consequences not only on the structuring of identities and opportunities for in-group members but also on relationships and modes of interaction where ethnic individuals and groups meet” (Ibid.). Maintaining social cohesion involves not only a challenge due to fluid social contexts in terms of social identities; it is also a question of how one may see divisions, not necessarily in terms of racial or ethnic tensions, but also in terms of income or wealth inequality and disparities in political participation or other forms of participation (Ibid., p. 3). In other words, the success of social cohesion also hinges on the level of ‘meritocracy’ that is claimed under Singapore’s ideology.

One may assess the public policies in Singapore with regards to their function under its state ideology, by analysing the ideology from the angle of civic versus ethnic nationalism, and in terms of communitarian versus liberal values. From there, one may examine the effects of its consequent policies on various spheres of public life for the different ethnic groups.
The distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism is one of the most commonly used concepts in the study of ethnic relations and nationalism. It dates back to the 1907 work *Cosmopolitanism and the National State*, where German historian Friedrich Meinecke asserted a fundamental difference between political and cultural nations, a dichotomous framework then developed and popularised by Czech émigré Hans Kohn in his 1944 book *The Idea of Nationalism* (see Shulman, 2002, p. 555). Kohn argued that nationalism in the West, particularly England, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United States, was primarily political, being inspired by Enlightenment ideas of liberty and equality and having struggled against dynastic rule, whereas in Central and Eastern Europe and Asia, nationalism arose in polities that poorly coincided with cultural or ethnic boundaries (Ibid.). Hence in the Western model, citizenship is equated with membership in the nation, whereas, in the Eastern model, nations have been consolidated around the common heritage of a people and the idea of the *volk* or people instead (Ibid.).

Kohn’s contrast of the two models cast the Eastern form of nationalism in a negative light, for he described it as not only less rational but also lacking in self-assurance and compensating an inferiority complex with over-emphasis, as it “exulted the primitive and ancient depth and peculiarities of its traditions in contrast to Western nationalism and to universal standards (Kohn, 1994, p. 164; cited in McCrone, 2008, p. 318). As such, these civic/ethnic and West/East dichotomies have been criticised for having a normative, ethnocentric bias. McCrone raises that such a distinction “does lend itself to ethnocentric caricature – why can’t they be more like us?” (McCrone, 1998, p. 9; cited in Shulman, 2002, p. 558; emphasis in original). Conceptually, some scholars have also attacked the logic of the civic/ethnic distinction, with Yack challenging the notion that a civic identity would be freely and rationally chosen whereas an ethnic identity is inherited and emotionally biased, for civic identities may also be inherited, he argues (Yack, 1999, p. 109; cited in Shulman, 2002, p. 558). Nielsen and Kymlicka both argue that ethnic nationalism should not be equated with cultural nationalism for they differ in openness to outsider, as seen in examples of Quebec and Flanders where nationalisms have been labelled as ethnic but should actually be seen as cultural (Kymlica, 1999, p. 133; Nielsen, 1999, p. 126; both cited in Shulman, 2002, p. 558). Finally, from an empirical perspective, scholars working with the civic/ethnic dichotomy have also
been quick to say that most states and nations contain both components. Smith for instance says that “every nationalism contains civic and ethnic elements in varying degrees and different forms. Sometimes civic and territorial elements predominate; at other times it is the ethnic and vernacular components that are emphasised” (Smith, 1991, p. 13; cited in Shulman, Ibid.).

In any case, a framework using conceptual categories along the lines of ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ has been adapted and elaborated by David Brown to view nationalisms among Southeast Asian countries as forming a continuum from ‘ethnocultural’, through ‘multicultural’ to ‘civic’ (Brown, 2005; cited in Barr and Skrbis, 2008, p. 3). Adopting this spectrum of categorisation, Burma may be placed on the furthest extreme of the ‘ethnocultural’ end, with Thailand not far behind, whereas Indonesia is placed on the ‘civic’ end, with Singapore behind it, while Malaysia may be placed in the middle (Ibid.). Barr and Skrbis argue that the placing in such categorisation may be misleading, for even as Indonesia was quasi-secular in national ideology and race and ethnicity were not recognised as legitimate forms of identification, there was also clear ethnic dimension in transmigration policy whereby Javanese and Madurese were shipped to outlying provinces, resulting in dominance over the locals (Barr and Skrbis, 2008, p. 4). Similarly, despite the official rhetoric that Singapore follows a civic model of nationhood, Barr and Skrbis argue that “since around 1980 the Singapore nation-building project began moving away from a civic-oriented model [...] towards a more ethnic-cum-racial form, with the conceptions of ‘Chinese ethnicity’ and a peculiarly Singaporean notion of ‘Chinese values’ assuming increasingly important roles” (Ibid., p. 5). Rather than a picture of meritocracy as painted in official rhetoric of the Singapore leaders, what Barr and Skrbis see in the Singapore society is an occupation of Chinese ethnicity and values coming to occupy a similar place that Malay ethnicity occupies openly in Malaysia: “it is the basis of full identification with the nation, but allows the other communities to live and prosper in a relatively comfortable communion with the centre (Ibid.)”.

The first signs in Singapore of a shift in the direction towards ethnic nationalism, according to Barr and Skrbis, were the launch of the ‘Speak Mandarin Campaign’ in 1979 and the decision within the same year to enhance elite Chinese-medium schools under the Special Assistance Plan (SAP), whereby children were given multiple advantages such as special consideration for pre-university scholarships
Neither Indian nor Malay students, in contrast, were given special help or schools of their own to address their needs (Ibid., p. 93). Following that, Confucianism was propagated in Singapore, beginning with the invitation of Chinese-American professors of Chinese students to Singapore in 1982 to announce that Confucianism is suitable for all Singaporeans, regardless of race or religion. As reported in the national Straits Times newspaper on 5th September 1982: “Confucianism can be practiced by all, regardless of their colour or creed. It may have natural appeal to the Chinese, but it is meant to be universal as it just teaches a person how to be a human, how to live” (cited in Ibid., p. 95). Along with that, there was a discourse arguing that Chinese culture was good for the development of Singapore, a discourse led by Singapore’s prime minister for over three decades since 1959, Lee Kuan Yew. He said on 25th August 1992:

“In looking back over the last 30 years, I believe we were fortunate that 77% of our people had strong Chinese traditional values which put emphasis on the strength of the family, the bring up of children to be modest, hardworking, thrifty, filial, loyal and law abiding. Their behaviour had an influence on non-Chinese Singaporeans.” (cited in Ibid., p. 87)

‘Chinese values’ as such were of course a construction, in fact something that was previously given mostly negative associations in the public discourse in the 1960s and 1970s, when they were linked with Chinese communism and Chinese chauvinism (Ibid., p. 45). But Chinese values as defined in a narrow, sectarian version by the Singapore government were soon “promoted to the whole population through the thin disguise of the ‘Asian values’ rhetoric and enshrined in the national ideology through the White Paper on Shared Values in 1988” (Ibid., p. 95). This privileging of Chinese values, along with a rising dominance of Mandarin as a major vehicle of communication, to the exclusion of other ethnic groups, is characterised by Barr and Skrbis as a form of ‘Sinicisation’ and ‘incomplete assimilation’ – “a balancing act between the imperative that minority members need to strive to act ‘like Chinese’ in order to succeed and the insistence that at the end of this process they will continue to be relegated to a minority status” (Ibid., p. 98).
David Brown (1994) has analysed similar changes in Singapore in the management of ethnicity but under a different framework with wider historical scope, whereby he distinguished between three periods: the first from self-government in 1959 to independence in 1965, was an ‘ethnic mosaic’ period whereby ethnicity was downplayed to promote a unifying capacity of multiracialism; the second period, from 1966 to 1980, was distinguished by principles of race-blind meritocracy; the final period beginning in the 1980s may be seen as an attempt of ‘inclusionary corporatism’, characterised by ethnicity being increasingly managed through mechanisms of a corporatist state (see Barr and Skrbis, 2008, p. 53). Corporatism refers to “attempts by an avowedly autonomous state elite to organise the diverse interest associations in society so that their interests can be accommodated within the interdependent and organics national community” (Brown, 1994, p. 67). Brown suggests that the development of corporatist tendencies in a plural society leads to the state becoming involved in attempts to engineer ethnic consciousness, and that the state may seek to organise ethnic communities as ‘singular, compulsory, non-competitive and hierarchically ordered’ categories, with effective supervision of ethnic demands by licensing and controlling the issues recognised as legitimate (Ibid., p. 76).

Brown notes that even in the initial period of ‘ethnic mosaic’, it did not imply that each ethnic group would receive equal attention, for there was in practice “a stress, both in national ideology and in resource allocation, on the constitutionally guaranteed ‘special position’ of the Malays” (Ibid., p. 79). Hence the Malay language was not only a lingua franca but also promoted as the national language, and the Malays received free education, unlike other racial communities (Ibid.). The government was “impelled to downplay its concern to protect Chinese interests while displaying its concern for the Malays” (Ibid.), due to its desire to attain independence. Circumstances changed after independence, such that national ideology began to be portrayed more in terms of ethnic neutrality, whereby the discourse of ‘multiculturalism’ was used “to celebrate the virtue of inter-ethnic tolerance in an achievement-oriented society committed to economic development” (Ibid., p. 80). With unchallenged authority, the Singapore government in the 1970s concentrated on the central task of industrialisation and inculcated its citizens with ideals of self-reliance, pragmatism and pursuit of excellence, such that the national identity
became epitomised in ideas of ‘national development’ and ‘meritocracy’ (Ibid.). In the 1980s and early 1990s, Brown argues, Singaporean politics moved in a corporatist direction. The People’s Action Party regime had already subsumed all trade unions under the pro-government National Trade Union Congress (NTUC) in the 1960s and proceeded to appoint its party members to key NTUC posts. Its government also offered ‘non-constituency MP’ places to defeated opposition candidates since 1984 and provided channels such as the Government Feedback Unit since 1985 for controlled participation. Alongside such political moves, Brown sees the government’s remoulding of ethnic cultural values, to form a national identity with core ‘Asian values’, as part of a more inclusionary corporatist strategy, furthered by an institutionalisation of ethnic interests through state-licensed organisations “through which ethnic interests could be articulated and through which state policies could be promoted” (Ibid., p. 96).

Considering the function of corporatist strategies in controlling and depoliticising ethnic interests, as described by Brown, and the argument of Barr and Skrbis that there is ‘incomplete assimilation’ whereby the culture of the dominant ethnicity is privileged as being superior and more conducive for economic excellence, one may see that a civic/ethnic dichotomy is inadequate in characterising Singapore’s ideology as a nation. Singapore has also been characterised as an authoritarian political system, whereby “authorities are appealing to Confucian traditions somewhat dishonestly to justify an intrusive and unnecessarily paternalistic political system” (Fukuyama, 1995, online), with an argument made by former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and his followers that “Western-style democracy is incompatible with Confucianism, and that the latter constitutes a much more coherent ideological basis for a well-ordered Asian society than Western notions of individual liberty” (cited in Ibid.). Legitimised by Confucianism as ‘Asian values’, Singapore’s authoritarian rule is used to promote political stability which in turn is used to advance economic development, as Lingle (1996) has argued. Authoritarian rule at the same time may be used to suppress ethnic and class conflicts, legitimated especially by anti-communist ideology, as Deyo (1987) and Rodan (1994) have pointed out (see Goh, 2002, online, p. 2). The question of Singapore in a classification between civic or ethnic nationalism, regardless of whether one sees the rule as more authoritarian or more corporatist, may thus be refined to one of whether one sees capitalism or
Chinese values as reigning supreme in their conflation. Confucianism has incidentally been compared to the ‘Protestant Work Ethic’ as a driving force behind economic success (Lim and Chua, 2003), quite without irony.

Another paradigm for analysing the organising of ethnic cultures under Singapore’s political system would be the distinction between communitarianism and liberalism. This may provide us with further perspectives on how different ethnic communities in Singapore are disconnected from one another and how much autonomy or privilege each community may enjoy under the system. But first of all, it has to be recognised that whereas communitarianism, with its insistence of community-embeddedness of individuals, emerged in the West as an alternative or modification to liberalism, as notably debated in the 1980s (Chua, 2004, p. 3), communitarianism in Asia is “a counter-discourse to liberalism, not a reformist one” (Ibid., p. 8). What political leaders in Singapore, and elsewhere in East and Southeast Asia, employ as national ideology is a ‘vernacular communitarianism’, whereby a sense of community providing emotional and material resources is taken for granted as everyday life, such that “politics is always about the management of the social rather than the adjudication of conflicts between individuals” (Ibid., p. 9). This is not to say that individuals in such a social system are so thoroughly socialised that they do not feel repressed, hence there is a need for Asian politicians to demonise liberalism as ‘Western’, while imposing their ‘collective’ values’ onto the citizens (Ibid.).

In Singapore, claims to a ‘communitarian’ ideology are made as the Singapore embraces capitalism and legitimises itself on its economic achievement (Ibid., 14). Whereas the challenge of a liberal government in seeking stability is to contend with issues of social welfare for individuals, the task of a communitarian government is to support conservative values of tradition (Ibid., p. 16). This is done in Singapore through a multi-racial division in governance which is combined with other political manoeuvrings to remove challenge from any social group to the power of the regime, such that development of democratic politics in Singapore is severely hampered (Ibid., p. 19).

The racially defined communities in Singapore are incidentally evenly distributed in the island state due to deliberate redistribution of the population by quota in the process or urbanisation. Concentration of ethnic quarters in pre-independence days
has been broken down, such that ‘community’ in Singapore no longer exists in the sense of such locality. “This enforced physical integration of the different racial groups as immediate neighbours [was] rationalised negatively in terms of preventing racial conflicts and in more positive terms as encouraging racial integration” (Chua, 2004, p. 90), even though there is no reason to believe that this served any more than to weaken cohesion within ethnic communities.

Drastic urban development took place in Singapore from 1960s to 1980s. In 1959, when Singapore gained self-government, less than 9% of the population was sheltered in public housing; but since the creation of the Housing and Development Board (HDB) in 1960, by 1974 nearly 43% of the population lived in HDB flats, and by 1989 the proportion was 87%, with 20 'New Towns' encircling the original urban core. (De Koninck, Singapore/re, cited in Koolhaas, 1995, p. 1033) This may be seen as part of de-traditionalisation policies which replace communal traditions with a new collective life. While there have since been efforts to conserve external facades and structures of old colonial buildings for instance, Singaporeans have lamented that these seem to cater to the tastes of tourists but ignore intangible aspects of heritage such as "traditional trades and lifestyles" (Teo and Huang, 1995, pp. 610-611).

In his diagnosis of Singapore's urban 'renewal', Rem Koolhaas has thus summarised it: "the new republic's blueprint, its dystopian program: displace, destroy, replace". (Koolhaas, 1995, p. 1035) The HDB system was not only a speedy solution for efficient housing, but also an emergency response to a specific political crisis, for it was said that in the slums and kampungs (Malay for rural village) of the early 1960s, "criminal elements bred and thrived; Communism found new adherents", as HDB stated in its 1969 memorial publication First Decade in Public Housing (cited in Clancey, 2004, ip. 48).

Further to that, in 1989 the Ethnic Integration Policy was introduced to set ratios for ethnic groups in public housing estates to ensure a balanced mix of ethnicity and prevent enclaves from forming. This also effectively helps the People's Action Party, political incumbents of a one-party rule since 1960s, to disperse voters, the opposition being known to fare better in constituencies with high populations of Malays (Think Centre, 2010, p. 6). Unfortunately, the policy often makes it difficult for children of minority races to live near their parents (Ibid., p. 7). The quotas for
precincts and blocks have been 84% and 87% for the Chinese, 22% and 25% for the Malays, and for the Indians/Others' it was 10% and 13% until March 2010; this would make it difficult for Indian families to move into the Little India area, as one cannot buy flats from Chinese families (Tham, 16 March 2010), for instance. A new quota announced for permanent residents, set at 5% and 8% respectively, further complicated the matter (Ibid.).

Little India or Tekka is incidentally a rare area in Singapore where there is an unbroken sense of authentic living culture, as the shophouses of the conserved buildings remain bustling with life till today. Apart from the colourful vegetable stalls and a wide range of Indian restaurants, there are various traditional trades such as flower shops, textile shops, jewellery shops, sweets shops, shops selling religious artefacts and products, even fortune-tellers with parrots. There is incidentally a Little India Shopkeepers and Heritage Association which was established in 2000 under the urging of the Singapore Tourism Board partly for the objective of "the betterment of Little India as multi-cultural and multi-ethnic tourist destination in Singapore" (Lisha, 2010, online). It plays a significant role in the organisation of annual celebrations of various traditional festivities in Little India, including Deepavali (festival of light), Pongal (harvest festival) and Thaipusam. An Indian Heritage Centre has been scheduled for construction in Little India by end-2013, as a project of the National Heritage Board.

This compares favourably to the area known as Chinatown in English, a misnomer given that the Chinese are a majority almost everywhere in Singapore, and this in fact refers to the place called Kreta Ayer (in Malay) or Niu Che Shui (in Mandarin), formerly an enclave of the Cantonese community specifically. Despite conservation of the physical buildings, it has lost its specific flavour since the 1980s when residents and shops were displaced, and has become a manifestation of Singapore’s Sinicisation with a grand Chinese identity. The exhibition in the Chinatown Heritage Centre (visited in February 2013), is not only conspicuous for its dark lighting in a reproduction of dingy living conditions of the original tenants but also for the over-emphasis in its exhibition on lack of hygiene and development in Chinatown instead of sharing fond memories in a sense of communal bonding.
The Malay settlement of Geylang Serai has another twist of fate, whereby in addition to urban redevelopment, a replica Malay Village was created, without finding success as a tourist trap. Most recently, there are plans for a new ‘civic centre’ there, tentatively called Wisma Geylang Serai. It is significant that such ethnic neighbourhoods, including also the Arab Street area, used as venues for annual festive bazaars and some cultural shows, serve as symbolic centres of ethnic cultures in Singapore, whereas the new towns are kept ethnically neutral as neighbourhoods.

The ethnic quota in public housing has often affected the social and cultural lives of the residents, especially the minority groups of Malays and Indians. For Malays especially, there are aspects in daily life being Muslims such as dietary items which are grouped into halal and haram (permissible and not permissible by religion respectively), hence in any event of emergency, it would be difficult for a Malay family to find a Malay neighbour to take care of children (Chua, 2004, p. 91). With local state-initiated activities being more cost-effective for the Chinese majority due to critical mass, it is also not surprising that the mosques with control over their own spaces have become the centre of Muslim activities in each public housing new town (Ibid.).

One key institution set up in the process of Singapore’s modernisation and urbanisation is that of the ‘community centres’ situated at new towns or housing estates around the island nation. They are a network of centres which originated as food distribution centres in the colonial days but later provided sports activities and cultural activities that contributed to a collective sense of multiracial Malayan culture prior to Singapore’s separation from Malaysia in 1965. Holden (2004) has analysed its function since the 1960s as “part of a postcolonial narrative of production, of the disciplining of individual citizen subjects in a national modernity” (pp. 79-80), an institution that manages leisure time of citizens as “self-improvement and bodily training … as part of an ascetic devotion to work which Max Weber identified with Protestantism and which, in the 1980s and 1990s, came to be identified with Confucius and Asian values in Singapore” (p. 80). The community centres were first taken over from the colonial rulers and placed under the newly formed People’s association after Singapore gained self-government in 1959. Through these centres, the PAP also appropriated the successful mass mobilisation of their leftist, Chinese-
educated allies in promoting a new nationalist culture that is cleansed from decadent Western culture such as cabarets and nightclubs (Ibid. 82-83). When the left wing of the PAP broke off as Barisan Sosialis in 1961, six members of staff were sacked and a strike by majority of PA staff put down; the community centres have since then become narrowly political, promoting the influence of the ruling party (Ibid., p. 84). Until today, the PA remains a party organ that may restrict the use of its venues even while belonging to an opposition party’s ward.

Education is another public sphere that is ruled by the logic of multiracialism in Singapore. Whereas English as the primary language of instruction for all in school and also the working language in public administration has provided as a basis of meritocracy in Singapore, the teaching of mother tongue has been organised according to rigid classification based on paternal descent, as mentioned in the previous section. Such enforcement of language education as racial marker is potentially a hurdle in social mobility: for example, a child who is born of mixed parentage such as Indian and Chinese, with English spoken in the family, would tend to suffer poor performance in Mandarin or in Tamil, and “may as a consequence be deprived of tertiary education as entry to local university is contingent upon his/her achieving a minimum standard in the second language” (Chua, 2004, p. 89). Some flexibility was only introduced in more recent years. But this reflects a multicultural and communitarian policy that uses education of a second language or ‘mother tongue’ as “vehicle for transmitting culture and values of its race” (Ibid.) but hampering employment opportunities for some in the process. Apart from racial differentiation at the individual level, there is also question of unequal treatment for students in different school systems. Whereas Christian mission schools and ‘bilingual’ schools which have Chinese as another first language often enjoy special assistance, the lack of subsidy for Madrasahs under Edusave scheme has been a concern for the Malay-Muslim community (Abdullah, 2011; Manap, 2012, online).

Social welfare has also been divided in Singapore to some extent along ethnic lines. Ideologically speaking, the PAP government has insisted that it is against social welfarism for two primary reasons, firstly that it believes welfarism saps the work ethic, secondly that it argues that substituting itself for the family in providing social and financial support as such would weaken the family and the fundamental bond in society (Chua, 2004, pp. 91-92). Yet, the government does give subsidies in areas of
education, health, housing and other infrastructure provisions, often under description as ‘human capital’ investments, including ‘a very generous package’ since 2003 of assistance up to S$100,000 for purchase of public housing (Ibid., p. 92). Such ‘generosity’ of course also has to be evaluated against trends of rising housing prices through the decades along with conditions of eligibility and availability. Most recently, PM Lee Hsien Loong has rejected a proposal by local economist Prof Lim Chong Yah for ‘wage shock therapy’ to be implemented to address income inequality and compensate for stagnating wages in the past decade attributed to the influx of low-wage foreign workers. He argues in a May Day rally speech that one “must get at least 30 per cent productivity growth in ten years” in exchange for 30 per cent real wage growth (Lee H.L., 2012, online).

Racialisation in welfare provision actually began in Singapore in the early 1980s with an attempt to address the disadvantaged social, economic and educational position of the Malay community relative to the Chinese and the Indians (Chua, 2004, p. 92). An organisation dedicated to helping Malay children from lower-income families who are falling behind in their education, the MENDAKI (Majlis Pendidikan Anak-Anak Islam) was established with governmental financial support and collaboration of other Malay-Muslim community organisations. But due to ‘the logic of equality of racial groups’ (Ibid.), the Chinese population followed suit by setting up the CDAC (Chinese Development Assistance Council), and this was followed by SINDA (Singapore Indian Development Agency). The government administrates it by deducting a small sum of money from the monthly salary of each working Singaporean through the Central Provident Fund. As typical under Singapore’s multiracial policy, “individuals are marked by official racial categories and not permitted to contribute across racial boundaries” (Ibid.). Furthermore, potential beneficiaries of mixed parentage tend to fall between the cracks, especially South Asian Muslims. Ironically, with these racially divided self-help groups, the Chinese community by sheer numbers and economic strength tends to collect more funds than the Malays and the Indians, hence the minorities, especially the Malay community, again tend to compare unfavourably (Ibid., p. 93). This may have a long-term effect of perpetuating economic divisions, though the government has also encouraged the three racial organisations to share resources and to allow children of different races access educational help at centres closest to homes regardless of
which organisation is operating the centre (Ibid.). Whether the ethnic majority stands to benefit most from this would be another question.

It has been noted, based on research in North London, that racism, especially among the inner-city working class, does not operate in the form of cultural stereotypes alone, but has manifested as part of a process whereby residents and workers attempt to make sense of their concerns in urban decline (Rattansi, 1992, p. 31). Racist discourses and practices as such are seen to flourish in “situations of acute competition for scarce resources such as employment and housing and they are exacerbated by the insecurities of rising inflation” (Ibid.). A similar argument may possibly be made of Singapore, which has seen rapid population growth by 2010 of permanent residents rising to 10.7% of total population and that of non-residents rising to 25.7% of total population (Lai, 2012, p. 4). However, in contrast with ‘anti-immigrant’ contexts of the West, expressions of xenophobia have largely been limited to netizens’ comments on websites and more specifically during General Election of 2011, and there is a need to disentangle from these the more general locals’ sentiments against policies of rapid and massive immigration which lead to “claims of discriminatory hiring practices against locals, soaring property prices including public housing, allocation of places and bond-free scholarships to foreign students in the highly competitive higher education sector and growing pressures on social facilities and public transport” (Ibid., p. 37).

The issue of xenophobia and racialisation in Singapore is complicated by the official classification of Chinese and Indian immigrants under the same ethnic identities as local ethnic Chinese and Indians, “a misfit that is based on false assumptions of ethnic cultural similarity and identity” (Ibid.), with an “expectation of relatively problem-free integration arising from supposed similarities [that] falls flat in the face of the poignant differences and divides [particularly] between local Chinese and PRC Chinese” (Ibid.). Ultimately, one may argue that the conditions for local-immigrant relations and integration would much depend on economic growth and distribution issues as well as city planning for liveability (Ibid., p. 39). There is also one principle that should arguably be upheld for the sake of social cohesion, namely that Singaporeans should be convinced that “citizenship and belonging is what is meaningful, rightful and at the heart of it all” (Ibid.) in order to present more extreme sentiments of ethnic nationalism from taking roots against current trends of
immigration promoted by the government. In February 2013, Singapore saw an unprecedented protest of thousands against a government white paper that envisages a population growth to 6.9 million by 2030, a significant event for its expression of nationalist sentiments (Au, 17 Feb 2013, online).

4.2.2 Lack of Liberalism in Singapore in the Public Spheres on Issues of Racism and Stereotyping

This section will deal with the question of whether problems of racism and stereotyping among different cultural communities are suppressed or further perpetuated by illiberal public policies, which eschews open exchange of view in the public sphere for draconic legal measures instead to maintain ‘racial harmony’. It will conclude in reference to Kymlicka’s framework of liberal multiculturalism, that as long as the particular context of Singapore’s current political atmosphere prevails, ‘intercultural dialogue’ in Singapore can only refer to a form of national education or cultural industry and not to a sense of deliberative democracy.

The public media in Singapore is available in all four official languages. But the government exercises social and political control with the press and other media. The Newspaper and Printing Act (1974) imposed limits on ownership of media, with a restrictive definition of its role as ‘supportive of government interests’, stipulating that all newspapers are to be Singaporean public companies including management shares allocated to government-owned holding companies and trusted individuals which have 200 times voting power over ordinary shares in matters of editorial policy and appointment or dismissal or directors and editorial staff (Chua, 2004, p. 81). Past directors of the domestic intelligence service, the Internal Security Department, have been continually appointed to the management board (Ibid.). In the 1980s, a monopolistic company, the Singapore Press Holdings, was even set up to incorporate all national newspapers in all the official languages (Ibid.). Formerly, Nanyang Siang Pau, a privately owned newspaper used to be alleged of playing up pro-communist sentiments and issues of Chinese languages, and in May 1971, the general manager and three other leading staff members including editor-in-chief Liy Sing Ko were arrested under the Internal Security Act (SDP, 2012, online). In 1986, a bill to amend the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act (NPPA) was also introduced
to restrict the sale and distribution in Singapore of any foreign publication if it was found to be “engaging in the domestic politics of Singapore” (Ibid.).

The Singapore government is also monitoring the new media on internet out of political considerations. In 2012, a few months ahead of the General Elections, The Online Citizen, one of the country’s most popular socio-political websites, was ordered by the government to be gazetted as a political organisation under the Political Donations Act, to prevent anonymous donations or funding from foreign sources (CNA, 17th February 2012). On 28th May 2013, the Media Development Authority announced that any online news site reporting on with more than 50,000 viewers from Singapore a month would have to put up a S$50,000 bond and comply within 24 hours to its directions to remove any content deemed in breach of content standards according to a Licensing Regime, which was gazetted two days later as subsidiary legislation to the Broadcasting Act without parliamentary discussion (#FreeMyInternet, 1st June 2013). This prompted an online petition to defend freedom of speech and a protest on Hong Lim Park on 8th June 2013 attended by more than 2,000 Singaporeans, where bloggers criticised the regulation as being politically motivated in curtailing criticisms against the government, taking into account that a ‘clarification’ by Minister Tan Chuan-Jin suggested blogs may also have to be looked at if they ‘evolve’ into news sites (Channel News Asia, 8th June 2013; The Online Citizen, 5th June 2013). Human Rights Watch describes the new rule as casting “a chill over the city-state’s robust and free-wheeling online communities” (New York Times, 9th June 2013) as it “will clearly limit Singaporeans’ access to independent media” (Ibid.).

Apart from freedom of speech, freedom of association in Singapore has been severely restricted through the Societies Act which requires all voluntary associations to register with the Registrar Society, which is empowered to deny registration with minimum reasons, for instance the presumption that activities may have negative consequences on public order (Chua, 2004, p. 82). Freedom of assembly is also limited, for the Public Entertainment Licensing Unit (PELU) housed in the Police Department can deny any permit by simply citing that ‘Police assesses that the event has the potential to lead to law and order problems’ (Ibid., p. 83). Giving of speeches in public is defined as ‘public entertainment’ and hence license is
required, arguably contrary to the principle of freedom of expression which is supposedly guaranteed by the state constitution (Ibid.).

The most anti-democratic of all legislation is however the Internal Security Act, which empowers the Minister of Home Affairs to detain anyone for years without public trial, as long as the Minister has subjective reason to believe that the detained has acted against national interest and is a threat to national security. Apart from arrest operations in 1960s and 1970s whereby alleged communists have been detained for as much as two or three decades, a group of social activists including young Catholics were detained in 1987 for an alleged ‘Marxist’ conspiracy. In 2001, 13 Muslim ‘extremists’ linked to Al-Qaeda were detained. Despite the relatively sparse use of the ISA in Singapore in more recent decades, it is “cold comfort to a population that is increasingly better educated and diversified in their opinions and sentiments. Finally, so long as the ISA remains as a piece of the legal arsenal for repression, it will always mark the absence of democracy in Singapore.” (Ibid., p. 84)

Singapore is known for “very severe gerrymandering” in the electoral process (Ibid., p. 79), prompting unheeded calls for an independent electoral commission. There is also much racialisation in political elections in Singapore, notably through institutionalisation of the GRCs (Greater Representative Constituencies), each formed by up to 6 constituencies. The rationale for the GRC was ostensibly to ensure that the minority races, namely Malays and Indians, are represented in all future parliaments, for each contesting team for a GRC must include a Malay and an Indian minority member, and a team has to garner the largest number of aggregate votes in order to win the GRC. But what it does in effect is to disadvantage the opposition political parties, as the grouping of constituencies makes it not only harder for them to attain a winning margin, candidates also have difficulty to raise funds as deposit for qualification in the first place (Ibid., p. 80).

Chua would thus summarise politics in Singapore: “In the desire to maintain ‘social harmony’, an abstract socially desirable good, the government has chosen to engage in ‘preemptory’ action as a mode of government, a strategy that is implicit in all the above-discussed anti-democratic legislation. (Ibid., p. 97)” Political thinker David Miller (2000) would characterise the PAP government as an extreme form of ‘right communitarianism’ that may also more simply be called authoritarianism (see
Ibid., p. 94). But the ‘success’ of communitarianism in Singapore apparently lies in achieving a kind of stability through authoritarian rule and corporatist strategies. Chua has argued that only a segment of the tertiary educated, middle-class individuals in Singapore may crave for liberal freedom, whereas for the rest, “the apparent benefits of emphasising ‘collective’ well-being provide a sense of security, in spite of some lack of freedoms. The worst nightmare of a liberal in Singapore is to discover just how pro-family, pro-racial, pro-religious identification and nationalistic are the overwhelming number of Singaporeans. (Ibid., p. 98)”

As long noted by Benjamin (1976), “Singapore’s Multiracialism puts Chinese people under pressure to become more Chinese, Indians more Indian, and Malays more Malay, in their behaviour”. Brown argues that such multiracialism also promoted political stability in two ways: “It removed ethnicity from the political arena and defined its location in the non-political social realm, and it also provided individuals with the ‘cultural ballast’ which is, according to the government model, necessary in order to prevent the alienation (cultural and also potentially political) of the ‘rootless’ individual. (Brown, 1994, p. 83)” Althusser’s (1971) notion of Ideological State Apparatuses may well be applied here to a consciousness of nationalism (p. 219), whereby modern power in nationalism institutionalises knowledge on reality (Ibid.) and uses research institutions and intellectuals as tools of social order (Ibid.).

The privileging of the social over the individual in Singapore is explicitly articulated in the five ‘Shared Values’ of its national ideology: nation before community and society above self; consensus instead of contention as the basis of conflict resolution; family as the basic building block of society; regard and community support for the individual (Chua, 2004, p. 14). This formulation suggests that ultimately, nothing will ever be allowed to precede ‘national’ goals as set by Singapore’s one-party government. What constitute the aspirations and values of each racially and culturally defined community may also find little voice in the public sphere apart from the official channels, due to draconian control under the rule of PAP which remains unchallenged, with the help of non-democratic instruments along with devices of corporatism.
‘Chineseness’ for one is hence essentialised for instance in a way that is in line with authoritarian rule and capitalist economy in the guise of Confucianism promoted by the PAP government. Hence when the Nanyang University, a Chinese university established in the 1950s through donations from people of all walks of life, was closed by the PAP government in 1980, it was a move that cannot be explained through the standardisation of English as common language per se, but is apparently due to fears of political radicalism oriented towards communist China among the Chinese-educated intellectuals (Chua and Kwok, 2001, p. 108). Around the time of 1997 election, the PAP leaders levied charges of Chinese chauvinism at opposition leader Tang Liang Hong of Workers’ Party, who positioned himself as representing the Chinese community. He was eventually declared bankrupt after defamation suits filed by PAP leaders for questioning their integrity, and fled Singapore after receiving death threats (Amnesty International, 15th August 1997, online). Intellectuals within the Chinese community, while careful in their public interventions, have been critical of the state’s subsequent idea of developing a Chinese ‘cultural elite’ and changes to the Chinese-language curriculum announced in early 1999, reflecting “tremendous scepticism toward the state’s efforts at cultural engineering” (Chua and Kwok, 2001, p. 110). They “feel that culture should not be trivialised and politicised by the state such that, in raising cultural concerns, the Chinese-educated [is] so quickly tarnished by the label of chauvinism” (Ibid.).

Another example of how alternative voices of the communities become muted is the development of the AMP (Association of Muslim Professionals), which was formed after an inaugural conference of Malay-Muslim professionals in 1990, motivated by a disenchantment of organisers with the way the Malay-Muslim community was controlled and represented by PAP Malay MPs (Ibid., p. 100). They argued that these Malay MPs were dominated by party interests and unable to represent the Malay-Muslim interests, and hence a new professional organisation was needed as an alternative channel. But this challenge to the status quo seemed quickly dissipated when the government offered to fund AMP at the same level as MENDAKI. It agreed and ended up developing the same community services and became very similar (Ibid., p. 101). Since then, AMP has again wanted to reposition itself to engage in national, inter-ethnic and issue-oriented agenda, but PM Lee Hsien Loong has reminded at its 3rd national convention in June 2012 that it should
stay focused on education, family and financial skills and take caution in “venturing into civil society issues which are not primarily to do with the Malay-Muslim community” (CNA, 30th June 2012, online).

Similarly, the interests of the Indian community is supposed to have found representation through organisations like SINDA and the Hindu Endowments Board (HEB), but the latter is in fact also an institution dating back to colonial days for the government to exercise control of religious and cultural practices, such as restriction of music instruments in religious processions, stipulated in HEB guidelines and enforced by the police. In 2011, after a report in the national Straits Times announced that devotees at the annual Thaipusam festival are to observe rules not to beat drums, play music or chant loudly during the 4 kilometre procession, local human rights lawyer M. Ravi filed an originating summons against the Attorney-General’s Chamber and HEB, saying that the guidelines violate the rights of religious minorities under the Constitution; to nobody’s surprise, it was thrown out of court.

Where cultural heritage is concerned, nothing is allowed to take precedence over national goals of economic development, and some would hence choose to label the approach of the PAP regime as ‘pragmatism’ (Kwek, 2004, p. 112). On the question of whether Singapore can afford urban conservation, Chief Planner of the Urban Renewal Authority in Singapore, Liu Thai Ker, has said that conservation “should not be an economic burden to the government. Instead, its economic success will go a long way towards furthering the cause of conservation. (Ibid., p. 114)” It is not surprising that Singapore does not follow the example in many advanced countries in subsidising heritage conservation or according concessions such as direct grants, tax rebates and compensation (Ibid.). Heritage is discussed in Singapore more as an industry and even given the needs of national education, economic growth takes primacy, without taking heed of social or cultural impact (Ibid., p. 121).

The most recent example is the controversy of government’s plans to construct an 8-lane highway through the cultural landscape of Bukit Brown, a setting of tropical rainforest which has become the biggest Chinese cemetery in the world outside China over the century, the resting place of many pioneers in Singapore’s history. The government stood firm in going ahead with development plans despite token consultation with activist groups in 2012, with Minister for National Development Tan
Chuan-Jin reducing the heritage place as a matter of memories and arguing that the next generation can simply “create their own memories’ (Tan, 6th March 2012). The English national newspaper Straits Times labelled the concerned heritage lovers and nature lovers, who were calling for a moratorium in the highway project, as ‘naysayers’, and published forum letters dismissing conservationists as peripheral interest groups while insisting ‘national goals’ have to take precedence (SG Hard Truth, 22nd March 2013), in a typical manner of manufacturing consent through the state-monitored media in Singapore. But what seems overlooked, in such ‘national goals’ of racing to build infrastructure for an envisaged 6.9 million population in 2013, is the issue of spatial justice as well as the need for social cohesion achieved through a “shared sense of home” (Geh, 2013, p. 14). The strong public reaction against the loss of Bukit Brown as heritage is arguably an indicator of “this growing need for visible and palpable proofs of our shared past. A rapidly changing landscape may be a developer’s dream and entertain tourists but stressful nightmare for those who choose to make Singapore home. (Ibid., p. 17)”

Even if social stability may render an impression of social cohesion with few cases of inter-ethnic violence, there remains an undercurrent of racial tension among various groups, whereby the Indian and Hindu population seems to experience high racial discrimination despite economic integration. In The Ties That Bind and Blind (Chin and Vasu, 2007) a Nanyang Technological University report based on surveys conducted between 2006 and 2007 on attitudes of racial or religious groups towards others, it is found that Chinese are least accepting towards being in a place full of Indians, with 75% approval compared to 79% for Malays and 86% for 'Others', and also least receptive towards the prospect of Singapore’s majority population being Indian, at 56% compared to 58% for Malays and 66% for 'Others'. In terms of the attitude of Christians towards non-Christians, the report notes a 76% approval of being in a place full of Hindus compared to 99% for Buddhists or Taoists and 82% for Muslims, and only 58% are receptive towards Hindus becoming a majority population, compared to 97% for Buddhists or Taoists and 61% for Muslims.

Racial discrimination against the Indians on the part of the dominant Chinese population in Singapore is tied to physical attributes as well as cultural prejudice. One form of discrimination encountered by Indians in Singapore is when they attempt to rent an apartment from a Chinese household. They are often turned away
on some pretext, with some Chinese landlords complaining that the cooking of curry is too smelly, or that Indians place ‘weird-looking idols for prayer’ which would not be good for their fengshui (Aiyer, 2006, p. 123). It has also been observed that Chinese passengers in buses and trains may move away and find another seat to avoid Indian passenger sitting next to them, and Chinese taxi drivers may be hesitant in accepting Indian passengers who are flagging (Ibid., p. 122). The common stereotypical perception of Indians is that they are ‘smelly and dirty’ (Ibid.). Additionally, there are stereotypes of Indians being “cliquish, conservative, cunning and verbose” (Ackermann, 1997, p. 72). The Malays on the other hand have been stereotyped variously as being “oversensitive, extreme in religion, warm, friendly, gentle” (Ibid.), conservative, ‘traditional’ and essentially a rural, village-dwelling people, relatively laid back compared to the Chinese (Ibid.). The Chinese emerge looking the best in such stereotyping, being regarded generally as “modern and hardworking” (Ibid., p. 71).

Such stereotyping and prejudices in daily life aside, there is also ‘scientific racism’ in Singapore which has been disturbingly expressed by Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s prime minister for three decades, who has remained in the Cabinet even two decades after stepping down, under the job title of ‘Senior Minister’ and then ‘Minister Mentor’. He has reportedly related in a question and answer session, after delivering a public speech on 27th December 1967, a story that goes like this:

Three women were brought to the Singapore General Hospital, each in the same condition and needing a blood transfusion. The first, a Southeast Asian was given the transfusion but died a few hours later. The second, a South Asian was also given a transfusion but died a few days later. The third, an East Asian, was given a transfusion and survived. That is the X factor in development.

(Barr, online, p. 1)

This has been interpreted as a racial hierarchy of Asians based on strengths and weaknesses which are genetic and inherent, in which the Chinese and other East Asians are at the top, Malays and other Southeast Asians are at the bottom, and Indians and other South Asians are in between” (Ibid., p. 4) Lee has apparently also drawn arguments of racial hierarchy from an environmental determinism based on
Arnold Toynbee’s ‘Challenge and Response’ thesis, which he quoted in Cabinet meetings as early as 1959 (Ibid., pp. 7-8). Toynbee has argued in A Study of History that the Sinic or Chinese civilisation was nurtured in the north of China where climate was severe and hence became a ‘hard’ society, whereas societies nurtured in easy environments are inherently weak (Ibid., p. 8). In 1965, in an interview on Australian television, Lee cited differences in physical environment to discuss the difference between Malays and Chinese in Malaysia:

“One is the product of a civilisation which has gone through all its ups and downs, of floods and famine and pestilence, breeding a people with very intense culture, with a belief in high performance in sustained effort, in thrift and industry. And the other people more fortunately endowed by nature, with warm sunshine and bananas and coconuts, and therefore not with the same need to strive so hard. Now, these two societies really move at two different speeds.”

(Ibid., pp. 8-9)

In reality, the income of Malays in Singapore was noticeably lagging behind the Chinese in 1970s, but there could be different explanations. Tania Li found that by 1983/4, “The widespread and deeply held belief among Malays in Singapore is that their problems and disadvantages have been imposed on them on a racial basis by the Chinese majority. Discrimination by Chinese against Malays is based on the Chinese opinion that Malays are culturally inferior and incapable of hard work. (see Brown, 1994, p. 87)”. Prejudice against the Malay may also be traced back to the attitude of colonial capitalism in the 19th and 20th century when conditions of labour in colonial enterprises were far from favourable, such that the Malays were better off in their villages and traditional occupations including rice plantation as opposed to rubber, tin and opium which garnered more revenue for the government, and hence “the Malays were not considered very productive in the colonial capitalist sense” (Alatas, 1977, p. 95). Citing Mannheim on the distorting influence of ideology, Alatas therefore argues that the study of the Malays has been “overwhelmingly dominated by ideological forces of the uncritical and superficial kind” (Ibid., p. 9)
Possible racial discrimination has also been observed within civil service and education in Singapore: “Instructively, data highlighting Chinese over-representation in the bureaucracy, GLCs, statutory boards, the SAF, and the over-representation of Chinese recipients for the most prestigious scholarships such as the President’s and SAF Scholarship, is not publicly discussed and is generally sidestepped by the Singapore media. In the purportedly meritocratic society, there has only been one non-Chinese President’s scholar between 1987 and 2005. Up to 2005, 98 per cent of recipients of the Singapore Armed Forces Overseas Scholarship (SAFOS) have been Chinese. Moreover, there has never been a Malay SAFOS recipient. Similarly, up to 2005, 97 per cent of Singapore Armed Forces Merit Scholarship (SAFMS) winners were Chinese. It was only in 2004 that a Malay received the SAFMS. (Rahim, 2009, p. 66)”

Union leaders have also voiced concern in 2003 that Malay women were facing job discrimination based on the clothes they wear, only to be met with then Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s dismissive response that the problem was more about lack of education and that any discrimination would just be ‘a reality of living in a multicultural society’ (Barr and Skrbis, 2008, p. 104).

As a cultural practice, the issue of the tudung or Muslim headscarf has in fact become a sore point in Singapore. In 2002, four first-grade Malay Muslim girls in a primary school wore the headscarf every day against the school rules. After the school authorities tried in vain to stop them from doing so, the government asserted that they would no longer be permitted to attend the school if they did not comply within specified time limit. Eventually, one girl voluntarily left the school while the other three were compelled by the government to leave. There was some contention as there seemed to be inconsistencies: the government was meantime allowing Sikh schoolboys to wear the turban at school; all Muslim women teachers had been allowed to wear tudung in national schools; many schools have also not followed the government line, with some wearing it with acquiescence of school authorities (Law, 2003, New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, June 2003, pp. 54-55). This having occurred at a time of anti-terrorism, Muslim MPs in Singapore were even compelled to explain to the PAP government the difference between Muslim piety and Islamic fundamentalist extremism (Ibid., p. 64). The episode puts into question
the government’s claim that its multiracial policies allow each ethnic group to live according to its own culture, with equal opportunity for all (Ibid., p. 67).

It appears that discrimination based on race, culture or religion has not been dealt with satisfactorily by the authorities in Singapore. In The Ties That Bind and Blind report, it is suggested in the conclusion that ‘tolerating the different’ would be the “realistic and viable option to sustaining cohesion in a culturally diverse society”, rather than expecting society to commit to "substantial common values in the place of tolerance (Chin and Vasu, 2007, p. 35).” The idea of tolerance may well be the most prevalent interpretation of 'racial harmony' advocated by the government ministries and agencies, rather than mutual understanding. Interestingly, in a survey to find out religious attitudes among some 2,800 Singaporean secondary school students, results showed that while three-quarter of them stressed the importance of tolerating people of other religions, the general definition of ‘tolerance’ is simply “not talking about it” (Chew, 2008; cited in Lee, T., 2009, TOC, online).

If nothing else, Singapore has no short of legal instruments to rely on in guarding against discord among its multi-ethnic population. It has a Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act, in effect since 1992, which allows the government to restrain any person of authority in any religious group or institution for "causing feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-will or hostility between different religious groups", or for carrying out activities to promote a political cause under the guise of propagating any religious belief, and so on. This is on top of a Sedition Act, last revised in 1985, which covers tendencies such as exciting disaffection against the government as well as promoting "feelings of ill-will and hostility between different races or classes of the population of Singapore"; it was first used in 2005 when three men were charged under this act for making seditious and inflammatory racist comments on the internet. In February 2010, three Chinese youths aged between 17 and 18 were held by the police for allegedly posting racist remarks on Facebook against Indians; while eventually released, they could have faced fines of up to S$5,000 and three years' jail under the Sedition Act.

These two acts are in addition to the Internal Security Act, inherited from the British colonial administrators, and used between the 60s and 80s mainly to target leftists. The same act became used in the 2000s to arrest more than 30 alleged members of
an Islamic militant group were arrested for suspicion of terrorism. In February 2010, a pastor of an evangelist church was called up by the Internal Security Department and given a warning after video clips posted on Youtube in which he was seen interviewing a former Buddhist monk and nun about their conversion, whereby he appeared to make disparaging comments on tenets of Buddhist teachings such as nirvana, meditation and reincarnation.

Apart from challenging the justification for such legal measures on account of national security, one may also argue that there can be other ways of maintaining ethnic and religious harmony, of promoting intercultural dialogues, beyond tolerance in the form of avoiding discussion of differences. Mr Githu Muigai, UN's Special Rapporteur on racism and discrimination, said after a visit to Singapore in April 2010: “time is ripe for the authorities to review any legislative restrictions that may exist”, “to allow Singaporeans to share their views on matters of ethnicity” and “work together to find solutions” (Muigai, 28th April 2010, online).

For a while, the Singapore government appeared to be relaxing on sanctioning of racist comments online. When three bloggers in Singapore were found posting content that could be deemed as inciting racial and religious conflict in November 2011, targeting especially at the Malay-Muslim community, the authorities chose not to prosecute. Instead, Minister-in-Charge of Muslim Affairs Dr Yaacob Ibrahim commended on the community for responding in a way that was ‘calm and rational’, and asserted the need for a code of conduct for people to moderate their views online (Saas, 27th November 2011, in CNA, online). But dealing with racist remarks in Singapore appears to be an ongoing challenge in Singapore. In December 2011, MP Seng Han Thong had to make an apology after making racialised comments that attributed failure in communication with commuters during underground breakdown to ethnicity of train staff: “I noticed that the PR mentioned that some of the staff, because they are Malays, they are Indians, they can't converse in English good, well enough” (Syuhaida and Chan, 22nd December 2011, in CNA, online). In March 2012, a 19-year-old polytechnic student posted on Facebook a racist comment that Indians should be relegated to separated cabins in the train, upon which MP Indranee Rajah called for Singaporeans to “celebrate not only our commonalities, but our differences as well” (Fong, 28th March 2012, in Yahoo Singapore News, online). But any hope that the government would choose dialogue
and education over censorship in dealing with the social media was dashed as the new MDA licensing regulation on websites in effect from 1st June 2013 marked another regression.

This subsection will complete its analysis on the conservative and authoritarian rule in Singapore by measuring its multicultural approach against some of the standards of Western liberal multiculturalism discussed by Kymlicka (2002):

1. “One difference between liberal and illiberal forms of nation-building is in the degree of coercion used to promote a common national identity. (p. 54)” Singapore does not claim to have a single national identity, but under its multiracial policy, it has used coercion to ban the use of Chinese dialects in the media in order to create a uniform Chinese identity as the dominant ethnicity. It has also notably banned the wearing of headscarves among Muslim schoolgirls in public schools in 2002; but there is no issue with the ninth Speaker of the Singapore Parliament, Halimah Jacob, elected in January 2013, wearing the tudung.

2. That “liberal states have a more restricted conception of the relevant ‘public space’ within which the dominant national identity should be expressed, and a more expansive conception of the ‘private’ sphere where differences are tolerated” (pp. 54-55). Singapore apparently takes a pragmatic approach, for despite the public ban of Chinese dialects in the media, the ruling party PAP’s candidate Desmond Choo spoke Teochew at a by-election rally in May 2012 for the Hougang constituency, where the incumbent opposition MP Low Thia Khiang of the Workers’ Party (WP) is known to be popular among the Teochew voters there before he contested in a different constituency. (Choo lost in any case.)

3. “Third, liberal states are unlikely to prohibit forms of speech or political mobilisation that challenge the privileging of a national identity (p. 55)” Soon after civil society activist Nizam Ismail, who represented a minority identity as a director of the Association of Muslim Professionals (AMP), participated in a Hong Lim Park protest against the government’s Population White Paper and spoke at a forum held by the opposition, he was removed from his
appointment in April 2013. State-owned national newspaper Straits Times subsequently printed a two-page report entitled ‘When Activists Cross a Line’ (4th May 2013) indicating an issue of ‘political agenda’ (Loh, 5th May 2013). The New Paper, a tabloid belonging to the same Singapore Press Holdings, did an interview with him and then published an article citing that he was ‘pushing for racial politics’ (TNP, 2nd May 2013). From the same newspaper group, the Malay newspaper Berita Harian (28th April 2013) published a report alleging that Nizam not only had financial problems but also had ‘intimate relationships with several women’. In short, Singapore may not always prohibit any speech challenging its national agenda outright, but the media may appear to be assisting in a form of smear tactics against minority representation associated with an opposition view.

4. “Fourth, liberal states typically have a more open definition of the national community. Membership in the nation is not restricted to those of a particular race, ethnicity, or religion (Kymlicka, 2002, p. 55).” Furthermore, as a result of this ‘inclusiveness’, “the terms of admission are relatively thin” (Ibid.). The Constitution of Singapore appears to be relatively flexible on the issue of citizenship by registration. Apart from issues relating to duration of residence, one just needs to be “of good character” (Part X, Section 123 – 1a) and to have “an elementary knowledge of one of the following languages, namely, Malay, English, Mandarin and Tamil” (Section 123 – 1e). In practice, on the other hand, Singapore has kept reiterating the need to maintain its ethnic ratio, whereby the Chinese population remains dominant. Despite causing a furore with a 2011 book Hard Truths To Keep Singapore Going where he described the Muslim population as posing a problem in integration for being ‘distinct and separate’, Singapore’s Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew has repeatedly cautioned against declining fertility rate among Chinese, which stands at 1.08 in 2011, compared to 1.09 for Indians and 1.64 for Malays. He highlights that “the size of each successive generation of Chinese Singaporeans will halve in the next 18 to 20 years” (Lee, 7th May 2012), a point which is easily interpreted as hinting the need for a strong Chinese ratio in National Service.
On 19th April 2013, little more than a month before the new MDA online regulations were announced, an online cartoonist named Leslie Chew, known for his *Democratic Singapore* series published on Facebook, was arrested for alleged sedition, his handphone, computer and hard disk confiscated by the police. While he was investigated for a cartoon that appeared to be critical of government policies towards the Malays, the fact that he was investigated under the Sedition Act instead of Section 298A of the Penal Code (“promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion or race”) is significant, as media analyst Cherian George (whose loss of tenure as lecturer at Nanyang Technological University meantime led to an online protest by students and faculty members) observed (Choo, 26th April 2013).

As Bao and Kymlicka (2005) have noted, political discourse in Asian countries tends to reject ‘Western’ models of liberal-democratic multiculturalism for being grounded in ideas of individualism and competition, while claiming Asian societies are grounded in ‘communitarianism’, in ideas of harmony, deference and paternalism (p. 6) Such talk has been discredited for the way it has been manipulated by leaders like Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad or Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew “to justify their authoritarian rule and suppression of political dissent” (Ibid.) There is a need to distinguish between such state-defined ‘communitarianism’ with what Chua Beng Huat terms as ‘vernacular communitarianism’, the latter referring to obligations towards one’s own local ethnic, religious or linguistic community, whereby there may indeed be less emphasis on individual choice and the freedom to exit – yet it is a difference not to be exaggerated (Ibid., pp. 6-7). It is also important to trace the shifts in Singapore’s political discourse on national identity back to its early days of independence. While Lee Kuan Yew in 1971 was espousing the adoption of English language as “a key to advanced technology to the West” (cited in Velayutham, 2007, p. 56), a trend of ‘excessive job-hopping’ among workers by the end of the decade had prompted the political elite to warn against a ‘creeping individualism’ invading the society’s moral foundations, eventually leading them to ‘Asianise’ Singapore through introduction of religious studies and Confucian ethics in school between 1979 and 1990 (Ibid., p. 57). In a response to globalisation in the 1990s, a new discourse on the magic of ‘New Asia’ sprang up, allowing Singapore to appropriate modernity - in terms of economic progress, technology, education and high standards of living - as an Asian achievement, while constructing dichotomies
between the West and the East in attributes like consumerism/modesty, anarchy/order, individualism/community, contention/consent (p. 74). Such discourse of ‘Asian values’ serve as a creative way to bundle together the political objectives of power, economy and national identity: “A successful Singaporean economy relied on the twin imperatives of embracing a globalised modernity while developing a population with significant commitment to Singapore as a nation and consent to the powers which drive it. (p. 76)”

Given such a political atmosphere that eschews ‘contention’ for ‘consent’, one can only assume that there is no room for ‘intercultural dialogue’ in the context of Singapore to be imagined as a form of open exchange of views, as a form of deliberative democracy, to resolve issues of social inequality or intercultural misunderstanding. ‘Intercultural dialogue’ in Singapore in that case can only refer to a form of activities staging a veneer of ‘racial harmony’ in the hope that people will come to believe in it. To that end the Singapore government has officially recognised the role of heritage appreciation in strengthening a “sense of national identity and belonging”, as stated in its 2000 Renaissance City Report (Ministry of Information and the Arts, 2000, p. 4). Festivals like the Singapore HeritageFest are now seen also as an “endeavour to bring people together” (Lui, 11th August 2010), in the words of Acting Information, Communications and Arts Minister Lui Tuck Yew, who remarked said of Singapore’s multicultural society that “in today’s modern environment, we have lost some of the intimacy of these interactions and the mutual understanding that comes with it” (Ibid.).

Similar sentiments seem to be expressed by former diplomat Kishore Mahbubani, best known as author of the book entitled *Can Asians Think?* (2001), criticising Western nations on their ideals of human rights and individual freedom. Comparing Singapore with America which builds its national identity on values of freedom and democracy pride of its achievements, Mahbubani, who is currently dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, describes Singapore an “accidental nation” (10th June 2013) for which it is “difficult … to create a sense of a national identity” (Ibid.). Reminiscing on Singapore’s ethnic harmony in close-knit neighbourhoods of the 1960s, he asks if Singapore today can rely on an ethnic harmony presumed to come from natural evolution, or whether such harmony has in fact been an artificial
development requiring “harsh and unforgiving laws which allow no expression of ethnic prejudice” (Ibid.).

In all such discourse, ethnicity and culture are put forward as fundamental fault lines in society, whereby the Hobbesian option of conflict prevention through authoritarian rule instead of open dialogue seems inevitable with modernisation. Under such assumptions, the only question that should remain in ‘intercultural dialogue’ would pertain to how exactly heritage may help to promote feelings of mutual respect and understanding between different communities in the ‘cultural’ sphere, putting aside any social disparity that might equally be an issue. In Chapter 6, the concept of intercultural dialogue in transcultural as well as multicultural models as discussed in this chapter will be applied to the case of Singapore, using the intangible heritage of Indian classical dance as the example of a medium. Meantime in the following chapter, one shall first explore the concept of heritage generally and then more specifically that of dance as cultural heritage.
5. HERITAGE AND DANCE

This chapter will provide first of all an overview of the meanings of ‘heritage’ as an epistemological concept and as a practice. The former relates to heritage as material objects and as cultural values, whereas the latter involves institutionalised practice which has developed from social life at community level and an instrument at national level to an issue of global governance at international level. Considering the current global consciousness on heritage, as seen in international frameworks for tangible as well as intangible heritage, the use of heritage for intercultural dialogue, as expressed in the relevant conventions, is one aspect that awaits further exploration. Intercultural dialogue as such will be analysed as a process applicable under assumptions for a transcultural model of society as with a multicultural model, whereby the challenge in each case may be seen in an attempt to overcome differences in cultural identities as well as in the interpretation of local and universal values of heritage.

The second half of the chapter will analyse the implications of dance being interpreted and practised as a form of heritage. It will begin with an introduction on dance as theorised in various perspectives of anthropology through development of the discipline over the last century, from psychological and functionalist explanations to a structuralist perspective that sees dance as a symbolic or ritualistic action which may evoke social cohesion or more complex forms of social relations, as well as a communication theory of dance which considers how it transmits or conveys cultural meanings, providing one model to analyse intercultural dialogue involving dance as a medium. Finally, dance will be considered in terms of its institutionalised role as a form of heritage at community and national levels, not to mention how dance as heritage may be dealt with presently on an international level through global governance with instruments such as the 2003 Intangible Heritage Convention. This will provide a basis for further exploration in the subsequent chapter with regards to the use of dance heritage for intercultural dialogue.
5.1 The Concept and Practice of Heritage
5.1.1 What is Heritage?

This section will discuss the concept of ‘heritage’ and trace how it has expanded through time in senses of the word as well as in categories of objects with associated heritage values, up to its globally adopted usage as a legal concept in international frameworks today, covering ‘cultural heritage’, ‘natural heritage’ and ‘intangible heritage’. The understanding of heritage in the prevailing discourse will be discussed, with a clarification on the difference between history as account of the past and heritage as embodiment of the past. One will also delve into questions relating to ontological premises of ‘cultural heritage’ between objects and a cultural system of values and meanings, and it will be argued that it is a form of objectification through not only material forms but also performances. ‘Heritage’ as a whole has to be understood as not only through epistemological approaches such as historiography, ethnography or archaeology in relation to material evidence but also in terms of a social construction of knowledge itself, whereby man creates the tools of cultural expressions but is in turn reproduced through such cultural expressions, in a dialectic relation.

The word ‘heritage’ as it is commonly used today encompasses two key ideas which are much intertwined, namely “heritage as ideals and heritage as things” (Davison, 2008, p. 32). Davison argues that this is evident in the concept of ‘cultural heritage’ as widely used as part of international frameworks such as that of UNESCO today, a concept which stems from “an anthropological understanding of ‘culture’ as embracing both values and the objects in which they were embodied” (Ibid.). These two ideas may hence tend to be conflated, such that not only is the value of a heritage object or place assumed to be objective and one with its materiality, the concept of heritage may even privilege the materiality so much that it “is used to legitimise, or make material, the intangibilities of culture and human experience” (Kuutma, 2009, p. 7). Cultural heritage may generally be understood as privileging “the situated, material, aesthetic and experiential aspects of culture” (Ibid., p. 6), in a conception which drew initially from Western or European architectural and archaeological conservation practices, before being extended now to cultural expressions like storytelling, craftsmanship and rituals under the term ‘intangible’ (Ibid.).
But there is one key aspect to the concept of heritage not to be neglected, namely the sense of history or of the past. It has been commented that heritage is “virtually anything by which some kind of link, however tenuous or false, may be forged with the past” (Johnson and Thomas, 1995, p. 170; cited in Harvey, 2007, p. 26). Lowenthal has contrasted heritage practice with history as an ‘account of the past’ (1996, p. 121). He wrote:

_Critics castigate heritage as a travesty of history. But heritage is not history, even when it mimics history. It uses historical traces and tells historical tales, but these tales and traces are stitched into fables that are open neither to critical analysis nor to comparative scrutiny… Heritage and history rely on antithetical modes of persuasion. History seeks to convince by truth and succumbs to falsehood. Heritage exaggerates and omits, candidly invents and frankly forgets, and thrives on ignorance and error… Neither history nor heritage is free to depart altogether from the well-attested past. But historians ignore at professional peril the whole palimpsest of past percepts that heritage casually bypasses._ (Ibid.)

While this antithesis between heritage and history has been criticised for making an assumption of historians being dedicated to ideals of objective truth and for ignoring the systematised evaluation of heritage in the professional practice (Davison, 2008, pp. 35-36; cf. Harvey, 2007, p. 30), it serves to underscore heritage practice, in its engagement with an imagination of the past, as being more complicated than a mere presentation of historical ‘truths’ through material evidence.

While this may lead to questions of epistemology in approaching the phenomenon of ‘heritage’ as objects or places located in the natural or social world, or otherwise in terms of social practices tied to interpretations of the past or the world at large, it would be useful first of all to trace the development of the concept of ‘heritage’ through time, especially with its relationship to ‘culture’. The original sense of the word ‘heritage’ referred first and foremost to the physical property or heirlooms handed down from parents to children, and by extension of analogy it would also refer to an intellectual or spiritual legacy (Davison, 2008, p. 31). It is basically a word expressing a relationship with the past, derived “from the vocabulary of traditional societies in which values were derived from ancestral relationships” (Ibid.). Such
inheritance, or legacies of mostly private realms, can be seen in the case of Europe significantly as the reserves of nobilities, but may also be observed in terms of religious lineages of the church; this eventually became extended to a more public domain, more specifically as national and secular heritage, under the political projects of the modern nation-state in 19th-century Europe (Lowenthal, 1998, p. 57).

Heritage as we know it has hence become a ‘political’ idea which “asserts a public or national interest in things traditionally regarded as private” (Davison, 2008, p. 36), such that the public may reserve the right, for instance, to ensure the preservation of a building or place, even overriding the right of an owner with legal title to alter or demolish it (Ibid.). While there is difficulty in finding agreement on how the roots of ‘heritage’ as a distinct practice should be traced, it may be argued that development in the late 18th and early 19th centuries marked “a distinct qualitative shift in attitudes to the past” (Carman and Sorensen, 2009, p. 13), in contrast with valorisation of the past in earlier societies such as the Roman and Chinese Empires, as there was a shift whereby heritage increasingly became institutionalised as “a public concern and [...] an expression of the interests and responsibilities of civic societies” (Ibid.). One may however note the predominance of certain interests, values or approaches guiding heritage practices till today. As Harvey (2007) has argued, heritage as a process “is not given, it is made and so is unavoidably, an ethical enterprise” (p. 37).

One new function in the use of heritage objects as part of a national project during the 19th century may be seen in the use of public institutions of high culture such as museums – with forerunners in the private Wunderkammer or cabinet of curiosities of the monarchs in privileging the sense of sight as source of knowledge – used for a new public cause of lifting the taste and hence moral and behaviour among the common people. Tony Bennett notes that high cultural practices in general originally “formed part of an apparatus of power whose conception and functioning were juridico-discursive”, a form of power which, as defined by Foucault, “deployed a range of legal and symbolic resources in order to exact obedience from the population” (Bennett, 1995, p. 22). Just as the art of festival along with ballet and theatre all formed parts of an elaborate performance by the late 17th century concerned first and foremost with the display of royal power” as Norbert Elias has demonstrated, by the early 19th century these practices became inscribed in ‘new
modalities’ for the exercise of what Foucault described as disciplinary or governmental power (Ibid., pp. 21-22). However, Bennett emphasises that this new governmental power is characterised by a multiplicity of objectives rather than a single principle like sovereignty, such that 19th-century reformers “typically sought to enlist high cultural practices for a diversity of ends: as an antidote to drunkenness; an alternative to riot, or an instrument for civilising the morals and manners of the population” (Ibid., p. 22). A second point he notes, following Foucault’s argument, is that governmental power works through detailed calculations and strategies rather than laws and edicts, and hence high culture “was increasingly thought of as a resource to be used in programmes which aimed at bringing about changes in acceptable norms as self-acting imperatives” (p. 23) The nature of museums as a kind of heritage practice followed such rationales of availing high culture to the people. “The museum had to be refashioned so that it might function as a space of emulation in which civilised forms of behaviour might be learnt” (p. 24), with natural and cultural artefacts arranged and displayed in a way to increase knowledge and enlightenment of the people, and it also had to be developed “as a space of observation and regulation in order that the visitor’s body might be taken hold of and be moulded in accordance with the requirements of new norms of public conduct” (Ibid.). Artefacts or heritage objects were thus institutionalised for acts of public viewing.

Where built monuments are concerned, the concept of cultural heritage in the global framework today, as represented by the Venice Charter with its emphasis on materiality, may be traced back to the development of 19th-century nationalism and liberal education movement in Europe, as Smith (2006, pp. 17-18) argues. She notes how the use of monuments in commemorating and triggering particular public memories and values led to a dominant practice of restoration for historic buildings, only to be criticised by John Ruskin in his treatise The Seven Lamps of Architecture (1849), which in turn inspired a new conservation ethos of ‘conserve as found’ in heritage practice (Smith, 2006, p. 19). In the Venice Charter of 1964, the preamble appears to propagate a similar ethos in its humanist intention for conservation or restoration of monuments, considered “no less as works of art than as historical evidence” (ICOMOS, 1965, Article 3), with implicit purpose of a civilising education for future generations. At the same time, the wording of the preamble suggests an
imagination of an unquestionable relationship between the materiality of monuments and their intrinsic value: “Imbued with a message from the past, the historic monuments of generations of people remain to the present day as living witnesses of their age-old traditions. (Ibid., preamble)” It may be interpreted as reflecting and perpetuating the idea of inherent nature of value and significance in a monument, as it creates “a sense that memory is somehow locked within or embedded in the fabric of the monument or site” (Ibid., pp. 90-91).

We may now turn to consider how cultural heritage is studied or assessed through epistemological approaches under the prevailing international framework, leaving out natural heritage which would involve natural sciences instead of social sciences. Through international agencies such as UNESCO, the concept of heritage has been extended significantly “from a familial or national setting to an international one” (Davison, 2008, p. 32), based not so much on a humanist as on an anthropological understanding of culture which “strengthened the moral claims of the would-be custodians of cultural property while side-stepping difficult distinctions between its ‘high’ and ‘low’, popular and elite forms” (Ibid.). Cultural heritage has been thus defined in UNESCO’s Draft Medium Term Plan 1990-1995:

*The cultural heritage may be defined as the entire corpus of material signs - either artistic or symbolic - handed on by the past to each culture and, therefore, to the whole of humankind. As a constituent part of the affirmation and enrichment of cultural identities, as a legacy belonging to all humankind, the cultural heritage gives each particular place its recognizable features and is the storehouse of human experience. The preservation and the presentation of the cultural heritage are therefore a corner-stone of any cultural policy.*

(UNESCO, 1989, p. 57; cited in Jokilehto, 2005, pp. 4-5)

The policy paper goes on to list the scope that may be covered under cultural heritage, including items of cultural property, monuments, buildings, architectural complexes, archaeological sites, rural heritage and the countryside, as well as urban, technical or industrial design, furniture, and also ‘non-physical’ or intangible cultural
heritage “which includes the signs and symbols passed on by oral transmission, artistic and literary forms of expression, languages, ways of life, myths, beliefs and rituals, value systems and traditional knowledge and know-how” (Ibid., p. 5; emphasis my own).

In reference to this definition of cultural heritage in terms of a sum total of cultural expressions, Jokilehto of ICCROM has found it apt to refer back to the most ‘classic’ definition of culture in anthropology, that by Edward Burnett Tylor in *Primitive Culture* (1871), as “that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society” (see Ibid., p. 4). The mention of Tylor is significant, as he has been noted for his reaction against Arnold’s humanistic concept of culture, with an evolutionary perspective which led him into placing great emphasis on objects of material culture as manifestations of culture (Stocking, 1963, p. 9).

While Jokilehto’s description of cultural heritage as ‘material signs’ seems an explicit reference to the studies of material culture, these have gone through much evolution since Tylor’s era. The primary concern with material culture under anthropological research until the 1920s followed the assumption that the ceremonies and belief systems of ‘primitive’ cultures could not be saved, whereas artefact studies provided basis for theories of social evolution, diffusion and acculturation (Tilley et al, 2006, p. 2). Due to the replacement of evolutionism with functionalism in theoretical outlook, however, primary concern in anthropology shifted from artefacts to social life (Ibid.). Material culture entered the mainstream again following another theoretical shift in 1960s to structuralist and symbolic anthropology (Ibid.). There have also been corresponding Marxist positions in material culture studies especially in the 1970s and 1980s, which continued to current concerns with globalisation, cultural hybridity, and cultural flows (Tilley, 2006a, p. 7). These may be summarised then in broad strokes under the two perspectives of culture as system of meanings and culture as social life, which in this thesis would be reconciled according to Archer’s (1996) dualistic approach, as discussed in Chapter 2.

One key aspect to cultural heritage that is present from both a structuralist or semiotic perspective and a Marxist perspective is that of ‘value’. One may even go as far as arguing that it is value and meaning that “is the real subject of heritage
preservation and management processes” (Smith, 2006, p. 56). That is arguably too reductive, however, whereas this thesis prefers to argue that the significance of heritage lies in its symbolising of values and meanings in a cultural system through its material form or performance. As Tilley (2006b) argues, “[i]deas, values and social relations do not exist prior to culture forms which then become merely passive reflections of them, but are themselves actively created through the processes in which these forms themselves come into being” (p. 61). This dialectical relationship will be elucidated later on with the concept of ‘objectification’.

The question of value in heritage has in any case been elevated to the level of a worldwide metaculture, through the spread of a globalised heritage practice. With the 1972 UNESCO World Heritage Convention combining both built and natural remnants of the past as ‘World Cultural and Natural Heritage’ (Davison, 2008, p. 32), and effectively “universalising Western concepts of heritage and the values inherent within” (Smith, 2006, p. 28), a new sense of global awareness was created for common interest and responsibility in preserving cultural and natural heritage “to whatever people it may belong” (UNESCO, 1972, p. 2) “as part of the world heritage of mankind as a whole” (Ibid.). This may be seen as part of a peace project in UNESCO’s larger mandate, under a philosophy of ‘unity in diversity’, whereby traditional boundaries no longer demarcate ownership (Di Giovine, 2009, p. 142), and instead a place may be valorised as having ‘universal value’ by the authority of an international body (Ibid., p. 209). In short, it is a process of global consciousness whereby heritage transcends particular ownership as a public concern.

Not only has the relation with heritage objects and places grown from interests at private or local levels to national and global levels due to increasing interconnections in a globalised world through increasing travel and communication as well as exchange in goods and ideas, the scope of what qualify as heritage has also been expanding in the global consciousness due to the growth of knowledge in increasing differentiation of cultural and social meanings associated with heritage. Value, which may be understood simply as “a social association of qualities to things” (Jokilehto, 2006, p. 2), is ascribed to ever more categories of heritage, with an expanding awareness of historical and scientific knowledge and a new-found importance given to monuments and sites representing ‘modern heritage’, ‘agricultural, industrial and
technological properties’ and ‘military properties’ among others, as evident in new typological frameworks promoted (ICOMOS, Feb 2004, p. 15). With the world witnessing an exponential inflation of heritage, it is well foreseeable that debates on priorities among different forms of heritage would be inescapable.

The very way in which heritage places and their values are categorised already reflects some judgment on what is more relevant to society as a whole. For instance, the cultural significance of sites, landscapes or buildings is defined in the Burra Charter (1999) as “aesthetic, historic, scientific, social or spiritual value for past, present or future generations” (Australia ICOMOS, 2000, p. 2); in the World Heritage Convention (1972), monuments and groups of buildings are considered as ‘cultural heritage’ for their “outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or science” (UNESCO, 1972, p. 2), sites for the same value “from the historical, aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological point of view” (Ibid.), and ‘natural heritage’ “from the aesthetic or scientific point of view” (Ibid.). Whether one includes or omits social or spiritual values, and whether one highlights ‘natural heritage’ as set apart from cultural heritage, already reflects certain assumptions on what is most relevant for conservation, what constitute the key aspects of ‘culture’ and how it should be studied. There appears a tendency to subsume cultural value under the social, once again reflecting the anthropological perspective of culture as social life, whereas spiritual value suggests a reaction to the predominance of modern rationality. Among all, aesthetic value would be closest to a concept of culture in a humanist view.

Despite how knowledge on heritage may take on an air of objectivity through procedures of study under disciplines such as history and anthropology, in practice it is ultimately “a social construction, imagined, defined and articulated within cultural and economic practice” (Graham, 2002, p. 1003), as “that part of the past which we select in the present for contemporary purposes” (Ibid., p. 1006); the word ‘cultural’ to be understood here as a shorthand for the inextricable political and social factors. As Tunbridge and Ashworth (2007) have pointed out their coinage of ‘dissonant heritage’, heritage may be used not only as cultural resource for its intrinsic value, but also as political resource to legitimise state ideologies or as economic resource as an industry on its own or to earn locational preferences for other economic activities (p. 206).
Bendix (2009) has similarly remarked: “Cultural heritage does not exist, it is made. From the warp and weft of habitual practices and everyday experience – the changeable fabric of action and meaning that anthropologists call ‘culture’ – actors choose privileged excerpts and imbue them with status and value. (p. 255)” In fact, the elevation of the social significance of cultural heritage to a global stage often creates a paradox. A heritage would be “considered to have high social value and to be endowed with the capacity to foster positive identification within groups or entire polities” (Bendix, 2009, p. 258). Whereas in reality, it also involves economic value, not to mention political interest, yet the significance of cultural heritage is presented as “emanating from one particular cultural context” (Ibid.).

In short, one may argue from a socio-cultural perspective that it is a gross oversimplification to imagine cultural heritage in a purely semiotic perspective as an unproblematic phenomenon representing some essence of culture. Cultural heritage may arguably be better understood as undergoing constant dynamic processes of change through three potential “loci of agency” (Ibid., p. 260), namely society, politics and economy. Bendix would argue that one challenging task for cultural anthropologists today is to be take a more reflexive approach particularly on the subject of ‘intangible heritage’, as formalised in the 2003 convention, to help document “the processes that foster as well as hinder heritagisation” (Ibid., p. 254), and overcome arguments from their own disciplinary history that would otherwise be simply “taken up as tools to legitimise the need for one or another practice to be reclassified as intangible heritage” (Ibid.). Kirschenblatt-Gimblett (2006) would argue that intangible heritage as such is “a mode of cultural production that gives the endangered or outmoded a second life as an exhibition of itself” (p. 313), whereby any listing of ‘world heritage’ tangible or intangible serves to “convert selected aspects of localised descent heritage into a translocal consent heritage” (Ibid., p. 314), such that these elements are no longer transmitted through traditional means that are oral or by gestures, but are instead subject to interventions and put into a new context in relationship with other ICH elements (Ibid.), a new context which hence may be described as ‘metacultural’ (Ibid., p. 319).

One may also consider the critique by Denis Byrne (2008) on the practice of cultural heritage as a form of reification based on the notion that “culture is a thing, an object
that can be acted upon from the outside, an entity that is *available* to conservation" (p. 159, italics in original). He comes from a perspective of seeing culture as no more than a pattern of thoughts and actions (Ibid.) and heritage as “a field of social action” (Ibid, p. 167). The notion of reification here may be traced back to Georg Lukács who attacked the view of “culture as a thing rather than a set of ideas, actions, and beliefs residing in people’s minds” (Ibid., p. 159)

The concept of objectification, which may be traced back to Hegel and Marx, has been defined as the “concrete embodiment of an idea [which] becomes realised in the form of a material thing” (Tilley, 2006b, p. 60). It has been cited to provide an understanding of the relationship between subjects and objects as the central concern of material culture studies (Ibid., p. 61). It explains how the “material object may be a powerful metaphorical medium through which people may reflect on their world” (Ibid., p. 62). But as art, material forms and performances are more than just a kind of representation. An example to illustrate this would be Yolngu aboriginal paintings in north-east Australia, which are not to be considered as mere representations of the ancestral past, but to be seen as having intrinsic value while serving to connect ‘the particular with the general’, ‘the individual with the collective’ and ‘the outside to the inside’ (Morphy, 1991; cited in Tilley, 2006b, p. 67). In other words, one may understand the symbolic meanings of such art within its cultural system and “far from being a passive reflection of ideas or social relations” (Tilley, 2006b, p. 67).

In the second instance, one may further consider the function of such artistic expressions as part of a socio-cultural system, as heritage that is instituted and in turn facilitates socialisation within a cultural community – not just how man creates cultural expressions but how cultural expressions make man. This may be understood in terms of how Berger and Luckmann (1967) have characterised the dialectical relationship “between man, the producer, and the social world, his product” (1967, p. 61). They state in summary: “Society is a human product. Society is an objective reality. Man is a social product.” (Ibid., italics in original) This outline helps to explain how heritage as a human product gains objectivity through the process of institutionalisation and how man in turn becomes a social product through the process of socialisation.
The three ‘moments’ or processes identified in the dialectical process are namely externalisation, objectivation and internalisation (Ibid.), whereby objectivation, a word derived from the Hegelian and Marxian coinage *Versachlichung* (Ibid., p. 197), refers to a “process by which the externalised products of human activity attain the character of objectivity” (Ibid., p. 61). This results from habitualisation and institutionalisation, which in the perspective of Berger and Luckmann, are significant as the human organism otherwise lacks the necessary biological means to provide stability in human behaviour that it finds in its socio-cultural formation (Ibid., p. 50-51). Citing Gehlen’s concept of *Triebüberschuss* and *Entlastung*, they say: “Habitualisation provides the direction and the specialisation of activity that is lacking in man’s biological equipment, thus relieving the accumulation of tensions that resulted from undirected drives. (Ibid., p. 53)” They see institutionalisation as occurring “whenever there is a reciprocal typification of habitualised actions by types of actors” (Ibid, p. 54), a concept of institution that is admittedly broader than prevailing thoughts in contemporary sociology relating to social control (Ibid., p. 197). They argue that institutions by their very fact of existence tend to control human conduct by establishing predefined patterns (Ibid., p. 55) and that there is a functional gain as interaction between people becomes predictable (Ibid., p. 57).

Another quality of institution according to Berger and Luckmann is historicity, through which social formations also acquire a quality of objectivity (Ibid., p. 58) and hence can be transmitted to a new generation (Ibid., p. 59). However, they do not claim that integration within a socio-cultural system naturally follows, for they argue that functional integration cannot be assumed a priori as different sets of institutionalisation processes may take place concurrently for the same individuals without hanging together functionally as a consistent system (Ibid., p. 63). – an interesting aspect which one might already appreciate with the discussion of transculturality or individual as the postmodern self in the previous chapter.

But in addition to institutionalisation through habitualisation, they also highlight the process of ‘legitimation’ in society, which may be described as a “‘second-order’ objectivation of meaning” (Ibid., p. 92), as this produces new meanings that serve to integrate the meanings already attached to disparate institutional processes (Ibid.). Legitimation is a process of explaining and justifying. It ‘explains’ the institutional
order “by ascribing cognitive validity to its objectivated meanings” (Ibid., p. 93), and also justifies the institutional order “by giving a normative dignity to its practical imperatives” (Ibid.). Legitimation is a process whereby ‘knowledge’ is produced which precedes ‘values’ of institutions (Ibid., p. 94).

How such values of institutions may be internalised by individuals as members of society, comes in the next moment as a matter of socialisation. Internalisation, according to Berger and Luckmann, is “the basis, first, for an understanding of one’s fellowmen and, second, for the apprehension of the world as a meaningful and social reality (Ibid., p. 130). In primary socialisation, the ‘significant others’ of an individual are imposed upon him, as each individual is born into an objective social structure within which he encounters the significant others of his socialisation (Ibid., p. 131). At this stage, “there is no problem of identification” (Ibid., p. 134). But in the next stage, there is secondary socialisation, as “the internalisation of institutional or institution-based ‘sub-worlds’ ” (Ibid., p. 138), or “the acquisition of role-specific knowledge” (Ibid.), this being required due to the division of labour in society.

The above discussion on institutionalisation would serve as an explanation of culture in terms of social life. The role of symbols in the transmission of culture, as mentioned earlier, would however be more lucidly and extensively discussed not so much in terms of institutionalisation as through the perspective of a phenomenology-influenced sociological study. This includes rituals, which may be summarised as the communicative action forms of symbols (Luckmann, 2007, p. 124). As Hobsbawn (1983) has also argued, in his discussion on how ‘invented traditions’ serve to establish social cohesion, legitimise authority or inculcate beliefs and behaviour (p. 9), there is a difference between tradition as such and “convention or routine, which has no significant ritual or symbolic function” (Ibid., p. 3)

A concept of ritual would arguably be a key to understanding much of what is currently termed intangible heritage, which may be understood in the sense of “enactment […] through the acts of people” in the words of Arizpe (cited in Aikawa-Faure, 2009, p. 24). The foremost category by that token would be performing arts - including dance, which provides the example to be studied in this thesis.
The dialectic relation between cultural expressions as products of man, and man’s social life as shaped by the heritage of his cultural expressions, would easily lead to a debate in relation to ‘intangible heritage’, on the question of whether one should focus on such expressions as creative products, or as processes as part of social life. Such debate can be seen prior to the adoption of the 2003 Intangible Heritage Convention, when UNESCO organised the international roundtable entitled ‘Intangible Cultural Heritage – working definitions’ at Turin in March 2001. Two anthropologists took different positions as they assessed results of a worldwide survey, undertaken by UNESCO, of definitions used by members states, IGOs, NGOs and other institutions, for the term ‘intangible cultural heritage’ or equivalent, including ‘folklore’, ‘traditional culture’, ‘oral heritage’, ‘traditional knowledge’ and ‘indigenous heritage’, as provided by 36 entities (Ibid., p. 23).

Manuela da Cunha, anthropology professor from University of Chicago, proposed a wide-ranging scope in the definition of intangible heritage to shift the focus from products to the process of production, covering folklore and crafts, biodiversity as well as Indigenous knowledge, whereby the protection of cultural heritage would necessarily entail the protection of the social and environmental context (Ibid., pp. 23-24). She recommended that a primary objective of the new instrument should be to maintain ‘living processes’ rather than exclusively ‘historical processes’ and concluded that UNESCO should take a more ‘holistic view of protection’ in relation to economic issues, privileging cultural producers (Ibid.). She also raised the issue of identity in relation to intangible heritage, noting a duality between definitions of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ assertions of cultural identity, as well as a shift of notion in many countries from denial of legitimacy of local identity as inimical to national identity, to an acknowledgement of plural ethnicities and identities (Ibid., p. 23).

On the other hand, Lourdes Arizpe, professor and researcher at the National Autonomous University of Mexico and former Assistant Director General for Culture at UNESCO, favoured a more limited scope of domains to be considered as intangible heritage, suggesting that UNESCO should identify within its new international instrument what have not yet been dealt with other organisations. To her, UNESCO as an IGO needs to find a balance between member states’ political consensus and scientific rigour. She considered ICH as a process of creation
comprising skills and past practices among other factors, emphasising that “enactment is an essential and defining aspect of ICH in a sense that this heritage exists and is sustained through the acts of people” (Ibid., p. 24). She gave a list of justifications for establishing the new instrument, including to “conserve human creations that may disappear forever, taking into consideration the importance of valuing human creations and enhancing the diversity of human creation” (Ibid.); “to strengthen identity in compliance with UNESCO’s mandate to promote peace” (Ibid.); to “provide historical continuity” (Ibid.) for the psychological need of people to feel belonging to some tradition; and to “foster enjoyment” (Ibid.).

Arizpe grouped principal elements of ICH under themes of life, social, biodiversity, land, symbolic, spiritual, literary, performing arts and festive; by eliminating elements already dealt with by other IGOs, she then identified domains that UNESCO should focus on, namely: “i) the area between nature and culture; ii) areas concerning Indigenous people’s culture; iii) social cooperation and social cohesion; iv) oral tradition; and v) local arts and crafts” (Ibid., p. 25).

The presentation of the two views led to animated debate among experts, who were divided between anthropological concerns of local practitioner communities and political concerns of states’ roles, between those considering ICH as product and those considering it as process, with the issue of cultural rights of Indigenous peoples and economic aspects of ICH protection causing controversial discussions (Ibid.). In the consensus that emerged, one conclusion was that the term ‘community’ should be the keyword for the new instrument (Ibid., p. 26).

In January 2002, an expert meeting which convened in Rio de Janeiro then reaffirmed earlier UNESCO views that it should focus on the cultural dimension of ICH and not duplicate activities of other organisations, particularly in economic rights for which agencies like WIPO and WTO already have specific expertise (Ibid., p. 34). They also stressed that a flexible concept of ‘safeguarding’ should be adopted, respecting the diversity of ICH as well as the internal dynamics of each cultural expression, and they considered linking the preservation of ICH with cultural diversity as a source of creative inspiration and sustainable development, developing the convention within the framework of the 2001 UNESCO *Universal Declaration of Cultural Diversity* (Ibid., p. 35). Such consideration of the dynamic processes in the
creation and development of material and immaterial cultural expressions, would incidentally be important to an understanding of cultural diversity that considers cultures as open rather than closed systems (see Albert, 2010, p. 19; Albert, 2011, p. 6).

The principles championed throughout these meetings and subsequent intergovernmental expert meetings, as recalled by Aikawa-Faure (2009), former Director of the Intangible Cultural Heritage Unit of UNESCO, were that ICH should refer to a process and not to a product, that it is not static but constantly developing, that its safeguarding should take a practitioner- or community-centred approach in order to ensure viability, and that respect for human rights, cultural identity, diversity, creativity and mutual appreciation were integral to the safeguarding process – principles that “are fully embodied in different parts of the Convention” as one sees in the Preamble, Article 1 (Purposes), Article 2 (Definitions) and Article 15 (Participation of communities, groups and individuals) (Ibid., p. 36).

The idea that intangible heritage is both a re-enacted and a creative process, providing a sense of historical continuity and cultural identity, and encompassing both the processes as well as products, as discussed in the Turin meeting, is thus formalised in the definition under Article 2 (Definitions) of the Convention:

>The “intangible cultural heritage” means the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills – as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith – that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage. This intangible cultural heritage, transmitted from generation to generation, is constantly recreated by communities and groups in response to their environment, their interaction with nature and their history, and provides them with a sense of identity and continuity, thus promoting respect for cultural diversity and human creativity.

(UNESCO, 2003, p. 2, online)

There is a difficulty here posed by the idea of ‘continuity’, however, for as Hobsbawn (1983) has argued, the break in continuity is something that cannot be
overlooked even in traditional realms of genuine antiquity (p. 7). He noted that “new traditions can thus use old materials” (Ibid.), and “plenty of political institutions, ideological movements and groups – not least in nationalism – were so unprecedented that even historic continuity had to be invented” (Ibid.). Skounti (2009) similarly argues with regard to intangible heritage that a ‘recycling’ of cultural facts, under a conviction on the part of individuals and institutions that they are contributing to protecting forms of cultural expressions, gives an “authentic illusion” (p. 77) that is akin to the invention of traditions. For the purpose of this thesis, however, a more pertinent question is not so much that of authenticity in heritage per se, but as to how a plural society interprets in heritage, as one will discuss in the following section.

5.1.2 Heritage as Medium for Intercultural Dialogue? – between a transcultural model and a multicultural model

This section will consider how heritage may be used as a medium for intercultural dialogue in a plural society, through the use of cultural and natural heritage as resources of knowledge for learning. Following discussion in the preceding subsection, any heritage may be understood within the context of a cultural system as ideals or values embodied in material forms, performances or sites; or within context of a socio-cultural system for its historical value that explains circumstances leading to its production in existing form as found; or for its own intrinsic aesthetic value that may or may not have to be appreciated within context of a particular cultural system. This is not to mention how natural heritage may be considered for its scientific value, presumably in a universal sense that does not require contextualisation within a cultural system.

An additional consideration would be how heritage ‘tangible’ or ‘intangible’ alike may not only serve the interpretations of the past, but also be used as common medium of activity within a community or beyond. In this regard, ‘culture’ in the framework of the globalised world today may, further to Bennett’s and Meyer’s perspectives on human development and collective action, be considered in terms of a liberal learning of the self and the world of human expressions (Oakeshott, 1989, pp. 43-45), that would “always relate to an historic inheritance of human achievement” (Ibid, p. 50). Culture in this sense would be enhanced through the ethics of heritage
protection in providing common resources for knowledge in science and history and for personal development in aesthetics.

Intercultural dialogue through heritage may then be understood as an open exchange as in interaction, through cross-cultural activities among individuals regardless of social group identities of their cultural communities. An argument for a transcultural model would not only be based on a belief in the reality of “inner differentiation and complexity of modern cultures” as Welsch (1999) suggests, but also one that refers to “the right to live beyond one’s culture” in the view of the philosopher Mamardashvili as cited by Epstein (1999a, p. 82). In short, beyond a matter of identity and representation in heritage practice, there is also a matter of freedom of participation.

The need for overcoming of cultural identity alone may be justified partially by the aim of intercultural dialogue in terms of social cohesion. Yet another important aspect in the process of intercultural dialogue would in theory involve open exchange of views for reasoning, whereby one attempts to understand and respect the rationality of the other in society. This section hence assumes a transcultural approach in dialogue through heritage as one that focuses on the task of social cohesion through common activity while privileging the individual's liberal choice; whereas a multicultural approach in dialogue through heritage may be considered as one that focuses on understanding and respecting a different cultural system, privileging values of its community as well as appreciating the symbolic meanings of its expressions as part of cultural memory. The two approaches are not assumed here to be mutually exclusive or any of them a superior model independent of socio-political context.

The challenge of heritage policy in plural societies has been discussed by Ashworth et al (2007) in terms of the social role and political interest in heritage: “It is self-evident that society is composed of individuals, that individuals are different, and thus that society must be plural. Heritage, however, is about common values, common purpose and common interests. Societies may be pluralising […] but official heritage often remains stubbornly in the singular. (p. 71)” Several policy models of plural societies can be observed, the first to be mentioned being the assimilatory or integrationist model, whereby heritage would function to “act as an instrument of
assimilation of ‘outsiders’ into the core while constantly reaffirming and strengthening it among ‘insiders’ [and it also] exercises an educational and socialisation role as excluder and includer (Ibid., p. 75)". Other policy types according to Ashworth et al include the melting pot model, the ‘core +’ model with add-ons to a *leitkultur*, the pillar model with self-contained groups of minimal uniformity imposed, and the mosaic or salad bowl model which invites all social groups to be part of its heritages (Ibid., pp. 77-85). This framework relating to the instrumental role of heritage in the plural society takes some of its cue from Hall (2005), on aspects such as the awareness of symbolic power involved in the act of representation, the relation of culture and identity, the politics of recognition and issue of equality, not to mention the challenge of cultural relativism (Ashworth et al, 2007, p. 49).

According to analysis of Ashworth et al (2007) on different models of heritage management in plural societies, Singapore would serve as an example of the ‘core+ model’, whereby the “a plural society adopts a leading culture which is not the culture of the majority or, indeed, even that of any of the diverse cultural groups involved” (p. 155). Such an ‘imported’ core in this model does not involve so much as something in the sense of a *Leitkultur* which has survived into the postcolonial era, for instance in the form of a lingua franca or a sport, but instead simply a “convenient binding mechanism” (ibid.). In the case of Singapore, where urban development threatened to destroy local historical identity reflected in the shop-houses and kampongs soon after independence in 1965, colonial nostalgia as represented by such oriental icons as the Raffles Hotel was distanced from British history and reappropriated as a Singaporean institutional open to all within economic limits regardless of ethnicity (Henderson, 2001; cited in Ashworth et al, 2007, p. 157). Meantime, with introduction of the Land Act in 1974 empowering the Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) to acquire land from private landowners, as many as 23 mosques, 76 suraus (Muslim buildings for prayers), 700 Chinese temples, 27 Hindu temples and 19 churches were acquired between then and 1987, their land used for redevelopment purposes (Kong, 1993, p. 31; cited in Kuah-Pearce, 2009, p. 169).

Such a third party imported core model (Ashworth et al, 2007, p. 155) as Singapore hence contrasts with a melting pot model, or for that matter a pillar model whereby “each group is free to create, manage and consume its own heritage without interference from, or indeed participation by, others” (Ibid., p. 165). A case in point is
the nomination of Singapore Botanic Gardens (SBG) as world heritage site, submitted in on 7th December 2012, in which the justification refers under Criterion (ii) to “economically important plants across the world and South-East Asia [with] a fundamental influence on the social and economic development and prosperity on the region” (UNESCO World Heritage Centre, 2013, online; emphasis added); and under Criterion (iv) to it being “a unique exemplar of a British colonial tropical botanic garden” (Ibid.; emphasis added). While welcoming the submission of tentative listing including the SBG as world heritage site, the Singapore Heritage Society noted in a statement (2nd April 2013, online) that Singapore’s ratification on 19th June 2012 as 190th state party to the 1972 World Heritage Convention was made known to the Society only through UNESCO news release, and expressed hope for greater transparency in the government’s plans and actions. It highlighted Article 12 in the UNESCO operation guidelines, which says that state parties to the Convention are encouraged to ensure participation of a wide variety of stakeholders including local communities and NGOs in the ‘identification, nomination and protection’ of world heritage properties (Ibid.). The society also highlighted Article 64 of the same guidelines, whereby state parties are encouraged to prepare Tentative Lists with wide participation of stakeholders including local communities and NGOs (Ibid.).

This was not incidental, for the nomination coincides with ongoing plans of the government for highway construction and future property development cutting through the historic Bukit Brown Cemetery, which consists of more than 100,000 graves amidst 230 hectares of lush greenery. This is in spite of fervent calls by activist groups including Nature Society in 2011 and 2012 to preserve it as a heritage park, citing nature protection reasons as well as national identity (see Huang, 12th March 2012, online; Huang, 25th March 2012). A loose network of volunteers, connected through the social media and dubbing themselves the ‘Brownies’, have worked independently of the National Heritage Board, going to the site every week to conduct tours for school groups and members of the public including international visitors, not to mention organising exhibitions and a series of talks, with the hope that heritage status may be given to Bukit Brown. Independent historian Raymond Goh, alongside his brother Charles Goh who is founder of Asia Paranormal Investigators, have virtually eclipsed the work of National Heritage Board as they have managed to discover and identify the graves of 41 pioneers of Singapore with roads named after
them (Goh, 6th June 2013). Volunteers like him see not only spiritual value and historical value in the site for the local communities, but also aesthetic value in intricate relief sculpture and tile art among other elements of the graves with the unique setting blending Chinese fengshui beliefs into the landscape of a tropical rainforest. Raymond has written in a helpless plea, upon news of the SBG nomination: “But yet, do you know we can have another cultural and natural heritage of outstanding universal value, one that is still yet unappreciated by the public at large, and that the government is planning to drive a highway through it to alleviate traffic congestion?” (Goh, 13th May 2013, online). Bukit Brown Cemetery, which is the largest Chinese cemetery outside China, with some graves dating back to 1830s (The Economist, 17th March 2012, online), also poses a challenge to the assumption in multi-ethnic Singapore that heritage may be allocated neatly and separately according to race. It is not only because some graves feature imposing figures of bearded Sikh guards, recalling an uncomfortable page in history of them serving Chinese merchants during British colonial days, but also because this Chinese cemetery represents more specifically the Hokkien and Peranakan communities, whereas major cemeteries of other Chinese communities such as the Cantonese and the Teochews have long been exhumed for urban redevelopment. Such is the limitation in cultural heritage being viewed along the lines of community identity and clan ownership, which are often fragmented. Hence the pluralistic values of Bukit Brown as not only cultural but also natural heritage, as public good of the Singapore society in mitigation against Urban Heat Island effects for instance (Huang, 25th March 2012; Huang, 1st April 2012), are obscured in the process of a discourse along the lines of cultural and national identity.

The neglect of Bukit Brown as heritage has also been set in contrast with the heritagisation of the Sun Yat Sen Villa – where the ‘Father of Modern China’ used to stay as a revolutionary against the Qing dynasty in early 1900s - which was gazetted as national monument in 1994 and after restoration through efforts of the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce at the behest of Minister George Yeo, officially opened as the Sun Yat Sen Nanyang Memorial Hall on 12th November 2001, the 135th anniversary of Sun’s birth (Hong and Huang, 2008, p. 181). Hailed as ‘a cultural shrine for all ethnic Chinese Singaporeans’ in the 1990s during the height of the Asian Values discourse and business orientation towards China as an important
market for Singapore investors, much fanfare was made of China’s one million renminbi donation (S$183,000 then) towards its renovation, little fanfare of S$100,000 from Taiwan (p. 189). As Bukit Brown came under threat, it was often pointed out that 20 members of the Tong Meng Hui (Chinese Revolutionary Alliance) who supported Sun were actually buried there (Goh, 13th May 2013). Based on such argument of comparable historical values and bearing in mind China’s political interest in the Villa, the disregard of Bukit Brown may be interpreted not only as the government placing higher priority in urban development over heritage protection, but also as it placing greater importance on diplomacy with China than on local heritage and local identity. Considering that new Mandarin-speaking immigrants from China make up the greater proportion of Singapore’s current population increase, the exhuming of this cemetery belonging to the Hokkien-speaking local Chinese may even be interpreted as part of an attempt by the government to replace local identity that is primarily of the southern Chinese stock with a grand Chinese identity of predominantly the northern Chinese stock – which would come across to local Singaporeans as neo-colonialism manifested in an ‘imported core’ of heritage.

Returning from here to the general discussion, both a transcultural and a multicultural model for intercultural dialogue involving heritage as medium clearly have to be assessed through questions of symbolic power that cultural studies typically tackles, such as whether the transcultural expressions may obliterate any community’s longing for recognition of its identity, and whether a particular representation of multicultural identities obscures further issues of diversity in social values. One ‘difficulty’ is that “as a communicative practice, heritage and its messages are multi-vocal, relayed simultaneously from many sources, both public/official and private/unofficial, and at many scales” (Ashworth et al, 2007, p. 207). Where political significance goes, heritage is “a key force for cohesion but also fragmentation” (Ibid., p. 212) and pluralising of the past through heritage interpretation would be ‘an unavoidable condition of postmodern societies (Ibid.).

A review of existing literature in heritage studies suggests that where relevance to intercultural dialogue is concerned, most emphasis has been on the overcoming of cultural differences in terms of identity. To cite an example of intangible heritage, Rodney Harrison has considered the invention of the Notting Hill Carnival, by drawing on older traditions of festivals and carnival from Britain and the Caribbean,
as a form of social ‘work’ in promoting racial harmony between British African Caribbean people and white indigenes. He says that the way two traditions were brought together by emphasising “some of the positive aspects of cultural diversity in Britain in terms of music, dance and cuisine was an ingenious way of attempting to bring together a community that was divided” (Harrison, 2010, pp. 244-245). As what he calls ‘social action’, heritage here appears to embody the idea of transculturality or hybridity. This model is interesting in the context of this thesis, for it may be contrasted with the example of performing arts used at national occasions in Singapore, where heritage tends to emphasise an idea of ‘multiracialism’, as discussed in Chapter 4.

There may yet be a different strategy based on transculturality for the representation of heritage, as analysed by Sharon Macdonald in the museological representation of the Transcultural Galleries at Cartwright Hall in Bradford, a city in Britain which has a substantial South Asian population and has seen racial tensions since the 1970s. Instead of arranging artefacts in terms of separate cultures, curator Nima Poovaya Smith appointed in 1986 has used a notion of ‘connection’ as the logic of display, conceptualised along lines of movement, process or creative agency (Macdonald, pp. 126-127).

Where a multiculturalist perspective is emphasised, however, the challenge in heritage has been discussed beyond symbolic representation for the politics of recognition, venturing into the issue of rights. The late 20th and early 21st centuries have arguably seen “radical change in the conceptualisation of nation states as homogeneous units” (Logan et al, 2010, p. 12), and one big question is the extent to which societies should accommodate and recognise all cultural differences and languages, or whether such recognition may be confined to indigenous groups (Ibid., pp. 12-13). Human rights may well be evoked when claims in favour of cultural diversity and heritage, particularly the intangible, are at stake, as in claiming a cultural practice as a human right under the sub-category of cultural rights, but there may often be debates with claims from others that the practice contravenes laws or human rights instruments (Ibid., p. 14). In short, heritage may also pose the challenge of cultural relativism.
Such challenge of relativism relates to a predicament that the anthropologist Thomas Hylland Eriksen has seen in the World Commission on Culture and Development report *Our Creative Diversity*, which sees culture as “the fountain of our progress and creativity”, in a double-edged argument that culture is not only an instrument of development not also the social basis of the ends themselves, such that “[r]espect for all cultures whose values are tolerant of others and that subscribe to a global ethics should be the basic principle” (WCCD, 1995, p. 15). On ‘creativity’, as a factor which is “[f]ar from being germane to the arts alones [but instead] vital to industry and business, to education and to social and community development” (Ibid., p. 78), the report has on one hand cited Weber’s pioneering association of culture and religion with entrepreneurship (Ibid., p. 88), but on the other hand, in its Weberian concern with cultural values in the context of modernity, ultimately placed cultural values, associated with traditions and ethnic heritage (Ibid., pp. 193, 274) on equal footing with development and modernisation (Ibid., p. 15).

To summarise it in the perspective of Eriksen (2001, online), there remains an unresolved tension between the explicit assertion of culture being ‘dynamic’ and the imagination of cultures largely as islands. The position of WCCD may be appreciated in consideration of how anthropologists have been urging development agencies to be more sensitive towards local conditions and to take into account the cultural dimension; but Eriksen raises concern that “the insistence on cultural difference and plurality as constitutive of the social world does not fit very well with the equally strong insistence on the need for a global ethics” (Ibid.) Furthermore, in WCCD’s middle ground between “a relativistic view of development and a universalist view of ethics” (Ibid.), it has distanced itself from issues of identity politics and mono-ethnic models within the nation-states, instead of confronting questions such as how a state may strike a balance between equal rights for all citizens and the right for groups to be different, as discussed by Kymlicka (1989) and Taylor et al (1992) on the issue of multiculturalism (cited in Ibid).

Eriksen would in fact advocate eschewing all blanket concepts of culture relating to diversity among different communities, and instead adopt a discussion of ‘culture’ generally only in terms of *Bildung* rather than traditions (Ibid.), which would imply not shying away from some form of value hierarchy in the pursuit of global ethics. He cites Levi-Strauss’ (1979) foresight in saying that “we will awake from the dream that
equality and brotherhood will one day rule among men without compromising their
diversity” (461; cited in Ibid.), to argue that it would be more realistic for WCCD to
recognise this dilemma while subscribing to Levi-Strauss’ perspective of a world
partitioned into different cultures (Ibid.). He himself argues that the world is more
continuous and hence such concept of separate cultures is not as useful as speaking
simply of ‘local arts’ or constructed ‘local realities’; even cultural rights should be
focused on the individual (Ibid.), he argues from a liberal standpoint.

The current UNESCO global framework on intangible heritage may not be rights-
based, but it makes an interesting attempt in promoting a form of world polity
founded on cultural diversity. Where safeguarding of the heritage and
rights of indigenous peoples is concerned, there have been other instruments which
are stronger in tone or provision than the 2003 Intangible Heritage Convention,
namely the 1989 International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention (No. 169)
Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, and the 2006
174). Nonetheless, the central role given to cultural communities was meant to be
one of the most significant aspects of the 2003 Convention, as noted by International
Cultural Heritage Law specialist Janet Blake (2009, p. 45). This idea within the
framework of ICH “provides opportunities to democratise the process by which we
give value to heritage” (Ibid., p. 46), although it also raises the further question of
whether official recognition should then depend on whether the ICH expressions or
practices are highly valued outside the immediate cultural community (Ibid.). She
also notes that there can be a difference in the first place “between the meaning of a
term such as ‘community’ to an anthropologist, for example, and its legal definition(s)”
(Ibid., p. 51) - which brings one to the question of who has the authority to decide.
The Permanent Court of International Justice, asked to elucidate on the term, noted
that the “existence of communities is a question of fact; it is not a question of law”
(Ibid., p. 52), which one should understand as implying that ‘ordinary meaning’
should be applied (Ibid.). The accepted understanding of ‘minorities’ in relation to
Article of the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(1996) relies on both objective criteria such as ethnicity and language as well as the
subjective one of self-identification or ‘solidarity’; the ILO Convention on Tribal and
Indigenous Peoples also places high importance on ‘self-identification’ as criterion
Blake raises a question: can a group which “has no consciousness of itself as a group or a community” (Ibid.) be said to ‘exist’ legally despite “objective criteria that sets it apart from other elements in a state’s population” (Ibid.)? This question touches on the issue of who should have authority in knowledge of defining a group, whether it should be a government or some international experts for instance.

After an expert meeting held in Tokyo in 2006 to draft guidelines on implementation of provisions relating to community involvement in inventorying safeguarding ICH, ‘communities’ are defined as “networks of people whose sense of identity or connectedness emerges from a shared historical relationship that is rooted in the practice and transmission of, or engagement with, their ICH” (Ibid., p. 60; italics added). This departs from an earlier definition for ‘community’ at a previous expert meeting in 2002: “People who share a self-ascribed sense of connectedness. This may be manifested, for example, in a feeling of identity or common behaviour, as well as in activities and territory. Individuals can belong to more than one community. (Ibid., p. 61; italics added)"

Janet Blake points out that ultimately, any safeguarding of intangible cultural heritage must rely on the collaborative efforts and active involvement of cultural communities: “Unlike a site, a monument or artefact that has a material existence beyond the individual or society that created it... it is only through its enactment by cultural practitioners that ICH has any current existence and by their active transmission that it can have any future existence. (Ibid., p. 65)” Incidentally, other than the 2003 ICH convention, the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions has also made reference to the issue of participation – in this case, the civil society is mentioned (Article 11, see UNESCO, 2005, online). In relation to these two conventions, R. Albro has asked in a 2007 paper: “how do UNESCO’s conventions help to configure the extent and limits of heritage participation and for whom? (Ibid., p. 62)” The relationship between the community and the ICH resource is not simple, as Blake notes, for there is potential conflict that exists not only between but also within cultural communities, which are “not static and unchanging but rather are fluid entities” (Ibid.).

Community participation is highlighted in the fourth of five criteria for inscription on the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity, which
requires under the Operational Directives: “The element has been nominated following the widest possible participation of the community, group or, if applicable, individuals concerned and with their free, prior and informed consent. (UNESCO, 2011, p. 3)” Community participation has remained a difficult issue in the implementation of the 2003 Convention. As seen in negotiations of the Intergovernmental Committee, “the principle of community participation is extremely difficult to implement because of its wide-ranging political implications”; none of the first three sessions of the Committee saw the presence of representatives from communities, practitioners or grassroots NGOs as observers (Aikawa-Faure, 2009, p. 39).

In practice, identification of communities associated with an ICH and verification of community consent has still posed a problem in the nomination process, as acknowledged at the Sixth Session (Bali, Indonesia, November 2011) of Intergovernmental Committee. The Subsidiary Body, set up by the Intergovernmental Committee since the Fifth Session (Nairobi, Kenya, November 2010) to assess conformity of each nomination, has met with “difficulty to be certain that the community referred to in the description was the same as that involved in the safeguarding measures or that had provided its consent to the nomination” (UNESCO, June 2011, p. 9). Under criterion R. 4, states are requested to describe clearly how the community, group or individuals concerned have participated actively in preparing and elaborating the nomination at all stages, but there are often doubts: “What were the consultative processes leading to the nomination? How and when were they organized? How were the perspectives and aspirations of bearers and practitioners integrated into the nomination itself? What other forms did the participation of the community take? (Ibid., p. 12)”. With regards to the ‘free, prior and informed consent’ to be demonstrated, the Body often found it difficult to identify who the signatories were (Ibid.).

Nevertheless, accepting the fact that global frameworks as such may tend to render intangible heritage as new products for a new audience across borders as Skounti argues, one may simply maintain that a major potential and challenge will lie in the use of ICH elements as a medium for intercultural dialogue. The Operational Directives for the 2003 Convention has already cited Relevance Criterion 2 such that “Inscription of the element will contribute to ensuring visibility and awareness of the
significance of the intangible cultural heritage and to encouraging dialogue, thus reflecting cultural diversity worldwide and testifying to human creativity. (UNESCO, June 2010, p.3)."

If one accepts that heritage affords an opportunity for intercultural dialogue by learning about human expressions in other communities not only through shared activity, but also through cognitive and affective appreciation of the rationality in another cultural system as suggested in Chapter 3, one may argue that the symbolic meanings within the cultural system provide a key to a better understanding. This would mean that heritage as cultural symbols are not only understood in terms of their social functions in a socio-cultural system but in terms of their meanings in the cultural system as a totality of cultural expressions resulting from history up to the present time. Heritage forms an integral part of these cultural meanings, embodied in places, objects or performances as a form of ‘memory’. It has been indeed observed that there is no defining action or moment of heritage beyond “a range of activities that include remembering, commemoration, communicating and passing on knowledge and memories, asserting and expressing identity and social and cultural values and meanings. (Smith, 2006, p. 83)" With regards to heritage places and events as a collective aide-memoire, it has also been argued that these form “an active component of a cultural toolkit for remembering and forgetting” (Smith and Waterton, 2009, p. 293), citing the perspective of James Wertsch (2002) that remembering is not a passive process but is actively engaged to negotiate collective and individual aspirations (cited in Ibid.).

In this respect, rituals, festivals and elements of music, dance and poetic forms, which might be classified as ‘intangible heritage’ under the prevailing global framework, may all considered a form of cultural memory, according to Jan Assmann (1992, p. 56-57). Assmann has cited the perspective of Maurice Halbwachs that memory is constituted through the process of socialisation and the collective is also a subject with memory under a social frame or cadres sociaux (Ibid., 35-36); Halbwachs’ perspective of the past may even be drawn in parallel with that of Berger and Luckmann 40 years later, in terms of a social construction (Ibid., p. 48), Assmann argues. Whereas Halbwachs ties cultural memory to a sense of stability in space and time and to group identity but differentiates it from ‘tradition’, Assman
prefers to differentiate between ‘communicative’ and ‘cultural’ memory (Ibid., p. 45), whereby communicative memory refers to memories relating to the recent past which may be recorded as oral history (Ibid., pp. 50-51), whereas cultural memory, including myths, is oriented towards fixed points in the past (p. 52) and carries meanings beyond routine life (p. 54). The last point parallels what has been said by Luckmann as well as Gehlen about the significance of ritual lying beyond routine life.

With regards to the concept of collective memory, Wertsch (2009) has cited psychologist Bartlett’s emphasis back in 1930s, in reaction to Halbwachs, that it should be seen as “memory in the group, [but] not memory of the group” (Bartlett, 1995, p. 294; cited in Wertsch, 2009, p. 119; emphasis in original citation). Wertsch would suggest to view memory as being distributed within a group through an instrumental process that “involves active agents, on the one hand, and ‘cultural tools’ such as calendars, written records, computers, and narratives, on the other” (Ibid.). His notion of cultural tools as mediating in active remembering is derived from the soviet psychologist Vygotsky, credited for originating the Activity Theory in psychology. Vygotsky (1978) has remarked that the essence of human memory consists in the fact that human beings actively remember with the help of signs, citing the example that one may also say the very essence of civilisation lies in purposely building of monuments in order not to forget (p. 51).

A dichotomy has been made by Halbwachs between memory and history, a distinction which has been carried forward by historian Peter Novick in his argument that “[understanding] something historically is to be aware of its complexity, to have sufficient detachment to see it from multiple perspectives, to accept the ambiguities... [whereas c]ollective memory simplifies; sees events from a single, committed perspective... reduces events to mythic archetypes” (pp. 3-4; cited in Wertsch, 2009, p. 125). Similar observations on cultural memory have been made by Jan Assmann. At the risk of oversimplification, one may distinguish collective memory from analytic history as considering the former as ‘subjective’, reflecting a particular group’s social framework, and the latter as ‘objective’, though scholars such as Hayden White (1987) have also raised questions on whether any representation of the past can be genuinely objective (see Ibid., pp. 125-127). But one may argue that if intangible heritage is considered as cultural memory in the
form of myths, festivals and rituals, it follows that it involves subjectivity in terms of
the representation or embodiment of particular cultural values, notwithstanding any
‘objective’ historical circumstances that may have given rise to the arbitrary symbolic
forms.

Awareness of the past, as furbished by memory along with history, relics and rituals,
involves one’s experience as well as belief, for “[t]he past simply as past is wholly
unknowable” (Collingwood, 1928; cited in Lowenthal, 1985, p. 187). Hence
Lowenthal writes: “We are in fact aware of the past as a realm both coexistent with
and distinct from the present. … Deliberation often distinguishes the here and now –
tasks being done, ideas being formed, steps being taken – from bygone things,
thoughts, and events. But conflation and segregation are in continual tension; the
past has to be felt both part of and separate from the present. (Ibid., p. 186)” He cites
philosopher R.G. Collingwood on the sense of time: “We do call the past, as such,
into being by recollecting and by thinking historically […] but we do this by
disentangling it out of the present in which it actually exists. (cited in Ibid.)” Whereas
awareness of the past may be based on memory, the range of meanings associated
with memory may obscure its relations with the past. On this, Lowenthal cites
psychologist Ulric Neisser as criticising the long-time preoccupation in a natural
science paradigm of psychology with replicable, value-free, quantitative laboratory
analysis: “if X is an interesting or socially significant aspect of memory, then
psychologists have hardly ever studied X. (cited in Ibid., p. 193)” Neisser’s own work
*Remembering in Natural Contexts* would therefore draw insights from novelists,
historians and psychoanalysts.

The concept of memory is important to culture and heritage alike. Luhmann has
gone so far as to speak of culture as the ‘memory of social systems’ (1999, p. 47).
For the sake of clarity in psychological terms, one may summarise culture –
reclaiming Weber’s perspective from Parsons – as the knowledge of meanings and
values which provide relevance to action; heritage, on the other hand, may be
understood as the objectification of meanings and values in artefacts, places or
performances and an externalisation of memory in a sense of continuity with the
past. As far as such a theoretical perspective is concerned, the distinction between
‘tangible’ and ‘intangible’ in the current global discourse is superfluous, if not to say
‘colonial’, as Herzfeld argues, in how “beholden the whole system is to a Cartesian understanding of the world” (see Byrne, 2011, p. 147).

‘Tangible’ heritage on its own would be ‘mute’, as Lowenthal argues, for despite any aura of antiquity, it still requires interpretation to voice its meaning (1985, p. 243). He would deem unreal the distinction made by Michael Oakeshott between ‘disinterested’ historian and the ‘practical’ people “who use the past to understand, sustain, or reform the present” (Ibid., p. 237). Where national identity is concerned, even the difference between history and fiction would arguably be one of purpose or device rather than content, in their common search for ‘truth’ which is more than the truth about the past; what the novelist achieves where the historian does not is in recreating a past that is more vital (pp. 226-229). Herzfeld (1997) would remind us that the language of national or ethnic identity, in its discourse of inclusion and exclusion, is also “a language of morality” (p. 43).

In the context of a multi-ethnic nation, an appreciation of cultural heritage of a different cultural community would hence involve not only experiencing the aesthetic values associated with it but also interpreting the moral values associated thereof. This thesis would also emphasise that an awareness of ‘cultural differences’ in terms of respect for institutionalised normativity should be guarded against stereotyping of members of a cultural community through a Parsonian understanding of culture as behaviour. In the subsequent chapter, we shall turn to explore how intercultural dialogue may be promoted through the medium of dance as heritage in the case study of Singapore. Meantime, the second half of this chapter will attempt a pseudo-etic definition of ‘dance’ and discuss in what sense dance may constitute as heritage in the first place.

5.2 Dance as Communication and Dance as Heritage

5.2.1 What is Dance? – Perspectives in Anthropology

In this section, we shall explore as to how dance as heritage in different communities transmits different cultural values and hence has potential as a medium for intercultural dialogue. This subsection will begin by first attempting to define dance as a phenomenon in itself, based on perspectives in anthropology, before looking in
the following subsections on how it may function as a form of communication and how it is socially constructed as a form of heritage with particular values ascribed.

The approach in defining dance here will be one based on social anthropology, involving a combination of etic and emic perspectives. The etic perspective has been informed partly by a philosophy of art, as elaborated with the help of the art theory of Susanne K. Langer in *Feeling and Form* (1953), recognised for its importance till today in honouring dance as part of the canon of art forms (Huschka, 2002, p. 57). It is known for adapting the concept of ‘symbolic form’ from the logic of cultural sciences as exemplified by Ernst Cassirer’s *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen* to discuss dance as a form of communication through gesture, rather than as a symptom of emotions (Langer, 2011, p. 280) as early scholarship in anthropology tended to do. The “virtual realm of Power” that dance thus creates through gesture (Ibid.), as discussed by Langer, is interesting in the context of this thesis as it provides another dimension of dance as communication which may transcend cultural differences. Such aspects of dance will be dealt with later.

On the hand, an emic perspective on dance would emphasise that what constitutes as dance differs from culture to culture, not only in form and but also in function and meaning. In fact, dance anthropologist Adrienne L. Kaeppler has asserted that whereas cultural forms that result from the creative use of human bodies in time and space are often glossed as ‘dance’, in many societies “there is no indigenous concept that can be adequately be translated as ‘dance’ " (Kaeppler, 1985, p. 92). Kaeppler has been credited for setting out emic elements of dance using examples in Tongan culture, offering a clear ethnoscientific approach in analysis that might be used to further studies of dances anywhere from an anthropological perspective (Williams, 2004, p. 191) This perspective is especially important for the purpose of the thesis as ‘dance’ is linked to different meanings and indeed different cultural values for different cultural communities, which presents a great challenge as well as opportunity in the use of dance as medium for intercultural dialogue. What one needs to do would be to apply an imposed etic in the definition of dance in order to guide the process of understanding a particular dance as cultural form, for instance Indian classical dance, from the perspective of a different cultural community.
We shall begin here by attempting to give a simple ‘universal’ definition of dance, in the first instance without going into perspectives of dance as an art specifically. Through this process, we shall see how one needs to filter away perspectives of dance as a psychological or biological phenomenon from a functionalist explanation of social anthropology relating to aspects of culture and identity, with the latter perspective to be elaborated later on.

A most basic concept for dance, as cited by Anya Peterson Royce in *The Anthropology of Dance* first published in 1977, would be “rhythmic or patterned movement” (Royce, 2002, p. 5). However, as she points out immediately, this is too general and insufficient to distinguish dance from other rhythmic activities such as those in work routines or sports, hence an alternative would be to formulate dance as “rhythmic movement done for some purpose transcending utility” (Ibid.). Yet if one considers that there may be dance which is essentially an aesthetic activity versus dance which serves some other function as well, then one has to rephrase the definition in order to circumvent such a distinction, for such distinction serves little purpose, when one thinks of dance as an aspect of ‘human behaviour’, Royce argues, noting that such distinction has led to a dichotomy in dance literature between those who write about ‘art’ dance and those who write about ‘folk’ dance (Ibid.). A more inclusive definition would certainly be more helpful in discussing phenomena of dance, particularly for the purpose of this thesis, which is using dance as a medium for exchange between cultures which may have very different ideas of dance. Royce eventually streamlines her definition for dance as “patterned movement performed as an end in itself” (Royce, 2002, p. 8).

Incidentally, one further confusion Royce has noted while considering ‘rhythmic movement’ as the distinguishing feature of dance, is the question of whether there is dance of human versus dance of nonhuman (Royce, 2002, p. 5). Curt Sachs, author of *World History of the Dance* (*Eine Weltgeschichte des Tanzes*) first published in 1933, has compared the human activity of dancing with ‘dancing’ of birds and other animals (Sachs, 1937, pp. 9-10, cited in Royce, 2002, p. 4). The resolution to this confusion, as Sachs himself then proposes, is to make a distinction between innate and acquired behaviour, although he brings in confusion again with the question of whether the dancing of chimpanzees may be acquired (Royce, 2002, p. 4).
This brings in an important issue, for dance has often been conceived of as little more than innate behaviour in general books on dance. Psychologist Havelock Ellis has not only argued in the 1923 book *The Dance of Life* with a cosmological statement that ‘life is a dance’ (Grau, 1998, in Carter ed., 1998, p. 198; Williams, 2004, p. 33), he has even suggested elsewhere that dance has its origins in sex (Williams, 2004, p. 6). In *Dancing: the Pleasure, Power and Art of Movement*, a voluminous popular book published in 1992 to accompany a multi-million US dollars television series on dance forms around the world, Gerald Jonas begins with a passage depicting the movements of a child’s limbs at birth, declaring that the “impulse to move is the raw material that cultures shape into evocative sequences of physical activity that we call dance” (p. 12, cited in Grau, 1998, in Carter ed., 1998, p. 198). Such tendency to consider dance as foremost a biological phenomenon born directly from nature may be motivated by a universalist view. As dance anthropologist Drid Williams points out, such universalist view may be summed up with a disguised syllogism thus: all dancing is movement, all human beings move, therefore all human beings dance; but such an argument about dance being a universal medium of expression among humanity makes no anthropological sense as it would have no significance in answering the question as to why people dance (Williams, 2004, p. 34). Particular explanations as to the origin of dance, be it biological or psychological or otherwise, may apply to some forms of dancing but not to others (Ibid., pp. 6-7). The notion of dance as a form of ‘behaviour’, when conceived as a universal phenomenon that is value-free, ‘objective’ and prior to human intentions, would be a conception that can be equally be attached to animals or machines, and separate from any social context (Ibid., p. 203).

In explaining the interest of anthropology in concerning itself with the phenomenon of dance, Royce concluded her book with a quote by Curt Sachs in *World History of the Dance* to explain how dance is tied to culture:

> If the dance, inherited from brutish ancestors, lives in all mankind as a necessary motor-rhythmic expression of excess energy and of the joy of living, then it is only of slight importance for anthropologists and social historians. If it is established, however, that an inherited predisposition develops in many ways in the different groups of man and in its force and direction is related to other phenomena of civilisation, the history of dance will then be of great
Royce has qualified in her attempt to find a definition for dance, that the reason for having definitions is ultimately to allow people to talk about something and others to understand it, and there are two levels of understanding here: one that has significance among natives, and one consisting of analytic devices that may not correspond to what is meaningful to those engaged in a particular dance form (Royce, 2002, p.8), in other words the emic and the etic perspectives. Writing in 1977 on the developments in the anthropology, Royce has pointed out the importance in going beyond the analyses of dance form to consider how form shapes and is shaped by cultural standards and values (Ibid., p. 216).

Her definition of dance as patterned movement performed ‘as an end in itself’ is inclusive enough to refer not only to dance performed primarily as aesthetic expression or for enjoyment but also dance performed as ritual activities (Ibid., p. 10). It suggests at the same time the presence of human intention in general, a point which is crucial in Williams’ perspective on danced movements. Williams asserts that it is generally true to say that danced movements “are intentional movements and therefore best understood as actions” (Williams, 2004, p. 20). She cites the description of dance as ‘expressive act’ according to Susanne Langer, as well as the position taken by philosopher David Best (1974, p. 193) that “an intentional action is not the same as a physical movement since the latter can be described in various ways according to one’s point of view and one’s beliefs about the person performing it” (Ibid.). Unlike a physical movement, an action according to Best cannot be specified without taking into account what the agent has intended (Ibid.).

Williams hence rejects any characterisation of dance as a biological phenomenon or psychological symptom. Such perspectives may be dated back to scholarly attention of the Middle Age on danse macabre or the dance of death, and on the dancing mania of convulsive movement caused by disease known as St Vitus’s Dance (Ibid., p. 41), yet they have persisted well into the 20th century. A 1952 article by M.D.W. Jeffreys entitled “African Tarantula or Dancing Manila” for instance has suggested that dancing, along with sports activities such as tennis and rugby, results from an over-accumulation of sex hormones, an argument that he supports through evidence of
research psychologists working with rats (Ibid., 40). He goes on to observe that young women are ‘the most often affected’ in such outbreaks of dancing mania, in Nigeria as with the Tarantella in Italy (Ibid.). This is criticised by Williams for making a baseless generalisation, from an European dance form believed to originate from the need to sweat out poison from the bite of a venomous spider, to a form of dancing in Nigeria that looks convulsive but is in fact associated with a religious movement (Ibid., pp. 40-41).

Even social anthropologist Paul Spencer, who like Royce has taken a cue from Curt Sachs in emphasising that dance is more than mere expression of excess energy (Spencer, 1985, p. 5), who states that dance as an entity is not separable from the anthropological concept of culture and furthermore not separable from the anthropological concept of institution, has still considered the cathartic theory of “tension release achieved through dance” as a plausible partial explanation for the dance phenomenon (Ibid.). He tries to mediate the problem by citing that Susanne Langer herself has made a distinction between dancing as an art form and ‘pleasure dance’ in which emotion is experienced more directly, and hence he says this is largely a problem of definition (Ibid., p. 7). Of course, this poses no problem to the working definition we have adopted thus far, which sees dance as intentional action and is all-encompassing enough, as long as we do not see dance movements as involuntary symptoms of emotional release. Paul Spencer in fact cites various theories to explain different dances, referring to catharsis, expression, social function and so on, considering that they supplement each other, but what Williams cautions with regards to Spencer’s approach, is that different theories and explanation belong to different worlds of ontological and epistemological explanation and hence can be entirely incompatible if not contradictory (Williams, 2004, p. 23). Actually, one may also argue that the cathartic concept of dance as a safety valve for releasing emotional steam, as first proposed by sociologist Herbert Spencer in 1862, and cited by Paul Spencer as a concept foreshadowing Freud’s concept of the libido (Spencer, 1985, p. 4), might be more useful when considered not in relation to psychological function but to social function. For instance, the pre-colonial dancing among the Kerebe in Tanzania, described as an inter-village competition during the dry season that provided an emotional outlet for men in contrast to their toil at other times under an oppressive regime (Ibid., p. 5), would make more sense being explained as a
social activity that is institutionalised, since as Spencer notes, it persisted and developed as a major preoccupation for some time after the demise of the regime (Ibid., p. 6)

The social function of dance is a topic to be dealt with later on in this chapter. But now we shall finish off the discussion on dance as a psychological or biological phenomenon by turning to the perspective of Judith Lynne Hanna who sees dance as culturally patterned and has developed a theory on dance as nonverbal communication. She defines dance as being “composed, from the dancer’s perspective, of purposeful, intentionally rhythmical, and culturally patterned sequences of nonverbal body movements other than ordinary motor activities, the motion having inherent and aesthetic value” (Hanna, 1987, p. 57). In short, it includes the principal points discussed so far about dance being patterned movement, dance being intentional action as an end in itself, and dance being tied to cultural values, except that in addition she also considers dance as a nonverbal expression and emphasises its aesthetic value, two points that will also have to be addressed in time.

What is of interest for a start is how Hanna deals with the question of whether dance is a biological phenomenon and what separates human from animals in dance. She actually takes an interest in the question of the extent to which human beings have a biologically based predisposition for dance, and she notes the phenomenon that animals such as chimpanzees, horses, dogs, bears, parrots or elephants have been trained through conditioning to perform some ‘dancing’ movements within their biological possibilities (Ibid., p. 58). Her view with regards to this, first of all, is that certain capacities would be realised only in humans, even if chimpanzees may display rhythmic movements and develop gestures, which suggest primates “carry the seed of those visual, motor, auditory, kinaesthetic, affective, and cognitive patterns that are more fully developed in humans” (Ibid.). But secondly, and very critically, she points out the distinction between fixed action patterns and selected action patterns, with a crucial factor being human’s symbolic capacity (Ibid.). She cites neurophysiological knowledge to explain this, saying that the capacity of neurological connections in human allows one to associate an object with a symbol that denotes it while being at a distance in time, space and affect (Ibid., p. 59). She goes on further to elaborate on dance as having ‘deep structures’ just like linguistic
behaviour (Ibid., p. 70) and being able to convey meanings and emotions through elements like icon, stylisation, metonym or metaphor just as in language (Ibid., p. 44). In short, the basic idea as shared with Suzanne Langer is that dance is a symbolic action and hence much more than a psychological symptom. While the details of Hanna’s paradigm of dance as nonverbal communication may not be relevant for purposes of the thesis, a general perspective of dance as a form of communication would still be helpful in our later discussion on functions of dance in larger contexts.

The aspect of aesthetic value in dance is something that will be dealt with in detail in later on, this being an important aspect as it is also very much tied to differences in cultural values in relation to dance, not to mention posing a challenge when dance is considered for communication across cultures. The significance of dance as ritual activity, on the other hand, will be included in the discussion of social functions of dance.

One interesting remark to be made here in closing would be to note that dance as an activity has tended to be seen negatively or as being of secondary importance in civilised society, especially when considered as a psychological symptom, as release of emotional impulses or excess energy like what was discussed earlier. A similar perception may be taken towards dance as ritual activity in the eyes of more secular cultures. Helen Thomas has noted in Dance, Modernity and Culture: Explorations in the Sociology of Dance that there is an association of dance with ‘primitive’ cultures, as reflected in speculative evolutionary approaches, with non-European societies seen as representing an earlier phase of human development, in “a world inspired by fear and dread” and steeped in magic (Thomas, H., 1995, p. 8), as if dancing would become less important as cultures become more ‘civilised’ and ‘rational’ (Ibid., p. 9). It does not help that dance has often been considered one of the oldest if not indeed the oldest of all arts, for instance according to 18th-century enlightenment philosopher Condillac who thought that dance constituted the first symbolic activity from which language and music stemmed (Sparshott, 1998, cited in Thomas, H., 1995, p. 8). Another problem is the dogma of Cartesian dualism which Gilbert Ryle (1949) has referred to as the ‘Ghost in the Machine’ subjectivism, also tied to a distaste of the body in religious beliefs like a fundamentalist conception of Christianity whereby the soul is of paramount importance whereas bodily functions
are an unfortunate necessity and dance is sinful as it stimulates temptations of the flesh (Best, 1999, p. 104)

A similar view is also reflected in the marginalisation of dance in sociology which focuses on the problem of modernity (Thomas, H., 1995, p. 9). This is so much so that the concern with dance in sociology as shown in studies in the 1970s and 1980s has focused mainly on working-class subcultures and youth, and when couched in functionalist perspectives, their behaviour of dance would be seen as an escape from the routine of work via some kind of fantasy (Ibid.), in short tending towards deviance from social norms. Helen Thomas sums it up by saying that “in relation to dance, subculture is to dominant culture as primitive is to modern culture: a dangerous, exotic, non-rational, marginal ‘other’.” (Ibid., p. 10) Bearing that in mind, we shall see what social anthropologists have to say about dance from a functionalist perspective.

We have hence discussed the question of how dance should be defined or what constitute dance, and argued that dance should be studied in its significance to cultural contexts instead of seeing it as symptom of psychological or biological processes. Next, we shall look at the significance of dance in relation to social functions, and more specifically on the cultural values that it may transmit for a cultural community.

A functionalist perspective on dance has incidentally been an important approach in social anthropology. However, instead of considering that there is some predominant function of dance that is applicable across all societies as some scholars may have speculated, here it will be argued that with dance being a differentiated phenomenon, the ‘function’ and values associated with dance will ultimately have to be understood within an emic perspective. Indeed, it may be further argued that, if dance may be used as a medium in “promoting respect for cultural diversity”, just as any intangible cultural heritage is meant to do according to the 2003 UNESCO convention (UNESCO, 2003, Article 2 Section 1), a respect for diversity in dance as cultural forms should also encompass respect for the cultural values that are attached to them.

As mentioned earlier, there has long been a universalist view on dance that sees it as a phenomenon of nature, common to all human beings and independent of
differences among cultures. The propagation of such a view may well be motivated by love and enthusiasm for dance, or a good intention in emphasising what is shared among all mankind, but such claims serve no purpose in advancing knowledge from an anthropological perspective. Unfortunately, a review of dance literature also shows us that for a long time, studies on the cultural diversity of dance have been rare, and these too tended to focus on diversity in forms and were short on analysis of functions and values.

For decades after its publication in the 1930s, Curt Sach’s *World History of the Dance* has served as a resource for researchers interested in the analysis of dance styles across different cultures, although the information that Sachs gathered was not only second- or third-hand but inadequate, being based on accounts of travellers, reports of missionaries and old ethnographic works (Youngerman, 1974, in Grau and Wierre-Gore ed., 2006, p. 77, 79). Sachs, who has notably called for a study of dance according to cultural context, has come up with an assortment of cultural opposites for his analysis of different dance styles (Ibid., p. 80). Some of the dichotomies he listed include: the absence versus existence of animal dances, convulsive dance versus relaxed and body-conscious dance, predominance of solo dance versus predominance of group dance, agricultural versus hunting or totemic, cult of the moon versus cult of the sun, dance in circles versus dance in lines and so on (Ibid., p. 81). His statements on styles have been criticised as essentially impressionistic (Royce, 2002, p. 138).

The next large-scale comparison of dance features worldwide was to be the choreometrics project directed by Alan Lomax in the 1960s, a project involving the production of over 200 films of dance and everyday activities in major cultural regions in the world, followed by an application of a coding system for cross-cultural comparison of different movement traditions (Ibid., p. 137). The project benefited from the use of Effort-Shape, one of three leading dance notation systems invented in the 20th century. Lomax, who had the help of Irmgard Bartenieff and Forrestine Paulay as collaborators for devising of the coding system, analysed movement profiles using four major parameters: body attitude, type of transition, number of active body parts, and complexity (Ibid., p. 136). Altogether 43 movement traditions or ‘profiles’ were represented in the 200 films made, and these were grouped into seven ‘stylistic regions’ based on common patterns, namely Amerindia, Australia,
New Guinea, the Maritime Pacific, Africa, the ‘Old High Culture’ which refers to East Asia and parts of Central Asia, and Europe. (Lomax, 1968, 233)

It may be pointed out that both of these cross-cultural studies on the diversity of dance were much influenced either by the 19th-century theory of unilinear evolutionism, or the slightly more sophisticated version of it, the theory of cultural milieus which suggests that cultural traits are developed ensemble in different geographic areas and spread mainly through migration. Sachs hence suggests that each prehistoric European culture would find a correspondence among the cultures of primitive people which can still be seen in contemporary times, as primitive people today are going through stages of evolution that the occidental culture has already passed through (Youngerman, 1974, in Grau and Wierre-Gore ed., 2006, p. 82-83). Lomax even goes so far as to suggest that pre-agricultural societies such as hunters and gatherers, pastoralists and horticulturalists have more simple movement profiles than agricultural societies, that complexity of dance style is correlated with level of socioeconomic development (Royce, 2002, p., 136, 139).

Lomax also betrays an assumption that cultures are essentially bounded entities with particular traits, as he models dance culture upon languages, similar to Hanna’s assumption of a ‘deep structure’ in dance expression, and hence he considers people as belonging to movement traditions of body communication just as they belong to speech communities (Ronström, 2011, in McCormick and White, 2011, p. 289). Lomax states the premise of his project thus: “Choreometrics test the proposition that dance is the most repetitious, redundant, and formally organised system of body communication present in a culture. (Lomax, 1968, p. 224)” He adds: “The dance is composed of those gestures, postures, movements, and movement qualities most characteristic and most essential to the activity of everyday and thus crucial to cultural continuity. (Ibid.)” He apparently sees the continuity of a culture as being embodied in form through instinctive biological or psychological behaviour, rather than regulated and negotiated through cultural values.

The interest in such grand overviews on the diversity of dance seems to have waned towards the end of the 20th century, as anthropologists shift interest towards unique qualities of dance as a phenomenon in its own right, as seen with a symbolic, structural or semiotic approach, or considering all the complexities of its specific
context, rather than as a phenomenon derived from something else (Royce, 2002, pp. 31-32). There is even a contemporary approach to dance and movement that makes embodied knowledge an explicit focus, with scholars like Sally Ness and Barbara Browning (Ibid., pp. xx-xxi). In all, Royce identifies five different approaches of anthropologists in dance over the last century, in the following chronological order: the evolutionary approach; the culture trait approach; the culture and personality and culture configuration approach; the problem-oriented approach in complex and plural societies; and the approach focusing on dance as a unique phenomenon (Ibid., p. 19). A quick look at these different approaches would show us an interesting development of random ideas on functions or cultural values associated with dance.

Evolutionists, who posited some kind of stages of progress that all societies would go through, considered dance as an essential component of primitive culture, mostly associated with ritual and magic (Ibid.). Sir James Frazer, author of *The Golden Bough* (1890) has for instance told of how in Transylvania dancers would leap high in the air just in order to make the crops grow tall (Ibid., p. 20). As evolutionism gave way to cultural relativism in early 20th century, such tones became moderated by a view of culture as a unique combination of traits and circumstances, such as Franziska Boas who, in *The Function of Dance in Human Society* (1944), notes that among Kwakiutl Indians, there are expert performers for dance, although everyone is obliged to take part, so that “the separation between performer and audience that we find in our modern society does not occur” (Ibid., p. 22). The Culture and Personality school, as represented by anthropologists like Ruth Bennett, came about with the influence of Freud and psychoanalysis in the 1920s, and now one sees the idea of historical progress being abandoned and culture being characterised according to psychological set (Ibid., pp. 24-25). Borrowing the contrast between the ‘Apollonian’ and the ‘Dionysian’ from Nietzsche’s *The Birth of Tragedy*, Bennett in *Patterns of Culture* described the Southwest Pueblos as Apollonian (1934, p. 79), as they do not seek self-torture or ecstasy, their dance being “a monotonous compulsion” with “tireless pounding of their feet” seeking to conjure rain with the perfection of 40 men moving as one, without anything wild about it (Ibid., pp. 92-93). She describes on the other hand the Native American tribes of the Northwest Coast, specifically the Kwakiiutl, as being Dionysian, as they strove for ecstasy in their religious ceremonies; the chief dancer would lose control of himself, froth at the month, tremble violently,
even holding glowing coals in the hands (Ibid., pp. 175-176). While such essentialising of cultural personalities would be considered problematic today, perhaps the contrast may arguably still be valid if one considers it as differences in cultural values.

For the problem-oriented approach in complex and plural societies, Royce cites her observation of the Zapotec dances of Juchitan to illustrate that the performance of dance can also be a process of contestation in social behaviour whereby certain cultural values like family allegiance and unity may be upheld by those who demand more respect and authority by age (Royce, 2002, p. 31). Dance is also seen as a vehicle for communicating ideas of the identity of a tribe as well as parodying identity of other tribes, as observed in a 1956 study by J.C. Mitchell of the Kalela dance in the African Cooperbelt (Ibid.).

It may be mentioned here that comparative studies in dance anthropology soon became more focused from studying general differences between different dance cultures to studying specific aspects such as comparison of the same genre in different regions, for example some comparative studies in the 1960s between ‘weapon dances’ or trance dances in different cultures (Ibid., p. 134), which also suggests a new awareness on different functions of dance. What arguably marked the beginning of the new thinking in anthropological work on dance was a new express intention as characterised by Gertrude Kurath in the seminal article Panorama of Dance Ethnology: “not as a description or reproduction of a particular kind of dance, but as an approach toward, and method of, eliciting the place of dance in human life” (1960, p. 250; cited in Royce, 2002, p.16). Interestingly, she was also calling for an end to the dichotomy between ethnic dance and art dance. Indeed the confines of dance anthropology would eventually be exploded, with dance scholars since then opening up new theoretical and methodological approaches, especially after the 1980s, not only through semiotic notions of representation as mentioned earlier, but also by putting gender and ethnic issues on the agenda with feminist and sociological perspectives (Thomas, 1995, pp. 5-6).

Kurath’s seminal article came at a time of major shifts in explanatory paradigms in social and cultural anthropology and raised questions with regards to the function of dance in culture (Williams, 2004, pp. 112-113). She noted: “Scholars have justified
their studies on dance, not only by their use to readers in search of information or of material for performances but also by the functional significance of dance in society. (Kurath, 1960, p. 235; cited in Williams, 2004, p. 113)” She argued that the relevance of dance ethnology may be justified, awaiting further inquiry into the function of dance in culture, “which in turn depends on more findings on the relative significance of dance in particular cultures” (Ibid.).

One should now zoom into the development of the functionalist perspective in the anthropology of dance from early 20th century onwards. Functionalism on a whole dates back to 19th-century sociologist Durkheim with the analogy of society as an organism, and has provided the paradigm for sociological theory, most notably in the work of Talcott Parsons who worked on developing a grand theory or general theory of action in a functioning society, with a model consisting of the social system, the personality system and the cultural system. For anthropologists, it was significant as an alternative to earlier paradigms that were evolutionary or diffusionist, as observed by Malinowski in Introduction to Ashley-Montague (1937). He considered the functionalist approach as a vindication of empirical research, with the demand that observation be guided by “laws and principles of culture as a dynamic reality”, aiming at the “establishment of a common measure of all cultures, simple and developed, Western and Oriental, arctic and tropical” (cited in Williams, 2004, p. 104).

Drid Williams sees functional explanations as an improvement over earlier explanations, which would have reduced dancing to single metabolic, chemical or psychological attributes of human beings as organisms (Williams, 2004, p. 107). Such explanations also tend to stay away from moral and aesthetic judgments about non-Western dance forms, and functionalism in research also tends to suggest requirement of fieldwork and familiarity with the spoken language of the peoples concerned (Ibid.). However, she sees limitations in such perspectives too.

An early example of a functional explanation for dance would be what Radcliffe-Brown proposed in The Andaman Islanders (1913). In keeping with a functionalist perspective that an activity would have its function insofar as it contributes to the maintenance of the social structure, he suggests that the chief function of the dance lies in the submission of the personality of the individual to community action; the harmonious aggregation of individual feelings and action produced concord and unity,
or “tribal solidarity”, which is intensely felt by every individual member who participates (Radcliffe-Brown, 1964 [1913]; as cited in Williams, 2004, p. 109) His functionalist perspective might also be blended here with an influence of Herbert Spencer’s theory on subliminal communication, as he considers the rhythm as generating a force that regulates the dancer to conform, such that he becomes absorbed in the unified community (Spencer, 1985, p. 13). Spencer considers this functionalist perspective as also a homeostatic model whereby not only is the society deemed as a living organism, the thoughts and sentiments of the individuals are seen as derived from himself and from society at the same time (Ibid., p. 14).

Williams on the other hand adds that whatever Radcliffe-Brown has said about dancing the Andaman Islanders may well be true, but there is a problem with later writers generalising and applying the same “concord and unity” theory to dance in other cultures; the Kalela dance of the Bisa for instance is a case of dance producing disharmony rather than harmony in a complex society (Williams, 2004, p. 109).

Another example of a functional explanation is Margaret Mead’s claim in *Coming of Age in Samoa* (1928) that dance serves a purpose in education and socialisation of Samoan children, partly as “it effectively offsets the rigorous subordination in which children are habitually kept”, and partly as it helps in “reduction of the threshold of shyness” (Mead, 1967[1928], pp. 117-118, cited in Royce, 2002, p. 25) The dance also provides an outlet for the individual to demonstrate skill and superiority and be rewarded (Royce, 2002, p. 78). In short, this is an explanation which sees dance as an organ of social control, but it is more complicated than say the notion of the minuet being used as an educational device in 18th-century Britain in epitomising etiquette (Spencer, 1985, p. 8). Instead of dance as a mould of standard products, Mead regards it as a device of selective education to separate adept children from the inept, preparing them for success or failure in later life; it becomes even more confusing as she adds to this a consideration of dance being cathartic, with children wallowing in an orgy of aggressive individualistic display (Ibid., p. 9). Williams summarises Mead’s perspective on dance generally as seeing it as a vehicle to accomplish psychological adjustments for Samoan and other teenagers (Williams, 2004, p. 107)

Gertrude Kurath (1949) has summarised occasions or functions of dance under 14 purposes, such as courtship, weddings, hunting, battle, cure, clown and so on.
Anthony Shay (1971) created a more general typology with 6 categories such as validation of social organisation, vehicle of secular and religious rituals, psychological outlet, dance as aesthetic activity and so on. Bearing in mind the varying prominence of different functions in dance forms across cultures, we shall consider in the next subsection the meaning of dance as heritage with regards to its representation of cultural identities or values and its use in orientating behaviour.

5.2.2 Power of Dance in communicating Cultural Values and embodying Social Relations

Intangible cultural heritage or tradition, as discussed earlier in this chapter, may be understood generally as a social process whereby cultural values and meanings of a community are transmitted and negotiated through socialisation and institutionalisation. If ‘tangible’ heritage involves such construction of meanings as embodied in or ascribed to monuments, sites or artefacts, ‘intangible’ heritage in contrast involves the transmission and affirmation of meanings through re-enactment of performances and practices. This subsection will examine how dance functions as a type of intangible heritage that transmits cultural values, being a kind of ritualised action and a symbolic form or expression consisting of human movements. We shall consider how dance as such holds a kind of ‘power’ over people and how dance may furthermore serve to embody and communicate cultural meanings and have an effect in shaping or orientating people’s behaviour within and across communities.

As suggested in the previous section, ‘dance’ is a general term for rhythmic or patterned movements which give aesthetic pleasure, but a dance form in any culture has to be understood in relation to its specific associated meanings or functions, for ‘dance’ is not a universal category with the same meaning for all cultures. As dance anthropologist Adrienne L. Kaepple has argued, ‘dance’ is a multi-faceted phenomenon that includes not only what the spectator may see or hear but also hidden and underlying processes under the specific social contexts (Kappler, 2000, in Dance Research Journal, Vol. 32, No. 1, 2000, p. 117). “Cultural forms that result from the creative use of human bodies in time and space are often glossed as ‘dance’ (Ibid.),” but movement analyses from anthropological points of view would
actually “encompass all structured movement systems, including those associated with religious and secular ritual, ceremony, entertainment, martial arts, sign languages, sports, and games (Ibid.).” Kaeppler considers these structured movement systems as systems of knowledge which are socially and culturally constructed, with content that “can be visual manifestations of social relations, the subjects of elaborate aesthetic systems, and may assist in understanding cultural values and the deep structure of the society (Ibid.).”

Under the theoretical framework of this thesis, which analyses intangible heritage as part of cultural systems, the main interest is on how values and meanings may be communicated through a medium such as dance. Dance anthropologist Judith Lynne Hanna, who formulates a theory of dance as a form of non-verbal communication, sees dance as part of the cultural communication system in which human beings deal with problems of social organisation and regulation, discriminate between gender, age, social background or group membership and transmit information of culture to subsequent generations (Hanna, 1987, p. 64). She has gone so far as to develop an elaborate semiotic model to analyse how messages or meanings in dance are encoded and decoded between choreographers or dancers and the audience. She takes into account socio-cultural contexts as well as dynamics between dance expression and sensory perception, based on cognitive structures, emotions, communication skills and other factors (Ibid., p. 78). While this thesis does not aim to apply such an elaborate semiotic model to its final analysis, it does help to concur with Hanna as she argues that there can be polysemy or multiple meanings in a non-verbal form of communication like dance, which also often connotes certain social relationships among other things in its communicative function (Ibid., p. 89).

Before looking at what specific social meanings a dance form may represent for a culture, let us turn to the question of how dance is an effective medium in communicating any value or meaning. Susanne Langer, coming from the philosophy of art, has been most influential in this regard in her discussion of the ‘virtual power’ created by dance. She sees dance as a ‘symbolic form’, in the senses that it manages to stir one’s aesthetic emotions as a symbolic expression, through conceptual but non-discursive means. She thus compares dance to a virtual realm of power, “not actual, physically exerted power, but appearances of influence and agency” (Langer, 1953, p. 175; cited in Hanna, 1987, p. 40). Hanna similarly asserts
that dance is a symbolic behaviour, which communicates by creating an illusion through body locomotion and gesture (Hanna, 1987, p. 39), and she would emphasise that this capacity of humans in symbolisation, to “communicate abstract concepts, removed from an immediate stimulus, distanced in time and space and in deliberately chosen rhythms” (Ibid., p. 60), is what sets the performance of dance by human beings apart from ‘dancing’ by animals.

Social anthropologist Paul Spencer has also cited Langer, in her perspective of dance as a virtual “realm of mystic forces” (Langer, 1953, p. 190, cited in Spencer, 1985, p. 35), whereby a dancer’s world is “a world transfigured, wakened to a special kind of life” (Ibid.). But he subsumes this perspective under a theme of dance as “ritual drama” (Ibid., p. 27), based on Victor Turner’s concept of the *communitas*. This points to the paradox present in any society where people are divided by social inequalities and rivalries, yet at the same time there is a generic human bond that unites them, with all humans as mere mortals of a uniform condition. The relevance of dance is such that it is not just a highly social and levelling activity that draws people together in solidarity, it is also marginal and anomalous, contrasting with normal everyday life, taking the dancers out of their structured routine and into a realm of timeless charm. Turner’s model, to be discussed in detail later, has an affinity with a dream world in which the structure and repressions of everyday existence are upturned in a meaningful symbolic pattern, a shift from daily power relations to communitas with suspension of normal life. But Spencer would also suggest that dance may otherwise be part of a process of self-generation for a community, comparing the semi-religious fascination of dancing with Max Weber’s of charisma enhancing the moral authority of a leader. Or dance may also be used for mounting competition between rival groups, as a form of boundary display.

Hanna (1987) has combined the two concepts of ritual and power to explore the communicative potency of dance. She suggests that dance provides a sense of power over the self and others, as a form of expression through which “life forces are made manifest and communicated” (Hanna, 1987, p. 128), and hence may be used for “validation and re-creation or leadership, competition for power, social control, coping with subordination or its threat, constraints on the exercise of power, and redress and transformation” (Ibid.). Referring to power as basically “the ability to influence others” (Ibid., p. 129), including people’s “predispositions, feelings,
attitudes, beliefs and actions” (Ibid.), she discusses the psychological basis for which
dance may be significant as a symbol of power relationships and politics.

Firstly, she argues, citing Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) phenomenology of perception, that
it is through the body that humans express life experiences prior to using other
material objects in the physical environment (Ibid., p. 130). She therefore says: “The
simplest form of power is the individual’s own body. Ontogenetically each person
experiences the discovery and mastery of the body in time, space, and effort
patterns. (Ibid.)” The human body carries memory rooted in sensory experiences
along with cultural attitudes, and it is hence not surprising that the body goes from
being an instrument of physical power to being a symbol of power (Ibid.). Secondly,
dance has efficacy in representing political thought as it is a multisensory
phenomenon that combines aspects of vision, motion and emotional impact in its
communicative expression (Ibid., p. 131). Thirdly, it is through symbols and rituals
that group perceptions and attitudes are reinforced and internalised as part of a
mechanism in socialisation and integration (Ibid., pp. 131-132).

Hanna goes on to cite examples whereby dance is used as an agent of social control,
to inculcate or maintain political and religious values. The Chinese Communist Army
has for example used the Yangge (‘Red Sprout Song’) folk dance not only to rally for
support in rural areas but also to convert the population in the larger coastal cities
(Ibid., p. 138). Gloria Strauss (1977) has argued that the Chinese government also
used the demanding and energetic dance form of the European ballet as a symbol of
the ‘Great Leap Forward’ and the social equalisation whereby women are active and
can be superior to men (cited in Ibid.). Similarly, ballet is also used as a metaphor for
a transformed and egalitarian Cuba, whereby the previously aristocratic art is
practised by thousands of students, such that the upright posture of the ballet
dancer’s body is re-interpreted “to reflect the sort of pride exuded by a once-
colonised people now ‘standing tall’ and exerting an impact on international affairs”
(Copeland, 1978, p. 13; cited in Hanna, 1987, p. 139). The Spanish are known to
have used dance dramas, especially those depicting the struggle of the church
against its opponents, in order to demonstrate the Christian faith to the Native
Americans and to convert them (Hanna, 1987, p. 139). In Kenya, war dances are
held in every district to promulgate a new constitution under a Kikuyu tradition; at the
1963 ceremony marking Kenya’s independence from Great Britain, President
Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, extended the tradition by calling for dances in every district, and ethnic groups from all parts of the country also came to the capital of Nairobi to dance (Ibid., p. 140).

Gabriele Klein (2010) similarly observes that dance has been used in the European society not only as a form of cultivation of high culture, but also as an external representation of state power. She traces social dance or Gesellschaftstanz to the 12th century in medieval Europe, when a new bourgeoisie class was rising in the cities, and the nobilities began to seek a new language of dance that distinguished itself from the wild Reigentanz or circle dance of the farmers (Klein, 2010, in Bischof and Rosny ed., 2010, p. 127). When Elizabeth I of England held festive ceremonies at her court, it was a reflection of a development in the Renaissance period, when the nobilities considered dance as part of the learning of good manners (Ibid., p. 128). Klein cites Norbert Elias (1997) in his theory of civilising processes, that the nobilities are forced under threat of their economic and political power to acquire codified cultural knowledge through royal academies and assimilate such knowledge into part of its sociocultural habitus. She argues that dance plays an important role in the internalisation of such norms (Ibid., p. 129). Hence the Courante, which was basically a kind of step and hop at the time of Elizabeth I, developed under Louis XIV into a geometrically measured dance form that was representative of the court; the Menuett also developed at the time of Louis XIV, as another stylised dance form that was even more complicated in its variations (Ibid., p. 130). The Menuett became so representative in its courtly manners, even after the rise of the Contre-Danse in the 18th century, that Wilhelm II in the late 19th century would attempt in vain to prescribe a renaissance of the Menuett while forbidding from official occasions the waltz which had been popularised during the bourgeoisie revolution as a symbol of equality (Ibid., p. 131).

While the abovementioned examples demonstrate how dance has been used to civilise members of a cultural community or a nation by symbolising the power of a class or group through physical power of the body, we still need to explain the process in which dance transmits cultural values as heritage. This brings us to the aspect of dance as ritual. Ritual refers to “an extraordinary event involving stylised, repetitive behaviour” (Hanna, 1987, p. 129) which in the words of social anthropologist Raymond Firth can be understood as a “symbolic mode of
communication of ‘saying something’ in a formal way, not to be said in ordinary language or informal behaviour” (Firth, 1973, p. 176; cited in Hanna, 1987, p. 129). Firth’s approach to ritual is, incidentally, one based on the meaning of rituals in relation to social tensions rather than to social solidarity.

The earlier theories of social solidarity with regards to ritual are best represented by sociologist Durkheim, who reasoned that rites and ceremonies play an important role in society like religion, in terms of periodic opportunities for a social group to assemble itself around sacred images that represent the community. Rituals in his view are meant to arouse a passionate intensity or feelings of ‘effervescence’, whereby individuals experience something larger than themselves (Durkheim, 1965 [1915], p. 258, cited in Bell, 1997, p. 24). Anthropologist Max Gluckman has however argued that Durkheim’s model of ritual as a projected expression of social cohesion and unity of the group needs to be modified as it does not do justice to the presence of conflict that is built into any society (see Bell, 1997, p. 38). Every social system, according to Gluckman, “is a field of tension, full of ambivalence, of co-operation and contrasting struggle” (Gluckman, 1963, p. 127; cited in Bell, 1997, Ibid.). Gluckman cited the example of Zulu women in agricultural rites, whereby women would boldly parade around in men’s clothes and do things which are normally forbidden to them. He suggested that these are ritualised rebellions with cathartic effect to release social tensions, hence ritual may help affirm unity, but not as a simple expression of social cohesion as suggested by Durkheim or Radcliffe-Brown (see Bell, 1997, Ibid.). This perspective is similarly seen in Firth’s conclusion that ritual provides for “the routinisation and canalisation” of personal and social tensions (cited in Ibid., p. 278).

But further to this point, Gluckman’s work is significant as it moves away from Durkheim’s notion that ritual is primarily concerned with religion or the ‘sacred’. Instead, he defines in Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations (1962) that ritual is a category of social action covering religious activities in one extreme and social etiquette in the other, in the symbolic enactment of social relations (see Ibid., p. 39).

Gluckman’s work on the ritualisation of social conflict, combined with the work of Arnold van Gennep (1909) on how rites of passage serve to order chaotic social changes that could otherwise destabilise society, was later developed by Victor Turner into an influential analytical model. Turner combined a functionalist interest in mechanisms for maintaining social equilibrium with a structural perspective on social
organisation of symbolic action, to argue that many forms of ritual serve as ‘social dramas’ whereby stresses and tensions built into a social structure could be expressed and resolved (Ibid.). Taking the example of his fieldwork among the Ndembu of northwestern Zambia, Turner analysed ritual, social order and communal strife by taking a cue from van Gennep’s idea of liminality within the three phases of rites of passage: separation, margin and reincorporation. He cites van Gennep who has shown that all rites of passage or ‘transition’ are marked by these phases: the first phase comprises “symbolic behaviour signifying the detachment of the individual or group either from an earlier fixed point in the social structure, from a set of cultural conditions (a “state”), or from both” (Turner, 1969, p. 94); the intervening liminal period is where the ritual subject or ‘passenger’ is ambiguous in attributes, neither here nor there, as “he passes through a cultural realm that has few or none of the attributes of the past or coming state” (Ibid.); the third phase is where the passage is consummated.

Turner uses the Latin term *communitas* to refer to the modality of social relationship which can be recognised as emerging in the liminal period. In contrast to society as a structure, differentiated and often hierarchical in the system of political, legal and economic positions, this is “of society as an unstructured or rudimentarily structured and relatively undifferentiated *comitatus*, community or even communion of equal individuals who submit together to the general authority of the ritual elders ” (Ibid., p.. 96). He suggests that social life for individuals and groups is a type of dialectical process “that involves successive experience of high and low, communitas and structure, homogeneity and differentiation, equality and inequality” (Ibid., p. 97). Communitas, as the ‘open society’, works in contrast to structure as the ‘closed society’, “in that it is potentially or ideally extensible to the limits of humanity” (Ibid., p. 112). Communitas may manifest itself as so-called millenarian religious movements marked by equality, anonymity and absence of property, but as the impetus becomes exhausted, the movement in practice tends to become itself an institution with its own norms (Ibid., pp. 111-112).

Turner hence finds it necessary to distinguish between different modalities or historical consequences of communitas: (1) *existential* or *spontaneous* communitas, similar to what hippies of the time (the 1960s) would call a ‘happening’; (2) *normative* communitas, where through time, under the need to mobilise resources or the need
for social control, the existential communitas is organised into a social subsystem; and (3) ideological communitas, which refers to a variety of utopian models of societies based on existential communitas (Ibid., p. 132). Therefore the use of the term ‘anti-structure’ by Turner to describe liminality and communitas, mainly in reference to tribal and agrarian society, should not mislead one into understanding it as simply a structure reversal or ‘mirror-imaging’ of ‘profane’ socio-economic structure, it is rather “the liberation of human capacities of cognition, affect, volition, creativity, etc., from the normative constraints incumbent upon a sequence of social statuses” (Turner, 1982, p. 44), to enact a multiplicity of social roles and be conscious of membership some categories of social groups. When persons, groups or ideas move from one level or one style of organisation to another, he say, “there has to be an interfacial region, or, to change the metaphor, an interval, however brief, of margin or limen, when the past is momentarily negated, suspended, or abrogated, and the future has not yet begun, an instant of pure potentiality” (Ibid.; emphasis in original). The term limen is incidentally Latin for ‘threshold’, but adapted by van Gennep to apply to the idea of transition in rites of passage. Significantly, Turner also says: “ ‘Meaning’ in culture tends to be generated at the interfaces between established cultural subsystems, though meanings are then institutionalised and consolidated at the centres of such systems. (Ibid., p. 41; emphasis in original)"

Despite the aspect of play in such ritual, this is part of what Durkheim would consider as ‘de la vie serieuse’, Turner argues, for they are intrinsically connected with the ‘work’ of the collectivity in performing symbolic actions so as to promote fertility, crops, to cure illness, ensure success in hunting and agriculture and so on (Ibid., p. 32). He cites the example of the Ndembu Twin Ritual, in which women and men abuse one another verbally in a highly sexual and humourous manner, a behaviour that serves the ultimate aim of the ritual, which is to produce healthy offspring but not too many at once (Ibid.). Turner considers that in relation to liminality in ritual or myth, it may be heuristically useful to cite Durkheim’s characterisation of ‘mechanical solidarity’, which Durkheim regarded as the achievement of group goals among small and non-literate societies with a simple division of labour and little tolerance of individuality (Ibid., pp. 41-42). Turner sees the expressive genres of ritual and myth as both ‘work’ and ‘play’ at the same time, arguing that the distinction between work and leisure may in fact be considered as a consequence of the Industrial Revolution
(Ibid., p. 32). He cites Jean Piaget, known for his study on the developmental psychology of play, for regarding it as “a kind of free assimilation, without accommodation to spatial conditions or to the significance of objects” (Piaget, 1962, p. 86; cited in Turner, 1982, p. 34). Hence ritual is both earnest and playful in the liminal phases of tribal and agrarian cultures, Turner argues, citing the observation of Milton Singer that a Krishna dance in contemporary India would be referred to as *līla*, sport, whereby participants ‘play’ in various ways as ‘Gopī’ or cowherdesses with Krishna, one of the Hindu God Vishnu’s incarnation. It is an erotic love-play with mystical implications, as God’s ‘sport’ with the human soul (Singer, 1972, p. 160; cited in Turner, 1982, p. 35).

Citing Turner’s concept of ritual as social drama, Hanna considers that dance-plays mediate social relations and political situations through four phases: (1) a breach of the norms of a social group; (2) an intensifying crisis; (3) a legal or ritual process for redress; and (4) public expression of a schism or a reconciliation (Turner, 1977, p. 38; Hanna, 1987, p. 172). She relates with this paradigm the example of the 1929 ‘Women’s War’ of the Ubakala, in which ritualised behaviour of dance-play communication turned into real feminine protest by Ubakala women that forced the British to alter their colonial administration of Eastern Nigeria. Referring to the Ubakala dance-play as a metaphor for power that turned into riots, Hanna writes: “A dance-play performed to maintain cultural values or to mediate a paradox may indeed stimulate a crisis. (Hanna, 1987, p. 178)” Indeed, she argues that the symbolic representation of confrontation in dance may lead to actual assaults or enhance the dynamics of social relations, religion and politics, especially with warrior dances. “Dances, and especially warrior dance, may be a symbol of power representing, expressing, and communicating self-control and dominance,” she writes (Ibid., p. 180).

As Fischer-Lichte (2012) notes, the transformative power of ritual as suggested in Turner’s theory would eventually be further developed by other scholars like Stanley J. Tambiah and characterised in terms of ‘performativity’ (p. 47). The idea of performativity makes reference to the conception of ‘speech act’ as formulated by John L. Austin based on linguistic philosophy (Ibid.). Fischer-Lichte emphasises that transformation made possible through performativity should not be conceived in a closed model as Tambiah does, but in an open model (Ibid., p. 48).
With respect to social relations, dance as ritual is not only used to heighten solidarity and boundary of a social group against others. It may also be used overcome cultural boundaries, as argued by Jochen Dreher and Silvana K. Figueroa-Dreher (2009), using the example of Tango. They cite Arnold Gehlen (1977) in the argument that rituals have an effect as behaviour which becomes collective routines of a social group as its form is known and socially sanctioned (Dreher and Figueroa-Dreher, 2009, in Klein ed., 2009, p. 44). They also cite Turner to describe rituals as a specific form of social action that builds a sense of belonging by celebrating the central symbols (Ibid., p. 45). With the example of Tango, they claim that the moment of ‘embrace’ (el abrazo), in which one experience an intimate physical connection by dancing navel to navel, even as strangers, is a form of ritual in the venues of Milongas which makes possible the inclusion of any person who is culturally an outsider (Ibid., p. 47).

The next chapter will explore how such ritualistic or other aspects of dance may be exploited for intercultural dialogue to provide a sense of social cohesion. The following subsection will however consider how dance is used as a form of cultural heritage at a community level and beyond.

5.2.3 Dance as Heritage

The preceding subsection has provided some insights on the efficacy of dance in transmitting cultural values and evoking some form of social relations in society, thereby reflecting a community’s cultural system and socio-cultural system. This subsection will consider how dance may be considered as a form of cultural heritage according to the three basic senses of heritage as outlined in Section 5.1.1, namely heritage as ideals, as things, and as a sense of history or the past. One may hence see it as a representing certain achievement in human expressions by way of its ideals and physical forms, or by embodying certain memories of the past. At a community level or a national level, it also becomes a kind of symbol that serves as a marker of identity, while at the same time associated with the relevant ideals in cultural values.

Dance as cultural heritage, being ‘intangible’ in terms of its maintenance through performativity instead of materiality, should not be assumed as a simple property of
continuity within a cultural communities, as if it is a form of internalised dispositions, but instead as a collection of symbolic expressions in a cultural system produced in the course of history along with associated ideals. It is, furthermore, to be understood through its use by a community as part of institutionalised cultural memory under the socio-cultural system. The challenge in maintaining 'continuity' of a dance heritage, following this dualistic perspective, would lie in the contestation between accommodating a plurality of expressions and interpretations on one hand, and preserving some particular social or cultural value and identity, as legitimised by certain interpretations of history and communicated through representations of the past, on the other.

The first basic question that is underlying this discussion would be: what constitutes dance, or other forms of intangible or tangible heritage for that matter, as cultural heritage at its most fundamental, its ideal or its form? Following the argument of Tilley cited in Section 5.1.1 on material culture, cultural values should not be considered as existing prior to dance as a cultural form. As already put forward in Susanne Langer's theoretical perspective, dance may be conceived as a 'symbolic form'. From a perspective of communication, Section 5.2.2 has also explained the important aspect of dance being a form of ritualised action with transformative power.

But even if dance be assumed as a signifier of cultural meanings and by that token imagined as secondary to the cultural values which would then be considered the 'real' subject, an application of cross-cultural psychology by way of the theory of value orientation according to Talcott Parsons, which assumes values as internalised and manifested through one's action or behaviour, would be too narrow to be helpful here. Dance, as argued in the last two sections, should be understood as intentional action that is symbolic and communicative, rather than behaviour or psychological effect that is affective and unconscious.

Considered as cultural heritage, dance should furthermore be observed in terms of performances and creative works, in the 'documentary' sense of culture as "the body of intellectual and imaginative work" (Williams, 1961, p. 57), not only in the sense of culture as the 'ideal' or as the 'social' (Ibid.). In a transcultural model, dance heritage, by virtue of an indeterminate nature in its performativity, would, on assumption that cultural identities and norms are irrelevant over creativity in performances, be best explored from a documentary sense of heritage; whereas discussion of dance
heritage in a multicultural model would arguably be most fruitful when it considers cultural differences in ‘ideal’.

The next most important question for dance heritage would in fact relate to a humanist rather than psychological perspective of culture, pointing to the aspect of aesthetic value which is also highlighted in dance theory, going beyond a functionalist explanation of dance in social anthropology. One may hence ask, in anticipation of challenges in intercultural dialogue through dance heritage as the medium: how may the aesthetic values of a dance heritage from a different cultural community be evaluated, should it just be accepted as subjective or be understood based on the rationality of associated cultural values? A further challenge would be how one may deal with polysemy in cultural meanings associated with a dance heritage. One answer to these questions would be to consider dance primarily as art, with meanings dependent on contexts shaped by institutionalisation, and hence susceptible to change in the course of history, as argued by Graham McFee in *Understanding Dance* (1992).

McFee (1992) contends that it is inadequate to claim that aesthetic judgments in the domain of art are merely ‘subjective’. The term ‘subjective’, when taken in the three senses of being “private, idiosyncratic and biased” (p. 22), may represent a perjorative use of the term, suggesting that it is something bad or wrong (Ibid.). But he argues that if the word ‘subjective’ is used to suggest aesthetic judgments can be biased or idiosyncratic, it is not a problem since it presupposes the possibility of a judgment that is otherwise (Ibid., p. 23). What may be problematic is when the claim that subjective judgments are private involves the idea that ‘anything goes’, that opposite views of two persons would be equally valid (Ibid.). In contrast, McFee defines objective judgments as those that are “public, arguable, amenable to reasoning” (Ibid., p. 33). But what complicates the matter is a fourth sense of the word ‘subjective’, when it implies personal involvement such that the judgment draws on one’s perceptual powers, but the judgment can also be ‘objective’ in the sense of developing public judgment (Ibid.). McFee hence maintains that aesthetic education should not be considered as a simple contrast to ‘objective’ studies such as science and mathematics (Ibid., p. 35).
McFee then makes a further distinction between what may be called ‘aesthetic’ judgment in general including for objects of nature, and artistic judgment. The difference for a spectator is between seeing an object under concepts appropriate to the merely aesthetic, and bringing to bear on the object concepts which are appropriate to the appreciation of art, such as form, style and meaning (Ibid., p. 42). He cites as example a similar argument made by David Best with the example of dance performance by classical Indian dancer Ram Gopal, that though he was enthralled by the quality of the dance movements, it was clear that his “appreciation was of the aesthetic, not the artistic” (Best, 1978, p. 115; cited in McFee, 1992, p. 43). McFee (1992) further argues that art is not only an intentional activity but also has a conventional character, such that the judgment of works of art has a ‘learned’ character (p. 44). As it is, dance as human action already has to be understood in its context as something that is rule-governed or rule-related (Ibid., p. 52), in contrast with any sequence of movements by apes or machines (Ibid., p. 56). McFee in short maintains an institutional concept of art, which would consequently also mean that art has a historical character, whereby “the meaning of a work of art at one particular time may be different from that which it has at some other time, solely in virtue of theoretical changes (Ibid., p. 84). Following this perspective, dance heritage may be taken to refer simply to all the artistic expressions of any individual, group or community in the form of dance that may be relevant knowledge as part of a cultural system.

A third layer of understanding with regards to dance heritage however would go beyond the question of aesthetic value in dance, to consider dance beyond being an art form on its own, in its ‘larger’ social context. One may ask the question: what social or other values may be attached to dance as heritage of a community or nation within the structure of a socio-cultural system, and how may that relate to the question of social or cultural identity?

Such questions would be extrinsic to the discussion of dance as art from the perspective of McFee, who has criticised the approach of viewing dance as having different functions which reflect on the various societies. He borrows the remark by Peter Fuller (1980) that art criticism in the 1970s had left an ‘art-shaped’ hole by speaking of many things which relate to art but not about art itself, to argue that “[t]he same seems to be true of much sociological writing about art in general and about
dance in particular” (McFee, 1992, p. 295) by sidelining the aesthetic and artistic dimensions of dance.

However, these questions are relevant when considering how, as discussed in the preceding subsection, dance has been used as a way to civilise members of a society and provide them with a sense of place in the social structure. They are also relevant if one considers how significantly dance heritage may be used to represent identity of a community or a nation. It is therefore worth turning attention to the phenomenon of national dance forms, especially how their representation through national dance companies has been used in the 20th century by modern nation-states to embody their nations (Shay, 2002, p. 26).

Shay cites sociologist Craig Calhoun in observing how ‘naturalness’ of the nation-state as an entity has come to be seen as stable and immutable (Calhoun, 1995, p. 283; cited in Shay, 2002, p. 26). Calhoun writes: “This construction of ‘cultures,’ ‘societies,’ and ‘nations’ as basic units of modern collective identity and of comparative social science research has significant implications. In the first place, it implies that each one is somehow discrete and subsists as an entity unto itself rather than only as a part of a world system or some other broader social organisation or discourse that defines it as a constituent unit or part. This boundedness is suggested, in large part, by the sharp boundedness of modern states; the ideology of nationalism promotes the notion that each has its own singular culture (and vice versa). (Calhoun, 1995, pp. 53-54; cited in Shay, 2002, p. 27)” Shay also cites anthropologist Herzfeld in observing that nationalism is “directly predicated on resemblance, whether biogenetic or cultural. The pivotal idea is that all citizens are, in some unarguable sense, all alike (Herzfeld, 1997, p. 27; cited in Shay, 2002, p. 29)”. Hence it is not surprising that essentialism, as epitomised by presentations of national dance companies becomes a strategy representation of the State, Shay argues (2002, p. 30). He quotes Herzfeld in the observation of how essentialism operates on two different levels of both the State and the People, for it is “always the one thing it claims not to be: it is a strategy, born […] of social and historical contingency. The agents of powerful state entities and the humblest of local social actors engage in the strategy of essentialism to an equal degree (Herzfeld, 1997, p. 31; cited in Shay, 2002, p. 30).”
Shay cites the example of how the Ballet Folklorico de Mexico under its founding director and choreographer Amalia Hernandez has successfully provided a representation of Mexico on the world stage. He notes that in her company’s performances both at home and abroad, Hernandez “chose to send a tourist’s picture-postcard to her foreign audiences and warm familiar images that evoked home and belonging in her home audiences (Shay, 2002, p. 87). This impression made a very deep impact on the Mexican-American audiences in the early 1960s and created a sense of pride and awareness among the Chicano community, resulting in “vociferous demand for the creation of scores of Ballet Folklorico look-alike dance companies” (Ibid.).

The performances and repertoire of the Ballet Folklorico were significant for the strategic role they play in representing the politics of identity in Mexico. They “set off heated discussions in the national discourse of Indian versus Spanishness, which has dominated Mexican political and social life for the past four centuries. This discourse of mestizaje (racial mixing) intersects along lines of race, class, gender, and political and economic empowerment (Ibid., p. 88)”. In print, Amalia Hernandez consciously claimed to celebrate both her Spanish and Indian heritages, identifying herself as a Mestiza (Ibid., p. 89) But in fact, Shay argues, she had, in a way parallel to most other colleagues directing national companies, created a representation of Mexico that was acceptable and appealing to the upper-middle-class elite of Mexico City, rather than populations outside of the capital where there were no political and economic benefits (Ibid.). This is not to mention that the adoption of a Mestizo identity would also imply for the native the giving up of one’s cultural heritage such as language, lifestyle and clothing (Ibid., p. 90).

In some cases, not only does the issue of class play a role in determining what form of dance expression is to be depicted on stage. There may also be modernist interpretations, often indicative of colonialist morality, on how a culture should be like, for the example of the nationalist Reda Troupe of Egypt (Ibid., p. 135). Shay would describe the resulting dance form in Hobsbawm’s terms as an ‘invented tradition’ (Ibid.).

One part of the story is how belly dancers were frowned upon under attitudes of Victorian British morality which continued despite nationalism, with the respectability
of the new upper classes as well as the Islamists (Ibid.). Hence as Armbrust (1996, p. 38) observed of post-1952 Egypt, “Heritage is not simply there, but something to be properly organised. Vulgarity should be struck from the record and the folk be admitted to Egypt’s heritage on condition of ‘authenticity’. (cited in Shay, 2002, pp. 135-136).” Shay (2002) argues that one cannot attribute the attitude entirely to religion, even though Muslim fundamentalists have targeted belly dancers with physical threats and effectively changed the professional dance scene in Cairo (p. 139); there is after all no specific proscription of dance in the Koran per se while hints in the hadith are ambiguous, and Muslims in Indonesia, Iran and Turkey have varied widely in attitudes towards dance (Ibid.). With regards to Egyptian dance or raqs sharqi (Oriental or Eastern dance), otherwise known as belly dance, there is nothing particular shameful about the dance movements on their own, despite common misunderstanding, and it is performed by both men and women under different genres (Ibid., p. 141). It is however considered dishonourable for a woman to perform it in front of males of not proper kinship by reason of Islamic law, whereas dancing at weddings is common, except they “should wear respectable clothes and move within proper limits” (Van Nieuwkerk, 1995; cited in Shay, 2002, p. 141).

With the Reda Troupe created in 1959, which even came directly under the Ministry of Culture in 1961, the choreographer Mahmoud Reda “felt compelled create a new hybrid genre of dance to fit in with the modernist version of folklore” (Shay, 2002, p. 145) in order to attract audiences and support from the elite classes (Ibid.). One major modification he made was to exclude males from performance of belly dance movements, “thus following the colonial gaze, now shared by the elite decision makers in the Egyptian government, of what constitutes proper and improper movements for the male” (Ibid., p. 148). Instead, he would create a male style of movements for the Fellahin men of Delta based on everyday work movements (Ibid.). Secondly, he also sanitised belly dancing of movements he found sexually suggestive (Ibid.) Thirdly, he employed the use of groups and removed solo-improvised dancing although belly dancing had always been associated with soloists (Ibid., p. 149).

Mahmoud Reda would say in an interview in 2000 that he did not follow any example in his staging: “What I did was my own invention. Artists throughout Egypt follow me. They think it is authentic. (Ibid., p. 145).” The final element that sets his work from
traditional Egyptian dance practices is his choreography, for instance in a work entitled *Al-ginniyat al-bahr* (The Mermaid), which follows the type of narration common to fairy tales of 19th-century European ballet (Ibid., p. 151). But Reda set such a trend that even the National Folklore Troupe founded separately in 1961, which travels widely, can be described as “very much a company in the Mahmoud Reda mold” (Ibid., p. 152). Interestingly, there is also a raqs sharqi community of more than one million women in the United States, an overseas community not of Egyptian origin but connected via websites, conventions and workshops, with “no wish to replicate actual folkloric practices from the field, but rather seek the spectacularized choreographic theatre genres of Egyptian choreographers such as Mahmoud Reda” (Ibid., p. 161). Shay likens this phenomenon to Anderson’s ‘imagined community’ (Ibid.).

The representation of a national identity through ‘dance heritage’ not only implicates the privileging of certain upper or middle class values and identity in the case of single ethnic nation-states; it is also problematic when state-sponsored national folk dance ensembles are used to represent multi-ethnic nation states (Shay, 2008a, p. 166). Shay argues furthermore that there are typically four types of representation in such repertoire: firstly, positive representations, for example the way the Aztecs are portrayed as a noble people in Amalia Hernandez’s choreography, without reference made to their horrific sacrificial rites; secondly, ‘quaint’, ‘exotic’ or ‘primitive’ representation of a minority ethnic group, such as the Yaqui Deer Dance depicting the Yaquis as primitive, in contrast to the festive Mestizo dances representing Jalisco or Vera Cruz; thirdly, negative choreographic images to reinforce majority prejudices towards unpopular ethnic groups, such as the portrayal of Gypsies by Kolo, the Serbian State Folk Dance Ensemble; and finally, no representation, like the omission of the 10 per cent Turkish population in the Bulgarian State Ensemble of Folk Songs and Dances (Ibid., pp. 166-167).

These different modes of choreographic representation would often be mixed for the effect of contrast as a form of ‘othering’, for example in the Moiseyev Company performances, in which “the Russians are noble, proud, and elegant, while the Lithuanians or Latvians are quaint peasants” (Ibid., p. 167). Similarly, one may analyse how the Serbian identity versus the ethnic minorities is represented in the repertoire of Kolo in the 1980s. Shay stresses that this is not due to any evil notion
of hatred harboured towards any specific group, but rather that “individual choreographers, in undertaking the state imperative to represent the various ethnicities within their repertoires, turned to unmediated, pre-existing stereotypes that already floated freely in Serbian society to create the choreographic images” (Ibid., p. 170). Hence in a 1987 video of Kolo, one sees in the opening sequences that dancers’ faces are shown in a ‘heroic’ mode and juxtaposed with Serbian Orthodox icons of saints, whereas in a representation of the Albanians, one sees austere costumes and dancers with a noble demeanour suggesting that they are ‘noble savages’ (Ibid., p. 171). Another dance depicts the Muslims of the Sandjak as exotic, in an orientalist way similar to Hollywood and Broadway musicals, with a feminised culture calling to mind the notion of harem women sitting around all day (Ibid.). The Gypsies on the other hand “are shown as childlike, indolent, over-sexed” (Ibid.), with clichés like a Gypsy wagon, a camp fire and patchwork clothes, concluding with a man running his hand up a woman’s leg under the skirt, indicating a night of passion ahead (Ibid., p. 172).

Shay argues that these choreographic images have the effect of establishing the minority ethnic groups as lower ‘Others’ in Serbian society. He ventures to ask: “To what degree can such negative, disparaging depictions of the ‘Other’ permit and encourage the excesses of ethnic cleansing that characterised Serbian civil life during the breakup of the former Yugoslavia? (Ibid.)”

In his analysis of state folk dance ensembles, Shay is mainly concerned with the politics in representation of national identity, which involves the ‘strategy’ of essentialism as Herzfeld calls it, often involving the idea of authenticity: “The artistic directors and choreographers of most dance companies that perform traditional dances expend a great deal of time conducting research, or conversely, at least attempting to justify and show their works to be ‘authentic’. (Shay, 2002, p. 36)” But one may emphasise a further dimension tied to the representation of identity, which may be positive or negative as Shay mentions, and that is the aspect of moral value that is often bundled with identity through essentialisation. Herzfeld (1997) has said: “The terms for cultural identity assume a certainty hitherto denied them by the experiential exigencies of social life. Nationalistic reification of these terms reverses the contextual sensitivity appropriate and necessary to their use as terms of personal, moral evaluation; they become instead the technical vocabulary of a fixed political
order. (p. 43)” He added: “Ultimately, the language of national is indeed a language of morality. It is an encoded discourse about inclusion and exclusion. (Ibid.)” This can be underscored by the example of the former Yugoslavia as analysed by Shay.

Shay (2002) maintains that there is a complexity of specific contexts in the formation of state folk dance ensembles, tied to discourses of not just nationalism alone but everything from ethnicity, religion, gender, class, race to colonialism, which one may analyse in performances with regards to the “unspoken aspects of these discourses” (p. 225). The theatricalised versions of social and ritual dances, which create a sense of authenticity by drawing on village practices in aspects of music, costumes and movements of folk and traditional dances ‘in the field’, are more effective as political statements than modern dance developed as high elite art, because they can claim to represent the masses and they also reach out to larger numbers of audience members as entertainment (pp. 226-227). By this argument, one also sees how dance forms that claim authenticity in traditional elements may be more readily accepted as ‘cultural heritage’ than choreographic works which are more associated with creativity of individuals.

Not that there would be no multiple interpretations for any dance that may be classed as heritage, given that dance is polysemic by nature as discussed earlier. There are often conflicting historical interpretations of what is identified as a single phenomenon of dance, an interesting example being the case of flamenco dance in Spain. The multiplicity of identities involved in flamenco may be discerned in how the dance heritage is described in all all-inclusive manner under the Nomination File in 2010 for its inscription into the representative list of UNESCO intangible heritage: “Flamenco baile is a dance of passion, of courtship, and a wide range of situations expressing individual sadness and joy. It has its own aesthetic, and is based on a complex technique. The form differs depending on whether the performer is a man (heavier use of the feet) or a woman (gentler, more sensual movements). Its diversity depends on aspects of music, choreography (structured or spontaneous), geography (local schools) and content (festive and dramatic). (UNESCO, 2010, pp. 4-5)”

Hayes (2009) has argued with regards to 20th-century historical accounts of flamenco that they not merely differ in the mapping of its evolution, but also serve as
a form of representation which “constitutes the reader as a subject of ideology” (p. 43). She bases this argument on Althusser’s (1971) idea of a tautological relationship between ideology and the subject, whereby ideology according to her may be understood as “the process by which the individual locates him or herself in a field of relationships, including the family, religion, law, and culture” (Hayes, 2009, p. 43). She cites Althusser as saying that “the peculiarity of ideology is that it is endowed with a structure and functioning such as to make it a non-historical reality, i.e. an omni-historical reality, in the sense in which that structure and functioning are immutable, present in the same form throughout what we can call history” (in Adams and Searle eds, 1986, p. 240; cited in Hayes, 2009, p. 44). Such ‘truths’ appear as constant and unchanging independent of material conditions, and hence Althusser ironically states: “Ideology has no history. (in Adams and Searle eds, 1986, p. 239; cited in Hayes, 2009, p. 44)” Hayes observes this in how historical discourses on flamenco dance compete in speaking ‘the authority of reality itself’ with regards to gender, race and class (Hayes, 2009, p. 46). Hence accounts of foreign flamenco aficionados also reflected “the social and political tensions that endow dancing bodies with their problematic corporealties” (Ibid., p. 73), echoing “the modernist dualities of masculine vs. feminine, expression vs. technique, and gypsy vs. Spaniard” (Ibid.).

As with the general case of heritage, dance with all the conflicting values that it entails may also be discussed in a framework of human rights. Jackson and Shapiro-Phim (2008) have argued that dance has a multi-layered power and hence may be used either to uphold or subdue the dignity of individuals and their civil, political, economic and cultural rights: “Dance holds the power to create a sense of community and shared perspective, displays sensuality and sexuality, embodies memories in a tangible medium, sustains and communicates cultural values that are held dear to a group, and expresses deeply felt emotions, including the agony of loss and the exuberance of life and/or transcendence of spirit. (p. xix)” While dance may be used to bridge diverse communities and to provide avenues for cultural expressions, it has also been subjected to artistic restrictions or used to promote repressive ideologies (Ibid., p. xv).

Dance may therefore be used as a space of resistance, as seen in occasions where Iranian women have performed solo improvised dance, in a sign of defiance against
a regime where permission for such dance does not exist (Shay, 2008b, pp. 77-80). In Chile, the national dance *cueca*, which symbolises the romantic interlude between a man and a woman, has been re-created as *cueca sola* as a powerful metaphor for Chilean women to represent the detained and disappeared (Agosin, 2008, pp. 297-298). But dance may also be used as a tool of subjugation of the individual, as seen in the example of animation politique, a compulsory activity of political enculturation in Zaire under President Mobutu Sese Seko, ostensibly drawing on dance from ancient Congolese traditions (Huckstep, 2008, pp. 51-52, 62). Citing the example of German modern dance during the Nazi period, Marion Kant (2008) would even raise the question of to what extent the manipulation of dancers as instruments, subjected to the will of the choreographer, may challenge our understanding of human rights by being a form of ‘practical imperative’ (p. 16).

While this thesis does not take a rights-based argument as its point of departure, the issue of conflicting cultural values in the context of ethics will remain pertinent to the question of what constitutes intercultural dialogue. The next chapter will move on to explore how dance heritage may be used as a medium for intercultural dialogue, in a transcultural as well as a multicultural context of society.
6. DANCE HERITAGE AS MEDIUM FOR INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE IN SINGAPORE

This chapter will explore the use of dance heritage as a medium for intercultural dialogue, by contrasting two different approaches, one based on the transcultural model, and the other based on the multicultural model. This follows from discussion in preceding chapters with regards to the difference between these two models in their approach to intercultural dialogue. What has been outlined in still a generally under-theorised manner in the field of heritage will now be examined with a specific focus on dance as cultural heritage.

The first section in the chapter will discuss intercultural dialogue in the specific context of dance as cultural heritage, under a transcultural model which may be understood in short as a strategy of overcoming differences in cultural identity. It will lead to questions as to whether one may be dealing with hybridity in cultural expressions and whether that may serve only to obfuscate cultural differences. The second section will consider intercultural dialogue in a multicultural model, whereby cultural differences in values and norms among different communities may have to be acknowledged. It will test the intercultural communication framework of Culture Assimilator in its potential and limitations as a heuristic approach for intercultural dialogue. The challenge is to adapt it in such a way so as not to stereotype the behaviour of members from a different cultural community for a sense of control and comfort in encountering the other, but instead simply to use critical situations as a basis to detect potential conflicts and learn about the rationality behind what are perceived as different cultural standards.

Among other dance forms, examples involving Indian dance heritage will be highlighted in the first subsection in relation to a transcultural model for intercultural dialogue. This is to provide a contrast to the multicultural model of intercultural dialogue that follows in the next subsection, involving Indian dance heritage in Singapore. With the focus on Singapore as case study, this chapter will serve as the final test in this thesis on the hypothesis that dance as heritage can serve as a medium for intercultural dialogue, be it in the sense of promoting social cohesion or in the sense of liberal learning under the ideals of autonomy and value pluralism.
For the purpose here, intercultural dialogue with dance heritage as medium will refer to any interaction or exchange between people of different cultural communities, including artistes, spectators and participants, whereby one may achieve some form of intercultural learning or engage in some creative process through the medium of dance heritage.

### 6.1 Dance as Medium for Intercultural Dialogue in a Transcultural Model

This section will review how dance heritage has been used in the globalised world in a way that transcends national, ethnic and cultural boundaries, and examine the assumption that this would contribute to a sense of social cohesion in an inclusive society, or to pluralism of values. It will consider the implications in various strategies of overcoming differences in cultural identity through dance, such as whether it might yet involve some form of essentialisation or dominance of a capitalistic logic, as dance heritage is taken out of its original context for theatrical effects.

The theoretical basis here for a transcultural model in intercultural dialogue will largely refer to the work of Russian philosopher Mikhail N. Epstein. The significance of Epstein’s perspective may be appreciated not merely in terms of highlighting fluidity in cultural identity for individuals but also in the emphasis on creative interaction between cultural systems. As opposed to a multicultural framework, where “differences are often promoted for their own sakes, resulting in a kind of cultural levelling that may transform differences into their exact opposite, leading to a relativistic and cynical ‘indifference’ among cultures” (Berry and Epstein, 1999, p. 3), a transcultural approach aims instead to “assert the fundamental insufficiency and incompleteness of any culture and thus its need for radical openness to and dialogue with others” (Ibid.).

This perspective may acknowledge multiculturalism as “right in asserting the natural origins and physical essences of existing cultures” (Epstein, 1999a, p. 85), but at the same time sees a complementary position in deconstruction from postmodern theory by serving to demystify such origins and essences. His argument follows the view of Mamardashvili (1992), who sympathises with multiculturalism as a form of liberation from a monolithic culture but stresses the right to live beyond one’s culture, to “take a step transcending one’s own surrounding, native culture and milieu not for the sake of anything else” (p. 336; cited in Epstein, 1999, p. 82). To Epstein, deconstruction,
“followed to its logical end, opens in its every object the capacity to endlessly reconstruct and redefine itself” (Epstein, 1999a, p. 80), but no escape or deterritorialisation would be possible without the initial territory of ethnicity, hence “[o]rigins need to be clearly stated in order to be vigorously transcended” (Ibid., p. 83).

In Epstein’s perspective, transcultural thinking is not meant to produce new categories of identity, but should move beyond the notion of identity, whether it is a single, double, multiple or hybridised identity (1999b, p. 94). He argues that while a person of mixed ethnic backgrounds or an immigrant might try to “substantiate his/her new identity through the synthesis of two or three cultural traditions” (Ibid.), it is problematic to understand what Homi Bhabha refers to as the ‘third zone’ in such a way, for “transculture questions the very principle of zoning” (Ibid.). He points out: “The attempts to annunciate still another zone or identity actually reinforces the traditional way of thinking ‘zones’ and ‘segments’ by dividing and multiplying this category rather than transcending it. (Ibid.)” It appears that Epstein is suggesting one may speak of the historic origins of cultural systems based on ethnicity, but sees no usefulness in any notion of cultural identity for individuals.

The second thrust of Epstein’s transcultural theory involves pushing the principle of difference to the next stage of self-differentiation, following the work of Jacques Derrida on differance (Ibid., p. 97). Cultures are not considered here as enclosed and self-sufficient entities to be tolerated, but incomplete each on their own, such that the question at stake is “whether they can be creatively involved with one another” (Ibid.). Epstein calls this type of relationship ‘interference’, which may be taken as a maturation of self-differentiation (Ibid., p. 99).

With these two components of transculturalism in mind, one may note how the idea of transcending one’s cultural identity has figured prominently as a major motif or strategy in existing discussion on how dance heritage may contribute to intercultural dialogue. One example is the book entitled Intercultural Communication and Creative Practice: Music, Dance, and Women’s Cultural Identity, edited by Laura Lengel (2005). Noting that much work in intercultural communication has been limited by an essentialisation of culture and culture identity (Lengel, 2005, p. 11), she argues for introduction of perspectives from performance studies to explore the potential of
dance and music in overcoming differences, as dance and music “can have tremendously different cultural interpretations in the public versus the private sphere” (Ibid., p. 9). Insisting on the “fluid, constitutive nature” (Ibid., p. 11) of culture, she argues that cultural identity is multi-faceted, not synonymous with nation or national identity as how it tends to be essentialised in much of the discourse within intercultural communication (Ibid.), but instead encompassing differences in gender, ethnicity and class, which “all constitute one’s cultural heritage(s), and all unite to provide the essences of creative and communicative practices” (Ibid., p. 12). She cites Bhabha in arguing that “[p]erformance and creativity create spaces where one can explore the ‘inter’ or ‘in-betweenedness’ of culture and cultural identity” (Ibid., p. 11).

Albright (2005) adds to the argument by questioning if a multicultural model in the presentation of dance will provide any ‘authentic’ perspective of original cultural contexts. She cites the example of a 1990 Los Angeles Festival called “People of the Pacific” featuring everything from Korean Shamans, a Hawaiian dancer, Australian Aborigines to Javanese dance and a collaborative performance of the Mahabharata epic by Kathak and Bharata Natyam dancers including many trained in the Indian communities within the United States (p. 51). She says that despite programme notes and educational opportunities, “there was clearly no way one could possibly pin down an ‘appropriate’ – much less an ‘authentic’ – perspective on these performances” (Ibid., p. 52), and she wonders “[whether] having travelled across the Pacific to this monster of late capitalistic art engineering, many of these ‘traditional’ forms would ever again carry the same meanings, even in their original contexts” (Ibid.). She argues for deconstructing the notion of cultural context, given the current moment of global intersection where cultures are “rarely stable or knowable containers” (Ibid.). She hence sees it as a sensible strategy for dancers “to present their dancing bodies as sources of gendered, racial, and sexual identities that can disrupt traditional visions of culture and respective contexts” (Ibid.), and observes that dislocation has in fact often become a central theme among choreographers (Ibid.).

Furthermore, Albright contends that in addition to cultural identity that may be represented in dance, there is also a ‘somatic identity’ involved, “the experience of one’s physicality” (Ibid., p. 53). It is this “slippage between the living body and its
cultural representation” (Ibid.), not just the token representation of culture or ethnicity through one’s physical body, that produces interesting work. A wonderful sense of liberation can hence be derived from the fluidity of exchanges in a choreography which “questions or challenges which cultures belong to which bodies” (Ibid., p. 53). Albright also invokes Judith Butler’s notion of a performative identity, whereby identity is seen as a process of ‘becoming’ that is continually in motion without beginning or end (Ibid., p. 57). An example cited is the 1995 ‘Reverdance’ performance by Congolese-Canadian dancer Zab Maboungou, in which she constantly varies her choreographic phrase and resists recognisable shapes and iconographic movements, thus disturbing the dynamic of the traditional gaze and also resists commodification, according to Albright (Ibid.). Albright’s perspective may hence be interpreted as being in line with Epstein’s philosophy of a transcultural model in intercultural dialogue, which aims not to produce a new identity as hybrid per se, but to engender differentiation and interference.

However, one may have to be careful as to how the idea of interference may be applied to dance heritage as a form of intercultural dialogue. The discussion to ensue below will involve setting the idea of ‘interculturalism’ as advocated by Richard Schechner, as well as a more recent formulation of ‘world dance’, against Epstein’s ideal of transculturalism. It will be argued that ultimately one cannot omit the issue of power, such that no form of ‘fusion’ dance should be automatically equated with transculturalism and liberation without contextualising, and one should also be careful about privileging any particular idea of modernity as universal.

The term ‘interculturalism’ was first coined in the 1970s by New York-based theatre director Richard Schechner, who founded ‘performance studies’ as an academic field. He set it in contrast to ‘internationalism’, as he “felt that the real exchange of importance to artists was not that among nations, which really suggests official exchanges and artificial kinds of boundaries, but the exchange among cultures” (Pavis, 1996, p. 42). He also compared it to multicultural performances, whereby each cultural or ethnic group retains its distinct features as pure forms, and fusion, which goes one step further by mixing elements of two or more cultures “to a degree that a new society, language or genre of art emerges (Schechner, 1991, p. 30; cited in Loots, 2005, pp. 38). Interculturalism, on the other hand, is described by him as an open-ended fashion of performances:
Interculturalism differs from both multiculturalism and fusion, Interculturalists refuse utopian schemes, refuse to cloak power arrangements and struggles. Instead, interculturalists probe the confrontations, ambivalences, disruptions, fears, disturbances and difficulties when and where cultures collide, overlap and pull away from each other. Interculturalists explore misunderstandings, broken messages and failed translations – what is not pure and what cannot successfully fuse. These are seen not as disasters but as fertile rifts of creative possibilities. Where multiculturalism falters, where fusion does not occur, interculturalism happens. (Ibid.)

Schechner’s writings on interculturalism, along with similar Western use of ritual and techniques in theatre drawn from Africa, Asia, Native America and elsewhere, have however been criticised by Bharucha (1990) for their “ambivalent ethics of cross-cultural borrowings” (p. 13). He criticised Schechner’s ethnocentric assumptions in his idea of borrowing from other cultures thus stated: “People didn’t question too much whether or not this interculturalism – this affection for Kathakali exercises, the precision of Noh drama, the simultaneity and intensity of African dance – was a continuation of colonialism, a further exploitation of other cultures. There was something simply celebratory about discovering how diverse the world was, how many performance genres there were, and how we could enrich our own experience by borrowing, stealing, exchanging. (Schechner, 1982, p. 19; cited in Bharucha, 1990, p. 14)” Bharucha (1990) considers it “a naïve and unexamined ethnocentricity” (p. 14) as “the borrowing, stealing and exchanging from other cultures is not necessarily an ‘enriching’ experience for the cultures themselves. (Ibid.)”. His criticism of interculturalism is echoed by Andree Grau, who notes:

It would be naïve to see interculturalism as an overriding global phenomenon that transcends the differences of class, race, and/or history. The implications for interculturalism are not the same for people in impoverished countries as for people in technologically advanced societies.

(Grau, 1992, p. 17; cited in Chakravorty, 2010, p. 274)

If Bharucha’s concerns with equitability in cultural exchange under ‘interculturalism’ touches on issues of group rights or the need of respect for cultural meanings in the heritage of performing arts, it is not surprising that a more sympathetic view, as
expressed by Loots (2005), would come from a more liberal position to focus on how such intercultural performances provide a strategy “to celebrate the power of the body to resist hegemony” (p. 37). She also defends Schechner against Bharucha’s severe criticism by citing the former’s own acknowledgement of the “immense difficulty of making and understanding art that draws on many traditions without privileging any” (Schechner, 1991, p. 136; cited in Loots, 2005, p. 28). In reference to Foucault’s (1981) articulation on the body as a site of struggle for meaning and power, she sees a need to challenge the racially constructed ownership of dance, whereby ‘black dancing bodies’ for instance may be held back in cultural stereotypes of traditional and ritual dance while black women may not yet find a voice and space to articulate their concerns of racial victimhood (Loots, 2005, pp. 34-36). She cites the example of Jayesperi Moopen, a female Johannesburg-based choreographer of Indian descent, who has attempted to make black male dance practitioners learn the complex movements of Bharatha Natyam and let them work alongside classically trained Indian female dancers. Even though the work may seemingly remain ‘multicultural’ in Schechner’s definition as it has not invented any new language, Loots argues that Moopen has managed to ‘probe the confrontation’ between South African and Indian cultures (Ibid., p. 39) by challenging cultural stereotypes in classical Indian dance. She also cites the work Untitled (1998) by Jay Pather, which makes references to his cultural heritage as Diaspora South African Indian through the costumes for two male dancers and their chanting and singing, but also creates ambiguity with notions of racial, gender and cultural identities (Ibid., p. 42).

In comparing the above two positions on ‘interculturalism’ as promoted by Schechner, one may return to the two aspects of a transcultural model in intercultural dialogue as outlined by Epstein and assess the implications for dance heritage. The question pertaining to the first aspect would be how such interculturalism helps to transcend cultural identities. For Loots, the point is not to create any hybrid identity out of the dancing body which “wears the embodiment, through colour and sex, of much of our physical identity” (Ibid., p. 44), but to confront the past and present of dance history or heritage through articulation, “to disrupt and rest closed and narrow definitions of who we are so that we can produce discourses that challenge the normalised and naturalised power relations around issues of race, gender and culture” (Ibid.). In other words, the significance of interculturalism in Loots’ view lies not in the creation
of hybrid forms visually, but in the context of struggle against the power of social structures governing identities which may be embodied in the dancing body. To wit, one does not seek to transcend cultural identities for its own sake, or one may end up reinforcing them as the reified subject in the ‘attempts to annunciate’, as Epstein has pointed out.

Further to this, an issue relating to the second aspect of Epstein’s transcultural model would be the question of creativity. Here, one needs to query whether creativity may be equated with the production of visual spectacles relying on the mix and match of traditional dance forms as a new privileged mould of aesthetics.

The concerns of Bharucha with interculturalism in theatrical practice come in fact from similar premises, as seen in his critique of Lear, an intercultural production which premiered in Singapore in 1999, incorporating performance traditions drawn from different parts of Asia such as Noh, Chinese opera, Silat, Thai dance and so on. Bharucha contextualises it against a concept that parallels transculturalism, namely the quest for an ‘Open Culture’ as envisioned by Kuo Pao Kun, Singapore’s paternal figure in the theatre scene and prominent cultural commentator, whereby ‘language’ and ‘race’ as conflated in Singapore’s official policy can be detached (Bharucha, 2000, p. 12). Kuo exhorts Singaporeans to abandon their status as ‘cultural orphans’ under the predicament of living with fragments of their inherited ethnic cultures while kept apart from other communities in the multiracial state (Kuo, 1998, p. 53; cited in Bharucha, 2000, p. 11), to “leave the orphanage to start creating a new cultural parentage for themselves. History has proved that there is no way they could reconnect back to their former parent cultures per se. However, having lost their own – cut loose and therefore set free – they have thus become natural heirs to all the cultures of the world. (Ibid., p. 61; cited in Bharucha, 2000, p. 12).

Lear, a production which saw a $1.5 million budget supported by the Japan Foundation Asia Center as chief investor, and the appreciation of Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong as its Chief Guest of Honour, was directed by Ong Keng Sen, who considers Kuo as his mentor (see Bharucha, 2000, pp. 8, 17, 19) but is otherwise known for his performance training at Tisch School of the Arts in New York University, with influence of Schechner. To Ong, Shakespeare’s ‘universality’, which apparently persuaded Japanese financial support in the intercultural adaptation, was
not as important a consideration as his ‘neutrality’ in the context of Asia, compared with say an adaptation of Ramayana with an intercultural cast from Southeast Asia, where ownership of the epic would be deeply contested (Ibid., p. 27). But Bharucha criticises that the production saw a “reduction of the characters into abstractions, essences, and archetypes” (Ibid., p. 28), and elsewhere a reduction of “the Noh actor to an exotic oddity from an intercultural, high-tech version of the Phantom of the Opera” (Ibid., p. 32). One saving grace to him would lie in the power of virtuosity in traditional Noh performance, ironically underscored in the ‘death-fall’ scene of the Old Man, with “the actor’s tenacious hold on to the innermost secrets of his tradition, whose juxtaposition with a heterogeneity of foreign elements oddly serves to heighten its inner focus and energy” (Ibid., p. 33).

Bharucha’s ultimate critique of interculturalism in a work like Lear, based on two primary aesthetic principles adopted by Ong as ‘juxtaposition’ and ‘rupture’, is that it becomes a “surrender to spectacle” (Ibid., p. 37), in the sense of what Guy Debord has theorised as ‘the society of spectacle’, whereby the essential character of the spectacle is “a negation of life that has invented a visual form for itself” (Debord, 1995, p. 14; cited in Bharucha, 2000, p. 37). The underlying assumption for Ong seems to be that there is no other choice but to ‘consume the Other’, which Bharucha sees as “self-congratulatory, in so far as it legitimises the absence of any real respect for the Other, who can never be regarded on equal terms” (Bharucha, 2000, p. 44).

However, one may further analyse the significance of the production by contextualising it against the state ideology of the ‘Asian modern’ in Singapore. Wee (2007) sees an inclination of Ong in creating a New Asia contesting the global West (p. 134), that easily falls into trap of echoing the PAP government’s ‘Asian values’ discourse (Ibid., p. 135). While Ong, who has also initiated an ambitious intercultural research and performance programme of workshops and classes known as the Flying Circus Project, speaks of the need for artists to entre other Asian cultures for a vision of a larger Asian instead of merely Singaporean culture, he also emphasises that the Lear production is still Singaporean because he is Singaporean – seemingly a suggestion that he as Singaporean “possesses some knowledge of intercultural negotiations [and that] local ‘intra-Asia’ experiences lead to the possibility of a larger intra-Asian imagination” (Ibid.). But what one sees in Lear, held together by the
English language despite an otherwise multilingual script, is arguably a result of modernisation/‘Westernation’ in Asian-Singapore that has also allowed Ong to become a ‘global cosmopolitan’ – a “rational, capitalist West in Singapore that has re-inscribed Ong’s Asian-Chinese ‘roots’“ (Ibid., p. 138). That prevents him from decentring “the modern rationality that is part of contemporary Singapore” (Ibid., p. 139).

A critique of dance performance privileging spectacle of the ‘Other’ might also have been levelled at the globalised creative processes in a dance production like Duty Free (2002), premiered in Berlin and choreographed by Jutta Hell and Dieter Baumann, involving two dancers from China, two from Estonia, one from Canada and one from Germany (Foellmer, 2004, pp. 90-92). Citing Foucault’s model of the ‘heterotopia’, the idea of places which are utopian yet present, real yet unreachable at the same time, Foellmer argues that the dancing body similarly becomes a mixed site, a place where the local and the global overlap (Ibid., p. 90). Watching the performance, one sees the dancers sometimes performing ethnic dance movements, sometimes moving in some kind of synchronisation, sometimes copying and transforming one another’s movements; it is hard to say if the dance movements belong to specific cultures, yet the dancing bodies are apparently present and representing four distinct cultural spheres (Ibid., pp. 93-94). One sees a constant ‘tightrope walking’ between the local and the global, with flashes of identities now and then, but seemingly ‘free’ from any sense of social order (Ibid., p. 95). Foellmer’s conclusion seems ambivalent, as he approves of it questioning the very ontological premises of the ‘local’ (Ibid., p. 85) and sees cultural identity as contingent like ‘knots’ which are in-between (Ibid., p. 90), yet concedes that the performance ultimately reflects the very idea of globalisation itself with all its social and economic model of functioning (Ibid., p. 95).

Ploebst (2004) argues that a kind of ‘intercultural intra-culturalism’ involving constant crossing of the boundaries of oneself has already become the reality for dancers and choreographers as seen in Europe (p. 156); the challenge for creative artists is to come up with concepts that go against the grain of the entertainment industry, and for choreographers to keep crossing the boundaries in cultures of dance without losing one’s centre (Ibid., p. 157). He cites the production of Total Masala Slammer (2001) by Michael Laub, in which Kathak dancers are integrated in a hodgepodge of
dance, music and film cultures, with references to Bollywood movies and Goethe’s story of Werther. He compares its artistic strategy to that of Dadaism, which had a political significance in its anti-authoritarian approach towards the idea of freedom, in contrast to the imagination of freedom in Laban’s expressionist dance forms under an ideal of purity, which eventually became a closed monocultural system serving elitism and totalitarianism in Nazi-era Germany (Ibid., p. 154).

A similar form of interculturalism, involving the mixed media of dance and architecture, has been analysed by Briginshaw (2009) on the example of Shobana Jeyasingh’s Duets with Automobiles (1993). The work involves three female Indian dancers performing a mixture of dance vocabulary from contemporary dance and classical Bharata Natyam, and filmed in juxtaposition with three London office buildings with connotations of power, money and masculinity. Briginshaw cites Bhabha’s idea of ‘inscription and articulation of culture’s hybridity’ (Bhabha, 1994, pp. 38-39; cited in Briginshaw, 2009, p. 107) to analyse how the choreography and filming invest the city spaces and dancing bodies with power and possibilities of new meanings as well as identities (Briginshaw, 2009, p. 108).

While ‘interculturalism’ denotes a practice in performing arts whereby dance may be used creatively for theatrical effects or to negotiate identities embodied by the dancing bodies, there has been a more recent movement focusing on dance as manifestations of culture. It is dubbed ‘world dance’ in the US college circles, as promoted by UCLA’s Department of World Arts and Cultures – a department formed in the 1990s by fusing the dance department with the ‘ethnic arts’ programme (Foster, 2009, p. 2). The emphasis appears to be more on pedagogical practices, where dancers may learn to appreciate ‘world dance forms’ from Odissi, Hula to Samba, categorised by geopolitical identifiers, or by socio-functional markers such as Javanese court dance, Tibetan temple dancer, Brazilian Orixa dances (Savigliano, 2009, p. 180). The term ‘world dance’ “intimates a neutral comparative field wherein all dances are products of equally important, wonderfully diverse, equivalently powerful cultures” (Foster, 2009, p. 2). But in considering this as another modality for intercultural dialogue through dance, there are still questions as to how the colonial history that produced ethnicities as such continue to operate, and indeed what “has been constructed for dancing through the use of the term ‘world dance’ “ (Ibid., p. 3) generally.
The formulation of World Dance has to be understood as a phenomenon of global culture and analysed as a construction of knowledge. It “is a representation, a relatively new way of putting together, conceptualising, and validating ‘other dances, rather than a plain discovery of their presence in the world” (Savigliano, 2009, p. 164). It “operates through disciplinary techniques that reshape the ‘other’ dances’ presentational and disciplinary techniques, along with the beliefs and values associated with them” (Ibid.). In short, Savigliano suggests that World Dance is discursive practice that may be understood along Foucauldian lines as a way of ‘ordering things’ and ‘disciplining’ bodies and pleasures (Ibid., p. 166), and it begs the question of legitimation in validating inclusions and exclusions of people and their practices, to take a perspective of Spivak (1993; cited in Savigliano, 2009, p. 166). The teaching of ‘world dancers’ to appreciate a world dance “requires one to ascribe to a worldview composed of culturalist interpretations imposed from above” (Savigliano, 2009, p. 180), that “while representing the triumph of the global, always re-installs a reconfigured local call” (Ibid.), making World Dance a site of convoluted ‘otherness’ (Ibid., p. 181). Although choreography under this framework allows for fusion dances from Chinese Hip Hop to Senegalese Butoh, World Dance as a practice entails “a compound of cultural relativism values and collectionist interests” (Ibid., p. 175) that introduces contested distinctions in the idea of the ‘traditional’, while at the same time choreography with its capability of capturing movements is claimed as a strategic tool of the West with its ballet/modern/postmodern continuum (Ibid., pp. 175-177).

In relation to the issue of otherness created through the power of classification in the ‘worlding’ of dance, the question of global consensus in cultural diversity is discussed by Hambergren (2009) with the specific example of Indian dance. She cites the performance tours of Ram Gopal in Sweden in the 1940s, arguing that it is “the transnational dissemination of [a] cultural modernity that creates a multi-sited geography” (p. 20), in this case a new-found ideal of ‘peace on earth’ in Sweden following the Second World War in which the collective national image is tarnished by Nazi collaboration (Ibid.). She hence observes how a dance critic named Idestam-Almqvist (1949) wrote in a newspaper article on Ram Gopal’s performance, arguing that the dancer was presenting a modern Indian ‘ballet’ that could compete with Western ballet: “In that critic’s opinion Gopal’s dances are not authentic, but also this
criterion itself is deemed unproductive... Indian dance is too multifaceted to be adequately represented by any one coherent and common dance form... [Indian dance and classical ballet] both build on a variation of expressive forms, have roots in different folk dance traditions, and neither should be conceived of as anthropological museum displays, but rather as free, innovative, artistic creations. (Ibid., p. 19)" In this text, the idea of cultural modernity appears to be in need of equal, global artistic value mirroring the image of a world of united and equal nations (Ibid., p. 21). Gopal himself incidentally also propagated similarly modernist arguments in his career, that instead of dances that are mechanical, lifeless and tiresome, he wanted to “prune traditional dances of all repetitive movement” in order to create something understandable to Indian audiences of his time (Gopal, 1957, pp. 52-54; cited in Hammergren, 1999, p. 29).

In contrast to Ram Gopal who spoke of being Westernised due to a diasporic identity, Lilavati Devi, a Sweden-based dancer formerly from his company, built her persona based on a biographical narrative of a bloodline linked to the caste system with childhood memories of Hindu rituals; despite suggestions that she had European origins, her artistic work drew on a mythologised persona of her being Indian (Hammergren, 1999, pp. 23-26). In her unique combination of Asian exoticism and Western modernism, she somehow expressed suspicion about non-Indian students wanting to perform Indian dances professionally in ‘original’ form. Hammergren suggests that this is a “will to break with a nationally located, patriarchal practice and the reinstating of a past with deep roots in religion and nation” (Ibid., p. 25), and explains it with Stuart Hall’s (1994, pp. 393-394) description of a doubling in identity, with shared essence and continuity of the past on one hand, and rupture and transformation on the other.

Hammergren argues here with Foucault’s concept of heterotopia that definitions of coherence are often hard to achieve, with the problem not lying in how things are incompatible but in the assumed locus for classification, when the topos itself keeps shifting (Ibid., p. 30) For Gopal, his ‘modern’ spirit might well have been Indian as much as European (Ibid., p. 29). Hammergren cites Bhabha who advocates to resist “the attempt at holistic forms of social explanation” (2004, p. 248), since cultures are too incommensurable to be placed in one system (cited in Hammergren, 2009, p. 17). Based on Bhabha’s argument, an attitude that ‘all cultures are equal’ would be a kind
of cultural pluralism that places different cultures in the same timeframe, and hence an ethnocentric form of cultural modernity; the use of European ballet as a norm in this case may also be a claim of universality, instead of accepting that cultural knowledge is context specific (Ibid., p. 21).

Savigliano proposes that the practice of World Dance would need to be immersed in a discussion of ethics based on postcolonial critique and a philosophy of intersubjectivity along the line of Levina’s proposition to decentralise the self (Savigliano, 2009, p. 183). Identity politics, she argues, may otherwise be turned from a source of mobilisation for the disempowered into an ideological device of what Hardt and Negri (2000) call the Empire (see Ibid.). She point outs that it seems, after Althusser and Foucault, “impossible to conceptualise a subject outside subjectification and the disciplinary introjection of the juridico-ethical machine”. (Ibid.) Finally, she proposes to experiment with the notion of ‘neighbours’ as instances of proximity for permanent negotiation in the encounters among others, following the work of Zizek, Santner and Reinhard (2005), investigating “what is happening when we enter into the proximity of the other’s desire” (p. 4; cited in Savigliano, 2009, p. 184). She imagines this as dancers giving up translatability as practitioners of different dances, installing “partially articulated neighbourhoods of movements other than discrete dance forms and traditions” (Savigliano, 2009, p. 186), and “outdoing the New Age attitude that reduces the Other to a mirror-image or to a means of self-realisation and self-enrichment” (Ibid.).

One may stop here with regards to the issue of cultural difference in a transcultural framework. But there remains the aspect of creativity, for which a perspective in psychology can provide an additional dimension, by considering dance as a process than a product. According to Vygotsky’s developmental framework, the creativity process includes imagination and ‘play’ as an expression of meaning making, which is the construction of knowledge into understanding with others, within or across a variety of contexts and codes (Vygotsky, 1986; cited in John-Steiner et al, 2010, p. 12). Creativity is hence a transformative activity where emotion, meaning and cognitive symbol (John-Steiner et al, 2010, p. 12). Vygotsky has written in The Psychology of Art (1925) early in his career that art may be seen as both an effect and effector of emotions, as it “introduces the effects of passion, violates inner equilibrium, changes will in a new sense, and stirs feelings, emotions, passions and
vices without which society would remain in an inert and emotionless state” (p. 249; cited in John-Steiner et al, 2010, p. 13). He also expresses the view that creativity is part of social life:

Art is the social within us, and even if its action is performed by a single individual it does not mean that its essence is individual… art is the social technique of emotion, a tool of society which brings the most intimate and personal aspects of our being into the circle of social life… it would be more correct to say that emotion becomes personal when every one of us experiences a work of art: it becomes personal without ceasing to be social…

(Vygotsky, 1925; cited in John-Steiner, 2010, p. 14)

Oreck and Nicoll (2010) have further applied Vygotsky’s psychological concept of the zone of proximal development (ZPD) to provide a model for dialogue in dance. They cite Vygotsky (1925) in saying that the act of artistic creation cannot be ‘taught’, that the teacher’s role is instead a cooperative one to help students “organise the conscious processes in such a way that they generate subconscious processes” (p. 256; cited in Oreck and Nicoll, 2010, p. 108). ZPD is defined in Vygotsky’s theory as the distance between the problems a student can solve independently and his capabilities under more competent teachers and peers, and this zone in the arts, Oreck and Nicoll (2010) argue, cannot be determined (p. 108). They argue that in the arts, “the teacher and mentor may possess greater experience but is not the expert in what the student has to express” (Ibid., p. 109). They cite Lakes’ (2005) observation to bemoan the irony that while founders of modern dance broke from tradition to express their individual visions, many training methods that these pioneers developed become tradition-bound themselves and offer few opportunities to develop their own vision and style (in Oreck and Nicoll, 2010, p. 112). In conclusion, they stated principles for dance dialogues as follows:

1. Everyone has the capacity for artistic creation in dance.
2. Children and adults move through developmental stages of artistic activity through social interaction and internal dialogue.
3. Teachers and mentors must be open to the possibility that they cannot imagine what and how their students and mentees are about to create.
One may argue that the challenge in intercultural dialogue with a transcultural model is to go beyond the effects of intertextuality in using dance heritage as a part of artistic creations transcending cultural identities, to achieve a kind of intersubjectivity between dancers and an audience of a different cultural community. Intersubjectivity has been described by Calvin Shrag (1972) as ‘being with the other’, with two existential qualifications – the possibilities of alienation and community (p. 146; cited in Fraleigh, 1987, p. 58). In this regard, Sartre has spoken in *Being and Nothingness* (1965) of three ontological dimensions of the body, between the body known to ‘me’, the body of the other known by ‘me’, and apprehension of the own body known by the other; in his bleak outlook, he has suggested that one is unable to see oneself as others do, while being powerless to their gaze (cited in Fraleigh, 1987, pp. 59-60).

However, Fraleigh would contend, citing Gabriel Marcel’s (1952) work in describing the body as a ground for communion. She paraphrases it thus: “When I realise that my body is not something that I possess, an object to be manipulated, but rather that mystery that I am, the path is opened for me to also regard the bodily lived existence of others as I regard my own. Then authentic community and creative intersubjectivity become possible. (Fraleigh, 1987, p. 60; emphasis in original)”

Directing this general discussion of transculturalism back to a focus on the use of traditional dance in the Singapore context, one has to be aware that under the ‘global’ cultural policies of the PAP government, the local arts and cultural industry are strategically placed in line with the overarching concerns of economic globalisation. Transcultural works in the performing arts with their international potential in outreach may hence possibly be placed on a higher hierarchy over traditional art forms such as Indian classical dance in their purist forms. Chong (2011) has observed how under the National Arts Council’s mechanism of ‘meritocracy’ in grants policy, relying on ‘objective criteria’ such as ‘professionalism’, Chinese opera troupes occupy a peripheral position relative to contemporary English-language position (p. 131); the appeal to heritage for legitimacy in maintaining identity does not translate into much official recognition in the form of funding (Ibid., pp. 133-134). Middle-class theatre practitioners of the English-educated community, on the other hand, possess a kind of cultural capital of their artistic habitus in the form of literary
skill, as Chong argues, that allows them a privilege to indulge in what Bourdieu (1993) would call the ‘practices of distinction’ and to resist the conservatism of civil servants tasked with censorship (Chong, 2011, p. 157). Even while cast as a progressive artist and portrayed as deviant and often subversive under what Althusser would term as ideological state apparatus, one would enjoy special treatment, being “seen as someone who needs to be indulged or tolerated in capitalist Singapore” (Ibid., p. 158) and thus is likely to overcome state didacticism, or at least reserve the privilege to secure higher-level state grants than traditional artists (Ibid., p. 167).

Under such social differentiation, intercultural dialogue of a transcultural model, as products of creative arts, may have a tendency of being channelled to more privileged venues and platforms of Singapore as a global city, whereas traditional arts appear to be relegated for intercultural dialogue in a more conservative multicultural model of arts education in community venues and public schools, which will be discussed in the following section.

More specifically with regards to Indian classical dance, this is not to say that there have not been artistic attempts at intercultural works on initiatives of artistes rooted in the community, but most have largely retained the integrity in form of Bharatha Natyam or other regional styles of classical Indian dance while adapting literature from other cultures, and it should not be assumed incidental that they have by and large been left out of international platforms such as the Singapore Arts Festival. Choreographed by Cultural Medallion recipient Santha Bhaskar, Manohra (1995), an adaptation of a Thai fairy tale incorporating some elements of Thai dance, marked the last time any local Indian dance company was featured at the prestigious event for more than a decade thereafter. The same choreographer has also produced Rasa and Dhwani (2003), which reflects a nationalist discourse in its uses of local poetry in four official languages as the literary basis for choreography, and has choreographed for Vibrations (2007), an experimental work incorporating light, video and dramatics interventions. Young Artist Award recipient Meenakshy Bhaskar has choreographed a Yaatra series, experimenting with western orchestral music and flamenco music while dealing with contemporary themes.
The dependence on NAC annual grants which generally uses professionalism and innovation of Western arts as benchmark, along with the need to keep attracting a younger and more cosmopolitan audience, might have provided part of the impetus to keep staging more ‘creative’ or ‘innovative’ productions, as dance practitioners of the Indian community as an ethnic minority fear being marginalised.

6.2 Dance Heritage as Medium for Intercultural Dialogue in a Multicultural Model - Adaptation of the Culture Assimilator

6.2.1 Cultural Differences between Chinese and Indian Communities in Singapore in the Practice of Dance Heritage

The preceding section has discussed intercultural dialogue through dance as imagined in a transcultural model, focused on transcending differences in cultural identity and promoting creativity in dance-related expressions. This section in contrast will discuss intercultural dialogue through dance in a multicultural model, where differences in cultural identities tied to dance heritage are recognised. Dialogue in this model may hence be imagined as a process of ‘intercultural understanding’ whereby cultural differences may be respected.

In reality, ‘intercultural dialogue’ in dance heritage imagined in a multicultural model should not be assumed as therefore immune to appropriation for visual spectacles in the same manner as in a transcultural model. However, the focus here will be on arts education programme and more ‘community’ events where ‘tolerance’ or ‘racial harmony’ rather than creative production are the order of the day. Hence the investigation will centre on how intercultural learning may be activated in such contexts which involve cross-cultural situations of interaction.

The discussion of examples here takes its cue from the concept of ‘critical incidents’ in cross-cultural situations, which is key to the Culture Assimilator approach for intercultural competence training, applying the concept to situations involving Indian classical dance in Singapore where cultural differences in the practice of dance as heritage may lead to conflicts or misunderstandings in scenarios of arts education or organisation of local community events. This involves an adaptation of the existing approach, and is hence neither aimed at producing training manuals to prepare individuals’ cognitive skills in adapting to a different cultural environment, nor designed to characterise people of a different community according to certain traits.
of behaviour under the name of 'cultural standards', as the limitations or issues with
such an approach in relation to the goal of intercultural dialogue have already been
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. Instead of assuming as the German proponent of the
Culture Assimilator approach Alexander Thomas does, that problems in
misunderstanding or tension are due to differences in unconscious, internalised
dispositions known as 'cultural standards', it will be argued that any 'cultural
differences' claimed by the external observer should be a source for contextualising
instead of essentialising.

What may arguably be achieved with this conceptual tool in relation to cultural
heritage shall therefore be to identify possible sites of conflict and to contextualise
the prototypical differences in practices across cultural or socio-cultural systems in
order to generate knowledge for mutual understanding, where one recognises how
knowledge of the 'other' culture is also dependent on social construction of the
culture of the self. Following the arguments of Archer (1996), culture is not to be
understood in a Parsonian manner as an integrated system of internalised values,
but instead as a system of meanings where contradictions may exist, and as a result
of historical development of the socio-cultural system. The question of cultural
difference will hence be dealt with here by considering dance heritage as part of the
knowledge in a cultural system, with a specific example of Indian classical dance
compared to similar expressions in Chinese culture, in a pseudo-etic approach.
Additionally, by way of a discussion on ideology with perspectives of cultural studies,
it will be analysed as to how a construction of cultural differences as such may
potentially serve to reify the culture of the Indian minority (and by extension of the
argument, the Malay minority as well) as being less modern than Chinese culture
associated with the dominant ethnicity and the prevailing ideology in Singapore.

The approach of intercultural communication, with its construction of cultural
differences, needs to be problematized here in its view of a lifeworld limited by the
interlocutors' cultural backgrounds, while assuming conditions of relative political
symmetry (Young, R.E., 1996, p. 185). From a phenomenological perspective, such
'cultural differences' are in fact social constructions arising from subjective
consciousness in the encounter with the Other (Dreher, 2007, p. 148). In
characterising 'cultural differences', the task in intercultural communication is merely
to find easy answers for pragmatic purposes of day-to-day life, as opposed to an
ethnological approach which does not provide such simple answers as it seeks to explain the relation between culture and individual actions (Moosmüller, 2004, p. 45). With such an approach, one needs to take caution in avoiding danger with the concept of ‘cultural difference’ being used by institutions of the state to decide the fates of some minority cultural communities through stereotyping (Roth, 2009, p. 79). The highlighting of cultural differences may be meaningful in the politics of multiculturalism as part of a process “whereby each culture is respected and protected in its dialogue with all others” (Young, R.E., 1996, p. 172), but these cultural differences also need to be de-abolutised in the critical process (Ibid.), and this is where Derrida can offer insights in helping to identify ideological practices in ‘communicative distortion’ in institutionalised structures, by way of a deconstructive critique (Ibid., pp. 176-177).

As a discussion on how the study of critical interaction situations may help provide ways of dealing with cultural differences, this section will proceed as a point of departure with a summary of how the Culture Assimilator approach has been thought to be useful for intercultural learning. As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3, the Culture Assimilator has been claimed as having positive effects in intercultural communication on cognitive, affective and behavioural aspects. The approach would be to compile critical interaction situations into a manual to train participants in recognising different possible interpretations of actions; one may be psychologically better prepared through such exercises to deal with a different cultural environment; one may thus be trained to behave flexibly and appropriately according to a different set of cultural norms; additionally, one may be able to ‘understand’ a different value orientation, or be ‘reflexive’ on cultural differences in value orientation.

An application of such an intercultural communication framework to dance heritage would arguably be useful on a pragmatic level of avoiding conflict or misunderstanding during cross-cultural situations, as one learns to contextualise any unexpected or incomprehensible form of action to the values and norms of a different dance heritage, and to respect cultural differences in such values and norms. However, whereas behaviour of people from a different culture is ultimately dependent on individuals as well as on the norms stemming from socialisation, dance ‘heritage’ in a ‘community’ by definition already involves norms in practices that are more or less determined by institutionalisation though there remains some
polysemy in interpretation of meanings. In an ethnographic approach the most effective way of research on the norms in the heritage practice would just be to interview the ‘gatekeepers’. Hence an approach of random sampling in the Culture Assimilator, which investigates ‘cultural standards’ as norms with slight variations in national cultures otherwise assumed to be homogeneous, would not be so fruitful, unless one adapts it to take into account regional differences or differences across generations.

Furthermore, if one were to imagine this framework as an approach to help promote ‘intercultural understanding’ on a higher level, not in terms of the lifeworld of day-to-day situations but in terms of intercultural dialogue where there can be learning between cultures as different systems of values and meanings, the challenge would lie in how knowledge on cultural differences may be discussed to help one respect diversity rather than to stereotype people of a different cultural community. The limitation in a framework of Culture Assimilator fixated with the notion of ‘cultural standards’, even as one qualifies that such standards in culture as orientation system are produced in the course of history and continue to develop (Thomas, 2011, p. 112), is that in its pragmatic outlook that characterises ‘national cultures’ for the same purpose of convenience as one would characterise an Unternehmenskultur or work culture of an organisation, with an instrumental focus on the now. To adapt the knowledge from critical incidents for ‘intercultural understanding’ in cultural heritage, one would have to appreciate that the sense of history or the past for the cultural community concerned should be the main subject.

One must give a cultural community due recognition that their sense of continuity in history may be richer than any single imagination of an essence in the culture as embodied in members of the culture. In considering dance heritage as a medium for intercultural dialogue, the aim should not be an attempt to ‘understand’ the general value orientation of a certain cultural community based on expressions of their dance heritage as evidence, but instead an attempt to appreciate the values and meanings associated with the dance heritage by contextualising it within its cultural system or socio-cultural system as extensively as possible, such that any easy dichotomy of cultural differences can be deconstructed. In other words, one may attempt a cross-cultural study of dance heritage, but this should not be taken as a basis for a comparative study of two cultures. To use a Culture Assimilator as a tool for finding
references for intercultural dialogue, it may be more meaningful to use the cross-cultural situations as basis for discussion of ‘intercultural standards’, instead of deriving ‘cultural standards’ which would be easy answers from the external observer that freeze a community in time.

Further to that, one may argue that while critical incidents may serve as reference to discuss how norms of ‘intercultural dialogue’ should be negotiated, any description of cultural differences that tend to essentialise would have to be deconstructed. The approach here will be to begin with a list of critical interaction situations involving the reception of Indian classical dance by the Chinese community in Singapore. Based on these situations, a few themes on value orientation will be constructed, borrowing from dimensions of value orientation based on works of Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961), Hofstede (1980) and Schwartz (1992). Any dichotomy of cultural difference between the Indian and Chinese communities in Singapore based on dance heritage will then be deconstructed through further contextualising, such that any placing of various cultural communities on a hierarchy based on the ideology of the Asian modern in Singapore may be challenged.

In the lack of interviews with Chinese informants in Singapore on their experiences of critical situations involving Indian classical dance, this researcher is listing a number of such critical situations based on observations from his own experience of an arts administrator and facilitator who has been worked in arts education and event organisation involving Indian classical dance in the period between 2005 and 2010. This will then be followed by an attempt to construct and deconstruct cultural differences based on dance heritage, with a little help from a cross-cultural history of dance. The following are samples of critical interaction situations:

1) Chinese event organiser contacts Indian dance group to arrange a performance for an evening event with a member of parliament as guest-of-honour. The group declines after hearing that the performance is to take place during dinner.

2) Chinese event organiser requests Indian dance group to arrange for a performance by a group of dancers. But the dance group only sends a solo dancer.
3) Chinese event organiser requests for Indian dance group to present a ‘vibrant’ dance performance for a performance at a shopping mall. But the dancer performs an item that is full of incomprehensible hand gestures and the expressions do not look all very ‘happy’.

4) Chinese event organiser requests for a performance by an Indian dance group that features male and female dancers, preferably with a romantic theme of love instead of religious theme. But the item provided does not seem to match expectations.

5) A school teacher arranges for an Indian dance group to conduct a dance workshop at the school as part of the arts education programme, in a secular setting for a multicultural group. The instructor starts by teaching the students, who are of mixed cultural and religious backgrounds, to perform a ritual that is apparently Hindu.

6) A school teacher at a Christian mission school has engaged an Indian dance group to stage a performance as part of the arts education programme, and enquires shortly before the show as to whether there may be religious content in the programme. The dance group assures it is not religious but the dance apparently makes references to mythological story of Hindu origin.

7) A school teacher requests for an Indian dance workshop whereby students can be trained in creativity in dance expressions within two sessions. The instructors who conduct the workshop simply teach basic steps and make the students practise without much improvisation.

8) Chinese event organiser requests for an ‘innovative’ dance item from an Indian dance group as part of a special festival event. The dance group provides an interesting synopsis for the programme, but the dance still looks no different from the usual and the costumes are also nothing out of the ordinary.
Based on the above critical situations, the following themes have been identified, whereby Indian classical dance may be stereotyped: (A) Spirituality or Religiosity versus Secularism; (B) Individualism versus Collectivism; (C) Tradition versus Modernity.

But before going further with this discussion on cultural differences, it would be useful to appreciate the significance of Indian classical dance as a form of ‘intangible cultural heritage’, with the help of the first Relevance Criterion in the 2003 Intangible Heritage Convention. Referring to the definition for intangible cultural heritage in Article 2 of the Convention, this criterion in the nomination form stipulates that it should be among ‘practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills’ which the community ‘recognises’ as part of its cultural heritage, that it is ‘transmitted from generation to generation’ while being ‘constantly recreated’, that it provides ‘a sense of identity and continuity’, not to mention that it is not incompatible with requirements of human rights mutual respect and sustainable development. This by no means suggests that there is any likelihood of Indian classical dance in Singapore being nominated one day if ratifies the convention, unless its local dance community makes such important contributions in shaping its expressions, for cultural heritage in this globalised world is ultimately still imagined as national achievements, not transnational resources for local communities. Incidentally, India as state party to the Convention has used it so far for the safeguarding of dance-related art forms which are lesser known: Kutiyattam and Mudiyettu of Kerala, Kalbelia folk songs and dances of Rajasthan, Ramila in northern India, and Chhau dance in eastern India. This leaves out the eight major classical dance forms of India originating in different regions, as already recognised by Sangeet Natak Akademi, the national academy for music, dance and drama: Bharatanatyam of Tamil Nadu, Kathak of Uttar Pradesh, Kathakali of Kerala, Kuchipudi of Andhra Pradesh, Manipuri of Manipur, Mohini Attam of Kerala, Odissi of Odisha and Sattriya of Assam. This suggests that there are already adequate platforms for appreciation of these eight classical dance forms, though appreciation levels may still vary widely, for instance with Sattriya which has only been included in November 2000 (The Hindu, 27th February 2011).

For the case study here on Singapore, the focus will be on the south Indian classical dance form of Bharatanatyam, which is most prevalent of all among the Indian population in Singapore partly because it is historically associated with the regional
culture of Tamil Nadu, which is where most of Singapore’s earlier migrants from India originated, as reflected by the choice of Tamil as one of Singapore’s four official languages since half a century ago. Secondly, Bharatanatyam has attained national status in popularity in India and abroad, such that it is commonly practised by dancers of a south Indian background generally. Frequently used in national occasions such as the National Day Parade in Singapore to represent the Indian community as part of the CMIO formula, its recognition as a cultural symbol or ‘heritage’ of the ‘Indian community’, alongside Kathak for the North Indians or Bhangra dance for the Sikhs where available, would be unproblematic for the majority Singaporean Indians of the Hindu faith, though the attitude towards it by the Muslim or Christian Indians may still require further study. Classical dance forms in India are largely associated with the Hindu faith due to their origins in religious practices and the references to Hindu mythology in the sung poetry and the enacted drama, hence it may be that a non-Hindu would accept Bharatanatyam being used as a cultural artefact to represent the Indian community alongside Chinese and Malay dance forms, while refraining from practising the dance form personally. (From this writer’s observation of Singapore’s professional and amateur artistes in Indian classical music and dance through personal contacts, there are also Bharatanatyam dancers of the Christian faith, but one may be under pressure from the pastor to refrain from its practice, or one may be able to draw the line personally and refrain from performing it at a temple event, though watching such performances at a temple per se is fine. There are also Muslim or Sikh musicians who do not find it problematic to perform songs of Hindu origins, by treating it simply as traditional songs.) In short, how a community ‘recognises’ a cultural heritage as its own may involve more complexity than it sounds.

The issue of identification aside, there should be no doubt however as to how much ‘expressions’ and ‘skills’ are involved in the learning of the Bharatanatyam dance form and how its mastery provides a sense of cultural achievement. The dance involves a rich repertoire of items in specific structures, with combinations of different segments based on three categories of expressions in classical concept of Indian dance: nritta, nritya, natya. Nritta refers to pure rhythmic dance without evocation of emotions; nritya refers to dance with footwork as well as some expressions of emotions; natya refers to dance drama incorporating various elements of hand
gestures and facial expressions. In fact, dance items composed of pure rhythmic movements or nritta as such is more the exception than the rule. Much of Bharatanatyam involves not only precision in postures and rhythmic movements but also a form of mime using a highly codified language of mudras or hand gestures, which makes it different to understand and appreciate for the uninitiated. In that regard, ‘knowledge’ in the dance form as an intangible heritage may be quite exclusive to the dance community with its connoisseurs, although general references to Hindu mythology, such as iconic gestures depicting stories of the heroic Rama with the bow and arrow and the playful Krishna with the flute, would be relatively accessible to the audience. Audience reception would also make an interesting study. There may be a tendency, for instance, for one to attend an arangetram - a solo performance by an amateur dancer, which is organised like a social occasion, rather than forking out money to pay for a professional or artistic dance production.

An arangetram, literally meaning a ‘stage debut’, is a performance by a dance student after at least several years of training. As O’Shea (2007) has observed, Bharatanatyam provides diasporic South Asian communities with a potent symbol of cultural identity and continuity due to the ‘conjunction’ established by dancers and supporters between “nationality, spirituality and feminine respectability” (p. 54). The arangetram is less often the launch of a dance career than a source of family pride before an audience consisting of friends, relatives and business associates; it is also seen as a rite of passage into adulthood (Ibid.: 154-155). For the diasporic Indian community in Singapore just as elsewhere, it has become a sign of achievement, for not all children or youths sent to learn Bharatanatyam in weekly classes would eventually have the time and perseverance to master the dance adequately through additional one-to-one tutelage, or enjoy the privilege of financial support from the family to stage an arangetram, which consists of a complete elaborate repertoire known as the margam. The most basic items of a margam are Alarippu, Jathiswaram, Sabdam, Varnam, Padam and Thillana. Of these, Alarippu and Jathiswaram are pure rhythmic dance, belonging to the Nritta category. Shabdam belongs to Nritya, as it incorporates poses, hand gestures and facial expressions that evoke Hindu deities. The centrepiece of a performance would be a Varnam, usually about 30 to 45 minutes in duration, alternating between Nritta, Nritya and Natya; a typical story would describe a deity as the object of love for a female
character, depicting her pangs of love and longing for union. This is followed in the second half by items like Padam, which belongs to Natya. What serves as a finale would then be the Thillana, which is a joyful, rhythmic piece which brings the dance performance to its conclusion. The codification of Bharatanatyam into this margam format is attributed to the Tanjore Quartet, four brothers employed as dance masters in the court of the Maratha king Serfoji at Thanjavur in early 19th century.

As a graduation ceremony, the dance performance would significantly incorporate the paying of tribute to Lord Shiva as Nataraja or Lord of Dance on a much adorned altar at downstage left (audience right), while the live musicians are typically placed at downstage right (audience left). It also concludes with the dance student receiving blessings from the guru, and engaging in speeches of mutual thanks with guru, parents, family and friends. While an average arangetram performance would last around two hours, there are also extreme cases where, by including more than one costume change, slide shows of one’s coming-of-age, speeches by relatives and associates, not to mention the virtually obligatory tea reception during the intermission, it may last as long as four hours.

There is definitely a strong sense of ‘continuity’ associated with the practice of Bharatanatyam, even if much of that involves continuity in mythological time. Dance gurus like to trace the lineage of Bharatanatyam all the way to a mythological origin in Lord Brahma, creator of the universe. Bharatha Muni, the sage who lived 2000 years ago and wrote Natya Shastra, a classic Sanskrit treatise on the art of dance and theatre, was said to have it bestowed as a fifth Veda created by Brahma. As Priya Srinivasan describes in an ethnographical account of the speech by a dancer at her arangetram, there is a fervent sense of community bound together by the language of dance that is considered integral to Indian cultural and religious tradition:

*She began by thanking ‘aunty’, meaning her guru who was sitting on stage right with the musicians, explaining that it was ‘aunty’ who had taught her about Indian culture and tradition. She knew she was dancing for the Gods and that this was a divine form she had been given. Like dancers of 2000 years ago in India, she was continuing to practice Hinduism in her own small way.*

(Srinivasan, 2009, p. 70)
Of course, no one knows for sure how the dance identified today as Bharatanatyam would exactly be performed 2,000 years ago, even if classical literature from that era may have given interesting indications that some elements or concepts of the dance have persisted from then till today. It is not an uninterrupted history in any case. What is known is that much of the vocabulary of its dance movements as known today is derived from Sadir, a solo dance form performed by temple and court dancers in pre-colonial and colonial South India, while the choreographic themes reference temple sculpture and religious ritual (O’Shea, 2007, pp. 26-27). The dramatic content of this dance often involves expressions of religious devotion accompanied by sung poetic texts in an erotic idiom, as developed from the Bhakti movement – a convention of devotional worship that seeks spiritual attainment through a personal and affectionate relation with a deity (pp. 26, 113). The narrator in such dramatic poetry is typically the main female character, longing for the return of the divine lover and recalling the good times together. Sadir was incidentally performed by courtesans known as devadasis (literally ‘female devotees of God’) who were affiliated with particular temples and courts (p. 4).

During the Victorian period of British colonial rule, the non-domestic lifestyle of the devadasis was denounced as prostitution and their ritual activities as superstition, under the anti-nautch (literally ‘anti-dance’) movement launched in 1892 (Ibid.). The agitation may be seen as a misunderstanding on the part of the campaigners, a rejection of the validity in dance expressing religious experience through sexual metaphors, as well as a conflation of choreographic content with sexuality of the practitioners (p. 114). The socio-political background was that of a “colonial conflict […] between the multiplicity of Hindu religious traditions and British Protestantism” (Ibid.). In any case, when the dance form was revived in the 1930s and rechristened as Bharatanatyam, it was aligned with the political discourse of independence and at the same time there was a shift in social context: middle-class girls and women of the Brahmin caste were turning to the dance practice, thus elevating the respectability of Bharatanatyam (p. 5). A key figure then was Rukmini Devi, who founded the Kalakshetra dance institution and thereby formalised the training of Bharatanatyam in the form of dance classes in place of the informal gurusishya or guru-disciple mode of instruction (p. 41). Hailing from a Tamil Brahmin family but influenced by nationalist activism as well as social causes of the Theosophical
Society at the time, Rukmini Devi had originally intended to learn dance from the famous ballerina Anna Pavlova whose performance she had watched in Bombay; while that never materialised, Pavlova left a great impact on her by encouraging her to combine her devotion towards dance, spirituality and nationalism (Ibid., p. 38). In 1935, at the suggestion of E. Krishna Iyer, the dancer, promoter and critic who another key figure in reviving Bharatanatyam with a nationalist agenda, Rukmini Devi approached devadasi dancers and started her training under Mylapore Gowri Ammal (Ibid.). She then gave her debut concert, which although not a formal arangetram, launched a dance career as a respected public figure against the anti-nautch elites of Madras, and in 1936 she founded Kalakshetra (Ibid.).

While Rukmini Devi is credited as a pioneer in validating Bharatanatyam, critics have also celebrated another figure, Balasaraswati, who saw herself as safeguarding the artistic legacy of the devadasis (pp. 47-48). They diverged in various aspects not only in the training but also the performance of Bharatanatyam, including the articulation of movements as well as stage presentation. In O’Shea’s perspective: “Whereas Rukmini Devi preferred the clarity and dramatic force of multiple performers carrying consistent roles, Balasaraswati emphasised the challenges offered to the solo dancer by the lyric mode’s shifting characterisation. (p. 49)”

In any case, while the association of Bharatanatyam with ‘traditional’ Indian culture led to a significant effect in boosting its prestige and popularity especially among the diasporic communities, dancers trained in Bharatanatyam, both in India and beyond, continue “to distinguish themselves from their peers by creating choreography that is original” (pp. 57-58). As it has been pointed out by Chennai-based dancer Padma Subrahmanyam, best known for her research on karanas as fundamental units of dance movements described in the Natya Shastra,

> the so-called traditional concert of Bharatanatyam is by itself a product of the changing time. The presentation has gone through enormous changes in the past forty or fifty years. Hence, it is easy to imagine the changes that could have taken place in the last 300 years and the last 3000 years. Who could say which is original, pure and authentic.  

(1979, p. 92; cited in O’Shea, 2007, p. 59)
O’Shea would also cite the original and innovative work of choreographers like Toronto-based Hari Krishnan and British-based Shobana Jeyasingh to demonstrate how one may challenge the imagination of a tradition as “inherently fixed” (p. 65). Katrak (2013) argues that there is a Contemporary Indian Dance which has evolved in the 20th century, with pioneering work by Uday Shankar who opened up a hybrid genre rooted mainly in Bharatanatyam and Kathak, or by Chandrakala who rejected the religious iconography of classical Bharatanatyam in favour of abstract movements, not to mention transnational choreographers later including Anita Ratnam and Hari Krishnan who reinvent religious icons and mythological stories to connect with contemporary and even feminist relevance (p. 47).

However, it has to be added here that choreographers working in the idiom of Bharatanatyam may face a dilemma, for there is much richness in the expressions of the dance that is tied to the lyrics and musical structure of classical songs in the Carnatic music tradition as well as the references to scenes from mythological stories. ‘Breaking free’ from these conventions would also mean sacrificing such fine details. Hence choreographers who are well-versed in this dance idiom may not gain a sense of achievement by re-inventing the dance in a way that would risk losing the character of the dance form with its aesthetic attributes. Nonetheless, there have always been attempts by Singaporean choreographers working in the Bharatanatyam idiom to update their work in order to find contemporary relevance, such as Santha Bhaskar’s People Get Connected (2006) which features a new ‘mudra’ denoting the handphone as part of its general theme of communication, that gives her artistic license to include the classical poem Meghaduta by 5th-century Sanskrit playwright Kalidasa alongside contemporary and non-Indian literature as references for the dances. Another production of hers, entitled Vriksha (2009), adapts the local play The Silly Little Girl and the Funny Old Tree by Kuo Pao Kun for a theme of environmental protection; in this work (which this writer witnessed personally through involvement as a dancer), Bharatanatyam hand gestures are used more sparingly and in a more naturalistic manner in depicting the life force of the forest or the personification of evil forces. If these works, as reflections on the forces of modern technology and deterioration of natural environment, may be interpreted as an attempt to reconcile between the heritage of Bharatanatyam dance vocabulary and concerns of the contemporary world, the focus of another
Singaporean choreographer, Nirmala Seshadri, would in her own words be dealing with the asymmetry in the “primary expression of patriarchy in Bharatanatyam [being] the objectification of the woman for the pleasure of men” (Seshadri, 2011, p. 2). For instance, in her evolving work *Crossroads* (2002-2008) in collaboration with Kalakshetra-trained dancer Neewin Hershall, she incorporated *Ashtapadi* by 13th-century Sanskrit poet for its erotic depiction of the love between Radha and Krishna in Hindu mythology, in a multidisciplinary exploration “with a suggestion of androgyny through movement, costume, and visual art” (Ibid., p. 6).

The above account of Bharatanatyam as an artistic expression in India and in Singapore should help to underscore the point that Bharatanatyam as a dance heritage should not be understood simply as a cultural artefact representing an archaic spirit. It should also not be understood simply as being transmitted through the generations and recreated through historical periods representing a collective spirit of its community such that one imagines there is no autonomy under institutionalised norms of the heritage practice. Instead, the significance of its created norms has to be appreciated against the context of nationalist struggle against colonial rule and affirmation of the Indian community in identity and continuity against the context of migration by the Indian diaspora. How the artistic expressions evolve into a plurality of forms is a matter of how individual artistes interpret and react to the world. When one speaks of the dance heritage as being ‘constantly recreated’, one has to be careful not to reify the agency of change as being a single-minded institution of the community. There is more than one way to interpret the social values, aesthetic values and spiritual values of the dance as heritage.

One may now come to the identified themes of ‘cultural differences’ to discuss if such constructions are indeed helpful for management in a diversity of dance heritage.

**(A) Dance Heritage as Ritual – Religious/Spiritual versus Secular Expressions**

As suggested in the discussion above on the historical development of Bharatanatyam, there is much ambivalence in its cultural significance, between the religious or spiritual aspect and the artistic aspect. For an intercultural context in Singapore, it shall be argued here that the most appropriate way to deal it would be
to respect the choice of any member of the Indian community that associates the classical dance form with spiritual meanings, without having to make any generalisation that Indians are more naturally inclined towards ritualised actions than others due to their ‘internalised dispositions’.

Due to its historical origin, the Bharatanatyam dance vocabulary has much character of religious rituals in it. It is even often argued that the spiritual aspect is an integral part of the aesthetics in Bharatanatyam. One may cite for instance the Natya Shastra, or even the classical Sanskrit playwright Kalidasa, in describing the religious function of natya as an ocular offering to please the gods. In addition to the concept of rasa, literally meaning essence or flavour, which is central to Indian aesthetic theory in the performing arts, specifically referring to the navarasa or 9 emotions expressed in dance, the idea of bhakti is also often cited as considered pivotal to the art. This is particularly so coming from the perspective of the devadasi tradition as represented by Balasaraswati, for whom the state of the devotion and the practice of the dance art are one and the same in spiritual experience of bhakti (Knight Jr., 2010, p. 28). The ideal is for the ego to be subjugated and the dancer surrendered to divinity as part of the dance as it inspires a similar sense of spirituality in the audience.

One cannot assume that this spiritual significance in Indian classical dance is clear to a Chinese audience in Singapore. They may not generally be aware that the Indian dance community makes a huge distinction between Bharatanatyam as a classical dance, and folk dances such as Kummi, a traditional harvest dance which involves women dancing in circles with rhythmic clapping, not to mention ‘cinematic dance’ such as Bollywood which is frowned upon as cheap entertainment. Whereas words like balei wu for ballet or tufeng wu or folk dance, distinguishing the classical and folk traditions in the West, may be straightforward concepts to the Chinese, there is only one umbrella term yindu wu which is commonly used to refer to any kind of Indian dance, classical, folk or popular. Incidentally, if one surveys websites hosted in People’s Republic of China, one would find the term yindu wu often confused with belly dance, probably due to similarity in costume that they see in Hindi-language Bollywood films. On the other hand, local Singaporean Chinese may identify ‘Indian dance’ with their impression of Tamil movies which typically feature scenes of South Indian villages apart from urban settings; there is in fact a slightly
dated cliché, annoying to Singaporean Indians, which describes ‘Indian dance’ as ‘running around the coconut tree’.

This lack of distinction between Indian dance as a classical art and as folk expression also becomes a source of misunderstanding. To many Bharatanatyam artistes, it is insulting to be asked to perform during a dinner event, be it in a hotel ballroom or in state-run venues known as the community centre in Singapore, as they find it disrespectful of the art. This contrasts with the Chinese practice of watching Chinese opera at street festivals or tea houses, where the idea of eating during performances is perfectly unproblematic unless one is at a formal theatre setting. Underlying this may also be the assumption that only arts of Western origin or of international standing as contemporary practice, such as Western classical music or ballet-based contemporary dance, need to be accorded the formality of theatrical rules, whereas any form of Indian dance drama, Chinese opera or Malay music and dance are merely ‘folk music’ or ‘ethnic dance’ for the masses. Female dancers in Bharatanatyam incidentally may also frown at performing the commercial setting of a shopping centre where events such as Singapore HeritageFest are held, as opposed to performing in a theatre or a temple, where a line between high art and entertainment can be drawn. It has to be emphasised that such problems cannot be understood simply as one between Chinese and Indian Singaporeans with different internalised dispositions in ‘orientation systems’. There may also be Indian Singaporeans involved in the organising of state-supported ‘grassroots events’ who are not sensitive to the sensibility of artistes in classical Indian dance; hence it is a matter of power structure influencing the norms.

In the other extreme in the ‘understanding’ of Indian culture, one may also easily assume that Indian classical dance is religious, as opposed to Chinese dance or Malay dance. One may base this contrast on the observation that Indian dance practitioners insist on rituals like the ‘namaskaram’ before and after a performance or a dance lesson, whereby one touches the ground with the hands and then touches one’s forehead, which they may explain as a sign of submission or respect to Mother Earth. One also observes after all that whereas Indian dance is often performed at Hindu temples for religious festivals, music and dance are known to be discouraged in conservative Islamic beliefs and may be avoided by the Malays during the fasting month of Ramadan. Hence a classification of Indian dance and even ‘Indian culture’
in general as being religious and ritualistic, may seem useful knowledge for a
differentiated approach in managing diversity in Singapore’s cultural practices.

But there is a difference between sensitivity and respect for a community’s beliefs
and practices, and stereotyping the community as being exceptional in its behaviour.
The contrast made between Indian/Hindu culture and Malay/Muslim culture above is
in fact too stark. One popular traditional dance form for the Malays in Malaysia and
Singapore happens to be Zapin, which is believed to have been brought to the
region in the 14th century by Muslim missionaries from the around the region of
Yemen, as a means to spread the religion. What constitutes as the Malay heritage of
dance in Singapore would also a complicated topic on its own. In the 1950s, various
old Malay folk or social dances were rearranged in Singapore into an eclectic fusion
of Malay and European dances for Ronggeng dance stage of cabaret Bangsawan
theatre performances and dance artistes since then have continued to mix and
create new dances from existing pan-Malay repertoires of Inang, Masri, Joget, Asli
and Zapin (Mohd Anis, 2003, p. 10-11). It is problematic to essentialise, for the
development of Malay performing arts in Singapore is also influenced by external
factors, such as the demise of a cosmopolitan Malay film industry that was
flourishing in 1950s and 1960s until political changes around 1963 along with decline
of the trade unions forced major film director and actor P. Ramlee to leave Singapore.

The 1950s incidentally saw much cross-cultural collaborations involving ethnic
dances of the Chinese, Malay and Indian communities, inspired by the idea of a
‘Malayan’ identity, in the time of an anti-colonial movement partly tied to leftist
agitation. Hence the Bhaskar’s Academy of Dance notably staged a Bharatanatyam
rendition of the Chinese folk tale Liang Shan Bo and Zhu Ying Tai, also known as
Butterfly Lovers, using costumes adapted from Chinese opera and Indian music
imitating the Chinese pentatonic scale. It played at the premium venue of Victoria
Theatre for the duration of a week in 1958, with the support of Chinese middle
schools in mobilising students as audience, despite the absence of endorsement by
the PAP which would later seek to create a distinctive Singaporean culture through
concerts entitled Aneka Ragam Rakyat or People’s Variety Show from 1959 to early
1960s featuring traditional dances of different ethnicities (Hong and Huang, 2008, p.
88). Hence even in early nation-building days of Singapore, the significance of
Bharatanatyam was not limited to being a ‘Hindu’ dance.
It would furthermore be problematic to mark Indian culture as being religious and ritualistic simply based on an impression of its Indian dance expressions, with an assumption that there is no equivalence of such in Chinese culture. If one traces Chinese history as far back as the pre-Confucius era, one would note that back in the Western Zhou dynasty (1100-770 BCE), dance was used by the royal court for important worship and ceremonies. The “Six Dances” recorded in the class treatise included dances like the “Yunmen”, used for homage to the God of Heaven, the “Xianchu”, for sacrifice to the God of Earth, the “Shao”, used for homage to the Gods of the Four Cosmic Directions, and so on (Wang, 1985, p. 11). Apart from the religious dances, the royal court also held the ‘Civilian Dance’ in praise of the political rule, as well as the ‘Martial Dance’ to display the kingdom’s military might (Ibid., p. 14). Apart from these, there were also folk dances from minority groups which became popular in the court as well. It was in the Tang dynasty (618-907 CE) that dance is described by scholars as reaching its golden age in China, as the borders of the empire were extended to Central Asia. Of the “Ten Books of Music” for dance compiled during the reign of Zhenguanyin (637-642 CE), only two as performed at banquets were of the Han nationality, the rest originated from regions beyond such as Korea, India, Samarkand and so on (Ibid., p. 50). In the later dynasties, especially by the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), due to the boom of urban life and rise of the middle class, performing arts such as Chinese opera became popular, and the art of dance became absorbed into Chinese opera (Ibid., p. 78). What were featured at religious processions then were folk dances such as the Yangge, as well as the Lion Dance among others which have since remained popular in Chinese culture. Hence if one may note interpret it as being due to historical circumstances that dance for religious rituals did not develop into an important art form in Chinese culture. Instead, the most important high art in pre-modern China would happen to be traditional opera, which incorporates dance into theatre rather than theatre into dance as in the case of Indian culture. But lion dance, if it may be classed as a form of dance despite the visual focus on the props of the lion head and body, is itself a highly ritualised form of practice.

Catherine Bell (2009) has incidentally challenged the prevalent view in Western society of ritual “as a matter of special activities inherently different from daily routine action and closely linked to the sacralities of tradition and organised religion” (p. 138).
There is in fact a whole range of ritual-like activities, whereby the *Anjali* in South Asia with the hands clasped in a prayer position before the chest with a slight bow may be understood simply as a form of formalism (p. 142), whereas the way the President of the United States takes the oath of office by placing the left hand on the Bible may also clearly be seen as deriving from Christian ritual and Christian values (p. 156). There is hence no ground for placing cultures in hierarchy in terms of disposition towards rituals just because one culture has ritual-like actions concentrated in its dance expressions.

It is also inadequate for the sake of intercultural dialogue to speak of ‘cultural standards’ in the practice of Indian dance heritage for flexibility in adaptation. There should arguably be common understanding of ‘intercultural standards’, such that one may have to refrain from imposing any ritual, while interpreting it in a religious manner, on people of a different cultural or religious community, even if one personally is not inhibited by any taboo in with assimilating rituals that originate in another cultural or religious community. In any case, the easiest way of resolving the differences in Singapore is simply not to make any issue out of it, like a tacit agreement as ‘intercultural standard’ for harmony. There is certainly no need for participants to interpret any teaching of ritual-like gesture in dance expression as proselytising, just as there is no need for an instructor to explain the importance of such gestures in an overtly religious manner. It is a desire to seek ‘original’ or ‘standard’ meanings of such gestures in the culture, while misreading the motivation in its articulation, that may lead to dissatisfaction.

One simplest way to reach ‘intercultural understanding’ between Chinese and Indian practice of dance heritage is to acknowledge that the latter there is much spiritual value attached to Indian dance heritage, whereas Chinese dance heritage only involves social value. The above historical perspective has served to provide a little explanation of this difference in the context of the respective socio-cultural systems, without suggesting that there are ‘cultural differences’ embodied in members of the two cultures.

(B) Dance Heritage as Social Cohesion – Individualism versus Collectivism

An attempt to contrast Indian and Chinese cultures on a scale of individualism versus collectivism, on evidence of practices in dance heritage, would make an
interesting discussion. This discussion is postulated based on possible perceptions of Indian culture stemming from an event organiser finding the predominance of solo performance in Indian classical dance incomprehensible or difficult to appreciate, or finding it frustrating that Indian dance companies are not able to provide a wider or more innovative range of repertoire, as one compares with the repertoire available in Chinese dance.

While the tradition of solo performances in Bharatanatyam has already been explained earlier by way of the devadasi tradition of spiritual devotion, one needs to add the pragmatic consideration that Bharatanatyam costumes are very elaborate, not to mention the accessories and makeup which add up to a long time in preparation, partly due to 20th-century reforms to render dignity to the dance practice. Hence it is not easy to mobilise dancers to volunteer for performances. Furthermore, Bharatanatyam being highly sophisticated, individual showcases tend to be favoured. Apart from proper stage productions, only more major events such as the National Day Parade would find it easy to mobilise group dancers.

To appreciate the contrast on the second point, one needs to understand the modern development of Chinese dance against the context of a political exercise in People’s Republic of China to integrate different nationalities despite the dominance of the Han nationality. If one were to observe development following the Cultural Revolution where a very limited number of modern Chinese operas and ballets were allowed, one would note a very interesting imagination of cultural integration reflected in major creative dance dramas such as *Rain of Flowers on the Silk Road*, which emerged in 1979 as tribute to 30th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China (Ibid., pp. 106-107). This work was inspired by dance poses depicted in murals of Dunhuang along the Silk Road. Other dance drama included *Princess Wencheng*, which was a story to represent good relations between Han Chinese and Tibetans in the past thousand years (Ibid., p. 108). Such major dance ballets have formed a pattern of creative work, alongside the repertory pieces that are supposedly representative of minority cultures in China. In Singapore, Chinese dance groups used to be influenced by the Chinese Art Troupe which visited from communist China in 1947, before the British colonial government restricted movements between China and Singapore; local dance groups then learnt from Chinese dance films in the early 1960s, until it was possible for choreographers to visit China in 1980s
(Chua, 1997, pp. 173-179). Since then, greater influence in dance training and choreography from China has been possible, though the audience at large may well find dances from China alien to them as they are very remote to urban and modern Singapore (Ibid., p. 183).

Chinese dance in Singapore has not only followed trends of development in China where ballet has been blended into ‘Chinese classical dance’, dance forms of other nationalities in China, such as the Tibetan, the Mongolian and the Thai minorities, have also been distilled or reinvented into standard repertoires. Chinese dancers tend to learn and perform a wide range of such repertoires in a piecemeal manner. In the context of the Indian dance community however, each of the seven and eight regional dance forms is not only linked to different regional identities but also highly sophisticated in its own way, each with different basic postures and styles in movements and expressions. Hence unlike the piecemeal approach in Chinese dance, it is highly unlikely for one to learn across different dance styles. One should also not forget that similar regional divides exist among the Chinese community with Chinese opera sung in different dialects or languages.

Apart from reifying the Indian or South Asian community as one that is fragmented, it may also be possible for an event organiser in search of visual spectacles to assume that Indian dancers are lacking in ‘individualism’ on account of costumes and dance movements appearing to be following age-old patterns. Without going into a discussion of psychology in visual perception here, one may respond by noting that the formal features of postures and fixed units of sequences known as adavus in Bharatanatyam may have given this impression. Similar comments might have been made with ballet for someone who does not find its movements appealing. The difficulty in appreciating the musical structure and the interaction of Bharatanatyam movements with the music may also contribute to a lack in interest. But where individualism in creative dance choreography is concerned, that would require a good grasp of the musical structure and dance vocabulary for credibility, not to mention additional factors such as institutional or financial support.

However, if one were to borrow the construct of individualism-collectivism as discussed by Hofstede (1991), whereby individualism refers to the tendency for everyone to look after himself or herself and the immediate family, whereas
collectivism pertains to integration into cohesive in-groups with unquestioning loyalty (cited in Allik and Realo, 2004, p. 32), one may claim both tendencies in the practice of Bharatanatyam, for the pride of the family and for one’s Indian or Hindu identity at the same time. Perspective may again shift if one follows the argument of Oyserman, Coon and Kemmelmeier (2002) that individualism involves personal uniqueness while collectivism involves duty to the in-group and maintenance of harmony (cited in Ibid., p. 33). It is complicated as cross-cultural psychologists appear to have adopted the idea of ‘multiple modernities’ in discussing how the tension between the individual and the collective is solved differently in ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ cultures (Ibid.). Allik and Realo have also linked this construct to the concept of social capital, as defined by Pierre Bourdieu (1986) in terms of resources in institutionalised relationships, and by Robert Putnam (2000) in terms of social networks and norms of reciprocity. They note that whereas one may take a communitarian point of view to see individualism as a destruction of social capital, one may also follow a Durkheimian perspective in considering individualism as precondition for growth of social capital through voluntary cooperation and partnership (2004, p. 34).

One can only stop here by acknowledging that there seems no basis to draw any conclusion based on perceptions of such cross-cultural situations involving dance heritage, and proposing that it would be more useful to adopt a more open-minded and flexible approach in organisation of multicultural dance events as an ‘intercultural standard’ in respecting differences, instead of placing cultures in hierarchy based on their value in creating visual spectacles under a banner of national identity or cashing in on cosmopolitan vibrancy.

(C) Dance Heritage as Learning – Tradition versus Modernity

Indian dance practitioners learn Bharatanatyam in a very formalised and systematised manner, whereby they have to memorise the Sanskrit names of mudras or symbolic hand gestures – 28 single-hand gestures and 24 combined hand gestures, Sanskrit names of different postures and head or eye movements, and so on. This may be described as a traditional style as opposed to a utilitarian style among “systems of discourse” (Scollon, Scollon and Jones, 2012, p. 171). However, there is no need to stereotype and dismiss any such discourse as a form of what Edward T. Hall used to call ‘high-context’ culture, on basis of anxieties from
someone from another culture who has not been clued into the relevant cultural context. Traditional styles of communication exist in any culture.

In an Indian dance workshop, an instructor may have the tendency to teach non-Indian students in a similar manner which is not proven to be effective in a cross-cultural context. If this is done mechanically, it may possibly risk losing attention and interest of students and it also may not be considered optimum under the aims of such arts exposure programme. Indian dancer teachers who are attuned to the traditional guruisshya mode of teaching may sometimes assume submission of students to instructions of the teacher as an essential part of the value system to be inculcated in a ‘holistic’ learning of the dance heritage as a whole way of life. This may of course also be an integrated approach that exists somehow in teaching of other traditional art forms.

One needs not conclude that any form of teaching using traditional categories of concepts would therefore not be effective, for these may always be reinterpreted according to contemporary purposes of instruction. The demonstration of how the nine rasas or emotions are expressed using dance gestures and facial expressions in the stylistic forms of Bharatanatyam, or other classical Indian dances for that matter, may be inspiring as arts education if there is more time for interaction with students, instead of rushing through a complete demonstration without allowing time for students to digest. Coomaraswamy (1918, p. 32) has long argued that the rasa theory may be understood as an approach in appreciating how beauty is felt through empathy or Einfühlung, involving the analogy of taste.

The pertinent question is also whether the educational authorities and the particular educational institutions are clear about whether such arts education programmes should serve merely as a chance for interaction across cultures, or whether Indian classical dance is desired to serve other educational purposes such as helping non-Indian students to expand their imagination in the arts, rather than experiencing dance training that follows a particular cultural heritage. It would not be so fruitful here to describe ‘cultural standards’ in training styles of any dance heritage. The challenge based on a future-oriented outlook would lie in clarifying goals of learning specific to cross-cultural dance education, with ‘intercultural standards’ once again as the proposed keyword.
By deconstructing the above three themes of ‘cultural differences’ that might otherwise be perpetuated by stereotyping subjective experiences of cross-cultural situations, one demonstrates that an attempt to derive characterisation of any cultural community based on critical incidents using a Culture Assimilator approach would not be sound, as it does not even involve cross-cultural study of behaviour where one may claim to reproduce situations of similar social contexts for members of each cultural community. Furthermore, in addition to the three themes mentioned above which are based on critical incidents from the point of view of an ego observing the other, there are two additional themes which may be identified, that are not captured in such a Culture Assimilator approach, because it reflects the perspective of the less dominant cultural community:

(D) Dance Heritage and Nature – Mastery versus Harmony

Much of the richness of Bharata Natyam as a traditional dance form lies in the use of elaborate hand gestures and mime as part of its dance expressions. In fact, the presence of such theatrical elements arguably makes the description of Bharata Natyam as dance somewhat inadequate from a pseudo-etic point of view of the Chinese, for it should then rightly belong to a category that lies somewhere between dance in the Chinese understanding and ‘Chinese opera’ (which in turn places such importance on stylised and codified movements that it does not correspond to ‘opera’ in the sense of Western classical music).

This may explain why the easiest way to appreciate Bharata Natyam or general ‘Indian dance’ alike in the Chinese imagination, would be to extract from it some popular items as ‘peacock dance’ or ‘snake dance’, whereby dancers reduce the narrative and the abstract components of the sophisticated dance expressions to highlight naturalistic movements in imitation of these animals. For grand events such as national occasions, special costumes would be made for such items. These hence constitute virtually a ‘transcultural’ mode of creativity disguised as a ‘multicultural’ representation, and may in fact be part of quasi-commercial events for tourism. The distinction between Indian classical and folk dance often becomes irrelevant for dancers in such ‘innovations’.

One recent example of such ‘intercultural’ dance productions would be the 2013 Chingay parade – a street procession that originated in the Chinese Spring Festival
celebrations but have over the years lost its religious and community significance as it evolves into a carnival showcasing local and foreign cultural performances and a ticketed event costing as much as S$60 for the best seats. As a production entitled *Fire in Snow* in February 2013, the parade has featured a segment of ‘Indian dance’ entitled ‘Snake Kingdom’ (Narpani Pearavai. 7th March 2013), to mark the Chinese Year of the Snake.

Indian dancers who train in Bharata Natyam are also often involved in such performances in major occasions such as the National Day Parade. The artistic direction for the Youth Olympic Games opening ceremony in August 2010 makes an especially interesting study on representation of Singapore’s ‘multi-racial’ society. In a welcome dance item, the Malay dancers are placed first in the sequence on centrestage, as if acknowledging their status as the indigenous population; they seem to be playing the chief host to a national and international audience as they begin dancing in costumes of noble yellow and gold colours, carrying props of betel nut containers (Olympicsingapore2010, 15th August 2010, 02min 18sec) to a song with the words *Selamat Datang* (Welcome). Then come the Chinese dancers from the flanks in costumes of auspicious red and yellow colours, carrying lanterns in auspicious red (Ibid., 02 min 44 sec). Meantime the Indian dancers can be seen (Ibid., 02min 40 sec) emerging out of the dark from behind into a formation upstage centre, after having to tread through water (an artificial pool which gets the dancers’ feet all wet), which possibly signifies that they are descendants of a migrant society. They are clad in a shiny outfit of opulent yellow and purple with an artificial foldable ‘plume’ behind to make them look like peacocks. But soon centrestage gives way to dancers representing the Eurasian and the Peranakan Chinese communities, who are dressed in the most colourful costumes from traditional to modern, supported by Chinese lion dancers who are similarly in multiple colours. The song meantime reaches a climax as it segues from a local Malay folk tune to a rap in English.

A Singapore audience watching the whole sequence may get the impression that the sequence also represents a progress from the traditional to the modern, from the original Malay, Chinese and Indian ethnic identities to a new hybridised identity, which is nonetheless dominated by the Chinese. While the last aspect is quite natural as it reflects the reality of the Chinese population being the majority, it is a little unfortunate that Indian dancers are cast in the cliché of an animal dance once
again, like how the Malay dancers tend to evoke life in the rural villages, echoing a discourse that associates them with the ‘fishing village’ that Singapore once was before modern development with the advent of the British and the Chinese. Hence ethnic dance even as a well-meaning representation of ethnic identity may often play into stereotypes in the minds of the audience as well. More creativity is required to avoid such problems of stereotyping.

Another interesting phenomenon with the use of dance to represent multicultural Singapore is how such events as Chingay and Racial Harmony Day have turned into carnivals with a logic of spectacle as well as a political hierarchy where dancers of parades representing the vernacular cultures are followed by leaders of grassroots organisations and then at the apex by the cabinet ministers or members of parliament or corporate events (Goh, 2013, pp. 235-236).

**(E) Dance Heritage and Gender - Masculinity versus Femininity**

The use of dance heritage to represent ethnic identity in Singapore also comes with a gender bias. The favouring of Bharata Natyam as cultural symbol of the Indian population, especially the Tamil population, also means that male Indians tend to be left out, except for the Sikh population which is represented by the Bhangra dance performed by men.

As such, the most important dance spectacle featuring Tamil males would be the annual Thaipusam street procession, except the feature of body piercing means that it is not for the faint-hearted, though it has become a major tourist attraction. The authorities also seem to frown upon the high volume of percussion and playback music that participants produce, as attempt as reported in the press was made by the police with the Hindu Endowments Board (HEB) to enforce a music ban in 2011, prompting M. Ravi, a human rights lawyer, to file a summons against the HEB guidelines for violating the rights of religious minorities (Wong, 2011).

There is yet another traditional dance form performed by South Indian men, known as the *Dappan Koothu*, but any acknowledgement of this as dance heritage would remain problematic. While this is a free and energetic form of folk dancing that the younger generation of Tamil population in Singapore is increasingly identifying with especially since it has been much featured in popular songs of Tamil movies of
recent years, it is still rejected by the elite society for being associated with a lower caste and with its original function as a funeral dance. In Malaysia, the national oil company Petronas had to apologise and pull out a music video featuring the dance to mark Deepavali celebrations in November 2012, after angry viewers complained that it did not reflect Indian culture and was inappropriate for the festive occasion (Business Line, 7th November 2012). This underscores the fact that social value of a ‘dance heritage’ is not always shared by an ethnically defined community, not to mention the question of aesthetic value that may be used as a yardstick.

6.2.2 Dimensions of Intercultural Learning with Indian Classical Dance as Medium

This section aims to discuss some of the dimensions of intercultural learning where cultural heritage of dance is involved as the medium of intercultural dialogue. The preference to speak of intercultural learning as a process, instead of ‘intercultural competence’ as a whole set of skills and related aspects under the framework of intercultural communication, has partly been argued in Chapter 3. The consideration of dance being a form of art completes the argument, as the framework of ‘effective’ intercultural communication generally assumes an overriding objective of individuals in adapting to a different environment for specific utilitarian goals already, whereas intercultural dialogue involving the arts would be more appropriately seen as a process of learning under the premise of respect for cultural diversity.

The challenge for intercultural dialogue, considered here as a form of liberal learning, would hence not be discussed in terms of personal goals in knowledge and skills, but instead in terms of the attitudes, which would be classified under the ‘affective’ aspects in a framework of intercultural competence alongside cognitive and behavioural aspects. It shall be argued here that the main aspects of the challenge in intercultural learning, in overcoming cultural differences, may be discussed in terms of ‘empathy’ in the understanding of a different socio-cultural system and ‘open-mindedness’ in appreciating the symbolic communication as part of a different cultural system. One makes no claim of these two affective aspects being exhaustive, but considers them as possible solutions to two questions: Firstly, how may one learn to ‘understand’ the culture of a different community as a socio-cultural system?
Secondly, how may one develop a positive attitude towards symbols and values in a different cultural system?

A focus on these two attitudes or affective aspects would arguably be most pertinent for the challenge of intercultural dialogue, amidst a nebula of intercultural competence referring very generally to a whole complex of abilities among individuals “that are required to perform effectively and appropriately when interacting with others who are linguistically and culturally different from oneself” (Fantini, 2009, p. 458), whereby ‘effective’ reflects the outsider’s or presumably ‘etic’ view of one’s own performance in the target culture, whereas ‘appropriate’ reflects the insider’s or ‘emic’ view of how one’s behaviour may be perceived (Ibid.). A concept of ‘intercultural learning’ based on a framework of intercultural competence under the Culture Assimilator approach would have focused on effective functioning through integrating a different ‘orientation system’ in a field of action, such that ‘intercultural understanding’ through appropriate attribution of others’ actions is also premised on serving the development of ‘intercultural competence’ in such functioning (Thomas, 1988; Thomas, 2003b, pp. 142-147), as discussed in Chapter 3. Such frameworks of intercultural competence have been designed to help individuals cope with a different cultural environment for temporary purposes of business, study or otherwise, based on the assumption that people have generally internalised particular dispositions in their behaviour based on meanings and values in their own cultural systems, that they would not be able to communicate effectively across cultures. As discussed in Chapter 4 however, one may also observe a transcultural society where people naturally communicate and function with meanings and values of more than one cultural systems. As mentioned in Chapter 3, with an approach of the Culture Assimilator, one may adopt a kind of flexibility in action without any attempt at judgment or resolution on issues of differences in cultural values between different socio-cultural systems – which may in fact suggest a retreat from intercultural dialogue. That is due to a narrow definition of ‘intercultural dialogue’ in terms of ‘effective and appropriate’ intercultural communication.

However, in the context here, where respect for cultural diversity in heritage and the arts is the premise, a more meaningful definition for intercultural dialogue would involve ‘intercultural learning’ in a different sense, as a form of dialogic learning drawn on theorists such as Dewey and seen as part of the democratic or public good
for individuals and groups, “[functioning] in the same way as dialogue among individual interlocutors in any learning community” (Young, R.E., 1996, p. 168).

One may indeed argue that the prerequisites of dialogue and the prerequisites of education are the same insofar as they share the same horizontal dimension in embracing all humanity and achievements of mankind and the same vertical dimension in exploring reasons for choices in actions and policies (Kazepides, 2012, p. 84). These include respect for all, cooperation, care, open-mindedness and all other virtues that may be summarised by the Greek work philantropos (Ibid., p. 80). It may hence be argued that the high point in any learning is not learning the knowledge of propositions that ‘something is the case’, or learning the skills of ‘how to do something’, but learning the attitudes of how to be a certain kind of person (Ibid.). This would include, for genuine dialogue, what Oakeshott in his philosophy of liberal learning calls ‘intellectual virtues’, such as “disinterested curiosity, patience, intellectual honesty… doubt… sensibility” (Oakeshott, 1989, pp. 60-62; cited in Kazepides, 2012, p. 80), whereby learning entails “acquiring the ability to feel and to think, and the pupil will never acquire these abilities unless he has learned to listen for them and to recognise them in the conduct and utterances of others” (Ibid.)

One may now proceed to discuss the relevance of empathy and open-mindedness to intercultural dialogue, with the specific example on dance heritage. To begin with, the concept of empathy or Einfühlung may be traced back to its use in the context of aesthetics with romantic thinkers around 1800 such as Herder and Novalis (Stueber, 2006, p. 6). Herder in Vom Erkennen und Empfinden der menschlichen Seele (1774) has imagined empathy in terms of a quasi-perceptual act distinguished from mere inferential processes, as the ability ‘to feel into everything, to feel everything out of himself’ (cited in Ibid.). Under the romantic movement, the ability to empathise with nature was tied to a pantheistic metaphysics as well as a critique of a modern society organised according to the rational principles of science (Ibid., p. 7). But it was Theodor Lipps who eventually used empathy as a concept central for philosophical and psychological analysis of aesthetic experiences, to explain the non-inferential and quasi-perceptual character of such experiences. Aesthetic experiences were understood by him as perceptual encounters with external state of affairs that cause internal resonance, projected into and felt as a quality of the perceived object (Lipps, 1903; cited in Stueber, 2006, p. 7). Lipps held that the
projective mechanisms of empathy are based on an innate human tendency of motor mimicry, as already noted by psychologist Adam Smith (1853), and speculated that it it is still present despite being inhibited by external circumstances such as cultural conditioning (see Stueber, 2006, pp. 7-8). This concept of empathy was further developed by Edmund Husserl and his student Edith Stern in their explication of intersubjectivity between individuals recognising one another as being minded (Ibid., p. 9). Thinkers in the hermeneutic tradition also used similar terminology such as *mitfühlen* or *nacherleben* to refer to a means of understanding other minds (Ibid., p. 11). But whereas Lipps seemed interested in questions like how one may recognise the emotional state of another through facial expressions, they were more interested in the epistemic means for justifying the interpretation of utterances and actions of others, including an evaluation of significance in the context of historical narratives (Ibid., p. 11). In an attempt to take into account the complex of psychological aspects along with philosophical considerations with regards to the understanding of others’ behaviour, Stueber (2006) makes a distinction between ‘basic empathy’, as mechanisms of inner imitations according to Lipp’s conception (p. 20), and ‘reenactive empathy’, as referring to the “folk-psychological ability to understand the behaviour of other agents in more complex terms” (Ibid., p. 152). On reenactive empathy, he takes a cue from Collingwood (1946) who suggests that our understanding of how a thought - which is more than some internal mental state - can be a reason for someone’s reason for actions, is possible only if we are able to integrate them as thoughts into our own cognitive perspective by imagining them as our own thoughts that could be reasons for our own actions (Ibid., p. 162).

The application of the empathy concept to dance can be traced back to Titchener, who was responsible for adapting into English the Greek term *empatheia* for what Vischer called *Einfühlung* in aesthetics. Titchener distinguished between a mental nod to an argument using the ‘mind’s muscles’ and the actual physical nod activated by the ‘body’s muscles, such that kinaesthetic along with other forms of information served to convey meaning, with empathy consisting in the act of reproducing in one’s mind the kinaesthetic image of the other, synthesising physical and emotional experience (Foster, 2011, p. 128). In the 1930s, John Martin attempted to develop a theory of communication in dance, initially using the word ‘metakinesis’ to correlate physical movement and psychic accompaniment, but later referring to a process of
‘inner mimicry’, suggesting that watching dance depended on the integration of motional and emotional systems (Ibid., p. 156). Choreographer Yvonne Rainer who travelled to India in 1971 used the term ‘kinetic empathy’ to describe her experience of witnessing a solo dance performance depicting the Ramayana character Nala. For her, ‘kinetic empathy’ consisted of an immediate mimetic capacity of physical articulation, divorced from emotion (Ibid., p. 163). Whereas the representation of emotions on the face of the Indian dancer was apparently universally recognisable, the hand gestures did not ‘mean’ anything to her, yet she was able to respond by mimicking their energising and charismatic motions, which gave her a sense of power (Ibid.).

Recalling the arguments of McFee (1992) as cited in Chapter 5, such appreciation of a dance heritage would be merely aesthetic but not artistic, for dance as an art form has a conventional and historical character and has to be understood in context of its rules which have to be learned. Dewey (2008) has made similar arguments in his theory of art, citing that the aesthetic standing of the Parthenon comes about as the work becomes an experience for a human being, but whoever wants to go beyond personal enjoyment and “to theorise about the aesthetic experience embodied in the Parthenon must realise in thought what the people into whose lives it entered had in common, as creators and as those who were satisfied with it, with people in our own homes and on our own streets” (p. 297).

Stueber (2006) has also acknowledged the need of theoretical information to understand the world of another culture, as there are limitations to the use of empathy as a strategy to re-enact another person’s thought. Empathy basically involves “an act of the imagination, that is, an act of using our own cognitive machinery as it is defined right here and now, in order to interpret other agent’s behaviour in folk-psychological terms and to gain information about another person’s mind” (p. 210). This is different from immersing oneself into another culture, in what Bourdieu would describe as a habitus with embodied and practical know-how, for one’s cognitive system cannot be assumed to be flexible beyond restraint (Ibid.). One needs to reflect on what in the hermeneutic tradition has been called the ‘prejudicial structure of understanding’ (Gadamer, 1989), whereby “grasping the content of an utterance or a thought requires it to be integrated into our own culturally and historically contingent perspective on and conception of the world –
including our preconceptions regarding the world of the interpretee – from which we as interpreter are never able to abstract” (Ibid., p. 205). Stueber accounts for limitations in capacities of empathy by way of how we as people would “regard beliefs and norms that we are emotionally attached to as being essential to our own identity, our conception of ourselves as rational agents, and our conception of the fundamental parameters for our relation to the world and other human beings” (Ibid., p. 213). To overcome these limits, one has to supplement the strategy of empathy with additional theoretical information, such that interpretation eventually has to be an open-ended process of interplay between re-enactment, cognitive extrapolation and theory proper (Ibid., pp. 216-217).

A theoretical perspective in a cross-cultural discussion of dance heritage such as what is demonstrated in previous section would hence be arguably helpful in understanding Indian dance heritage within its cultural context, without having to turn into unnecessary cultural stereotyping of the associated community. The same argument may hold for negative as well as positive stereotyping, for there may also be a tendency for a Chinese spectator enamoured of Indian classical dance to essentialise spirituality in Indians, when there is no ground for placing Indians, Chinese or people of any other cultural background in a hierarchy of spirituality. One should understand culture as achievements of a community but not as embodied in each member of the community.

As suggested in the previous subsection, one also needs to avoid contrasting a cultural practice like Indian classical dance with Chinese dance, ballet or contemporary dance in a hierarchy from the traditional to the modern. Under a perspective such as Habermas’ project of modernity which places great value on autonomy of the modern individual, or perspectives of dominant ideology theorists, one may assume that any dominant culture is unitary like dominant social interests that may be associated with it (Archer, 1996, p. 64). This means that the “logical content, structure and potentiality of the Cultural System is granted no autonomy from the Socio-Cultural level which is causally responsible for it” (Ibid., p. 65). Habermas argues for three domains of reason corresponding to three autonomous ‘validity-spheres’ in the modern world. He says: “The cultural rationalisation from which the structures of consciousness typical of modern societies emerge embraces cognitive, aesthetic expressive and moral-evaluative elements of the religious
tradition. With science and technology, with autonomous art and the values of expressive self-presentation, with universal legal and moral representations, there emerges a differentiation of three value spheres, each of which follow its own logic. (Habermas, 1984, pp. 164-165; cited in Harrington, 2000, pp. 84-85) With the connection of moral and religious values with aesthetics values in Indian classical dance through an emphasis on evoking bhakti or devotion in the performance, there is a threat of the dance heritage being placed on a lower rank under a banner of modernity with a narrow conception of secularity.

Habermas, who has incidentally been accused of betraying Western preconceptions in an abstract universalism, has tried to absolve of such charges by way of the idea of an ‘ideal speech situation’ for any culture’s value orientations to be argued out (Harrington, 2000, p. 100). Such conditions for collective dialogue to ensure consensus without constraints may arguably end up with a circularity between the ideal conditions for emancipation and the practical or temporal conditions of it (Archer, 1996, p. 69). But assuming that emancipation is the subject where a dialogue on the artistic values of Indian classical dance is concerned, one may still consider Habermas’ argument, against neoconservative critics, that artistic value of beauty, sublimity and innovation cannot be disjoined from socially silenced human needs (Boucher, 2011, pp. 63-65). It may then be argued, for instance, that the learning of Indian classical dance is actually an empowering experience for the female gender in a male-dominated society, and democratising for a community that has long privileged the religious Brahmins in cultural practices.

The other dimension in intercultural learning to be discussed here is open-mindedness. Open-mindedness according to Dewey’s thinking is one of the fundamental aims of education. It may be argued from a liberalist perspective as “an intellectual virtue that involves a willingness to take relevant evidence and argument into account in forming or revising our beliefs and values, especially when there is some reason why we might resist such evidence and argument, with a view to arriving at true and defensible conclusions. … The attitude of open-mindedness is embedded in the Socratic idea of following the argument where it leads and is a fundamental virtue of inquiry. (Hare, 2004, online)”
From a psychological perspective, open-mindedness is a kind of attitude, and attitude may be defined as a psychological tendency to evaluate an entity with some degree of favour or disfavour (Jonas et al, 1994, p. 776). An attitude as such is dependent on one’s expectancy, the subjective probability of attribute one subscribes to an object, and one’s value, one’s evaluation of the attribute (Ibid., p. 777). Attitude change may generally be induced by incentives, such as monetary incentives, taxation or legal sanctions, but the offering of incentives may also result in a more negative attitude towards a certain behaviour, due to the so-called ‘overjustification effect’ (Ibid., pp. 783-785). The issue of attitude here in relation to cultural heritage may be discussed in relation to prejudice between different communities, which may be discussed in social psychology with social identity theory. In social anthropology, it has been discussed that sensitivity to social boundaries may find symbolic expression in ritual form. As Cohen (1985) has noted, “[t]he symbolic expression and affirmation of boundary heightens people’s awareness of and sensitivity to their community (p. 50)”. Hence the association of Indian classical dance with the Indian identity in Singapore, as embodied in the dancing body, may well lead to an attitude of defence or rejection by non-Indians such as Chinese members of the society. One needs to bear in mind the problem of racism against Indians by the majority Chinese population in Singapore: “The body and colour of the skin becomes the point of reference for ridicule, insult and verbal abuse. (Velayutham, 2007, p. 4)” The association of the dance heritage with Hindu practices may in fact also lead to rejection among Christian members of the Indian community.

Hence the challenge in the use of Indian classical dance as medium for intercultural dialogue may also require an open-minded attitude that accepts a polysemic nature of the dance heritage whereby it is dance movements may be appreciated on their own without making an issue out of associations with ethnic or religious identity.

The aspect of open-mindedness in intercultural dialogue would arguably also go in line with Parekh’s (2000) justification of cultural diversity based on the appreciation that “no culture embodies all that is valuable in human life and develops the full range of human possibilities” (p. 167). R.E. Young (1996, p. 144) highlights that Winch’s remarks on the wisdom of learning from other cultures have been cited with approval from Habermas. Habermas has ventured so much to suggest: “Can’t we who belong to modern societies learn something from understanding alternative,
particularly premodern forms of life? Shouldn’t we, beyond all romanticising of superseded stages of development, beyond exotic stimulation from the contents of alien cultures, recall the losses required by our own path to the modern world? (1984, p. 65)” This may provide a balance to an assumption of intercultural dialogue, whereby a modern understanding of rationality as group adaptation to change according to Habermas’ as well as Dewey’s thinking (Young, R.E., 1996, p. 131), is over-privileged.

Intercultural learning, as R.E. Young argues, may be considered as a democratic or public good which accrues initially to individuals and eventually to cultural groups (Ibid., p. 168). Against Hayek’s liberalist argument, that the public domain should be coupled with the market as an apparatus to optimise decisions amidst irreducible value pluralism. Young argues that commodification would see a result whereby “rational, democratic expression of difference in life-values including cultural difference is reduced to who has the most marketing power” (p. 169). In the case of Singapore, a minority culture such as that of the Indian community would be easily marginalised.

As part of Dewey’s pragmatic philosophy whereby the world itself refers to “experience as appreciative, perceiving, and enjoying” (1934, p. 46; cited in Greene, 1998, p. 56), “art in its form, unites the very same realisation of doing and undergoing, outgoing and incoming energy” (p. 48; cited in Ibid.). Greene argues that Dewey’s perspective anticipated Ryle’s (1949) refutation of the Cartesian myth of the ‘Ghost in the Machine’ when he stated:

*In making mind purely immaterial (isolated from the organ of doing and undergoing), the body ceases to be living and becomes a dead lump. This conception of mind as an isolated being underlies the conception that esthetic experience is merely something “in mind,” and strengthens the conception which isolates the esthetic from those modes of experience in which the body is actively engaged with the things of nature and life. It takes art out of the province of the live creature.*

Contrasting Dewey’s idea of engaged aesthetic experience with E.D. Hirsch’s (1987) idea of background knowledge as ‘cultural literary’, Greene argues that the crux for Dewey was not a ‘rich and developed background’ explanation, but the encouragement of active learning that involved questioning, inferring, making judgments and imagining (1998, pp. 63-64) instead of following “ready-made rules and precedents” (Dewey, 1934, p. 304; cited in Greene, 1998, p. 72).

The question then with Indian classical dance is, how may a non-Indian learner appreciate it beyond understanding its social value or ‘function’ of heritage as providing the Indian community a sense of continuity and identity? It would be argued here that intercultural learning here may involve an understanding of cultural symbols and meanings associated with the dance not just per se but also how its aesthetic values may be associated with a whole philosophy of life. Whether or how one takes the Indian philosophy away as reference for reflexivity on general ethics related to autonomy, community and spirituality (Shweder et al, 2003) would be up to the individual’s judgment and imagination.

One may learn for instance that in Indian philosophy, there is a concept of art associating it with Yoga, as “mental concentration… the overlooking of all distinction between the subject and the object of contemplation; a means of achieving harmony or unity of consciousness” (Coomaraswamy, 1918, p. 21). This plays an important part in Indian thought, whereby even the lesser crafts may constitute a practice or acharya analogous to samprajnata yoga in its single-minded attention, as Coomaraswamy observes, citing (Ibid.) the philosopher Sankaracharya’s remarks in commentary to the Brahma Sutra that “the arrow-maker perceives nothing beyond his work when he is buried in it; but he has nevertheless consciousness and control over his body, both of which are absent in the fainting person”. He also cites Sukracharya in observing that the practice of visualisation is identical in worship and in art, for instance when the worshipper recites the dhyana mantram to describe the deity while forming a corresponding mental picture (Ibid., p. 22). Coomaraswamy suggests that there would be psychological basis in such imagination in terms of aesthetic principles, citing the principle of thinking, self-identification with object of art work and vividness of the image (pp. 22-23). He cites Croce’s Aesthetic in the remark that externalisation of an art work “implies a vigilant will, which persists in not allowing certain visions, intuitions, or representations to be lost” (see Ibid., pp. 23).
He argues that the primary purpose in Hindu art is neither self-expression nor realisation of beauty: “To him the theme was all in all, and if there is beauty in his work, this did not arise from aesthetic intention, but from a state of mind which found unconscious expression. (p. 25)” Where Bharatanatyam or any other classical Indian dance form is concerned, one has to acknowledge that this had its origin as Hindu art and hence shares the same philosophy, but the dance has emphatically also evolved beyond its religious functions. Given such duality, one may do well to consider Geertz’s perspective of religion as a cultural system consisting of symbols (1973, p. 90), and to add that such symbols may also be appreciated in our postmodern world in a secular context simply for their aesthetic values.

The idea of beauty in Indian thought may be encapsulated in the basic concept of *rupa* or form, which refers to static geometric form as well as movement which follow principles of rhythm and internal harmony (Sharma, 1990, p. 26). Rupa as a vital form provides the manifest (vyakta) order of the unmanifest (avyakta), whereby the latter as the outpouring of life may be understood as equivalent to ‘elan vital’ according to Bergson (Ibid.). Scholars in Indian aesthetics such as Kapila Vatsyayan would hence consider dance, in its vitality, in its manifestation of the flow and essence of life, as the core of Indian art (cited in p. 27). Sharma (1990) has also argued that there is a specificity to Indian aesthetics, as spirituality is related to materiality in the Indian context in a way that one does not see in the Western context. Whereas Western art favours some form of mimesis, “Indian art is anti-representation” (p. 29). He adds: “Transcendence, or going beyond is a dynamic quality of rupa (Ibid.).”

There is no need to delve further in the philosophy of Indian aesthetics for the purpose here. Suffice it to say that the use of Indian dance heritage as medium for intercultural dialogue in arts education programme at public schools may miss out a lot on cultural values and meanings, if the learning outcomes are not clear, or if one focuses by default on dry historical knowledge or technical instruction of dance steps. Another issue to consider is the tendency in Singapore’s financial support of arts and culture to subjugate it as one cluster of the creative industries following the UK definition, alongside design and media; arts and culture would cover everything from performing arts to visual arts and literary arts, along with museums and heritage sites (Ooi, 2011, p. 121). Measured against similar indicators as the media and
design clusters, fine arts practitioners are hence “inevitably pressed to become more economically productive with their creativity” (pp. 121-122). What impact this may have on the educational factor in performing arts and heritage remains to be investigated. The impetus to import foreign talents for the cultural industry may possibly undercut interest in nurturing local talents, in dance as with other arts. There may also be a tendency in a McDonaldisation of heritage, for instance where schools request traditional dance groups to teach creative methods of choreography to children in just one or two sessions, with no regard at all for traditional values associated with the dance form.

Citing Bateson’s (1972) concept of the ‘double bind’ between the abstract and the concrete concerning play and therapy for the child, Spivak (2012) has proposed that “the training of the imagination that can teach the subject to play – an aesthetic education – can also teach it to discover (theoretically or practically) the premises of the habit that obliges us to transcendentalise religion and nation” (p. 10). She traces the question posed by a double bind of mind and body to Schiller in On the Aesthetic Education of Man, where he suggested the Spieltrieb of art as a balancing act could save society (p. 19).

In short, the kind of intercultural learning that this thesis supports as a concept of intercultural dialogue involves a form of liberal learning that is open-minded to the cultural diversity for their intrinsic value rather than instrumental value, and empathetic towards a different perspective coming from a different cultural community. It is not to be understood as a form of ‘intercultural competence’ where one’s interest is egoistical and instrumental, focusing on one’s survival in another environment through effective and appropriate communication. The purpose is not to objectify another culture in search of predictability in their behaviour, but instead to strive to appreciate a different form of rationality even if one may decide to stay true to the priorities in one’s own value system. One needs to resist any essentialisation of cultural differences, that tends to place different cultures in a form of hierarchy. Baecker (2000) would even suggest replacing the term intercultural competence with cultural competence (kulturelle Kompetenz), arguing that instead of othering any culture based on its origin and the idea of disposition, in a colonial mode, one should simply think of all cultures as part of the Weltgesellschaft (pp. 30-32). But a discerning use of method of the Culture Assimilator or Intercultural Sensitiser, in
scrutinising and deconstructing any cultural difference that is perceived, may help to ameliorate negative attitudes towards another cultural community.

The use of the concept ‘intercultural learning’ here is hoped to capture the value of autonomy in experiencing the world as well as the politics of recognition for a cultural community as the other. Explored here specifically in reference to the use of dance heritage as medium for intercultural exchange, it does not claim to exhaust all meanings of intercultural dialogue. This thesis would in fact argue that any intercultural exchange, that privileges a dance heritage in its role of ‘civilising’ the people and providing a kind of cultural capital, also needs to be balanced by a multicultural representation to mark equality among the communities, as well as a creative transcultural approach that helps to articulate a common humanity transcending differences in language and religion, without privileging any assimilation in one single direction. Dialogue should be a two-way affair.

To round up this chapter, one may provide a little perspective on how a philosophy of intercultural dialogue in building community may yet be meaningful in the context of Singapore. In an imagination of intercultural dialogue based on Levinas’ new conception of the ethical, departing from a model based on Kant, it would be argued that the Self is not the source of meanings in the world, and that it is Other who is the source of one’s reason and obligation (see Zylinska, 2005, pp. 14-15). It is an idea whereby discourse has to come from the other, opening to the suffering of the other in his ‘infinite alterity’, because “[i]t is not I, it is the other that can say yes. From him comes affirmation; he is at the commencement of experience” (Levinas, 1969, p. 93; cited in Zylinska, 2005, p. 14). To Levinas, the beginning of morality involves a preoccupation for the Other, to be willing to do good, to serve, to the extent of self-sacrifice (see Bauman, 1995, p. 60). Taking moral responsibility as such entails treating the Other not as a specimen of a species but as unique, and thereby elevating oneself to similar uniqueness and dignity: “At the moment I am responsible for the Other, I am unique. I am unique as far as I am irreplaceable, in as far as I am chosen to respond. (in Poirie, 1987; cited in Bauman, 1995, p. 60)”

If such an imagination of morality be considered too idealistic, it would least of all be anything conceivable in Singapore, if surveys on Singapore’s ‘national’ values, epitomised by the word *kiasu*, are anything to go by: it has been suggested in a
survey among 2000 Singapore residents, based on the Seven Levels of Consciousness model conceived by Richard Barrett (1997), that Singaporeans consider their own society as competitive, self-centred and elitist (Chan, 24th August 2012; Clothier, 6th September 2012). The coinage of *kiasu*, also highlighted in the survey as an attribute, literally means ‘the fear of losing out’ in the Chinese dialect of Hokkien, has been variously interpreted as a negative complement of competitiveness or an obsessive desire of value for money; while argued as an attribute not unique to Singapore, it has been suggested that “[w]here competition encourages calculated risk taking, kiasuism calls for uniformity” (Ho et al, 1998, p. 359).

If Singaporeans can indeed be generalised as *kiasu*, which manifests itself in competitive, selfish, calculating, greedy behaviour yet with an aversion to risk at the same time (Ibid., pp. 363-364), it may have positive implications for the continuing stability of the Singapore society under the state ideology of a ‘multiracial meritocracy’ that is oriented towards a neoliberal economy. At the same time, such individualism may have negative implications for their ‘cultural competence’ towards a cosmopolitan community. In one perspective, there may be signs of progress, for example in a shift of Singapore’s civil society from a vertical relation of advocacy in “appeal to higher authority” (Koh and Soon, 2012, p. 95) – to put it in very non-threatening words - to a more horizontal peer-to-peer relation, as citizens become more vocal (Ibid.). But one should not be misled by such an upbeat account to ignore the persistent patriarchal and authoritarian control over a feminised, “politically emasculated public sphere” (Tan, 2001, p. 118; cf. Tan, 2010) – civil society engagement in UN processes of human rights and in civil and political rights and democratic expression has long been constantly suppressed in state-controlled mainstream media (Chia, 2012, p. 23). Seen in such light, globalisation in Singapore, with its multi-faceted manifestations of migration trends, economic challenges and struggle in the new media, may yet prove to be a double-edge sword of more social change to come.
7. CONCLUSION: LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

With a transdisciplinary approach exploring different dimensions of ‘intercultural dialogue’ – as a policy approach and as a process of exchange or communication, this thesis has put forward two different models of intercultural exchange involving the use of cultural heritage as a medium for exchange, considering dance as an example of heritage. The two models, differentiated on the factor of salience in cultural identity, are namely multiculturalism and transculturalism, the former emphasising respect and mutual understanding for cultural diversity among different communities, the latter promoting creative engagement to overcome differences in cultural identity. As suggested in arguments of the penultimate chapter, these two approaches are not postulated as mutually exclusive, but instead may be seen as complementary.

This conclusion will serve to reframe this analysis with its interconnecting themes of intercultural dialogue, heritage and pluralism on the example of dance heritage in Singapore, in order to recognise limitations in the study here of culture which has admittedly such a multiplicity of aspects, and thereby to provide recommendations for further research.

The analysis of intercultural dialogue as mentioned has been made by relating it to considerations of the political dimension in cultural policy and the psychological dimension of processes in face-to-face communication. On the political and ethical level, it considers the underlying goals and ideals of intercultural dialogue as an ideology in building social cohesion and upholding the values of freedom and democracy, between arguments of liberalism and communitarianism; on the psychological level, it considers the aspects of knowledge, attitude and behaviour towards a different culture particularly in the social process of interaction. While applying these perspectives to cultural heritage as medium for intercultural dialogue, one also has to take into account that in practice, the multiple uses of heritage in a globalised world involves different mechanisms and indeed ideologies tied to political, economic and cultural motivations. Hence it is not a simple case of one ideal type of intercultural dialogue being superior over another, as demonstrated in Chapter 6 by testing the implications of both models on the example of Indian classical dance in Singapore.
Nevertheless, if there is any recommendation that may be made towards cultural policies as part of the conclusions here, it would be one leaning ultimately towards a liberal philosophy in intercultural learning as discussed in Chapter 6, for which one may overcome perception of cultural differences by appealing to aspects like empathy and open-mindedness - not simply as intercultural competencies in a normative sense, but in terms of their psychological basis in relation to heritage as a cultural tool. Bearing in mind the limitations of the analysis in this thesis based on theoretical formulation without primary data, the conclusions would also point the way towards further research on such aspects of intercultural dialogue involving cultural heritage as a medium, which may inform policies targeted at projects of social cohesion.

It would be useful here to start by recapitulating the arguments in the thesis, by reconnecting discussion in the first half on general concepts of culture and intercultural dialogue, with their application to the specific contexts of heritage and dance in the second half, keeping in mind the main objectives of research in this thesis in studying these three aspects: intercultural competence for intercultural dialogue between different cultural communities; dance as cultural heritage; and Singapore as case study for intercultural dialogue between transcultural and multicultural models.

A good place to start would be the basic concepts of culture, for which Chapter 2 of this thesis has provided an overview based on various disciplinary perspectives from anthropology and sociology to cultural studies. A major theme which has underscored much research interest in anthropology and sociology on culture has been the contrast between traditional or primitive societies and modern societies. The tension between an attempt to explain the challenge of culture as ‘civilisation’, in terms of different stages in evolution of mankind, and an attempt to appreciate diversity without any assumption of a fixed path in linear progress, may be traced back to the contrasting views between Tylor and Boas. The former emphasised the psychic unity of mankind from a developmental perspective, whereas the latter stressed that no culture is inferior to another and the same action may have a different reasoning across different cultural contexts which needs to be understood on its own terms, in a perspective which may too simplistically be described as a form of cultural and moral relativism. The difficulty for Boas in finding historical and
psychological explanation in cultural variation left a legacy and a vacuum, which in the work of Ruth Benedict developed into a view that sees different cultures as distinct from one another in a way analogous to personality. A different approach would be taken by Levi-Strauss, who shares Boas’ rejection of biological and evolutionary theories on cultural variation, but emphasises based on a structuralist perspective that despite differences in symbolic systems, there is an underlying ‘deep structure’ among all cultures that is universal.

Against such postulating of culture as psychic system, there is another current in anthropology which gives primacy instead to culture as social life. This is namely the functionalist perspective, which in its crudest formulation by Malinowski would reduce ‘primitive’ culture to biological or utilitarian terms of subsistence and sexual drives – a view which Levi-Strauss refutes by demonstrating how the ‘savage’ mind is also capable of ‘disinterested thinking’. In the more refined formulation by Radcliffe-Brown, however, social life, including the aspect of ‘cultural tradition’, is not constituted of biological needs but of social institutions or established norms. Shifting attention from anthropology to sociology, the quintessential functionalist would be Durkheim, whose sets about seeking an explanation to how social order is achieved in industrial and pre-industrial society, and finds the answer in shared values and norms. Talcott Parsons expands on this functionalist perspective to study social action, with a particular interest in developing pattern variables between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ societies. But despite the sophistication of his model, he follows the basic premises of Durkheim in the concept of institution, as a complex of roles and expectations in the social system, and the concept of internalisation, whereby sentiments supporting the common values are learned and acquired as ‘dispositions’. Along with this assumption that serves to explain social order, Parsons also channels Weber’s discussion of value rationality and social action into a framework to study ‘value orientation’ in social action. In so doing, he deviates from Weber’s view that the pursuit of ultimate ends leads not to a single good but to value pluralism, and also from the premium that Weber places on the rationality of ethical standards as beliefs, whereby action motivated by values and resistant to the moulding of interests is set apart from instrumental action.

Parsons’ solution for the problem of ‘double contingency’ – how the ego and the alter are able to anticipate each other’s expectation and action – would also eventually be
criticised by Luhmann. Luhmann would argue that the double contingency should not be eliminated by postulating values and norms, if social interaction is to be conceived as an encounter between autonomous systems. He would also replace Parsons’ idea of culture as the source of a normative order, with an idea of social systems as a *sui generis* reality. But meantime, Parsons’ theoretical framework of culture, which practically incorporates psychologism into a functionalist perspective, has created a legacy with many followers in the practice of intercultural communications which finds application in international business and educational exchange among other things. The interest for culture in intercultural communication would lie in ascertaining the norms of behaviour in another ‘culture’ for the practical purposes of ‘effective’ and ‘appropriate’ communication. Needless to say, the instrumental knowledge on culture produced in this field, as scrutinised in this thesis with the example of the ‘Culture Assimilator’ of ‘Intercultural Sensitiser’ approach, is understandably different from what might have been generated in, say, Geertz’s semiotic approach in ethnography, which seeks to interpret culture as a system of meanings through ‘thick description’, to reconstruct ‘the actor’s point of view’ instead of providing simple causal attribution for their actions.

One main thread of investigation in this thesis has been to examine in what ways the perspective of intercultural communication may contribute to the discussion of intercultural dialogue, specifically on the use of cultural heritage such as dance as a medium for dialogue. The assumption in this perspective here, as seen in the example of the Culture Assimilator framework discussed in Chapter 3, is that the challenge of intercultural dialogue is mainly one of communication. More precisely, it is one of making accurate attributions of intentions in the speech or action of persons representing a different ‘culture’, based on observations of critical incidents in cross-cultural situations, ‘confirmed’ with secondary sources in ‘experts’ who would ideally be familiar with both cultures. Another assumption in this framework, in the reinterpretation by German social psychologist Alexander Thomas, is that one can derive ‘cultural standards’ to characterise the unfamiliar culture as a form of ‘intercultural understanding’. A further assumption of his is that such understanding as a process of ‘intercultural learning’ will also stimulate appropriate action as one assimilates a different ‘orientation system’ of action, hence activating other aspects of intercultural competence such as flexibility in action.
As discussed in Chapter 4, such postulation of cultures in a Parsonian framework, as separate and distinct orientation systems which can be observed from actions in cross-cultural situations, may be discussed under a multicultural model for intercultural dialogue. The general limitations of this framework as such have already been listed at the end of Chapter 3, thus one needs only to summarise two key points from there: firstly, this approach sets out with the assumption that any tension or misunderstanding in critical incidents may be attributed to ‘cultural differences’, and ignores the possibility of attributing it to other social factors such as class or gender, to personality or to special circumstances; secondly, following a Parsonian framework of intercultural communication, this perspective of intercultural dialogue does not deal with challenges of differences in value rationality which may need to be explained or debated, only with differences in value orientation of individuals’ actions presumed to be representative of their cultural communities which need to be described for one’s adaptation.

By testing this framework of Culture Assimilator involving the concepts of cultural standards and intercultural competence, on intercultural dialogue in Singapore with Indian dance heritage as a medium, some further conclusions are made as follows:

1. There is no ground for deriving ‘cultural standards’ of another community based on differences in the practice of any cultural heritage relative to one’s own community, as using cross-cultural situations as basis for such characterisation is not sound, due to the existence of circumstantial factors in one’s action.

2. With any attempt of characterising a community in terms of cultural standards, one may be tempted to formulate it in the form of cultural differences based on themes like ‘Ritualistic versus Secular’, ‘Individualism versus Collectivism’, or ‘Tradition versus Modernity’, as seen in the example of Indian dance heritage from a Chinese perspective. This would constitute a form of stereotyping.

3. If one is to speak of the ‘intercultural competence’ of reflexivity, it needs not mean that one has to relativise the value system in one’s or the other’s community as being subjective and arbitrary, one just needs to reflect on whether one is placing one’s and the other community on some form of hierarchy.
4. Instead of ascertaining ‘cultural standards’ in another community through such observations of behaviour, it would be more useful to formulate ‘intercultural standards’ in the use of a cultural heritage as part of intercultural dialogue. There may be ‘cultural standards’ in terms of institutionalised ideals in a community, but that would be more objectively ascertained from the discourse of the community.

5. If one is to speak of the intercultural competence of ‘flexibility’, it needs not mean that one has to compromise one’s own values and norms, one just needs to consider whether there is more than one way to interpret the values and norms of the other community such that both may be accommodated in a more creative way. As for flexibility in norms of intercultural exchange, it should be understood as a matter for deliberation between cultural groups, not simply as a quality of the individual.

6. There are issues of essentialisation or appropriation in the use of cultural heritage such as dance for intercultural dialogue, which may be omitted from the perspective of one trying to ‘understand’ an unfamiliar culture. This is not captured by a Culture Assimilator approach unless the other cultural community is given a voice.

7. The Culture Assimilator approach privileges the need of one desiring to construct knowledge on an unfamiliar culture in order to find orientation in dealing with it. It has little control over the affective aspect, such as whether one decides to show respect for the other culture.

8. The Cultural Assimilator is silent on how the ‘intercultural competence’ of empathy may be developed in context of the arts such as in dance heritage.

9. The ‘intercultural competence’ of open-mindedness in the framework of the Culture Assimilator tends to be imagined as teleological for some purpose of cooperation, when it should arguably involve the desire to understand and be understood in intercultural dialogue through cultural heritage.

10. The study of critical incidents in cross-cultural situations would best be used in the ‘original’ Culture Assimilator method of intercultural learning that is situation-specific, without making generalisations that reify the other culture.

Generally, if one considers the Culture Assimilator as an heuristic tool of intercultural communication that may help promote intercultural dialogue in terms of open
exchange on the basis of respect and mutual understanding, it is apparently asymmetrical in approach as it prioritises on the need of one party seeking a sense of control, instead of giving the ‘other’ culture a voice. This is problematic and would have to be compensated on the second instance through surveys and interviews with members of the other community. The construction of knowledge on other cultures based on such a paradigm of intercultural competence may therefore be criticised in the perspective of cultural studies as perpetuating a similar power structure as the old model of anthropology, whereby the ethnographer representing a modern culture is assumed to understand the primitive culture of a community even better than the community itself. Given that this framework has also sought legitimisation in Luhmann’s systems theory, Luhmann’s perspective on communication would incidentally remind us that our ‘understanding’ of other communities is ultimately just a construction in our own minds. It would also be hardly an improvement to go from an optimism that an approach of intercultural communication can help one ‘understand’ other cultures, to a cynicism that says since everything is a construction, then one is justified to construct ‘cultural standards’ as pragmatic knowledge to slot other cultures into predictable patterns of thoughts and behaviour.

From the disciplinary perspective of psychology itself, taking a social constructionist perspective according to Gergen (2001) does not obliterate the need for empirical science, as mentioned in the introductory chapter; Faye (2012) has further argued that taking a naturalist-pragmatic approach in human sciences means that claims should be validated scientifically through epistemology in natural sciences, without implying that human intentions should simply be explained with brain sciences. It has to be made clear that the Culture Assimilator is by no means to be understood as a tool for cultural analysis. That in psychology has witnessed a ‘crisis in social psychology’ as announced by Armistead (1974) in the 1970s, challenging the domination of experimentalism and universal cognitivism; apart from the development of cultural psychology already mentioned, discursive psychology as represented by the work of Potter and Wetherell (1987) in studying cultural texts, not to mention Althusser’s channelling of Lacan’s ‘mirror stage’ as interpellation whereby the Cartesian idea of a fixed conscious self is deemed illusory – which in turn has been critiqued considering the need to understand historical specificity of cultural practices (see Walkerdine and Blackman, 2008, p. 67ff)
As ‘intercultural psychology’, the framework of Alexander Thomas is also limited due to its assumption of distinct and different cultural systems in cross-cultural situations. Considering this as part of intercultural studies that cover intercultural communication and intercultural education, this thesis has also pointed out that there are more ways to conceptualise intercultural learning. On its own, one may qualify the Culture Assimilator or the Intercultural Sensitizer simply as a heuristic approach, for an early developmental stage in intercultural dialogue, to kick-start the process of interaction in cultural exchanges by giving people a little sense of control in navigating through cultural differences. If one does not find any motivation to go further in intercultural dialogue, at least there can be minimisation of conflicts through conforming contingently to a different set of norms which are situational. In that sense it serves as a tool to maintain cordial relations between members of different cultural community. Hence one needs not rule out such production of knowledge altogether for being too egoistical and instrumental. However, accepting a principle of intercultural dialogue as exchange among equals should imply that one also has to start problematising any stereotyping construction of the ‘other’. As already discussed in Chapter 3, cross-cultural situations, apart from serving as references to minimise conflicts, should in fact most ideally be used to deconstruct cultural differences based on one-sided perspectives. This is therefore exactly what has been done in Chapter 6 with the example of Indian dance heritage, against any essentialising from a Chinese perspective. Respect for another culture and its norms needs not mean imagining members of the culture as people without their own free will.

For application to a multicultural model of intercultural dialogue, one should consider the investigation of critical incidents as remaining useful as reference for further research. But apart from that, such application of the Culture Assimilator may tend to make unnecessary assumptions by explaining people as products of their culture. It also misses out on an important premise of intercultural dialogue as an exchange between equals, namely the recognition of the other not only as a member of a community from which one derives one’s rationality in cultural values, but also as an individual who is autonomous in choosing and expressing one’s point of view. Furthermore, it tends to focus on understanding culture as a socio-cultural system, as a product of history which results in certain norms of behaviour, instead of
understanding culture as a system of meanings which can accommodate different interpretations, without necessarily having a consistency that rules over the minds of members of its community. One may argue in fact that a broader definition of ‘intercultural competence’ should include the latter form of knowledge, which would facilitate interaction and bonding across cultures.

A multicultural model of intercultural dialogue through a medium of cultural heritage should in short seek to understand the meanings and values associated with the place, the object or the performance, placing emphasis on respect for the choice of the other to be different in view or practice - as long as it does not infringe on anybody’s rights. This model has been contrasted in this thesis with a transcultural model of intercultural dialogue, with emphasis on overcoming differences in cultural identity through creative interventions. By no means does this thesis argue that one model is superior to the other and making the other model redundant. In fact, it is argued that with a concept of intercultural learning as liberal learning from other cultures as part of an appreciation of cultural diversity, the distinction between a multicultural and a transcultural model, predicated on the salience of differences in identity, would become irrelevant from an individual’s perspective. Under premises of social cohesion based on mutual respect, mutual understanding and a common sense of belonging through interaction, one may also argue that both approaches are needed to some extent, in order not to place one culture over another in importance, for dialogue needs to be two-way. In fact, the strength of any form of arts, be it literary, visual or theatrical, in promoting intercultural dialogue, should arguably lie in its ability to transcend such easy divides between multicultural and transcultural models, between seeing a fellow human being as member of a different community and as an autonomous individual that is part of the world at large, between seeing a community as unique and seeing it as constantly evolving as part of the world. At the same time, one has to bear in mind that both models of intercultural dialogue may equally be exploited by some other ideology for national propaganda or cultural production of a neoliberal economy, and hence may virtually be indistinguishable, especially if the only key difference between the two is assumed to be the emphasis on multiplicity or hybridity of cultural identities.

What qualifies as intercultural dialogue? Does it mean any interaction or exchange between two different cultural communities is necessarily good? Or does it have to
be measured by the value of some creative hybrid product resulting from it, as some arguing for a transcultural approach may insist? This thesis refrains from making any value judgment in the differentiation between two models. It only starts by inferring the different possibilities based on a constructivist perspective of transcultural and multicultural systems, using the model of Luhmann’s theory of self-referential systems. It is subsequently on the basis of perspectives from cultural studies and postcolonial theory that one criticises the construction of knowledge on any culture as the ‘other’.

Furthermore, the considerations here are centred on the communicative aspects of intercultural dialogue as exchange involving the medium of cultural heritage, tested on the example of dance as heritage. It has not attempted a review of some of the major perspectives in intercultural dialogue, that would have explored issues of aesthetics or moral values in depth. One perspective which could otherwise have been discussed more extensively is Levinas’ ethical philosophy on the Other as the source of morality.

The role of dance heritage in intercultural dialogue has thus been discussed mainly in terms of its contribution towards appreciation of cultural diversity. The treatment of dance as a subject in this thesis is principally oriented towards the perspective of dance as communication and as embodiment of cultural values, as relevant to the use of dance for intercultural dialogue, while considering how dance is socially constructed as a form of cultural heritage. The initial discussion of dance in Chapter 5 however is rooted in perspectives of social anthropology, in order to bring it in line with the general discussion of culture in Chapter 2. It is subsequently not surprising that some of the problematic views in early anthropological perspectives on dance also echo the problems of general anthropological views on culture, for example the explanation of ‘primitive’ cultures and dance forms as biological or psychological phenomena, or in terms of personality like in the perspective of Ruth Benedict.

What followed was a functionalist perspective, which as Drid Williams points out, brings little insight to the understanding of dance, beyond an acknowledgement of its social value as being universal. Such universality of social structure arguably becomes banal, as just a step of improvement from the view of dance as a biological or psychological phenomenon. The challenge in the appreciation of a dance form as
heritage would be after all be the question of whether one can be empathetic of its aesthetic value and spiritual value even as one does not share similar taste in beauty or hold the same religious belief. A perspective on dance based on symbolic anthropology, notably with Victor Turner’s idea of social drama, would arguably provide more insight in ‘translating’ the meanings of dance as well as demonstrating the dynamism and polysemic nature of dance.

As dance is analysed as a category of heritage in this thesis, there has also been an attempt to connect the two by considering heritage in general as a cultural tool of memory and ritual, which serves to explain how dance communicates meanings and values as heritage. An additional topic is the discussion of how heritage such as dance and in general may be a form of what Hobsbawm refers to as ‘invented tradition’.

After intercultural dialogue and dance, the third main aspect in this thesis has been Singapore. This thesis was incidentally embarked on at a time when Singapore, known for its draconian measures in media control, was beginning to acknowledge internal issues of racism, as highlighted by the April 2010 visit of the UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance. Meantime, Singapore held its General Elections in May 2011, when support for the ruling party slid to 60 per cent, and voices of dissent in the social media suggested the increasing presence of foreign talents and foreign labour as a factor of anxiety. As the thesis went into its final stage of writing, Singapore had witnessed a unprecedented protest of thousands in February 2013 against a population white paper signalling a further neoliberal migration policy, sparking off concerns of xenophobia, amidst anti-globalisation calls of ‘Singapore for Singaporeans’ as expressed in one placard. The discourse on race and culture has evidently become more complicated than an issue of ‘Indians’ or ‘Malays’ versus ‘Chinese’, as seen for example in the distinction made between local Indians and foreign talents or foreign labour from South Asia, articulated in a Tamil television forum of Idhayam Pesugirathu (Series 2, Episode 7, 28th February 2013) debating on the issues of employment and quality of living. It might be mentioned that such expressions of local sentiments are not a patch on xenophobic remarks in the social media of local Chinese against new migrants from People’s Republic of China, and on some notable occasions with remarks in the reverse direction.
All this tension suggests not only that the essentialising constructs of ‘race’ in guiding Singapore’s public policies have become a travesty in realities of the globalised nation, but also that a discussion of ‘intercultural dialogue’ may risk being limiting in its ideology if interpreted in a narrow way that essentialises cultures according to simple categories of race or religion. Cultural communities may in fact be more complicated than what boundaries drawn along the symbols of cultural heritage may suggest, as Chapters 4 to 6 have demonstrated in reference to Singapore’s CMIO formula of reducing ethnic and cultural diversity to a simplified classification of race.

An assumption that a Singaporean’s identity is defined by the sum of his or her racial or cultural roots in the family’s land of origin a couple of generations ago, plus his or her participation in Singapore’s economic success, may seem like an ‘open’ and flexible concept to facilitate the welcoming of foreign talents for Singapore’s development, while providing the veneer of a Singapore core as CMIO. But it is an overly simplified view that denies the authenticity and worth of the local identity, which invites local Singaporeans to ‘call the bluff’, and may add on to local resentment. As mentioned in Chapter 4, race relation is also a form of class relation, and racist sentiments are often triggered off by issues of employment, housing and inflation. As Chapter 2 discussed, social cohesion as a sense of shared belonging is also related to issues of inequality and disparity, and Singapore happens to have an alarming income inequality currently as indicated by the Gini coefficient. This suggests that these are social problems beyond misunderstanding between culturally defined communities, and need to be dealt with through economic measures. An interesting trend to watch is how Singaporeans complain of job discrimination against locals in the increasingly competitive job market. Singaporeans who express xenophobic sentiments may hence refute that these are ‘irrational’ sentiments, as it may also be argued as expression of survival instincts.

The unfortunate phenomenon in the social media is that xenophobic sentiments and criticisms against the PAP government’s neoliberal population policy may be hard to disentangle from each other. With the most recent move by the government to introduce a licensing regime that allows them to declare news websites or blogs as illegal, it may be killing two birds with one stone, but as Chapter 4 suggests, this marks the latest signal of Singapore’s rejection of liberalism in the open exchange of views, which is the other main component in the approach of intercultural dialogue.
What role can cultural heritage play in relieving such tensions? It may be limited, but then again it may be better left for further research than speculation. It may be necessary to mention however that intangible cultural heritage tends to be associated with ethnic identities and may fail to represent the local identity, which means this has to be handled sensitively. To the locals, who are experiencing increasing loss of physical cultural heritage in the city due to urban development which is catering to more immigration while feeding a neoliberal economy that may not benefit locals, an emphasis on intangible heritage, which new citizens from China or India may appear to better identify with than old citizens, can well feel like a form of neo-colonialism. It does not help when the minister for national development describes local heritage as a matter of ‘memories’, for which the new generation can simply “create their own”, if local citizens do not feel represented in these decisions.

Where the local community in dance heritage or other performing arts is concerned, the question may be whether heritage is treated as finished products as part of a creative industry, with productivity indicators in terms of economic output taking precedence over nurturing of local talents. Another question is how much recognition is given to the historical development of local culture. There is arguably a need for more historical research on local development of Indian classical dance and dance expressions of the Chinese and Malay communities alike, along with their cross-cultural collaborations, in order to correct a skewed perspective of culture as essence over culture as achievement of creative outputs.

Such aspects of social and cultural dynamics, which might be explored in an approach that takes a cue from Sorokin’s work, have not been amply explored in this thesis which has focused on scrutinising a Parsonian framework. An approach like this also would have important implications for how ‘intangible heritage’ such as performing arts may generally be understood - in the course of this PhD research, the concept of ‘intangible heritage’ has incidentally been studied alongside other frameworks such as folklore and indigenous knowledge, but any comparison has been left out of the thesis since the focus is on dance heritage as a form of communication, not on the idea of ‘safeguarding’. The 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions would similarly have gone beyond the scope of this thesis, though dance in a transcultural model may also be considered in that framework. But as part of a discussion on
intercultural understanding here, one may emphasise, in the words of Tariq Ramadan (2012, p. 146), that traditions are “by definition, never static nor closed”. This is not to be taken to mean that the past is hence irrelevant, for it is through memory or a concept of ‘meaningful time’ (Ibid.) that a tradition communicates its values, as Chapter 5 has discussed citing theoretical perspectives of Assman and Lowenthal among others, though the meanings of expressions may also change through dialogue with the Others while forms remain. In the example of Bharatanatyam for instance, it is ironically the suppression of the dance as decadence and superstition under British colonial rule that led to its reinvention as a symbol of nationalism.

As a second wider implication, the analysis on dance heritage in this thesis suggests that a ‘transcultural’ model of intercultural dialogue, circumventing or even suppressing the issue of cultural identity, may not offer itself as the panacea for all problems related to cultural differences. The example of dance heritage echoes concerns elsewhere that while expressions of postmodernism may serve as a move away from what Lyotard calls ‘metanarratives’, such expressions of creativity may also fall into habits of what Jameson calls a ‘cultural logic of late capitalism’, as Chapter 6 demonstrates. A multicultural model of intercultural dialogue, meantime, may risk being given to essentialisation, and therefore have to be balanced with a transcultural approach as well as be deconstructed with the help of some historical perspective, as Chapter 6 has demonstrated.

Thirdly, where the use of such heritage for cultural exchange is concerned, there would also be a need to discuss the issue of equitability in ‘intercultural dialogue’ whereby there may not only be one-sided appropriation of heritage for the purpose of staging spectacles for the creative industry, but also the issue of rights and welfare for artistes as practitioners, who may be engaged by event organisers to perform at various occasions on semi-voluntary basis in the name of intercultural dialogue, community service or other forms of nationalist propaganda.

In short, this thesis takes the perspective, as mentioned in Chapter 5, that intercultural dialogue on any medium of cultural heritage is still generally under-theorised. One important aspect that was not adequately addressed in the space of this thesis is the need for multi-faceted values of natural and cultural heritage to be
negotiated in a pluralistic manner in a globalised society, in terms of common public good. Without deliberation on such the multi-vocality and plurality of heritage value, thus handing the state a default licence to privilege selected symbols of nationalism unilaterally, much heritage may be lost with the neoliberal developmental state of land-scarce Singapore, under a model of what Zizek would refer to as ‘authoritarian capitalism’.

On the issue of pluralism, the discussion of dance heritage for intercultural learning in Chapter 6 has suggested that values of a heritage may be multi-vocal, from social value, aesthetic value to moral value, not to mention spiritual value. The last often poses a challenge, as one view in the project of modernity may be less sympathetic towards such traditions. In fact, an important aspect in this thesis also lies in deconstructing a hegemonic discourse of a ‘modernised’ community over a ‘traditional’ community. As pointed out in Chapter 2, modernisation as manifested in the globalised world today is too often interpreted by default as the instrumental rationality of capitalism.

The challenge in building a cosmopolitan community among a diverse and globalised population such as Singapore, with active participation by people regardless of ‘race’, language or religion, may partly be seen as finding cosmopolitan ‘intercultural standards’ for mutual respect and mutual understanding like a kind of communicative ethics. But a discourse of ‘intercultural’ dialogue needs to be guarded from obscuring economic and political issues in social cohesion through democratic participation, for it tends to divert attention to an imagination of fundamental cultural differences, such that intercultural competence is presumably all that society needs. As the 2008 White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue underscores, democratic participation should also be included as competence for dialogue. In Singapore, what one needs is the rule of law as institutional mechanism of democracy to defend the common good in issues such as environmental sustainability and the quality of life, beyond a corporatism of interests that may render a romantic picture of co-existence in ‘racial harmony’, yet emasculates the people politically. Any such romantic picture evoked in visual spectacles of dance or other art forms should not make one forget more pressing issues of social cohesion and human rights in Singapore or the region for that matter. The controversial ASEAN Human Rights Declaration adopted on 18th November 2012 is notably flawed with an Article 6 on ‘balance’ between rights and
‘responsibilities’ and an Article 7 on particularities of ‘regional and national contexts’ (ASEAN, 19th November 2012).

Recalling Parekh’s argument in this thesis, intercultural dialogue is ultimately about the challenge of cultural and value pluralism which needs to be greeted by a robust form of democracy. Understood as a process of democracy with the perspective of Laclau, intercultural dialogue may in theory allow one to dislodge any claim of universalism, or regionalism for that matter – such as ‘Asian values’, but it still involves a competition of different groups to find representation with their particularisms of values. What Mouffe reminds us with the friend-enemy thesis of Carl Schmitt however, is that one must not overlook the reality of antagonism; in order to save a state from discredit in its duty of ethic, and yet avert conflicts, the way to go would be to emphasise commonality. Culture heritage as such may also be a site of struggle, as one engages in a dialogue or a ‘dance’ with the Other, to use the word now as a metaphor. In a normative sense, one has to learn to be careful not to step on the Other’s foot. But perhaps through some creative but sensitive use of cultural heritage, one may yet rediscover enchantment in the world.

REFERENCES


Abdullah, Mohamed Alnizom. ‘Madrasah Students Should Also Benefit from Edusave Scheme’, in AsiaOne News, 16th Feb 2011. Online:


Goh, Daniel P.S. 2013. ‘Multicultural Carnivals and the Politics of the Spectacle in Global Singapore’. In Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, 14: 2, pp. 228-251.


Goh, Raymond. 6th June 2013. Personal correspondence.


403


407


Welsch, Wolfgang. 1999. ‘Transculturality - the Puzzling Form of Cultures Today’. Online: [http://www2.uni-jena.de/welsch/Papers/transcultSociety.html](http://www2.uni-jena.de/welsch/Papers/transcultSociety.html), accessed 13th June 2012.


