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Forced Displacement Urbanisms

Territorial Biographies and Contemporary Narratives
in the Syrian Refugee Camps in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq

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For those who seek light in dark times

Abstract (English)

Violent chronic conflicts, uprooting, and the continuous massive (re)generation of displacement waves constitute the main elements of the Kurds' history within nation-states' (changing) geographies. Today, Kurdish-inhabited territories represent palimpsests of involuntary dislocations and relocation stories, constantly (re)written by refuge-seeking/ granting (spatial) practices. Since 2011, contemporary uprisings and wars in Syria and Iraq have inscribed the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I) territories with a new layer of displacement stories. These territories acted as frontline receptors for consecutive Syrian refugees and Iraqi internally displaced waves seeking protection. Displacees found refuge in the rural, urban and newly set humanitarian camps' spaces; hence, they (temporarily) anchored and carved some sort of a presence within their receiving sites. The rationale behind such receiving sites' emergence, use and progression in the KR-I have historically oscillated between modernization, discipline, development and humanitarianism.

Guided by the urbanism lens, this research aims to narrate the KR-I's forced displacement territorial biography of involuntary dislocated and (re)located Kurds. This narration chronologically traces these groups' newly (re)shaped receiving sites and how refuge-seeking/granting practices aggregated and (re)articulated the KR-I's territories. It investigates the ways in which these receiving sites act as seeds of emerging urbanities in such a politically contested region. On the one hand, the research zooms out and repositions these sites' emergence and spatial progression within a broader geopolitical context, socio-economic conditionalities, uses and meaning subversions due to the ever-changing actors. On the other hand, it zooms closely into the newly set Syrian-Kurdish refugee camps in the KR-I within and beyond predefined (nation-state) belongings in their ever-distorted time-space frames. It securitizes on the ways in which these sites are conceived and inhabited to (re)claim rights "to" and "in" space, territory, history and future. Between the large and small pictures, the research investigates the human and the non-human spatial agency that (re)patches these ruptured Kurds' collective memories and contemporary narratives of where, when, what and with whom (a future) home rests.

This study is an urgent call for the international and local constellation of actors to critically rethink their standardized ready-made solutions and piece-meal spatial interventions in geographies associated with chronic crisis, ever (re)branded under emergency, development and peace 'help' banners. It sets the basis for rearticulating and developing further research-based interventions that account for exhausted conflict-ridden (infra)structures, political sensitivities, socio-economic situations and environmental impacts.

Abstract (Deutsch)

Gewaltsame chronische Konflikte, Entwurzelung und die kontinuierliche massive (Neu-)Erzeugung von Vertreibungswellen sind die Hauptelemente der Geschichte der Kurden innerhalb der (sich verändernden) Geografien der Nationalstaaten. Heute stellen die von Kurden bewohnten Gebiete Palimpseste unfreiwilliger Versetzungen und Umsiedlungsgeschichten dar, die durch (räumliche) Praktiken der Zufluchtssuche und -gewährung ständig (neu) geschrieben werden. Seit 2011 haben die aktuellen Aufstände und Kriege in Syrien und im Irak die Gebiete der Region Kurdistan im Irak (KR-I) mit einer neuen Schicht von Vertreibungsgeschichten überzogen. Diese Gebiete waren die erste Anlaufstelle für syrische Flüchtlinge und irakische Binnenflüchtlinge, die Schutz suchten. Die Vertriebenen fanden Zuflucht in den ländlichen und städtischen Gebieten sowie in den neu errichteten humanitären Lagern und verankerten sich so (vorübergehend) in den Aufnahmegebieten. Die Gründe für das Entstehen, die Nutzung und die Entwicklung solcher Aufnahmestätten in der KR-I schwankten historisch zwischen Modernisierung, Disziplin, Entwicklung und Humanität.

Unter dem Blickwinkel des Urbanismus zielt diese Untersuchung darauf ab, die territoriale Biographie der unfreiwillig vertriebenen und (wieder) angesiedelten Kurden in der KR-I zu erzählen. Diese Erzählung zeichnet chronologisch die neu gestalteten Aufnahmeorte dieser Gruppen und die Art und Weise nach, wie Praktiken der Zufluchtssuche und -gewährung die Territorien der KR-I zusammenführten und (neu) artikulierte. Sie untersucht die Art und Weise, in der diese Aufnahmestätten als Keimzellen der entstehenden Urbanität in einer politisch umkämpften Region fungieren. Einerseits zoomt die Forschung heraus und positioniert die Entstehung und räumliche Entwicklung dieser Orte in einem breiteren geopolitischen Kontext, sozioökonomischen Bedingungen, Nutzungen und Bedeutungsumkehrungen durch die sich ständig verändernden Akteure. Andererseits werden die neu errichteten syrisch-kurdischen Flüchtlingslager in der KR-I innerhalb und jenseits der vordefinierten (nationalstaatlichen) Zugehörigkeit in ihrem immer wieder verzerrten zeitlichen und räumlichen Rahmen näher beleuchtet. Sie untersucht die Art und Weise, wie diese Orte konzipiert und bewohnt werden, um Rechte "an" und "in" Raum, Territorium, Geschichte und Zukunft (wieder) einzufordern. Zwischen den großen und kleinen Bildern untersucht die Studie die menschliche und nicht-menschliche räumliche Handlung, die diese zerrissenen kollektiven Erinnerungen der Kurden und die zeitgenössischen Erzählungen darüber, wo, wann, was und mit wem (eine zukünftige) Heimat ist, (wieder) zusammensetzt.

Diese Studie ist ein dringender Aufruf an die internationale und lokale Akteurskonstellation, ihre standardisierten, vorgefertigten Lösungen und stückweisen räumlichen Interventionen in Gegenden, die mit chronischen Krisen verbunden sind, kritisch zu überdenken, die immer wieder unter dem Banner der Not-, Entwicklungs- und Friedenshilfe (neu) gebrandmarkt werden. Sie bildet die Grundlage für die Neudefinition und Entwicklung weiterer forschungsbasierter Interventionen, die erschöpfte konfliktbehaftete (Infra-)Strukturen, politische Befindlichkeiten, sozioökonomische Situationen und Umweltauswirkungen berücksichtigen.

Abstract (Nederlands)

Gewelddadige chronische conflicten, ontworteling en het voortdurend massaal (her)genereren van verplaatsingsgolven vormen de belangrijkste elementen van de geschiedenis van de Koerden binnen de (veranderende) geografie van de natiestaten. Vandaag vormen de Koerdisch bewoonde gebieden palimpsests van onvrijwillige dislocaties en verhuisverhalen, die voortdurend worden (her)geschreven door (ruimtelijke) praktijken die een toevlucht zoeken en verlenen. Sinds 2011 hebben de hedendaagse opstanden en oorlogen in Syrië en Irak de Koerdische regio van Irak (KR-I) voorzien van een nieuwe laag van ontheemdingverhalen. Deze gebieden fungeerden als frontlijnreceptoren voor opeenvolgende Syrische vluchtelingen en Iraakse ontheemden die bescherming zochten. De ontheemden vonden hun toevlucht in de landelijke, stedelijke en nieuw opgezette humanitaire kampen; zo verankerden ze zich (tijdelijk) en creëerden ze een soort aanwezigheid in hun opvanggebieden. De grondgedachte achter het ontstaan, het gebruik en de ontwikkeling van dergelijke opvanglocaties in de KR-I schommelt historisch gezien tussen modernisering, discipline, ontwikkeling en humanisme.

Geleid door de urbanistische lens, wil dit onderzoek de territoriale biografie van de gedwongen verplaatsing van Koerden in de KR-I vertellen. Dit verhaal traceert chronologisch de nieuw (her)gevormde opvanglocaties van deze groepen en hoe de praktijken van het zoeken naar en toekennen van een toevluchtsoord de gebieden van de KR-I samenvoegden en (her)articuleerden. Het onderzoekt de manieren waarop deze opvangplaatsen fungeren als kiem voor opkomende stedelijkheid in deze politiek omstreden regio. Enerzijds zoomt het onderzoek uit en herpositioneert het ontstaan en de ruimtelijke ontwikkeling van deze locaties binnen een bredere geopolitieke context, sociaal-economische voorwaarden, gebruik en betekenisondermijning door de steeds veranderende actoren. Aan de andere kant zoomt het nauw in op de nieuw opgezette Syrisch-Koerdische vluchtelingenkampen in de KR-I binnen en buiten de vooraf gedefinieerde (natiestaat-)grenzen in hun steeds vervormde tijd-ruimte frames. De manier waarop deze locaties worden ontworpen en bewoond om (opnieuw) rechten te claimen "op" en "in" ruimte, grondgebied, geschiedenis en toekomst. Tussen de grote en kleine beelden onderzoekt het onderzoek het menselijke en niet-menselijke ruimtelijke agentschap dat de collectieve herinneringen van deze verscheurde Koerden en hedendaagse verhalen over waar, wanneer, wat en bij wie (een toekomstig) thuis berust, (opnieuw) patcht.

Deze studie is een dringende oproep aan de internationale en lokale constellatie van actoren om hun gestandaardiseerde kant-en-klare oplossingen en stuksgewijze ruimtelijke interventies in geografieën die geassocieerd worden met chronische crisis, steeds (opnieuw) gemerkt onder de vlag van noodhulp, ontwikkeling en vredeshulp, kritisch te heroverwegen. Het legt de basis voor het opnieuw articuleren en ontwikkelen van verdere op onderzoek gebaseerde interventies die rekening houden met uitgeputte, door conflicten geteisterde (infra)structuren, politieke gevoelheden, sociaal-economische situaties en milieueffecten.

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Acronyms & Abbreviations

A2PS	Area-based Programming Projects for Protection and Solutions to Support both Local and Host Communities
ADPR	Advance Development Provincial Reconstruction
AFS	Adolescent Friendly Space
AoO	Area of Origin
BCF	Barzani Charity Foundation
BPRM	Bureau of Population, Refugee and Migration
BRHA	Board of Relief and Humanitarian Affairs (KRG)
CCCM	Camp Coordination and Camp Management
CE	Circular Economy
CFS	Child Friendly Space
CFW	Cash for Work
CGoI	Central Government of Iraq
CM	Camp Management
CRI	Core Relief Items
DDM	Department of Displacement and Migration (KRG)
DoE	Department of Education (KRG)
DoH	Department of Health (KRG)
DoS	Department of Sewage (KRG)
EVI	Extremely vulnerable individuals
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GCR	Global Compact on Refugees
GS	Global South
GSC	Global Shelter Cluster
HOFO	Head of Field Office
HOSO	Head of Sub Office
HRW	Human Rights Watch
HS	Human Settlement
HS-A	Human Settlement Approach
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre

IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IHR	International Humanitarian Regime
IKF	Iraqi Kurdish Front
IKP	Iraqi Kurdish Parliament
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPs	Implementing Partners
IQD	Iraqi Dinars
IS	Islamic State
ISF	Iraqi Security Forces
ISIL	Islamic State in Iraq and Levant
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
JCCC	Joint Crisis Coordination Centre
KDP	Kurdish Democratic Party
KR-I	Kurdistan Region of Iraq
KRG	Kurdistan Regional Government
LHR	Local Humanitarian Regime
MOMD	Ministry of Migration and Displacement
Mol	Ministry of Interior
MoRR	Ministry of Reconstruction and Rehabilitation
NES	North East Syria
NFI	Non Food Items
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
O&M	Operation and maintenance
OS	Organized Settlement
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OFFP	Oil for Food Program
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
PARC	Protection Assistance Reintegration Centre
PHC	Primary Health Centre
PKK	Partîya Karkerên Kurdistanê (Kurdistan Workers Party)
PUK	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

PWJ	Peace Winds Japan
PYD	Kurdish Democratic Union Party – Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat
QIPs	Quick impact projects
SDF	Syrian Democratic Forces
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SRP	Settlement Rehabilitation Program
UN	United Nations
UN Habitat	United Nations Human Settlement Programme
UNAMI	United Nations Assistance Mission of Iraq
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nation Children’s Fund
UNOHCI	United Nations Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
USCRI	U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrant
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WWI	World War 1
WWII	World War 2
YFS	Youth Friendly Space
YPG	People’s defence unit - Yekîneyên Parastina Gel
YPJ	People’s protection Unit Yekîneyên Parastina Jin

“We became aware of the existence of a right to have rights (and that means to live in a framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opinions) and a right to belong to some kind of organised community, only when millions of people emerged who had lost and could not regain these rights because of the new global political situation.”

(Arendt, 1948/2009)

Prologue: "We all gaze at the same sky"

It was a chilly starry night, 21 degrees to be exact, as the screen of my iPhone indicated that night of October 19th, 2018. I was drinking minted tea in the courtyard, sharing stories of different times and locations with my host Mala, a Syrian Kurd like myself. Everything about that night seemed exceptionally ordinary, yet in reality, it was not.

Geographically I was in Domiz 1 refugee camp in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I). Domiz 1 was a particular response to an extraordinary event: the Syrian conflict displacement aftermath. The camp's occupants were also extraordinary; they were first refugees, a category indicating that "being in the world" is reduced to homelessness, minimum living standards, and higher security measures. Nevertheless, these refugees were not just any refugees who became collateral damage of a conflict; they were Kurds by ethnicity, with an (imagined) entitlement to the land that hosts them, a land that they identify as part of their "Fatherland": Kurdistan -the land of the Kurds.

The setting itself was also extraordinary. I was hosted by Mala, a 23-year-old female living in Domiz 1 with her family since 2014, in a supposedly "temporary" dwelling unit. However, despite the sandwich panel roof and humanitarian organizations' logos visible here and there, everything else seemed fixed in place: the brick walls, doors, windows, and tiles ...Strikingly, Mala's dwelling unit vaguely resembled my aunt's village house, located in a small Kurdish town close to Afrin (Syria), where I used to spend some time when I was young. This resemblance is not only related to the patchwork materials or the courtyard or the tree somehow fixed to the corner, but it was also the ways spaces have been furnished with mattresses and the way the rooms were used for different functions (hosting, sleeping, cooking) by people in different times of the day.

Status-wise, although I was a Syrian Kurd like my host Mala, our presence in the same place was circumstantially different. Both of us were not perceived as citizens despite our "Kurdishness". On the one hand, by crossing Iraq's political borders for humanitarian reasons, Mala, and her family, like many others, were refugees, and they were entitled to shelter in protection in the camp. On the other hand, I arrived from Germany, where I resided as a student and was categorized as a migrant. I needed to acquire a visa for 30 days every time I needed to enter the KR-I.

Timewise, it was different as well. We both were staying temporarily in this camp. My temporariness was based on my research and fieldwork and sometimes my visits to some of the friends I made. Every time I passed the single gate, I needed permission to pass the checkpoint, and these permissions usually expired at my expected departure. Her temporariness was undetermined. Mala's perceived "temporary stay" started in 2014 after she was registered as a refugee in Domiz Camp. Unlike myself, Mala had an entitlement to enter and leave Domiz 1 Camp using the same single gate without an expiration date.

Perplexed by a normalized feeling of the exceptional, our stories were similar but not the same. Being on the route, unable to return home, yet at home, searching for a way to (re)route and (re)root, that is how this research journey began.

Part 1 – Setting the Scene

The recent history of Iraq and the Kurds is characterized by chronic violent conflicts, uprooting and an almost continuous massive generation of refugees. Since the Syrian conflict in 2011, followed by the ISIS war, collateral damage shock waves reverberated within the Levant and beyond. These waves carried forcibly displaced refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) and paved for the emergence of humanitarian camps in the receiving territories. Due to its location, relative safety, and prosperity in comparison with its neighbouring regions, the Kurdistan region of Iraq (KR-I) have also been one of the first countries of asylum, acting as a receptor for the refugees and IDPs in its existing urban settings and newly humanitarian camps which were mushrooming within its (urban)landscapes. However, the presence of these camps in the KR-I is, indeed, adding another layer of humanitarian camps to the landscape historically layered with refuge and displacements.

According to van Bruinessen (1992), King (2014), Izady (2015) and McDowall (2004, 2020) among many Kurdish studies scholars, being a producer and a receiver of the forcibly displaced is not new to this specific geography of the KR-I and its Kurds inhabitants. Violent disputes, socio-spatial ruptures¹, involuntary dislocations and (forced) relocations have continuously reshaped and restructured KR-I's territorial architecture. Iraq, on the one hand, is an internationally recognized nation-state. It has been, for many decades, the stage of internal and external conflicts over land and sovereignty, including the periodic Barzani uprisals between the 1940s -1970s, the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988), the first gulf war (1990), the economic embargo (1991-2003), the internal Kurdish conflict 1995-1997, the US military invasion in 2004, and the rise and fall of ISIS (2013-2017). Due to these recurrent events (accompanied by multi-folding crises), many regions in Iraq have been chronically unstable and fragile.

On the other hand, the Kurds represent a stateless nation. They live as minorities in their claimed ancestral land divided between Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria (Gunter, 2019; Tejel, 2009; Yildiz, 2004, 2005). Kurdistan lacks international recognition on the global stage. Displaced or not, Kurds have been eking out their spheres of belonging in their existing and receiving sites, partially succeeding with the presence of the KR-I as an autonomous region actively since 2005. As such, between struggles, dislocations and resistance, a Kurdish national dream of a united homeland for the Kurds surpasses reality; it exists and survives through the collective belief in Kurds' "imagined communities" (B. Anderson, 2016) generationally transmitted (O'Shea, 2004)

This research builds on Papadopoulos (2021) 's definition of involuntary dislocation as "abandonment, reluctantly, of the intimate space that a person considers home, as a result of various types of upheavals"(Papadopoulos, 2021). This abandonment consequently leads to rupture from a(n)(imagined) space-time continuity linked to geography. This research began in its initial stages by examining refuge-seeking/granting (spatial) practices. It focused on the ways in which the uprooted (Syrian) Kurds were arriving in the KR-I as displaced groups (refugees, internally displaced), crossing Syrian- Iraqi borders, and living in refugee camps. As it progressed, this research examined these camps in the light of debates on the 'Kurdish Question' (Elphinston, 1946; G. Stansfield & Shareef, 2017), and its diasporic relations that are still (re)shaping the urban scene of the region (Recchia, 2012). Therefore, it became essential to zoom out geographically from examining the refugee camps to reposition them within a broader territorial constellation of displacement-receiving sites. In the KR-I, these receiving sites' (re)emergences,

¹ Rupture here means the violent (unexpected) separations from a customary habitat and the (generationally) formed social networks embedded within it

(urban)progression and meanings oscillate between disciplinarity, confinement, development and humanitarianism. Consequently, the research traced back and forth the geopolitical and socio-spatial conditionalities that induced forced displacements. This tracing did unveil how these displacements did indeed (re)form the Kurds' collective memories and narratives of HOME in the contested and ambivalent context of the KR-I. Focusing on urbanism, this research moves along and beyond questions of political entitlements. It narrates the KR-I forced displacement territorial biography to include spatial practices as forms of resistance and (re)claiming rights "to"/ rights "in" history and territory beyond predefined stereotypes of belonging.

“Too much has been made of origins. All origins are arbitrary. This is not to say that they are not also nurturing, but they are essentially coercive and indifferent.”
(Brand, 2012)





Figure 1: Operational Camps in the KR-IAs of June 2021 (REACH, 2021)



Chapter 1

1. Context

1.1. Background


Since 2011, the Levant has been the stage for political upheavals and sequential instabilities. Starting with the Syrian conflict, followed by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) from 2013 onwards, multi-folded crises of destructions, insecurities and instabilities have dominated ever since. Crises as such generated unprecedented waves of forcibly displaced populations, spilling within and across Syria and Iraq's political borders. In the UNHCR forced displacement reports (2012 -2021), Syria and Iraq appeared regularly on the top ten list of the countries of origin of displaced groups - internally (IDPs) and externally (refugees)- who have undergone a territorial dislocation. Born out of such destructions, the need to manage unexpected mass displacement influxes and the urgent need to accommodate the displaced, humanitarian camps became common paradigms in this region. These camps have been acting as "temporary" spatial receptors for those rendered homeless and "layered and ordered by diverse objects and programs" (Hailey, 2009). According to the World Bank (2015) report, the KR-I hosted more than 1.5 million refugees and IDPs in urban settings and more than 40 new humanitarian camps, where the hosting capacity of the humanitarian regime and the Kurdish regional government (KRG) was "being stretched to the limit" (World Bank, 2015). After the conflict with ISIS ended in 2017, the humanitarian regime in the KR-I aimed to move away from emergencies and toward recovery and reconstruction (UNHCR, 2020e). However, sustainable solutions are beyond reach with the decline of funding, the fragile and severely damaged built environment, and the (re)surfacing crises. Time passed, yet the gaps between needs and provisions remain unbridgeable (UNHCR Iraq, 2020).

Ten of those 40 humanitarian camps, set formerly, still host Syrian refugees of Kurdish ethnicity. These refugees started to arrive in masses to the KR-I since 2012, with a combination of fear of being persecuted as 'enemies of the sovereign', the region represented for many Syrians a destination to go. For the Kurds, the kinship affiliations and concentration of better life opportunities just across the border redirect this move; it was somehow a move from one home towards (an imagined) another. In 2022, with the absence of a "clear solution" in the present and future Syria, this displacement seems to have a "no-return" status. Camps, therefore, became the spatial and material forms representation of the endless waiting: pre-fixed characteristics and futures are (re)shaped continuously by constellations of actors. The hosting practices are conditioned mainly by the geopolitical histories' characteristics of each hosting country, laws, and socio-economic factors. The camp spaces become the stage where multiple realities collide, producing a hybrid material image of displacement(s) narratives and re-identifications possibilities.

In this "decade of displacement", durable solutions are far out of reach, with displacees in protracted waiting while their former habitat is still inhabitable (iDMC, 2021). With the chronic insecurity in the region,

the expected camp lifespan exceeds the regular 18-26 years (Grafham & Lahn, 2018; Gil Loescher & Milner, 2005; UNHCR, 2016a). According to the KRG (2021) and UNHCR reports, around 30,000 refugees suffering from economic distress are on the waiting list to be relocated to camps. It seems that, in a state of protractedness, chronic socio-economic fragilities and the uncertainties of return, these humanitarian sites are becoming the only resort compared to the other options. According to interviews with refugees and humanitarian workers, these camps appear as “the right place to be at the moment” with “their own people”- (i.e., Syrian Kurds), a location to practice everydayness “as they used to”. These spaces, enmeshing some sort of safety nets of aid and support, are becoming loci for “active waiting and changing hopes” (Brun, 2015), and places to anchor momentarily. Consequently, this prolonged anchored waiting seems to shift the present and future vectors to the camp as it becomes some sort of “home” and, in many cases, envisages prospects for the foreseen future.

Furthermore, the prolonged reality of these receiving sites, the protraction of displacement, and the inability to go back and/or rebuild quickly have continuously resurrected claims to link relief with rehabilitation and development responses. These claims raised by humanitarian actors, activists, and academic voices, included adding and refining self-reliance, durability, and socio-economic resilience components. Many funded projects within camps indeed attempted to have such components, including participation, training, and cash for work (CFW) to hire refugees. However, in practice, all seem to boil down to top-down implantation swinging between aid and (unfinished) development operations, crippled by bureaucratic procedures with “assigned” budgets and depending on donors’ changing agendas and the political climate. Indeed, the camps’ lived realities appear unfinished, lacking clear time-space frames and multi-dimensional impacts on the hosts. They seem to fail largely to absorb present shocks and later on even cause the resurgence of different crises (economic, health, violence, armed struggles, famine.), with chronic vulnerabilities to ever-latent host communities’ struggles. The research shall trace the ways in which a mismatch exists between temporary humanitarian camps/settlements as emergency interventions and the chronic crisis-ridden fragile conditions that camps/settlements root in, which leads to the creation of sequential crippled urbanisation processes in an endless need for a boost.



Distribution of Kurds across Turkey, Iran, and Iraq (1996). Source: Redrawn based on McDowall (2004), *A Modern History of the Kurds*, Depicted in (Kaya, 2020)

1.2. Uprooted Kurds (re) Rooted in the Fatherland

“The self cannot be understood outside history.”

(Giddens, 1984)

Refuge (and power) have always dwelt in locality: the refugee is a product of territorial dispossession, (collateral) damage of upheavals resulting partially or completely in inhabitability of a location: socio-economic insecurities, spatial damages of infrastructures and the physical environments, and the (partial) elimination from a current home. Such elimination experience of an ‘original’ geographical belonging and political citizenship to another state leads to a rupture of ties to worldly things and turns their ‘being’ experienced unanchored. Being forced by necessity into a collective placement in uncertainty results in torment experienced individually and shared collectively.

In the case of the Kurds and Kurdistan, being trapped between maps and reality (O’Shea, 2004), is an understatement. The fierce conflict for the right to a Kurdish identity geographically separated by nation-states’ map lines has created periodic and multiple waves of displacement and become connotated with the Kurdish experience (McDowall, 2004, 2020). Today, apart from a dotted line marking the KR-I autonomous boundaries, the imagined Kurds’ Fatherland does not exist on world countries’ maps. Since the nation-states project of 1916, what was once known as Kurdistan, is sliced by the imposed political borders of Iran, Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. Though the geographical coordinates did not shift, the new (re)articulation of identities under banners of nation-building projects hardly allowed active Kurdish recognition on the global stage (until the activation of the autonomy rights of the KR-I in the 2005 Iraqi constitution).

This geographical slicing consequently fragmented its population bonds territorially embedded, where Kurds have suffered oppression practices differed periodically and geographically. These practices varied contextually: economic marginalisation, cultural cleansing, violent assimilation, persecution, habitat destruction and genocides (Gunter, 2019; Tejel, 2009, 2019; Yildiz, 2004, 2005). These various oppressive practices have created different sub-narratives, separated by borders of the containing nation-states, which in turn expanded the sub-cultural differences and collective memories, partially recognising Kurds living across the borders. Despite fragmentations as such, the Kurds’ collective memory bare generational and living recollections of forced displacements, involuntary dislocations, and violence.

Today the presence of Syrian Kurdish refugees in the KR-I challenges the common perception of refugees as “out of place”: characterised by their country of nationality, the generalisation of a nation-state “belonging”, embraced as well by humanitarian actors and international laws.

1.2.1. Syrian Kurds and the “Homecoming” displacement towards the KR-I

Ethnically and linguistically a distinct group, Syria’s Kurds inhabit lands close to the Turkish and Iraqi borders, including Kurdish pockets in other parts of the country, particularly Damascus and Aleppo. Syria’s Kurds, a historically marginalised ethnicity (Tejel, 2009), have been under systemic discrimination and repression (Yildiz, 2005). Though this research’s geographical focus is on the KR-I and forced displacements within and into the region, a brief recollection of the Kurds’ situation in Syria prior to the displacement is necessary to grasp the relational sub-historical connection enmeshed with geographies and their Kurdish inhabitants.

1.2.1.1. Stateless in “Our Land”

Many Kurds living in Syria hold national citizenship; however, the presence of stateless Kurds dates back to the Jazira census in 1962. This governmental census required those who lived in the northern Syrian parts to register and provide documentary “evidence” of their generational presence since the 1920s. As a result of this census, the Kurds who lived in this area were split into three categories:

- 1) Citizens: those who managed to fulfil the registration requirements.
- 2) *Ajanb*: (Foreigners – أجانب): those who tried to register but did not fulfil the registration requirements, therefore, lost their citizenship and were given a foreigner’s residence permit.
- 3) *Maktoum* (silenced – مكتوم) those who never tried to register and were removed from the administrative registry system.

These three statuses are hereditary. The *Ajanib* and *Maktoum* Kurdish groups were not, as Lund (2016) puts it, “seen as a rights-bearing subject delegitimising all claims”. As such, the census defined those who have “the rights to have rights” (Arendt, 1948/2009), excluding them from “the others”. Among the more different forms of inequity, some 300,000– roughly 15 per cent of the estimated two million total Kurds in Syria – remain stateless and have no (access to) fundamental rights (Harling, 2013). Indeed, due to continuous discrimination and delegitimation, stateless Kurds are likely to be more impoverished than the average non-Kurdish groups.


Being geographically far from the centre, this construction of the “rightless other” was a foundational step to legitimise the elimination measures against the “Kurdish danger” and an important part of the “Save Arabism” campaign. This campaign made the path for the Ba’athist military officer Mohammad Talib Hilal’s military “Arab Cordon plan” (Al Hizam al-Arabi الحزام العربي) implementation in Upper Jazeera region, a 350km long and 10-15 km wide inside Syria far from Turkish, and Iraqi borders (Syrians for Truth and Justice, 2020; Yildiz, 2005)². Al Hizam al-Arabi was carried out under the wide agrarian and land reforms policies and legitimised measures spreading the regime’s control over oil and water resources in these areas. These measures included land confiscation, denial of many Kurdish landowners’ citizenship claims, eviction, dispersion and Arabization, relocation, and setting “model towns” for the new Arab settlers (Othman, 1992; Syrians for Truth and Justice, 2020; Yildiz, 2005). The belt became fully

² Full plan document found in Maisel (2018, pp. 342-345)


operational in 1973 by Hafiz El Assad's government upon completing Tabqa Dam and Lake Assad, one of the major infrastructural projects on the Euphrates.

The cultural cleansing measures that started in 1945 intensified all over the country under the Ba'ath regime. These measures included banning learning written Kurdish, Kurdish books and literature, fostering "Arabic" as the only official language, the deportation of Kurdish religious figures, inaccessibility of education and employment for the Kurds, and denial of voting for non-Arabic speakers. Moreover, they also included substituting the Kurdish town names with Arabic ones, which varied by region (Balanche, 2018; Tejel, 2009, 2019): for instance, Dirik became Mallekieh, Sari Ka'nieh became Ras El Ayin, and Chal Agha became Jwadih. All these measures became more effective in the early 1970s, while Kurdish politicians were seen as "suspects", continuously under surveillance and often persecuted as a "threat to its national security and unity". As such, even those Kurds who are citizens, theoretically entitled to rights, "do not have exclusively rightful means of exercising them" (Lund, 2016), and became a representation of *second-degree citizens* and are rarely promoted despite their "proven" loyalties to the regime (Chaliand & Ghassemlou, 1993; Maisel, 2018; Tejel, 2009).

These forms of marginalisation and underdevelopment measures continued and resulted in substantially lower education levels (Albarazi & van Waas, 2016) and (Kurds) economic migration waves toward cities. Although revolts occasionally erupted every now and then, highlighted by the 2004 Qamishli revolt, which was brutally suppressed and many Kurds were killed, imprisoned, or fled, seeking refuge across the borders. Most of these revolts were quickly crushed.



Arabization of Kurdish Villages Names 1958-1970 Map depicted in (Balanche, 2018)



The Arab belt , relocation movements of Arabs and New model towns for the relocated Arabs, Based on Syrians for Truth and Justice (2020), Yildiz (2005) and Othman (1992) (Author, 2022).


1.2.1.2. Syrian Kurds Displacement Movements Since 2011

In March 2011, the Syrian Uprising erupted as part of the so-called “Arab Spring” in the MENA, starting from the city of Deraa in the southwest, and spreading to other Syrian cities, all demanding democratic reforms and the resignation of President Bashar Al Assad (Schøtt, 2017). Similar to other uprisings across the country, demonstrations, on smaller scales, also erupted in Kurdish-inhabited areas, headed by young people; one of the protests’ Fridays in 2011 was called by its Kurdish name “Îna Azadî” (Freedom Friday) (Allsopp, 2015; KB, 2011; Zisser, 2015). Unlike other protest areas, the Kurdish ones were partially spared the regime counter-insurgency attacks; due to their location far from the administrative and economic centres, these uprisings hardly reached other age groups and the broader population of the Kurds.

In an attempt to keep the situation calm in this region, the Assad regime issued Decree 49 in 2011, which gave thousands of stateless Kurds the possibility of acquiring citizenship. According to UNHCR Middle East and North Africa (2016) report, some 104,000 stateless individuals had acquired nationality by mid-2013. Nonetheless, the current conflict has made the process of applying for nationality difficult and has made it hard to map the impact of this decree on the number of stateless Kurds in Syria. So far, there are no precise figures on how many stateless Kurds have fled to other countries (Albarazi & van Waas, 2016).

The situation changed dramatically after the regime's withdrawal in July 2012 to be substituted. Kurdish non-state actors surfaced, replacing government personnel ‘peacefully’ (Allsopp, 2015; Harling, 2013; McDowall, 2020) Initially, the replacement was assumed to be transitional, to protect the Kurdish areas, provide temporary substitute services and advocate for a better community for the expected post-Assad regime. However, this replacement started expanding their control over Rojava and creating what seemed like a stable – Kurdish- enclave compared to the rest of the country. Non-regime political and militia bodies were geographically concentrated in relation to ethnicity distribution Kurdish Democratic Union Party – Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat- PYD, People’s defence unit Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, YPG and People’s Protection Unit-Yekîneyên Parastina Jin, YPJ. After the Kobane Siege and war against ISIS (2015), an alliance with other non-Kurdish groups became known today as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), with a common goal to protect the Euphrates Valley. This region today– in 2022- is governed by the Autonomous Administration of North and Easter Syria (AANES) and divided into three cantons: Efrin, Kobane and Cizire.

Even with the sporadic historical events and continuous administrative and political shifts in the Kurdish-inhabited areas since mid-2012, the Kurds in Syria are still far from internationally recognised autonomy in contrast to their Iraqi counterparts. Their aspirations remain at the mercy of internal feuds, hostility with Arabs and regional rivalries over the Kurdish question (Harling, 2013).




2010 POPULATION BY CANTON

CIZIRE	1,300,000
EFRIN	900,000
KOBANE	350,000


ROJAVA ADMINISTRATION




SYRIAN ADMINISTRATION



Rojava Population and Future Administration organization . Depicted in (Balanche, 2018)



PYD EXPANSION
Inhabited | Uninhabited



OTHER ACTORS
Inhabited | Uninhabited




PYD Expansion in Northern Syria- May 2017. Depicted in (Balanche, 2018)

1.2.2.1. Refugees in the Fatherland


In a few months, the flow of the displaced increased dramatically, clogging the region's rural and urban areas. Syria-Kurds who lived in direct conflict areas fled to their (extended) families in towns and cities close to Turkish Borders (known today as Rojava). In addition, the situation in Rojava witnessed an acceleration of violence, shifting geographies of armed confrontations, an increase in children militarisation, and economic degradation, among many others. Syrian Kurds who did not align with the post-conflict formed Kurdish authorities' practices, either left on their own or fled persecution from different groups. Since then, the inhabitable situation has become an everyday experience intensified by the geographical control of ISIS in Syria between 2013-2017 and (followed) by Turkish military operation threats enacted in 2019 in the name of its national and border security.

For many Syrian Kurds, the movement vector pointed toward the KR-I due to shared cultural and ethnic roots, cross-border kinship bonds and presumed economic prosperity across the borders. These factors, coupled with the longed-for official presence of 'Kurdish' sovereignty, created a magnitude pulling many Syrian Kurds to redirect their future vectors' geography -temporarily- towards KR-I. Therefore, displacement waves started pouring through border crossings of Sahela and Fesh-Khabour to arrive in what many identify as 'KURDISTAN': the Fatherland. The reality of Nation-State borders, citizen vs refugee dichotomy, different Kurdish dialects, and discontinuity of sub-group histories challenged the "homecoming" expectations.

The displacement waves of Syrian Kurds had many successions, and humanitarian camps were planned, constructed, and opened to host the "brothers and sisters". In 2022, around 100,000 Kurdish Syrians reside in ten camps, mostly former inhabitants of the Qamishli and Hassekeh governorates in Syria. Plans to expand camps, build new units and upgrade their services are in a motion responding to a long list of refugees requesting to move into camps. These camps are discussed in detail in chapter 5.



North-East Syrian Displacement during 2019 (Turkish military operations). The troops on the ground include Turkish Armed Forces and allied non-state groups (UN & Humanitarian Actors, 2019)



Military Situation in Northeast Syria, April, 2022 (Etana, 2022)

1.2.3. Forced Displacement Urbanism in The Kurdistan Region of Iraq

The Republic of Iraq's capital is Baghdad, and two official languages, Arabic and Kurdish. The country is a federal parliamentary republic with 19 governorates and one autonomous region. The Kurdistan region of Iraq (KR-I) became autonomous in 1970, only to be fully activated in 2005. The KR-I region consists of 4 governorates: Duhok, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and recently Halabja, and the majority of its population are Kurds. The climate in the KRI is semi-arid, characterised by hot summers and moderately cold winters

1.2.3.1. Kurds' Power Spheres and Displacement until WWII

Today's KR-I 's territories were mainly located on the peripheries of opposing and contesting powers: the Ottoman and the Persian empires, yet, relatively far from the control centres. These locations provided room to territorial powers (re)structuration of particular socio-political tribal and religious roots. Under the flags of the Ottoman and Persian Empires until the 1850s, Kurdish moods of sovereignty were mainly emirates or state-like powers of tribal confederations associated with defined territory. After the fall of these emirates, the religious sphere of sheikhs and their followers filled the power vacuum, crossing territorial and class boundaries. The rapidity and scale of these power shifts consequently triggered man-made conflicts and wars, inducing violent territorial dislocations, annihilations, deportations, (dis)possessions and refuge-seeking/granting practices. As such, socio-spatial territorial future vectors, relocating homes and roots were intertwined with a matrix of tribal customs, religious doctrines, and opportunities' structures for both parties: the host and the hosted, whether perceived as 'guests' or a 'brothers'. Nonetheless, the guest/brother categorisation differentiated the space-time allocation of refuge seekers' presence between temporary and permanence, ranging from guesthouses to villages' expansion within the host's territories.

By the end of WWI and the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the aftermath of forced displacement waves changed the socio-spatial realities for various ethnic groups. This period witnessed intensive international aid and relief (spatial) practices of groups such as the near-east foundation. These practices included setting and various operationalising typologies of buildings and sites with different expiration dates to address the massive shelter and protection needs. Baqouba temporary refugee camp is an example of these practices: a modern model of organised and ordered space for Christian -Arminian and Assyrian-refugees waiting for repatriation or resettlement.

For the Kurds, these circumstances and the implementation of the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement, map lines welded as new nation-states borders, consolidating in the everyday socio-spatial reality. These lines gradually ruptured territorially fused bonds forged by blood, kinships, conflicts, and power; as the authority of non-Kurds over the Kurds widened. This situation steered nationalism sentiments fed by the living memory of distrust, crises, and dismissal of Kurds' cultural rights. Consequently, power spheres, and refuge-seeking practices, reinvented themselves within these circumstances, which shall be explored in chapter 3.



*Baqouba Refugee Camp for Assyrian and Arminan refugees in North Baghdad, Iraq 1920.
The images are taken by the British Royal Airforce and currently exist in the national archives in London.
Sources: Layout Austin (1920) - Photos: (British Royal Airforce, 1919)*

1.2.3.2. Spatializing Kurds' dislocations and relocations in the KR-I between 1951-2005

Overthrowing the monarchy in Iraq in 1958 carried political promises of stability and equality but fell apart for the Kurds inhabiting North-Eastern areas (McDowall, 2020). As such, this period witnessed a succession of (political) instabilities and revolts as a reaction to successive practices of Iraqi administrations of Arabization to change the ethnic make-up in Kurdish-inhabited areas, especially in oil-rich zones, which were countered by military operations. These instabilities led to the dislocations that dislocated thousands of the Kurds and largely destroyed their habitat.

Nonetheless, the signage of the 1970 accord and presumably giving the region its autonomy, gave hope again for prosperity and reconstruction (Genat, 2017). However, as accord agreement was continuously breached, especially by the Arabization strategy of emplacing, leasing, and repopulating Kurdish-inhabited areas. About 250,000 Kurds were expelled from their habitat along the Iranian border to the Syrian-Turkish one. Consequently, the peace fell apart, with new revolts crushed brutally in 1975. These practices intensified after delineating a *cordon sanitaire*, which, similar to the Syrian Arab belt, was set along the Iranian border and later during the 1980-88 Iraq-Iran war. These measures reached their climax against the Kurds with the "Anfal campaign", ending with Halabja's genocide in 1988. The destruction reached 3,000 -4,000 Kurdish villages and towns, and hundreds of thousands of the Kurds either "disappeared" or ruptured from their ancestral lands scattered within and outside Iraq's boundaries (HRW, 2004). The relocation sites of the displaced Kurds were named "mojamma't" *مجمعات*, collective settlements", constructed by the Iraqi state military at the time, devolved gradually from modern models to disciplinary, army-guarded confinement sites to be mere lines drawn on the dirt (Leezenberg, 2004; Moldoch, 2017). These sites' dwellers were subjected to (forced) assimilation and ethnic identity transformation (commonly referred to as "nationality correction") to Arabs (Leezenberg, 2004). Between destructions, involuntary dislocations, forced relocations, and atrocities, the generational territorial bonds that survived the state-nations creation, were shattered with horror and marked its landscapes forever.

After a series of events following the first Gulf war, the Kurdish exodus in 1990 and the declaration of the Kurdish region as a "No-fly-zone" in 1991, the region fell into chaos. More than two million Iraqi Kurds lived in dehumanising conditions in camps along the KR-I's immediate borders. Within the borders, the condition was no less chaotic. The KR-I fell into an administrative vacuum after the withdrawal of Iraqi government officials and internal Kurdish political conflicts, intensified by the USA and the Iraqi double economic embargo. To stabilise the situation, and facilitate humanitarian operations and development interventions, the presence of official UN bodies in the KR-I became essential.

The humanitarian intervention included re-emerging temporary refugee camps within the autonomous region; as a transition to accommodate the refugees, some of the former "mojamma't" acted as well as receiving sites for the returnees. UN bodies' development interventions within the Oil for Food Program (OFFP) frame played an essential role in the displacement sites' spatial progression, bringing the concentration of income-generating opportunities and steering waves of internal (re)placements. Some of the mojamma't acted as receptors for these waves, turning into busy hubs and middle-sized settlements (Moldoch, 2017; Francesca Recchia, 2014); others were swollen by the encroachment of major cities' urbanisation, while the rest were left for decay (Mahzouni, 2013). In all

cases, aid dependency and patronage networks became essential for sustaining the everyday (HRW, 2004; UN Habitat, 2001).

1.2.3.3. Prosperity, Hospitality and Fragility in KR-I Since 2005

The scale was tipped in the Kurds' favour after the War on Iraq, overthrowing the regime in April 2003, as the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) had effective sovereignty over KR-I territorial boundaries, resources, and its federal budget. The KR-I underwent extensive infrastructure upgrades, construction projects, and national capacity-building projects supported by international partners (Leezenberg, 2015; McDowall, 2020; Natali, 2010). The KR-I transformed into an island of socio-political stability and economic prosperity within a hotspot zone (Leezenberg, 2017) and became a magnet for various displaced and international groups' investments. As such, the KR-I converted from a producer into a receptor for displacees and became the base for humanitarian agencies. Many of the displaced arrived in former collective towns while setting camps and settlements differed in relation to the occupant group of "guests" and "bothers", depending on ethnicity.

However, chronic conflict situations are characterised by periods of instability that continue post-acute emergencies, (re)occurring consistently as shocks and waves, while the consequences of severe fragilities persist over time (Schafer, 2002). the image of a prosperous KR-I glazed the region's inherited fragility, uncovered by pressures accompanying the subsequent events. This visible stability seems to be under the threat of chronic instability spreading across federal and national borders. These events shall be further detailed in chapter 4.

1.3. Research Objectives and Questions

The research's guiding question is: How can we read "refugee camps" in the Kurdistan region of Iraq in relation to the particular geopolitical history of forced displacements? The overarching question is how the landscape is (re)produced in an interplay of disciplinary and humanitarian practices on the one hand and everyday (survival) practices on the other.

To answer these questions, this research reconstructs the KR-I's territorial biography from the forced displacement lens. Therefore, it employs Corboz (1983) urban landscape as a palimpsest, Gregotti (2009)'s form of the territory and Lefebvre (1991) production of space, to examine different modes of involuntary dislocations and relocations that shaped this territory. Deriving from the research questions and the specificity of the studied group and geography, the research explores:

- a) The historical (re)construction of the territorial logic of power that shaped forced displacement and how sorting and shifting population intertwined with refuge-seeking-granting spaces and practices.
- b) Different regimes and power figures use the settlement as a spatial apparatus to categorise, legitimise and construct multi-scalar and territorial-based the self and the other.
- c) The geopolitical and socio-spatial particularities of forced displacements and their receiving sites that allow and condition their (urban) progression.
- d) The subverted and Janus-faced meanings that such spaces can carry as the everyday becomes an interplay of steadfastness, resistance, interdependencies, and homemaking.

Based on the above, the research aspires to document and analyse the Syrian-Kurds Refugee Camps as a particular case of receiving sites for the forcibly displaced in the KR-I. It shall explore the genealogy of forced displacement receiving sites set anew in the KR-I, focusing on refugee camps as emerging alien, new geographies within the geopolitical complexity of the region's post-colonial history. These sites have been witnessing different modes of space production (Lefebvre, 1991), within a region of chronic modes of conflict, and displacement has been historically the norm. Therefore, this study aims to move beyond the typical perception of the camps in KRI as "liminal spaces" to place them as multi-faced processes of urbanisation and re-identification in the regional frame. It shall incorporate what seems to be (re)formation and crystallisation of different forms of citizenship (Isin, 2002). Furthermore, it aims to address the different forms of agency (formal and informal), finding meaning between the "given and taken" and the "lived" as they come to resemble urbanity (Jansen, 2018).

This research has many ambitious goals. Firstly, explore and define the nature of the KR-I displacement receiving sites (re)incarnations as responses to involuntary dislocations. Secondly, trace refuge-seeking and granting practices within shifting spheres of power temporally and territorially (re)configured. Thirdly, (re)constitute spatial and territorial "governing" and "planning", which carry the Janus-faced care and control rationales. For this specific group (the Kurds) and geography (KR-I), successions of disruptions and distortions of violent conflicts and forced displacement are rooted in the land, the (living) collective memory. Fourthly, contribute to a broader growing body of knowledge that tackles "homing

displacement". This case demonstrates how "home" carries different meanings and scales in space-time relations: here (in the camp/in KR-I) and there (Syria, the former habitat), and then (before displacement/ before the formation of the nation-states) and now (in the waiting). This fourth goal looks at these spatial settings as worlds in the making, wielded by constellations of actors and interdependencies (re)produce perceptions of habitability, materially consolidating in a new geography. Finally, bring to the fore these receiving sites' role in the spatiotemporal processes of recollecting the self and (re)constituting the other (individual, group, community,..). These processes depart from the "state of exception" (Agamben, 1998) of temporary spaces on routes to consolidated places of everyday life and laying (new territorial) roots.

1.4. Research Strategies and Data Resources

Forced displacement is undoubtedly one of the reoccurring challenges in this century. Architects and urbanists in this field aspire to formulate practical recommendations through practice, academic research, and knowledge building. Their goals include (re)shaping policies and real-time solutions for practitioners, humanitarian actors and governments, all tempting to improve the status quo of the uncertain every day (Jacobsen & Landau, 2003). Refugee research, indeed, has always been a sensitive and complex area of study, frequently employing simplistic study and data collection methods to 'explore rich, textured and complex phenomena' (Lenette, 2019, p. xiii). This growing discipline falls into the intersection of major ones, including geography, politics, sociology, anthropology, psychology and recently, economy and urbanism. Humanitarian displacement camps, read within these intersections, represent paradigms of the ways in which 'urbanism as a discipline continuously acts as a receptor of new practices and discourses, adapting to ever-changing urban realities' (De Meulder, Ryckewaert, & Shannon, 2009). The following sections shall explain various research strategies, positionality, methods and tools employed to situate the research within these disciplines.

1.4.1. Researcher Position

A series of unfortunate and fortunate events led me to do this research. In the course of this scientific inquiry, I found answers to questions I never dared (or wanted) to ask, confronted realities I never dreamt of facing, and found answers I did not expect nor wanted to find. On these routes, I (dis)connected with my roots, lost battles, won others, (re)visited pasts and projected futures in different geographies. In the next part, I shall follow Snounu (2021) self-reflexivity strategy "by writing down my feelings and thoughts and making sure my audience was aware of my positionality" to do this research.

1.4.1.1. Series of Unfortunate and Fortunate Events

Ethnically, I belong to the Kurdish Zibar family who has lived in Syria since the 1850s. The family's elderlies tell stories about our grand grandfather, one of 11 brothers, fleeing a blood feud against the tribe and being dispersed across the land—the Zibari tribe that has, till today, a territorial presence in the Zibar district (قضاء الزيبار Erbil governorate) in the KR-I. Our grand-grandfather found refuge with a Kurdish group lived in a small town called Ma 'mal Ūshāghī (معمل اوشاغي), located nearby the current Syrian-Turkish border (close to the Afrin/Aleppo provenance). At the time, this area was part of the Aleppo Vilayat/Ottoman empire, and today in 2022, back again under some sort of Turkish mandate. My great-grandfather became one of "them" by living and marrying into his hosting group. Generationally, my family, similar to many Kurds, had moved within this territory towns and cities seeking better economic

and education opportunities: from Ma 'mal Ūshāghī to Afrin town to finally arrive in Aleppo, where I was born and raised. As they moved in space and time, the family also witnessed territorial changes that accompanied historical events, including the French mandate (1923-1946), the Syrian independence (1946), political (in)stabilities, and the Syrian conflict (2011). Today, my nuclear and extended family are either internally displaced, refugees or migrants, fragmented within and across Syrian borders. Most of them lost faith in returning to a place we once identified as "home".

1.4.1.2. Leaving, relocating and Revisiting "Homes"

During the years, I experienced being the "other", similar to what Said (1978) describes, yet in a very subtle manner, at least in the beginning. Mundane conversations with non-Kurds always had sentences similar to "if you were not Kurdish", then this or that would have been possible. I was barely educated about Kurdistan beyond my spoken Kurmanji dialect and some whispers here and there. I was advised to avoid trouble by not speaking Kurdish in public institutions, staying away from non-Baathist political parties, and limiting any aspirations in high-ranked governmental positions. For a Kurdish woman, laying low was the strategy to be safe. Most of the time, it felt "normal" to walk on the sidelines of life.


That was what I understood till I left the country for Egypt for a workshop on September 15th 2012, and I did not expect it was a no-return journey. After the sudden closure of Aleppo airport, I found myself unanchored, and I needed a visa and a permit to stay in each country. Doing research at the university was the cheapest and most effective strategy to stay and work legally, which was the case with studying and living in Egypt (5 years), Germany (4 years) and Belgium (2 years and counting). Studying has been an unexpected protection shield from cultural, religious, and bureaucratic complexities that faces a single woman linked and living in traditional societies. Studying at a European University later opened many closed doors and opportunities and even some border gates.

In the years of doing the field research, despite my Kurdishness, and a family name linked to the territory, I still needed a visa (issued internally) to enter the KR-I every time, valid for 30 days. One of the study's main limitations is the unpredictable political and chronic instabilities in Iraq and the KR-I. This limitation affected the accessibility to the field between July 2017-September 2018 due to the residual conflicts with ISIS and the travel and economic embargo that the central Iraqi government on the KR-I directly after the referendum (September 2017).

Arriving in what I believed to be the "Fatherland" was an exceptional experience; it felt like answering a long-awaited call. However, at the Erbil Airport, political borders and gateways reminded me of my stateless ethnicity, problematic nationality, and conditioned presence. I stood in the non-European queues, showing my documents, as my German permit and Kurdish visa were examined for forgery. Officers spoke to me in Sorani Kurdish, which I did not speak; trying with my Kormanji usually did not work, so we had to revert to English, which the officers hardly mastered, preferring it to Arabic. I experienced the same gate treatment in every security check between the territorial political divisions with the KR-I.

According to Griffith (1998), the researcher could be an insider, "someone whose biography [...] gives her [sic] a lived familiarity with the group being researched" or could be an outsider "who does not have any intimate knowledge of the group being researched prior to entry into the group" (Griffith, 1998), in

that sense, being at that geography at that specific moment in time, I was an outsider with a feeling of an imposed insider.



Author's family displacement movements



Ma 'mal Ūshāghī , Author's Hometown
(Esri, 2022)

1.4.1.3. Staying in Domiz 1

The mix of feelings and experiences I had by being in Domiz 1 camp and visiting other camps were unpredictable. I was more at ease being in camps than in the cities. I hardly experienced any sense of disorientation in these new places; I could read the Arabic written signs, such as Rondek (beautiful - روندك) in Kurmanji Kurdish, echoed and bringing to the fore memories from past lives. Morning radio songs of Fairouz, road trip songs played privately by Zakaria Abdullah intermixed in the camp's streets with the smell of cheese *fatayer*, grilled meat and freshly ground coffee with cardamon. To my surprise, I found pharmaceutical products from Syrian factories that I thought were impossible to come by. . I was shocked at how familiar it felt to be there, although I had never met any camp dwellers before. The informal conversations had a similar effect to a large extent. The camp, for me, emerged as a collage of agreed-upon phrases, languages, and sensory and visual memories set on an unfamiliar canvas. These sensations, aromas, and materialities brought back memories of my busy working-class neighbourhood between Al Aziziyeh and Alhamidyeh in Aleppo. Interestingly, part of Alhamidyeh was once an Armenian refugee camp set by the Near East Relief Missions in the 1920s

Informal talks and formal interviews revealed, implicitly and explicitly, my "privileged" position as the "one who got away". In informal talks, my position came to the fore in different modalities: questions by younger groups about life in Europe, phrases related to the inability to go or dreams and plans to resettle, while with the elderly, it was about longing to other family members, or the non-alignment of cultural norms by othering themselves saying "they are not like us", or "one should stay where his/her head is at peace". In formal interviews, using phrases like "us refugees" and "we refugees" meant taking me out of the equation, despite the generous informal welcoming, sharing tea, coffee and, on many occasions, food and goodbyes as "one of us". Some families from Afrin seemed to worry about "scandals spreading" of being refugees among a possible common network (which we did not share) and expressed discomfort about conducting the interview or meeting me. This fact singled the awareness of the shame of being a "refugee" as a stigma associated with homelessness, weakness, and dependency.

This time, my assumption that I was an insider was far from experience; I was the "other" again, this time as some sort of cautiously welcomed outsider.

1.4.1.4. Doing the research in Chronic conflict Zone:

"The field of refugee studies and state policies are considered very sensitive for researchers and are considered very sensitive issues, making it difficult for researchers to gain access to first-hand data" (Mencütek, 2018). Indeed, a conditional and sometimes restrictive research environment existed for me: a female researcher of Kurdish background and Syrian nationality. Nonetheless, my family name and doing a PhD at a European university did open many formal and informal doors and closed others. Procedures took longer than some European and American researchers I met, which usually acquired permits with a single email. I needed to visit the authorities to clarify my intentions and get official permission from the Asayish (who handles domestic security throughout the Kurdistan Region) to do the research on-site. This approval was decentralised to each city's camps.

These difficulties interplayed with more alternative ways to tackle access difficulties through endorsements of informal networks to get official documents faster. In addition, BORDA-Wesca in Iraq facilitated my work through an internship in 2018 and then a task-based contract in 2019, which acted more as a way to get the visa and facilitate permission. Being actively involved as a project consultant and hanging out with many humanitarian workers have uncovered the highly institutionalised dimension and power structures in relation to humanitarian and governmental collaboration, all embedded deeply in the region's development and progression. In all cases, similar to Snounu (2021)'s situation, conducting qualitative research in the KR-I, despite being an enclave of relative safety in Iraq, "requires being aware of the level of risk to undertake, being flexible to changing plans, and being careful when sharing opinions as your life may be at risk when offering a different opinion".

1.5. Methods

This research used a mixed-methods approach to collect the data necessary to answer the research questions. This research mainly focuses on the spatiality of the forced displacements and their receiving sites within the historical, and geopolitical context that restructures the territory and (re) shapes the displacees' living experience and Kurdish (sub) collective memories. The collected data illuminated different aspects of the settlement set anew and the time-space experience for different users.

The research employs Lefebvre's (1991) Triade to examine the sites as:

- 1) Designed
- 2) Constructed and conceived
- 3) (re)Appropriated by a constellation of actors.

To explore the first point: the site as designed, the research focuses on the development of policies and logic addressing forced displacement waves in chronic conflict zones and the progression of camp/settlement designs and implementation to manage and control such complex situations (part 1- Chapter 2). For the second point, the site as constructed and conceived, the focus has been on the entanglement of the KR-I history of involuntary dislocations and relocations, captured in a genealogy of their receiving sites. More precisely, the focus is on refuge-seeking/granting practices spatially and territorially present. Therefore, the research traced these practices and these sites back in history, reaching the ongoing situation in camps for displacees from the Syrian Conflict and the rise and fall of ISIS. The historical data were retrieved and reconstructed from an extensive literature review on academic research focusing on the Kurds, policy documents, and humanitarian and development organisations' reports (UNHCR, UN-Habitat, NRC, RNDVO, BCF.), historical and humanitarian organisations maps were KRG official reports (publicly available. Media articles, novels, blogs, and policy briefs also provided rich secondary data supporting the research. For the third point: the site as (re)appropriated: through fieldwork interviews, the focus was to understand how different users (re)adjust the settlements within the existing limitations: displacees, aid workers, government officials and host communities experienced the camp. (Part 3).

1.5.1. Fieldwork

Fieldwork generated qualitative data, visual materials, and ethnographic texts. Semi-structured and open-ended interviews, hanging out, and spatial mapping (Alexandra, 2017; Creswell, 2007; Jean, 2010;

Yin, 2009) were among the methods in the fieldwork carried out between 2018-2019. I also occasionally contacted a number of my interviewees between 2020-2022, through digital tools of WhatsApp and Zoom, due to Covid movement restrictions.

The primary questionnaire for refugees was first revised by mental health specialists and psychologists working at Jiyan Foundation for Human Rights INGO (German-Kurdish), Germany-based and active in Duhok Province. The goal was to validate that these questions shall not provoke latent post-trauma memories and suit the sensitive experience of refugeehood³.

In the Domiz 1 refugee camp, where I did my interviews and ethnographic study, I stayed with two Syrian-Kurdish ladies for a week; one worked at the Jiyan foundation and offered me a place to stay. Though the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) personnel in the camp noted that they were not responsible for my safety after 2:00 PM as they left. Nonetheless, I was assured that the camp was “a safe place to stay”. Being Syrian and a Kurd has eliminated linguistic and cultural barriers to a large extent. Furthermore, being a female researcher also impacted the study; it has allowed me to enter the dwelling units, take pictures and talk freely to women and men with minimum gender sensitivities. With the help of one of the refugees, who worked as a janitor at the Domiz 1 camp management, I climbed the water tanks to take pictures of the camp. I walked around and took photos of the routes, the spaces and the camp facilities and was able to calculate walking distances with my iPhone.

The research conducted in the Erbil camps was more on a “visits” basis. I accompanied UNHCR staff (in their car) to the field, which facilitated passing many checkpoints and opening closed gates. They guided me generously, providing their field notes about the physical situation in the camp and different logistical measures that played a role in the camp's daily life. They also supported my interviews with camp management (in each camp I visited) and oral permission to take pictures of the camp setting from the Asayish.

1.5.1.1. Interviews

The refugee studies discipline tends to have the ‘good intent quest’ to communicate the findings in academia and policy makers’ lobbies. The researcher may always fall into the vicious circle of objectifying the affected population who live in the situations studied. Hence, semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions and informal hanging out with refugees allowed them to share their viewpoints and experiences (Turner, 2010) and tell ‘their story’ (Creswell, 2007). ‘Voicing out’ refugees have tuned the understanding of the other parallel processes accompanying the camp’s space and (re) produces it.

Part 3, which focuses on the micro-level of the everydayness embedded in a spatial setting, builds up the argument focusing on one refugee camp: the Domiz1 refugee camp. In order to employ these methods, it has been essential to frame the selected case study in its historical and geopolitical context. Such framing allowed to offer a deeper understanding of the local and transnational context regarding crisis, diaspora, and ethnicity and uncover the origins of material manifestations in territorial boundness. With combined primary and secondary archival data (documents/reports by UNHCR, KRG and NGOs, and social media), the research develops a chronological register from the crisis as a trigger for setting and planning the camp and to the ways in which it has been inhabited.

³The selected families had no registry of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Yet, in 2 interviews, the situation got quite emotional.

Case studies and ethnographic approaches helped provide evidence, depth, and detail about the spatial attributes. Using these data-gathering methods, they supported identifying patterns, investigating the interdependencies of help networks, and homemaking processes through tracing spatial (re)production (Birch, 2012). Domiz1 camp selection was built on several factors: being the earliest and the largest existing one in the KR-I, accessibility, and the closest to the Syrian border and Duhok city.

1.5.1.2. Interviews with Refugee

Interviews were conducted with: 1) 30 displaced families living in camps from Syrian Aljazeera territory and 2) 20 aid workers and government officials working in humanitarian camps in 2018 and 2019. In addition to online interviews during 2020-2021 due to travel restrictions triggered by political unrests and the COVID-19 Pandemic (2020-). The interviewees were balanced in age and gender for the refugee group, while aid workers were majority men. The researcher informed all the interviewees about the research goals and assured the anonymity and confidentiality of their generous voluntary participation. Refugees did give verbal consent. However, they did not want to sign any documents, choosing to be anonymous because, as they told me, they "do not want to have problems if we go back to Syria". Most of the interviews were voice recorded via iPhone.

In the beginning, the Mukhtars (refugee-appointed leaders by the camp management) contacted several families and briefly explained the researcher's quest and the time needed. It has been clarified that the researcher was not affiliated (at the time) with any NGOs and informed that she voice record the interview and took the dwelling's interior pictures⁴. Using snowball sampling (Goodman, 1961), the selection was based on asking the Mukhtars to choose two families from each block, and then the families could also recommend another two families. Later, the four mukhtars (1 female + 3 males) were also asked to be part of the interviews. Each interview took place in the family's dwelling unit in a safe "comfortable environment where the participants did not feel restricted or uncomfortable sharing information" (Turner, 2010), usually in the living/guest room, and took from 30-90 min, depending on the family⁵.

Though the questionnaire was identical, the leading questions looked for a more descriptive nature beyond the 'yes' and 'no' answers. Most relevant information was uncovered only through using open-ended questions (Yin, 2009), and the richness of the data collected allowed the researcher to identify the spatial elements, the constellation of actors, and categorical meaning of interdependencies, homing and belonging in (an imagined) space-time (dis)continuity within life trajectories. All these elements and patterns emanated from and progressed within a 'temporary gridded settlement set anew. These patterns uncovered the ways in which refugees experienced the recollection of the self within and with this specific geography of their displacement. Furthermore, focusing on the spatial agency highlighted the material conditions leading to the emergence of the camp community, class (re)formation, global, territorial, and local economic impacts, and alternative forms of citizenship.

⁴ personal portraits shall not be taken unless the family accepts

⁵ The control group was in the camp: 3 families from Efrin area (there were quite few at the time, and some refrained knowing that I come also from Efrin). 5 refugee families living in urban areas and informal interviews with Arab families in urban areas.

1.5.1.3. Visual Ethnography

Camp spaces are inscribed by the refugee experience, which consequently embodies, through time, changes in meaning and future expectations through symbolic representations. Hence, using 'more than words' to find meaning (Nuñez-Janes, 2017), helps grasp the unseen everyday reality of refugeehood and ground imaginations to relational understandings of the world. In visual ethnography, photography captures the complexity of lived space. It adds uniquely to 'multi-sensory, dialogic and visual routes to understanding' (O'Neill, 2018, p. 73), goes beyond the 'literal' meanings, and provides insights into the life trajectory of a refugee compressed and unpacked in camp spaces. The researcher's use of photography and collected pictures taken by the participants on routes uncovered the intersectionality of identities (Chappell, Chappell, & Margolis, 2011), that seem to collide in space. Hence, visual ethnography in this research accentuated the power of the material world acting as a repository of information and knowledge by itself. Finally, visual representation attends to the researcher's perspective and experience in the field (Holm, 2015) as '*the visual brings the fieldwork experience directly to the context of representation*' (Pink, 2006, p. 16), and '*not only to make something observed visible to others but also to accompany something invisible to its incalculable destination*' (Berger, 2011, p. 11).

1.6. Dissertation's Outline

Due to the historical and multi-scaler complexity of the investigated topic and the vastness of its geography, this dissertation focused on the receiving sites set anew for the displaced Kurdish occupants in today's KR-I territory. It leaves other groups and existing spatial settings for future research.

The manuscript's structure is mainly divided into two lenses: territorial historical layering and everyday (re)production. It reflects the use of the three theoretical frames: Corboz (1983)'s landscape as a palimpsest, Gregotti (2009)'s form of the territory and Lefebvre (1991) triade in the production of space. Therefore, the structure is divided into four parts as follows:

Part 1: Setting the Scene

Part one (two chapters) sets the scene for this dissertation's problem: Forced displacement Urbanisms in the KR-I and the particularities of Syrian refugee camps set anew as receiving sites.

Chapter 1- Research context introduces the research problem of reading Syrian refugee camps in the KR-I's territory as a stage for chronic instability. It briefly explained the case's particularity by exploring the mesh of interrelationships of historical, ethno-territorial, and geopolitical factors between the refugee group (Syrian-Kurds), hosts (Iraqi-Kurds) and their displacement and arrival geographies. Then, the chapter illustrates the research objectives and questions, the researcher's position, strategies, and methods employed to collect the data. It ends by outlining the manuscript's structure.

Chapter 2: Humanitarian Camps and Forced Displacement Urbanisms presents the researcher's conceptual framework and state of the art on using the camps and settlements as spatial apparatuses. It focuses on the designed, constructed and conceived spaces. The chapter examines chronologically the humanitarian camps and settlements' employment to address mass displacement in the so-called global south. Built on this examination, the chapter sets conceptual and etymological frames, explaining specific vocabularies/terms used in this research. These frames are space-time (dis) continuity, crisis and rupture and entanglements of networks, homing, and nostalgia.

Part 2: Ruptured Roots, Mixed Soils: A Genealogy of Forced Displacement Receiving Sites in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq

This part constructs the KR-I forced displacement territorial biography by employing Corboz (1983)'s landscape as a palimpsest and Gregotti (2009)'s form of the territory. It highlights critical historical events and processes that resulted in the Kurds being a stateless nation and focuses on involuntary dislocations and relocation's role in this specific geography and how they are layering its (urban) landscapes. The aim is to highlight the changing and subversive meanings a displacement-receiving site could uphold.

Chapter 3: Refuge Spatial Practices in (pre)modern KR-I territory focuses on the political changes until 1958 in an attempt to map the ways in which uprooting, being en-route and (re)rooting has been a tool to exercise power and (re)set boundaries. This chapter uses Corboz (1983)'s landscape as a palimpsest to examine Kurdistan's territorial demarcations resulting from violent conflicts and involuntary dislocations. These territories, therefore, act as palimpsests marked by spatial (re)arrangements linked to shifting power spheres, dis-placements and the change in customary refuge-seeking/granting practices.

At its end, the chapter describes the contextual and historical events that led the Kurds to become a stateless nation and become “imprisoned in nation-states, not of their own making” (Owtram, 2019)

Chapter 4: Disciplinary Spaces to Hospitality (Infra)structures Iterations (1958- 2011) examines the ways in which forced displacement reoccurred within the project of state-building in Iraq and the KR-I. It traces violent disputes and conflicts triggers and consequences, and the Janus-faced state’s reconstruction and modernisation projects in KR-I territory. The chapter here employs Gregotti (2009)’s form of the territory and Lefebvre (1991) triade in the production of space to read the territorial restructuring in the KR-I using various settlement schemes as an apparatus. Therefore, it focuses on these schemes’ devolvement from mojamma’t (collectives) -modern settlement schemes, to confinement and punitive ones in less than a decade. The chapter’s second part depicts the change that followed two decades of involuntary dislocations-relocation and horrifying atrocities. Starting from the first gulf war and the 1991 no-fly zone on the KR-I proper, chronic conflicts between political parties and the Iraqi central government led to UN bodies acting as a surrogate state of some sort until 2005. In this phase, settlement schemes’ meanings and uses have (partially) subverted from spaces of oppression to become spaces for humanitarianism (relief camps) and hospitality and (de)growth (former mojamma’t-collectives) due to aid and development strategies. In the last part, the focus is on the political climate that followed the 2003 war on Iraq, the fall of the regime, and the ways in which it changed the course of KR-I’s autonomy and the fixation on its government.

Chapter 5: Humanitarian Camps: Making Space for “Guests” and Places for “Brothers” (2011-2022): This chapter examines the ways in which camps became the spatial translation of the “help” service provision to host “temporarily” the forced displacement waves caused by the Syrian conflict and the war on ISIS since 2012. It follows chapter 4 frames in the employment of Gregotti (2009)’s form of the territory and Lefebvre (1991) triade in the production of space. Building on these two frames and former chapters, chapter 5 demonstrates that the humanitarian camps are an additional layer of territorial aggregations and constellations of forced displacements. It highlights the ways in which different programs, interventions and rationales condition these sites’ spatial progression, swinging between upgrades and closures. The chapter also highlights the camps’ presence and impact on the (fragile) hosts’ (spatial) needs and the socio-economic flows between the open camps and their surroundings. Finally, the chapter shows that despite the efforts in such a heated geopolitical context and the collision of the latent fragilities, dependency on aid is inescapable, leaving these spaces and their users in crippling conditions.

Part 3: Homing the Waiting: (inter)Dependencies, (re)Rooting and Homing Refugeehood

This Part examines the ways in which refugees are (re)constituting a “place in the world” through inhabiting the camp: how does this conceived space meet the extended needs of its ‘temporary’ dwellers in time? Part 4 focuses on the micro-scale of selected cases of Domiz 1 Refugee Camp and uses Lefebvre (1991) triade as an analytical frame to answer these questions in two chapters as follows:

Chapter 6: Directory of Permanent Syrian Refugee Camps in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. This chapter is a chronological (visual) overview of the permanent Syrian refugee camps in the KR-I. It aims to shed light on the “given” and “provided” by various actors, mainly humanitarian ones. It sets the basis of the way the space was conceived and upgraded on the go, and it highlights the different aid and support forms that supported laid the foundation for refugees’ spatial practices.

Chapter 7: Help practices and (inter)dependency Networks in Refugee Camps reads the ways in which help practices (re) produce the socio-spatial in the camp's spaces., which in turn become enmeshed by human and non-human interdependencies. The chapter classifies five categories of help practices (aid, support, solidarity, collaboration, and care) with multi-scaler (territorial) networks and material manifestations. This classification is also based on the top-down and bottom-up actors, the nature and directions of 'help' transactions and social/communal clustering processes.

Chapter 8: Who/What Is Doing What? Dwelling and Homing Practices in Syrian Refugee Camps – The Kurdistan Region of Iraq analyses the ways in which camps become a destination: the location where all help practices and the activation of (spatial) agencies intersect and materialise as built forms. This demonstrates how the "given" physical forms transform into the canvas where anchoring, dwelling and even homing practices (re)adjust spaces to cope with the pre-supposed uncertainties. This chapter delves into the perplexing multi-layered belonging of the displaced group in the host territory: nation-belonging and arrival in the longed-for 'fatherland' by the violent rupture from its other part Syria, the former homeland, and the country of citizenship. It introduces different stages of a 'camp homing cycle' linking interdependent and relational socio-spatial-time fabrics, leading to nostalgic Home's projections of losses, possibilities, and prospects.

This chapter has been co-authored with Prof. Nurhan Abujidi and Prof. Bruno de Meulder, peer-reviewed and published as Zibar, L., Abujidi, N., & de Meulder, B. (2022). Who/What is Doing What? Dwelling and Homing Practices in Syrian Refugee Camps - The Kurdistan Region of Iraq. In Beeckmans, L., Gola, A. Singh, A. & H. Heynen (Eds.), *Making Home(s) in Displacement: Critical Reflections on a Spatial Practice*. Leuven: Leuven University Press. The change is only in its layout to match the format of the manuscript.

Part 4: Conclusions

This part aims to reflect on the uses of the theoretical framework in understanding Forced Displacement Urbanisms in the KR-I. Doing so encourages more extensive discussions on the spatiality of forced displacements and brings forward tools to work with emergencies and post-emergency situations. Linking forced displacement and urbanism is indeed essential to understand how "geography matters" (Massey, 1994) in the (re)inhabitation practices and claiming trajectory continuity after severe ruptures. Adding displacement receiving sites to the habitat inquiry shall open more comprehensive discussions to address questions of spatial (de)growth and rights "to"/"in" place; and hence provides insights learnt for academics, practitioners, policymakers, and human rights activists.

Chapter 9: Rooting on Routes: Forced Displacements and Emerging Urbanities, discusses the ways in which these spaces (fragile) continuity is geographically embedded and interdependently reproduced. It provides a more generalised overview of a homing cycle and stages within a camp context in relation to future vectors impacted by the present and the past

“Each social formation constructs objective conceptions of space and time sufficient unto its own needs and purposes of material and social reproduction and organizes its material practices in accordance with those conceptions.”

(Harvey, 1990)

Chapter 2

2. Humanitarian Forced Displacement Urbanisms.

There is mounting literature concerned with forced displacements and involuntary dislocations. This literature, in time, has broadened scopes geographically and crossed (sub)disciplines. Studies have implicitly and/or explicitly indicated the relational aspect between the displaced groups'-built environments and receiving sites on the one hand, and their (socio-economic) well-being on the other. In broader debates on economies, human rights, laws, and international and states responsibilities, the displacees are portrayed as "victim", "vulnerable", and "homeless". The "refugee seeker" figure, as such, is in urgent and (almost) continuous need of the protection and assistance provided and conditioned by various actors, may that be the host community/country, nation-states, and the international humanitarian regime (IHR) (Agier, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2016, 2019; Dowty & Loescher, 1996; B. E. Harrell-Bond, 1986; Gil Loescher, 1993). Locked within shifting power dynamics, which convey "the need to help" and protect (Hyndman, 2000; Krause, 2019; Malkki, 2015) the displacees generally become "casualties of care" (Ticktin, 2011) in care and control (urban) enclaves. Many scholars highlighted the paradoxical potentials that care' spatial apparatus (shelters, reception centres, camps) upholds. They have examined the ways in which these spaces may offer (partial) protection and development (Hammar, 2014), and become an arena to claim power through activism and resistance (Hall, 2015; Martin, Minca, & Katz, 2020; I. I. Sheikh Hassan, 2015; Wojnicka, Pustu, & ka, 2017) and provide possibilities for economic prosperities and self-reliance (Betts, Bloom, Kaplan, & Omata, 2017; Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000). Displacement-receiving sites can also condemn the "victims" to a worse situation than the ones they have been dislocated from, a materialisation of being homeless, stuck and exploited (Della Puppa & Sanò, 2021). As such, protection and care notions subvert; these spaces become storage locations where their lives are frozen and warehoused (Smith, 2004; USCRI, 2019), disciplined and confined (Fischer-Tahir & Wagenhofer, 2017) and/or (almost) incarcerated (Brankamp, 2021; Horn, 2009; Pallister-Wilkins, 2018; Ramadan, 2009).

In the past decade, scholarly attention has shifted to accentuating the occupants' (spatial) authorship and investigating reciprocities between receiving sites and their (temporary) occupants. This accentuation brings forward the ways in which spatial, human, and non-human agencies interact within specific geopolitical and socio-economic conditionalities. Many scholars pinpointed these interactions consolidation in material, social and urban progression forms (Agier, 2002, 2019; Büscher, Komujuni, & Ashaba, 2018; Darling, 2021; Herz, 2013; Jansen, 2018; Kennedy, 2008). Such consolidations are activated with (liminal) inhabitation, (re)adjustment, adaptation, co-existence and homing practices (Abourahme, 2020; Katz, 2021; Musmar, 2021; Ní Mhurchú, 2019; Seethaler-Wari, Chitchian, & Momic, 2021; Zibar, Abujidi, & de Meulder, 2022).

2.1. Geographies of Waiting

Most forced displacement receiving sites, especially in their early stages, have never been conceived as final destinations for their operators and occupational groups. Mostly they represent transitional stations on routes, geographies of “waiting” till another reality somewhere else becomes viable in the (unseen) future. Nonetheless, studies show that depending on the (limited) choice of the movement (Colson, 2007; Kunz, 1973, 1981; Nail, 2015), the ambivalent nature of “waiting” is not always passive. Life cycles carve their ways to (re)assert continuity in time by (re) adjusting and (re)adapting to the displacement ruptures, discontinuities and conditionalities. A hidden dimension of everyday life challenges “waiting” passive notions as the displaced groups attempt to anchor their presence in the receiving location.

As time goes by, these daily practices trigger forms of “active waiting” (Brun, 2015) enacted by the occupants in response to a range of biological, social, economic and political prerequisites (as needs, wants, demands and aspirations). Such prerequisites derive images from past-future projections (of what one had or could have had) and accelerate practices of (material) repossessions (Ryan-Saha, 2015). The conditional attainment of these prerequisites, in specific space-time coordinates, falls within the (inter)actions of agential powers constellations (including the refugees) between seeking, granting, claiming, and resisting (de Grancy & Zettelbauer, 2019; Ramadan, 2011, 2013b). The material consolidation of such geographies of waiting represents shifting and contesting power structures (Hyndman, 2000; Ramadan & Fregonese, 2017) that are constantly delineating and blurring boundaries of “right to” and “rights in” space. Such boundary dynamics are linked to socio-economic (re)formation and various emerging time-dependent opportunities and possibilities (Assmann, 1995; Hage, 2010; Jansen, 2018; Malkki, 1995; Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000; Omata, 2017a). The spatial forms ‘reflect shifting societal definitions of need’ (Hailey, 2009) for both: the displaced and the host. The receiving site becomes the embodiment of these (contradictory) purposes, definitions, and meanings.

2.1.1. Humanitarian Camps

The Humanitarian camp, a particular paradigm of geographies of waiting, carries various intricate meanings and governance moods. For its governing regime/operators, these modern (spatial) technologies (Weima & Brankamp, 2022) are demarcated and bounded spaces for (unexpected) chaos containment, an “arena” to govern (humanitarian) aid/help service delivery (Hilhorst & Jansen, 2010), control, securitisation and othering (Agier & Bouchet-Saulnier, 2004; Brankamp, 2021; Elden, 2006; Rajaram, 2002). They open rooms for (innovative) entrepreneurship (Herscher, 2017), humanitarian capitalism (Thomas, 1985) and disaster capitalism (Franck, 2018). For its occupants, these spaces' unfamiliarity represents the loss of what was (Hornung, 2017; Milligan, 2003), (limited) potential for recollection of what is left (Dudley, 2011; Dunn, 2018; Papadopoulos, 2021), while its incompleteness represents the (im)possibilities of a what could be (Betts, Omata, & Sterck, 2020; Bshara, 2014; Herz, 2013). What occurs within and across a humanitarian camp's borders is deeply entangled with the historical and geopolitical host-guest relationships and “always has repercussions beyond their geographical confines and vice versa” (Weima & Brankamp, 2022). In this respect, studying the KR-I refugee camps fall in the same line.

Accordingly, this research aims to develop wider conceptual frames and longitudinal and cross-sectional analytical tools to unfold their space-time complexities. These frames shall be introduced in the following sections.

2.2. Camps and Settlements: Spatial apparatus for Governing the displaced

2.2.1. "Are Refugee Camps the Best Solution for People Fleeing Crisis?"

In July (2013), The Guardian published an article with the title above that examined recent spatial responses accommodating Syrian refugees displaced by the 2011 conflict. This examination briefly covered camps and urban settings as receiving sites in neighbouring countries such as Jordan, KR-I, and Lebanon. Being the first asylum destinations, their practices varied: setting new camps, accommodating the displaced in existing (unfinished) structures and banning formal camps.

In the article, Zaatari (Jordan) and Domiz (Iraq) camps "logistically" represented "well-defined spaces with well-defined borders" where humanitarian assistance operates (Shearlaw & Guardian, 2013). Besides sheltering and protection, this assistance covers basic humanitarian (urban) services such as schools, clinics, playgrounds, and administrations. However, the article cited a UNHCR staff member stating that these camps are hardly "natural social structures" (Shearlaw & Guardian, 2013). Their territorial allocations and movement restrictions resulted in a lack of enabling factors to support sustainable income-generating activities, which coincided with a decrease in humanitarian funding. In contrast, according to the same article, the existing socio-spatial orders of communities in urban settings provide alternative enabling factors beyond the IHR and hosting states' abilities. These factors include social networks and (local/informal) markets. Nonetheless, refugees' dispersion and invisibility, as they relocate within affordable areas usually inhabited by the urban poor, result in situations "hard to manage or control". As such, refugees "miss out" on the help and create conflicts with their immediate hosts as their presence lowers wages and raises (private) rent prices (Shearlaw & Guardian, 2013).

Indeed, the question of whether the camp is the best solution is not new for many academic and policy-critical debates. The empirical reality is that camps do act as a solution to a certain extent; after all, they are "born out of necessity" (Hailey, 2009), and set as a 'humanitarian safe space' to 'help' refugees (Hilhorst & Jansen, 2010; Pallister-Wilkins, 2018; Spearin, 2001). The question is, rather, can these camps accommodate beyond the immediate survival needs induced by prolonged inhabitation? Moreover, if yes, in which ways and to what extent does accommodating this inhabitation (re)shape the initial temporary setting and the everyday life within and beyond forced displacement?

The recent displacement history of the "Europe refugee crisis" in 2015 demonstrates the ways in which using isolated camps signals the perception of refugees from the south in European countries. Since 2015, in hotspot zones, those who arrive "illegally" are portrayed as "invaders" (Merrick, 2020), despite the displacement trigger. Unless deemed threat free by getting the refuge application approved, a containment policy fostered the exceptional "waiting" nature and the "invaders" perception. For instance, the receiving sites of camps and reception centres in hotspots, such as Lesbos Greek Island, became an actual confinement zone designed, set and experienced as such (Pallister-Wilkins, 2018). Their isolated locations, barbed wires' impermeability, and the constraints on the occupants' movements reflect this reality. Moreover, these territories' geographies of islands in the middle of the sea, such as Lesbos

and Samos Greek islands, align with the inescapable imprisonment with the different camp paradigms set and managed institutionally.

In the so-called Global South (GS), although the layouts and design regulations align with international humanitarian standards used in the camps mentioned earlier, the situation differs in implementation and the meaning (re)articulations. For example, Palestinian refugee camps in Syria, Jordan, West Bank and Lebanon are highly urbanised in terms of density, functions, and occupation. Many evolved to become part of their hosts' urban landscapes and/or become towns on their own. Evident cases date back to the late 1920s for Arminian refugees in Lebanon (Bourj Hammoud neighbourhood in Beirut/Lebanon, Anjar town, and later starting from the end of WWII and the Israeli occupation in 1948 for Palestinian refugees (Al-Wihdat neighbourhood in Amman/Jordan, Nahir El Bard, Beirut, Jerash camp/Jordan, and Beddawi/Lebanon). Many camps became indistinguishable parts of their hosting cities, whether falling under urban categories of illegality, informality, or underdevelopment (depending on the hosting (regime) policies). Nonetheless, the maintenance of their "campness" impermanence becomes representational for resistance and "the right to return" (Ramadan, 2011, 2013b). The camps' materiality transforms into "a time machine" (Bshara, 2014), storing generational memories inscribed in space. Such representation of "the right to return" can also be depicted in Sahrawi refugee camps since 1975 (Herz, 2013), equally present in their material incompleteness and permanent temporariness. In other words, the camp's material impermanency in its dwellers' collective consciousness is the evidence of an irreplaceable home, territorially detached and a generationally claimed "HOME".

However, this incremental (incomplete) urbanisation seems to have a different character after the Syrian Refugees arrived in Lebanon, Jordan, and the KR-I. In Lebanon, for instance, many Syrian refugees experience precarious situations in informal camps legitimatised by government officials. Due to escalating conflicts, bitter history of conflict with the Syrian military in the 1980s, and violence associated with Palestinian camps (Ramadan, 2009), Lebanese authorities seem to embrace a policy of *abolishing* the Syrian refugee camps. This policy is evident in constant evictions (threats), forced removals, reaching to extreme measures forcing refugees to destroy their make-shift shelters (McKernan & Guardian, 2019; Nassar & Stel, 2019) and turning a blind eye to camps being set on fire or death-set due to unbearable climate conditions. The refugee camps' experience has been less bitter in Jordan than in Lebanon. Nonetheless, physical distancing was part of the camp policy toward Syrian Refugees in Jordan. Zaatari and Azraq camps' locations in Jordan seem to be in the middle of nowhere, with restrictions on movements and spatial upgrades going beyond ad-hoc temporary interventions (Dalal, Darweesh, Misselwitz, & Steigemann, 2018). In the KR-I, the situation differed for the Syrian refugees residing in camps, who share the same Kurdish ethnicity as their hosts. Minimum movement and labour restrictions and tent-free camps policy seem to render the situation more stable in comparison. The latter will be explored in detail in chapters 6,7, and 8 of this dissertation.



Kara Tepe or Moria 0.2 Refugee Camp in Lesbos, Greece. The camp accommodates thousands of refugees who were relocated after the infamous fire of Moria camp back in 2020 (Fallon & Guardian, 2020) , and becoming receiving sites for refugee deportees from Italy (Sant' Egidio & InfoMigrants, 2021). Photo Credit/ Panagiotis Balaskas



Kara Tepe Refugee Camp Initial Site Plan, Lesbos, Greece. Map: (Lesvos Municipality & UNHCR, 2016)

2.2.2. A Brief History of Humanitarian Camps-Settlements in the Global South

The following sections give a brief history of the design and planning rationales, approaches and standards for setting humanitarian spaces. The focus is mainly on two models employed in the global south as a spatial humanitarian response: the refugee camp and the refugee settlement. The focus will be on the spatial (progression) conditions from the perspectives of the IHR (international humanitarian regimes) and receiving states. Moreover, the following sections highlight how these spatial elements and sites act as (infra)structures for refugees' human condition and everyday spaces.

2.2.2.1. Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development

Between WWI and WWII in Europe, many relief agencies worked closely with the military to manage and aid refugees displaced by violent conflicts. The management and aid operations used military methods (tactic, fast-deployable, and temporary), which were spatially materialised in the tent and the 'transitional' camp. These elements served as provisional structures (6-8 months) while the resettlement sites were ready to be inhabited temporarily, yet with longer "undefined" time spans (Cuny, 1983). In the post-war rehabilitation approaches, budgets and tasks (which included refugees) were assigned for socio-economic revitalisation and (spatial) reconstruction. For example, the post-war and refugee accommodation approach in Germany in the 1920s was integrated planning, long-term socio-economic vision and permanent prosperous outcomes, and it heavily relied on existing governmental frames and institutions (Betts et al., 2017). The material consolidation for refugees was durable housing and (new) settlements (see Herscher, 2017).

After the end of WWII, the so-called Global South today experienced a long period of decolonisation movements, with waves of displacees pouring from within (IDPs) and crossing state borders (Refugees) (White, 2017). Starting from 1951, managing the "displaced" situation shifted into an international protection sphere headed by the UNHCR, which coordinates with Nation-state governments in the receiving territories⁶. Refugees have become a "humanitarian" issue, temporary for the host and managed from "outside" under the UNHCR mandate of protection and support. By the late 1960s, IDPs were included under the 'Persons of concern'⁷ protection umbrella. The UNHCR works closely with Nation-states in setting up temporary humanitarian camps as part of this protection.

With an atmosphere of restrictive refugee asylum, hosting and resettlement procedures, the expected waiting months in humanitarian sites became years (Jacobsen, 2001). Many of these sites were camps either remotely set, hardly accessible for aid delivery, or close to rural areas, potentially becoming (rural) slums (Black, 1998), and barely having access to (urban) infrastructures and services (if existed). Understandably, in such contexts, short-term interventions and the temporary survival models failed to address prolonged needs with the improbabilities of return. Despite the fluctuations and/or continuity of the aid efforts in zones with chronic conflict with (sequential) intervals of stability and crisis, using the "military" tactics and "mere relief" have proven ineffective and, in many cases, counterproductive (Cuny, 1983). Spaces as such gradually transformed into inescapable "waiting" traps, aid-dependent and added

⁶Since the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its protocol in 1967, UNHCR mandated to aid and protect refugees and IDPs. not including the Palestinian refugees under the UNRWA mandate since 1948. The work of the UNHCR is usually through agreements or memorandums of understanding (MOUs) for signatory and non-signatory countries respectively.



⁷This includes refugees, asylum-seekers, stateless people, internally displaced people and returnees (UNHCR, 2020b).

pressure on fragile and mostly war-ridden zones. Therefore, the spatial approach required a shift in conceptual and practical thinking beyond charity (Cuny, 1983; Gil Loescher, 1993). This shift was to develop 'well-planned and 'programmed' humanitarian (organised) settlements (OS) and temporary camps models tailored for chronic conflict zones and protracted displacements.

In principle, the UNHCR and the host government administrate both refugee camps and settlements. Jacobsen (2001) differs in terms of location, duration and (inter)dependency. On the one hand, the camp is an emergency response, commonly closer to borders and remote from urban settings, whereas self-sufficiency is not expected. On the other hand, the OS is ideally deployed to house refugees and catalyse the development of "underutilised" regions, according to the state, located closer to (rural) peripheries. Consequently, the OS poses fewer socio-economic and security threats (Zetter, 1995), is deployed for long-term stay and is expected to be self-sufficient pending the displacees repatriation. In reality, both models' possibility of local integration depends heavily on the 'goodwill' and how the hosting country perceives the displacees and defines their rights (Jacobsen, 2001).

In the global south, the earliest spatial paradigm of linking aid for refugees with development was the 'integrated zonal development' (IZD) projects in the late 1960s in Africa, which seem to reincarnate again as 'Refugee Aid and Development (RAD)' and then recently as the "settlement approach" (Betts et al., 2017; Gorman, 1986; GSC, 2020; UNHCR, 2016b; Werker, 2007). For 'rural organised refugee settlements', the goal was to bring the uprooted closer to aid and bring benefits closer to host communities, simultaneously manageable and controllable by the IHR and hosting governments. The settlement was subdivided into villages with their centralised services based on their size/population. By inserting new settlements and populations from scratch into (national) development projects, the ambition was 'stimulate development on the periphery' (Armstrong, 1991; T. Betts, 1965; Gorman, 1986).

Interestingly, the organised settlements model has been employed over the years (especially in South-African countries) to address mass displacements. Its echoes till today (2022) resurface in the (emergency) spatial responses to the refugee influx in many Global south refugee receiving countries, yet the name changes from camp to settlement and depending on the hosting state: Azraq Camp in Jordan (Dalal., Heber, & Palomino, 2021; UNHCR, 2016b), Tunaydbah Refugee Settlement in South Sudan (UNHCR Sudan, 2022), Kalobeyei refugee Settlement Kenya (Betts et al., 2020) and Nyarugusu Refugee Camp Tanzania (Kim, Jeong, & Sung, 2021; UNHCR Tanzania, 2015).



Left

Tanzania - Mishamo refugee settlement layout.


The settlement was part of the integrated zonal development and villages 6 and 10 layouts (Armstrong, 1991)

Right



The layout of the Mishamo refugee Village 10 in Tanzania.

V10 represents one of these cases, using the 'fishbone' roads to reach plots, with possibilities of expansion in the empty land. (Armstrong, 1991)

Around the same period, Fred Cuny, the famous active humanitarian practitioner, field-based researcher, and former US marine, proposed (one of the many) spatial paradigms for the refugee camp. His military background and hands-on experience fed his argument to shift from military camps' approach of "set, pack and go" and pay more attention to the occupants' profile as communities. According to Cuny (1977), it is essential to bring the socio-economic dimension. Humanitarian governance and practitioners need to rethink the camp as a "town and must be planned and constructed under the same design criteria but with greater consideration for the occupants" (Cuny, 1977). Learning from practice and influenced by the sites and services approach, Cuny proposed "the community" as a replicable socio-spatial unit (Kennedy, 2008). The community approach in designing the camp included more diversified spaces for (communal) gathering, working, public amenities and camp markets. Cuny juxtaposed development logics of self-built models and community mobilisation as a way to develop the layouts, focusing on replicability, decentralisation, infrastructural upgrades, and anticipating growth of (possible) future influxes. His ambitious schemes offered possible continuity factors in the transition from aid dependency to semi-self-supporting systems that may, in his perspective, reach fully independent settlements, which has been the main aspiration for the OS models as well. The schemes developed by Cuny's Intertect team influenced the setting emergency camps in Asia and Africa (including the KR-I in the 1990s, explained in detail in chapter 4). The layouts developed by Intertect work appeared in the First Edition of the UNHCR handbook of Emergencies in 1982 (Kennedy, 2008).



Up
 Cuny's schemes for camps based on communities.
 Stages of expansion and becoming a settlement (Cuny, 1977)
 Right
 Refugee Camp layouts in the first edition of UNHCR Handbook
 of Emergencies.
 These layouts embrace the community as the standard unit with
 decentralized services depicted in (Kennedy, 2008)



2.2.2.2. "Managing the Undesirables"⁸

From the mid-1980s, political climate shifts pushed for "repatriation", promoting it as the favoured durable 'solution' for the displacement problem. This promotion came with financial packages as incentives for the displaced to 'go home' (Jacobsen, 2001). In that light, fears accumulated of being the "hidden losers" (Chambers, 1986), and "transferring [refugees'] burdens" from the international community to (fragile) GS hosting countries instead of "sharing" them. According to Betts et al. (2017), the rationale behind these fears was built on the following factors (among many others):

- The absence of firm international commitments toward host governments.
- The (gradual) withdrawal of humanitarian assistance.
- The reluctance and hindering resettlement programs to the global north.
- The collapse of many inter-organisational partnerships.

Consequently, these fears impacted the spatial settings for the uprooted: camps became the 'last resort' and temporary solutions in most manuals and policy documents to "manage the undesirables" (Agier, 2011). This is evident in the UNHCR handbook following editions, which substituted most terminologies relating permanency with temporary, mainly replaced by using shelter instead of the house (Kennedy, 2008). Moreover, funding glitches affected many projects to upgrade humanitarian camps and settlements; physical interventions receded into situational/seasonal improvements. These factors resulted in dire living conditions for the forcibly displaced, barely making do to cover their survival needs, whereas their temporary spaces mirrored their homelessness.

Nonetheless, the improbabilities of feasible 'repatriation' (Stein, 1986) pushed many practitioners and scholars' voices, including Cuny (1983), Stein (1986) and Goethert and Hamdi (1988), to advocate for the (re)assertion of refugee camps/settlements as part of the long term (national) development goals. This avocation also included (partially) alleviating the burden on hosts and better the living conditions for the displacees. For example, Davis, Lambert, and RedR (1995), accentuated that "Humanitarian relief programmes, therefore, need to plan for both immediate relief and the promotion of peaceful, sustainable development".


Camp/settlement-wise, "bettering" socio-economic conditions is present on the soft components aspect (skill upgrades, ad hoc programs), and concentrating more on policies and strategies to facilitate essential aid delivery. The newly modified schemes in handbooks kept Cuny's previous hierarchies of components and rarely went beyond the technical orientation (reshuffling and shifting grided layouts of 'communities', responding to site features). The 'community' spatial unit itself kept its name, while it gradually lost the "communal" spatial attribute and reversed to tiled plots of former military-operation logics. The attempts to differentiate between camps as settlements in terms of space-time continuity and future projections concerning survival, essential and prolonged needs (partially) fluctuated with the ever-changing political realities. The impact is quite visible in the vocabulary in the earliest version of the Sphere book⁹ (Kennedy, 2008). Neo-liberal logics of self-dependencies and self-reliance became more

⁸ Book Title by Agier (2011).

⁹ The Sphere Handbook is Sphere's flagship publication. It comprises the Humanitarian Charter, the Protection Principles, the Core Humanitarian Standard, and minimum humanitarian standards in four vital areas of response: Water supply, sanitation and hygiene promotion (WASH) Food security and nutrition (Sphere Association, 2018).

present and intertwined with livelihoods. These fluid and emptied metaphors became associated with numerical 'minimums' of (spatial) basic needs, highlighting universal applicability (in armed conflict and natural disaster) and accentuating voluntary repatriation as the only durable solution. As such, these sites became spatial apparatus for biological lives reservation of some sort.

The materiality of many camps/settlements in the global south, whether unfinished, crippled, or thriving, mirrored the climate of (restrictive) possibilities beyond immediacy. As long as these sites were/are perceived as temporary from a top-down perspective, it led to the failure of the majority of integrated settlement projects, (re)production of aid-dependent population, adding insecurities, disempowerment and fragilities to the refugees and the host alike (USCRI, 2019).



Hardin (1987) Refugee Camp layouts Alternatives Lamusi Camp Design.
 by Davis, Lambert, and RedR (1995). Depicted in (Kennedy, 2008)

2.2.2.3. "End of Refugee Warehousing"¹⁰

Severe critiques for protracted refugee camps/settlements and their spatial paradigms have reemerged to condemn the dire inhuman situations (Agier, 2002; B. E. Harrell-Bond, 1986; Malkki, 1995). Various campaigns concerning refugee rights and their living conditions paved the ground for the 1990s "Refugee Anti-Warehousing" campaign led by the U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI), calling for wide range improvements (Smith, 2004; USCRI, 2019). It took more than a decade to get the UNHCR endorsement in 2004, which resulted in (re)embracing the 'transitional' possibilities of refugee camps/settlements. The transitional nature focused on displacement situations sequential changes, phasing the prolonged "temporary" and accentuating "privacy" 's socio-spatial needs.

Camp/Settlement wise, the goal was to push the IHR to rethink these paradigms in a 'durable solution light', who still stressed that their construction is the "least favoured solution[s]". The IHR revisited older themes and designs to address protracted displacement situations, reproduced in different manuals for humanitarian actors, mainly the UNHCR handbook of emergencies, the Sphere book and the "Transitional Settlement: Displaced Populations (TS)". These manuals highlighted camps and relief as a support system and focused on sequential changes with possibilities for durable solutions along with different phases. This phasing is intertwined with the receiving sites' temporary/permanence time spans, which are: 1) contingency, 2) transit, 3) emergency, 4) care and maintenance, and 5) durable solutions/or decommissioning of the site. (Corsellis & Vitale, 2004). Therefore, site planning and programmes varied based on projections ranging from eventualities to (dis)continuation of possibilities for each phase. However, the design schemes rarely escaped the military grid's rationales; few variations of 'community' schemes were developed for the emergency response with few visual representations in the TS handbook (Corsellis & Vitale, 2004), while phases beyond emergency had hardly any clear design input.

In the following years, manuals of community approaches (re)merged¹¹, majorly focusing on interventions in existing urban settings to support the host and the displaced. At the same time, alternatives to camps, shelter and settlement strategies attempted to hybridise humanitarian/development into context-based approaches. For the newly set ones, the spatial durability focused on shelter upgrades and materials responding to weather/time factors focusing on contextual solutions. Many catalogues followed, produced and revisited by the IHR, and their implementation partners (IPs). These documents also contained case studies and practices focused on infrastructure and public facilities upgrades (UNHCR, 2014, 2016b). As such, these manuals presented possibilities that settlements as an alternative to camps uphold when tailored to balance elevating hosts' burdens and extending support to host communities (UNHCR, 2016b, 2018, 2021b).

Similar to earlier endeavours, these manuals retained the spatial Cuny's community schemes and the OS spatial organisation (villages and decentralisation components) and allocation in underdeveloped areas. The result has been a socio-economic and spatial collage of humanitarian-development rationales, phasing expansion and building scenarios to retain the expectation of decommissioning and keeping in mind possibilities of integration and self-reliance. This hybridisation came with financial incentives for

¹⁰ In 2004, U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) embarked on a worldwide campaign to end the warehousing of refugees (Smith, 2006; USCRI, 2019)

¹¹ a community-based approach, a neighbourhood approach, area-based approach. Some of these manuals argue the possible applicability in camp-setting.

those who chose to repatriate and focused on self-support empowerment programs; (partial) self-upgrades to support protection and resilience. Using these “self” initiated programs mainly reflected a policy of escapism from humanitarian actors and hosting nation-states by transferring largely the burden of protection to the refugees themselves.


Furthermore, allocating refugee settlements in isolation from other urban settings and infrastructures is problematic. This isolation, combined with the (partial) restriction of movement and underserved (rural) sites, allows hardly any spatial flows (beyond humanitarian assistance). Consequently, such isolation challenges any possibility of economic resilience, durability, or effective integration. Moreover, refugees' repatriations do fail largely. These failures are outcomes of post-war fragilities, socio-economic fragmentations, insecurities, and wide infrastructure (partial) destructions in the countries of origin. In many cases, they result in additional and retrospective displacement waves back to (possibly) the former refuge location, despite challenges of aid decline and the fragmentation of camp-formed support networks. The bitter reality of self-reliance becoming a myth became clear with failure patterns of repatriation and paralysed durable solutions (see for example: Omata, 2017a, 2017b).

2.2.2.4. "Camps as a last resort"

In the past decade, refugee and IDP numbers peaked with the Syrian conflict, ISIS, and Yemen wars. With the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the dire scenes and living situations in displacement-receiving sites dominated the mainstream media. Camps' spaces, in particular, seem to fail in protecting and rescuing the victims, trapped in the contradictory measures between humanitarian care and (state) control. For instance, these measures are linked to insecurity and illegality in Europe (Moria, Calais), restrictions in Turkey (Öncüpınar), informality in Lebanon (Arsal), conditioned "prosperity" in Jordan (Zaatari) and stabilisation and homes at the KR-I (Domiz camp). Transferring the displacement burdens to the GS is again becoming the donor state (implicit) policy. Such policies impact the temporary camps and settlements' socio-spatial progression through: reverting to stabilisation, shifting back into shelters as foundations of 'home' and promoting a 'well-being' future-oriented thinking. In addition, these policies materialise differently depending on the contextual reality and reflect the host-state perceptions of the occupied group, whether brothers or (un) desirable guests.

Though those camps are still highlighted as the 'last resort', the recently developed manuals acknowledge that the well-planned and upgraded arrival sites do impact the "health, security, privacy and dignity" of its dwellers, in addition to self-reliance and empowerment. For instance, the "Site planning – Guidance to Reduce the Risk of Gender-Based Violence" (GSC, 2018a) accentuated the design's role in creating safe spaces that respond to (changing) social norms and increased insecurities that surge in camps. These shifts and changes invited along the way experiments to (re)develop and (re)tailor 'sustainable solutions' in camps. These experiments vary in scale and nature between trial and error depending on the host's political will, funding curves, and the camp phase (emergency level/time). (GSC, 2018b; UNHCR, 2016b, 2016c, 2018).


Nevertheless, camp design layouts witnessed almost no change. The community unit kept its name and lost its attributes, and the sustainability components became abstracted 'technical' solutions and high-cost (imported) end products, which, in many cases, lacked the supporting structures. Self-reliance and empowerment opportunities are limited and time-bound and lack an accessible and feasible milieu to function. Moreover, the focus on the 'operative' mission in many manuals and the provision of "foundations for homes" neglect to a large extent, the resurgence of crises and shocks and the dwellers' needs. The simplified schematic camp/settlement and community layouts largely disregard how the forcibly displaced inhabit the camps, their personal projects in waiting spaces with everydayness recaptured in the physical elements. Therefore, the existing solutions largely fail to account for temporariness, aid-dependence, infrastructural and socio-economic host fatigue challenges. The application of minimum standards leads to these sites' existence hovering in the endurance mood, generating additional fragilities and frustrations. With the resettlement programs hitting their least percentage in 2020 (UNHCR, 2021c), and becoming more restricted during the COVID-19 pandemic, in many cases, these sites are not "the last resort" anymore but are the only possible ones.




Transitional Settlement for Displaced Populations Refugee Camp Scheme
(Corsellis & Vitale, 2004)




Village layout plan view



Block layout plan view



Community layout plan view



Aerial view of the site (source google earth 31/12/2004)



Settlement level (image taken during construction - 11/06/16)

■ Central riverbed area - - - Main road network

Azraq Refugee in Jordan 2016.
Camp/Settlement Layouts and Aerial View (UNHCR, 2016b)

"هل الانتظار لا شيء؟؟ أنت تهزأ بي!
الانتظار كل شيء.
نقضي حياتنا كلها انتظارا وتقول لا شيء!!
كأنك تريد إضاعة معنى حياتنا"
محادثة بين لاجئين فلسطينيين في لبنان
إلياس خوري – رواية باب الشمس - ١٩٩٨

*"Is waiting "NOTHING"? You must be kidding me!
Waiting is EVERYTHING.
We spend our whole lives waiting, and you say "NOTHING"!!
As if you want to waste the meaning of our lives."¹²*

A dialogue between two Palestinian refugees in Lebanon
Elias Khoury, Gate of the Sun Novel, 1998

¹² Translated by the author

"If we release the picture from its deep-frozen state and add the temporal dimension, we discover a web-like form of trajectories, of which some are stationary in space, and some are in motion, while some entities may grow, and others shrink in the process."

(Hägerstrand, 2004)

2.3. Theoretical and Conceptual frameworks for Studying Forced Displacement Urbanism

The former section has focused mainly on the history of refugee camps and settlement planning paradigms, mainly on their utilisation as the top-down emplacement of particular sets of socio-economic relations and (limited) time spans. Despite the self-prefix attached to many programs and interventions (i.e. self-reliance, self-dependence,..), the top-down approaches hardly account for refugees' condition beyond victimhood, homelessness, and, in most cases, undesirable presence. Contrary to this perception, recent scholarship accentuates that everyday practices in these receiving spaces challenge such accounts (Dudley, 2011; Hage, 2010; Krause, 2019; Papadopoulos, 2021; Vandevordt, 2017). Refugees, mostly left to their own devices, take the "matter in their own hands" to improve their living conditions and physical environments (Bshara, 2014).

Indeed, reciprocal relations exist between the receiving sites and the displacees, infused with various arrivals, inhabitation and homing practices. These practices within and beyond the (imposed) limitations are embodied and embedded in the (re)formed materiality (Beeckmans, Gola, Singh, & Heynen, 2022; Brun & Fábos, 2015; Katz, 2021; Seethaler-Wari et al., 2021; Zibar et al., 2022). The reciprocal nature of these practices has been majorly studied from either imposed -top-down, restrictive policies or forms of refugee agency of resistance through inhabitation and homing practices. However, most studies (partially) lack the bridging between territorial pre-arrival displacement history and the displacements' role in restructuring (urban) landscapes. Furthermore, most studies on refugees' activation of the agency are fragmented: they read such agency as forms of citizenship claiming, activism and resistance, taking for granted the "move" itself as an act of agency. Such fragmentations are present in dichotomies of before and after displacement/the crisis as ends and beginnings. This reading largely misses the ways in which involuntary dislocation is a displacement from geography and also in time, ever-present in space-time (dis) continuity formerly expected, and the changes of life trajectory past-future vectors.

Based on the above, linking forced displacement, territorial biography, receiving sites, and refugee-seeking/granting practices can bridge the gap in the before mentioned studies. This research provides an in-depth understanding of how forced displacements throughout specific historical and contemporary moments (re)shaped the Kurds' "human condition" within their "Fatherland". Therefore, the following sections shall introduce a more holistic conceptual framework to construct this biography on different space-time scales.

2.3.1. Developing a Conceptual Framework

Forced displacement and involuntary dislocations are par excellence spatio-temporal phenomena, singling explicitly a reluctant move(s). However, if not forced by top-down relocation/emplacement, the act of moving itself singles an act of agency to claim the right to one's life trajectory, whereas the geographical movement vector does hold a degree of choice. This choice's vector is highly conditioned by various factors, including the acuteness of the event (Kunz, 1973), geographical proximity, time, the concentration of (economic) opportunities, and the "imagined" relations with their future hosts.

Indeed, forced displacements, man-made crises-induced, invoke multi-layered dispossessions of rights in a particular location and access to social networks forged within the locality and established on

sets of resources. They lead to a specific space-time re-evaluation of what makes a location habitable, causing temporary or permanent (sequential) ruptures. These ruptures disrupt and distort the present of a past "natural order of things" (Malkki, 1992) and imagined life trajectories. The "order" includes routinised everyday rhythms, (formal and informal) moods of governance, societal rules of conduct, socio-spatial configurations, economy, and expected path of (domestic) continuity. Involuntary dislocation disrupts this "order and hence creates mental, relational, and physical ruptures between the self, space, and habitual ways of living in a perceived current "home". As such, ruptures render the displaced figure homeless, stuck in a state of discontinuity and worldly unanchorage. Within these specific waiting geographies, pasts and futures seem disconnected from the present, whereas living in loops of waiting (temporary) seems to freeze the personal trajectory. In other words, when the temporary becomes open-ended, protracted with no solution in sight (Crisp, 2003; Gil Loescher & Milner, 2005), the situation becomes stagnant in what seems to be infinite time loops of some sort (Della Puppa & Sanò, 2021). Read as such, the occupants of these spaces are stuck in continuous life of presentness that strongly contradicts their biological ageing processes and succession of events, which are irreversible and moving across past-future arrows. This thinking aligns with Agamben (1998) work that sees the camp as a "space of exception", where its occupants are reduced to "bare life", and Malkki (1992) referral that refugees fall outside of the "natural order of things". One can hypothesise that within the geographies of (open-ended) waiting, such as displacement camps, the "annihilation of space by time" in Harvey (1990)'s words is reversed: space (partially) annihilates the conventional understanding of time.

An etymological detour is necessary to construct a specific conceptual framework to unfold these entanglements. This detour introduces the ways in which this dissertation employs the theories and broader scope of literature that infused the text above (rupture, space-time (dis) continuity, nostalgia, and homing interrelations) and their relevance to the addressed topic.

"[in time] the past is without entrance, the future without exit, while the intermediary present is so short and incomprehensible that it seems to be nothing more than the conjunction of past and future".

(Elias, 1992).

2.3.2. Space-Time (dis)Continuity:

“Do not worry about time. Here [in Domiz1 refugee camp], we [refugees] own nothing here but time [laughing]” Emad, 30 y, Refugee in Domiz 1 Camp, Interview, 2018

“I feel stuck here, frozen; if I leave here [Domiz1 refugee camp], my life can start there [Germany]” Mala, 21 y, Female Refugee in Domiz 1 Camp, Interview, 2018

The former quotations emerged in conversations during the fieldwork in the KR-I in 2018. Refugees' descriptions of the “experiencing time” bound to the camp’s geographical fixity did not match the ticking clock. They exhibited an almost contradictory understanding of time: either the excessive presence of time or a state of (continuous) stagnation, both associated with living in the camp’s spatial frame. Living in space-time uncertainty, hence, affects the ways in which refugees cope with eventualities, deal with probabilities, imagine possibilities and even construct prospects. In other words, “waiting” (re)shapes living experiences and future planning and activates displacees’ agency of “making do” and/or “moving forward”. In his book “what time is this place?”, Kevin Lynch (1972) embraces this understanding of space, time and active agency entanglements. He emphasises the nature of a “place as emblem of past, present, and future time” as an agent and argues that:

“Effective action and inner well-being depend on a strong image of time: a vivid sense of the present well connected to future and past, perspective of change, able to manage and enjoy it. The concept of time must be consonant both with the structure of reality and with the structure of our minds and bodies” (Lynch, 1972).

The quotation accentuates the reciprocal relationships between the physical space and experiencing time, which is crucial to how individuals (re)claim agency. Hence, these reciprocal relationships are disturbed and/or distorted due to forced displacement. Such entanglements have been discussed excessively in forced migration literature, connotating how well-being, traumatisation and “waiting time” are embedded in the context’s spatiality (For more check: Agier, 2008; Becker, 2004; Della Puppa & Sanò, 2021; Hamber, 2019; Horn, 2009; H. Keilson, 1980; Hans Keilson & Sarphatie, 1992; Malkki, 1995; Moldoch, 2017; Pallister-Wilkins, 2018; Stein, 1986).


Furthermore, time boundaries are evident in using different vocabulary connotated with displacement receiving sites: “temporary”, “waiting”, “uncertainty”, “protraction”, and even “permanent”. Indeed, displacement phases in humanitarian manuals impact the ways in which the site is designed, constructed and (if) expected to be integrated within host geographies. Empirically, unlike the demarcated spatial boundaries, the time boundaries are blurred, malleable and changing depending on the context and host/the displaced dynamics. Examples can be mapped across history and geographies: temporary camps such as Zeist between 1914-1915 for Belgian refugees in the Netherlands, Zaatari and Azraq between 2012-2014 for Syrian refugees in Jordan, and settlements such as Anjar Town/Lebanon in the 1930s for Arminian Refugees (Jaklian, Baboyan, & Pattie, 2020), and the Kalobeyei Refugee Settlement/Kenya opened in 2015 for refugees from different backgrounds (Betts et al., 2020). These

examples highlight that between experience and limitation, the perception of time also (re)structures the socio-spatial and temporal fabric of reality for the camp dwellers' human condition.

To clarify, the following frames allow for investigating the relationship between involuntary dislocation, forced displacement and space-time (dis)continuity. They support this research by analysing how “imposed timing” acts as “a technique of domination” (Lynch, 1972), and how the “distribution of waiting time coincides with the distribution of power” (Schwartz, 1974).

2.3.2.1. Space-time Continuum

Investigating the relation between space and time as empirical and measurable accounts belongs largely to (sub) physics and quantum mechanics disciplines. Coming so close to the topic, one cannot escape mentioning the two geniuses, Albert Einstein and Stephen Hawking. The inspiration and employment of space-time (dis)continuity in this research start from Einstein’s work on “special and relatively theory”¹³ which proved the inseparability of space, time and subjectivity perception of both¹⁴. Einstein argues that in the “I-time” or “subjective time”, “the experiences of an individual appear to us arranged in a series of events; [...] appear to be ordered according to the criterion of 'earlier' and 'later'” (Einstein, 1922), which other observes, based on their location in space, do not necessarily agree upon. Hawking (1998)’s discussions fed this research to work with arrows of time. He introduced arrows of phycological time as “the direction of time in which we remember the past but not the future”, using the broken cup example, which is one-directional and irreversible. To return to the relation of space-time to this research’s concern of forced displacement as space-time dislocation, it is essential to briefly see how these concepts interplay in such context and the time’s role in setting, adjusting and living in the receiving space.



The causal curve. Based on Minkowski’s light cone and Einstein’s theory of general relativity (Norton, 2015 depicted in Christophilopoulos, 2021)

2.3.2.2. Sets of time between the past, the present and the future

The central core of these debates has been the question: what is the nature of (real) time? Answering this ageless question of whether time is an elemental fact, a social construct or in the between is beyond the scoop of this research. Nonetheless, we shall take the contradictions and definitions that have decisive roles in the ways in which patterns of forced displacement urbanism (dis) appear, (may) endure, and their relation to power dynamics. We focus on three categories of time: linear time, cyclical time, and autobiographical time.

Linear time is represented as a succession of arrows from the past-present-future, measured by time’s “anthropological operators” of clocks and calendars (Brockmeier, 2000), a historical time. “The continuous flow of time with its constant pace, then, cannot be halted” (Ellegård, 2018). Linear time, in

¹³ developed between 1906-1922

¹⁴ Einstein’s work transformed the understanding of what is the past/future, which affected the understanding of causality and its space-time dependencies (represented in Minkowski’s light cone). This transformation led to the introduction of the 1927 Heisenberg uncertainty principle, that is, “the observer of the tested system at a given time and place is not being able to determine the further functioning of this system with complete certainty” (Magruk, 2017). This principle provoked different quantum mechanics and theory debates, including Einstein himself. Embracing and developing these principles is evident and still unfolding across disciplines aiming to predict the future based on the past: cosmology (universe beginning, end, collapse, black holes) (Hawking, 1998; Thorne, 1995), multiverse, “wormholes” and “time travel” theories (for example Morris & Thorne, 1988), future studies, and gave rise to a different genre of literature, pop-culture and film industry.



this research, also incorporates the biological time of “beginnings” and “ends”, ageing, and decay. This irreversibility of “time going on” coincides with Hawking’s definition of psychological time.

Cyclical and Spiral times, Giddens (1984) reads them as “repetitive character of day-to-day life, the routines of which are formed in terms of the intersection of the passing (but continually returning) days and seasons”. In other words: temporalities and rhythms. Therefore, cyclical time is a loop of habits, with inevitable variations as they are repeated moving forward and along the linear arrow of time. Adding the factor of decay, these loops of repetitions become a spiral. The repeated habits within geographical space-time produce ritualistic bonds, and the sense of familiarity intensifies as time goes by (Papadopoulos, 2021).

Autobiographical time: “The perception of time is fundamental to our experience and central to virtually all of our activities” (Matthews & Meck, 2014). Indeed, the way time is experienced does not necessarily align with the ticking clock, phrases used in daily interactions such as “it has been two minutes but I that I have been waiting for ages”, “it has been hours, but time went so fast I did not feel it”, are self-evident for the fact that individuals have different perceptions of time: which refers to the subjective experience of time of someone’s perception of the duration of unfolding events. (Bejan, 2019), which deeply interrelates depending on age and mental and emotional state. Brockmeier (2000) describes autobiographical time as a particular vision of the course and direction of time, which constitutes the meaning of the autobiographical process, in other words, the ways in which an individual tells his/her own story. Autobiographical time links the past with the present—a connection construed in the light of present events and future expectations. Brockmeier (2000) introduces six models of autobiographical time: in addition to the linear, circular, cyclical, the spiral that aligns with the formerly described time categories, we shall focus on the “timeless” ones: the fragmentary, and the static (stuck) models (Brockmeier, 2000), which are quite interesting in rethinking time as a factor of displacement.

Fragmentary time, on the one hand, is timeless as it is “told simultaneously, mingling real, possible, imagined and anticipated life courses like equal storylines”, which emerges quite interesting in memory recollection and guides selective nostalgia. The prize-winning novel written by Elias Khoury (1998) is one excellent example of this memory, which describes the ways in which the protagonist, a Palestinian refugee in Lebanon, jumps back and forth between the memories of imagined past futures and the present and, a proof for himself that his own life is a mosaic of stories of survival and loss, love and devastation, and never reached dreams.

Static time, on the other hand, is timeless as it is “a certain period of a life [...] that revolve around one central, usually catastrophic event” (Brockmeier, 2000). Using examples from interviews of Auschwitz camp survivals, the experience “meant living in a state of mnemonic paralysis, overpowered by an experience that, like a psychological black hole, absorbs all possible development, all movement that could lead the autobiographical process away from this all-consuming experience” (Brockmeier, 2000).




The misalignment between perceived time and clock time during lifetime (Bejan, 2019)


2.3.2.3. Between Past and the Future: time, space and geography

Apart from a few attempts (see Reiser, 1934), the relation between time and space has been picked upon rather from a distance in sociological endeavours (Giddens, 1984), till the 1960s with the innovative “time geography” work of Hägerstrand (1967, 1969, 1970, 1976, 1985, 1989, 2004). His early work identified migration chains based on individual paths (using linear time) in a population that moved where and when in a specific period. He wanted to bring to the fore “time” in the socio-spatial organisation in his “urbanisation process” project¹⁵, “to view time and space simultaneously as continua, populated by elements having different probabilities of survival, ought to help us to detect the collateral characteristics of processes of change” (Hägerstrand, 1987). Since then, using the time geography concept has been constantly embraced, reinterpreted, revisited, criticised, and rejuvenated by many remarkable sociology, geography and economic scholars (Ellegård, 2018; Giddens, 1984; May & Thrift, 2003; H. J. Miller, 2017a, 2017b; Pred, 1981; Thrift, 1977; Thrift & Pred, 1981)

Ellegård (2018) embraced this approach and presented the human individual’s perspective, building on Popper (1977) philosophical views in combination with later reflections by Hägerstrand (1985). To map causalities and shift space-time movements between the objective and the subjective, she positioned the individual’s existence and decision-making into two worlds: the outer and inner worlds. The Outer World shows what has happened in the past, the current situation, and possible future opportunities. The Inner World includes the individual of past subjective dimensions of experiences and future intentions, wishes and wants (Ellegård, 2018).



Bundles individual paths encountering and parting in a space/time representation. (Hägerstrand 1970 depicted in Thrift, 1977)




Different scenarios within and out of reach , inner and outer worlds in relation with the now (Ellegård, 2018)

¹⁵ In four-dimensional graphs, echoing Einstein, Hägerstrand (1970) introduced tools to map and allocate these anchorages as follows: 1) Paths: individuals’ time-space movements are constantly created as the now transforms the future into the past. 2) Bundles: grouping of several (individual) paths that meet in a specific time-space period creating possibilities of (social) encounters. 3) Time prisms: capture future possible locations in the time-space. Its shape depends on 1) space-time location in the now; 2) future planned space-time coordinates; and 3) the speed of movement 4) Local order pockets: time-space entities act as some sort of “superstructure, directly added to nature and not possible to maintain without that base”. Things and events are controlled by a given individual/group, who “might consciously arrange” them within these pockets. (Ellegård, 2018; Hägerstrand, 1970, 1985).


Conceptual change theories, strategic planning and thinking, and future studies also have been influenced by Einstein and Hawking's work, focusing on predictability and foresight (Hofer, 1973; Magruk, 2017; PosNER, Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982; Voros, 2003, 2019). Magruk (2017), for instance, developed the cone of future and the cone of uncertainty and possibility by combining the work of Einstein, Heisenberg and Hawking and building on different studies (such as Kononiuk & Nazarko, 2014; Ringland & Schwartz, 1998; Samecki, 1967; Voros, 2003 among many others). These cones introduce the relational scopes of boundaries of possibilities scenarios. Voros (2019) also builds on his earlier work (2003), in developing future cones and explains eight types of alternative futures, which in his explanation, "are all considered to be subjective judgments about ideas about the future that are based on the present moment", which can change over time illustrated in time cones. According to Voros (2019), these categories of futures are :

1. Projected: being "the most probable", "continuation of the past through the present", and future.
2. Probable: "likely to" happen.
3. Plausible: "could" happen.
4. Possible: "might" happen.
5. Preferable: "should" or "ought to" happen.
6. Predicted: The future that someone claims "will" happen.
7. Preposterous: "impossible," "never" happen
8. Potential: Beyond the present moment.


The former understanding of space-time in "ordinary"/individual transitions and planning will feed into analysing the ways in which the forced displacement is also a set of time displacements. These relations will be explained in the next section through crises and ruptures.



Uncertainty Cone (Magruk, 2017)



Cone of Possible Futures (Voros, 2019)



The cones of everything (Christophilopoulos, 2021)

"[in crisis times] life becomes like molten metal, [...] It is shaken perhaps violently out of rut and routine. Old customs crumble, and instability rules."

(Prince, 1920 in Solnit, 2010)

2.3.3. Crisis and Rupture

With the recent Covid-19 period, followed in 2022 by the Russian-Ukrainian war, unmasked collective and global senses of uncertainties, with an unclear yet expected end, waiting for a return to a recalled "normal".¹⁶

The word crisis itself is of Greek origin, meaning a tipping point, a culmination leading to separation, and a sudden break when a change in various forms is looming. According to Hay (1999), crises can be "temporary moments or phases; [creating] *deviations* from the normal (or 'natural') course of events" eventually expected to end. The linear and sometimes overlapping succession of events constitutes a situational and sequential change, fractions and ruptures enmeshed with a space-time fabric reaching a climax, resulting in periods of fragmentation, intense difficulty or danger, coupled with uncertainty and suspension of the "ordinary" (Hay, 1999).

In "the state of crisis" (Bauman & Bordoni, 2014), all the norms are suspended, and all the actions become directed towards "responses" to avoid, mitigate and react to what the crisis unfolds. Different scholars and thinkers call to read crisis beyond being "merely a description of events and moments in history that are deeply disruptive" (Cuttica & Kontler, 2021), also as being "a moment in which a decisive intervention can, and perhaps must, be made." (Hay, 1999). Their call expands to cover "the material and pragmatic facets of crisis (e.g. institutional effects, petitioning, changes in sovereignty) as well as with less-studied cultural phenomena linked to it (e.g. friendship, time perceptions) (Cuttica & Kontler, 2021, p. 3). Perceived as such, Hay (1999) argues that crisis "involves the active display of agency by actors or bodies which have some autonomy at the level at which the crisis is identified." (Hay, 1999, p. 323).

Indeed, unfolding war-induced crises' ripple effects, such as refugee waves reaching other continents, show active forms of agency. Their effects and acts evoke contradictory policies of care and control on the receiving side, depending on categories based on nationality, age, and gender (victims, threats, vulnerable, women, children). These ripple effects' spatial dimensions may take different forms. In existing settings, suspension and conversion are one of these forms: in active clash zones, schools may get suspended to become bases for the fighting parties, and in less active zones, converted to shelters for the displaced, basements become bunkers. Beyond (locality) borders, these spatial dimensions emerge as migration routes, gates, fences, and borders become borderlands (Agier, 2016), schools convert to reception centres, old/unfinished buildings become asylum centres and refugee camps. The sociability of these spaces holds contradictories of uncertainty, susception, solidarity, resistance, and activism.


Unquestionably, different scales of crises unfold as well as a consequence, including economic, societal, governmental, and personal, among many others. The accumulation of crises sets on course (temporary) conversions of the status quo of those who suffer it. The forcibly displaced populations convert into

¹⁶ As the Covid-19 crisis unfolded, human behaviour was altered (i.e., shaking hands, being in public spaces, group gatherings.) and fell into the new norms that the crisis set. The use of public space beyond "essential" needs was almost suspended repeatedly with every curve peak, changing in modes of governance, where institutional responses forced "behavioural change" measures and called "collective responsibility" of wearing masks and staying at home. Such spatial fixity in "excessive staying at home", T. Blokland (2020) argues, affects social fabrics built on various space-time encounters. It threatens public trust and everyday produced familiarity (T. Blokland, 2020). Where do people build familiarity if homes become workplaces, public spaces, and abandoned recreational areas, and "social distancing" is enforced. Any accidental "rubbing shoulders" (T. Blokland, 2020) becomes a "life-threatening" incident. However, being fragile together steered bottom-up practices of solidarity within different communities and groups, fixed to different (bounded) geographical scales, to cross closed borders and reach others through online and virtual platforms.

victims, internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees and vulnerable. Their time-space experiences of the natural and man-made environments relate to “safe/dangerous” routes and territories’ socio-spatial boundaries and sovereignty’s borders, enmeshed temporally and spatially by threats and opportunities. Within these time-space experiences, the consciousness of locality, citizenship, community, and networks that constitute “memories” and “home” seems to stem from the lack of the present and uncertainty of a future. The displaced face alienations, spatial boundaries, and borders categorisations of being recognised with displacees categories of internally displaced persons and refugees, hence falling under a new mood of governance (humanitarian, hosting state, hosting group...).

STATE OF CRISIS - ARMED + POLITICAL CONFLICT


Forced Displacement & Territorial Dispossession



As crisis-induced forced displacement causes the dislocation of time-space trajectories for different affected scales and groups, it also means the deviation and relocation of these trajectories. This relocation by violent choiceless separation causes frictions and ruptures of spatiotemporally embedded bonds depending on its timespan and distance. Losing these relational anchorages creates unbridgeable rifts between the self and its current home and articulates a new human condition for the ruptured, homeless condition. This displaced figure, rendered homeless by violent rupture, is on the route to finding a place to rest its roots.

Using ruptures caused by the crisis as transition thresholds between distortion, disruptions, creation, developments, and acceleration of new (re)formations will help shed light on the ways in which the post-rupture trajectories differed and fed the time perceptions and constructs, decisions of different inhabitation socio-spatial practices, (claiming) territorial rights and (re)setting dwelling and homing cycles, which will be investigated and traced along within this dissertation.

RUPTURE Time & Space



2.3.4. Home, Agency, and Nostalgia

Whether the displacement is caused by a temporary acute/anticipatory movement (Kunz, 1973) or an irreversible push, by being involuntarily dislocated by crisis, the displaced experience a partial or a complete rupture of the space-time continuum. As explained in the former sections, this rupture affects particular bonds sets that were once anchored in the world and shaped their fabric of reality: geographical/material (land, house, possessions), political (citizenship, rights), social (family, tribe, community), and temporal (time as a grasped and imagined past-present-future undisturbed continuity). As such, the displaced suffer insecurity, unfamiliarity, and homelessness.

The literature on home complexities and refugeehood shall be extensively examined in chapters 6&7. Nonetheless, it is essential to briefly introduce the entanglements as part of a more extensive conceptual framework.

2.3.4.1. Home, a relational concept

Home, in its abstract romanticised image, is a “place where one can be oneself, at ease, fulfilling (basic human) needs, in the (supposed) sanctuary from the everyday stresses, and a stable ground to support the future”. As such, what home “is” and “could be” are captured in smooth space-time micro and macro transitions and relational with social configurations. This research will take a point of departure Papadopoulos (2021) claims that:

“It is not possible for human beings to remain, for any length of time, in a state of dislocatedness, in total limbo, without any connection to a home or a sense of home, be it in lived reality or in thought, emotion or imagination, felt explicitly or implicitly. ”

This understanding aligns with what Jaspers (1971), in his “philosophy of existence” book, describes as the “conscious of the lack”. He highlights the importance of bridging with the world of things and people to (re)establish a sense of *anchorage*, hence (re)affirming individual and collective existence and continuity. Based on the above, the forcibly displaced is in an inescapable anxious search for a place to call home, as an essence of a worldly presence. Here, materiality becomes foundational for having a home or a sense of home; however, it is hardly a blank slate; it has its agency and embedded meanings. For Jacobs and Gabriel (2013) the material ontology is relational:

“[It] requires a commitment to recognising that the meanings we acquired from objects, things and practices are derived from their materiality as much as our own encounters with objects. The important point is that the material is not a blank canvas to which we imbue meaning through our encounter with it; rather, meaning is derived from a diachronic interaction between a network of agents, including material objects and human agents. Hence, the term ‘relational’ is employed to describe this form of engagement” (Jacobs & Gabriel, 2013).

This thinking echoes the ways in which the Humanitarian regime has been advocating for providing homes as the core of their protection mission partially. For instance, the UNHCR (2022) updated website highlights the importance of providing shelter as “a vital survival mechanism in times of crisis or displacement”. They see this material provision as the “key to restoring personal security, self-sufficiency, and dignity”. This statement affirms the perception of the refugee as not only a victimised and homeless figure but also the agency of the Humanitarian actors in the healing process, as the loss of one’s home due to displacement. The loss of a geographical fixity of home is connotated with a (presumed) loss of a sense of security, self-sufficiency, and dignity.

Providing a roof over one’s head and a containing space might be a precondition of a home; however, it is far from enough to constitute one. There is a mesh of relational tangible and intangible frames to build meaning and make room for interaction. The material frame signals meanings and possibilities; it is where meanings are (re)coded through different agential practices. Read as such, material frames of tents, provisional shelters, caravans, and unfixed roofs embody temporariness and uncertainty. Therefore, they challenge the abstract “desired” or “imagined” as a place of “safety, social continuity and positive containment” in its very essence:

Recently, academic scholarship did accentuate displacees’ spatial authorship, responding to different scales and dimensions of needs, be that biological, social, or political, among many others. Brun and

Fábos (2015)'s work, for instance, highlighted the possibilities of "making homes in Limbo" by setting a triadic constellation of homes as follows:

- 'home' is the meaning prompted by and the routinisation of day-to-day living experiences, done and undone by everyday practices (see also De Certeau, 1980).
- 'Home' represents feelings and intangible dimensions based on memories, traditions and an ideal dream exercised collectively at a group level.
- 'HOME' to include Nostalgia and the 'lost homeland' in the protracted displacement debate.


This constellation read not only different socio-spatial scales of home but also different sets of times of the ways in which homing is enacted and recalled. This reading aligns with Papadopoulos (2021) conceptualisation that the dislocated's home or a sense of home can be reconstructed and experienced, even temporarily, in a virtual and/or physical reality. The alignment of such research findings and theories is quite interesting: "home" becomes an activity of "homing" for the displaced in space-time frames. However, it is problematic to think of homing as an activity that (re)starts after a space-time rupture without asking: what forms of interactions occur in presumed (futureless) waiting spaces set anew? Moreover, if this relational is (re)constructed, what are the visual, social, and sensorial frames of reference for such (virtual) reconstructions and experiences? The following sections aim to answer these questions.

2.3.4.2. Relating: A network approach


The first question is, "what forms of interactions occur in presumed (futureless) waiting spaces set anew?"

In her book "Community as Urban Practice", Talja Blokland (2017) points out that 'different types of ties' form a 'web of human affiliations' in a particular social setting and create 'relational settings of belonging'. This thinking aligns with Massey (2004) argument that space conversion into place is "a product of what goes within it", which also "results from the juxtaposition and intermixing of flows, relations, and connections from "beyond". The relational interactions between the pre-set socio-spatial frames and their occupational groups, based on Lefebvre (1991) space production triad, are in a constant state of (re)production: of the conceived spaces into socio-spatial morphologies of memories and meaning(s) (Agier, 2007; Bshara, 2014; Dalal. et al., 2021; Jansen, 2018). Enormous displacement and forced migration studies indeed describe a set of relational and interdependent presence that supports the articulation of these morphologies and lays the foundation for camp ties to (re)form. They also show that ties emerge as sets of belonging clusters (political, social, economic, tribal, territorial), which may(not) overlap. Belonging to one or more of these clusters seems to provide safety nets for its members as long as they act in concert (Betts et al., 2017; Bshara, 2014; Herz, 2013; Hilhorst & Jansen, 2010; Jansen, 2018; Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000; Ramadan, 2010)

The formation of ties (and communities) is heavily conditioned by forms of power transactions between exchange and (re)assertion. In a displacement receiving site, these transactions' forms are conveyed in entangled care and control logics, which undoubtedly have a particular spatial-temporal register. The flow, nature, direction, concentration, frequency and quality of the power transactions and exchange flows between constellations of actors constitute nodes of networks spatially anchored. Based on the nature of 'transactions', ties may develop by identifying boundaries of clusters with 'active' spheres, hence, creating stronger relations when many ties exist and boundaries intersect (different and intense



Clusters of networks between power nodes within space-time frame (Author,2022)



Fragmented Clusters and interdependencies within space-time frame (Author,2022)

transactions). These clustering processes result in various forms of inclusion/exclusion through the complex layers of territorial, ethnic and group belonging(s) practised that seem to (re)articulate in a spatial setting in terms of (re)configured symbolic codes within the built form.

I will only point out here that there is a categorical difference in transactions based on the space-time socio-material meshes, a constellation of actors, and the temporariness of transaction and reciprocation natures. To clarify the difference, the proposition is a categorical difference between help practices into aid, support, collaboration, solidarity, and care. This proposition supports reading the “relating” as an interaction between spatial and human agencies, (re)consolidated in the built and territorial forms. The network approach and patterns of the ways in which (re)assembled networks are embedded in territories, paths and places will be discussed excessively in Chapter 7.

With the increasing insecurities and othering politics, interdependent networks are pillars displaced populations rely on to navigate uncertainties. The receiving site becomes (even temporarily) the destination: it is the location where all help networks intersect. This thinking correlates partially with Brun and Fábos (2015) first and second home. However, the question of whether this destination is a home and the ways in which memories, traditions and codes and ideal dreams (re)emerge in a new set space and newly formed relations are to be answered.

2.3.4.3. A future-oriented Nostalgia


The second question was: “what are the visual and sensorial frames of reference of such (virtual) reconstructions and experiences, even if it contradicts the notions of impermanency?”

According to Harvey (1990) “Each social formation constructs objective conceptions of space and time sufficient unto its own needs”. With the relationality and interdependent networks enmeshing the new space canvas, the “sufficient objective conceptions” responding to finding “a place to call home” need, collectively and individually, lie in understanding memory and nostalgia’s role, juxtaposed with forced displacement in the (re)producing an image of “home”.

Indeed, “memories carry the material characters of the surrounding” the idea of home has been correlated with an assumed continuous state of a positive (emotional) condition, a smooth space-time transition across the arrow of time. Reading home as such, in its absence, one experiences algos (suffering) in an endless desire for nostos (homecoming). Nostalgia refers classically to a painful yearning to the desired homecoming, or simply put, “homesickness”. Memory studies assert that memory reconstruction is always selective and fragmented. Halbwachs (1950), for instance, state that “even at the moment of reproducing the past, our imaginations remain under the influence of the present social milieu”. In displacement, the past, the former is idolised and romanticised from the present, which bestows upon it a “prestige that reality did not possess” (Halbwachs, 1950). In this romanticisation after rupture, the former suffering may be forgotten, as Halbwachs (1950) argues, “because constraints are felt only as long as they are operative and because by definition a past constrain has ceased to be operative”.

Recent studies challenge the conventional understanding of memories as passive, painful and freezing and push to (re)assert its positive role as a coping mechanism in displacement. For instance, De Brigard (2017) points out that nostalgia steers a mental simulation of possible scenarios of future events, a

remembering forward, a Nostalgia of ‘what could have been’ (De Brigard, 2017). Through remembering how places are experienced: physical features of materials, smells, and sounds, recalling such experiences constitute visual and sensorial frames of reference for the individual. Therefore, remembering together the ways in which social relations, rules of conduct, and affirmation of groups of close /similar cultural backgrounds, become the social frame of reference for ties reconstruction.



The work of Wildschut, Sedikides, and Alowidy (2019) on experimental social psychology with Syrian refugees in Saudi Arabia also showcases the ways in which Nostalgia as being not only past-oriented but also future-directed. They categorise these psychological functions as follows:


- a) Existential: (re)triggers self-continuity, meanings, core values and identity (re)formation.
- b) Self-oriented: (re)activates a sense of self-worth by revisiting positive self-attributes and increasing self-esteem.
- c) Social: fosters connectedness, attachments, feelings of security, support, empathy, and openness towards others.
- d) Future-directed: the evocation of better possibilities and ideas and motivation to enact (homing) innovative ideas.

These functions operate and (may) overlap in different time-space intervals. They mentally initiate and stimulate the process of ‘homing’ in forced displacement and support recalibrating “waiting” space-times.

Nonetheless, the act of remembering itself is a form of agency, and its visual imprints steer practices to project these imprints within the everyday performative (alien) spaces, colouring a wall, adding a plant, readjusting a kitchen, dividing spaces “like it used to be there [in the past in a former home]”. When this remembering becomes collective, i.e., then the visual imprints of these practices become collective as the projected imprints within the communal performative (alien) spaces are collectively recognised and agreed upon. For instance, these practices include marking and delineating spatio-temporal access thresholds (doors, walls, fences.) and infusing them with cultural cues signalling norms of social behaviour and gender sensitives (a curtain behind the open door which allows a dialogue but limits the uninvited

peeking eye, chairs in front of the door for men to sit outside and women inside). However, the recollection patchworks, spatially and materially consolidated, are also shreds of evidence of fragmentation between past-present-future. These fragmentations are (re)captured within the contextual present forced displacement conditionalities that deform the cones of absolute past and possible futures.

In the following chapters, this dissertation combines these frames: space-time (dis)continuity, crisis and rupture, home, agency, and nostalgia. This combination shall illuminate different factors, practices, and scales of the ways in which forced displacement receiving sites become emerging urbanities. This frame also allows reading how spatial structures of shifting powers due to violent conflicts and involuntary dislocations and relocations are (re)shaping not only the KR-I territory but also the political reality of its dwellers' human condition collective memories within and beyond different space-time frames.



Part 2

Ruptured Roots, Mixed Soils: A Genealogy of Forced Displacement Receiving Sites in Kurdistan Region of Iraq

"[in Kurdistan] Place, implicitly traced to an arrival of a man on a particular spot of land and fused with lineage membership passed on over time, is intimately bound up with social role, and the two come to influence heavily the relations of the two meeting strangers."

King (2014)

Due to its size, geopolitical sensitivity, ecological diversification, and socio-political complexity, in the case of Kurdistan, indeed, geography matters (Massey, 1994). The land of the Kurds or Kurdistan has been divided today by the current states' boundaries of Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Iran since the early 20th century. For centuries prior to the modern states project, Kurdistan territories had been a geographical cradle of the interests' intersect of great powers, internally shaped by local tensions over recognised territories of tribal, religious and state-like forms of sovereignty.

Amidst crises and ruptures of wars, clashes and conflicts over resources, these territories periodically and chronically have been unstable, stages of various historical violent events and involuntary dislocations (Clarry, 2019). Such man-made crises unquestionably coincide with sets of space-time (dis)continuities between violent uprooting and (forced) re-rooting. Indeed, these (dis)continuities mark profoundly the ways in which these territories are (re)inhabited and deeply entangled with the articulation of HOME and are part and parcel of the collective memory of the Kurds (O'Shea, 2004; Tejel, 2009).

Kurdistan territories, however, carried a Janus-face cornering involuntary dislocations: they were sources and fertile grounds for different refugee-seeking/granting dynamics to be embedded in a locality. Nonetheless, with the rise of the modern state and the subsequent appearance of international agencies in the wake of conflicts, the refugee figure was rendered an international responsibility. This shift of responsibility from localised to international entities as such has undoubtedly altered the ways in which refuge practices are enacted.

This research is concerned primarily with forced displacement receiving sites and their likeness in act like emerging urbanities in KR-I's particularities. Therefore, this part shall explore, through a longitudinal analysis, the ways in which refuge seeking-granting reshapes the KR-I territorial boundaries and socio-spatial structures. This exploration follows the theoretical and conceptual frame introduced in the previous part, focused on three intersecting concepts: 1)Space-time (dis)continuities, 2)Crises and Rupture and 3) Home, Agency and Nostalgia. Part 2 will employ this frame to construct the KR-I forced displacement territorial biography by tracing -briefly- the ways in which the repeated displacement of Kurds led to a continuous (re)production of receiving sites/places of reception.

Chapter 3

3. Refuge Spatial Practices in (pre)modern Kurdistan Region of Iraq's Territory

In the course of the fieldwork (2018-2019), I often encountered generational stories of uprooting and (re)rooting. In the first interview, Karzan¹⁷ - a local humanitarian psychotherapist working in KR-I's humanitarian camps- told upfront that "being a refugee (and on the run) is not a new concept here [in the KR-I]". He followed this statement with an overview of his family history infused with displacements.

Karzan's great maternal grandfather, being an "insurgent Kurd", fled from Turks' persecution from the Mousel vilayat prior to WWI and became a refugee in today's KR-I northern parts. After his arrival, he took refuge in one of the villages, lived with and married into one of its tribes. A few decades later, Karzan's father also found refuge and protection within the territory's villages, as he faced multiple displacements between the 1960s-1970s. However, amidst the violence and clashes in the 1980s, the Iraqi army razed thousands of (refuge granting) villages. Consequently, refugee camps mushroomed in Iranian and Turkish Kurdish territories across the borders to become the "proper" receiving sites for the displaced. Within these camps, Karzan's parents found refuge in Iran, only to come home and rebuild their village after Saddam Hussein's amnesty act in septemeber1988. This homecoming, however, was short indeed. In less than two years, during the 1990's exodus, the family, including the young Karzan, found themselves refugees, again in camps in Kurdish territories across the Turkish borders. The return was only after the no-fly zone was fostered in 1991, continually endangered by periodic internal conflicts or external threats.

Today, as Karzan explained, his village resumes the 'Kurdish tradition' of accepting the distant Syrian refugee "brothers" and "guests" crossing the borders in times of distress. Karzan pointed to an active presence for displacees by saying, "*We eat more Shawarma now..., one very good Kurdish Syrian chef opened a restaurant in our village*", which indicates an extended hospitality, habits' change and expected continuity. During the same fieldwork years and the repeated visits to the KR-I, I also got the chance to hang out and make friends with many local humanitarian workers. Due to being local Sufi Sheikh's descendants, some were nicknamed 'Sheikhs' by refugees and friends alike. One of them stated, "The moment they call us Sheikhs .. we have to give when asked, .. it is our duty after all"¹⁸.

The short vignettes above undeniably signify rooted refuge particularities in the specific geographical context of the KR-I, inherited from a mix of culturally embedded practices connected in times of distress. Formerly, seeking and granting refuge practices in pre-modern Kurdistan hosting and granting protection "duties" can socially be understood as a patron-client contract. According to the anthropologist Diane King (2014), who has worked in the KRI since the 1990s, hosting guests and refugees' mechanisms and rhythms bear hallmarks of tribal and religious roots and customs, generationally maintained in the Kurdish social life for hundreds of years. Aligning with my informants' stories, scholarship on the Kurds points out

¹⁷ Karzan is a traditional Kurdish name in the KR-I, which is here fictious as my informant as to be anonymous

¹⁸ A similar statement about duty to give by sheikh descendants can be found in King (2014) ethnographic work in Kurdistan.

that within the conditionalities of the situation, the displaced had, to a certain extent, a conscious choice of the geography of their 'arrival' (King, 2014; McDowall, 2004; van Bruinessen, 1992). By seeking refuge, newcomers pursue a particular sort of social 'fusion' through embracing a particular -expected- social role over time, which consequently triggers socio-spatial (re)formations, passed and maintained generationally, as the following sections shall explore.

In tracing this line of thinking, a few questions arise: if the 'arrival' is to seek refuge and protection, what are the particularities of this geopolitical and socio-spatial context that conditions such arrival? What are the time-space frames and modes of arrival that catalyses refuge-seeking-granting practices? What is eventually the degrees of their social fusion? To answer these questions, it is essential first to examine briefly the roots of (pre)Islamic refuge-seeking-granting practices and the ways in which they were incorporated and practised in the spheres of traditional political powers in pre-modern Kurdistan. (pre)Islamic

3.1. Refuge Seeking-Granting Practices

When addressing the status of refugees in the pre-modern Kurdish tradition, unsurprisingly, almost identical practices in the pre-Islam Arabian peninsula known as *Jiwar* or *Ijara* arise.

The pre-Islamic "*Jiwar*" or "*Ijara*" tribal customs, according to Shoukri (2010), imply duties of "granting protection and welfare to the needy and the fleeing person" and are "equivalent to the modern concept of refuge". In Islamic doctrine, the holy Quran and Hadith endorsed and embraced the *Jiwar* as secular responsibility and transcendent rewards of protecting the asylum seeker, and are celebrated until today (in 2022). The importance of this concept itself is very present as the epoch of the Islamic Hijri calendar is the day¹⁹ when the Prophet's *Hijra* (forced migration) took place. This particular movement, within Islamic history, constituted pivotal space-time events that paved for the rise of Islam and the fixity and expansion of its territories. For the purpose of this research, we shall briefly examine the ways in which refuge seeking and granting were practised. The goal is to understand under which circumstances these practices were maintained and/or altered.

Granting and seeking refuge, demarcating belonging thresholds of who is a 'brother' and who is a 'guest' and hence the duration of stay were not arbitrary nor unconditioned practices. Distinctions are clear when recalling the two early Islam forced migration movements (*Hijras*) in the early years of *El-Da'wah*²⁰. The first Hijra was in 613-615 towards the Kingdom of Aksum in Abyssinia²¹. The *Sahaba* (early believers) fled Quraysh tribes and their allies' persecution and oppression, were granted refuge protection by Negus and stayed as guests till 628. The second Hijra in 622 was towards Yathrib (Al Medina Al Munawara – the enlightened city- in Saudi Arabia today), where the Prophet Muhammad and his followers of Muhajireen (immigrants) were accepted and hosted unconditionally by the Ansar (helpers of the hosts) forming a brotherhood that became "stronger than blood". These practices oscillated between duty and (political) power harnessed by the refugees' presence and acceptance by their hosts, hence their rights in and to a place and its resources. The order of such practices is as follows:



This map shows the flights routes that Muslims took in the first and the second Hijra reproduced by the Author based on (Lumen Learning, 2022; Smart, 1999)

¹⁹ (16, July, 622),

²⁰ Ar: الدعوة - the summoning of the non-believers to embrace Islam .

²¹ (later Ethiopia and Eretria)

- Asking for refuge publicly: Upon arrival to the refuge site (village, town, kingdom..), the refuge seekers request in public the protection of the higher authority in place, which is, for instance, clear in refugees asking for protection in Negus's court. By doing so, they assert and acknowledge this authority's power over people (including themselves), land, and resources.
- Granting Refuge: When refugees are accepted as a group, they are granted protection in public assemblies (Shoukri, 2010), generally taking place in public spaces. This grant entitles the newcomers to collective protection (of the higher authority, its followers and allies), access to material welfare and a place in the location of refuge. Shoukri (2010) clarifies that by being granted refuge within the tribe, refugees, whether Guests or Brothers, observed the laws of the tribe that protected them and pledged loyalty (the commodity paid by protection and welfare). Those who are accepted as "brothers" are even expected to act in concert with the tribe in war and peace times "rise[s] when it rises, without asking why" and "carry out all the tasks" as full-fledged members.
- Inclusion Degrees: once accepted in protection, refugees can be "Guests" and/or "brothers", depending on the host. For "Guest", inclusion is conditional: temporary protection and rights are in place²². This case applies to the first Hijra refugees in the Kingdom of Aksum. Nagus refused to hand in his "guests" to the Quraish's delegation emissaries, granting them his full protection within his territory "go, for you are safe in my country". As such, he asserted their protection rights bound to his territorial influence.

Full inclusion applies to the second case of Hijra towards El-Medina: refugees and their hosts bonded through embracing the same religion, political aspirations and intermarriages, strengthened in sharing the resources and even homes. The hospitality converted into total fusion: the newcomers within the receiving community are "becoming one" by war and blood. In other words, in inclusion as such, refugees could move up within the social strata, with prolonged stay and proven loyalties (in war and peace times), and become undifferentiated from their receiving groups in terms of rights in/to place.

- Permission Dismissal: Custom gave refuge seekers that were denied the right of asylum (usually when the protector was an ally of the persecutor), a 'temporary safe passage (conventionally three days)' and/or escorted to a safe point (outside their territory).

Reading refuge-seeking-granting customs and practices as such, the aggregate of reciprocal relations and articulated attachments create some sort of kinship ideology. They define belonging thresholds, spatialities and temporalities of refuge, hence the access to the receiving groups' resources and protection. Nonetheless, in each geopolitical and socio-spatial context, refuge granting practices differed. The following section shall explore 'refuge' socio-spatial articulation and conditionalities in pre/modern Kurdistan, and the ways in which it is deeply entangled with:

- Spheres of (political) power grant refuge and cause displacement, and the concentration of opportunities accompanying seeking/granting refuge.
- The Mode of forced displacement (acute/anticipatory) and refugee categories (brothers vs guests

²² Most of the refugees went back to Mecca to enact the second Hijra with the prophet in 622, while others waited to join the rest of the Muslims in Medina after 628.

3.2. Refuge and the Spheres of traditional Political Power in Pre-modern Kurdistan

The ability to grant asylum, protect (or extend protection to) the vulnerable and host guests in the pre-modern Kurdish communities qualified, similar to the region's societies, (as) "an index of power and greatness" (G. Loescher, 2021). In short, the more powerful the protectors are, the more refugees they attract to become their followers. Correspondingly, the more followers these protectors have, the more power and control they can harness and claim (over resources) and expand their territorial influence. According to van Bruinessen (1992), the territorial logic of power²³ in pre-modern Kurdistan is linked to the ability to resolve conflicts between rivals, control over land and manpower to mobilise and produce in war-peace times alike. As such, granting refuge depended fundamentally on the balance of these three points. van Bruinessen (1992) study about the social and political structures of (pre-modern) Kurdistan distinguishes two patron-client spheres that persisted over time and changing tides of governing regimes:

- The social sphere of the Tribal and non-tribal²⁴ chiefs and their *raayt* (subjects الرعية)
- The religious sphere of Sufi orders' Sheikhs and their *murids* (followers المریدین).

In both spheres, as the following sections shall explain, the patrons derived their leverage and political and economic powers within a specific geopolitical context. These leverages had various degrees of combinations of a) (inter)dependencies under/against the rubric of worldly power (emirates²⁵, empires, and other state-like entities) and/or b) unworldly spiritual ones of Sufi Sheikhs withdrawn from God.

3.2.1. The Socio-spatial Sphere of (non)Tribal Cheifs and their raayt (subjects)

In pre-modern Kurdistan, prior to the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the formation of nation-states, most territories were traditionally associated with a tribe with a recognised territorial boundary that could "only be changed by conquest" (van Bruinessen, 1992). Traditionally, each territory was associated with particular tribes (of sub-tribes, clans and lineages)²⁶. Landownership and territorial rights, at the time, were products of shifting dynamics between tribal laws, Islamic jurisprudence, and feudal practices before converting toward state-owned and private properties. As such, the rights to access these lands and existing resources were granted by the controlling authority and included: passing, using and benefiting from these land, whether pastoral rights or as collective resources and properties (van Bruinessen, 1992).

The Kurdish tribe, according to van Bruinessen (1992), is considered an enduring socio-political territorial unit²⁷ composed of networks of patrilineages, kinships of real (blood) and putative attachments. Interestingly, refuge seekers fell into foreigners' groups (including seasonal workers..) who share putative attachments with the tribe, next to *loyal* political allegiances and followers. Many foreigners become

23 The territorial logic of power was the common case in different part of the world until it started to change gradually since the signage of treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and settling on the idea of the nation state's sovereignty and having a state citizenship linked to the state's territory. Though that the gradual decline of the economic and military power of the ottoman empire started in the same period, however, it took about 200 years for nation state project to emerge with the Greek independence in 1832.

24 The non-tribal groups had almost no political significance, not land ownership, mostly craftsmen or peasants of share-croppers or agricultural labourers generally controlled with various degrees of exploitation by the territorial tribe.

25 principalities : (Semi)independent political units of tribal confederations flourished in Kurdistan proper between 15th –19th centuries.

26 van Bruinessen (1992) differentiated between tribe, sub-tribe, clan and lineage. Tribe, which all groups respond to a feeling of a higher superiority, is based on descent, real and putative kinship. He reserves the term 'clan' for segments of the tribe that have a name of their own and are said to be political units on their own right, and uses 'lineages' for units smaller than clans that claim a common descent. Groups followed authority figures of one or a combination of chieftains, Aghas and Sheikhs.

27 van Bruinessen (1992) reads the clan as the primary territorial unit, yet conditional as they split, merge and leave, the tribe is permanent.


“friends and brothers” through joining the tribe actively in peace and war times, intermarriages bonds, and businesses. As such, these attachments consolidate in time into an actual membership and then kinship after a couple of generations (van Bruinessen, 1992). they blend in as an indistinguishable part of the tribe, where one can “hardly remember their foreign origins” (van Bruinessen, 1992). The primary responsibility of the head of the territorial unit²⁸ in conflict times is the protection of subjects and providing armies/fighters for the tribe, while in peacetime, these duties are to maintain the security within his boundaries of control, make sure that the land is productive (hence presence/stabilisation of labour-power inland) and pay the shares to the regime in power (including taxes, crops, ..). If the head is weak, unable to fulfil his duties and/or the exploitation is unbearable, the head is replaced by a member from the same bloodline to rule. Consequently, followers shifting their loyalty (by moving from his territory to another) becomes problematic for the tribe in control and an opportunity for its rivals.

In most traditional Kurdish societies, the village is the “territorial unit that takes precedence over all others”. It is the loci where the smaller political units of clans, lineages²⁹, and loyal *foreigners* to the tribe inhabit. For instance, among the Mangur Kurdish tribe, each of the seven clans is dispersed over two to ten villages. Hence, each territorial unit had control over population, land, resources and access rights within its boundaries³⁰. Each village has its specific agricultural properties and control over the surrounding grazing and pasture lands, and its boundaries also shift with medium-small scale quarrels over resources within their tribal territory (Izady, 2015; King, 2014; McDowall, 2020; van Bruinessen, 1992). Within villages, refuge spatially manifests. First, refugees are incorporated within the village spaces and granted accommodation and access to resources after being granted protection. The village’s immediate resources become scarce with the arrival of consecutive foreigners’ waves leading to an uncontrolled population increase (over time). Consequently, sequential processes of socio-spatial emanations-like take place within the tribe’s territory. van Bruinessen (1992) describes these processes as follows: a clan segment splits off to form a second village close by, and later another split forms a third, followed by another spreading within the tribe’s territorial boundaries. With each split, a sort of chain migration follows: first, through close kinship bonds of relatives and friends join the new village, and second by the arrival of new foreigners’ waves to benefit from the newly tapped resources. Therefore, the stretched socio-spatial relations connected to resources’ presence and (agricultural) vast land to be ploughed and maintained leads to the stabilisation and the new village’s growth. An example is the Balik tribe’s village formation in the KR-I north-eastern parts: the first village was in the valley next to the Balik river, and the newly formed chain of villages, within the tribe’s territory, going up the in the valley (van Bruinessen, 1992). King (2014) described a similar chain migration of *Deshta*, a split from *Kani* village (in the north-western parts of KR-I) and how the refugees and locals moved into the new village as they shared intermarriages bonds. With the territorial expansion and population increase, the number of men ready to battle and resources under control grows, hence the village’s chiefs’ power sphere. As such, this power creates a concentration of push and pull factors for populations to join one tribe and leave another.

²⁸ Chieftain (Tribe/Clan), Beg /Baik(town), Agha (village), Bavik (lineage, family) .

²⁹ of the same territorial tribe


³⁰ This factor became vital in different administrative reforms in the periods of Ottoman empire and later of British control till 1932 as we shall explore later.



Left: Kurdish tribal map of Iraq 1932, the Yale archives . (adjusted to white by the author, 2022)

Right above: "Barwari Bala, a tribal area, has several hundred villages, each of which is home to the members of between one and several lineages as well as women who have married lineage members"- Reproduced by the Author (2022) based on the map from (Courtesy of Kurdistan Regional Government Ministry of Reconstruction and Development.) depicted in (King, 2014)

Right: "Some features of tribal structure graphic representation. Which can be read in different ways: First as an actual lineage tree : triangles represent (male) individuals. Secondly, it can be read as a representation of the segmentary structure of a tribe, in which case each row corresponds with a Level of organization, rather arbitrarily to be labelled that of tribe (I), clan (II), lineage (III), sub-lineage (IV), household (V).³ In this case the triangles represent social units. Thirdly, a spatial structure of tribal villages connected via real and putative kinships within the tribal territories, In this case the triangles represent the spatial units : the villages, I is the mother village". Source: (van Bruinessen, 1992)



3.2.2. The religious sphere *Sheikhs* (of Sufi orders) and their *murids* (followers)

In the Kurdish context, Various Sufi orders³¹ were present; however, two dominated over time: the Qadiriyya and the Naqshbandiyya *Tariqa* orders. These orders were perceived as independent from both the tribe and the state. As such, they provided the 'organisational framework that could transcend tribal boundaries and counteract the tendency to split into mutually antagonistic sections' (van Bruinessen, 1992, 2011). For the purpose of this research, it is crucial to construct how these Sufi orders' organisational structures are reproduced within the traditional Kurdish context.

In Sufism, each order is linked to following a certain *Tariqa* (path, way), a method of approaching or understanding the religion³². Each member follows a certain *Tariqa* and has to swear an oath of allegiance to the deceased and living founders (*Sheikh*) and his deputy (*Khalifa*) and owe absolute obedience to his mentor that 'undermined the traditional authority (Anjum, 2006). The *silisla* (chain-سلسلة) and networks of allegiances 'act like a family' and constitute a *tayfeh* (طائفة). The authority ladder (of the living) is as follows: *Sheikh* (شيخ elderly, leader), *Khalifa* (خليفة - deputy), *murshid* (مرشد - a spiritual instructor), *mullah*³³ (ملا - teacher) and hierarchy of their *murids* (مريد - disciples and/or followers)³⁴. Kurdish Sufi *Sheikhs* are not necessarily from a notable bloodline³⁵; nevertheless, they get recognition of higher status by marrying into a notable family in a tribe (for instance: the famous Mawlana *Sheikh Khalid Naqshbandi*).

In theory, as "the door for God is open to all, " Sufi leaders are responsible for implementing Islamic sanctions, including harbouring those seeking asylum. By doing so, the Sufi spheres exceeded to cover peasants, non-tribal groups and *muskin* (vulnerable and/or poor - مسكين) who seek their protection from unjust *Aghas* (أغا) and feudal landlords who – in many cases- answer to them. As such, the *sheikh's* followers and clientele networks were not confined to a particular family/tribe lineage only, but "they [*Sheikhs and Khalifas*] often recruit[ed] their most devoted followers from the most exploited, the lowest strata of the society, ..[and] peasantry" (van Bruinessen, 1992). As such, *sheikhs'* power grew as they fed on solving (blood and class) feuds and tribal conflicts and keeping tribal leaders in check. An example is the growth of Barzanji Qadiriyya *Sheikhs'* influence, as the following sections shall demonstrate.

van Bruinessen (1992) points to strategic spatial positioning and articulation of the Sufi network in Kurdish inhabited territories. The spatiality of this network, depending on the importance of the location and the appointed personnel (*Sheikh/Khalifa*), roots and grows by establishing buildings close to or within settlements and were mainly close to or on the boundaries of two-three tribal territories. Hence, these socio-spatial nodes connect members across (tribal)territories. These networks' nodes sustain in time to


³¹ "Sufism represents the inward-looking, mystical dimension of Islam. Often thought erroneously to be its own sect or denomination – such as Sunni Islam – Sufism is better understood as an approach that mixes mainstream religious observances, such as prescribed daily prayers, with a range of supplementary spiritual practices, such as the ritual chanting of God's attributes (*zhikr*) or the veneration of saints." (Mandaville & PEW, 2010).

³² In Sufism, *Tariqa* is the spiritual and mystical path that individual takes toward direct knowledge (*ma'arifa* المعرفة) to reach truth (*haqiqqa* الحقيقة) and unshakable real certainty (*Yaqin* اليقين) of God (الله).

³³ The traditional *Mullah* has a religious education at traditional Islamic schools, he leads all religious ceremonies at the village level come on and instructs the village children in the Quran.

³⁴ The *Sheikh* are instated by receiving the *ijaza* by their *sheikhs* (or traditionally by being of the same bloodline), who in their turn can appoint their *khalifahs*, (who could become *sheikhs* on their own right if they are given the *ijaza* by their mentor-*sheikhs*). The hierarchy and numbers of followers also change depending on the scale of the town/village and the reputation of the mentor. For more detailed descriptions, check Anjum (2006).

³⁵ This fact is applied to the Naqshbandiyya order in Kurdistan, which in turn explains the wide spread of the order all over the territory in comparison of the more exclusive Qadiriyya order.



van Bruinessen (1992) Important centers of propagation of the Naqshbandi Order. Reproduced by the author 2022 based on (van Bruinessen, 1992)

- > Shaikh-Khalifa relationships
- Approximate boundaries of Kurdistan
- Residences of Mawlana Khalid's khalifas
- Residences of other Naqshbandi shaikhs (khalifa of khalifa, etc)

ensure the continuity of the *tariqa*, speak and guide in the name of the order / the sheikh. They vary in size and degree of isolation in relation to the function, followers and head of their master:

- *ribat* (رباط) Sufi dwelling for meditation and prayer, usually isolated),
- *zawiya* (زاوية) - rest house/residences for small circles),
- *khanaqa* (خانقاه) - a larger dwelling also acts as a meeting/ teaching place, some use the mosques in smaller villages).
- *tekiyahs* (تكية) - lodges) to host the disciples, and *madrasah* (مدرسة) - teaching institution).

As Sufi locations and buildings bounded to religious status, they all withdraw the legitimacy to act as sanctuaries and loci for protecting the vulnerable. Therefore, refugees' arrival and incorporation within the followers did indeed lead to the Sheikhs' influence's expansion over population and later territories. One concrete example is the Barzani Naqshbandiyya sheikhs' influence expansion over Barzan and Zibar areas in north-east Erbil today (Al-Azzawi, 1952 (2005); McDowall, 2004). In addition, being the powerful protectors of the weak, *Sheikhs, compared to tribal chiefs, remained "the most indigenous leaders of Kurdistan and the obvious focal point for the nationalist sentiment"*³⁶ (van Bruinessen, 1992). Their revolts against dominating states after WWI still exist in the living memory of the Kurds in the KRI and Kurdistan proper. In the KR-I proper, for instance, Sheikhs and their followers revolted³⁷ across the region: Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji and Sheikh Ahmad Barzani in the south and north KRI.

Consequently, the sphere of the sheikhs connects tribal territorial boundaries, class strata, and time (generationally inherited). In other

words, the traditional Kurdish Landscape is some sort of archipelago of villages networked by territorial-tribal layers and cross-territorial Sufi domains operating within and beyond state-like powers.


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Until the end of WWI, and to some degree WWII with the formation of the Republic of Iraq in 1958, the refuge was requested/granted within the tribal and religious spheres and can be read as patron-client relationships. Patrons exercised these powers in the forms of caring, protecting, controlling and - in

various degrees- exploiting

their clients (followers). Their clients, consequently, shifted their loyalties depending on the habitability conditions of their locations. Historically, the negligence of understanding and working with these bonds as such, according to van Bruinessen (1992) and McDowall (2004), proved to be "pricy" in losing the power and control over the territories and, in many cases, their demise, as the following sections shall reveal.

* * *



van Bruinessen (1992) understanding and representations of Kurdistan's Sufi Order links and networks. source: (van Bruinessen, 1992)

³⁶ it is not surprising that most of the revolts were lead by Sheikhs (or mullas) such as Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji (Qadri order)'s revolt against the British in 1920s, Sheikh Said (Naqshbandi order)'s revolt against Turkish officials in the 1920s, and Mulla Mustafa Barzani (Naqshbandi sheikhly family) revolts from 1940s till early 1970s.

³⁷ These revolts were counter attacked by British led land-air forces – supported by the suppressed peasants and the rival tribes, and pushing the "rebels" towards back to the mountains.

"In the realm of human affairs, power supposedly can sustain itself only through expansion; otherwise, it shrinks and dies."

(Arendt, 1970)

3.3. Shifting (political) boundaries and Refuge Practices in the pre-WWII KR-I Territory

Historically, within the geographical boundaries that the KR-I occupies today, the sustainment of power derived its legitimacy from expansion in territorial influence, fortune and loyal clients. Tribal and religious alliances play(ed) a significant role in the (re)ordering of the influences territorially, under the dominant empires' (indirect) rule, especially in remote plain lands and mountainous areas. The territorial logic of power, as such, had been a result of the continued resurgence types and (scales of) violent events. These events had triggered involuntary dislocations, induced forced displacements and consecutively (re)formed the mechanisms of seeking and granting refuge.

In the Pre-WWI KR-I geographical boundaries, as the following sections shall explain, the scales of forced movements, agency and actions varied and were mainly associated with power territorially structured by: 1) empires, emirates, states' borders, 2) tribes, clans and families territories 3) cross-territorial of religious control-influence. The following sections will provide a longitudinal historical review of the ways in which such (re)structuration occurred, with a focused lens on power boundaries' dynamics, involuntary dislocations, relocations and refuge practices.

3.3.1. Pre-Ottoman Kurdish inhabited Territories



"Since at least the second millennium BC and the emergence of the first empires of the Akkadians and Assyrians", according to Izady (2015), "massive deportations, involuntary dislocations and relocations constituted the norm in inhabited Kurdish territories". These *en-masse* forced movements, as such, were part and parcel of the disciplinary strategies of the sovereign powers in place towards their unruly and non-loyal subjects (Izady, 2015). The goal was to assert, maintain, and expand their influence and control boundaries. These strategies were concomitant with violence exercised on land, settlements and populations. They covered a wide range of annihilations and scorched earth policies: livelihoods' eradications by burning pasture/agricultural lands, killing domesticated animals, villages and towns destruction, filling the resulting vacant spaces with their *loyal* subjects and finally dispersing and relocating those who survived, hundreds of miles away from their former habitat. Violence and chaos, as such, fed (latent) tribal tensions, clan rivalries and blood feuds (those who survived and/or existed in the peripheral territories). (Izady, 2015; McDowall, 2004, 2020). As such, implementing these strategies ensured the inhabitability and population's territorial discontinuities.


Historical examples of the Mongols' raids between the 12th and 14th centuries reaching these territories highlight the ways in which the violence exercised ruptured (territorial) bonds by wiping out almost entire tribes. For instance, the Tamerlaine in the 1390s subjected many Kurdish settlements to genocidal military attacks" (i.e. Diyarbakir, Mardin, Jazira bin Umar, Hakkari, Mosul, Erbil and Nusaybin)". "In 1401, after a Kurdish revolt, Timur Lange sacked Erbil, Mosul and Jazira ben Umar. It was said that only one Christian village was spread" (McDowall, 2004). Such violence disturbed and distorted socio-spatial and temporal presence patterns of nomadic/sedentary Kurdish populations, impacting dramatically (international) trade local agricultural economy. As such, the violence resulted in a disequilibrium of (territorially) interwoven generational networks (Izady, 2015; McDowall, 2004; van Bruinessen, 1992). One can trace distortions and discontinuities on today's Kurdish inhabited area maps, present in territorial fragmentations' of various geopolitical, socio-spatial, and linguistic compositions.



Major Deportation Episode of the Kurds in the Course of the 16th-17th Centuries (Northern and Western Kurdistan) and 18th Century (Central Eastern and Southern Kurdistan)

 Areas of Deportees' origin
 Final destination of deportees

 Area with Kurdish majority today
 Administrative boundaries - Kurdistan Region

 Temporary deportee collecting sites before transference to permanent exile areas

Scale
 Km 0 100 200
 Miles 0 50 100 150

In the 15th-16th centuries (pre-ottoman), Kurdish inhabited areas, the form of the territory, its constitutive elements of nature (mountain areas, plains) and socio-spatial structures remained foundational for tribal influences' increase or elimination. Tribes' geographical coordinates, adjacency to clashing and combat fields and/or military routs and conveyed their involvements with sovereign contesting powers'. Consequently, these factors affected the ways in which (dis)loyalties were handled and power spheres grew. A concrete example is the Qaraqoyunlu and Aqqoyunlu territorial states' power dynamics that (re)shaped the early Kurdish emirates and tribal confederations, hence their influence on land and populations. By pledging loyalties to the Qaraqoyunlu's sultans in the early 15th century, for instance, Kurdish *mirs* became vassalages and increased their powers by acquiring "part of the territory as [sultan's] gift" granted to loyal subjects" and marrying into the rulers' families. However, when the Aqqoyunlu sultans came into power, such loyalties lost their power and became problematic. Through military campaigns, Sultan Uzun Hasan's "took it upon him to exterminate the leading families of Kurdistan, especially those who had shown themselves devoted to or subjects of the Qaraqoyunlu Sultans" (van Bruinessen, 1992). Similarly, under the Ismail Shah of the Safavid (1501-1524 - Persian Empire) rule, troops conducted punitive campaigns "to depopulate border areas from unruly tribes conspiring with the enemies". These campaigns burnt villages, butchered inhabitants, crushed resistances, uprooted and enslaved others to be "sold on island and in far-away countries", and last but not least, killed and substituted Kurdish leaders and *mirs* with their personal (Eppel, 2019; Izady, 2015; van Bruinessen, 1992). Violently shifting populations and destructive power dynamics, therefore, have distorted cultural realignments of different groups together. In forced displacement cases – where no forced settlement followed – seeking refuge was an action that took precedence when a window opened for the displaced to go somewhere. . In other words, forced displacements territorial restructuring caused by crisis, ruptures and homelessness created space-time discontinuities for these groups.

Nonetheless, within the Kurdish inhabited territories, refuge seekers' arrival to the remnants catalysed the creation of new tribes, who relocated themselves away from raiding armies. When the displacement triggers were acute (Kunz, 1973), the moving direction was to the closest safe location. Refuge in this period took place within the tribal spheres of their territorial natural and man-made structures (of villages and hamlets in mountainous areas). These territories, acting as (temporary) safe-havens, enduring conflicts and rapid changes of sovereignty, and being partially inaccessible for military campaigns, allowed densification of socio-spatial (tribal) networks within the receiving territories, accelerated by the displacees and refugees' presence. Such densification consolidated loyalty with the powerful sovereigns by providing armies and paying taxes subjects. This densification stretched from the rugged inaccessible mountainous areas towards the plains during crises and uncertain periods. The alliances' networks territorial expansions (mainly tribal confederations) formed the basis for the rise of (semi)independent Kurdish political units (chiefdoms, mini-states and emirates) and maintain(ed) their territorial presence for centuries despite the changes in central authorities. Today's hamlets, villages and towns on KR-I's Iranian borders of Hawraman mountains, where Soran and Baban emirates reigned for three centuries, have similar socio-spatial and cultural characteristics. These socio-spatially networked locations have acted as refuge loci for the persecuted and displaced Kurds, hideouts for rebels and insurgents, and, consequently, subject to consequential destructions that periodically resurfaced until the 1990s, as chapter 3 shall trace.

3.3.2. Ottoman KR-I's Territory


3.3.2.1. Early Administrative Reforms

The early Ottoman rule brought relative stability to Kurdistan. The scale of the conflicts and, consequently, forced movement patterns changed, and they were relocated close to the contesting borders between Safavids (Persia) and the Ottomans. As such, control over the mountainous border areas was sought in two ways: depopulation and ensuring the loyalties of semi-independent Kurdish emirates, who anyways "exploited their position on the edge of the empires to carve out high levels of autonomy" (Owtram, 2019), and consequently acting as some sort of de facto sovereigns.

Nevertheless, within this period, Ottoman Kurdistan witnessed the spread of (shifting) land regimes and administrative (re)structurations. An example of such practices is Land-holding³⁸ grants for the loyal subjects and armies (of tribal calvaries), becoming a common tradition with hereditary territorial rights. These lands were either located within the tribal boundaries or were "new" conquered lands, rewarded by the Ottoman Sultan in acknowledging tribesmen's loyalties and military services. This way, various authority figures acquired power over land, mainly tribal chiefs and/or military men, which could be nobles or the tribes' members (*rayyat*). Such power was harnessed by acquiring land accelerated degrees of exploitations, conflicts, forced displacements and shifting loyalties leading to various groups' (forced)displacement. This power over land, however, conveyed various responsibilities. Land-holders were responsible for: solving disputes, collecting taxes, and guaranteeing the fixity and growth of their subjects (and sometimes forcing them to stay). The role of these subjects was mainly to plough and cultivate the land and fight in war times (proportional to the size within their territorial boundaries). Therefore, maintaining these duties meant ensuring land fertility by having 'registered peasants', renting the vacant 'new' areas to 'landless' peasants, and most importantly, providing manpower and cavalymen ready for mobilisation. The peasants' primary obligations, including refugees, were to cultivate the land: registered ones have inheritable land tenure rights, only revoked if they did not fulfil their obligations for three consecutive years, while the landless get similar rights to the land after staying and cultivating these lands.


Within such administrative reforms, seeking/granting refuge, and social fusion (prospects), played a role in territorial (re)structuration and opportunities to gain rights and/or power over land: mainly by refugees being part of the peasants and joining the army. On the one hand, Tribes' land-holders needed to attract the population to increase their *rayyat*. Granting refuge and providing fixity and stability can be read as a strategy to maintain and expand their hereditary territorial rights. The uprooted refugees, on the other hand, benefitted from this provision and sought a prolonged active presence to root and acquire hereditary rights over land. By joining the tribe, some refugees become part of the loyal calvaries joining the tribes' armies. Those "who fight bravely" in wars had the opportunity to be rewarded a land. This means that even in such cases, refugees did not only acquire land but also authority and power over its inhabitants.

³⁸ In general, the land belonged to the ottoman empire, land-holders never owned it, "but had the right to collect only a stipulated revenue from it"(van Bruinessen, 1992). Those who could not maintain duties towards sultans and their subejects or over-exploited the land, were substituted by a family member.



location of Kurdish Emirates (Principalities) in Kurdish inhabited areas between 13th-19th centuries author 2022 based on Source: (Izady, 2015)

- Approximate average extent of the domain of principality
- Administrative boundaries - Kurdistan
- Areas with Kurdish majority today



3.3.2.2. Nineteenth-Century Political Changes in Ottoman KR-I proper

In the early 19th century, the cracks of the Ottoman Empire's power widened due to: 1) long defeats chain to the Russian Empire, 2) the foreign (Christian) influence, presence and expansion within and over its lands, and last but not least 3) a gradual loss of domestic control on *ayans* (local lords including the Kurdish *mirs* and tribal chieftains). These cracks were manifesting territorially as fragmentation processes along the Ottoman empire's peripheries. These processes consequently impacted governance moods and fed territorial independencies aspirations to mimic other geographies (Egypt under Muhammad Ali Pasha 1805, Greece 1830, ..) (Kaya, 2020; van Bruinessen, 1992). To counter such fragmentation processes, the Sultans' attempted to reclaim power over the peripheries through:

- Punitive "re-conquest" campaigns and by mobilising their military powers towards the peripheries, crushing oppositions with either persecution, exile or execution and
- Pushing for Ottomanism and the 1839 *Tanzimat* act (reforms)³⁹ imposition to assert centralisation and abolish local governance (Bozarslan, 2019; Cleveland & Bunton, 2016).

For Ottoman Kurdistan, reasserting authority focused on the "desire to break up the tribes" (van Bruinessen, 1992). On the one hand, the administrative engineering strategies facilitated by the implementation of the *Tanzimat* act aimed to obstruct and control the tribal territorial fluidity, double loyalty, and transborder religious affiliations (Bozarslan, 2019) with the Persian empire on the other. These strategies included the substitution of local governance with Ottoman centralised *walis* (والي - governors), 2) and the revocation of former communal tenure rights by the new land codes. The redistribution of land possession (which soon developed into ownership) was granted as "separate pieces" to individuals (including the tillers) through a *tapu* (طابو - legal deed) (van Bruinessen, 1992).

The waves of setbacks of Ottoman control, coupled with reform announcements, increased non-muslim communities' recognition and European presence. These setbacks included "unfamiliar" Christian missionaries' influence materialised in building monasteries and churches. Such presence had added to the heated situation, unsettled the local regimes, fuelled a series of disobedience, conflicts and revolts and resulted in various scales of disruptions and power vacuums. For instance, Two Emirs revolted and expanded their territorial influence: Emir Muhammad Pasha Kor of Soran (1833-7) and Emir Bedir Khan Pasha of Botan (1843-7) (Bozarslan, 2019; Eppel, 2019; McDowall, 2004; van Bruinessen, 1992). These revolts were, however, defeated and marked the end of the Kurdish emirates. The aftermath of their fall was chaotic: tribal rivalries (re)emerged, feuds and other conflicts resurfaced, tribal confederation broke, fracturing sub-tribal and clan bonds, while appointed *valis* and ottoman personnel, rejected by the locals, failed to solve conflicts and impose order. Within these accelerated power struggles, waves of forced displacements were as intense as the rapidity of their triggers.

The *tapu* land registration implementation in 1869 (continued by the British after WWI) and the fall of Kurdish emirates impacted deeply the fixated territorial power structures. Most "loyal" tribal chieftains and aghas became landlords, hence steering the territorial, tribal unities into a more individualistic structure and ensuring the power of tribal landlords over the local community (Vali, 2011). Oscillating

³⁹Ottoman empire administrative and rights reformation started in 1839, including equality between religious empire subjects, centralization and abolishing local governance to "encourage Ottomanism among diverse ethnic and religious groups". Many historian believe that was the early official attempts to "stem the tide of the rise of nationalism in the ottoman Empire"(Cleveland & Bunton, 2016).

between exploitations, favouritism, corruption, ignorance of the common villagers and mistrusting of the government, whole villages were registered as “personal possessions of local notable”. Sheikhs also gained access to land possessions, accumulated with additional resources of the *waqf* (الوقف -endowment treasury) under their disposal. Tillers, cultivators and (non-tribal) peasants, lacking the know-how of networks and information, lost their (rights to the) land and became mere tenants with the threat of eviction and/or replacement with machine efforts later on. These changes and injustices steered resentment that led to class conflict between these two distinct groups of landowners and land tenants.

With the power vacuum of the Fallen Emirates, the Sheikhs became evident agents to resolve (cross-sub) territorial and local conflicts. With the combination of worldly and unworldly powers and the ability and religious responsibility to protect and provide, granting and seeking refuge shifted to the religious sphere that crossed tribal and territorial boundaries. Sheikhs and their Khalifa attracted followers from different population strata: those who suffered displacement in the aftermath of the massive reordering and restructuring of (access to) land and territory and those who strived for more power. Their political role was also emphasised as protectors of religion with the arrival of missionaries mentioned earlier. Therefore, their power increased dramatically with their accessibility to networks, cross-territorial resources (land and money) and cross-class manpower (*sheikhs* and *khalifas* of non-notable lineages marrying into chiefly (tribal) families, loyal followers from different classes of peasants, military and refugees in war and peace times). As such, the sheikhs gained the power to mobilise warriors belonging to these networks, spread over different tribal territories (Bozarlan, 2019; McDowall, 2004; van Bruinessen, 1992).

The increase in population, where Sheikhs and Khalifa’s had their centres of power, led to the socio-spatial growth and extension of cities, towns and villages where these centres were strategically located. This growth strengthened the cross-territorial followers’ bonds over the tribal and territorial ones. Two concrete examples are Barzinji Sheikhs (of the Qadiriyya order) in the south and Barzani Sheikhs (of the Naqshbandiyya order) in the north and the KR-I Proper. Barzinji Sheikhs’ control expanded over the trade route between Baghdad and Tehran crossing the city of Sulaymaniyah and the villages surrounding the countryside. Barzani Sheikhs’ influence and control grew dramatically over villages (Al-Azzawi, 1952 (2005)). The growth and territorial expansion of the Barzani Sheikhenly family by granting asylum seekers refuge, offering solidarity and forging patron-client bonds in the 1850s as “... the shaykhs of Barzan attracted a large following of non-tribal peasantry escaping the repressive regime of neighbouring tribes” (van Bruinessen, 1992). Their local *tekiyah* became a sanctuary for the persecuted and a destination for protection seekers. According to Kingsbury (2021), such growth in population and territorial presence supported “consolidate the authority of the Barzani sheikhdom in the region, and was the focal point of a claim for greater regional autonomy” (Kingsbury, 2021). Therefore, Barzanis became “one of the five most powerful families in Kurdistan” (McDowall, 2004). Interestingly, this North and South power division persisted and reproduced itself in political parties’ current divisions (in 2022). The majority of former and current leaders of KRI movements, political parties, government personnel and parliament members are decedents of sheikhs and dominating tribal families, as chapter 4 shall demonstrate.

3.3.3. The Kurds “Trapped between Map and Reality”⁴⁰

Between 1914-1918, Kurdish inhabited territories became again stages and routes for marching armies, and its population got caught up between the Turks and the Russian troops, who were “laying waste life, property and landscape”. Ethnic cleansing, killings, persecutions and deportations of the Kurdish “traitors” and “insurgents” were common. Similar to the 13th century, uninhabitable of the scorched earth policy to “deny the enemy shelter or revictualling” (McDowall, 2004) rendering the land inhabitable. In 1919, during his visit to Southern Kurdistan, the Geography Professor and British army Lieut-Colonel Kenneth Mason MC pointed out destruction and sequential crisis effects on the territory inhabited by the Kurds in Rowanduz as follows:

“Before the war, the [Rowanduz] contained about 2000 houses and a population of over 15000. Neri was smaller and consisted of 250 houses. After the armistice, Rowanduz and its suburb Kala Teluk contained only sixty houses and Neri something under ten. Rowanduz, with its roofless crumbling walls, looks more like some town in Flanders. The whole country has, in fact, been laid waste by fire and sword, disease, pestilence, and starvation. To complete their cup of misery, when we visited the Kurds last winter, they were just recovering from the worldwide epidemic of “Espagnol” -Spanish influenza.” (Mason, 1919)

The shadow of death, famine, harsh climate and diseases forced the poor population to seek refuge and fall under the mercy of landlords who concealed and hoarded the food stocks from the armies. Those who were forcibly resettled were denied connections with their tribes and followers and placed under a “no-return” banner, an equivalent of “exiled” today. At the same time, those who survived pursued refuge by retreating to the hills and less hostile territories and communities.

The disorder resulting in the four years of WWI and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was more significant than any conflict for centuries. In parallel with the disorder, major events affected the ways in which Kurdish inhabited areas were generationally organised. The implementation of the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement demarcated borders trapped the Kurds within Mesopotamia (Iraq), Syria, Turkey and Iran (O’Shea, 2004) which is exemplified by the presence of international mandates (British for Mesopotamia (Iraq) and France for Syria) since 1920.

These dramatic changes in moods of (imposed) foreigner sovereignties and their geographically demarcated boundaries destabilised traditional power spheres and reshaped Kurdish inhabited territories. The Maps lines in the period, fixed till the present day, were without any regard to the distribution to of peoples. They ruptured (partially) all the networks that had been generationally weaved, largely obstructing these border areas’ former fluidity, dissolving all former moods of governance to be gradually substituted by the containing states. These borders not only divided the physical terrains into geographical terrains that were easier to control but also fragmented the tribal territories, broke up clan bonds and interrupted patterns of spatial flows of seasonal (nomadic) workers, and generated waves of ethnically persecuted groups redistributed across boundaries.


⁴⁰ Title of O’Shea (2004)’s book.

In this period, different (international) attempts sparked to weave a *de facto* autonomy of a demarcated "Kurdistan" geography for the Kurds to exercise their cultural rights, most famously in the treaty of Sèvres 1920. This treaty was later followed by the coronation of King Fasil by the British as the legitimised authority over Mesopotamia, changing its name to Iraq (meaning a well-rooted country). With the discovery of rich oil locations in KRI proper, the British kept their intervention at minimum costs and focused on developing natural resources, namely vital oil territories, instead of wasting resources to eliminate internal and ethnic conflicts (Bromley, 1991; Owtram, 2019).

Amidst this postimperial chaos, the final settlement over nation-states' borders in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 omitted any reference to a Kurdish homeland (Owtram, 2019). In 1926, the fixation on the administrative states' boundaries⁴¹, namely the "Brussels line", made these borders an experienced and consolidated reality (Lloyd, 1926). Last but not least, using the tribal - chronic - conflicts pattern as an excuse and handing over the "conflict problem" to the Arabs, the Kurds gradually transferred to become a minority under an Arab administration by 1932 (McDowall, 2004).

Subsequently, Most of the promises of Kurdish (de-facto) autonomy or (semi) independence within their ancestral territories had evaporated, hence feeding the climate surrounding the Kurds with suspicion and future uncertainties for decades to come.


⁴¹ such as former vilayets Mosul, Persian frontier, French mandated Syria and British mandated Iraq (Lloyd, 1926).



Towards Kurdish Self rule, borders proposed in different international conferences after WWI and historical (semi)autonomous regions of Kurdistan. reproduced by author 2022 based on Kurdish Institute of Paris and Izady (1998)

- Border proposed by the Kurdish delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919
- Border defined by the Treaty of Sèvres, 1920
- Border proposed by the Kurdish delegation at the first United Nations conference, San Francisco, 1945

- Kurdish Republic of Mahabad (1946-1947)
- "Red Kurdistan" in Azerbaijan (1923-1929)
- Kurdish-inhabited areas
- Kurdistan Region of Iraq



3.3.4. Territorial Refuge Practices and National Sentiments (re)formation (1918-1958)

Map lines in the post-Sykes-Picot states' boundaries, including the Brussels-line⁴², were ill-defined, especially in territories remote from the mandate power centres (White, 2017) With such poor control over newly formed borders, they were quite porous for population and goods (illegal) movements until the 1930s (Mason, 1919; White, 2017). Therefore, Kurdish inhabited territories, in addition to being loci for uprooting and destructions, were also routes and (temporary) receiving sites for waves of displaced groups. These massively displaced groups, mainly (Muslim) Kurdish insurgents, (Christian) Armenians and Assyrians, violently ruptured from their ancestral habitat by various (changing) persecutors, were seeking aid, protection and possibilities of continuities in arrival territories.

In addition, internal forced displacements and dislocations were also present in these historical scenes. The Kurds were facing multi-layered crises regenerated within new threats and power struggles. These struggles cover in-group conflicts, sub-territorial (small) revolts against landlord exploitation, territorial revolts uniting sheikhs and tribes against the British and the imposition of King Faisal's rule. As disputes became handled by the government personnel, Sheikhs and tribal leaders gradually lost their role as conflict resolvers beyond mundane matters without a legitimate replacement. Such instability and violence led to intensifying international presence and counter-insurgency actions that included imprisonment, persecution and military campaigns. Unsurprisingly, such clashes resulted in starvation due to acute shortages" of basic supplies, inability to fend harsh cold winters, the retraction of relief controlled by Iraqi government-appointed personnel, and, consequently, poverty and vulnerability and death rates among the Kurds.

The Land Settlement Law⁴³ (1932, 1938) effect, similar to the land code in Ottoman times, deepened the inequality between classes and affected the power over resources. "The effect, perhaps unintended, was to replace the semi-communal system with a system of ownership that increased the number of sharecroppers and tenants dramatically"(Metz & Library Of Congress, 1990). As such, it facilitated transferring land ownership to wealthy tribal leaders and villages' headmen, while the peasants in the land lost their former hereditary rights in place and became mere sharecroppers in debates with the land owners. Tribe notables of Begzada Jaf, Dizais and Mir Mahmalies, for example, became owners of vast lands, hence controlling employment opportunities, consequently resulting in them gaining a powerful position to "collaborate" with the regime. This change, with the substitution of manpower with mechanical once, exacerbated power abuse, exploitation and mistreatment and led to a large scale of class resentments, violent clashes, shifting loyalties, and forced displacements, such as the memorable peasants' revolt against Agha's and Sheikhs' orders in Arbat town⁴⁴. In all cases, such

⁴² It took almost a decade to set the Brussels line and few years as well to become completely affective (White, 2017).

⁴³ "By the early 1930s, large landowners became more interested in secure titles because a period of agricultural expansion was underway. In the north, urban merchants were investing in land development, and in the south tribes were installing pumps and were otherwise improving land. In response, the government promulgated a law in 1932 empowering it to settle title to land and to speed up the registration of titles. Under the law, a number of tribal leaders and village headmen were granted title to the land that had been worked by their communities. The effect, perhaps unintended, was to replace the semicomunal system with a system of ownership that increased the number of sharecroppers and tenants dramatically. A 1933 law provided that a sharecropper could not leave if he were indebted to the landowner. Because landowners were usually the sole source of credit and almost no sharecropper was free of debt, the law effectively bound many tenants to the land"(Metz & Library Of Congress, 1990).

⁴⁴ Due to historical events that will be explored in the next chapters, Arbat today is a constellation of different (involuntary) dislocations and relocations receiving sites.

revolts and class struggles triggered different forms of involuntary dislocations and a continuous need for a place of refuge.

In the Kurdish inhabited areas, the power to grant protection and the degree of the newcomers' inclusion was determined by a set of international and (remaining) traditional actors, which varied depending on the protected group. Subsequently, granting refuge became multi-layered and exercised by former and new figures of the authority of:

- 1) International aid actors under imperial supervision and the national governments (in the making).
- 2) Traditional leaders of (former) Sufi sheikhs and tribal leaders.

3.3.4.1. Refuge and Granting International Protection

This period marked the emergence of humanitarian governance of some sorts (Rodogno, 2014) with operations that came from the “outside” under international French and British Mandates. The “Refugee” category, as a vulnerable and in need of protection figure, was merely assigned to “minorities” fleeing the Turkish and Russian persecutions, namely Christians, in comparison to Muslim populations. The materialised and spatialised “relief” singled the extensive presence of humanitarian actors as protectors of these minorities, which at the time were perceived as “race cultures” (Robson, 2016b). Rodogno (2014) reads these aid forms of missionary nature to save, protect, educate, and morally guide the survivals as “paternalism and colonial stances”. As such, according to Robson (2016b), these acts of the paternalism of protection manifested as “distinct [locations] from geographical location” to “preserve” were spatially bounded. For instance, the American humanitarian organisation of Near East Relief (NER) activities mainly supported “saving” Christian minority refugees. Their international relief network territorially manifested in setting relief networks through a series of transitional way stations, relief camps, orphanages, clinics and hospitals were set on routes for Christian Arminian and Assyrian refugees from the Ottoman territories of Hakkari, Urumiya and Mosel⁴⁵ to reach the north of Baghdad.


The relief operations in these sites covered temporary protection and basic needs support, to later shift “from temporary emergency relief to constructive community service” (Rodogno, 2014). This shift is apparent through spatial upgrading into more permanent shelters, building orphanages, constructing schools, and having social support programs covering education, livelihoods and resettlements to a third country. In French Mandated Syria, for instance, the focus was mainly on Christian minorities. The shift from temporary into permanency with population flux after transferring a large number of (persecuted) Armenian refugees to cities such as Qamishli and Aleppo (Syria), and Beirut (Lebanon).

In Kurdish inhabited territories within British Mandated Iraq, the international relief, in many cases, also touched upon many poor Kurds' lives, as it extended to cover not only Christian refugees but, to some extent, Muslim internally displaced groups in towns and cities. However, the form of “relief” did manifest differently.



Near East Relief Orphanage built at Alexandrapol, 1921 (Near East Foundation Digital Museum, 2015)

⁴⁵ In modern-day states, Hakkari today covers parts of northern KRI, northwestern Iran, and eastern Turkey, Urumiya is in Iran and Mosel in Iraq.



Map of Near East Relief Operations in the Middle East in 1921 .
 reproduce by Author 2022 based on (Near East Foundation Digital
 Museum, 2015)

- Boundary of territory in which near east relief is operating
- Direction of deportations
- ▤ Portion of Armenia controlled by Soviets
- ▨ Armenia as bounded by President Wilson
- ▭ Administrative boundaries - Kurdistan
- △ Rescue houses
- ⊕ Clinics
- △ Refugee Camps
- ☪ Food Relief
- ✕ Clothing
- ☆ Orphanages
- ▣ Industrial
- ⊕ Hospitals


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
On the one hand, for the Christian refugees, the interventions were still “relief” spatialised as forms of constructed new settlements by outsiders. They constructed a temporary refugee camp of Baqouba (1919-1920) north of Baghdad is yet another example of the ways in which international humanitarianism was spatialised by “outsiders”. The British army managed and ordered the camp, and an intensified presence of other international humanitarian actors (including the NER) was a presence. Robson (2016b) argues that the Baqouba camp “orderly modern” space had:

“[Baqouba camp] provided a model on which the British and the League based their understanding of the post-war refugee problem and the range of possible solutions into the interwar period, as the conceptual framework for an international refugee regime was solidified, standardised, and incorporated into international legal and political structures”. (Robson, 2016b)

With insufficient funding to support the refugees, desires and pushing for repatriation, and resettlements schemes, the British gradually evacuated the temporary camp in 1920.

On the other hand, the Kurdish peasants and those who belong to the lower classes suffered sequential crises, deteriorated situations and intensified oppression by traditional figures of authorities, mainly the Agha Landowners (Mason, 1919; McDowall, 2004, 2020; van Bruinessen, 1992). For instance, the British forces undertook an extensive relief operation, providing food to address hunger and seed for the restitution of agriculture” (McDowall, 2004). As such, these international humanitarian actors were perceived by the vulnerable populations (Christian refugees and the poor Kurds) as saviours and protectors.





Baqouba Refugee Camp for Assyrian and Arminan refugees in Baqouba, North Baghdad, Iraq 1920. The images are taken by the British Royal Airforce and currently exist in the national archives in London. Sources: Layout reproduced by Author 2022 based on Layout Austin (1920) - Photos: (British Royal Airforce, 1919)

3.3.4.2. Conflict and Refuge within shifting political realities of traditional power spheres



Within the former figure of authorities of tribal and religious leaders, granting refuge was still taking place in the patrons' villages and centres and depended on opportunities' concentrations for both parties. Lloyd (1926), for instance, described how tribes in the Iraqi northern parts under the Brussel line sheltered persecuted:

"tribes have sheltered from time immemorial numbers of Christians. The Christians have been the serfs of their Kurdish leaders, who assigned to them the best villages and best-watered land, knowing that by their industry, they would develop them to the full to the eventual benefit of their masters. Some of these villages [due to displacement] have populations of over 1500 .. " (Lloyd, 1926).

However, the temporary refuge was revoked for some Assyrian "guests" by locals in some areas (such as Amadiya) during WWI, as a mood of British favouritism for what they saw as their "Christian subjects. Official promises to "clear certain areas with a view to refugee resettlement" in Kurdish inhabited areas and arming Assyrian refugees, already took place in Mindan close to Mosul and promises of self-determination (Robson, 2016a).

By the end of WWI, and the Kurds converting into a stateless nation "imprisoned in nation-states, not of their own making" (Owtram, 2019), solving conflicts became – gradually- centralised within the newly imposed governments, who were – theoretically- responsible for solving the displacement problem as well. This resentment intensified by the newly imposed fines by the British, which threatened the entanglement of religious and tribal powers in the land, weaved within the previous decade and consequently united rival tribal and religious spheres (such as the Zibari Chiefs and Barzani Sheikhs). This resentment fuelled the (latent) rivalries between both communities and steered recent memories of Kurds being persecuted Russian and Armenian troops massacring many Kurdish tribes in 1916. The unstable situation started to intensify from 1921 onwards, and the accelerated tensions and outbursts of violence spread territorially of attacks and (partial) annihilations of human and non-human components. These violent events and revolts against the armed Christians and their British "allies" reached their climax in the Simmel massacre in 1930 (near Zakhō). Such multi-scalar violence incidents legitimised using counter-violence to (re)assert authority, unsurprisingly concomitant with destruction, involuntary dislocations and relocations. These revolts were crushed by "British-led forces of Kurdish levies [which] proceeded through the area burning homes", pushing more traditional authority figures of chiefs and sheikhs to seek refuge within territorial networks across the mountainous porous borders (McDowall, 2004).

These movements, within shifting territorial boundaries, also fed into separatism processes "self-definition and delimitation" of nationalism that dominated post-ottoman territories and communities (Baron & Gatrell, 2003; White, 2017). Hence, many of the authorities' exiled figures, especially Sheikhs with tribal powers, stayed in fight and flight moods. They challenged the fixed borders as they were connected to their clientele networks by coming back with followers from across the borders to recapture the land and reassert authority. For instance, within the Mulla Mustafa Barzani's 1940s revolt, tribal chiefs got back up from Kurds crossing Iraqi-Iranian towards Iraq, and when persecuted, the rebellious Kurds crossed the same borders seeking refuge with supporters in Iran (Bishku, 2019).



Batatu (1978) timeline of national and local uprisings in Iraq after WWI till the 1958 Iraq coup. The highlighted are the Kurds' uprisings and revolts. Notice the pattern and the change of political leaders from Sheikh to Mullah. Source (Batatu, 1978)

3.4. Conclusion Remarks: Kurdish national sentiments and forced displacement impact on power spheres' (re)formation

This chapter attempted to briefly track the patterns, conflicts and typologies of seeking and granting refuge in the KRI proper until the 1958 formation of the Republic of Iraq. First, it is essential to understand the set of socio-spatial structures where populations seek and grant refuge. In the KRI, there have been socio-territorial structures of power where refuge practices take place within the tribal and the religious spheres. The ultimate power grew and shifted in each sphere due to internal and external factors. Internally, the power is associated with the ability to 'solve conflicts' within and across territories, control over land (and resources) and *loyal* allies and followers that act in concert in peace and war times. Externally, it withdrew its legitimacy from working with /against the centralised regimes and maximising their internal factors and spatial spheres.

Though that refuge-seeking-granting practice still took place in the former tribal and religious spheres, the shift towards international (formal) protection of the minorities with universal rights made its first official debut in the region. Such presence of new "imposed" actors to provide aid protection played a significant role in tipping the balance of power and shifting refuge geographies and their socio-spatial manifestations. In space-time frames, one can accentuate Zolberg (1983) statement that "the formation of new states is a refugee-generating process". In such constant interchanges of (dis)continuities, we can even go further by also accepting the counter and competently argument that refugee arrival and presence also gives states' borders their legitimacy and for whom the state is made (White, 2017).

The aggravated inequality and exploitation due to the 1932 Land Settlement Law aftermath led to several revolts and internal class struggles, hence the patron-client network formation. With the rise of a new educated class, reorganisation of workers and peasants who have been growing in discontent as the "new wealth was not tickling down to the lower social classes", being concentrated in towns and decreasing the rural areas; hence, the bonds between the patrons and their clients weakened. The following decade ushered socio-economic change with a geographical shift of power spheres: first: a reconfiguring of tribal and religious spheres' position within the new systems, and second the rise of the pan-Arab nationalism with Nasser that reminded the Kurds of their separate (national) identity. Within these shifts, tribal and religious spheres reinvented themselves in the contemporary images of (re)grouping as political entities. By incorporating and associating themselves with Kurdish nationalism and rights, these figures became the defenders through (re)formation of leftist programs and forming of political parties (Hiwa, Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) and finally, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)) (Batatu, 1978; van Bruinessen, 1992), which still are territorially concentrated, as shall chapter four demonstrate.

"My grandfather had a good sense of humour. He used to say he was born a Kurd, in a free country. Then the Ottoman arrived and said to my grandfather, "You are Ottoman", so he became Ottoman. At the fall of the Ottoman Empire, he became Turkish. The Turks left and he became a Kurd again in the Kingdom of Sheikh Mahmoud, king of the Kurds. Then the British arrived, so my grandfather became subject to his Gracious Majesty and even learned a few words in English.

The British invented Iraq, so my grandfather became Iraqi, but this new word, Iraq, always remained an enigma to him, [...]."

Hiner Saleem, *My Father's Rifle*, (2004)

Chapter 4

4. Between Disciplinary Spaces and Hospitality (Infra)structures in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq 1958- 2011

The preceding chapter attempted to trace the ways in which refuge-seeking-grating (spatial) practices were shaped in Kurdistan's tradition until 1958. The spatial formation and allocation of refuge spaces and places were foregrounded within the mesh of external and power internal power dynamics and their influences' geographies. Power, in these territorial socio-political structures, essentially emerged from 1) ability and credibility to solve conflicts, 2) control over land (and its resources) and 3) manpower (of followers and subjects) to act in concert in peace and war times. In all cases, Kurds, especially those who inhabited the peripheries, experienced power dynamics and shifts in two deeply interrelated mechanisms. On the one hand, border areas were where Kurds found margins for particular spheres of power have chances to emerge (Kurdish emirates or state-like powers of tribal confederations). On the other hand, these (border) territories' inhabitants were often subjected to man-made violent events, annihilations and deportations. The rapidity and scale of these events were relational to the strategies used to (re)assert spheres of power and authority.

Involuntary dislocations (and deportations without forced relocation) have been indeed resulting from multi-scaler conflicts (wars, massacres, conflicts, struggles, blood feuds, ..) related to (re)configurations of spheres of power, exploitations or shifting loyalties to the more powerful. Within the tribal and religious spheres, refuge practices were articulated as a patron-client social contract of either a 'guest' or a 'brother' within a matrix of tribal customs, religious doctrines and opportunities structure. Refuge's spatial allocation varied depending on the conflict/destruction acuteness, refuge sphere and opportunities concentrated in the refuge territory. On the one hand, under direct attack with acute movement, groups found refuge in the mountains. For prolonged displacement, depending on the persecutor, the displaced pursued refuge within tribal territories or religious sanctuaries on the other hand. With the latter, the influx induced population growth and socio-spatial emanations of hamlets and villages' chains meshed within these territories, hence the expansion of refuge grantor territorial influence.

Until the dawn of the 20th century, the territorial meshes of power were shaped by the allying, opposing and contesting external and internal regimes of Kurds (tribal and religious spheres) and non-Kurds (emirates, empires, and nation-states). With the fall of the Kurdish emirates, the Ottoman/Persian empires' military disciplinary campaigns and following administrative reforms impacted and reformed these territorial meshes and hence, traditional power spheres. These acts led to the fragmentations of tribal control and the gradual growth of the religious ones. The sheikhs' power accumulation and legitimacy: growth of (cross-class) manpower, became the conflict resolvers, intermarriages with notable tribal and non-tribal families. Furthermore, the imposition of new land codes made room for those leaders to take advantage and become land-holders and later owners, expanding their hold over man and territorial resources and thus reforming their loyalties and enemies' networks. This (territorial) power growth, as the following sections shall explore, paved the ground for these Sheikhs' transformation from mere religious figures to Kurdish Nationalism ones.

In the aftermath of WWI and (post)imperial conflicts, refuge-seeking-granting practices had different venues. Some were still finding room in shrinking spheres of traditional powers. International actors and (imposed) outsiders, however, came to the fore to protect the vulnerable and minorities (mainly Christians and a few Kurdish peasants' groups). Their protection and (non)material aid took place in refuge spatial networks crossed territories. The international relief was of more standardised spatial forms: temporary and permanent relief camps, orphanages, schools, physical upgrades of entire neighbourhoods, support of repatriation and/or resettlement. In the case of relief camps, it carried modernity within its 'alien' organised and ordered spaces an opposition to its surrounding. By virtue of such alienation, it served its purpose: being outside of place, making a clear distinction in preserving and protecting the 'vulnerable others' by outsiders.

With WWI dissolving the Ottoman empire and the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement, the Kurds inhabiting north Mesopotamia fell under the British mandate to be handed later to the Kingdom of Iraq. Since then, borders of nation-state projects imposed by outsiders consolidated in the everyday socio-spatial reality, cutting through the (cross)territorial bonds forged by blood, kinships, conflicts and power. These shifts indicate that (theoretically) the authorities' personnel (the British and then Iraqis) became the supreme conflict resolvers, while the tribal leaders' and Sheikhs' powers were partially in demise. The consolidated territorial boundaries were being theoretically dissolved under a unity of nation-state borders, with an absence of a Kurdish state. It became some sorts of allotropic state of affairs: a challenging climate swinging between unity and disunity, where the *outsider* had many interpretations: the British, the Arabs, the other Kurdish tribes, and the followers of other sheikhs. Furthermore, many tribes' members strived to reconnect with their extended relatives and kin divided by the borders. Nation-state's map lines ruptured the *us* bonds as a unity while the *us* and *them* boundaries were territorially fused.

As the authority of non-Kurds over the Kurds grew and deepened, it incited nationalist sentiments fed by the living memory of distrust, economic crises, and intensifying nation-state practices of Kurds' cultural rights dismissal. As such, amidst the national sentiments converting into a political awakening, tribal and religious influence and spheres witnessed a significant restructuring process.

4.1. Kurdish Nationalism in Times of Turbulence within a (Unified) Iraq (1958-1968)

One of the most highlighted WWII reverberations in the Levant is its ripple effect on the decolonisation movements and independence wars. Like many countries, the external influences and implicit competition between the opposite camps (the Western and Eastern blocks) found another stage for the power show in Iraq. At the time, this stage in the Iraqi Kurdish inhabited territories had many old and (new) local players: rival nationalisms (mainly Arabs and Kurds), tribalism, and communist vs anti-communist voices. Conflicts over land also increased as many landlords (mostly Aghas and Sheikhs) who gained their political and economic power within the monarch system were threatened by prospects of Agrarian Reform Law⁴⁶ and the ideological divisions within the newly formed political parties (McDowall, 2004, 2020). Caught up in macro, meso and micro interwoven interests and spheres of powers, the conflicts and proxy wars in this period had a resurfacing “my enemy’s enemy” logic character (Hughes, 2012). As such, they paved the way toward a more bipolar confrontation (Rauta, 2021) of two growing and contesting power spheres: the State and Non-State. Within these spheres, the former tribal and sheikh spheres also morphed and restructured themselves as (rival) political parties, distributed as branches in Kurdish inhabited territories. Similar to previous periods, shifting loyalties took place across these spheres, and each group employed its proxies against the other. In a morphing mesh of (territorial) powers, forced displacement movements were unquestionably an omnipresent result.

4.1.1. Mulla Mustafa Barzani’s power growth in 1958 Post-revolution Iraq

By 1958 and the successful coup (known as the *al-thawra* – revolution), the KDP was already in touch with the Iraqi Free Officers, who overthrew the monarch and established a republic. The national rights of Kurds as “partners in the homeland” were included in the published provisional constitution⁴⁷ (Jawad, 1981), and times seemed promising for the Kurds with better economic prospects (flourishing oil industry) and envisioned land reforms, and last but not least the return of Mulla Mustafa Barzani. For many Kurdish groups, Mulla Barzani represented the remains of a dream of “a Kurdistan”. He revolted against the monarchy in the 1940s, accompanying Qazi Mahmoud in forming the Republic of Kurdistan in Mahabad and becoming its minister of defence and army commander till the fall of the republic in 1947. Barzani and his followers found refuge in the Soviet Union till he was allowed back in 1958. As such, Mulla Barzani’s living memory portrayed him as the face of Kurdish nationalism. These prospects were evidently not promising to all, as they ruptured existing and partially maintained power relations (Yildiz, 2004).

With the return of Mulla Barzani, who had the Qassim’s government blessing, on the one hand, some of Mulla Barzani’s rivals- momentarily - pledged their loyalty to Barzani. On the other hand, his (tribal) adversaries, especially those who revolted against Qassim’s government, were rendered plotters and enemies of the state. They suffered Barzani’s retaliation: including burning villages and crops, seizing livestock and being persecuted -by his allies- across borders into Turkey or Iran (McDowall, 2020; Stansfield, 2003). The persecuted leaders and their followers found refuge across the borders, as many

⁴⁶ Agrarian Reform Law October 1958 proposed to limit individual ownership to a maximum of 10 hectares of irrigated and 20 hectares of rain-fed land, the rest was expropriated by the government, to be redistributed between individuals and to be paid substitution to former owners in state bonds, which it absolved itself from in 1969. (Metz & Library Of Congress, 1990) this law “implied redistribution of almost half the total cultivated area of Iraq (24 million dunums) to the peasantry” (McDowall, 2004).

⁴⁷ Article no.3 read “Arabs and Kurds are partners in the homeland, and their national rights are recognized within the Iraqi entity” (Jawad, 1981)

leaders were notables (aghas, chieftains and landlords) who held land rights and had networks connected over the border. Though events as such supported the expansion of Mulla Mustafa's influence sphere in the Kurdish northern region, these persecutions deepened the internal Kurdish fractures.

On Iraq's scale, troubles still followed, singling an explosive situation of political and loyalties divisions, (sub)territorially concentrated. A series of small-medium scales uprisings mushroomed in different parts of the young republic to seize power; the Ba'athist uprising in Mosul in March 1959, followed by July 1959 in Kirkuk, were key events to entice tensions between the Kurds and Arabs again, resurrecting feuds buried decades ago. The case of Mosul against the nationalists and Ba'athists represents the mesh of loyalties between Qassim and Barzani's interests⁴⁸ of reasserting national, local and tribal power and closing old debts, while the Kirkuk case⁴⁹— a rich oil zone- included 1) foreign and national interests, 2) class struggle ethnically shaped related to induced involuntary movement due to increased exploitations and expulsions of peasants by (new)landlords found their place with the flourishing oil industry and formed a working-class, 3) Qassim's government against communist and 4) the inconsistencies between Kurds' tribal and rising intellectual understanding of 'national rights'(Batatu, 1978; McDowall, 2020). Events as such were more complex than ethnicised dichotomies (Arab-Kurd); they were deeply entangled with changing power- land -population geometries, consequently (re)ordering and (re)structuring Kurdish inhabited territories by evictions and forced displacements towards the patrons' territory.

Until 1960, the state and Barzani's had a more united front than their enemies labelled as the "Rebels", while the KDP, led by Ibrahim Ahmed and Jalal Talabani based in the south, struggled to widen the Kurds' rights based on autonomy. However, the situation overturned as the state sought to reassert its ultimate power in the name of a unified Iraq; the rules of the game changed dramatically in the following events. The growing power of Barzani became threatening to the state power led by Qassim's government (Yildiz, 2004). The latter started public campaigns rendering Barzani and his followers as 'plotters against the republic', accompanied by stripping them from political and economic privileges, supporting their tribal rivals, withdrawing Kurdish Journals from their licenses, ignoring KDP's demands for Kurds' rights⁵⁰, persecuting its members and closing its branches (McDowall, 2020). These measures attempted to single out the state's role as the rightful conflict resolvers, hence changing the power-game players into the State vs the Kurdish Rebels.

These constataions did not unite the Kurdish front as expected. On the contrary, this front became more fragmented amidst Barzani and anti-Barzani tribal conflicts, now under Kurdish nationalism banners. These groups fell into traps of 1) personal ambitions of both Qassim and Barzani, 2) working-class within

⁴⁸ "Kurds streamed into Mosul 'in self-defence against Arab chauvinism', even recalling the murder of Shaykh Mahmud's father, Sa'id, fifty years earlier. The communists, led by a Kurd,10 and Barzani tribesmen played a major role in quelling the revolt and wreaking vengeance on nationalists and Ba'athists. At least 200, and possibly as many as 2,500, died in four days of disorder. While the communists and Kurds settled scores in Mosul, Qasim used the events as a pretext to purge nationalists and Ba'athists from the armed forces and government" (Batatu, 1978; McDowall, 2004)

⁴⁹ "Tension had been growing for some time between conservative established Turkomans versus working-class incomer Kurds who had settled increasingly during the 1930s and 1940s, driven from the land by landlord rapacity and drawn by the chance for employment in the burgeoning oil industry. [...] Qasim held the communists rather than the Kurds responsible for these 'barbaric and inhumane' events, and since they coincided with an ICP campaign to enter the government, he moved against them." (Jawad, 1981; McDowall, 2004)

⁵⁰ These demands include " the introduction of Kurdish as an official language; the return of Kurdish officials from Arab areas; and progress on agricultural reform and industrial development, including nationalization of the oil industry. In addition, they asked for the removal of troop reinforcements; an end to martial law; an abandonment of the so-called 'transitional period'; the restoration of democratic liberties and practical implementation of Article 3 of the Constitution." (McDowall, 2004)

the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) and Kurdish Communists mainly pushing for Agrarian reforms and labour rights, 3) Aghas and landlords caught in small peasant's uprisings, losing their grip on the land and fearing dislocation by the Agrarian Reform Law, and 4) a large pool of unemployed and forcibly displaced Kurdish population shifting loyalties based on the higher bid (McDowall, 2004). The following section shall examine the impacts of these factors, the key events that reshuffled the balances of power between 1961-1970, and (Kurdish) population forced displacements and (re)placements in Kurdish inhabited territories.

“One man, Loqman, a villager who had long been a client of the Haweri lineage as a sharecropper and fighter, recounted his and his family’s comings and goings from Deshta from the 1960s to the 1990s: “We left the village and went to Mosul for four years. Then I joined Mohammed Agha’s chete fighters, and our household was in Zakho for three years because the government wanted us Kurds to return to our area. Then in 1974 we returned to Deshta, and remained for six years. Then, the Iraqi government kicked us out. We fled to the mountains with Khalid, another chete leader from the Haweri lineage, and stayed for one year. Then we moved to Zakho and again to Deshta in the 1990s.” Loqman and his family now live in Zakho.”

Diane King, *Kurdistan on the Global Stage*, (2014)

4.1.2. (re)Structuring power Spheres and the First Kurdish-Iraqi War (1961- 1968)

4.1.2.1. Friends and Foes

Until mid-1961, the Qassim and Barzani clashes were indirect: stalling through negotiating agreements to harness power by making 'friends' of each other's enemies, attracting loyalties and using the other's weak points to crush the 'plotters and traitors'. On the one hand, Qassim's government started losing its authority by being overwhelmed by regional, national revolts, and international threats. Hence, he needed to assign proxies to fight small-scale wars with his competitors and rivals and make deals across the borders. The goal was to create inner and outer rings to contain the conflicts in the Kurdish parts. Therefore, the regime reached out to anti-Barzani Kurdish tribes located southwest of the region on the Iranian borders by arming and funding them, spreading army forces and negotiating with the Iranians to not interfere in the inevitable war.

On the other hand, Mulla Barzani, his allies and followers expanded their firm grip on the north-eastern Kurdish inhabited parts, using guerrilla warfare tactics, attacking pro-government tribes, confiscating their weapons and singling their power against the state. Qassim resorted to military operations, including airstrikes and destruction of villages in the north, attacking civilians indiscriminately with the support of Kurdish paramilitary forces (known as *fursan* or *jash*)⁵¹. Kurds were suffering the aftermath sided by the rebel forces. Despite their ideological conflicts, KDP backed Mulla Barzani a few months later; this union wielded tribalism and Kurdish nationalism and reasserted Mulla Barzani's image as the Kurdish heroic resistance leader. Many pro-government groups redshifted their loyalty to the national cause, attracted by Mulla Barzani's undeniable power growth and weapons supply.

Undoubtedly, Falling again into the same heated climate within and across these territories, thousands were driven across Iranian and Turkish borders seeking refuge. These intense intervals of discontinuities kept feeding into the continuous disruption of the countryside, rupturing socio-spatial and generational bonds by population dislocations and relocations within and across borders.

4.1.2.2. Kurds and The Baathist Coup Against Qassim

The first Ba'thist coup ended Qassim's era in 1963. As negotiations failed with the new government⁵², the Kurds, on different occasions, became outsiders again in their ancestral land. Rendered as 'minority guests' inhabiting Arab lands and 'brothers and friends of the Arabs', welcomed by the host government's generosity, the Kurds in Iraq, despite their alliances, found themselves 'homeless' despite their homes and lands continuous and generational presence. In this period, the Ba'athists took advantage of the fractured Kurdish front and added to it by imposing an economic blockade and persecuting the 'wanted [Kurdish] men'. Their troops surrounded Sulaymaniyah, attacked Amadiya, Rawanduz and Koi-Sanjaq and captured the town of Barzan, marching towards Ranya. However, the army marches and forced

51 This group of pro-government military forces are known as *fursan* (knights) by government and more derisively as *jash* (little donkeys) by anti-government Kurds, mainly composed of anti-Barzani tribal chiefs and unemployed Kurds who loathed Barzani's ideologies.

52 With the ceasefire, the KDP, who started to establish their ties with the Ba'thist prior the coup, welcomed formally the new government. Attempting to escape another round of destructions by negotiating national demands before resorting to Barzani and consequently losing his trust. These demands, however, were paralyzed and undermined by the new governments' preoccupation of an Arab Unity question.

displacements in the KR-I were interrupted by another coup by Abd al-Slam Arif and the National Command of the revolutionary Council (NCRC).

Though the government changed, the pattern of switching sides, unfulfilled agreements, and armed conflicts intensified and continued its non-stopping destruction cycles and forced displacement movements. In 1963, Arif and Barzani signed a short-lived peace agreement⁵³, threatening each other's enemies with armed forces⁵⁴, and supporting each other with weaponry and men. Ahmad-Talabani group and their followers, who objected to this agreement⁵⁵, became a 'threat' to the Kurdish revolution led by Barzani, who took over the KDP. The wedge between the Kurdish north and south went deeper by expelling and attacking the Ahmad-Talabani group, driving more than 4000 people to Iran. However, as Arif declined Barzani's Kurdish Autonomy demands, the war broke out again, ending this short-lived alliance and uniting the Kurdish front for the moment. As such, this war and alliance made a crack for the Ahmad-Talabani group to temporarily return and support the national struggle.

The battle was halted momentarily by Arif's sudden death. The Bazzaz and the National Defence Council (restructured) government recognised the Kurdish rights and nationality and paved a road to autonomy⁵⁶. However, in 1966 the new president Arif (former president Brother) declared that "No autonomy will ever be granted to the Kurds [...] The government has never envisaged negotiations with the rebels". This statement renewed Iraqi military operations and legitimised the air force's use of napalm and chemical weapons in Barzan and Rawanduz villages. The goal was to cut the territorial and social bonds facilitating support leaking through Iranian borders. However, the form of the territory with its mountains terrains where the Kurdish resistance and their followers dwelt for years gave the Kurds the upper hand. It supported their guerrilla warfare tactics, especially by being armed with Iranian weaponry. Swinging between conflicting policies and war fatigue for both combatting parties, it was an assault-halt situation, only to end by the 1968 Ba'ath Army coup and the rise of Baker and Saddam Hussein to power (McDowall, 2020).

4.1.2.3. Forced Displacements waves within Reverberating Conflicts

With the intervals of clashes and pauses intensifying, refuge granting and seeking spatio-temporal patterns were reshaped based on the: acuteness of the move, the fleeing group (civilians in villages/fighters mountains or cross the borders), the territorial expansion of the refuge sphere. Perhaps there is no better description of the intensity of violent events than in Hiner Saleem's novel, *My Father's Rifle*. With the story of Azad's family's dislocations between 1965 -1970, the novel minutely portrays how these dislocations and relocations interplayed, destabilised families, distorted their life patterns and

53 Arif and Barzanin signed the agreement on February 10th, 1963, the key points were recognizing Kurdish national rights within a unified Iraqi state; releasing war prisoners of war, and restoration of Kurdish property; reinstatement of government administration in the northern region and lifted the economic blockade. KDP led by Ahmed and Talabani criticized omitting of Kurdish autonomy or self-administration, which was the core of the fight for them.

54 "Arif threatened force against any opponent of Mulla Mustafa, while the latter warned that any resistance to government forces would constitute a declaration of war against himself." (Jawad, 1981)

55 For the KDP lead by Ahmad and Talabani, the agreement reflected only the primordial (tribal and religious) interests as the national call, while they claimed to reassert Kurdish autonomy to be fundamental ideological concept.

56 " It recognized Kurdish nationality within Iraq, promised decentralization with freely elected administrative councils, and proportional representation for Kurds in central government. It also recognized Kurdish as an official language, with all ancillary linguistic and cultural rights, and undertook to establish a parliamentary system of government within a year" (Jawad, 1981)

(re)shaped their social ties. The following extracts highlight the geographically networked movements through space-time frames.

“that day, we lost seven men in our family [1965 militia man attacked].

We fled [Aqra]. [...] My family arrived in Billê [...] a small village of about 100 homes not far from Raizan, the town where the leader of our people, Mustafa Barzani, had his headquarters. This was the second time I had left my hometown of Aqra. [...] The first time [was to visit the father who had] just been released from jail and was living under house arrest [...] on Iraq’s southern border with Saudi Arabia.

[..] From that day we arrived, a one-room house was put under our disposal by the order of general Barzani himself. [...] Our neighbours brought us large trays laden with food. [...]

[..] All the merchandise [in the village] had been smuggled in from Iran, for Baghdad had imposed an embargo on the regions controlled by our leader, Barzani.

[..] The Iraqi army began to bomb some of our villages.

[..] One day they [Iraqi army] started to bomb our village. [...] Henceforth, at dawn the entire village went to hide in the caves along the river, and so did we. We brought along the little food we had and stayed hidden all day in our caves. We did not leave until sunset, taking the same road back for the two miles that separated us from our house.”

Hiner Saleem, *My Father’s Rifle*, (2004)

These excerpts above describe the ways in which refuge was sought and granted, similar to patterns in ottoman times, within their patron (Mulla Barzani’s) network that enmeshed with his territorial power sphere. They depict how the socio-spatial networks have acted as the receiving (infra)structures for his family after fleeing their home town Aqra. The village, under their patron’s influence, provided the “brothers” with material support (housing, food and blankets) and allowed them access to employment and other resources. This brotherhood then was forged by blood and war through intermarriages with their host groups, to be later welded by acting in concert through fighting the wars (joining the Kurdish fighters) and even fleeing together to seek temporal refuge in nearby mountain caves to come back and rebuild after the 1970’s autonomy accord was signed.

* * *

4.2. From a Kurdish Autonomy to Kurdish Exodus (1970-1991)

By 1970, around 750 villages had been destroyed, and 200,000 Kurdish villagers were displaced in the northern parts inhabited by the Kurds (McDowall, 2004). On the global scale, the 1951 refugee convention broadened its temporal and geographical limits beyond Europe by its 1967 protocol to be applied universally (G. Loescher, 2021). However, this protection still did not reach the Kurds. First, Iraq was not a signatory of the refugee convention and second, the displaced Kurds were still within their nation-state; thus, for the humanitarian regime, they were internally displaced groups.

4.2.1. From Modernisation to Terrorisation: (re) spatialising Forced Displacement

Similar to many recently decolonised geographies in this global 'development' decade, the modernisation, development and betterment masked the Ba'athist regime's intentions in unstable regions. By adopting a "governing by design strategy" (Aggregate, 2012) in the KR-I, the new regime aimed to create "a human landscape of perfect visibility" (B. Anderson, 2016), hence making it easy to spread its effective control over the land. The Ba'athist regime recognised that the main obstacle was the tribal and religious power and networks enmeshed territories of plains, mountains and porous nation-state borders. Therefore, the goal was to strategically dissolve these bonds by spatial planning and welfare components performing as tools for demographic engineering. As the following sections shall demonstrate, these tools played an essential role in converting the forcibly displaced Kurds into (partially) dependent subjects and "better objects of political control" (Scott, 1998) and serving the Ba'athist goals in Arab nation-state building.

4.2.1.1. The Peace Accord and the first Golden Age (1968-1974)

After the Ba'ath party seized power in 1968, the new regime, led by Baker and Saddam Hussein, was facing many pressing issues: it needed time to assert its authority over resources and manage its internal organisation, control borders with Iran and model the Iraqi nation-state as a part of the Arab world. The Kurds, backed up first by the Shah of Iran, also needed time: a breather to heal and rearrange their ever-fragmented front. Hence, when the Ba'athists announced their goals to include "the resolution of the Kurdish Question in a peaceful manner", the Kurdish front was responsive and joined the negotiation table, reaching the Peace Accord issued on March 11th 1970, only to collapse shortly by 1974⁵⁷. Although short-lived, the peace accord gave the Kurds a conditioned autonomy as long as Baghdad retained power and control over oil-rich zones based on the population census. The years between 1970-1974 were portrayed as the 'golden age' in terms of stability and the development of the KR-I. The peace accord

⁵⁷ The measures of the Accord included "(i) The Constitution be amended to read 'the Iraqi people is made up of two nationalities, the Arab nationality and the Kurdish nationality; (ii) the Kurdish language to be an official language alongside Arabic language, and the official language in areas with a Kurdish majority; the language of instruction in those areas and taught throughout Iraq as a second language; (iii) Kurds to participate fully in government, including senior and sensitive posts in the cabinet and the army; (iv) Kurdish education and culture to be reinforced; (v) all officials in Kurdish majority areas to be Kurds or at least Kurdish-speaking. (vi) Kurds to be free to establish their own student, youth, womens' and teachers' organizations; (vii) a dedicated development fund to be assigned for Kurdistan; (viii) pensions and assistance to be provided for the families of martyrs and others stricken by poverty, unemployment or homelessness; (ix) Kurds and Arabs to be restored to their former place of habitation; (x) the Agrarian Reform to be implemented; (xi) the Kurdish broadcasting station and heavy weapons to be returned to the Government; (xii) a Kurd to be one of the vice presidents; (xiii) the Governorates (Provincial) Law to be amended in a manner conforming with the substance of this declaration; (xiv) unification of areas with a Kurdish majority as a self-governing unit; (xv) the Kurdish people to share in the legislative power in a manner proportionate to its population in Iraq"

included “a dedication of a development fund to be assigned to Kurdistan” as a proof of intention, and major reconstruction projects took place in the region. These projects were naturally accompanied by massive infrastructure processes of roads and highway projects. These (modern) spatial insertions came with faster and more advanced moods of connections, production and consumption, and communication. Such massive changes in a short time indeed changed the ways in which populations inhabit these territories, the land value and (former) traditional ways of income generation. In other words, reshuffling the territorial structure of power traditionally interplayed with a mesh of control over population and resources. These projects were part and parcel of the smaller spatial insertions into the urban-natural landscape as a remedy to heal war scars and accommodate the ‘homeless’ forcibly displaced in the KR-I (Pyla, 2006). After the accord⁵⁸, the need for such schemes came hand in hand with the implementation of the 1958 Agrarian Reform Law in the KR-I, which included “areas set aside for landless and refugee peasants” (McDowall, 2020) and the need for housing due to collective farms projects (قرى إسكان الفلاحين). This remedy also included introducing modern spatial formulas of mass housing and new settlements to building schools and vocational centres, all to develop the under-served city and the rural parts alike. Furthermore, to wield these insertions, especially in remote war-affected villages, the physical programs were coupled with soft ones to empower the war-affected population: funding self-help housing and providing employment and support for the war-affected population (Genat, 2017).

4.2.1.2. The “Modern” model

The need to rebuild and reconstruct the evacuated (Kurdish) villages and house the forcibly displaced was one of the pillars of the 1970 peace accord. Repopulation of the villages emptied by fighting, providing financial compensation and ‘reconstructing’ heavily damaged villages and modernise them⁵⁹, were part and parcel of the program to improve “the specific conditions of underdevelopment in the Kurdish region” (Genat, 2017; Iraqi Government, 1970) and facilitating the “transformation of the village dweller into an urban dweller” (Pyla, 2006).

The layouts for these new housing projects and settlements were not new for the Iraqi government; their schemes rearticulated the modernisation movement between 1955-1961. The aspiration of this movement at the time was to “assert a young nation’s modernity”. These schemes followed former ones developed in the Iraq National Housing program by international architectural companies such as Doxiadis Associates, which included Hassan Fathy at the time, whose comments and contributions were part and parcel of guiding community-sensitive designs (Doxiadis Associates & DBoGI, 1963; Genat, 2017; Stansfield, 2003; Steele, 1997)⁶⁰. In these schemes, ‘community’ was “a modern substitute for the traditional gathering places of tribal life”. (Pyla, 2006). The spatial translation of ‘community’ was a



⁵⁸ This plan was put on hold in the Kurdish region as the political disputes between the Kurdish parties led by the Mullah Mostafa Barzani supported by the Shah of Iran, and the Iraqi army became bloody (Mahzouni, 2013).

⁵⁹ “It could also boast that 2,700 dwellings had been rebuilt, and over half the one hundred destroyed villages in Erbil province had now been reconstructed.” (McDowall, 2020)

⁶⁰ Fathy was member of the Doxiades Organization in Athens 1957 -1962, he entered into the activities of the Ekistics group including the work on Iraqi national housing program, and joining the ‘City of the Future’ research project then underway at the Ekistics Centre itself. (Steele, 1997).

replicable unit of 10-15 attached houses with a 'gossip square' to supposedly boost 'healthier community spirit'. These spatial settings classified community classes based on their income similarities⁶¹ (Pyla, 2006).

Though the national housing program ended with the fall of the Qassim regime, its modern schemes survived. Labelled in Arabic *mojamma't assrya* (modern collective *مجمعات عصرية*), 250 'modern villages' were set out to be constructed in rural Iraq, including the Kurdish region, to become the receiving (infra)structure for the dislocated population. In this phase, these sites had iron-grid layouts, connections to improved state services (health, education, ..) and public infrastructures (electricity, water..) and recreational areas, compared to the 'primitive situation in the unserved villages' (Genat, 2017; Moldoch, 2017; Francesca Recchia, 2014). As the non-stopping clashes resurfaced by the end of 1973, turning again many (border) regions temporarily inhabitable. The new -set sites and their known locations acted as magnets attracting many displaced Kurdish groups seeking safety, moving away from the battlefields spreading across the plains and mountains but creating socio-spatial frictions with their networks extending behind the borders. Consequently, these conflicts, movements and new-set settlements territorially restructured the ways in which refuge took place.



Housing activities in the national housing program of Iraq and generic layout for the town, developed by Doxiadis Associates (Doxiadis Associates & DBoGI, 1963)

⁶¹ Doxiadis contextualized his abstractions of "scales" and "hierarchies" by arguing that the smaller, class 1, II, and III communities corresponded to sizes found in Iraqi towns and villages. (Pyla, 2006)

4.2.1.3. Resurfacing instabilities

Though the period between 1970-1974 seemed to be 'peaceful', behind the scenes, each player was rearranging his cards. All players on both Iraqi and Kurdish fronts were widening their national influence spheres and checking their international allies' powers, who, in turn, used the Ba'ath-Kurd conflict to tip the balance to their favour and assure access to oil that way (amongst other benefits). As such, this modernisation movement was an attempt to gain time to stabilise the new regime and build its military power and create fissures within the territorially enmeshed networks in the Kurdish inhabited territories. The other side of this Janus-faced appeared shortly, reflecting the regime's counterinsurgency strategy against the rebellious Kurds and spreading control over oil-rich zones and arable areas claimed by the Kurds. By implementing this reconstruction strategy, the Ba'athist government seeded these spatial tools in the northern parts in the early 1970s. The newly set "modern settlements" and housing schemes, as such, became demographic (re)engineering (Talabany, 1999) and obscured a vast Arabization movement (*ta'rib* – تعريب). This movement accelerated after the nationalisation of oil facilities in 1972. By the time the Iraqi government issued the Autonomy decree in 1974, around 64 Kurdish villages were Arabized in Shaikhan⁶² district alone, Kurdish villages in Kirkuk, Aqra, Skaykhan and Khaniqin were either evacuated or completely bulldozed and last, but not least, around 50,000 Shi'i Fayli Kurds⁶³ were denied citizenship and expelled from Iraq (HRW, 2004; McDowall, 2004).

Unsurprisingly, the mirage of "temporary stability" crumbled. This drastic and massive Arabization did lead in 1974 to another Kurdish revolt, this time directed by Barzani and his followers, who depended on Iranian and American support against the Iraqi army that, in the meantime, was upgraded with soviet tanks and aircraft. Clash areas started to be evacuated, and waves of displacees Kurds backing up the revolt headed towards the mountains Iranian border: areas and villages controlled by the Peshmerga. As the Iraqi army advanced, the Kurds inhabiting these clash areas and hiding in dug-up trenches started retreating and looking for safe routes. The move was majorly acute, with a narrow room for choice. The displaced took the mountains routes, going on foot, horses, and cars, while seeking temporary refuge in their alliance networks villages. The duration of stay depended on the scale of the offensives, ranging from a few nights to a few months. Though the routes towards refuge differed, many local informants who have displacement memories (living and/or generationally transmitted) also described similar journeys. Aligning with Saleem (2004) former descriptions, they shared stories of how they or their family members became refugees in Iran.

The sudden and continuous refugee influx was unprecedented; hosting villages under the Kurdish forces' protection swelled in population. With the economic embargo and the retraction of Kurdish forces, the situation in host villages started cracking, intensified by dire conditions and a severe lack of everyday supplies. In a short time, waves of displacees carried bundles of their belongings and clogged gates on the Iraqi-Iranian borders crossing under the scrutiny of the Iranian police. Between 1974-1979 self-set and United Nations tent camps (such as Nelliwan and Ziwa) mushroomed and stretched on both sides of the Iraqi-Iranian borders sheltering the displaced. In a land still Kurdish in the living memory of

⁶² Shaikhan district, located in Mosul governorate (renamed Nineveh by the Iraqi government). The list is based on the Human Rights Watch interview with Haji Muhammad Ya'qub Hussain, assistant to the director of the Agriculture Department of Shaikhan, June 10, 2003

⁶³ "Shi'i Fayli Kurds, resident in Iraq since Ottoman days and yet without Iraqi citizenship. The government argued they were Iranians, and now determined their fate by the simple expedient of expelling roughly 50,000 of them from September 1971 onwards." (McDowall, 2020)

the displaced, Kurds were out-of-place undesirables. Most of these camps were set in isolation; over 100,000 Kurdish refugees suffered confinement, hunger and exposure to harsh environmental conditions (McDowall, 2020).



Nelliwan Kurdish Refugee Camp in Iran 1974. Photo Credit : Chris Kutschera,

4.2.1.4. The Relocation Model

The Kurdish revolt ended with the Algerian Accord signage in 1975 between Iraq and Iran, Kurdish forces abandoning the fight, the KDP was fragmented, and Mulla Barzani and his family were in exile in the United States. This accord included withdrawing the Iranian support of the 'Kurdish rebels in the mountains' and that both Iranian and Iraqi parties would "maintain border security and prevent subversive infiltration in either direction". Hence, the Ba'athist regime created a *cordon sanitaire* belt along its sensitive frontiers, widening between 5-35 km for national security safety⁶⁴. Therefore, in the name of nation-state security, the Iraqi military started evacuating and razing Kurdish villages, especially from the Barzan valley where the Kurdish resistance HQ was located, pushing the KDP across the Iranian borders to find refuge in Karaj and set its command centre in exile (Human Rights Watch & Black, 1993). Around 1400 villages ridging from mountains to plains were levelled with the ground.


Between 1975-1979, it is estimated that around 400.000-700.000 Kurds were deported and/or relocated to newly-set settlements, while some villages were repopulated with Arab families⁶⁵. Between 1974-1979, costing around 90 million Iraqi dinars, the Iraqi military recuperated these 'modern villages' schemes to become large-scale *mujama'at* – collective towns/settlements or "complexes" "built for that purpose [relocating displacees]" (McDowall, 2020). The locations of these settings were mainly away from the mountains and Iranian borders towards the plains to the northeast. These collectives were set near large towns or along the main highways in areas within Iraqi Army military-controlled boundaries, while the remote ones were set close to farmlands, factories, and workshops for economic purposes (HRW, 2004; Human Rights Watch & Black, 1993; McDowall, 2004; Moldoch, 2017). The Iraqi military radically reduced these schemes' 'modern' treats in implementation with a primary function of housing. These sites were bisected by wide roads to allow military vehicles' movements and control; the rest were agglomerating of mere grids subjected to the inability to flatten the site's topography. The 'Communities' spatial paradigm introduced in earlier schemes became simplified rows of concrete block structures with modern utilities and a space for a market. By the end of this phase, these structures were hardly complete to be occupied; as such, the displacees could also apply for loans from the government's Real Estate Bank in order to build a home in this period; as they were forbidden to return to their villages in the buffer zone (Genat, 2017; Human Rights Watch & Black, 1993; Leezenberg, 2000).

In this phase, "[t]he uprooting that people underwent was to be counterbalanced by the provision of services and infrastructures" (Francesca Recchia, 2014); they were connected to the national electricity grid, water and sanitation networks (Leezenberg, 2000), while On a household scale, financial compensation for the loss came with the relocation (Genat, 2017). These benefits were a mask "to provide

⁶⁴ "The scale of the displacement of Kurds in the north during the mid-1970s was immense, displacing the entire Kurdish population from an area reaching from the town of Khanaqin, close to the Iranian border, to the Syrian and Turkish border areas around Sinjar. Many Kurdish villages were bulldozed, and new Arab settlements were built nearby". (HRW, 2004)

⁶⁵ In the Human Rights Watch Report (2004) highlighted this process between 1970s and 1980s "involved [...] military force and intimidation: entire Kurdish villages were completely depopulated and bulldozed [...]. followed up the brutality with legal decrees aimed at consolidating the displacement [...] property deeds of the displaced Kurds were invalidated by legal decree, most frequently without compensation or with nominal compensation. The Iraqi government nationalized the agricultural lands, making them the property of the Iraqi state. [...]and] embarked on a massive campaign to resettle the formerly Kurdish areas with Arab farmers and their families, thus completing the Arabization process. " (HRW, 2004).

a level of well-being to offset the political repression"⁶⁶ (McDowall, 2004). The (public) services in these sites included essential health, education and administrative ones controlled by the army, while the other domains were gradually reduced (depending on the year of construction), lacking spaces with communal and recreational possibilities (Leezenberg, 2000). This provision also included food rations conditioned that individuals follow the national assimilation program: Men were forced to enrol in the army, children and youth received military training, and women had to attend compulsory Arabic evening courses. On a social level, regroupings were still based on ancestral villages and affiliations. These socio-spatial conditions were utterly alien from the farmers' former habitat, again pushed out of their ancestral land and the traditional ways of life within the assimilation attempts.




Harir collective Town layout 1978 - Courtesy to Harir Municipality - Depicted in (Genat, 2017)



Harir collective Town Today, Esri maps 2022

⁶⁶ "It also allocated 336 million dinars on developing the region. It probably spent more per head of population in Kurdistan than elsewhere in the country during the second half of the 1970s." (McDowall, 2004)

No	Governerate	Settlement Name	Year of construction	Predominant tribe(s) relocated. in the collective settlement					
1	Duhok	Feshkaboor	1976	Musa Rashy, Sendy	33	Duhok	Kharab dem	1975	Sulaivany
2	Duhok	Derabon	1976	Pizhdin	34	Erbil	Kani Qirjala	1974	Surchy, Akraea, Goran, Harky
3	Duhok	Qara wila	1976	Pzhdin, Rezgary	35	Erbil	Sebeeran	1977	Balak, Baradosty, Sherwany, Harky
4	Duhok	Bakirman	1976	Sendy, Gully, Shrenkhy	36	Erbil	Qushtapa	1978	Mizury, Barzany , Harky, Bradost
5	Duhok	Cham Kurk	1976	Musa Rashy, Kochar, Dosky	37	Erbil	Kasnazan	1977	Topzawa Baradosty
6	Duhok	Tilkabar	1976	Sendy, Barwary	38	Erbil	Shawes	1977	Khoshnaw, Balakayati, Goran
7	Duhok	Girik Sindi Sufla	1976	Sendy	39	Erbil	Peerzin	1977	Khoshnaw, Balakayati
8	Duhok	Hizawa	1976	Barwary	40	Erbil	Mala Omer	1979	Khoshnaw, Balakayati
9	Duhok	Darkar Ajam	1976	Barwary, Sendy	41	Erbil	Bahirka	1978	Barzany, Harky, Baradost
10	Duhok	Bersive	1976	Barwary	42	Erbil	Bastora	1977	Balakayati Surchy, Goran, Khoshnaw, Balakayati
11	Duhok	Batofa (Batifa)	1976	Barwary, Gully	43	Erbil	Harir (Hareer)	1978	Mzury, Sherwany, Balakayati
12	Duhok	Begova	1976	Nerway, Barwary, Dosky	43	Erbil	Diyana (Diana)	1978	Balakayati, Bradost, Gardi, Barzani, Muhajir
13	Duhok	Kany	1977	Nerwa Rekan	44	Sulaymaniyah	Sharushyan	1977	Ako, Sharoshy
14	Duhok	Qidish	1978	Barwary, Gully	45	Sulaymaniyah	Ranyah	1979	Ako
15	Duhok	Deralook	1977	Rekany, Nerwayi	46	Sulaymaniyah	Raparin	1976	Ismail Uzery
16	Duhok	Sheladzey	1977	Dosky Zhory, Rekany	47	Sulaymaniyah	Tuasoran	1978	Ako
17	Duhok	Kalakchin	1975	Goran	48	Sulaymaniyah	Bastasen	1978	Mangur
18	Duhok	Qasrok (Qasruk)	1976	Mizury, Kochar, Sulaivany	49	Sulaymaniyah	Zharawa	1978	Nuradeeny
19	Duhok	Chira	1976	Goran, Govay, Zebary	50	Sulaymaniyah	Pemalk	1978	Nuradeeny
20	Duhok	Ba'adry (Bahadre)	1975	Hawery, Simoqy	51	Sulaymaniyah	Takya	1975-8	Showan, Pishder, Qalasewka
21	Duhok	Bagerat (Baghera)	1976	Nerwa Rekan	52	Sulaymaniyah	Gopala	1976	Kafroshi, Hamawand
22	Duhok	Kuret Gavana (Goregaven)	1977	Balakaiaty	53	Sulaymaniyah	Taynal	1976	Shynakayati
23	Duhok	Mansooria (Miserky/Misureek)	1975	Kochar, Masihi, Sulaivany, Barwary	54	Sulaymaniyah	Allahi	1976	Mirawli, Shenaki
24	Duhok	Marona (Marwin)	1975	Zedik, Mizuri, Dosky, Kochar, Barwary	55	Sulaymaniyah	Tasluja	1975	Ismail Uzery, Mirawli
26	Duhok	Bastke	1975	Sulaivany, Dosky	56	Sulaymaniyah	Arbat	1977	Jaf
26	Duhok	Miqbla	1975	Sulaivany, Mizuri	57	Sulaymaniyah	Zarayan	1978	Tauguzi, Hozibawa, Sherabayani
27	Duhok	Batail (Batil)	1975	Sulaivany, Dosky, Barwary	58	Sulaymaniyah	Shanadari	1978	Zangana, Jabari
28	Duhok	Ismail Ava	1975	Sulaivany	59	Sulaymaniyah	Khurmal	1978	Haruni, Hawrami
29	Duhok	Bawarde	1975	Sulaivany	60	Sulaymaniyah	Anab	1978	Hawrami, Shamerani, Hawari
30	Duhok	Girsheen	1975	Sulaivany, Dosky, Miran, Barwary	61	Sulaymaniyah	Zamaqi	1978	Hawrami, Shamerani, Nauroly,
31	Duhok	Kelik (Kalak)	1975	Sulaivany	62	Sulaymaniyah	Seerwan	1978	Hawrami, Garmiany, Nauroly, Shamerani
32	Duhok	Bajid Kandal	1975	Hawery					



Map shows the mojamma't (collectives) /the relocation model built during the 1970s. Produced by the author (2022) based on (Stansfield, 2003)

4.2.1.5. The Confinement Model

By the end of the 1970s and Saddam Hussein's successful internal coup, the Kurdish front was fragmented as ever. At the beginning of the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988), the internal tensions between the Kurdish PUK and KDP groups and unresolved feuds resurfaced, fragmented them even further. Nonetheless, these tensions had softened by the end of 1983, leading mainly PUK and KDP militia to form a Kurdish Front back up by Iran. This front's control expanded north and south, covering almost all Kurdish claimed territories by 1987. Therefore, between 1984 and 1987, with such territorial expansion, the relationship between the divided Ba'athist regime and the Kurds changed dramatically. On the one hand, by joining the resistance against Saddam's regime, many tribal and religious leaders found the chance to renew their patronage roles with the Kurdish nationalist pride, protecting followers and providing fighters, hence (re)creating their power spheres of (sub)territorial pockets of protection and thriving within the Iraqi borders.

On the other hand, (displaced) groups trapped within the territories, especially in clash areas and the government's controlled territories, suffered the absence of survival needs and any consistent or alternative employment. Therefore, these situations reinforced their dependency on their patrons, who [consequently] were locked in dependency on the government. Sheikhs who retreated to their religious roles, rebuilding their *tekiyahs* networks and granting refuge. Those who stayed away from political life since the 1960s were spared, were richly rewarded for their services, adding to their power⁶⁷, and later supported by the government with money and power, joined the fight carrying the banners of religious protectors against the Marxists and the Shi'i threats (McDowall, 2020).

Between fear, self-preservation, public image, and being driven by uncertainties, many Kurds juggled their loyalties. Some joined the *Peshmerga*, while others joined the Iraqi armies feeding the *jash* (Kurdish paramilitary forces) again. For the non-combating groups, however, the situation was complete mayhem. Those trapped in relief camps along the Iraqi-Iranian borders suffered dire conditions, alarmed by the ongoing war's early violence signs and chaos. Many refugees decided to return, benefiting from Saddam's general amnesty in 1979. The Iraqi regime labelled these groups as returnees (*aïdoun* عائدون) and had barely a choice of where exactly to go back, surrounded by a mistrust and suspicion climate. Those who lived within the borders suffered intensified measures of evictions, destructions, executions and depopulation of the Kurdish villages, which coincided with the Arabization and placement of pro-government groups. Tribes were fragmented into smaller entities; each was juxtaposed with segments from different tribes (G. Stansfield, 2001). Depending on their affiliation with the regime, and their allies of local leaders and sheikhs, these segments were grouped with either (former) friends or foes.



Collectives built between 1977-1983, such as Bahrka, Harir, Qushtapa, (and many others) acted as receiving sites for these forcibly displaced and relocated groups in large numbers within their incomplete infrastructures and vacant parcels (Human Rights Watch & Black, 1993). The Iraqi military enlarged many of these sites by adding new roads and additional grids, capitalising upon the existing services built earlier of electricity, water supply systems, schools, and health points (Leezenberg, 2000). As such, this territorial (re)engineering and spatial insertions of and within these receiving sites revealed: "the

⁶⁷ "chiefs were richly rewarded for their services, receiving lucrative factory licences, or land grants, or export/import privileges"

ambivalent character of the regime’s collectivisation program” (Francesca Recchia, 2014). Unlike the former models, there was no permanent housing in these extensions, nothing but tents (Human Rights Watch & Black, 1993). Nonetheless, the displacees, still to some extent, received a piece of land and a budget for housing; they were also provided with food rations monthly distributed.

These conversions of new and old set settlements into *mojamma’t qassryya* (coercive collectives *مجمعات قسرية*), heavily controlled and guarded by the Iraqi army, according to Francesca Recchia (2014), can be seen as the second generation of the collectives (Human Rights Watch & Black, 1993). As such, subverting the implementation of the projects within these sites from improvement and upgraded models to confinement ones (Genat, 2017; HRW, 2004; Mahzouni, 2013; McDowall, 2004; Moldoch, 2017; Recchia, 2012). The main differences between this model and the prior model were the dismissal of the development concept and the transformation into a containment and control apparatus. The control materialised in tools of permanent military surveillance, including gates, fences, military posts, and wide roads to facilitate heavy military machinery. Symbolically confinement was reasserted by control elements decorated with portraits of Saddam Hussein and the Baa’thist regime’s symbols (Moldoch, 2017).

No	Governorate	Settlement Name	Year of construction	Predominant tribe(s) relocated in the collective settlement
63	Duhok	Khanky	1987	Dinay, Hawry, Shingary, Arab, Sendy
64	Duhok	Sharya	1987	Dinany, Faidy, Hawry
65	Duhok	Azadi-1	1987	Teary
66	Duhok	Girbeesh	1986	Zebary
67	Erbil	Kawr Gosik (Kawergosk)	1987	Kandinawa, Shekhabzeny, Surchy, Qaraj, Shamamk, Qaladiza
68	Erbil	Jideeda Zab	1987	Qaladizi, Salay, Shekhabzeny
69	Erbil	Tobzawa	1987	Shamamk, Shwan, Salay, Qaraj,
70	Erbil	Binaslawa	1987	Luk, Showan, Nalia, Jabary, Mantik,
71	Sulaymaniyah	Shkarta	1987	Khoshnaw
72	Sulaymaniyah	Choman	1983	Balak
73	Sulaymaniyah	Qara Hanjee	1987	Jaf, Zangana
74	Sulaymaniyah	Shorish	1988	Jaf, Zangana
75	Sulaymaniyah	Bazyan Asri	1987	Manmi, Hamawand
76	Sulaymaniyah	Baryka	1987	Jaf
77	Sulaymaniyah	Qadir Karam	1987	Zangana, Shekhan, Jabari, Qalasewka
78	Sulaymaniyah	Smud	1987	Jaf, Zangana, Dawda, Shekhan, Zand



Map shows the mojamma't (collectives) /the confinement model built between 1980-1987. Produced by the author (2022) based on (Stansfield, 2003)


4.2.1.6. The Punitive/Forced Relocation models (1987-1990)

The growth of the Kurdish-Iranian control in the north became alarming to the Ba'athist army. Ali-Hasan al-Majid, president Saddam's cousin and right arm in the north, came up with a "solution" to the Kurdish problem: eradicating forever the socio-spatial bonds supporting the *Peshmerga* by turning habitable into inhabitable. He, therefore, initiated the most violent campaign against the Kurds: using a mix of conventional and chemical weaponry against the traitors, saboteurs, and their families. The clashes escalated in 1987, reaching their climax with the genocidal Anfal campaign⁶⁸ (Feb-Sep 1988).

In preparation for the Anfal, within the last months of 1987, the Iraqi government razed around 4050 Kurdish villages and towns, while "their livestock would be killed or confiscated, and their agricultural fields and orchards would be destroyed" (Leezenberg, 2004). They persecuted and performed executions of males over 12 years old and were deemed collaborators with the Iranian enemy (Human Rights Watch & Black, 1993). Those who reached the borders sought refuge with their Kurdish population; Iran granted around 100,000 refuge, while Turkey denied around 60,000 refugees protection or assistance, leaving them stranded in the mountainous brooders (Yildiz, 2004).

In this heated political and violent climate, many Kurdish families who supported the resistance were seen as a potential threat and were named traitors and saboteurs (Moldoch, 2017). The Iraqi military relocated hundreds of thousands of women and children into newly set collectives in the same year (Moldoch, 2017; Yildiz, 2004). The iron-grid model of mere lines on the dirt, and similar to collectives set in this phase, all the "modern" attributes disappeared: these settings lacked running water, a sewage network, no electricity, and signs of life (Leezenberg, 2004; Yildiz, 2004). Furthermore, the occupying groups were not registered, confined and monitored needs and even labelled 'Iranian traitors'. by virtue of their spatial isolation and stigmatisation, as such, they were denied access to food rations or livelihood to support their basic needs. Hence, this generation of *mojamma't* (collectives) was drastically reduced compared to the former 'improvement' and confinement models to suit its punitive ones.

Though all were Kurds, they were socially and spatially divided within the new spaces between 'the good': those who accepted to cooperating with the army and 'the bad': those who refused to do so. The need for the *jash* (Kurdish paramilitary forces) declined by the war's end. However, pro-government tribal and local leaders gained a new sphere of power. By being on the government payroll, acquiring tracts of lands, becoming government *mustashars* (advisors مستشار) and being appointed as administrators to these *mojamma't*, and the inaccessibility of agricultural lands and means of living for the forcibly displaced, these leaders regained their patronage powers among the vulnerable groups striving for hand-outs (McDowall, 2020).



Anfal Campaign 1988 – February – September .
reproduced by Author 2022 based on (Ghaidan, Al-Dabbagh, & Fethi, 2004-5)

⁶⁸ "The operation named after Quran's Sura ; Al-Anfal literally means 'the spoil of war' and it refers to the battle of Badr against the infidels wrongfully using its meaning and interpretations.



Iran's Offensives:

- 1. Qasr-i Shirin
- 2. Penjuin
- 3. Haj Omran
- 4. Lolan district


▨ Kurdish population majority

⋯ Deportations reported



Kurdish Deportation locations and offensives (van Bruinessen, 1986)

No	Governerate	Settlement Name	Year of construction	Predominant tribe(s) relocated in the collective settlement
79	Duhok	Giery Gawre	1988	Kochar, Sulaivany
80	Duhok	Azadi	1992	Dosky Zhory
81	Erbil	New Khabat	1988	Sian, Gardy, Galaly, Nanakaly, Kakay
82	Erbil	Shakholan	1990	Mizury, Harky, Binjy, Sherwany
83	Erbil	Barhushtir	1989	Shwan, Akraea, Sharazur, Qaladiza
84	Erbil	Girdachal	1988	Halabja, Sendy, Showan, Zebary, Guly
85	Erbil	Jazhnikan	1988	Zebary, Rekany, Narwami, Gully, Sendy, Mizury
86	Erbil	Daratoo	1988	Qaladiza, Erbil area, Showan
87	Erbil	Basirma	1988	Harky, Alana, Khoshnaw, Khailany, Rost,
88	Sulaymaniyah	Haji Awa	1988	Pishdary, Merga
89	Sulaymaniyah	Piramagrun	1988	Jaf, Qaraways
90	Sulaymaniyah	Baynjan	1988	Kafroshi, Hamawand
91	Sulaymaniyah	Bazian-1	1989	Pishdary
92	Sulaymaniyah	Bazian-2	1989	Pishdary
93	Sulaymaniyah	New Halabja	1988	Rokhzadi, Mekayli, Galali, Hawrami



Map shows the mojamma't (collectives) /the punitive/forced relocation model from 1988 onwards Produced by the author (2022) based on (Stansfield, 2003)

Moldoch (2017), in her two-decade work with Anfal campaign survivors, has described the initial stages of one of these punitive-detention sites, Sumud and the ways in which the reduction of human life spatially materialised. Set in late 1987, the Sumud collective (renamed Rizgary today) had a detention camp-like condition guarded by the military and the *jash* (Kurdish paramilitary forces). One of Moldoch's interviewees depicts the situation as follows:

"The soldiers marked a small plot with sticks. They said, here, this is your place now. [...]And then we went around and collected stones here and there. Some people gave us some bricks, so we built a room."⁶⁹.

"They sent us to a piece of land at the outskirts of the camp. We went around Sumud and collected other people's broken stones. We went to empty houses and got some doors and bricks. Then we built a room [...] for seven people [...] later [...] twenty of us in one room. The house was far away from everything. There was no water."⁷⁰

According to Moldoch (2017) research, the living conditions within sites represented a complete state of powerlessness on a daily basis for what seemed to be a time loop trap: an indefinite future that may end at any moment. These sites had a confined sense of presentness demarcated with clear lines in a bounded space, with little left expected to be lost.

After the Anfal campaign, the return to the original villages or agricultural land in the post-Anfal cleared areas was forbidden and punishable by immediate execution (Human Rights Watch & Black, 1993; Yildiz, 2004). Male displacees and survivors who returned from their hideouts were executed or imprisoned in detention centres, while those who were "released" and the elderly, women, and children were to be resettled. In 2004, the Human Rights Watch report estimated that 32 army-guarded towns had been constructed as confinement locations by the Iraqi military throughout the Kurdish inhabited territories (HRW, 2004). Each to accommodate 10,000-15,000 resettled Kurds, the spatiality of this containment was described in Leezenberg (2004) as follows:

"After the [post-Anfal 1988] amnesty, the surviving deportees were brought back to the north and simply dumped on relocation sites near the main roads to the region's major cities, surrounded by barbed-wire fences. Unlike the victims of most earlier deportations, they were not provided with any housing, construction materials, food, or medicine (let alone financial compensation), but just left to their own devices".

Sumud collective, for instance, grew in population after the Anfal campaign to reach 70,000 people, predominantly women and children who had potentially lost their male family members for good. In these punitive forced relocation collectives, new dwellers- primarily women and children - were hardly covering their survival needs and in a constant hunt for basic (building) materials collected from destroyed villages and bulldozed houses to make the inhabitable habitable (Mlodoch, 2012). These situations have created an overwhelming experience that fits Kelison's term of sequential traumatisation (H. Keilson, 1992; Mlodoch, 2012): violent rupture and humiliation that cannot be forgotten and still marks the living

⁶⁹ (Interview with Kurdish women of the Anfal survivors, Rabea, 2002 in (Moldoch, 2017). This statement had been reasserted through her fieldwork, this included detention, constant humiliation and punishment for 'bad Kurds.'

⁷⁰ (Interview with Kurdish women of the Anfal survivors, Haseba, 2010 in (Moldoch, 2017) who lost her husband and son and survived with 6 children.

generational memory of Iraqi Kurds of consecutive displacements and wars. Trapped between memory, fear and survival needs, many of these Kurdish populations never returned to their hometowns (Human Rights Watch & Black, 1993) and still lived in these collective settlements until the writing of this work (2022).



Sumud (renamed Rizgary) town , 2011. Adam Jones, Ph.D./Global Photo Archive/Wikimedia Commons, Map: Esri 2021

4.2.2. To the Mountains: The Kurdish Exodus 1991.

In the wake of 1989, wounds of the genocide, war, loss and involuntary dislocation were wide open. The Kurdish society fragmented politically and ruptured territorially, was shaken and traumatised to the bones. With the Iraq-Iran's formal peace agreement in 1988, Kurds had barely room to breathe (McDowall, 2020; Yildiz, 2004). By July 1989, the Iraqi military has cleared 75,000 Square kilometres of the KR-I of Kurdish populations and their towns and hamlets, extensively lying them with minefields and announcing amnesty and compensation for those who surrender (McDowall, 2020).

The invasion and the annexation of Kuwait to the Iraqi State in 1990⁷¹ led to the first Gulf War in 1991 and the Iraqi Army's defeat at the hand of US-led coalition. This turn of events came as a miraculous save for repressed groups in Iraq, including the Kurds in the north and the Shi'as in the south. Profiting from the war's aftermath of military disorder and mass deserters, a large-scale uprising spread against the Baa'thist regime: Streets were raging with furious crowds. With the escalating uncertainty, fearing Kurds' retaliation if Saddam fell, the majority of *jash* leaders joined the Kurdish front to be pardoned later, converted from embarrassed collaborators with the regime in Baghdad into champions of the Kurdish nationalists (McDowall, 2004, 2020). In a few days, the formerly fragmented Kurdish forces increased to 100,000 men, and the Kurdish front advanced and reached Kirkuk, only to be counter-attacked by the Iraqi Army's heavy weaponry and aircraft. Despite their defeat in Kuwait, the rebellion was easy to crush for the Iraqi regime, and the protestors were brutally suppressed, detained, or killed. Such brutalities of the army's retaliation created a mass panic for the Kurds, recalling the genocide's recent ruthlessness. No one was safe from Saddam's revenge within the Iraqi state borders. In acute movements, around two million people crossed and filled the mountainous areas of Turkey and Iran. Refugee tents and camps mushroomed within the rocky landscapes, adding to the pre-existing displacement and involuntary dislocation problems that resulted from the Anfal campaign in 1988 (McDowall, 2020; Yildiz, 2004). In the beginning, Turkey denied refugees access to allow later half a million to cross the border. Contrarily, the Kurdish-Iranian side attempted to absorb the displaced within its towns while emergency camps were set up for almost a million refugees.

⁷¹ Iraqi troops led by Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and its annexation to the Iraqi state took the world by surprise (Rudd, 2004). This event led to issuing the UNSC 678 resolution (UNSC, 1991) and the creation of a coalition of 35 countries' forces led by the US army. These fought Iraq in the Gulf war from 1990 - 1991, and the military operation named 'Operation Desert Storm' to expel the Iraqi occupation forces from Kuwait.



Sardacht Kurdish Refugee Camp in Iran 1991.
Photo Credit : Ali Rashidi



Kurdish Refugees - Isikveren camp – Sirsank –
Turkey– Photo Credit : Boris Spremo 1991

4.3. From a Kurdish Exodus to a Kurdish Autonomy (1991-2011)

The humanitarian situations for refugees within and across KR-I borders were deteriorating dramatically; hundreds died of exposure and sickness in the harsh and unpredictable weather (Rudd, 2004; Yildiz, 2004). In 1991, the Turkish – Iraqi mountainous borders were congested with refugees in dispersed self-set camps. These populations were suffering and dying of dire conditions in the absence of basic survival needs (R. J. Brown, 1995; HRW, 2004; Leezenberg, 2000). The Turkish government obstructed official relief activities and humanitarian support as it rendered the presence of these Kurdish refugees illegal on its land (R. J. Brown, 1995; Rudd, 2004)⁷², pushing them from what ones part of their ancestral land.

The pressure to drastic intervention accelerated: Turkey pressured the international actors to solve the refugee problem, and the allied forces' victory in the Gulf War became clouded by the inhuman condition at the borders. Within a few weeks, The UN Security Council passed resolution 668 to "remove the threat on International Security and peace and ensure safe passage for humanitarian aid" (UNSC, 1991) declaring a 'no-fly zone' over northern Iraq and a 'safe-haven' for humanitarian intervention. The goal was to ensure refugees' safe return home (HRW, 2004; Leezenberg, 2000)

4.3.1. Back from the Mountains – The Relief Model

With the enactment of resolution 688 in 1991 and setting the No-fly zone, and the immense pressure on the international community to solve the Kurdish refugee problem, president G. Bush announced the start of 'Operation Provide Comfort'. The operation's goal was to create "protected enclaves" in Zakho and cover large parts of the Duhok governorate for the refugees' safe return (R. J. Brown, 1995; HRW, 2004; Leezenberg, 2000). Simultaneously, the Humanitarian agencies and the Iraqi government signed unilateral agreements and memorandums of Understanding (MOU) that officially legitimised their relief activities in the KR-I. These activities translated spatially into setting safe routes and nodes stretched from the Turkish borders into Kurdish inhabited territories in northern Iraq, where "relief supplies for these refugees will be made available in large quantities and distributed in an orderly manner" (R. J. Brown, 1995; McDowall, 2020)⁷³.

Under Operation Provide Comfort, Fred Cuny⁷⁴, a renowned humanitarian worker and former marine, worked with the allied forces on a safe routes return strategy within the protected enclave in Duhok. More than ten temporary resettlement camps were set up in two months, acting as an apparatus to facilitate practical large-scale relief efforts to accommodate 250,000 refugees coming down from the mountains (CAPT Don Hutchins, 2021). To implement this strategy, first, the army identified safe routes and a series of rely points within the protected enclave. These networks consisted of immediate relief and aid provision nodes divided into short stays of 'rely points' to meet basic needs for refugees returning





The "protected enclave" set by the allied forces in 1991, and the powers in control in 1992. (Institute Kurde De Paris, 1992)

⁷² All the words in italic are in Kurdish, which is the used dialect in that part of the KR-I. Zanon also translates into "pasture land, which was part of the seasonal migration for farms and semi-nomads" (van Bruinessen, 1992).

⁷³ The priorities established were: 1) to stop the dying and suffering; 2) to resettle the population at temporary sites we are establishing a stable, secure, sustainable environment in northern Iraq; and 3) to return the displaced civilians to their former homes" (R. J. Brown, 1995).

⁷⁴ "The fact he was a former marine gave him a common bond with the Marines in Kurdistan and meant that he understood the principles of military necessity. Colonial Jones credited Cuny service as invaluable". (R. J. Brown, 1995)




Map main relief stations, food distribution points that were secured and allocated in the protected enclave. Many of these locations were formerly sites of oppression and confinement. Produced by the author (2022) based on diagram depicted in (Brown, 1995)

from the borders for a day or two and extended stays of temporary relief camps and villages declared safe by the army. These nodes' space-time frames played an essential role in ensuring the protection of security troops and easing handing over of these tasks to non-military organisations and humanitarian agencies with the refugees' active participation in achieving these tasks (R. J. Brown, 1995). Ironically, some

of these sites were former *mojamma't* (collective towns) in the late 70s (ex: Batufa , Begova), subverting their one-time use from confinement to relief. These safe routes led to temporary and resettlement camps

set anew in the lowlands adjacent to military troops' camps. Such aggregation of settlements and sudden influx of population converted the region into an intensified arena of military-humanitarian presence (Yildiz, 2004). Between care and control, this aggregation was to 1) reassure refugees of their safety and 2) facilitate the construction and relief operations in camps and close-by villages.



Up: Diagram of the safe routes, main way stations, food distribution points that were secured and allocated in the protected enclave (Brown, 1995)

Left : Leaflets used during operation Provide Comfort 1991 (Veritans., 2008)

The temporary resettlement camp in KR-I resembled Fred Cuny's Intertect team's earlier humanitarian camp schemes, introduced in chapter 2, and substituted the conventional military camp models. As such, the team used the communities-ordered camp (Cuny, 1977), carrying the same roots of the modern schemes, which were developed and deployed for the displaced in former conflict situations in post-colonial countries (e.g. Sudan 1985). Cuny's team revisited and reappropriated their original schemes to suit the Kurdish context. Therefore, camps' administrative divisions were named according to the local dialect as follows: *zanons* (communities) of 60 persons, grouped into *gunds* (villages) of 1000 people creating a *bajeer* (settlement) of 21,000 -45,000. Furthermore, this reappropriation touched upon the ways in which these spaces were set, tweaking the original schemes to match cultural sensitivities and the groups' economy, described by Rudd (2004) as follows:

"Cuny helped these units adjust to the needs of the Kurds. For example, when the MEU [mechanical engineering unit] engineers began putting up the tents, they wanted to align them in an efficient checkerboard pattern similar to that of a military encampment. Nevertheless, Cuny recommended that they be arranged in clusters that allowed families and extended groups some autonomy. [...]the engineers favoured latrines known as three-holers, which could accommodate several people at the same time. Again Cuny explained that the Kurds would not share latrines, making the single enclosed models more useful" (Rudd, 2004)

In these camps (and largely the way-stations), the military troops' provision had physical and soft components. The physical component included infrastructure work of land clearance, roads, sanitation and setting tents. The soft one covered the provision program of distribution of food rations, non-food items (mattresses, blankets, fuel rations..), and health care, in addition to training and activating participation by working with Kurdish leaders and empowering refugees. In all cases, these camps were still interim waiting areas to "resettle refugees to their original homes", with different attempts to rehabilitate the damaged infrastructures and services in the Zakho area. Electricity generators, water distribution points, wastewater treatments come on water purification, and medical clinics were all set in place and running in no time (R. J. Brown, 1995; CAPT Don Hutchins, 2021; Rudd, 2004). These provision efforts lasted for two months with expectations of stabilisation as the "survival needs were being met," and the mission was accomplished with the return of the refugees back within the state's borders. Military camps were cleared out in a matter of days organising the troops 'retreat' (CAPT Don Hutchins, 2021; Rudd, 2004). Shortly, the responsibility for the humanitarian relief in the region was handed over to UN agencies led by UNHCR and NGOs working in the field. Starting from then, these refugees were perceived by the humanitarian actors as internally displaced groups (IDPs).



Aerial view of one of the camp near Zakho in 1991. (Brown, 1995).

4.3.2. Relief Under Siege

With the critical situations that resulted after the exodus, attempts of autonomy negotiations between the Kurdish Front and Saddam were facing a dead end. Peshmergas took control of Sulaymaniyah and Erbil. The Iraqi regime retaliated: Eviction and Arabization operations were resumed heavily below the 36 parallel line, especially in oil-rich areas. Kurdistan was under tight military siege, and Saddam imposed a gradual economic blockade. As such, fighting between the Peshmerga and the Iraqi army resumed, especially in Kurdish oil-rich areas below the 36 parallel line, displacing another 200,000 people and causing extensive destruction. The Kurdish population protested against opposing parties, as hunger, homelessness, and the approaching winter intensified the fragility of their situation (McDowall, 2020).

The situations on the ground were dire. On the one hand, the scale of destruction and the intensity of violent dislocations shattered the very foundations of the Kurdish groups and their livelihoods once interwoven with the socially and spatially networked territory. With the acute decrease of agricultural production, disrupted transportation routes, land confiscation and the double economic embargo internationally by the US on Iraq and nationally by Saddam, most of these groups became heavily hinged on aid and smuggled goods, turning them into dependent consumers (Leezenberg, 2000; McDowall, 2020). On the other hand, international and foreign aid was undermined by the obstacles set by the central government of Iraq (CGol), disrupting and limiting its effectiveness.

Furthermore, with the withdrawal of Iraqi civil and military presence from the region, the KR-I fell into an administrative, legislative, and institutional 'vacuum'⁷⁵ (Leezenberg, 2000; Natali, 2010). Such a vacuum made room for the "Kurdish nationalist discourse to shift from practices of resistance to those of state-building" (Fischer-Tahir, 2012). After the 1992 elections, the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) was led jointly by KDP and PUK (Yildiz, 2004). Most of both party leaders come from "the old-established social, political, and religious elites that emerged before the second half of the twentieth century" (Fischer-Tahir, 2012); as such, the mesh of (former) tribal and religious spheres reinvented themselves within these parties. With such legitimised power at hand, KDP and PUK "supported their members with land, pensions, and jobs in the party apparatus and state administration" (Fischer-Tahir, 2012), stabilising old and attracting new clients within their patronage networks. Still, the KRG, at the time, was bypassed as it had ambivalent international recognition and was illegal to the CGol⁷⁶.

Despite the efforts of different foreign NGOs to overcome UN agencies' scarce funding and attempt to regenerate the education system and rehabilitate the countryside, it became apparent that these outcomes are unattainable (Leezenberg, 2000; McDowall, 2004; Natali, 2010; Yildiz, 2004).

75 This 'vacuum' made room for the Iraqi Kurdistan Front (IKF) (a coalition formed in late 1988 seas included KDP, PUK and other major Iraqi Kurdish parties) to hold elections in 1992 and self-declared a de facto KRG (Yildiz, 2004).

76 the KRG still worked on its institutional (re)formation: new ministries were created for reconstruction and development, humanitarian aid and population, peshmerga affairs, and culture. In addition, the KRG liaised with government programs and established a council of governors at the presidential level to work with INGOs, the UN, and donor agencies (Natali, 2010).

Consequently, relief and aid were delegated through local NGOs, attached to one political party or another. Many of these legal NGOs, ran or owned by (former) tribal chieftains and Aghas, in their turn converted into private contractors, delivering services to relief agencies. Hence, these primordial spheres found another niche to reinvent themselves within the humanitarian one; relief was accessed through patronage networks and became vital to survival. (McDowall, 2020; Natali, 2010). Unlike many sheikhs who gradually lost their influence, these owners accumulated capital (and hence power), becoming wealthy businessmen, widening the gap between classes of tribal and non-tribal groups.

Amidst these complexities and power imbalances, internal war broke between KDP and PUK in 1994⁷⁷, exposing inequalities and reviving latent tensions between classes. The situation became chaotic, violent, and insecure once again. “ Unemployment is running as high as 80-90%; food prices have surged 200% in the past year [1995], and demonstrations and attempts to gain forced access to stored food aid have occurred” (Gunter, 1996). Numbers vary between 90,000 - 200,000 people were either seeking refuge or were evacuated by the opponent, and moving to their patronage zones, restructuring demographically again KR-I regions (McDowall, 2020), reemphasising the region’s character of chronic instability.



Internal division of KRI between political parties after the end of the civil war in 1998. (CIA, 2003)

⁷⁷ This civil war ended with the US government’s mediation and the signing of the Washington agreement in 1998. It resulted in the demarcation of administrative areas divided between them. (Yildiz, 2004)

4.3.3. Restoration and Rehabilitation Models under the Oil For Food Programme (OFFP)

The oil-for-food program (OFFP) was established in 1995 under the UN Security Council resolution 986. The goal was to alleviate civilians' extended suffering due to the sanctions imposed on Iraq under Bill Clinton's administration after the first Gulf war. In the OFFP program, the KR-I was targeted to receive 13% of Iraqi oil sales proceeds to alleviate hardship and provide humanitarian goods and reconstruction projects for civilians' needs without allowing Iraq to boost its military capabilities (UNSC, 1995). The state of affairs gave the UN bodies the legitimacy to act as a 'surrogate state' stipulating the *de facto* KRG (Crisp & Slaughter, 2009; Kagan, 2011; S. D. Miller, 2018), filling the institutional role of the vanished bodies of the Iraqi's central government⁷⁸.

The UN-Habitat, under the OFFP, implemented the 'Settlements Rehabilitation Program' (SRP) in northern Iraq (KR-I today), targeting vulnerable and displaced groups. The physical components of the approach, on the one hand, included spatial rehabilitation, self-built models, and improvements in services and (urban) infrastructures. On the other hand, the soft component focused on both society and local authorities to be integrated with/in the rehabilitation: through capacity enhancement, enabling the private sector, IDPs empowerment, and participation in the planning and implementation of the program. (UN Habitat, 2001, 2002). Undeniably, the OFFP significantly impacted the immediate well-being of Kurdish inhabited areas and created the basis for possibilities of recovery and roots of humanitarian development – stability linkage in the KR-I.

4.3.3.1. *mojamma't*: to Dismantle or to Upgrade?

Intervention site selection for the SRP (settlements rehabilitation program) was based on identifying the IDP's current and former settlements, assessments of the physical situation and the presence of socio-economic networks. The SRP reconstruction plans mainly addressed Kurdish villages in the areas destroyed heavily during the 1980s. A variety of projects attracted many internally displaced Kurds to go back to their villages and participate in the reconstruction process, which in return provided opportunities for income generation for a large group of unemployed workers who did not have any access to the labour market as a consequence of the double embargo and the dire situations.

'Collective towns' i.e. *mojamma't* were identified in these assessment reports as a distinctive settlement typology⁷⁹ (UN Habitat, 2001). Initially, the intent was to dismantle *mojamma't* as they represented apparatus of state violence and materialised reminders of horrifying events. The goal was to resettle the coercively displaced back to their villages after being reconstructed (Moldoch, 2017). However, the expectations were that IDPs' return rate would accelerate after rehabilitating their original villages; the numbers revealed the reluctance of IDPs to repatriate (UN Habitat, 2001, 2002). The

⁷⁸ The UNSC resolution 986 and the MoU signed between the UN and the CGoI in 1996 gave the United Nations Inter agency humanitarian program the role of acting on behalf of the CGoI to prosecute, transport, and distribute humanitarian aid for INGOs and you and agencies to KR-I. This role was delegated to UNOHCI (Volcker, Goldstone, & Pieth, 2005a). Other UN agencies were active since 1996 : Food and Agriculture organization FAO, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the United Nations development program (UNDP), the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) the United Nations office for project services (UNOPS), the World Food program (WFP), and the World Health Organization (WHO) (Volcker et al., 2005a). some of the agencies even were "operating as ministries: The United Nations Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator [in Iraq] (UNOHCI) as a council of ministries, the United Nations Human Settlements Program (UN-Habitat) as a ministry of housing and reconstruction, and the United Nation Children's Fund (UNICEF) as a ministry of water and sanitation" (Natali, 2010)

⁷⁹ A total 397 sites of displacement were identified as: collective towns, urban areas, virtual sites/IDP neighbourhoods (individual dwelling scattered) At the time, the number of IDPs was estimated by 22.91% of the region's population (UN Habitat, 2001).

continuous dislocations and intervals of intensified violence had prolonged and severe aftermath: sequential vulnerabilities, eradication of traditional way of life and livelihoods, fragmentation of territorially enmeshed social (support) networks, not to mention deaths by hundreds of thousands, with more than 100,000 widows abruptly losing their husbands (traditionally the breadwinners), with an even greater number of orphans (McDowall, 2020). On the one hand, the rupture from the former villages and towns of origins was severe: these locations became the embodiments of traumatic experiences and constant reminders of irrecoverable losses. On the other hand, the (partially) destroyed socio-spatial (infra)structures and the scarcity of livelihood opportunities (UN Habitat, 2001) were outweighed by the relief consistency (though scarce), post-displacement formed networks, and shared resilience experiences weaved a patched socio-spatial fabrics that rooted deeper the new geography. All these factors consequently altered (if not subverted) these populations' relation to what/where 'home-land' is and upon whom it relies; as such, they changed the needs and expectations of these displacees.



As needs were endless and resources were quite limited, it seems that the UN program found it hard to escape recuperating collective town infrastructures to support the displaced, regardless of their former "oppression" notion. For the SRP scheme, 625 receiving sites (of towns and villages) were assessed to be rehabilitated, and Fifty-two selected ones were former collective towns. Unsurprisingly, many of these sites had crippled conditions: 13-25% of the dwellings were either poorly self-built or still tents⁸⁰, and basic services heavily relied on inconsistent institutional and humanitarian support (which many still do to this day)⁸¹. Consequently, recommendations for humanitarian interventions towards *mojamma't* included "urgent relief, income generation, assistance to the disabled, housing redevelopment and reconstruction, rehabilitation, and infrastructure allocation" (UN Habitat, 2001). According to the UN-Habitat report in 2001, around 55% of the surveyed populations remained in their receiving sites of towns and villages (whether they were collectives or not). Therefore, the pragmatic focus on collective towns' improvement became one of the main components of the SRP⁸².

Map shows the location of the UN Habitat intervention locations in the Settlements Rehabilitation Program (SRP) 1995-2003. Based on (UN Habitat, 2001), reproduced by the Author (2022)

⁸⁰ This percentage is probably linked with the year of construction and the group being a refugee coming back from borders

⁸¹ 2019, Interview with Mr. the mayor of Basirma (one of the former collective towns which a refugee came was annexed to it later).

⁸² In 2002 operational activities report by UN-Habitat referred explicitly to that the work that covered the collective towns, namely the "[r]enovation of approximately 10,450 houses, upgrading the water and sanitation infrastructure in towns, improving internal roads, construction of 388 classrooms and construction of 12 new health centres".



Map shows the location of the UN Habitat intervention locations in the Settlements Rehabilitation Program (SRP) 1995-2003. Based on (UN Habitat, 2001), reproduced by the Author (2022)

4.3.3.2. Inequal Aid Interventions

In the turmoil of modernisation dressed this time as (international) humanitarian and development endeavours, the entanglements with traditional patronage systems reinvented themselves within the government bodies and local NGOs. As such, the OFFP inevitably was infested with multi-layered favouritism and corruption that led to its termination in 2003 (Volcker, Goldstone, & Pieth, 2005b). In all cases, it is undeniable that the KR-I (partially) accumulated in this period was the basis for (partial) economic recovery attempts that coincided with the continuity of external aid (Natali, 2010). In the UN-Habitat reports' recommendations (2002, 2003), the SRP (settlements rehabilitation program) became long-term interventions. Taking a new name, 'Under the Common Roof Approach', the former SRP projects and programs broadened the intervention boundaries of towns and villages and intended to reach both urban and rural areas. The goal was "to facilitate and rationalise planning and programming activities", through compiling a spatial database. As such, 'Under the Common Roof Approach' emphasised developing transport (interlinkages) schemes and stressed using the master planning approach in their work in the three major cities of Erbil, Duhok, and Sulaymaniyah. Therefore, to activate the "collaborative arrangement existing between UN-Habitat and local authorities" (UN Habitat, 2002), it was essential to complement these interventions by supporting upgrades within the institutional frame in the KR-I.

However, several factors impacted the possibilities of balance and effectiveness of this approach and the similar programs and projects in KR-I. The conditionalities that restrained their application included the CGOI (Central Government of Iraq) centralised decisions, the absence of political trust between the CGOI and KRG, the internal instability of the KRG and its deep articulation around patronage spheres and favouritism⁸³. Inevitably, these conditions pushed for unequal interventions linked to geographical proximity in the view of redevelopment and powerful actors. Additionally, granting access to relief agencies' bids and (business) contracts was mainly through patronage networks, especially for oil, transportation (food, medicine, ...), and trading for the construction market. As such, local businessmen - with the right patronage connections - had access to the UN contracts as they tweaked or altered their activities (to a local NGO or a private business) to meet the demand (Leezenberg, 2000; Natali, 2010).

Furthermore, implementing this approach on the ground had also shortcomings: spatial interventions were mainly stones and concrete, lacking the right actors/materials to activate them: "Schools were rebuilt without books, clinics were established without medicines or qualified physicians, and village houses were constructed without vital services such as electricity, access roads, and potable water" (Natali, 2010). Many training programs became only attractive to NGOs to acquire funding, as the trained populations had barely any feasible access to the labour market (if it existed); in other words, lacking a milieu of continuity or progress.

With the dire economic situations and uneven territorial improvements, local economic migration accelerated between (neglected) rural and (growing) urban cores, pushing populations towards more powerful patronage areas where livelihood opportunities were concentrated. Consequently, differences in the reconstruction schemes were related to the balance and access to aid-related resources and labour

⁸³ Despite the efforts of training programs and small contracts in the UN-Habitat, they were reported to be tailored for those who have *wasta*.

power within the parties and administrative areas leading to an unbalanced geographical distribution of income/investment absorption. Those areas located outside these networks became part of the squatters and underdeveloped urban margins, with hindered self-investment, while the other remote overlooked settlements are (still) suffering incremental deterioration. Therefore, with the absence of basic physical and support (infra)structures, these geographies dwellers suffered accumulating (social) problems: a high rate of dependency as the “remaining farming families, [were] no longer able to make a living and finding it easier to live by handouts” (McDowall, 2020), which was coupled by high illiteracy levels. As such, they damaged the KR-I’s agricultural and livelihood patterns and crippled the peripheries (Mahzouni, 2013). Unfinished projects exemplified all these factors combined, chronic conflicts and continuous insecurities, hence becoming (re)surging features of this conflict-ridden society.

4.4. The Rehabilitation Development and Revitalization Models 2004-2012

Until 2003, the KR-I was a “partially legitimised territory of Iraq, dependent on external patronage for survival” (Natali, 2010). The region progression was heavily constrained by crippled development interventions on short intervals, the CGol (central government of Iraq)’s control, patronage spheres growing and privatising, while the KRG was cautious about maintaining validation. However, after the Iraq war and overthrowing of Saddam Hussein’s regime in April 2003, the scale was tipped for the Kurds’ favour after decades of chronic struggle.

The situation in southern Iraq was a full-blown disaster drenched in protracted conflict and armed insurgencies. Relief was re-routed to address southern Iraq’s unstable regions, reduce insurgencies and oppose the growing insecurity. In comparison, the KR-I appeared as an island of socio-political stability and economic prosperity within a hotspot zone (Leezenberg, 2017). After the 2005 Iraqi constitution, the KRG gained its legitimacy as a distinct political entity within Iraq⁸⁴ with effective sovereignty within its territorial boundaries, a federal budget, and the CGol control devolution over the KR-I resources, especially Kurdish Oil. Hence, the KRG launched extensive institutional reforms and upgrades⁸⁵. The no-fly zone and the safe-haven operations were all theoretically terminated, and the green line was demilitarised and followed by the end of the double embargo. The Kurdish region became a magnet for various groups, investments and a base for HQs of many humanitarian agencies (Leezenberg, 2015; McDowall, 2020; Natali, 2010).

Despite the decreased relief budget, KR-I’s situation witnessed a remarkable change. Being the direct recipient of aid agencies’ funding, the UN agencies’ former role as intermediaries was demoted to advisors and supporters⁸⁶ and substituted by newly formed KRG institutions. The operations under the OFFP were handed over to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). UN projects were to be resumed under the Advance Development Provincial Reconstruction (ADPR), with a special budget to develop the KR-I three governorates that grew significantly and added to the KRG federal budget⁸⁷. The revenues touched all aspects of life in the KRG, including security, construction, and large infrastructure projects (roads rehabilitation, water treatment plants, power transmission substations, and hydropower stations). These revenues supported private sector development, creating the industrial zone, and connecting the KR-I cities with the rest of Iraq. National capacity-building projects supported by the US

⁸⁴ Article 117 in the Iraqi constitution specifically recognized the KR-I as an integral component of federal Iraq with both Kurdish and Arabic as the official languages. Political processes and institutions also became more representative to include diverse parties, ethnic and religion groups. Despite their ongoing political differences, the KDP and PUK decided to run one unified Kurdistan list for the Iraqi parliament, and Kurdistan National Democratic list for the KNA for December 2005 legislative elections. Additionally, the Kurds gained a substantial representation in Baghdad with Jalal Talabani (former head of PUK) becoming a president, and many of the officials were of Kurdish regions as ministers.

⁸⁵ On January 21st, 2006, Ma’soud Barzani and Jalal signed the unification agreement, which established the framework in which the KDP and PUK parties could call govern the region once again. The signage of the unification agreement between KDP and PUK merged their administrations into one regional government and established the institutional mechanisms leading to a full institutional reform and upgrade. By 2009, the Iraqi Kurdistan parliament was in place (IKP), with spaces for the younger generations to participate in political life. The age of the membership in the parliament was lowered from 30 to 25 in 2009.

⁸⁶ The newly devised institutional framework and the constitutional legitimacy enabled the KRG to achieve a higher degree of autonomy to alter laws aside from the foreign politics and financial issues: it had its own police and security forces, control on the natural resources within its official boundaries including ‘certain petroleum fields’.

⁸⁷ The embezzled amount OFFP added to the budget allocated for the rehabilitation grew at least three times larger than the previous one. KRG received 17% of the full federal budget.

aid regional reconstruction team (RRT) and the World Bank focused on local governance, policy reform (which were adopted from the Iraqi institutions), service delivery, public participation, and civil society in the decision-making processes (Leezenberg, 2015; McDowall, 2020; Natali, 2010).

4.4.1. Former Displacement Sites

These before-mentioned changes have definitely played a role in transforming the physical nature and the meaning of former displacement sites (relocation, confinement and punitive ones). Some of these sites benefited from the overall stability and started showing characteristics of urbanity and progress with the KRG's investments in their improvement. These improvements covered public facilities (health, education, public buildings) and the rehabilitation and modernisation of the infrastructure (water and sewage networks, roads upgrades). In addition to pensions for the Anfal survivors, families received budgets for houses or reconstructions. Few towns started to witness a rapid transformation and the construction of two stories houses painted with colours. Those who arrived as children had their own families, with additional privileges (scholarships, employment, ...), and had their households in the town. The activation was not only a spatial upgrade but was also invested by the population with access to capital and/or income-generating activities. Interestingly, the flexibility of the confining modular layout became an advantage, allowing expansion. What was once an apparatus for suppression became a site for pride, progression, hospitality, and prosperity (Moldoch, 2017; Recchia, 2012).

As such, the improved locations were turning into busy medium-sized towns, and some of the collective and coercive towns, which were approximate to each other, grew dramatically becoming one settlement or swallowed by the major cities' growth. The towns with approximate locations to major cities or industrial locations had a more noticeable share of this upgrade scheme.



Daratoo, KR-I, was initially built in 1988 as detention site. with the fast pace of economic prosperity, it is going under a fast-paced urbanization process and swallowed by Erbil growth,. Photo credit Leo Novel in (Recchia, 2014). Esri Map 2021.

4.4.2. From Disciplinary Spaces to Arrival (infra)Structures

The 2003 US-led coalition invasion of Iraq and its aftermath also produced its own internal displacement waves landing on the region's shores. Different groups from central and southern Iraq crossed the federal (internal) boundaries seeking refuge in the KR-I. Again, once set as a confinement zone, some of the former collectives (*mojamma't*) transformed into temporary receiving sites, yet this time for the Iraqi displacees (predominantly non-Kurds). The abandoned and vacant existing infrastructures in these sites, such as Rizgary (formerly Sumud), became safe shelters for the displaced (Moldoch, 2017). However, the arrival of Arab IDPs was alarming for the Kurds. The anxiety towards "a new style of Arabization" (UNHCR, 2007b; Younès, 2007) echoed in pushing to set temporary camps for the IDPs, legitimised as "the most efficient way to control the displaced Arabs while providing them with assistance" (Younès, 2007), and hence ensuring the impermanency of these "guests". However, this approach at the time was opposed by the US officials and UNHCR fearing ghettoisation (Younès, 2007), which interestingly was carried on with the IDP influx later in 2013 (as chapter 5 shall explore). The majority of the IDPs who lacked the will or the (financial) means to stay within the KR-I either: 1) left for neighbouring Arab countries such as Syria and Jordan, 2) were transferred (later) to camps set on the Syrian Jordanian borders, 3) were relocated to safe urban enclaves outside the KR-I federal borders, 4) or benefited of resettlement programs to a third country (UNHCR, 2007b).

In comparison, setting up refugee camps/settlements was the tool to accommodate Kurdish refugees and offer them durable solutions. According to the UNHCR (2007b) report, about 4000 Iranian Kurdish refugees from the 1980s were transferred from central Iraq to KR-I and housed in two refugee settlements: Barika and Kawa. Moreover, about 12,000 Kurdish refugees from Turkey were transferred to the Makhmour refugee camp (UNHCR, 2007b). All three refugee settings were either close by or annexed to a former collective town, which also seems to be the strategy used for many Syrian refugee camps (as chapter 5 shall explore). It is worth mentioning that around 700 Syrian Kurds were displaced in Iraq because of the 2004 violent events in Qamishli, Syria (Tejel, 2009). Some of these families rented houses in the Domiz settlement in (the) Duhok, once a complex constructed in the 1980s to house Iraqi military officials working in the military base in 2003, which was partially abandoned by its citizens or rented cheaply (HRW, 2004). Today, Domiz Camp hosts the largest Syrian refugee camp in KR-I.


4.5. Conclusions: Crippled Urbanity


The KR-I remains caught between development and dependency. The conditionalities that the central government of Iraq between 1991-2003 enforced were replaced by the U.S. government the international and humanitarian actors. Being landlocked amidst chronically unstable Iraqi Arab territories and continuous threats coming from the Turkish territories, the Kurdish region became some sort of a stable enclave with the presence of all international (humanitarian) actors and military troops bases. As such, to suspend any additional conflict (among many other factors), progress and development were encouraged to a point: as long as the KR-I did not become 'too autonomous' (Natali, 2010), threatening borders' stability. Within such imbalanced and blurry power boundaries and conditionalities, traditional social and political structures continue to hinder effective political progress or reforms. The emergent private sector in the Kurdish quasi-state also remained tainted by the past policies and the damage inflicted on the market and economy⁸⁸. Development and empowerment were masked by flooding the region with imported goods (mainly from Turkey and Iran), while the decades of violence and wars' distortion hindered attempts to support any possibilities for locally produced goods. As such, the region became the free zone for a new neo-liberal market and a consumption-based presence and imported goods, which to this day, plays a significant role in controlling the region's economic progress and autonomy

Furthermore, the gloss of development and progression masked the cities' crisis-inherited fragilities, while essential services were still missing in the region's poorest parts of many towns and villages (many were former collectives) that were not dismantled or abandoned (Mahzouni, 2013). Other towns remote from the city or vibrant urban cores have not been as fortunate, most of them faced out-migration, leaving those who cannot afford to leave behind, and the situation is in constant deterioration (e.g. Basirma town), with many turning into slums (e.g. Baherka). Extremely uneven development between the city and the periphery created unprecedented inequality only experienced by the poorest of the poor, who lack access to patronage networks.

Map shows the location camps set of Kurdish Iranian and Turkish refugees relocated from southern Iraq. Based on (UNHCR, 2007b), produced by the Author (2022)

⁸⁸ The legitimacy allowed the KRG to behave like a quasi-development state, emphasizing on the openness of its economy with minimum state role on investment and almost unconditional private sector support. The KR-I became at the time the most active neo-liberal market in the Middle East iterating between 'Bazaar cash economy' and 'Simi-Market Exchange'.





Refugee and IDP camps within the KR-I administrative boundaries In August 2020 (UNHCR Iraq & Reach, 2020)

- | | | | |
|--------------------|---------------------|-----------------|----------------|
| Country Border | Governorate Capital | Refugee Camp | Primary Road |
| Governorate Border | District Capital | IDP Camp | Secondary Road |
| District Border | Village | IDP Camp Closed | Railway |

Chapter 5

5. Humanitarian Camps: Making Places for “Brothers” and Spaces for “Guests” (2011-2022)

5.1. The KR-I: a fragile safe pocket amidst chronic geopolitical instability

Since late 2010, the MENA region witnessed rapid socio-political movements and uprisings, mainly referred to as the “Arab Spring”, asking for governmental and socio-economic reforms (Sadiki, 2016). What seemed as an unprecedented revolutionary transformation in countries such as Tunisia and Egypt in early 2011 had its ripple effects within the MENA region, which are “still unfolding [...] with divergent trajectories in the different countries involved” (Fares, 2016). In Syria, these effects indeed ignited a latent spark in March 2011 and went virally with “peaceful narratives” in different cities (Fares, 2016). Unexpectedly, the situation transformed dramatically by 2012 into a (civil) war with multiple ideologies, fronts and players covering: local (pro-regime militia and civil society forces), regional (Lebanese Hezbollah) and international (Russia, the US and Iran) parties (Alkifaey, 2016; Fares, 2016). This situation was exacerbated in late 2013 by the rise and radical expansion of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). As explained in the introduction, such a violent turn of events changed territorial structures of governance and power and generated what Chatty (2018) believes to be the second-largest forced displacement movement since WWII.

In the Syrian conflict's early years (2011-2012), Iraq was still suffering the aftermath of the Anglo-American invasion, drenched in the chaos of sectarian division and political instability. However, as explained in the former chapter, for the last decade, the KR-I's situation differed. The region appeared to have unprecedented (economic) changes and stability, having (partial) control over its federal budget and oil-fields revenues and opening its doors to the free market (Natali, 2010). Therefore, the KR-I became the magnet for international companies and foreign and local entrepreneurs eager for business and (oil) investments (McDowall, 2020; Natali, 2010). Glass skyscrapers, housing projects, shopping malls, private universities and hotels mushroomed in the three big cities, attracting the international, regional and local opportunity seekers for a better life (King, 2014; F. Recchia, 2014). Rural-urban migration intensified as many towns and villages had better connections with the centres due to large infrastructural highways and road improvement projects (Mahzouni, 2013). Therefore, the KR-I rose to the global stage as an enclave of stability and economic flourishing amidst a heating political climate and chronic instability (which intensified with ISIS expansion by mid-2013). The region became the destination where displacees sought refuge and the loci for humanitarian actors' headquarters and homebase for their aid operations.

Today, in 2022, the estimated number of IDPs is about 700000 IDPs and 250,000 refugees (87% are Kurds) (OCHA, 2022; UNHCR, 2022; UNHCR Iraq, 2022b).

5.2. Accommodating the displaced within KR-I's Political Geography since 2011

For many displaced groups, seeking/granting refuge practices have taken place, since 2011, in the intersecting care responsibilities spheres of the humanitarian and governmental networks. Learning from the long humanitarian presence and obstacles experienced in the former years, the early responses initially brought the UNHCR (Refugees) and OCHA (IDPs), the Kurdistan regional government (KRG) and the central government of Iraq (CGol) representatives to the table to manage the crisis at hand. These actors form a network, all acting as what one can describe as a local humanitarian regime (LHR). The LHR bodies and government departments work with other UN actors (UNICEF, UNDP, ..) and delegate humanitarian tasks to the implementation partners (IPs) of international, local NGOs and private sectors. The LHR's mission is to work in tandem and develop a national emergency response strategy addressing the refugee waves and (un)expected displaced influx and presence (UNHCR Iraq, 2012b) and facilitates humanitarian operations. Such presence of (committed) aid actors and humanitarian support offered advantages enmeshed within the receiving sites' (infra)structures through different programs and interventions.

5.2.1. Kurdish-Syrian Refugees' arrival to the 'Fatherland'

Since the Syrian conflict erupted in 2011, 13,3 million have been internally and externally displaced, with 6,6 million registered refugees (UNHCR, 2021a) who have undergone territorial dislocations. The Kurds - a historically marginalised ethnicity in Syria (Tejel, 2009) - experienced this involuntary dislocation slightly differently. Syria-Kurds who lived in direct conflict areas fled to their (extended) families in towns and cities close to the Turkish Borders (known today as Rojava). The flow of the displaced increased dramatically in a few months. Syrian Kurds struggled with the endless uncertainties and unforeseen safe futures within the constantly shifting controlling authorities and changing politics, including: the Syrian regime, rebels, Kurdish parties, the Turkish government, and various non-state actors (Gunes, 2019). Just across the borders the KR-I appeared as a suitable destination, with the presence of kinship affiliations, cultural and linguistic similarities and concentration of better life opportunities. Many of these Syrian Kurds have planned their movement toward the KR-I, implying that the displacement movement at the time was, as Kunz (1973) describes, of anticipatory nature. After all, the KR-I represented for many Syrian Kurds a generationally longed-for home. Waves of Syrian Kurds in the North-Eastern parts started arriving to supposedly realised part of 'Kurdistan': the fatherland.

5.2.2. Refugees' Registration and Rights within the KR-I

It is essential to highlight that Iraq is a non-signatory country of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (Petersohn & NRC, 2022; Qadir, 2019). Therefore, refugee rights in Iraq have constantly been recalibrated in a series of agreements and memorandums of understanding (MoU) depending on the crisis level and political will. For the new arrivals to the 'fatherland', their belonging was tied and constrained by legal impediments of CGol: refugees can neither access long-term residency or naturalisation (UNHCR Iraq, 2022b). In practice, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and KR-I authorities grant asylum seeker status to those who do not fall under the 1971 Law in Iraq, which mainly addresses political refugees' non-refoulement (Qadir, 2019).

In the early phases, those who crossed the borders needed local legal sponsorship (later supported by the UNHCR) to get permits (renewed every six months) to stay and rent in urban and rural settings. In addition to legal sponsorship, these permits required security clearness from the Asayish (the KRG's security and intelligence agency), registration with local authorities and a UNHCR certificate (forma). To acquire residency permits, refugees were first processed by the KR-I directorate of displacement and migration (DDM) and the UNHCR. This 'processing' covered checking the security clearance and registering detailed information (including biometric data) about the household and the individual family members, reviewing official documents issued by the country of origin and identifying vulnerabilities (UNHCR Iraq, 2012d).

In 2018, The KR-I's Ministry of Interior (Moi) issued decrees 7174 and 10041, which fostered the right to seek asylum, which, in turn, mandated KR-I's Residency Directorates to grant temporary residency permits, renewable yearly, to all border-crossing Syrians, which later in 2018, included those who leave KR-I and return later (Petersohn & NRC, 2022; Qadir, 2019). Such permits grant refugees many temporary rights such as the freedom of movement, free access to health services, and education within its areas (Khan, Mansour-Ille, & Nicolai, 2020; UNHCR, 2020e; Yassen, 2019), and ideally a *de facto* right to work (*Etemadi*- self sought) with minimal labour restrictions (Petersohn & NRC, 2022).

5.3. Making places for bothers:

5.3.1. Crossing the borders and Early Humanitarian Responses

In late 2011, the Sahila and Fesh Khrbor border crossings acted as KR-I's gateways for newcomers to villages and reception centres across the borders, where the Asayish registered their entry. According to UNHCR 2012 reports, most of these arrivals until early 2012 were mainly single men (18-25) fleeing compulsory military service, and several (young) families (UNHCR Iraq, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c). The 2018 field interviews with refugees who entered in 2011 indicated that they had support from kinship or patronage networks maintained generationally across the borders. Early arrivals acquired legal sponsorship within these networks, and many were hosted by relatives, friends, and political affiliations in the host communities (UNHCR Iraq, 2012e). Others (with access to financial resources/jobs) rented and shared housing in their receiving geographies. Duhok governorate represented the first destination for many Syrian displaced families due to its geographical proximity (60 km from borders), Kurdish dialect similarities, employment opportunities and housing prices. In comparison, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah governorates attracted single men who found employment mainly in the booming hospitality and construction sectors at the time (Reach & UNHCR Iraq, 2014).

5.3.2. Arriving at Domiz Mouskar

80% of the families interviewed in 2018 highlighted that they arrived/lived temporarily in Domiz Mouskar (Arabic for encampment). Domiz Mouskar's, named after the small town of Domiz lying in its proximity, was a military-constructed old mass housing project dedicated to military personnel in Saddam's time, with a large field acting as a military airport. Domiz Mouskar's history as a receiving site for the forcibly displaced started after its evacuation in the construction of the safe enclave in 1991 in the no-fly zone. These housing units have acted as (temporary) receiving structures for different formerly displaced Kurdish groups returning to the region (HRW, 2004). Later, waves of Syrian Kurds who fled in

2004 due to Qamishli events (Allsopp, 2015; Tejel, 2009) filled the existing vacant apartments and structures. The 2004 arrivals built some sort of stability and social networks in their new homes and became arrival infrastructures for 2011 early arrivals. Many refugee families still resided in *Domiz Mouskar* during the fieldwork in 2018.

The ethnic particularity of these refugees, being Kurds, combined humanitarian operations of aid and relief responses to the registered refugees, was complemented by KRG and the host communities' support to make place for 'brothers and sisters' in need (Redvers, 2013; RUDAW, 2019). However, these new arrivals faced delays in registration due to a long waiting time for processing procedures. Such delays rendered the unregistered refugees' presence 'invisible' to the LHR, who rotated within different residence locations. Therefore, these arrivals had barely access to direct humanitarian assistance at the time (UNHCR Iraq, 2012b). Furthermore, according to interviews with early *Domiz* dwellers in 2018, single men also faced extreme difficulties finding a place to rent and share. These difficulties were mainly due to traditional family structures' neighbourhoods that perceived the presence of single men without families as 'improper' and a 'recipe for trouble' (Interview with *Domiz* 1 Refugee, 2018). With such accumulated issues, the LHR decided to make place for these increasing numbers. They cleared a small area close to *Domiz Mouskar* in vacant land once allocated by the Duhok governorate as a future park to act as a transit site. In a few days, rows of the KR-I's Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MoDM) and old UNHCR tents furnished the soil in that site according to UNHCR standards to temporarily shelter 300 un-homed displacees (UNHCR Iraq, 2012c).



Domiz Camp – 2012 - The New Humanitarian
(Heba Ali/IRN)


5.3.3. The first 'official' Camp operational: Domisz 1 Refugee Camp.

By 2012, the camp filled up quickly with a dramatic increase of refugees and their families arriving in the region weekly (750 to 2240 in March 2012 (UNHCR Iraq, 2012d)). The LHR in Duhok decision was to utilise the settlement approach (applied in other chronic conflict situations) to manage and transform this transit area next to *Domiz Mouskar* into a Domiz 1 humanitarian camp (Interviews with UNHCR-Duhok, BARHA, 2018). Domiz 1's capacity increased from 300 to 20,000 individuals by April 2012 to match the standard capacity mentioned in humanitarian manuals (the transitional settlements (TS) (Corsellis & Vitale, 2004), Sphere (Sphere Association, 2018), and UNHCR handbook of emergencies (UNHCR, 2021b)). The camp's establishment included (re)dividing the site into quarters (Kurdish *Takh*). Each sector was, in turn, divided into blocks of shelter plots (Kurdish *Qa'ada*). Depending on the occupational group, these quarters and blocks were divided into single and family zones.

However, the construction and improvement processes took a slower pace due to several factors, including the non-stopping waves of refugees at the time, insufficient funding, site complexities related to its challenging topography, the time needed and limited capacity of (local) contractors to carry plots and quarters' construction. Therefore, to mitigate these resurfacing issues, the LHR reframed the construction process to specific time-space frames related to temporariness: eight phases/quarters to be operational in the foreseen future (2013-2014), while they designated transit ones into temporary stay ones, to be cleared and (if needed) replanned later.

As the focus in the early stages of 2012 was an emergency response, mainly sheltering and protection, the unprepared Domiz 1 camp site had barely any (provisional) infrastructures to support potable water provision, sewerage, and garbage collection. To mitigate such problems and respond to daily needs, these services were provided by a hybrid system of the local municipality's departments, private contractors and hired Syrian refugees services, taking more manual labour using cars and tankers serving families/blocks. As such, these services caused high operational costs; for example, the operational costs to desludging cesspools in one month in Domiz1 reached 1.5 million dollars in early 2012 (Interview with former UNHCR field coordinator, 2018). Therefore, the newly constructed blocks were developed with connections to the sewerage, water and electricity grids were established and running in some parts and extended in the following years to upgrade the older parts of the camp.


In less than three months in 2012, the under-construction camp also accommodated different LHR representative mobile - caravan offices: most notably the Asayish (Kurdish security forces), who ensured the security inside the camp (UNHCR Iraq, 2012b), and Qandil and UNHCR to facilitate on-site administration and registration tasks. Different humanitarian organisations were also rooming the site, with their different support programs in providing day-to-day services and responding to extended needs (distributing food rations and non-food items (NFI), education, health, ..). All these actors found homes in white shiny temporary caravans appeared with signs indicating the services provided with colourful logos of responsible actors (i.e. KRG, UNHCR, UNICEF, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Danish Refugee Council (DRC), KURDS, Peace Winds Japan (PWJ), ..).



The provided tent in the first year in Domiz, with a toilet of corrugated sheets wall. On the side, you can notice the sketch of the water-based cooler.. The sketch from the refugee republic interactive documentary illustration project in 2013. by Jan Ruthuizen.. (Submarine Channel, 2013)



Domiz 1 Refugee Camp construction became later Domiz 2 Refugee



5.3.4. (re)adjusting Domiz1 camp' spaces:

The phased, constructed, and transit areas all appeared as rows of tents at first glance. However, waiting time and extended needs coupled with phasing and redistribution did indeed impact the ways in which these temporary structures transformed into (partially) consolidated, more permanent ones by 2013(creatively recorded on the Refugee Republic interactive website (Submarine Channel, 2013)). On the one hand, the main provided and the under-construction parts were some sort of reincarnation of the Cuny's community model adopted by the UNHCR, which in theory consists of 16 shelters. However, as the family numbers increased depending on the available space, the community label was dropped for the block to become the replicated unit. The LHR (mainly UNHCR, DDM and Qandil NGO in the beginning) improved the design as follows: each had a concrete slab, three blocks' rows for the tents (60 cm walls), connections to the electricity grid, potable water and black-grey water networks, while plot designs were tweaked for protection and cultural factors: each shelter had its concrete blocks constructed facilities (shower, toilet and a kitchen). The transit areas, on the other hand, were mainly blocks of tent rows, with a capacity of each varied between 16-39 depending on space availability, with communal shared facilities, also set in rows, where the occupants were to be relocated in the constructed areas.



*Domiz Refugee Camp in 2013. The dwelling units were still in their make-shift state, with the block showers and toilets
photo credit: Van -Hear MP, 2013*

After all, these blocks were initially to be replanned and improved similar to other blocks. Nonetheless, with the prolonged waiting and privacy needs, on the other hand, Domiz 1 refugees carved and installed their individual facilities and divided their plots into rooms using metals/concrete block frames, which most were later incorporated as part of the improvement process. Between transit, old and new constructed areas, as such, Domiz 1 camp became today an ensemble of 'block' grids, resonating the continuous (though irregular) flux of refugee waves and their subsequent accommodation, shifted, sorted, and (re)calibrated according to site features and extended needs all patched together as one bounded site.

5.3.5. New Refugee Waves, Prolonged Needs

By 2013, the conflict intensified in Syria, and displaced groups of Kurdish ethnicity fled to the North-Eastern (NES) parts to be hosted temporarily by their kinship and tribal networks. With the withdrawal of regime and non-state actors' competition to claim authority, state and non-state militarisation, increasing insecurities, prolonged temporariness, population congestion, fragile infrastructure and absence of state services, the living situations got very problematic. The situation across the KR-I borders seemed more promising than the NES, with the KRG open door tolerating policies for the Syrians, news arriving from early refugees finding employment and societal and institutional aid and support in and out of Domiz1 camp support encouraged many Syrian Kurds to join them in the fatherland. Therefore, for months, non-stopping refugee flows kept pouring into the KR-I, reaching an estimated 151,500 refugees in the KR-I (UNHCR Iraq, 2013b). Some of the new arrivals filled Duhok's urban and rural settings, including Domiz *Mouskar*, while others arrived directly at Domiz1 to be hosted by their kinship and acquaintances. With soaring numbers of the un-sheltered, many arrivals were temporarily reallocated to school buildings, mosques and transitory camps in all three governorates (DRC, 2013; IOM, 2013).

This congestion and unexpected pressure on urban and rural areas exhausted the fragile and conflict-ridden context. Such an urgent need for housing also steered a spike in rental prices in urban settings. According to interviews with camp dwellers (2018), the rent in *Domiz Mouskar*, for example, went from 120\$ to become 350\$ in less than a year. The same interviewees highlighted that this spike would have been manageable if the job market still offered opportunities and more than one member of the dwellers were working. In a few months, vacant spaces within and outside the camp's immediate boundaries filled up quickly with tents and make-shift structures serving accommodation and basic livelihood purposes. With increasing human and non-human flows and rising needs, different stores started filling both sides of the road, stretching from Domiz1 gateway to Domiz *Mouskar*.

In early 2013, as the ISIS war became a foreseen future, job opportunities became scarce as local and international (oil) investments froze, impacting dramatically the tourism and hospitality sectors where refugees were employed. Such accumulated difficulties in maintaining basic needs, costs to plan for fleeing to a third country, and increased living expenses as ISIS danger approached exhausted refugees' scarce financial resources (World Bank, 2015). Consequently, many refugees (families) rerouted their destination towards Domiz1 camp and temporary humanitarian shelters, which offered better chances to provide basic needs and protection. Later, by May 2013, the camp exceeded its limited capacity by four folds reaching an estimated number of 91,600 registered refugees in less than a year (UNHCR Iraq,

2013b). Early Domiz dwellers with an allocated plot hosted extended families, friends or acquaintances as they waited. Others filled up seven locations: two informal sites outside Domiz 1 current boundaries and five irregular transit areas for temporary occupation (to be cleared and replanned by 2016).

Therefore, the long list of people needing (housing) aid became hard to manage. To reduce these pressures, the LHR response at the time was to appropriate, plan and construct, in addition to Domiz 1, eight separate refugee purpose-built temporary sites⁸⁹ to be operational as quickly as possible (DRC, 2013; IOM, 2013). These sites are as follows: Domiz 2, Akre, Gawilan in Duhok governorate, Darashakran, Kawergosk, Queshtapa, Basirma in Erbil governorate and Arbat in Sulaymaniyah governorate. By the end of 2013, the refugee population were relocated to these new sites, and camps were (fully) operational.



Domiz Refugee Camp in 2013. The dwelling units were still in their make-shift state, with the block showers and toilets Source: Jason McCartney MP, 2013


⁸⁹ Akre is an appropriated a former prison in Akre city. Later in 2019, Bardarash was also added as a refugee camp, which was an IDP, decommissioned in 2017.

5.3.6. The ISIS war and IDPs influx in the KR-I

By the end of 2013, a power vacuum developed in large parts of Syria and Iraq simultaneously as ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) rose to claim power and intensified its armed attacks. By 2015, ISIS-affiliated groups moved across borders and brought under control an area larger than the UK (Leezenberg, 2017; McDowall, 2020). The violence that came with such expansion was unprecedented: destructions, killings, bombarding, enslaving women and children. International and local media streamed and covered stories of atrocities and the continuous advance of the ISIS forces, especially after capturing Mosul in 2014. Fear and uncertainties became the prevailing climate.

Such atrocities and territorial control threatened the international and local power balance and aggravated (latent) insecurities, countered by intensified joint international and local military operations, where Peshmerga members were on the front lines, turning these areas into active warzones in both already unstable countries. As such, most of these operations rendered life impossible and existing towns and cities inhabitable. Consequently, in no time, thousands of Syrians (87% Kurds) and Iraqis (Kurds, Arabs and Yazidis) alike sought refuge within the closest safe haven, which was, for many, territories under the KRG's control (World Bank, 2015). Many of these internally displaced arrived with almost nothing, most injured and/or traumatised by the atrocities of the violent experience (Jiyan Foundation, 2018).

Between 2014-2015, the estimated refugees and IDPs numbers in need of immediate help within the territories under KRG control increased to 1.5 million (World Bank, 2015). Similar to the waves of Syrian refugees, additional camp sites within the KR-I were planned, installed and instantly operational to host the IDPs with the basic humanitarian aid and services provided.



Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Disposition Map in 2016. The map shows the expansion of ISIS control and the concentration of ethnic groups in both Syria and Iraq. Produced by U.S. Army Maps (2016)

5.4. New Camps Conceived: Territorial insertions and Spatial (re) organisation

The continuous refugee and IDPs waves influx pressured and congested the existing (urban) safe enclaves scattered within Syria and the bordering countries. These population 'invisible' and unexpected presence created obstacles for large-scale humanitarian operations and exhausted national resources of the receiving sites (fragile) infrastructures (World Bank, 2015). In countries like Jordan, Turkey and the KR-I, standardised humanitarian camps became one of the effective solutions for addressing and managing 'temporarily' these pressures and increasing shelter needs. Nevertheless, these camps' size, geographical locations and spatial progression differed based on the hosting country. For this generation of forced displacement receiving sites in the KR-I, their spatial articulation and geographical fixity particularities stem not only from a decade of unprecedented events in the Levant. They are also closely tied to the (former) traditional understanding of refuge granting practices as the reassertion of power over territory and resources through socio-spatial reconstruction of brother and guest categories in KRG hosting politics. Similar to Kurdish traditional hosting practices, the power to host legitimised the reassertion (expansion) of the KRG territorial authorities and power over resources. By accepting and protecting the vulnerable in such geopolitical resurfacing instabilities and (international) security threats across its federal borders, the KRG aspired to maintain the region's post-Saddam image as the promise of stability, progression and economic flourishing. These factors and aspirations affected the ways in which spatial allocation and progression of the newly set receiving sites are still taking course.

5.4.1. Camps: spatial apparatus and 'effective' solutions


In the KR-I territory, camps' site selection and insertion varied within its (urban)landscapes. Similar to former forced displacement receiving sites over the past four decades, the LHR placed all of the sites in direct access to main roads and highways to facilitate day-to-day humanitarian operations, usually in diameter of less than one and half hours' drive from their city offices. Initially, all these camps' were temporary for their dwellers' expected to stay. Nevertheless, the temporariness initial space-time frames for refugee camps differed from IDP ones.

5.4.1.1. New transit and permeant Refugee Camps

In 2013 after setting Domiz1, sites for refugee camps were either seen as permanent (with unclear closure date) and hence planned and constructed as settlements such as Domiz 2⁹⁰, Kawergosk, Queshtapa, Darashakran and Gawilan. The prolonged stay and permanency character were materially present in using concrete slabs, improved/upgraded shelters, and setting infrastructure networks with (if possible) connections to the national services grids and coated roads. The other camps were (at their initial state) of temporary/transit character and were set, appropriated and constructed accordingly. These transit/temporary sites in 2013 were: camps in Basirma, Bahrka and Arbat, reappropriated buildings: Bardarash's sports centre, Bekhme mountains holiday resort and Akre former prison (inside Akre city). The transit nature was materially present in using basic tents/caravans and communal facilities,

Map shows the location of Syrian refugee camps in the KR-I since 2012. Based on (UNHCR, 2007b), produced by the Author (2022)

⁹⁰ Domiz 2 was initially the phase 9 of Domiz 1 camp expansion, however, it was converted to serve as a separate camp later.



Roads
Water bodies
Administrative Boundaries
KR-I Federal Boundaries


Main Cities
Planned Refugee Camps
Temporary /Transit Camps
Border Crossing



0 10 20 30 40 50 km

Map shows the location of Syrian refugee camps in the KR-I since 2012. Based on (UNHCR, 2007b), produced by the Author (2022)

all directly laid on the soil, without any preparation or basic infrastructures besides clearing the land and marking grid lines. However, by the beginning of 2014 and with increasing refugee and IDP numbers, the role and character of these transit sites changed. The LHR transferred the refugees of Bekhme into Basirma camp, which became a permanent refugee camp, and the refugees of Arbat to the permanent Arbat refugee camp a few kilometres away. Dwellers of other camps were either relocated by the LHR to the other camps or left on their own to relocate to cities or rerouted to a third country.




Baharka Transit Camp Site for temporary hosting refugees in 2013, the site became an IDP in 2014 after refugees relocation to Arbat permanent refugee camp (REACH & UNHCR Iraq, 2013)

5.4.1.2. Temporary IDP Camps

By the end of 2013, waves of Arabs and Yazidi IDPs started pouring into the territories under the KRG's control. Former forced displacement receiving sites such as Bahrka and Arbat acted as receptors for the newly un-homed IDP and were replanned and reappropriated to serve as displacement camps. The spike in the IDP numbers and exceeded humanitarian needs oversaturated the existing urban and rural capacities of KR-I's conflict-ridden infrastructures. These pressures were coupled with conflicting host-communities welcoming and hosting practices to host the Iraqi guests, fear of Arabization and ISIS groups' infiltration with the KR-I. Therefore, to mitigate these accumulating pressures and fears, the LHR constructed and operated temporary camps under the KRG's care. The transit nature was materially similar to transit sites of refugee camps in terms of shelter typologies, use of communal facilities and lack of basic infrastructures. The number of operational camps increased from 7 in 2014 to 25 in 2015, peaking to 43 by 2016.

These numbers changed by the end of the active war against ISIS in 2017. Gradually, 17 IDP camps were decommissioned: the number decreased to 35 in 2018, 31 in 2019 to 25 active sites with an estimated 175,000 IDPs, according to OCHA (2022) report. It is worth mentioning here that Bardarash camp accommodated IDPs until its decommission in 2017 and has been active again since October 2019 (UNHCR, 2019b, 2020c), this time for Syrian refugees fleeing the periodic Turkish military operations on North East Syria parts till today in 2022 (Reach, 2022).

No	Camp Name	No	Camp Name	No	Camp Name	No	Camp Name
1	Bajed Kandala	16	Nargizlia 1+2	31	Qayyarah Jad'ah 4	46	Barzinja
2	Rwanga Community	17	Zelikan	32	Qayyarah Jad'ah 5	47	Nazrawa
3	Chamishku	18	Piran (Nargizlia 3)	33	Tina	48	Laylan 1
4	Bersive 1	19	Qaymawa	34	Haj Ali	49	Yahyawa
5	Bersive 2	20	Bardarash	35	Hasiyah	50	Daquq
6	Dawudiyah	21	Khazer M1	36	Debaga Stadium	51	Laylan 2
7	Khanke	22	Hasansham M2	37	Debaga 1		
8	Kabarto 1	23	Hasansham U2 + U3	38	Debaga 2		
9	Kabarto 2	24	Chamakol	39	Ankawa 2		
10	Shariya	25	Bartella	40	Harsham		
11	Garmawa	26	Hamam Al Alil	41	Baharka		
12	Essian	27	As Salamyiah	42	Surdesh		
13	Sheikhan	28	Qayyarah Jad'ah 1	43	Arbat IDP		
14	Mamrashan	29	Qayyarah Jad'ah 2	44	Ashti		
15	Mamilian	30	Qayyarah Jad'ah 3	45	Tazade		



Map shows Operational Temporary IDP camps in February 2017. produced by the Author (2022) Based on (Reach, 2017)

5.4.1.3. The Aggregation of Forced Displacement Receiving Sites

As receivers for forced displacement waves, these sites' spatial characteristics were strongly present in specific humanitarian articulations. The LHR allocated camps in broader urban and territorial structures within the KR-I, which, remarkably, in relation to specific geographical coordinates and their active/decommissioned status, cannot be separated from their occupational groups' ethnicity and former areas of origin (AoO). In abstraction, these camps appear as insertions stamping the territory with new grided camp layouts. However, in practice, most of these new grids appear juxtaposed to older ones. By superimposing the new camps' layer on the KR-I former forced displacement receiving sites, whether transit or permanent, IDPs or refugees, more than half of these camps are juxtaposed and/or annexed to former collective towns built between the 1970s-1980s, in Gregotti (2009)'s words, reshaping again the "architecture of [KR-I]'s territory". Examples include refugee camps such as Basirma, Queshtapa, Kawergosk, and Arbat and later IDP ones such as Bahrka, Sharya, Garmawa, Sheikhan and Arbat. All the before-mentioned camps carry the exact names of the collective town each seems to be annexed to. Such annexations supported a broader humanitarian intervention that extended from camps to host communities. These interventions accelerated, supported and legitimised broader KR-I national (frozen) upgrades: highways and roads (i.e. 22 km Rovia-Gopal highway between Duhok and Erbil constructed between 2018-2020) (KRG, 2020), centralised infrastructures (i.e. KRG & JICA Japan agreements to improve water intake facilities, water treatment plants, the transmission and distribution network and other related facilities(JICA, 2018), which expanded in 2022 to electricity projects in KR-I) and institutional upgrades and more area-specific programs serving the towns and camps alike (UNHCR Iraq, 2022a).

Interestingly, the reconstruction of 'brother' and 'desirable' and 'undesirables guest' categories are territorially present in a palimpsest of former and new relation of each camp's geographical coordinates and differ in their spatial progression (as the following sections shall elaborate on). If one comes closer to check the population origins of these sites in 2020 reports, most of the active camps within the KR-I official federal borders are either refugee camps of Kurdish Syrians (brothers) or Yazidi IDP camps, who are desirable guests also seen by the KRG and Iraqi population count as Kurds. However, keeping these camps temporary seems to be a strategy to assure the return of these groups and keep the demographic balance and expansion of the KRG's cliental networks outside KR-I's federal borders (such as Sinjar).

In comparison, IDP camps located in disputed areas primarily host Arab displacees were either closed or expected to be so by 2020. Indeed, for these undesirable camps, it seems that the KRG carried its 2006 idea of using temporary camps as a defence mechanism, fearing a new Arabisation wave (UNHCR, 2007a), and hence (re)located Arab IDPs in the disputed areas under its temporary control, shifting geography outside the KR-I's 2005 federal boundaries. The same camps that the CGol has been pushing since 2017 for their decommission despite the uninhabitable situations of their dwellers' places of pre-war habitat.

Arbat and Barika are former collective towns, built by the Iraqi Military, Displacement camps all , built by UNHCR & KRG, Arbat Refugee Camp, Arbat IDP Camp opened in 2013 as refugees transit site and converted to IDP camp after, Ashti IDP Camp and Barika refugee settlement for relocated Iranian-kurdish Refugees from southern Iraq. Sulaymaniyah Governorate. Base map Esri satellite (Author, 2021).

Arbat IDP Camp 2014

Arbat Collective Town 1977

Ashti IDP Camp 2015

Barika Collectuve Town 1987

Arbat Syrian Refugee Camp 2013

Barika Iranian Refugees Camp 2006

Ariel Photo shows the constellation of forced displacement receiving sites 25 km away from Sulaymaniyah City in the KRI. Base Map (Esri, 2022) produced by the Author (2022)



0 0,5 1 1,5 2 2,5 km

Qushtapa Collective Town 1978

Qushtapa Refugee Camp 2013

Kawa Iranian Refugees Settlement 2006

An aggregation of forced displacement receiving sites in Qushtapa for Kurdish populations in Erbil governorate. Author, 2022. Base: Esri map 2022



0 0,25 0,5 0,75 1 km

5.5. Constructing the New Camps

For these new camps, the initial goal of the KR-I was to accommodate the non-stopping waves of refugees and IDPs and facilitate effective humanitarian operations of sheltering, aid and protection (Middle East Research Institute, 2015). Lessons learnt from Domiz 1 have guided the LHR strategy in constructing and operating these new camps, which became the 'quick' and 'effective' apparatus in emergency response. According to Interviews with (former and current) UNHCR-Iraq personnel and planning units⁹¹ in 2018, the LHR tweaked and developed the UNHCR settlement approach into a more contextually suitable one⁹². Mainly, the UNHCR & the KRG's directorate of Displacement and Migration (DDM) supported implementing the settlement approach in standardising, planning and constructing the camps, either as a phased or rapid-response approach depending on the necessities of the situation (GSC & IOM, 2019).

Transit, temporary or permanent, these camps also were ensembles of the straightforward grided blocks of plots, adapting and breaking the grid to the site's particular natural features and characteristics (topography, flash flood) (Zibar et al., 2022). This installation included clearing the land and incorporating sewerage grids of black-grey water separation, with the possibility of connections to local (infrastructural) electricity grids, not to mention road coating and upgrades. The gridded layouts also supported facilitating, effective aid delivery and allowed plugging in needed services and social infrastructures (administrative, health and education

Furthermore, the spatial organisation of the 'conceived space' (Lefebvre, 1991) for all newly set camps (after Domiz), whether IDPs or Refugees, the initial setting was an ensemble of quarters divided into blocks further subdivided into shelter plots. Each registered family (max six individuals) has an entitlement to a plot (Qa'adea) with the sheltering unit; the plot's size varies from one camp to another. As much as the site allowed, the 'block' layout used was replicated in all blocks. Hence by having such uniformity in the early stages, the upgrade is expected to follow similar standardised steps. Most of these camps' construction phases echoed space-time frames devised in Domiz 1: constructed blocks and transitory 'reserve' areas (commonly replanned later for relocated refugees). According to interviews with LHR personnel and refugees in 2018 and 2019, these sites, referred to as 'informal' or 'irregular', were as chaotic as the conditions that produced them and the function assigned: waiting within waiting. In refugee camps, most of these sites had course correction after being cleared within camp upgrade projects and mostly cleared and replanned 'properly', following the same standardised block layout used in the camp's other quarters.

5.5.1. Coordinating Service Provision & Protection in Camps

Different KRG institutions and departments play a role in service provision according to developed standards aligning with both humanitarian and local ones. Departments work with UNHCR and UN sister agencies to support and provide public services: for instance, the Department of Sewage (DoS), working

⁹¹ In-person and online Interviews (2018, 2019, 2021) with UNHCR Iraq Personnel in Erbil and Duhok including : Planning Unit, field coordinators, innovation unit and former camp managers.

⁹² (Interview with UNHCR Iraq Planning Unit, 2018a, 2018b, 2021)




Diagram Illustrates theoretically how cluster works in different disaster stages. Source : (OCHA, 2020b)

with UNICEF, supports sewage network designs and construction, Electricity Department supports the connection to the national electricity grid, education (Department of Education (DoE) & UNICEF), and job coaching and employment plans (Department of Labour and Social Affairs (DoLSA and ILO)) (UNHCR Iraq, 2019b).

Such ever-growing and complex tasks need ongoing coordination; therefore, the KRG and the humanitarian actors formed bodies and mechanisms to carry on such tasks. The KRG, on the one hand, established institutional bodies for coordination and management of its services, which are part and parcel of the LHR. With the increased influx between refugees and IDP, the KRG needed a main body to manage crisis and coordinate the humanitarian and management efforts. As such, the KRG body to established in 2014 is Joint Crisis Coordination Centre in Erbil (JCC) (JCC, 2016) to supervise these efforts on the KR-I level. Since 2014, with the support of UNHCR, JCCC managers the camp in Sulaymaniyah, while the Barzani Charity foundation manages the camps in Erbil since late 2018, and started managing the Duhok camps since 2021. Earlier, refugee and IDPs' camp management (CM) tasks were more governorate based: for instance, the Development and Modification Centre (DMC) 2012-2014 followed by the Board of Relief and Humanitarian Affairs (BRHA) 2015 – 2020 in Duhok, Erbil Refugee Council (ERC) with the support of other NGOs (DRC, SRC) 2013-2015 followed by Erbil Joint Coordination Centre (EJCC) in Erbil till 2018.

On the other hand, the humanitarian actors coordinated through "Clusters" since early 2018. "Clusters [are] groups of humanitarian organizations, both UN and non-UN, in each of the main sectors of humanitarian action, e.g. water, health and logistics. They are designated by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and have clear responsibilities for coordination" (OCHA, 2020b), and developed contextual strategies with other local governmental actors (GSC, IFRC, & UNHCR, 2018). These clusters (such as shelter, protection, wash, ...) serve as coordination mechanisms and a platform to support multilateral agencies' field efforts. Working with UNHCR & OCHA, CCCM manage Sulaymaniyah Camps jointly with JCC; Duhok and Erbil camps are being managed by Barzani Charity Foundation (BCF) since 2021 jointly with the Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM). Each camp has its representatives' board consisting of quarters *Mokhtars'* (selected refugee leaders) responsible for several blocks mediating between camp management and the camp dwellers.

5.5.2. Provided Shelter Typologies

The LHR also tweaked the provided shelter typologies, upgraded them to suit protection guidelines and the existing cultural sensitivities, and adapted them to site-specific features. Which also differed according to the occupying camps dweller.


5.5.2.1. Basic Shelter: The family tent

The tent is the standardised response in an emergency stage in almost all camps. In the early emergency stages, between 2012-2014, most of the tents were either distributed by the Iraqi Ministry of Migration and the Displaced (MoMD) or donated by the regional and international governments (such as Japan, Kuwait, UAE, ...), or UNHCR family tents (4 m*6.6m*2.2m) with other donated models from international governments and NGOs. For IDPs, the tents used were the AFAD make-shift shelters of a hemi cylindrical shape (4.5m*5.8m*2.1m). These tents were set within the cleared demarcated plot and later had a constructed concrete slab, usually combined with shared/communal WASH facilities (kitchens, Showers and Toilets).

5.5.2.2. Basic Shelter: The caravan

Initially, the caravan units are/were used for the temporal acute border displacements of Kurdish families residing on the northern Turkish-Iraqi borders due to (periodic) shelling between the Turkish forces and the PKK. According to 2018 interviews with UNHCR Staff, these displacements usually have very short spans (of 3 days to 2 weeks), so caravans are transported to the safest location till the clashes end. In 2013, with the urgent need to set transit sites with a more stable situation along these borders, LHR transported some of these caravans to set Basrima as a transit camp for refugees waiting to be relocated to other camps. Early used caravan units (10.7*3.9 m²) have two rooms and a kitchen in the middle for two families. Similar to tents, these caravans were complemented by shared/communal WASH facilities. Later, as Basrima became a 'permanent camp, the earlier caravans were used in combination with improved shelters in other camp quarters.

The use of the caravans is also present in several IDP camps within the KR-I, such as Darkar, Dawadia, Rwanga Community and Tazada. According to an interview with the UNHCR field coordinator in 2021, these caravans are expected to be replaced by improved and upgraded shelters in the long run, which is not confirmed for caravan IDP camps.



Side View of UNHCR standardized Family Tent. (UNHCR, 2016c)



(ShelterBox, 2012)



Tents donated by the Japanese government for Basrima Camp. Photo credit Inge Colijn 2013



Make Shift tents used in Qayyarah Jadah Camp, Source (IOM, 2016)



The mix between UNHCR make shift and standardized family tents erected for refugees . the blue sheets are winterization sheets distributed. The picture is from Domiz Camp, 2013. Photo credit Chris C. Anderson (2013)



The use of Caravan and tents as sheltering units in Basrima Camp as temporary, while the improved shelters are being constructed, 2013. Photo credit Inge Colijn 2013

5.5.2.3. Basic Self-Improved Shelters

From the emergency stages, with the increase of registered refugees and KRG tolerating policies, it became clear to the LHR that the refugees' stay would be undetermined. As the winter approached, the LHR distributed winterisation packages and materials for shelter self-improvements (plastic sheets, tent reinforcements, and sometimes corrugated sheets). Resourceful and financially abled camp dwellers covered shortages with acquired materials from local markets (such as metal and wooden frames, corrugated sheets, ..) to reinforce their tents' durability and ability to face harsh weather. These improvisations also supported essential privacy, protection, and cultural and gender sensitives based needs. These readjustments were mainly through the articulation of privet WASH (kitchens, showers and latrines) and dividing internal plots into gendered zones using fabric sheets (for example (abandoned) distributed blanks, corrugated sheets, winterisation sheets, and old tents..).


These adjustments were tolerated largely by the camp's management in refugee and IDP camps as long as the plot's boundaries were maintained and roofs were temporary. However, this toleration differed depending on the occupational groups and time expectancy. In Domiz 1, for example, the building rate and speed changed dramatically in no time, depending on refugees' access to materials and capital. By the end of 2013, refugees replaced their tents with concrete blocks, walls and/or corrugated metal sheets, and their fabric was reused in fencing and covering the roof. In IDP camps under the KRG's control, the improvisation has been limited, mostly replacing decayed tents/caravans with new ones.



The self-improved shelters improvised assemblages of hoarded materials (provided, borrowed, bought) to adjust the shelters to suite extended and cultural-sensitive needs. Domiz Camp, 2013. Photo credit Inge Colijn 2013

5.5.2.4. The Improved Shelter

With the camps' expansion, new camps being designed and constructed, fire outbreaks and harsh weather, the need a more durable and less maintenance shelter typology was inescapable. Therefore, the LHR adopted a newly developed model: the improved shelter, consisting of a plot with a concrete slab with protection wall of three rows of standardised concrete blocks to support the standard UNHCR tents (which varied between Refugee and IDP camps), concrete blocks -walled of a kitchen, and WASH facilities (a shower and a toilet with roof tank). These utilities have separate grey-black water systems in most camps and are all connected to one sewerage systems (septic tanks, cesspools and separate grey lines) per block. This typology was first introduced in permanent refugee camps and later adopted in IDPs within the KR-I's boundaries. Though that all improved shelter typologies had the same components. The typology constantly changed regarding the attached facilities' (bathroom, shower, and kitchen) allocation and orientations. These changes were adopted to minimise materials needed (pipes, concrete blocks, connection to water/sewerage and water tank location), all falling under protection and gender sensitivity banners.



*The Improved shelter : a basic tent base , protection wall of 3 rows of concrete block with a Kitchen, a toilet and a shower .
The changes in the scheme were based on privacy and to save expenses for water and sewerage connections. Layouts reproduced by the Author (2019)*




Variations of the improved shelters typologies used in KR-I Camp. Up: Ashti IDP Camp, the improved model with the combination of the make-shift AFAD Tent (Author, 2018). Below Basirma camp improved shelter unit. Photo credit Inge Colijn 2013

5.5.2.5. The Upgraded Shelter

A semi-permanent shelter became the paradigm for upgrading old and setting shelters in all refugee camps since 2015. Named the Upgraded shelter, it has the same plot size as the early layouts. This typology consists of two rooms, a kitchen, a shower, and a toilet with an internal courtyard. The materials used were concrete blocks for rooms and facilities walls, sandwich panel roofs and standardised windows and doors. These units also have connections to the camp's electricity and sewage network and water tanks.

The LHR considered the upgraded shelter a self-built model, as the refugees are supposed to carry out its construction. Refugees get suggested designs, materials, and cash to build (or hire labour) with the technical support of the NGO running and supervising the camp upgrading task (i.e. PWJ in Queshtapa and Bardarash). Any extra additions to the suggested designs need approval from the camp management and are funded by the refugees themselves. According to interviewees, many refugees desire to live in the camp, be rent-free, be closer to families, and start their (married) lives there; hence, the built unit becomes a commodity worth the investment.

Since the war ended with ISIS in 2017, it became clear that IDPs (majority Yazidis) are reluctant to repatriate due to the recent violent history, fear of remaining (sleeping) ISIS cells, stigma, uninhabitable situation of places of origins, lack of jobs among many other factors. The CCCM and the Shelter Cluster have been advocating for more durable shelters for these camps since 2019, mainly under banners of protection and sustainability (Shelter Cluster Iraq, 2019, 2021).



Top: The Upgraded Shelter in implantation by Peace Winds Japan.(PWJ). The images show the process of provision and self-building. (PWJ, 2019)




The use of the upgraded shelter typology in Domiz 1 refugee camp. (Author, 2018)

5.5.3. Blocks Schemes

As mentioned earlier, the LHR used the settlement approach and humanitarian standards in planning and setting up these camps. These standards, in theory, follow Cuny's earlier community model that UNHCR adapted and applied to camps globally. However, in the field, the community disappeared to be substituted by the Block, which became the spatial organisational unit, also used in (re)planning transit and future influx zones. This change is present in all the published humanitarian maps indicating the single block's schematic layout.

The standardised single block layout was, first and foremost, designed based on the site's capacity and the year of construction. Nonetheless, the schematic design, capacity and materiality of these blocks depended on the profile of the dwellers if they were considered brothers or (welcomed) guests, which in turn indicates the time-expectancy of their stay. In planned refugee camps such as Darashakran, Gawilan, and Kawergosk, the block consisted of 12-16 families, with improved shelter typology. The newly replanned zones since early 2016 consist of directly upgraded shelters (concrete blocks walls of 2 rooms and facilities with sandwich panel roofs). However, these numbers and shelter typologies differed in IDP camps. The single block's capacity in IDP camps lying within the KR-I's official federal boundaries, in which the majority host Yazidi groups, was an average of 20 families, yet varied between 4 to reach 36 in different quarters in each camp depending on the camps' sites' topography and year of construction. For instance, the standardised single block layout consists of 16 families in camps such as Bersive (1,2), Baharka and Arabt, while the number is 20 families in Kabarto (1, 2), Chamishku and Bardarash. For IDP camps located outside the KR-I's official federal boundaries and under the KRG's control, each block reached 50 families in capacity, accommodated in tents rows with incorporated communal facilities in each block. The Qayyarah Jad'ah five camps are examples of using such blocks.



Variations of the block schemes of variations of improved shelters from 2013- 2018 used in refugee camps. The right model is the current adopted model. Layout courtesy to UNHCR Iraq Technical Unit 2018.

5.6. Perceived and Lived: Spatial Progression in the KR-I's Humanitarian Camps

In the KR-I, as established so far, depending on the occupational groups, forced displacement receiving sites lay their (provisional) roots in the exhausted context, regardless of their 'expected' or 'determined' futures. All these sites appear to hold almost similar physical components (at least in their initial phases), while they differ in the soft components and users' practices (within and upon the space). In a particular geopolitical context such as the KR-I, these sites' (initial) physical and soft components, their dwellers' profiles and the operators' policies are the main determinants of these sites' futures.

5.6.1. From Refugee Camps to Towns

On the first field visit to Domiz 1 in 2018, the camp spaces were strikingly different from pre-arrival pictures and videos on social media. Despite the rows and grids arrays visible in the water tanks, (asphalted) roads and sharp perpendicular pavement lines, camp places seemed an almost consolidated reality, resembling the KR-I's towns: the vibrant (market) spaces, different shelter typologies and colourful painted walls. Field visits to other camps in the same year, however, did reveal other realities. On the other hand, permanent refugee camps such as Kawergosk, Queshtapa, and Darashakran exhibited even more disciplined scenes, even in transit and under-construction zones consisting of tents and improved shelters. Uniformity was present in shelter typologies, roads, and even garbage bin positions, all accentuating initial almost identical grids. Similar to Domiz1, though less vibrant, these camps had market spaces, small grocery stores around the corner, primary health clinics, schools, and partially asphalted roads. Furthermore, for each refugee camp, the LHR developed an addressing system that supported the facilitation and support of aid and service delivery. Even vehicles such as motorcycles have camp-specific identified plates.

Comparing the built environment of Domiz 1 and Basirma camps (set initially as temporary sites) with the rest of the planned 'permanent' camps, one can notice that the first two progressed from retrofitted transit/temporary sites to become permanent camps with ongoing attempts of course correction. By walking through Domiz1 campscape, for instance, each sector materiality revealed its phase of construction and if it had a course correction through size, aggregation of materials used, roads condition among many others. Tents were gradually disappearing and being replaced with upgraded shelters, and sewerage systems were still undergoing corrections/upgrades and extensions. Most dwelling units had concrete block walls with standardised windows and doors (prefabricated units), and tent fabrics demarcated a plot or covered the temporary roofs. However, one can still notice the origins of the mix between experimenting and planning in each sector. Other camps have more disciplined and organised, though less vibrant, spaces.

Such camp scenes imply spatial progression and urbanisation processes of some sort, with expectations of more prolonged permanency linked to the Syrian refugees' displacement protraction nature and reluctance to repatriate. Within the KR-I Syrian refugee camps, different projects were supported by the KRG and the host communities for the Kurdish 'brothers and sisters', which later frosted with intermarriages, to feel welcomed (Redvers, 2013). Therefore, besides the tolerance measures, such projects covered the 'upgrade' the living conditions and provision of more durable solutions. Due to a protracted crisis, these camps' conceived geometries and temporary structures became the spatial containers of populations' movement 'pause': staying put in space till a better solution arose. In theory,

such 'pause[s]', as Tuan (1977) argues, makes room for future possibilities and prospects to take shape within these locations, allowing them to "be transformed into place(s)" (Cresswell, 2014; Tuan, 1977). Indeed, paused movement mobilised such future (projected) possibilities in the forms of tangible and intangible improvements and upgrades, impacting various societal and spatial scales.

Nonetheless, these (almost tent-free) scenes seemed unfinished in all visits, covered with recognisable humanitarian logos and patchworks of different provisional and more permanent materials. Such marks reasserted an image of the paradoxical 'presentness': linearly measured cyclical time.

5.6.2. Tent-Free Refugee Camps

In Domiz1, the initial restrictions on permanent materials were (partially) lifted by mid-2012, as long as their use was in a 'controlled' manner: built within the plot boundaries, one-story height and temporary roofs. The camp management regulated such control into self-upgrade guidelines and permits, conditioning the ways in which this upgrade is enacted. On the one hand, many international and local NGOs (such as DRC, NRC, KURDS⁹³) started in mid-2013, providing materials, NFIs and cash for refugees with self-upgrade permits. On the other hand, not all refugees waited for such support. Those with access to sufficient capital took the matter into their own hands and bought (extra) materials to reappropriate their plots to suit their (extended) needs. As such, these upgrades needed manpower, (partially) filled by the presence of refugees and locals. Whether being helped by family members or hiring more skilful camp dwellers, refugees combined the given with the added and transformed the provisional shelters into more appropriate dwellings. Locals contractors were also involved since 2012 and supported construction tasks on the quarters/blocks level. For instance, In Domiz1, each sector had different contracted local companies, for example, sector two: Zab company 70 plots, Nipple, Dolub and Qalaat Ninewa companies- 48 plots for each (UNHCR Iraq, 2012d).

By the end of 2014, the vision for refugee camps was that to be integrated and handed over to the local authorities. Therefore, they must align with the local settlements' standards. Such expectations reaccentuated the humanitarian actor's and local authorities' collaborations and accelerated the constellation of actors' spatial intervention in camps. Lessons learnt from Domiz seem to affect the LHR's intervention strategy: rearticulated as spatial upgrade projects. For instance, the UNHCR launched in 2015 a 'tent free camps' campaign to upgrade Erbil for refugee camps, implemented mainly by Peace Winds Japan (PWJ) NGO (PWJ, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c). This campaign is still an ongoing project in all KR-I's refugee camps (discussed in detail in chapters 7-8).

With each upgrade campaign, technical units of the IPs produced layouts and technical drawings (shelters, services buildings, schools, roads, sewage networks, electricity, street lights, ...) to be revised and approved by the LHR and local authorities prior to implementation. In addition, such upgrades also came with soft components of various (social) support programs retailored by various NGOs to enable refugees to adapt to a time-extended stay. These programs covered a wide range of support, including training, education, language courses, mental health support, women empowerment, and small loans for entrepreneurs to start their own business projects (opening barber shops, bakeries ..).

⁹³ Kurdistan Reconstruction and Development Society

Similar to the Settlement Rehabilitation program funded by the OFFP in the 1990s and the early 2000s, UN bodies' interventions, running and upgrading camps generated livelihood opportunities for both the refugees and the host community(s). Therefore, these upgrades and incremental (spatial) progression touched every aspect of life. They (re)set an urbanisation process, reaching and impacting (in)directly the adjacent existing rural and urban settlements and even reaching city centres. By the end of 2019, apart from Bardarash, which was reopened in 2019, all camps had upgraded shelters. Such accumulated effort, practices, aspirations and needs in these very time-conditioned spatial frames gradually converted these spaces into places. After all, as PM Barzani indicated, these Syrian Refugees were at their homes (RUDAW, 2019). The LHR's near-future goals in 2020 were to "proceed to continuous integration of camp services into national and municipal service provision schemes with the aim of sustainable service provision." (UNHCR, 2020e).


5.6.3. Spatial Flows, Markets & Income generating activities

Access to aid, free tent-free accommodation, healthcare and education are foundational for camps' socio-spatial infrastructure and operate as assets interwoven to its grids. Since their emergence, refugee camps have been loci for opportunities concentration for the Syrian refugees and host communities. In addition to the traditional support of the host community to their "brothers and sisters", the presence of these settings and different programs supported the articulation of an enabling milieu. The enablement covered (free) access to (upgraded) dwellings, essential health services, education and training coupled with the freedom of movement and employment possibilities, extended to locals with the increasing need for local staff, (private sector) contractors and (service, commodities) providers. Refugees in camps are as well hired by the LHR, depending on demand in either irregular CFW (cash for work) system or long employment in the administrative, education and health services provided in the camp. In addition, all KR-I refugee camps have market streets (cafes, food delivery, grocery stores, pharmacies), car repair shops and many other services that (partially) address everyday needs. Such presence made room for partnerships, entrepreneurship and employment opportunities. Many of the fieldwork informants had two jobs in early 2013, working as NGO employees in the morning and another job afternoon (e.g. a taxi driver, shopkeeper, private teacher...). Last but not least, since mid-2013, the need for soldiers increased as the *Peshmerga* (Kurdish military) became one of the front-line fighters against ISIS, gaining their position in the local, regional and international communities (Mustafa, 2021). Refugees were also welcomed to join their Kurdish brothers in the fight against the same enemy (ISIS). They were enlisted as paid employees with various social and economic benefits (discussed in more detail in chapter 7).

Therefore, this enablement policy played a significant role in creating synergies between hosts and refugees to facilitate the everyday, minimise conflict, and stabilise and deepen displacement roots. However, the situation differed from one camp to another: this enabling milieu was, as ever, conditioned by the camp's location, year of construction, and aid consistency, all contributing significantly to the camps' socio-spatial and economic socio-spatial progression.

5.6.3.1. Market Emergence in Domiz1 Camp

The emergence Domiz1 camp economy involved various factors, mainly refugees' (limited) access to capital and/or employment, increased demand, and limited supply. The market's emergence was mainly to address everyday or seasonal needs in 2012. This market was as provisional as the camp at the time:



Shops emerging in the camp using the same materials of PVC frames and glass windows. The sketch from the refugee republic interactive documentary illustration project in 2013. by Jan Ruthuizen.. (Submarine Channel, 2013)

small make-shift stalls, window shops from corrugated sheets and tent fabrics. With the increase in demand and availability of humanitarian aid and support, income-generating activities, the (visible) make-shift materials were replaced with metal frames and later concrete blocks. The camp's management tolerated these changes as well and incorporated them into a set of regulations and permits, which were mainly similar to the shelters' ones (maintaining the plots' parameters, grid lines, and temporary roofs). Refugees with access to financial, social and locational assets had more entrepreneurial-oriented ideas for their dwelling units. For instance, refugees with large families (more than 6) had the right to two plots, sometimes with advantageous locations (corner, close to emergent street markets,..). They employed these assets in modifying their dwelling units to have (additional) income-generating sources: converting a room into a window shop accessed from outside (communal/public spaces). Later, the LHR also contributed to regulating and transforming the market spaces. For instance, the make-shift stalls that filled vacant land in the main street in Domiz 1 were converted into small shops (2m*2m) of corrugated sheets. According to an interview with Kawergosk and Queshtapa camps' managers, the LHR incorporated such locality assets of plots (corner, near to market) and assigned them (partially) to vulnerable families "who could benefit from having a shop to use or rent" (Interview, 2018).



Variations of materials and activities in the Domiz1 refugee camp, all representing a consolidated temporariness in built forms. Photo credit Ed Kashi 2013

These interventions were complemented by different (ad-hoc) humanitarian programs that supported skilled refugees, such as barbers, handymen, and bakers, with small grants and tools to start their businesses, which rented or adjusted dwelling units to suit the business. The combination of such in-unit spatial adjustments, make-shift shops, and LHR interventions allowed the articulation of commercial fabric and the presence of other forms of in-camp income generating (small) job opportunities for other camp dwellers to work in delivery, baking, cleaning, ...

Between 2012-2014, employment opportunities and the supply market existed mainly outside the Domiz1 camp boundaries, mostly in Duhok city, about 8 Km (15 min by car). Local car drivers facilitated refugee access to transportation. Domiz1 camp's gate became a pick-up/drop spot, acting as a transportation hub to commute within the KR-I. Taxis were offering the *nafar* (individual) system: each taxi can carry four individuals per ride (for instance, the fare from the camp to Duhok per person was in 2018 – 5000-7,500 IQD(3,5-5\$) and to Erbil 37,500-52,500 IQD(25-35\$)). Larger vehicles were rented/hired for commodities transportation like (imported and local) building materials, (used) furniture and commodities to be (fixed and) sold in the camp's market. The prices in Domiz1 were lower compared to shopping centres and markets nearby, which in turn attracted (poor) locals as well. In early 2013, the road from the camp gate leading to Duhok started to become some sort of a vibrant market, especially banning some activities from the camp (mainly money transactions), serving both the camp and the local populations. Transportation, building materials, and money transfer (remittances) became the main activities and needed commodities until 2013.



A make-shift shop using the UNHCR decayed tent and wooden frames. Ingy Coijn 2013

Such human and non-human spatial flows and socio-economic interactions participated in creating a vibrant market within the camp, allowing these flows to circulate within the camp and (urban) settings. As such, these flows participated in the consolidation of market streets, hence adding locational values to certain blocks and plots and extending business and opening hours in busy streets. Interestingly, in 2018 fieldwork in Domiz, one of the Mokhtar requested not to post the markets' pictures on social media. He explained, "after Angelina Jolie visited the market, she donated less money to the camp". Many refugees seem to associate funding decline with the LHR celebration of a 'vibrant market'. During the same visit, only after the humanitarian actors' official visits and working hours were over (after 3 pm), Domiz1 shops and market streets come (fully) back to life.

5.6.3.2. Spatial Progression in other Refugee Camps

The situation in camps constructed after Domiz 1 has been less progressed. First, the composition of these camps' dwellers was a patchwork of relocated refugee families from Domiz1, reception centres and waiting lists. Everything within these camps concerning shelter upgrades has been systematically provided, and the upgrades were more controlled to supposedly 'minimise the mistakes' the LHR had to 'fix' in Domiz1 and Basrima, for example. Most of these 'mistakes' generally referred to trespassing the plot parameters, positioning shelters in areas prone to flooding and inadequate water & sewerage connections and infrastructures. Refugees in these planned camps were assigned to their caravans or 'constructed' improved shelters, which had limited room for self/collective adjustments.

Furthermore, despite the similarities with the presence of economic activities, the market development has been less vibrant. The remoteness of their location from an urban centre (45-75 min by car), the absence of public transport and sufficient means to commute created obstacles in more vibrant flows. As most of these camps were either isolated or annexed to a former collective town, they seem to suffer similar crippling conditions due to high unemployment rates and exhausted and mostly malfunctioning and/or non-existent infrastructures. The situation in Basrima Camp represents such a crippled reality: its remoteness from the closest employment hubs (Erbil, Shaqlwa, and Soran) was not bridged by means of transportation. Basrima (collective) town itself also still suffers inherited infrastructural and socio-economic fragilities and the absence of employment opportunities. According to the mayor of the collective town Basrima (town), (refugees in) camps have better services than in their host settings (Interview, 2019).

Such controlled provision, aggravated by locational problems, limited spatial flows and socio-economic interactions, have hindered the refugees' capabilities to act and develop in-camp networks similar to Domiz, consequently increasing dependency on the LHR. The camp and the towns' progression are almost entirely dependent on aid and government contribution, which are in (fluctuating) decline. Such a lack of enabling milieu led to the 'make-due' spatial features and vacant market structures set by the LHR in both camp and town.

Market Street in Kawergosk Camp
(Author, 2018)



Grocery shop in Questhapa Camp.
The image shows the adjustment of
part of the dwelling to become the
shop, and the extension using
provisional materials to abide with
camp regulations (Author, 2018)



5.6.4. IDP Camps: Spaces for Guests

In 2018 field visits, the scenes captured of Bahrka and Ashti IDP camps have differed dramatically from the ones of refugee camps. Ashti IDP camp, for instance, located about 25 Km from Sulaymaniyah city, did exhibit temporary space-time frames of expected departure: tents and basic improved shelters dominated the scenes, the in-between spaces with barely any signs of public life, roads were not coated or asphalted, sewerage ducts were wide open, and the small stalls were a patchwork of corrugated sheets and decayed tents. In Bahrka IDP camp, which lies just outside the Erbil (under-construction) 150 km ring, the situation was more progressed in comparison, with more readjusted shelters in a patchwork of corrugated sheets, caravans and tent fabrics, which is related to more spatial flows between the camp and the city. However, the general scene did have the same temporary features of open ducts, makeshift stalls and traces of removed tents.

Though this research focus is mainly on Syrian-Kurdish Refugee Camps in the KR-I, it is important to sketch the situation in other Humanitarian camps occupied by the Yazidi and Arab groups internally displaced within and outside KR-I's federal borders. The goal is to briefly showcase that hosting practices differ based on the group's ethnic background and involved actors.

5.6.4.1. Movement Restraints

Since the beginning, the freedom given to the Syrian refugees was not matched for the IDPs: it has been "a condition of vulnerability is aided by perceptions of mistrust among communities in a context where inter-community interactions are limited" (Costantini & O'Driscoll, 2020). The environment was more constraining for IDPs hosted in camps from outside the KR-I's federal borders; the announced suspicion is related to the ISIS members, especially those lacking documentation. As a result, the majority face severe movement and access constraints to facilities outside the camp boundaries (UNHCR, 2020e). Such restraints hinder IDPs income generating attempts of informal/irregular daily labour (48% have partial access) and intensify dependencies on institutional aid (56% dependent) and loans (45% in accumulated debt) (UNHCR Iraq, CCCM, & Reach, 2022). These percentages varied between camps as they linked to IDPs' lack of documentation issues within their location within disputed areas and obstacles faced passing security forces checkpoints (i.e. 86% in Hasansham U3, 84% in Hasansham U2, and 48% in Khazer M1 have access-related issues) (UNHCR Iraq et al., 2022). Moreover, mistrusts and the recent violent history between Arab and Kurdish ethnicities and the sub-ethnic groups (Kurds tribal conflicts, Arab- Shi'i and Sunni Muslims) deepened and materialised in the built environment.

5.6.4.2. Prolonged temporariness

As explained earlier, in the emergency phase, camps for both IDPs and Refugees were conceived for the provision of humanitarian service and to address survival needs. Contrary to refugee situations, IDPs, both Yazidis and Arabs, were expected to repatriate (UNHCR, 2018). As such, the projection of the future elsewhere did echo in the spatial interventions and programs that addressed the IDPs camps. However, the expected prolonged IDP displacement uncovered the plausible scenarios for these camps' progression. These scenarios mainly depend on the international humanitarian actors and hosting government policies concerning the occupational groups.


According to UNHCR Iraq et al. (2022) report, the infrastructure and shelter provisional and inadequate state in IDP camps varies depending on their locations. For instance, on a shelter scale need for improvements (82% in Ninewa, 76% in Duhok, 70% in Erbil, 20% in Sulaymaniyah) based on resurfacing issues was linked to protection, health and environmental issues. These issues include lack of privacy and enclosure, using communal facilities, units needing protection against fire and hazards, not to mention extended needs for NFI such as mattresses (38%) and cooking utensils (30%). On the camp's infrastructure and public services scales, scale, issues included water quality (enough (safe) water for drinking, cooking, hygiene and other domestic needs), unsafe waste disposal, inaccessible health services (overall 91%) linked to costs, distance and unavailability of treatment, education absence of secondary school (Darkar, Hasansham U2, and Qoratu), and/or supporting teaching staff (in four Sulaymaniyah camps, eight Duhok camps, and three East-Mosul camps), or children drop-outs to work and support the families (UNHCR Iraq et al., 2022).



Ashti IDP Camp showing the improved shelter setting with the brick-built utilities, patched up fabrics of improvised spatial practices. The iron-grid layout demarcated by the lamp posts. The roads are cleared but



0 10 20 30 40 50 m

A horizontal scale bar with tick marks at 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50 meters.

Ashti IDP Camp map exported from Esri, 2022.

Image shows improved shelter and fences of improvised practices to create a sense of privacy. The picture also shows the unpaved streets and open ducts. (Author. 2018)



0 100 200 300 400 500 m

5.6.4.3. IDP Camps 'paused' Closure

Various reports and news press highlighted critical issues related to IDP camps' closure. Since October 2017, the CGol's started pushing for camps' closure and for IDPs to repatriate. The official reasons were funding decline and the importance of original dwellers' return to their areas of origin (AoO) as a catalyser for the reconstruction and revitalisation processes. Nonetheless, 90% of these AoO were categorised as "medium-to-high severity of lack of livelihoods, services, social cohesion and security" (OCHA, 2020a). DTM and IOM Iraq (2022) latest report accentuated earlier information gathered in the field and confirmed in different interviews between 2019-2021. The main reasons for IDPs' no-return and re-displacement are identified in different geographical locations as follows: residential destruction, poor security situations, lack of services, blocked returns by security forces, tribal and ethnoreligious tensions, and families' affiliation with ISIL. This closure was put temporarily on hold during the early COVID-19 pandemic from April 2020 to October 2020 (OCHA, 2020a; UNHCR Iraq et al., 2022). Despite these percentages, the pandemic and the humanitarian actors' statements about the dangers of such closures, these push for repatriation practices were carried out in other parts of Iraq. Most IDP camps were either decommissioned, closed or reclassified as 'informal sites', blocking official aid delivery (OCHA, 2020a; UNHCR Iraq et al., 2022). According to 2010-2021 online interviews with humanitarian personnel working in IDP camps, these pushes created a second wave of re-displacements, and in-camp migrations are still occurring (UNHCR, 2020e), with 2% return intentions of in-camp IDPs reported by the end of 2021 (UNHCR Iraq et al., 2022). The presence of such factors (individually or together) indicates the uninhabitable reality of places of original inhabitation. In contrast, in IDP camps (such as Sheikhan, Kabarto 1 and 2, and Mamilian IDP camps), people can still get by despite their unfinished nature, crippling conditions and the decrease in aid and support (DTM & IOM Iraq, 2022). These camps seem to be the only inhabitable resort for these populations.


IDP camps, located at the KR-I federal borders, have been witnessing a push for more durable solutions, including the use of more permanent materials and building techniques on a shelter scale (such as interlocking concrete block walls, earth-mud built) in Duhok IDP camps (Shelter Cluster Iraq, 2019) which is being carried out in Shreya camp after a fire (Shelter Cluster Iraq, 2021). In addition, this push also includes recommendations for incorporating infrastructural solutions, such as decentralised wastewater treatment (carried out in Bhakra camp). In all scenarios of temporariness and insufficient services, the situation for IDPs presence still hovers in the no-return and re-displacement moods.

5.6.4.4. Spaces and Non-places for undesirable Guests

According to the 2022 Euro-Med Monitor report (2022), only 10 IDP camps are officially active and in dire situations. This number contradicts the recent report highlighting 26 active IDP sites under the KRG's responsibility (OCHA, 2020a; UNHCR Iraq et al., 2022). These ten camps refer to the IDPs' camps outside the KR-I official federal boundaries, which are not progressing beyond the improved shelter, while some quarters and blocks are being dismantled and removed. For instance, Qayyarah Jad'ah 1, 2, and 3 camps were decommissioned and closed, while the remaining and returning IDPs were relocated to Qayyarah Jad'ah 5. Furthermore, according to the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), IOM's information management system, these numbers only refer to officially recognised sites. DTM numbers show that there are an estimated number of 30,000 individuals who inhabit informal sites (i.e. the government

authorities have no assumed responsibility for management and administration). These informal sites have conflicting land use, located in the degraded (urban) environment, former/closed campsites, and abandoned structures in remote villages. Shelter typologies differ. They are either unfinished structures, abandoned buildings, tents, make-shift or improvised shelters, or caravans. These populations usually share public/communal services with irregular services and assistance. The DTM and IOM Iraq (2021) reported more than 210 informal displacement sites mapped within the KR-I by mid-2020, of which 202 were in Duhok, interestingly, including (abandoned or shrinking) collective towns (such as Sharya and Khanke).

With the (steep) decline of funding, CGoI push for camps' closure and prolonged protraction, the situation in these sites keeps deteriorating. Spatial interventions by many NGOs (such as RNDVO, ..) in these camps are mostly improvised attempts to 'get by', (re)asserting the waiting character of cyclical dismissing any vision of prolonged presence. Nevertheless, the mere presence of these camps under the KRG and Humanitarian actors' areas of control can be an implicit factor for such closure. On the one hand, the push for closure could delegitimise such control in the disputed areas from the CGoI side, claiming the state's control back. For the KRG, on the other hand, keeping these camps swinging between closure and provisional conditions reflects first a former fears of Arabization, echoing the KRG's 2005 advocacy for temporary camps. Such fears are omni present in the early decommissioning and closure of IDP camps close to (oil-rich) Kirkuk, for example. Nevertheless, these camps' mere existence maintains the official presence of KRG and International Humanitarian in these territories. Therefore, such a power game is present in the materiality of these undesirable guest spaces frozen in simplified futureless space-time frames of 'non-tampered with' spatial geometries. These camps remain hinged to a daily 'get by' state and constantly reverting any signs of place-making into their initial non-places state.





0 250 500 750 1.000 m




Layout of Single Block

- Tent
- Shower
- Water Tank
- Latrine
- Tap Stand



GPS Coordinates of Camp Location:
 Longitude: 43°14'49.88"E (43.2471879)
 Latitude: 35°45'25.46"N (35.7570731)





0 10 20 30 40 50 m



- | | | |
|----------------------|-----------------|--|
| Camp Delineation | Service | Community Area |
| Fence | Storage | IFP (Information and Feedback Point) Box |
| Blocks | Entrance | Child Friendly Space |
| Office | Camp Management | Shop |
| Health | Office | Maintenance |
| Distribution | Health | Storage |
| Education | Distribution | Internet Tower |
| Community Area | Education | Water Tank (3) |
| Child Friendly Space | | |

The layout shows the iron-grid layout of the Camp number 5, with the layout of single block of 50 tents with shared communal latrines and distribution points. Map by (Reach, UNHCR, & CCCM, 2021)- Right - Qayyarah Jad'ah IDP Camps Esri ,June 2022

0 100 200 300 400 500 m

5.7. Unfolding Chronic Crises and Protracted Displacement in the KR-I 2017-2020

The war on ISIS, the influx of Syrian and Iraqi forcibly displaced groups, and the ongoing economic crisis generated socio-economic shocks in the region. Early reports, such as the World Bank (2015) one, highlighted the impacts of more than 1.5 million refugees and IDPs in the region: poverty has doubled, health and living standards have dropped, lack of basic needs⁹⁴ provision for both the fragile displaced and the hosts. There has been emanant stress on the inherited fragile infrastructures, including water, sanitation, electricity, and solid waste management. Moreover, there has been an increase in demand for food, education, employment and health facilities. These impacts resulted in socio-economic and ecological degradation causing “unsustainable strains causing long-term distortions”, as the capacity of the international humanitarian actors and KRG “is being stretched to the limit”. Though the situations for camp refugees and IDPs are better than expected⁹⁵, the gaps between needs and provision are beyond bridging (World Bank, 2015).

From September 2017 onwards, a succession of political instabilities and calls for political reforms has resurfaced across Iraq, echoing in the KR-I. First, (latent) tensions broke loose between the KRG and CGol due to Masoud Barzani enacting the KR-I independence referendum in 2017 and the CGol rendering its results ‘unconstitutional’ and fostering countermeasures. These countermeasures included: freezing the federal budget, threatening military operations, spreading military control over the disputed areas, and banning international flights to the region. These sanctions also came from across the borders of Iran and Turkey, which sided with the CGol, fearing similar movements in their Kurdish inhabited areas (Mustafa, 2021). As the region was isolated from such significant international and regional spatial flows of humanitarian aid and economic character, therefore adding to the aftermath of the severe decline of import/export trade due to the ISIS war, the KR-I mirage of prosperity imploded (Charountaki, 2020; Mustafa, 2021).

The situation hardly improved despite lifting the sanctions by late 2018. The Cascades of national and regional crises aggravated the impacts of recent sanctions. These crises cascades resumed starting from mid-2019, with uprisings breaking all over Iraq, asking for political and governmental reforms (UNHCR, 2020e), which hindered federal budget transfer. A few months after, in October 2019, another wave of Syrian refugees crossed the border in need of assistance and was accommodated in Bardarsh Camp (former IDP Camp), which added to the economic strains and exhausted the host communities. By January 2020, internal temporal displacements also occurred, this time on the KRI northern borders, due to escalated conflicts between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partîya Karkerên Kurdistanê) -PKK and the Turkish, causing temporal displacements (Aljazeera, 2020).

Covid-19, since April 2020, unearthed decades of accumulated vulnerabilities and inherited inequalities in the KR-I and its forced displacement receiving sites. Inconsistencies in livelihood income generation activities (if they existed) became the norm due to unavoidable multiple lockdowns and prolonged economic crises (Durable Solutions Platform, 2020; UNHCR, 2020a). These inconsistencies were coupled with oil price droppings that harshly affected a wide range of industries (mainly travelling

⁹⁴ Basic needs in the same report include: food, water, fuel, transport, clothing, hygiene items, health care, education and rent.

⁹⁵ as the camp’s services have reduced the pressure on the ones in the urban centres, especially in terms of health (primary health clinics PHC) and education (schools).

and tourism) in the KR-I, leading to the closure of many related (small-medium) businesses run by refugees and the loss of jobs (Petersohn & NRC, 2022). Consequently, these factors increased dependency on aid, with continuous lockdowns and restricted movements enforced for the safety of all, all added psychological and socio-economic strains to camp dwellers' well-being (UNHCR, 2020b; UNHCR Iraq, 2022b). Despite the intentions and the international humanitarian actors aimed to move away from emergencies and towards recovery and reconstruction (UNHCR, 2020e), Covid-19 Pandemic limited, paused and even reverted such commitments. Therefore, refugee and IDP (extended) needs are beyond the LHR and the host communities (limited) capacities and capabilities (Petersohn & NRC, 2022).

So far, these sites and their occupants depend (almost) entirely on governmental and humanitarian capacities. UNHCR has announced in its 2020 reports that, with the weakness of the political framework that enables 'effective operations, its work will 'maintain its focus on the continued scale of the emergency. As such, the focus is narrowed again to urgent programs, only to partner with development actors (if possible) in joint programs (UNHCR, 2020a, 2020e). Such announcements challenge the 'sustainability and self-reliance' that SDG promises confronted within these sites temporary notions in such (reoccurred) prolonged presence.

5.7.1. 2021 onwards, Context-Based Interventions

The (renewed) commitments to the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and the move towards the HDP Nexus (advocated for strategy in the MENA region since 2019) aimed to nudge limitations inherited in such chronic conflict and chronic crisis zones, which are in the KR-I's case are subject to on political will, synergies with the CGol (central government of Iraq) and institutional capacities in the KRG.

With eased Covid-19 measures since mid-2021, the international actors in Iraq seem to be picking up on their former commitments as a response to (economic) impacts of the recent pandemic and the chronic state of multifaced fragilities. Their attempts have been resurfacing with (bi-lateral) agreements to develop collaborations between these constellations of actors, mainly governmental institutions of CGol, KRG, ILO, WFP, UNDP, UN-Habitat, OCHA and UNHCR, among many others (SEED Foundation, 2022; UN Habitat, 2022; UNDP, 2022; WFP, 2022). These collaborations' scopes have been mainly empowerment through income-generating opportunities, education and spatial upgrades for supporting public infrastructures and services, which are area-based interventions. Such announcements are a striking reminder of different reports and LHR press releases that carry an almost identical language to the 1995 Settlement Rehabilitation Programs and 2002 Under the Same Roof approaches. This language echoes the (almost) identical requests for further funding, development and appeals for closing employability gaps. The reincarnation of durable solutions, local integration, self-reliance and inclusion, upgrading of local institutions, developing synergies and most importantly, responsibility sharing seem like an echo travelled and keeps looping through time in the same territorial frames of the KR-I.

By 2022, the UNHCR has been collaborating with different UN actors and KRG institutions to support such commitments by shifting focus from humanitarian to development assistance and aims to "create an environment where protection risks are reduced" (UNHCR Iraq, 2022a). Such shift has been framed in the UNHCR 'Area-based Programming Projects for Protection and Solutions to Support both Local and Host Communities (A2PS)' approach, which is holistic-context tailored and needs-based interventions (UNHCR Iraq, 2022a). The A2PS projects, which have been in the UNHCR pipeline prior to the COVID-

19, have been carried out since mid-2021⁹⁶. Their implementation, “including infrastructure, shelter and WASH projects”, is spatially bound to a defined geographic area associated with large refugee populations or IDPs adjacent to underserved host communities (Al-Khateeb & UNHCR Iraq, 2022). For instance, the UNHCR Iraq (2022a) report highlighted multi-scalar interventions to serve Kawergosk town and camp populations (estimated 15,000, including 8000 refugees and 2000 IDPs). These projects’ goals are supporting town and camp infrastructures, ‘minimising duplication of services and insufficiencies’ and bringing these buildings in line with local institutions’ standards, incorporating new technologies resulting in running costs reduction and maximising user comfort (UNHCR Iraq, 2022a). The projects carried out in 2022 include constructing a new water supply system, a new high school, renovating the town’s community centre and expanding the town’s primary health care centre (UNHCR Iraq, 2022a).

Despite the efforts within the camps/settlements, the situation is still problematic. Being situated in such a heated geopolitical context, the latent fragilities from previous historical events, the cascade of crises resurfacing and intensifying, and dependency on aid are inescapable, while the components of development reinserted within the camp/settlement components lack the nurturing milieu to achieve its aspirations.

⁹⁶ These information were also provided earlier through online interviews with UNHCR Field coordinators in 2021.

Part Three

Homing the Waiting : (inter)Dependencies, (re)Rooting and Homing Refugeehood

"Not all people exist in the same now they do so only externally, through the fact that they can be seen today. But they're not there by not yet living at the same time with the others

Rather, they carry earlier things with them, things which are intricately involved. One has one's times according to where one stands corporeally.."

Ernst Bloch (1932,1977)

Almost all lines of thought explored in part two have highlighted particular sets of conditions for refuge spatial practices in the KR-I. Each chapter has explicitly indicated the relational aspect of involuntary dislocations, human and non-human flows, time frames and receiving milieus (sets of geographical routes, locational assets, and socio-political orders). Whether resulted and enacted in the name of nation-building, security or humanity, the receiving spaces become material assemblages of socio-spatial tissues with different time expectancy frames. For the case of the KR-I, forced displacement flows have been indeed periodically (re)structuration the territories of KR-I and its urban Landscapes.

Generally, the announced aims to set new receiving sites have been mainly to 'control' populations influx, 'manage' the crisis, 'protect' and 'help' the vulnerable (this order differs depending on the context). The newly set receiving sites, including refugee camps, starts initially as 'structures of protection' (Scott-Smith & Breeze, 2020) with clearly delineated physical boundaries, setting protection spheres and meanings: protecting those who are within them (newcomers) and those who are outside (hosts). In Humanitarian camps, such announced aims carry 'help intentions' for what the humanitarian regime sees as 'camp community' and 'host community'. In addition to protection, these intentions are (but are not limited to): alleviating pain, empowering, aiding and supporting all to achieve a sense of 'well-being'. In action, these practices were articulated through humanitarian interventions, donation campaigns, activists' movements and development visions, and temporarily creating some sorts of (temporary) resources' accumulation and circulation within the spaces of intervention. Such 'help' practices, shaped by different human and non-human flows and power relations (top-down, bottom-up), operate directly in the camps' locations, where a constellation of actors (including refugees) interact. These interactions form (new) ties, with different temporal registers, all concentrated in the displacees receiving spaces. The camp's receiving structures become the canvas for such articulations and possibilities for communities (re)formation. These ties, depending on the consistency of flows and duration of interactions, develop into networks. These networks, with internal and external dependencies, become foundational to the ways in which an unexpected situation is managed and mitigated. In the past two decades, scholarship on refugee camps aimed to investigate the ways in which everyday life takes shape within such a controlled and temporary presence. As discussed in the former chapters, this presence cannot be separated from the geopolitical climate and the hosts' will to grant refuge. It is conditioned by different sets of (spatial) orders, programs, and rationales embedded in forced displacement receiving sites.

For the past decade, planned refugee camps in the KR-I have become a spatial translation of the "help" practices to host "temporarily" the displaced and how life takes (re)shapes them. Part 3 focuses on the ways in which Syrian-Kurdish refugees are (re)constituting a "place in the world" through inhabiting their camps in the KR-I. It addresses the following questions: how does this conceived territory function to meet the extended needs of its 'temporary' dwellers and their prolonged stay? To answer this question, part 3 starts with a directory of Syrian Refugee Camps in Kurdistan: the canvas for the everyday. Then it follows with two readings to answer the posed question: one explores the camp as networks of interdependencies between human and non-human actors within and beyond the conceived-lived camp spaces. While the other focuses on the ways in which 'home' is rearticulated and (partially) re-rooted in these temporary time-space frames.



The dwelling unit of a nurse in the camp. the nurse offers her services for first aid in her unit. The unit is located in Media Qr. The nurse also provides house visits when there is an emergency, or an elderly that cannot come. (Author, 2018)

Chapter 6
**6. Directory of Permanent Syrian Refugee Camps in the Kurdistan
Region of Iraq**

All the arial maps in the chapter are generated from Eseri in Augut, 2022. Camp population refer only to the UNHCR registered refugees, and based on the UNHCR Operations Data Portal as of June 2022 (UNHCR ODP, 2022) .



Domiz1 Refugee camp



Domiz2 Refugee camp



Bardarash Refugee camp



Gawilan Refugee camp



Darashakran Refugee camp



Kawergosk Refugee camp



Qushtapa Refugee camp



Basirma Refugee camp



Arbat Refugee camp

0 0,25 0,5 0,75 1 km

6.1. Domiz 1 Refugee camp

Official Opening Date	April, 4 th , 2012.
Governorate	Duhok
District	Semel
Sub district	Fayda
Area (in 2018)	1,142,000 m ²
Estimated Registered ⁹⁷	30,500
Refugees June- 2022	
Planned capacity	30,000
Population AoO (2018)	Kurds /Hassakeh & Damascus
Distance from Syrian Borders	55 km
Distance from Duhok	15 KM
Planning & Construction	UNHCR & KRG-DMC
Camp management	2012: KRG-DMC
UNHCR with	2015: BRHA
	2022: BCF
Land Ownership	Public
(UNHCR Iraq, 2018c)	

Checking the Domiz1 location on the 1932 Kurdish tribal map, Domiz did not fall within any tribal lands at the time. Therefore, Domiz1 is probably either a *Miri* (state-controlled land) or *Musha* Land (or communal lands) or *Mawat* (unclaimed barren land or wasteland). In all cases, these three categories fall under the Iraqi Government's use rights to serve the public. Iraq, similar to countries that fell under the Ottoman empire, had an Islamic tenure system. There are main categories included within the Islamic Shari'a (law): the first one is the 'Waqf' as land held for endowment; 'Mulk', or private ownership lands; 'Miri' the state-controlled land which carries 'Tassruf' or the government rights to use the land; the 'Musha', or communal lands and (Mawat), so-called 'dead lands', unclaimed land: mainly used for grazing under common property regimes. (For more information, see Al-Ossmi and Ahmed (2017))



⁹⁷ (UNHCR ODP, 2022)



0 100 200 300 400 500 m









What appears on these pictures as single line buildings, are in fact rows of small shops of 2*2 meters, the openings are towards the residential area which mirror larger shops incorporated with the shelters.



0 10 20 30 40 50m



0 25 50 75 100 125 m

- | | | |
|---|---|--|
|  Tents |  Surroundings |  Principle Street |
|  Services and Facilities |  Camp borders |  Secondary Street |
|  Upgraded shelter |  Arterial Road | |




0 100 200 300 400 500 m

6.2. Domiz 2 Refugee camp

Official Opening Date	December, 28 th , 2013.
Governorate	Duhok
District	Semel
Sub district	Fayda
Area (in 2018)	325,000 m ²
Population AoO (2018)	Kurds /Hassakeh & Damascus
Planned capacity	7 150
Distance from Syrian Borders	60 km
Distance from Duhok	16 km
Distance from Domiz 1	5 km
Planning & Construction	UNHCR & KRG-DMC
Camp management	2013: KRG-DMC
UNHCR with	2015: BRHA
	2022: BCF
Land Ownership	Public
(UNHCR Iraq, 2018c)	Similar to Domiz 1

The human flows between Domiz 1 and Domiz 2 camps are active due to proximity, kinship networks, affordable market presence and work opportunities. Many Domiz2 refugees (including those who were relocated) work in Domiz 1 for CFW or regular employment (school teachers, nurses, NGO staff,..).





0 100 200 300 400 500 m

The image shows the main entrance of the Domiz 2 refugee camp, the blocks and administrative services. Every refugee camp has one controlled access only.




0 10 20 30 40 50m



0 25 50 75 100 125 m

- | | | |
|-------------------------|---------------|------------------|
| Tents | Surroundings | Principle Street |
| Services and Facilities | Camp borders | Secondary Street |
| Upgraded shelter | Arterial Road | |



0 100 200 300 400 500 m

6.3. Gawilan Refugee Camp

Official Opening Date	September, 29 th , 2013.
Governorate	Duhok
District	Bardarash
Sub district	Kalek
Area (in 2018)	1,260,000
Occupied	750,000 m ²
Estimated Registered ⁹⁸	9,350
Refugees June- 2022	
Population AoO (2018)	Kurds /Hassakeh & Aleppo
Planned capacity	29,000
Distance from the Syrian Borders	265 km
Distance from Duhok	138 km
Distance from Erbil & Mosul	50 km
Planning & Construction	UNHCR & KRG-DMC
Camp management	2013: KRG-DMC
UNHCR with	2015: BRHA 2022: BCF
Land Ownership	Private
(UNHCR Iraq, 2018c)	rented to the government
1932 Kurdish tribal map	Sindi Tribe territory.

By November 2019, with Bardarash Camp reaching its capacity, UNHCR & KRG-BRHA, with the support of PWJ, decided to accommodate the new arrivals in Gawilan's repurposed transit zone and proceeded with developing a new permanent sector with improved shelters (UNHCR Iraq, 2019a). In 2022, the camp is still receiving new refugees from Syria, while PWJ, BCF and UNHCR are upgrading the newly constructed area for an undetermined 'temporary' stay (Personal Communication, 2022).



⁹⁸ (UNHCR ODP, 2022)



0 100 200 300 400 500 m

Gawilan Refugee camp is still receiving new refugee waves. The area with the improved shelters was formerly a transit zone..



0 10 20 30 40 50m



0 25 50 75 100 125 m

- | | | |
|-------------------------|---------------|------------------|
| Tents | Surroundings | Principle Street |
| Services and Facilities | Camp borders | Secondary Street |
| Upgraded shelter | Arterial Road | |



0 100 200 300 400 500 m

6.4. Bardarash Refugee Camp

Official Opening Date (refugees)	October. 2019
(IDPs)	December. 2014
Governorate	Duhok
District	Bardarash
Sub district	Bardarash
Area (in 2018)	450,000 m ²
Estimated Registered ⁹⁹	3950
Refugees June- 2022	
Population AoO (2018)	Hassakeh (Qamishili)
	Kurds
Planned capacity	11,154
Distance Duhok	100 km
Distance from Erbil	60 km
Planning & Construction	UNHCR & KRG-BRHA
Camp management	2014: KRG-BRHA
UNHCR with	2022: BCF
Land Ownership	Private
	rented to the government
1932 Kurdish tribal map	Surchi Tribe territory.

By November 2019, with Bardarash Camp reaching its capacity, UNHCR & KRG-BRHA, with the support of PWJ, decided to accommodate the new arrivals in Gawilan's repurposed transit zone and proceeded with developing a new permanent sector with improved shelters (UNHCR Iraq, 2019a). In 2022, the camp is still receiving new refugees from Syria, while PWJ, BCF and UNHCR are upgrading the newly constructed area for an undetermined 'temporary' stay (Personal Communication, 2022).



⁹⁹ (UNHCR ODP, 2022)



0 100 200 300 400 500 m









Bardarash Refugee camp is still in the improvised shelter stage in most of its sectors. The camp is still receiving new Syrian refugee waves with the recent clashes in the NES.



0 10 20 30 40 50m



0 25 50 75 100 125 m

- | | | |
|---|---|--|
|  Tents |  Surroundings |  Principle Street |
|  Services and Facilities |  Camp borders |  Secondary Street |
|  Upgraded shelter |  Arterial Road | |



0 100 200 300 400 500 m


6.5. Kawergosk Refugee camp

Official Opening Date (refugees)	August 15 th , 2013
Governorate	Erbil
District	Khabat
Sub district	Kawergosk
Area (in 2018)	424,000 m ²
Estimated Registered ¹⁰⁰	8130
Refugees June- 2022	
Population AoO (2018)	Kurds/Hassakeh & Damascus
Planned capacity	11,154
Distance from Erbil	38 km
Planning & Construction	UNHCR & KRG-ERC
Camp management	2013: KRG-ERC
UNHCR with	2015: EJCC
	2022: BCF
Land Ownership	Private
(UNHCR Iraq, 2018c)	rented to the government
1932 Kurdish tribal map	Gerdi Tribe territory.

The land has two parts in terms of ownership: a vacant residential part¹⁰¹ due to a lack of services in the area and an agricultural part: where the owner initially held customary land rights¹⁰².

The camp is located next to Kawergosk collective town. The Iraqi military built the collective town in 1987 and relocated families of Kandinawa, Shekhabzeny, Surchy, Qaraj, Shamamk, and Qaladiza tribes (Stansfield, 2003).

The UNHCR and the DoH inaugurated a new PHC project, for both refugee and host communities with access to 20,000 beneficiaries in May 2021 (Al-Khateeb & UNHCR Iraq, 2022).



¹⁰⁰ (UNHCR ODP, 2022)

¹⁰¹ A number of people received land plots (as part of government support to its employees, Arabisation, etc) but they did not occupy/construct due to lack of services in the area. Land was therefore vacant and used for camp construction.

¹⁰² During the agrarian reforms of the 1970s, he received 40 dunams. Refugees arrived outside the agricultural season and camp was constructed. Owner has asked for compensation. Municipality is considering providing owner with other land (only 12% of current land size but the land will be more valuable and he will receive ownership rights).



0 100 200 300 400 500 m









These crops show the differences between the upgrade shelter (below) and the traces of the improved shelters (up). These vacant spaces are being replanned and cleared for a dwelling expansion. in other online map data base (mapbo, wegohere, there areas are already constructed.




0 10 20 30 40 50m



0 25 50 75 100 125 m

- | | | |
|---|---|--|
|  Tents |  Surroundings |  Principle Street |
|  Services and Facilities |  Camp borders |  Secondary Street |
|  Upgraded shelter |  Arterial Road | |



0 100 200 300 400 500 m

6.6. Darashkaran Refugee camp

Official Opening Date (refugees)	September 29 th , 2013
Governorate	Erbil
District	Khabat
Sub district	Darashakran
Area (in 2018)	1,150,000 m ²
Estimated Registered ¹⁰³	11,740
Refugees June- 2022	
Population AoO (2018)	Kurds /Hassakeh & Damascus
Planned capacity	20,000
Distance from Erbil	42 km
Planned	ACTED
constructed by	UNHCR & KRG-ERC
Camp management	2013: KRG-ERC + ACTED
UNHCR with	2015: EJCC
	2022: BCF
Land Ownership	Private
(UNHCR Iraq, 2018c)	rented to the KRG
1932 Kurdish tribal map	Surchi Tribe territory.

For Darashakran refugee camp, “UNHCR and its partners spent more than 6 million\$ preparing Darashakran for its new residents”. Its master plan was fully developed by the French ACTED as a small town (UNHCR, 2013). ACTED managed the camp in 2014 and provided “technical expertise by carrying out the topography assessment, slope analysis, and grading study” and supervised the implementation of the construction work (ACTED, 2013).

In April 2014, the IOM’s project “Rebuilding Lives, Building Communities” supported the Darashakran refugees through livelihood initiatives which included setting and opening 110 shops of corrugated sheets and prefabricated windows and doors, in addition to the distribution of 11 large motorcycles to support transporting goods (IOM, 2014).



¹⁰³ (UNHCR ODP, 2022)



0 100 200 300 400 500 m









The images on shows the disciplined grid in Darashakran refugee camp. Yet, with the camp being isolated from other urban centers, it population are highly depended on aid.



0 10 20 30 40 50m



0 25 50 75 100 125 m

- | | | |
|---|---|--|
|  Tents |  Surroundings |  Principle Street |
|  Services and Facilities |  Camp borders |  Secondary Street |
|  Upgraded shelter |  Arterial Road | |



0 100 200 300 400 500 m

6.7. Basirima Refugee camp

Official Opening Date (refugees)	August 26 th , 2013
Governorate	Erbil
District	Shaqqlawa
Sub district	Basirima
Area (in 2018)	150,000 m ²
Estimated Registered ¹⁰⁴	1950
Refugees June- 2022	
Population AoO (2018)	Kurds /Hassakeh & Aleppo
Planned capacity	4580
Distance from Erbil	66 km
Distance from Soran	32 km
Planning & Construction	UNHCR & KRG-ERC
Camp management	2013: KRG-ERC
UNHCR with	2015: EJCC
	2022: BCF
Land Ownership	Private
(UNHCR Iraq, 2018c)	rented to the KRG ¹⁰⁵
1932 Kurdish tribal map	Surchi Tribe territory.

The camp is located next to Basirima collective town. The Iraqi military built Basirima collective town in 1988 and relocated families of Hakry, Alana, Khoshnaw, Khailany, Rost and Blakayati tribes (Stansfield, 2003).

In August 2013, Basirima's initial purpose was to act as a temporary site for refugees who would be relocated to Erbil camps under construction. The majority of its 3258 refugees were relocated from collective centres (schools and mosques) in Basirima town by the KRG-ERC and UNHCR with the support of the Basirima town mayor (REACH & Iraq, 2013; REACH & UNHCR Iraq, 2013; UNHCR Iraq, 2013a).

In 2018, PWJ finalised the construction of a 9 km pipeline connecting two boreholes to the camp, thus resolving the water quality and shortages chronic issue (UNICEF & WasH Cluster, 2018).



¹⁰⁴ (UNHCR ODP, 2022)

¹⁰⁵ the land lies in a disputed ownership area and parts with private ownership



0 100 200 300 400 500 m









The image shows the consolidated upgraded shelters in Basirna refugee camp. the thin plots in the pictures are the caravans still used.



0 10 20 30 40 50m



0 25 50 75 100 125 m

- | | | |
|---|---|--|
|  Tents |  Surroundings |  Principle Street |
|  Services and Facilities |  Camp borders |  Secondary Street |
|  Upgraded shelter |  Arterial Road | |




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6.8. Qushtapa Refugee camp

Official Opening Date (refugees)	August 19 th , 2013
Governorate	Erbil
District	Dashti Hawler
Sub district	Qushtapa
Area (in 2018)	426,000 m ²
Estimated Registered ¹⁰⁶	8,580
Refugees June- 2022	
Population AoO (2018)	Kurds /Hassakeh & Damascus
Planned capacity	7880
Distance from Erbil	38 km
Planning & Construction	UNHCR & KRG-ERC
Camp management	2013: KRG-ERC
UNHCR with	2015: EJCC
	2022: BCF
Land Ownership	Private
(UNHCR Iraq, 2018c)	rented to the KRG ¹⁰⁷
1932 Kurdish tribal map	Surchi Tribe territory.

The camp is located within an aggregation of forced displacement sites: a collective town and a refugee settlement: the Iraqi military built Queshtapa collective town in 1978 for the relocated families of Mizury, Barzani, Harky, and Bradost tribes (Stansfield, 2003). The UNHCR set up the Kawa settlement in 2006 for relocated Kurdish Iranian refugees from southern Iraq. In 2013, the camp received 3572 of 5000 refugees relocated from several receiving spaces in Qushtapa: 8 schools, one youth centre, one park, and one empty house (REACH & Iraq, 2013).

In 2021, the UNHCR collaborated with the Erbil Directorate of Migration and Crisis Response and the General Directorate of Electricity to support the electricity network by the installation of a 7 km feeder, which serves the Qushtapa refugee camp, the Kawa refugee settlement Shawes collective town and several small villages nearby (UNHCR Iraq, 2021).



¹⁰⁶ (UNHCR ODP, 2022)

¹⁰⁷ the land lies in a disputed ownership area and parts with private ownership



0 100 200 300 400 500 m

The image on the right reflects similarities and differences between Qushtapa Refugee camp (up) and the Kawa refugee settlement (below).



0 10 20 30 40 50m



0 25 50 75 100 125 m

- | | | |
|-------------------------|---------------|------------------|
| Tents | Surroundings | Principle Street |
| Services and Facilities | Camp borders | Secondary Street |
| Upgraded shelter | Arterial Road | |



0 100 200 300 400 500 m

6.9. Arbat Refugee camp

Official Opening Date (refugees)	November 29 th , 2013 ¹⁰⁸
Governorate	Sulaymaniyah
District	Sulaymaniyah
Sub district	Sulaymaniyah
Area (in 2018)	450,000 m ²
Estimated Registered ¹⁰⁹	9660
Refugees June- 2022	
Population AoO (2018)	Kurds/Hassakeh & Aleppo
Planned capacity	10240
Distance from Sulaymaniyah	25 km
Planning & Construction	UNHCR & KRG-JCC
Camp management	KRG-JCCC
UNHCR with	
Land Ownership	Private
(UNHCR Iraq, 2018c)	rented to the KRG
1932 Kurdish tribal map	Jaf Tribe territory.

The lies within a constellation of displacement sites. The Iraqi military first built Arbat collective town in 1977 and Barika collective towns in 1987, both for the relocated Jaff tribe families (Stansfield, 2003). In 2006, the UNHCR constructed the Barika refugee camp for the relocated Kurdish-Iranian refugees from Southern Iraq. it took less than 10 years for additional camps to be inserted by the UNHCR and JCCC to accommodate refugees and IDPs: Arbat transit camp opened in 2013 for refugees and converted to an IDP camp by 2014 and Ashti IDP camp in 2015. The UNHCR set up the Kawa settlement in 2006 for relocated Kurdish Iranian refugees from southern Iraq.

UNICEF with the Sulaymaniyah Directorate of Surrounding Waters (DoSW), drilled, installed and connected the five boreholes to the four reservoirs, and water trucking finally stopped (UNHCR Iraq & UNICEF, 2015), and a second 900m pipeline from the boreholes to the main storage tank, and its connection to the water tanks were to be completed mid-April 2016 (UNHCR Iraq & UNICEF, 2016).



108 The camp was open for construction in August 15th, 2013, yet the date above is when it started receiving refugees.

109 (UNHCR ODP, 2022)



0 100 200 300 400 500 m









Crops show the consolidation of Arbat Refugee camp. on the right, the white building is the camp's primary health center. The red roofed building is a primary school.




0 10 20 30 40 50m



0 25 50 75 100 125 m

- | | | |
|---|---|--|
|  Tents |  Surroundings |  Principle Street |
|  Services and Facilities |  Camp borders |  Secondary Street |
|  Upgraded shelter |  Arterial Road | |



0 100 200 300 400 500 m

The character of place is not only "a product of what goes within it" but it's also "results from the juxtaposition and intermixing of flows, relations, connections from "beyond".

Doreen Massey (2004)

Chapter 7

7. Help practices and (inter)dependency Networks in Refugee Camps

Refuge, power and help have always dwelt in an enmeshed space-time locality. The refugee is a product of territorial disposition related to a power struggle and collateral damage of an unexpected event: a crisis of spatial destruction and the physical and the mental rift from a 'home'. In principle, such elimination experience of a lived (and planned for) trajectory, (collective) belonging, (imagined) legitimacy of the right to a place and in it, is tied to crossing states' political borders. Such elimination indeed is, first and foremost, a spatial experience. It results in violent ruptures of various ties and networks embedded in a pre-supposed space-time continuum that asserts visibility and for the displaced figure to become un-homed. To use Heideggerian terms: the displaced undergo this rupture as an unanchored 'presence' and 'being'.

As a space of waiting, the humanitarian camp is a spatial deviation where this un-anchorage is experienced. Supposedly, the camp's spatiality is a manifestation of a "world" conceived and articulated outside "the natural order of things" (Malkki, 1995), of a pre-supposed space-time continuum. After all, it is a temporary response to the crisis to protect, accommodate and help the un-homed. In theory, the camp becomes a representation of time-space aberration that lies with the discontinuity, '*anomalous socio-geographic spaces*' (Landau, 2008), and a state of unconnected presence. Nonetheless, this detached presence may apply only if we objectify the camp and empty it from its everydayness, i.e. the conceived camp spaces before any form of occupancy. In practice, however, the camp's presence (and disappearance) is (par excellence) a result of dislocated and ruptured networks moved from geography to be (temporary) relocated in another, and the flows caused by such new (dis/re) locations.

How does this world (re)anchor to that order itself beyond being an aberration of the time-space-belonging? How does the 'unworldly' experience of uprootedness (re)attaches and bridges -even temporarily- to an alien setting of the camp, and to which extent may it normalize? To address these questions, chapter 7 provides a micro reading of stories from Domiz 1 refugee camp. It first explains the network frame reworked to be applied to understand camp interdependences. Then, it sketches detailed narratives of uprootedness and moods of bridging, anchoring and (re)rooting. In the end, the chapter summarises a proposition of categorical differentiation of help practices that (re)form interdependent networks

7.1. Spaces to Wait and Places to (re)Anchor

A refugee experience in a camp is bounded first and foremost to an involuntary dislocation from one territory to be temporarily (re)located in another. This dislocation- relocation results -in what Hailey (2009) describes as- a "double exclusion". The first exclusion is the spatial 'crossing the border', which results in an exclusion of a formerly inhabited territory and belonging ties. The second exclusion results from being in the camp: a designated space for the 'others', who have (virtually) no pre-arrival ties to the new context.

Ethnographic research in refugee camps shows that the in-camp-presence exclusion steers a situational sense of collectiveness by “being in it together” that induces particular provisional camp ties. These ties catalyse regrouping practices entangled with the new-alien space and (partially) solidify as time passes and even form communities within it. Scholars like Bshara (2014), for instance, link the rise of a camp community in Palestinian camps to “refugees’ sentiments of abandonment” and being “left alone to tackle their everyday life and to cope with their hardship”, which brings them to “take matters into their hands and try to inflect social change” (Bshara, 2014, p. 4). It seems that perceiving and experiencing this abandonment collectively push the newly displaced to come together, where the camp spatial elements are scenes and players of unmet needs and unfinished programs in this ‘coming together practices’: they are containers, dividers and flexible modifiers of how the everyday is or should be. In time, such practices partially (re)code the new set spaces by the occupational groups’ norms and customs. These re-coding processes, which start as needs-based, ‘reflect shifting societal definitions of need’ (Hailey, 2009), deeply entangled with camps’ structures, stimulating socio-political and morphological transformations. This transformation and (re)production may lead to an urbanisation process, where the camp becomes loci of care and economic survival and progression (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000; Omata, 2017a), and, if cultivated properly, create vital opportunities to contribute to activation of a territorial and national economy (Betts et al., 2017).

Furthermore, studies illustrate the possibilities linked to camps’ protracted and undefined temporary presence, turning into: islands of hospitality (Musmar, 2021; Ramadan, 2011), enclaves of resistance (Hassan & Hanafi, 2010) and even evolving to become loud statements of nations in exile (Herz, 2013; Peteet, 2005). This ‘shift’ can only be understood in compliance with interdependent networks, weaved by care and control practices, that tie the (given, modified and added) spatial and (re)formed social order within the camp. Thus, it is essential to rethink the camp’s spatiality within and beyond frames of bodily survival and humanitarian operations, as dynamic infrastructures and relations are in a constant state of (de)legitimization and (de)normalization. Such a rethinking process is foundational to understanding camp everydayness is performed through a constant state of (re)production of its conceived spaces into socio-spatial morphologies, memories and meaning(s) (Agier, 2007; Bshara, 2014; Dalal. et al., 2021; Jansen, 2018).

As highlighted earlier, these shifts and transformations are evidently conditioned to displacement generating/hosting territories, refuge seeking/granting practices, and the occupational groups’ perception of their -temporary- exile. The interrelations between these factors (performed spatially) lay the foundation for a camp community ties to form. For (urban) communities, Talja Blokland (2017) argues that ‘different types of ties’ form a ‘web of human affiliations’ in a particular social setting and creates ‘relational settings of belonging’. The same rationale can be applied to refugee camps. Studies exhibit similar patterns of how ties as such (re)form and shape belonging clusters (political, social, economic, tribal, territorial, ..), which may(not) overlap (Jansen, 2018; Omata, 2017a, 2017b). Belonging to one or more of these clusters seems to provide safety nets for its members as long as they act in concert (Betts et al., 2017; Bshara, 2014; Herz, 2013; Hilhorst & Jansen, 2010; Jansen, 2018; Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000; Ramadan, 2010; I. Sheikh Hassan, 2017). The formation of initial camp ties (and communities) are heavily conditioned by the (partial) presence and absence of help in forms of institutional protection

interventions, which legitimised the need to set camps as physical spaces to manage these (humanitarian) interventions (protection, management and aid).

7.2. 'Help' in a Humanitarian context

Help, by nature, is a form of power exchange from the helper towards the helped, a practice of offering/providing assistance in an unmanageable and/or unforeseen situation, which makes it one-directional. Nonetheless, help is expected to be theoretically reciprocated in relation to the helped ability to 'give back', which could cover basic recognition, gratefulness, and favours' to be collected (later). Unnecessarily with the same weight and power. Interestingly, 'help' in forced displacement, humanitarian and development discourses is an apparatus different actors employ to manage a situation they cannot handle alone. A simple preview of these main actors (UNHCR, UNDP, World Bank, OCHA ..) press releases over time proves such a point. Phrases such as 'help the refugees to help themselves, 'self-built', 'self-developed', 'empowerment to help oneself and others', 'support and help local institutions' keep resurfacing. The use of 'help' coats reluctances to direct (top-down) interventions and a need to 'find a way out' or 'around' of the unmanageable situation and shift burdens to others. Thus, 'help' rationales come to the rescue when there is a need to legitimize such transfer of power to act through aid, assistance, collaborations, support or handing over to the (recently) other 'empowered' actors.

Tilly (1998) reads (social) network formations on the basis of 'transactions'. In his reading, these formations start when "transactions clump into social ties, social ties concatenate into networks". If we read 'help' also as a form of transaction, we can observe a further step: creating the first (provisional) ties that are still absent. With consistency, flows, and interactions, these transactions not only 'clump' into the camps' provisional ties and transform them into sets of 'networks' but also solidify them. These (formed) in-camp networks' solidification and expansion are based on the interacting group(s) and the 'power concentration and its direction (s)' dynamism of help transactions. Scholarship on refugee camp exhibit how these in-camp networks explored from different lenses (economic, sociological, political), become essential for its dwellers to survive a broken humanitarian system and to resist and subvert control (Agier, 2011; Betts, 2015, 2021; Betts et al., 2017; Betts et al., 2020; Brankamp, 2019; B. Harrell-Bond, 1998; Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000; Oesch, 2020; Omata, 2017a, 2017b; Pasquetti, 2015). Indeed, understanding camp communities as the formation of networks based on help transactions within a particular spatial-temporal register may also shed light on how, similar to rooted communities, the categorical formation of class (re) surfaces through a change of power concentrations (Talja Blokland & Savage, 2001). The flow, nature, direction, concentration, frequency and quality of the 'help' transactions and flows between the helper and the helped indicate the camp-formed bonds. We can read these networks in the forms of nodes and segments, creating separate and/or intersecting clusters of mutual dependencies. Each node could be a community, sub-community, group, household, and individual. Segments stand for different forms (s) of ties, based on the nature of 'transactions' and 'engagements', which develop into identifiable clusters. Likewise, the embeddedness of the segment in different 'active' spheres creates stronger relations. These developed bonds and attachments may solidify a community boundary and steer clustering processes, embedding symbolic codes within the built form.

Reading the social life in a camp as sets of networks and clusters shifts the pre-supposed notion of 'one homogenous community of refugees bounded to the camp's physical boundaries and deconstructs

it into multi or sub-communities, groups and individuals. Thus, one can argue that, in a newly conceived refugee camp, the spatial is the pre-condition of the social. In turn, the social is a condition for spatial progression that modifies, changes or transforms the pre-social. But then, how do human and non-human flows in the newly conceived camp initiate and employ such transactions (with virtually no ties pre-existed)? How do the newly formed networks interact and interconnect? Is there a categorical difference in help transactions based on the actors, locations, temporality and temporariness of transaction and reciprocation natures?

7.3. Interdependency Stories from Domiz 1 Refugee Camp

'Let us go back to Syria; it is getting late.' Dareen said in Kurdish.

It was October 7th, 2018, a chilly night contrasting to the hot morning we experienced. Dareen decided to host me properly and take Mala and me on an excursion to the Zawa mountain top close to Duhok. Gazing at the distant Domiz 1 refugee camp, its shimmering nightlights stretched in Dahuk plains veiled its recent history and hardly differed from other settlements. Despite the barbed wires and the guarded gate, everything at the Domiz 1 refugee camp felt unexpectedly 'normal'. Like many displaced 'social worlds', this camp was a response to its' dwellers' geographical dispossession and became another 'Syria' to them, including Dareen.

Many Syrian refugees, like Dareen, crossed nation-state borders to the KR-I and ended up in Domiz 1. During the fieldwork in October 2018, the number of camp-dwellers was estimated at 33,600 individuals, mainly Kurds. Most Domiz1 inhabitants are displaced from Syria's North-Eastern urban and rural settlements of Qamishli and Hassekeh governorates. The camp had more diversity between 2013-2016 in terms of areas of origin. Refugees from Afrin and Kobani also fled and resided in the camp. However, according to 2018 interviews, more than 90% of them left, relocated to another camp, took routes back to Syria, were trafficked to a European country or moved to urban areas in the KR-I.

Apart from the alignments of grid structures, the earlier pictures of the camp on social media and various websites, taken in 2012 and 2013, hardly resembled the fieldwork visits and observations conducted in 2018 and 2019. There were almost no make-shift tents used as a shelter. Most camp dwellings have been adjusted and converted into more permanent structures. These structures appeared as assemblages of materials to solidify this presence, concrete blocks' walls, provisional fences of corrugated sheets, plastic sheets or former tents covering wooden or metal frames. One can find small and medium-size shops in almost every street, and most of these streets were asphalted or prepared to be so. The process of Domiz1 camp's spatial progression has been an incremental accumulation of different upgrade on-the-go programs and practices enacted by top-down and bottom-up actors: the LHR (local humanitarian regime) and the refugees. As discussed in chapter 5, these processes were conditioned by the geopolitical and socio-economic situations and traditional and contemporary seeking/granting refuge practices contextually (re)articulated.

Perhaps there is no better way of understanding these incremental processes and the actual interdependency complexity in refuge situations than to narrate detailed (involuntary) uprooting(s) trajectories and (re)rooting practices.



Top: People waiting at one of the check points to be allowed to approach the border crossing. The picture was taken by the refugee R during his journey from Syria to the KR-I in 2013.

Right: to arrive to the border crossing, many refugees had to walk in the area between the borders. The picture was taken by the refugee A during his journey from Syria to the KR-I in 2012.

Source: Personal Communication, Domiz 1 Dweller, 2018.



7.3.1.1. Being hosted in Domiz1 Refugee Camp

Dareen is a 37 Kurdish-Syrian female from Derek. I met Dareen through the Giyan foundation¹¹⁰, where she worked as an assistant, and I told her I was looking for a place to rent in the camp. It took only a few minutes call from Dareen to Mala, and my accommodation was arranged. Mala is a 23 Kurdish-Syrian female originally from Derek¹¹¹, a town close to Qamishli, and works with NRC as an employee at Domiz1's primary health centre (PHC). Hosting me for free was a simple power gesture reclaimed by Dareen and Mala: one by finding an outsider, a non-refugee, a place, and the second by granting it no expected reward.


During the fieldwork in October 2018, Dareen and I shared with Mala spaces of her family dwelling unit in the Shahidan quarter in Domiz1. Staying with Mala was possible as her parents -both refugees - were in Syria for a visit. Like many Syrians, Mala's parents benefited from the KRG's Ministry of Interior (MoI) 2018 decrees that allowed them to leave Syria and return to the region without registering again with the Assaysh and the UNHCR. For them, it is a simple procedure: they only needed to notify the Camp's Assaysh of their expected visit duration and get a written attestation to use at the border. According to Mala, her parents longed to return to their hometown to "check up on their assets and relatives, and bring some town-produced and home-made products" (Personal Communication with Mala, October 2018). Dareen stayed in an attempt to temporarily "escape" the crowded dwelling unit that she shares with her family.

Mornings were busy for the three of us. I roomed the camp for interviews and field observations while Mala and Dareen went to daily jobs. Our evenings were less active and more informal. Dareen and Mala's female relatives often came to hang out at Mala's place. Two parts of Mala's dwelling hosted these evenings: the living/guest room (which also functioned as a sleeping area for Dareen and me) and the open courtyard, furnished with a few chairs and a table in the middle. Similar to pre-war Syrian gatherings, offering food and beverages was part and parcel of hosting practices and duties. As our host, Mala always served sweet and salty famous Syrian dishes with rounds of beverages (usually black tea), and the guests gave back gratitude phrases and claimed the role to host in the next gathering. The dishes were usually made of ingredients bought from the camp shops or the stored ones brought from Syria. On other evenings we simply ordered food from Domiz 1's market. Dareen and Mala choose "the best shops" for Shawarma to remind me of the "real taste" of Pizza to taste and compare with European products. A (young) man usually delivered us the food using a motorcycle that carried the shop's label on its storage box. We bought the beverages from the grocery shop across the road, which Mala's parents knew its owners from Syria. They sold her everything cheaper than in the other shops in the camp.

These visits usually started by squeezing me for detailed information about life in Europe and the possibilities of reaching there 'legally'. The evening hangouts provided rich conversations and insights into camp life. After trays of food and hot tea cups break the ice, the visitors started to share stories of displacement, arrival, survival and daily hardships. On one of these evenings, the sisters Dareen and Khunaf shared with me their arrival stories

¹¹⁰ a Kurdish-German foundation based in Berlin. It operates in the refugee and IDP camps in the KR-I providing psychological support. I interviewed Giyan's founder in Berlin in 2017, where I met the local staff, who supported me in the KR-I and gave me better access to the camp.

¹¹¹ The Kurdish original name of the arabized name Malkkyieh المالكية .



Up-Left: Shahidan Quarter with the location of Mala's House and work. (Esri Maps, 2021)

Up-Right: Diagram of Mala's dwelling unit (Author, 2021)

Below Left : Pizza Hat is one of the famous pizzerias in Domiz Camp. The place offers free delivery for orders by phone. The word Hat is not a misspelling. Hat means "came" in Kurdish. All the other words are either in Arabic or in English (Author, 2018)

7.3.1.2. (re)Routing and (re)Rooting: Dareen's family

Many Syrian-Kurd refugees' routes ended up -eventually- in a camp. Similar to many male displacees, Yousef (Khunaf and Dareen's brother) fled obligatory militarisation and perused rumours of better (economic) possibilities and living conditions in the KR-I. In 2012, Yousef left Derek to be hosted by Syrian-Kurdish family friends, who were from 2004 earlier displacees in *Domiz Mouskar*. The family hosted him for a few months while he commuted to his job as a waiter in Dahuk. Later in 2013, his sister Khounaf joined him. Her arrival gave them both a 'family' entitlement to be granted Qaa'ida (plot) of an improved shelter in Domiz 1 camp.

'The government and the mounazama (NGO) helped us a lot', Khounaf said, and when asked about the names of the NGOs, she answered that they were so many that she could not keep up. Khunaf and Yousef collaborated and upgraded the tent into a concrete block-walled shelter using Yousef's savings with cash support from another NGO. They lived in this self-upgraded dwelling unit till 2014, when Khunaf got married to a Syrian-Kurdish refugee originally from Qamishli. The investment in constructing the shelter did pay off when Yousef sold this dwelling unit to another refugee he met in the camp and used the money to pay a smuggler to put him on a route to Europe. Khunaf and her husband rented an apartment in Dahuk city, where they both worked different jobs to save money. Although both are Kurds living in Kurdish culture, the sub-cultural differences were hard to dismiss; dialects, customs, norms, and even clothing all induced a constant estrangement. Being the 'other' intensified when many of their host fellows started referring to them as the Syrians 'Syrikans'¹¹². Ironically, they both hardly experienced such alienation and disconnection in Domiz 1 camp, when they went to visit relatives and acquaintances every now and then

'All we wanted is to go back to Domiz [...] many can help us there and many care for us. [...] we worked day and night till we saved 70 Waraqa (7000 \$) to pay for a cheap built Qaa'ida in 2016'.

The newly bought dwelling unit had two rooms, a guest room, a kitchen, and a bathroom. They got 'lucky' to find it, as the previous dweller, who knew her in-laws back in Syria, 'gave them his word' and waited for them to pay the money. The former dwelling owner used to pay the smuggler to put him and his family on route to Germany.

In 2016, Khunaf's husband found a way to get Dareen and her other brother with a visiting pass to the KR-I, where there are 'better chances' for them than in Syria. After arrival, they both applied for UNHCR *forma* and residency permits. With both documents, they acquired legitimised access to humanitarian aid and support, were officially on a waiting list for a plot in Domiz1, and were allowed to seek employment. They all still live in the same unit bought in 2016 till the camp's management grants Dareen and her brother a plot as a 'family'. In 2018, Dareen and Khunaf had incentive jobs in Domiz1camp with NGOs (their salaries range between 300\$-350\$). The husband and the brother commute to Dahuk city for work with a used car they bought together in 2017.

I kept in contact with Dareen via WhatsApp during the past years. She is still living and working in Domiz 1 and was looking for pride for her brother and saving money to support him with the wedding expenses. According to personal communication with Dareen in 2021, Yousef has been a refugee in

¹¹² Syrikan : means the Syrian in Sorani Kurdish

Austria since 2014. He remits money to his parents in Syria and occasionally to his siblings residing in Domiz1 camp. As Dareen told me, Mala is now a refugee in Germany, living in Berlin since 2020. Her arrival was after a long trip and residing in another camp in Greece for a few months. She could leave the camp after she paid a smuggler, whom she knew through trusted friends – via Facebook- who helped them reach Europe. Using the money she saved and borrowed from her life in the camp, Mala changed her life course. Mala is learning German in the integration classes and is interested in enrolling in the university.

Living the refugeehood, for Dareen, Mala and Khunaf, seemed to be deeply entangled with the mood /time of displacement; the pre-arrival situation and life-course changes in the present not only seem to distort the past but also reshape what “future” means, how hosting is enacted and how aspirations are pursued.


7.3.2. Story 2: Abu Jwan's family

Dareen introduced me to Abu Jwan (father of Jwan)¹¹³, a 40 years Syrian Kurdish refugee in the KR-I who lives with his wife (Um Jwan) and four children in the Sarheldan quarter in Domiz 1 refugee camp since October 2013. Abu Jwan and his wife are cousins, and they both come from Chal Agha, a small town close to Qamishli city, Syria.

The displacement is not the first one the family experienced before leaving Syria. The first one was 26 years ago (1996) when Abut Jwan left to pursue a degree at Damascus University due to the lack of educational institutions in NES¹¹⁴. His wife joined him after marriage and lived in the Barzeh neighbourhood. After getting his university degree, it was hard to find a 'well-paid job'. Therefore, Abu Jwan switched career direction and worked as a tailor. The second displacement resulted from the bombing and shelling in their neighbourhood in mid-2011. In the 2018 interview, Um Jwan described their movement as follows:

"Em ravin (we ran away). [...] We left everything behind and went to our family in Chal Agha, and they [her in-laws] took us in, helped us and took care of our children. We lived with Abu Jwan's brother for a few months. [...]we all thought it was only temporary". (Interview with Um Jwan, 2018).

Similar to early displacement trends in Kurdistan, Abu Jwan's family's trajectory followed a kin-based network. The family relied on these networks' presence embedded in their hometown and ruled by customs of hospitality (to those in need). In the following months, the situation in Damascus worsened, and despite the relative safety in Qamishli, the substitution of the Syrian regime with (changing) Kurdish authorities and the dire economic situation accelerated the feeling of instability and insecurity. Abu Jwan decided eventually, in September 2012, to follow the route his brother and other family members took to Domiz 1 refugee camp. He took the journey alone at first, using the Fishkhabur (Semalka) border crossing controlled by Kurdish authorities on both sides. As early refugees become more established, they share their camp knowledge with the new arrivals to help 'knowing one's way around). This knowledge differed based on the newcomer's arrival date at the camp and the recipient group/network where he/she landed. Abu Jwan's brother informed him beforehand about the crossing/ registration and arriving process: arriving at a transited centre, registering (declaring that his family will join him soon) and informing the authority of a relative living in Domiz1. A day later, he was transferred to the camp.



Displacement trajectories of Abu Jwan and his family first from Damascus to Chal Agha, a village close to Qamishil, and after a few months crossing the borders to the KR-I (Author, 2021)

7.3.2.1. Waiting within the waiting

Before being cleared out by 2015, Al-Mala'ab (the playground) was one of the first transit 'informal' zones to arrive. Located just outside the camp's gate, the CM camp's management designated Al-Mala'ab for basic tents for registered arrivals on the waiting list for a plot in the camp. Abu Jwan developed camp-provisional networks while he stayed in his brother's tent in Al-Mala'ab. Through these new ties and the information circulating about current opportunities and obstacles, Abu Jwan could make an informed decision about moving his family to the camp. He crossed the borders back to Syria to join and ensure his family's safety on the route.

¹¹³ It is a common practice in Syria that the man is nick-named after his eldest son. Abu (the father of) +the name of the son. This is similar for the mother to be called Um (the mother of) +the name of the eldest son. Refugees in the interview asked that their real names not to be reviled.

¹¹⁴ There are two universities in the NES, Al Furat (public-opened 2006) and Aljazeera (Private, opened 2007).

Abu Jwan's family received their tent with a few mattresses from the camp management (CM) and erected it in Al-Mala'ab with the help of his brother, two cousins, and the support of UNHCR and Qandil NGOs. Rows of tents furnished the unpaved area of Al-Mala'ab, where the family stayed for five months (Oct. 2012 – Feb. 2013). They shared communal facilities of kitchens, showers and toilets set to serve needs temporarily with other families. The family landed in limbo: disoriented by the lack of familiarity and hardship. According to Abu Jwan, the situation was "chaotic", with "no privacy" and "felt like a jungle" in comparison to the situation in 2018. Indeed, they found themselves in what Halbwachs (1950) describes as 'a fluid and strange setting lacking familiar reference points'. The family had to endure the harsh cold winter and unmerciful rainy and windy seasons as they waited for their plot to be assigned. In such a state of suspension, refugees hardly adjusted these tents beyond contingencies. The UNHCR and the CM distributed winterisation kits¹¹⁵. Ad-hoc aid and help came from different countries (Japan, UAE, Kuwait, Turkey, ..), NGOs (NRC, IRC, PWJ, ..), and the local community members from Duhok that winter.



0 100 200 300 m


*The location of Al- Mala'ab transit site for new arrivals after registration.
The site was cleared out in 2015. Right: UNHCR, 2013. Left: Esri, 2021)*

¹¹⁵ (Shelter support of tent insulation kits of inner tent lining, one partition, five thermal mats, and one set of polystyrene boards for the floor, and Core relief items (CRI): Blankets, plastic sheet, heating stove, and Kerosene).

7.3.2.2. Moving into the camp

Abu Jwan's family moved into the Sarheldan quarter in February 2013, ending that suspension phase. They were assigned to a plot of approx. 9.5*10.5 m² plot, a part of 16 families, block grouped in four tents, each family had a concrete block wall constructed kitchen and shared a shower and a bathroom with another family. After giving back their tent in Al-Mala'ab, the CM gave the family a tent to erect in their plot, with mattresses and Core relief items (CRI)¹¹⁶. "The neighbours had their tent in the middle of our courtyard," commented Um Jwan, describing the combination of the unclear and invisible boundaries of the plot. Thus, the temporary tent and sharing facilities still represented a state of unanchored presence for the family.


Domiz 1 camp provided, at the time, loci where an engineered basic spatial setting and humanitarian aid were embedded in its conceiving condition as a space of refuge. Furthermore, the combination of the camp's geographic location, the proximity to Dahuk city and the freedom to seek employment structured, for many refugees, opportunities to access to income generating activities. Abu Jwan is one of these refugees; his displacement experience, university degree and knowledge of three languages (Kurdish, Arabic and English), made him a good candidate for many jobs in and outside the camp. He worked as a manager assistant for a local contractor company for street coating until 2013. He was an employee in the Electricity department in Dahuk city in 2014 and then joined the camp community chiefs and became one of the four Moukhtars from 2016 onwards. Abu Jwan mentioned that he still supports some in-camp family members and remits money to some "poor" relatives who still live in Syria.



¹¹⁶ In addition to the family tent, these items include standard life-sustaining items such as plastic tarpaulins, family tents, fleece blankets, sleeping mats, kitchen sets, jerry cans and buckets (UNHCR, 2012).

Until 2015, especially with the ISIS war, the humanitarian actors were still in the emergency mood and providing basic aid. The emergence of the Domiz1 camp make-shift market along Kurdistan street (formerly Barzan) in 2013 was a response to increasing unmet needs beyond this aid and the presence of (refugees) capital and investments. The market stretches from the Assyash caravan (close to the camp's gate, and ends reception and Bazar at its end, with an array of NGO caravans (UNCIF, IRC, WFP, DMC, PWJ) offering in-camp services filling its northern side. The vacant spaces on its southern side, on the edges of the recently occupied quarters, were furnished with simple sheets of different goods, make-shift stalls, small shacks, and (tent) window shops. In the market, one could find various goods (used furniture, clothing, ..) and many essential services (Syrian bread shop, money transfer, repair stores,..). With the increased need to adjust the shelters, refugees and local merchants collaborated (Duhok and Erbil) to respond to the demand inside the camp. Building materials (concrete blocks, cement, corrugated sheets, metal frames, foam boards ..), tools and prefabricated interior elements (PVC doors, windows/ mainly from Turkey and China) were poured into the market.

It was inevitable for many refugees like Abu Jwan to take the matter into their own hands and adjusted to the inadequate given. He invested in reappropriating and upgrading his shelter with the help of his brother, agreement with the neighbour and use of saved income. Abu Jwan bought extra materials from the market, adding to the ones provided by NRC at the time. They used corrugated sheets to (solidify the invisible lines that) separate his family plot from the others and enlarged the constructed kitchen, as the family used it to have a bath instead of the shared one. Abu Jwan borrowed money from a friend to build one concrete block-walled room to substitute the tent and roofed it with corrugated sheets. Many refugees used foam boards to insulate the corrugated sheets from below and the tent fabric to cover them from outside, To enforce heat isolation and minimise the notice of the rain and wind that "sounded like bullets" and "hovering military airplanes", according to interviews.



Up: The location of Sarheldan Qr. In the camp where Abu Jwan Lives. Notice the changes on the fabric between the temporary and the semi-permanent. Right: UNHCR, 2013. Left: Esri, 2021.

7.3.2.3. To Anchor in a Refugee Camp


Between 2013- 2014, many relatives and friends of Abu Jwan also arrived at the camp; when asked about their numbers, he laughed and said:

“I guess now we have more than 50 families in Domiz 1 only, which are blood-related, not to mention close friends who are family-like. We prefer to stay to help and support each other”.

Patches of Abu Jwan’s former social world gradually weaved their clan’s organic order into the camp’s grided structures. The intensified fictitious and blood-based relations network formed a large cluster, where care is a custom and a tradition, becoming a safety net for its old and new arrival members. These networks weaved themselves upon and within the intersections of the physical layer (camps, shelters, markets,..), the soft layer (trainings, income generating and free services) and the humanitarian actors and refugees layers. Such intersections became vital anchorage nodes for newcomers to bridge the conceived camp (new) world and fragments of the old one (of customs, memories and traditions) carried along. Hence network formation dynamics between crisis, response and growing unmet needs, (re)distribution and reciprocity, became essential and interdependent to fill basic and complementary roles to ensure that the displaced can get by. Therefore, these dynamics and interdependencies in the camp provided mediums for sociability and stability in times of uncertainty.

Shelter improvement and spatial upgrade programs became prominent in the KR-I refugee camps, infusing a new mode of support for refugees to rely on from 2015 onwards. These upgrades’ scales varied: the LHR upgraded infrastructures, roads and public services and provided materials and support for self-upgrade projects on the shelters’ scale, echoing various sites and services projects across the globe. Using accumulated capital from his job, relying on their dense social network, and benefiting as much as possible from the support programs, Abu Jwan’s family converted their self-improved shelter into a two-room upgraded dwelling unit. This time, the traditional system of reciprocity resurfaced in sharing labour efforts and existing resources based on capacities and capabilities. Abu Jwan joined forces with a few cousins to upgrade the shelters and bought materials in bulk (fine and coarse aggregate, cement and concrete blocks). They used the materials to upgrade their shelter units. Abu Jwan elevated the flooring to 45 cm to avoid the rain coming into their shelters, relocated and built a bigger kitchen with ceramic tiling, added a new shower and toilet area, and built a new room to separate living domains and daily temporal activities (living, sleeping, hosting, ..). They (even) paid the neighbours 100 \$ to build themselves a new toilet instead of sharing the one in their courtyard. The family used the mattresses given earlier in the living/guest area but needed additional items for their prolonged stay: a cupboard, a desk, a fan and a few chairs, all bought new from the camp’s market. The MoMD (The Ministry of the Migrants and the Displaced) provided the water-based air-conditioners, while the family bought some kitchenware and a second-hand refrigerator from Fayda Camp (Domiz 2). A friend of Abu Jwan, whom he met in the camp, painted the rooms and helped him install the ceramics as a “gift” and a “recognition” for his help in another matter.

In the 2018 field visit, apart from the kitchen, all the spaces had painted concrete blocks walls, tiled rooms, and sandwich panel roofing.



Up: The façade of Abu Jwan's dwelling unit. Um Jwan planted an olive tree as a reminder of her former camp neighbours who were Kurdish- Syrians from Afrin. The family went to Germany after they paid a smuggler the money they got for their dwelling unit. (Author, 2018)

Left: the courtyard of Abu Jwan's Dwelling unit in 2018. The Blue-white Cube is an air-conditioner that uses water. these units were provided by the MoDM. Notice the Sandwich-panel roofs that still echo temporariness (Author, 2018)

Right: Diagram of Abu Jwan's Dwelling unit in 2018. (Author, 2021).

7.3.2.4. The Camp as a Working Place

Abu Jwan is the breadwinner. He spends his morning working hours in the Moukhtar's office, located approx. 250 m from the camp's main gate and the Asayish office. Abu Jwan has a motorcycle, which he bought to commute to work in Dahuk back in 2014, and uses to reach the Moukhtar's office close to the camp's gate, approx. 1.5 km away from his dwelling. Using his motorcycle, the grided sectors become part of Abu Jwan's daily journeys; he now knows "each bump in their street by heart".

Similar to the camp's administrative public buildings, the office consists of three caravans attached and internally adjusted to help facilitate the four Moukhtars' tasks as mediators between the LHR, the CM, NGOs, and the camp dwellers. Upon entry, there is an air-conditioned common waiting room for the camp dwellers, where the office boy commonly serves them tea or coffee. The waiting spaces provide a space for fluid encounters (Talja Blokland, 2017) and potential networking. Each Moukhtar has a room furnished with a desk, chairs, and a cupboard, which he uses to receive camp dwellers. Additionally, one caravan is appropriated to become a kitchenette and toilets.

After leaving the office and getting lunch with the family around 3:00 pm, Abu Jwan starts his second job as a fair collector for electricity generators' use in the camp. He needed this job to save money to take care of the growing needs of his children and their education. With the prolonged economic crisis, he needed a "shield against the unpredictable future".

7.3.2.5. Prospects of a "future"

Um Jwan does not work. Her social role as a housewife continued in the camp (despite the displacement). Though in the early days of being in Domiz 1, all she wanted was (to leave and) go back to Damascus, at the time of the interview, she mentioned that "it is good to be here [in Domiz1 camp] within the existing circumstances" (Interview with Um Jwan, 2018). On the one hand, the vague future and inaccessibility to their former lives in Damascus and the stabilised prolonged temporariness in the camp seem to condition her aspirations. She believes that she cannot find a match in any other location: having her fourth child, the other children get free education in camps schools, being surrounded by family and new friends, and the stable income of Abu-Jwan. "[now] I only feel like a stranger when I leave the camp". Um Jwan commented

When asked about the future adjustments for her dwelling, Um Jwan responded:

"I asked Abu Jwan to install a sandwich panel roof for the kitchen instead of the corrugated sheets. [...] We are waiting for the mounazama (NGO) to give us some cash to buy it, as we cannot afford to do so ourselves, especially after the economic crisis and as they (NGOs) decreased the aid assistance. Probably it will happen in a year or so if the situation gets better [than before]." (Interview with Um Jwan, 2018).



- Dwelling unit location.
- Moukhtars' Office.
- - - Quarter Premises



"you know, the kitchen for us is very important. It is the woman's kingdom" Um Jwan commented. When the family have extra savings, She wants to replace the roof and get new unified ceramic tiles for her kitchen instead of the current ones. She also expressed that she will install good cabinets. (Author, 2018)

7.3.3. Story 2: Abu Sipan

The story of Abu Sipan, 39 years old, and his family gives a detailed repertoire of a networked refuge for a Syrian Kurd. Abu Sipan's family used to have the *Ajanb* status (Foreigners – أجنب)¹¹⁷, where they lived in Chal-Agha (Jawadieh – جوادية), the same town Abu Jwan comes from. He inherited this status through his father's bloodline in 1962. Similar to about 300,000 Kurds in Syria, this status conditioned his living experience and limited his and his family's access to rights, including property ownership, education and official employment. Moreover, the *Ajanb* population were not granted official travelling documents; hence, they could not legally leave the country. These practices of explicit exclusions intensified the sense of belonging to a greater -imagined- Kurdistan for many Stateless Kurds like Abu Sipan, which now has an identified territorial presence in the KR-I. "Coming to Kurdistan [KR-I] has been a longed-for fantasy of mine.[...] the uprising was an opportunity for people like us in Rojava," expressed Abu Sipan in the interview. This homecoming fantasy became a reality only after the uprisings in 2011, which resulted in presidential decree 49 that gave back the *Ajanb* Kurds – theoretically- their citizenship. Benefiting from the decree, the loos control over border crossing points and easiness of getting a visa at the time, Abut Sipan entered the KR-I legally in December 2012. Through kin networks, he stayed with two male Syrian-Kurd university students in Erbil for two months and worked as a construction labourer. As a Male living alone, Abu Sipan's struggles increased with failed attempts to rent a place on his own, he commented:

"The landlords did not prefer to rent to single men, only families. [...] I told them that I am married and have children, but they told me they did not want any headaches. [...] they [the neighbourhood community] were very conservative compared to us [Kurds in Qamishli]"


(Interview with Abu Sipan, 2018).

The homecoming dream started to crack under the distresses of unfamiliarity with the Sorani dialect and sub-cultural norms, losing his job, and intensified by the instabilities and economic hardship that surrounded his wife and four children stayed behind in Syria at the time. Meanwhile, word of mouth travelled through networks of his village in Syria, WhatsApp and Facebook groups of relatives and friends, and other social media mediums about humanitarian aid in Domiz camp and employment opportunities. Between these push-pull factors, Abu Sipan decided to pay most of his savings to a smuggler to bring his family safely, united (again) in Domiz camp in February 2013.

7.3.3.1. A Refugee and a Host

After registration, similar to Abu Jwan's case, the LHR provided the family with a temporary tent in the transit area at the edge of the camp. Being a family of six with a pregnant wife (to become seven members soon) legitimised Abu Sipan's entitlement to two plots (12.8*10.8) in the Azadi quarter based on international humanitarian standards (followed in the replanned camp zones). The premises had a concrete slab, three rows of concrete blocks for each tent, and constructed shower and toilet with concrete block walls and attached water storage. After a couple of months, "A *mounazama* (NGO) constructed for them a small kitchen". All the facilities' roofs were corrugated sheets.

¹¹⁷ These categories were explained in Part 1 extensively.



Displacement trajectories of Abu Sipan and his family. first Abu Sipan's journey from Qamishli to Erbil in the KR-I and his return to Domiz 1 refugee camp to unite after few months with his family in 2013. (Author, 2021)


As time goes by, refugees start to convert from 'situational occupiers' to dwellers by building and performing the everyday: by 'being' in such unfamiliar spaces, they slowly familiarize themselves with their 'exceptional' state and start to relate to them. At the beginning of 2013, according to the interview with Abu Sipan, the undifferentiated plot boundaries invited "any passer-by" to take a shorter route and walk within the plot's premises, exposing the family to unwelcomed encounters and "it felt like living in the street all the time", he commented. This naked presence was "na maqbouleh [not accepted]" to the cultural gender sensitivities formerly known in the village life. Hence, such a lack of privacy generated the need for access barriers that materialised in the early stages of the camp with self-improvised forms). Hence, Abu Sipan erected fences of wooden sticks and sheets (plastic, abandoned deteriorated tents, winterisation sheets,..) around his designated premises, acting as explicit 'no access' cues, leaving just a flexible part to act as a controlled entry.



● Dwelling unit location.



The location of the informal area where Abu Sipan and his family stayed till they got their plot in Azadi . The site was cleared out and replanned in 2015. Right: UNHCR, 2013. Left: Esri, 2021.





Meanwhile, with the refugee influx in mid-2013, the LHR was under immense pressure for aid provision, and the number of refugees waiting in transit surpassed the capacity of setting camps and providing shelters. In Domiz1, many former arrivals hosted the new ones in their tents and plots. Being one of the first arrivals, Abu Sipan hosted a chain of his (extended) family members within his premises. Abu Sipan expressed proudly:

"I have six brothers, three sisters, more than ten cousins, and many friends living in the camp today. We [refugees] need to help each other survive here [in the camp]. [...] Most of them stayed here in this very living room for some time before getting their plots." (Interview with Abu Sipan, 2018).

Nonetheless, his two tents were always crowded and "inadequate" for hosting and living. Similar to Abu Jwan, a combination of saved and borrowed money helped him buy supplies from the camp's market. With the help of his brothers and hired refugees, he replaced one tent with a big room using new and dismantled concrete blocks (from the tent's base), cement and roofed it with corrugated sheets and tent fabric. He furnished these spaces with the mattresses provided earlier by the LHR and a donated TV from a charitable local humanitarian worker.



The location of Azadi Qr. In the camp where Abu Sipan Lives. Notice the changes on the fabric between the temporary and the semi-permanent. Right: UNHCR, 2013. Left: Esri, 2021.



- - - - - Tent
 - - - - - Toilet + Shower

2.5 M

Up-Left: the kitchen of Abu Sipan's Dwelling unit in 2018. The family bought the cabinets from camp's market . Notice the roof material which is still corrugated sheets. (Author, 2018)
 Down-Left: the provided shelter for Abu Jwan and his family in Azadi Qr in 2013. The plot was had two tents, with a constructed shower and a toilet.
 Up-Right: Diagram of Abu Sipan's Dwelling unit in 2018. (Author, 2021).

7.3.3.2. A Life Course Change

The viral construction process in Domiz 1 between 2013-mid-2014 constituted a continuous demand for “experienced” construction labourers like Abu Sipan and allowed them to have a surplus to invest in upgrading their dwelling units. This upgrade for Abu Sipan included adding a second room, disassembling the former kitchen, shower and toilets, and building bigger ones and connecting them to the septic tank in the road. He furnished these spaces with: a closet, a set of drawers, and kitchen cupboards. He bought many of these items from refugees who collected them from the surrounding host communities (either donated or cheaply sold) and refurbished them to be sold in the camp’s market.

Many governmental and humanitarian bodies carried out awareness campaigns and skills upgrading programs in Domiz 1 or in Dahuk city to “support refugees’ well-being” and empower them to become self-reliant. With the decrease of demand in the construction market for refugees as the IPs (Implementation partners), NGOs and local contractors took over after mid-2014, Abu Sipan enrolled in-camp skill-building programs (computer software, English classes). Later, he commuted to Dahuk, sharing one of the taxis at the camp’s gate, to follow political awareness programs offered by the KDP.

The war with ISIS on the Kurdish front steered many Syrian Kurds living in Domiz 1 (also geographically close to the Mosul battlefield). The fear of new displacements, economic repercussions and a latent sense of Kurdish nationalism drove them to join the Peshmerga to defend the “fatherland”. “Kurdistan’s call comes first”, Abu Sipan commented. He joined the Peshmerga in 2015 and made new friends. After all, in addition to a respected image and a higher social status of being a Peshmerga, this entitles the member to around 600 \$ monthly stipend (that goes to the family in case of death), access to privileged networks to be “well connected”, and additional (seasonal) benefits including free university seats for the children. Abu Sipan commutes to his workplace in a private taxi, staying at the front with his ‘Kurdish brothers’ for 10-20 days (depending on demand). This activation of an alternative form of belonging and citizenship had a strong material presence in every room, decorated with framed pictures of the Kurdish Barzani leaders.

Up-Left: Abu Sipan’s living/guest room. He recently bought the pillows fabric for the mattresses and the new pillows, and got them sewed by a tailor in the camp. He wants to have a proper room for his ‘important’ work friends (Author, 2018).

Up-Right: zoom-in to the pictures hanging on the wall. The first is the picture of Abu-Sipan with the current president Nichervan Barzani, and the second is the picture of Massoud Barzani, the former president and current chief of PDK . (Author 2018)



Between savings and support from self-built projects introduced in the camp from 2015 onwards, Abu Sipan built a new room for his eldest daughter to “focus on her studies to enter the university [in the KR-1]”. Being located close to the main market and a busy street, Abu Sipan followed in other refugees' improvisations of adding window shops to their units and renting them to other refugees. The availability of space, cash surplus and networks facilitated these additions, and the shelter unit has two shops opening to the street constructed with PVC frames and glass, which he rents for 120\$/month per shop. Abu Sipan rents his shops only to “trustworthy people” from his former networks in Qamishli (one is a mobile phone shop/service point, and the other is a school stationery supplies).

The pattern of Abu Sipan’s work created a new role for his wife to “act as the man of the house” in his absence. This included going to different NGOs and the Moukhtar’s offices to apply/receive their aid portions, buying the household needs, following children's schooling, and taking care of their young ones. Their plot's location eased reaching most of these services, which are within 300 m. Nevertheless, the unpredictability of her husband’s work periods limited her ability to follow any courses offered in the camp.

“I really was eager to follow an English course, but it is very hard to skip classes all the time. [...] All I want is for the children to study and succeed; I can endure the rest”. (Interview with Um Sipan, 2018).

This endurance was anchored in being present at the dwelling unit and circulating the camp, doing the chores, and being helped by her sisters-in-law and (female) relatives occasionally to take care of the children.



Abu Sipan’s Shop 2 façade. It is used as a school stationery, and rented to “an old friend” from Qamishli.. on the right side of the picture, you can see the sandwich panel roof that Abu Sipan will add to one of the rooms (Author, 2018)

7.3.3.3. Hosting as a community practice

Exchanging visits are part of the camp life routine in Domiz 1. Maintaining good relationships with relatives and solidifying new bonds with camp dwellers is “essential for having a life in the camp”. During these visits, one gets informed about the well-being of others, offers and requests help, and is informed of the newest measures in the camp and news from abroad. This exchange of information generally takes place in the living room, which acts as a guest room. Abu Sipan’s living/guest room “is always maintained and cleaned for any guest to be hosted properly”. The room has painted walls decorated with pictures of Abu Sipan with Nechirvan Barzani (KRG president since 2019 and former prime minister), matching mattresses, pillows to provide comfortable seating/sleeping, a well-groomed carpet, a flat-screen tv and a split-air conditioner. In addition, a decorative ceiling is added with additional ceiling spotlights to be used on special occasions and/or for special guests. When the house is full, or there is an electricity cut, the dwelling porch acts as a substitute for the guest room, where men sit on plastic chairs, drink tea and talk.

7.3.3.4. Today and Tomorrow

When asked about returning to Syria, Abu-Sipan answered:

“ We thought it [staying in the camp] was for a month or two. [...] Every year we say, it is going to be this year to return [to Qamishli]. I keep saying this [...] I want to be hopeful for our Syria”. (Interview with Abu Sipan, 2018).

(Based on his response,) it seems that his expectations and aspirations have changed their locality to be across the border. The probabilities are to stay in Domiz for now, a stable place despite the KR-I economic crisis compared to the unpredictable situation in Syria. The foreseen projected future seems to be anchoring and rooting in the KR-I. In 2018, his dwelling upgrade plans included switching all the roofs to sandwich panels, adding tiles and changing the kitchen ceramics when it is his family's turn on the NGOs list. If the financial situation improves, and he sells his entitlement to the plot for a “good price”, he wishes to move to Zakho (a city in the KR-I close to the Syrian borders) and buy a place there. His choice of the city had a multi-layered logic: they use a similar Kurdish dialect, it has a university where the children can study, and it is closer to his work location and the Syrian borders. After all, keeping oneself close to the missed home in Syria and still safe in the new one at the KR-I.

7.3.4. A mini-story: Emad

The lived experience and time fragments 'concealed in space' in the camp and register also the unexpected. One of the elected Mukhtars of the camp, Emad, 35 years old, has one of these 'unexpected' events when his tent caught fire a year after his arrival.

"In 2013, my shelter was on fire caused by electricity overloaded circuits; it was late at night. [...] All the camp [dwellers] came to help. My wife had to go and stay in other people's tents for some time till some of us – myself and other refugee relatives and friends- were able to rebuild the unit with the support of one of the NGOs, and some money from my in-laws gave me. [...] I owe many people for having this home. See this mattress, Abu Mohammad – the former Mukhtar you interviewed the other day- passed it to me and sent some of 'his' people to help [...] This guest room ground we are sitting in, was just dirt and open sky, is a witness of endless nights of worrying and concerns about what tomorrow would bring in the camp. Some rich people in the camp also sent me household items as 'gifts'. See, we refugees have no choice but to take care of each other" (Interview with Emad, 2018).

Under such circumstances, mutual interdependencies and care practices exchanged between (somewhat) equal individuals helped Emad in the absence of the LHR that evening and 'put one on his feet again'. The LHR partially aided Emad with a new tent, a few mattresses and some cash in the days after. Emad's shelter unit is now an embodiment of hardship and survival and materialised expression of such active interdependencies: logos of different NGOs on unfinished structures and donated items from refugees.



The old part to be rebuilt

The new built Part after the fire



● Dwelling unit location.

Figure: Emad's dwelling unit façade. Emad still has the steel frame structure plated with corrugated sheets, the roof is Styrofoam covered with plastic sheets from before. He was waiting for the new self-upgrade campaign to get more materials, as he spent all his savings to build the burned part. (Author, 2018)

7.4. Key Characteristics of help practices and interdependencies in the refugee camp

The displacement and spatial adaptation stories of Dareen, Mala, Khunaf, Yousef, Abu Jwan, Abu Sipan and Emad families are rendered through help practices that accompanied uprooting, (re) routing and (re)rooting. These stories illustrate patterns and practices of the ways in which (re)assembled networks are embedded in spatial and material orders: a territory, a border, a city, a town, a camp, and a shelter. Within these orders, “help” operates in specific time frames (emergency, post-emergency, protracted,..), and stitches patches of societies are thrown together. The dynamics and the rationales behind such networked presence have always been communicated using the same word “mousaa’da سماعدة” used in both Kurdish and Arabic, which the literal translation is: assistance or help to ‘get by’ and ‘move ahead’. As mentioned earlier, ‘help’ indicates insufficient capabilities and capacities to carry out a particular task or a direct intervention in an unexpected situation without assistance. Hence, help is about ‘finding a way out’ and (partially) transferring burdens.

Interestingly, used in a refugee camp, this word is loaded with a set of power relations between the helper and the helped. The interviews revealed that the meaning, response phase, resources available, and direction of the “help” exchange differed. This difference is captured in the use of ‘help’ synonyms (aid, support, care, collaboration, solidarity..) within the moods of the top-down (local) humanitarian regime institutions/actors and bottom-up communal refugee and host communities—all interacting and operating with, within and upon the multi-scaler spatial and territorial settings.

To clarify the differences, the following sections shall set categorical differences of help practices. This proposition aims to read the camp’s spatial progression as a product of processes of “relating”: between the network’s nodes and segments and differentiating between getting by and moving ahead application, materialised in the built forms and territorial routes.

7.4.1. Aid Networks

The use of aid in a humanitarian crisis commonly describes a help practice as a quick and short response in the emergency phase. The main aims are usually influx management, essential protection and alleviating pain. This response is conceptually temporary and covers survival and basic -immediate- needs within the humanitarian standards to endure and (if possible) to get by, and has a non-binding transaction nature (no giving back). In practice, aid (for each context) peaks based on the triggering event (i.e. the early refugee influx) or reoccurrence of a different crisis (i.e. Covid-19), then declines as the crisis becomes prolonged and then protracted while other emergency events occur in another geography (IDPs influx in the rest of Iraq, the Yemen War,..).

The view of Aid networks in a camp setting is a top-down one-directional in terms of power: the humanitarian – institutionalised- regime, including aid agencies and host-governmental bodies, are the helpers, while refugees are the ‘passive’ recipients of aid to endure and get by. As such, offering aid legitimises the presence of spaces to operate within. This legitimisation covers the physical component for allocating land to set up the refugee camp and construct its infrastructures (electricity, roads, ..), and institutional built forms within and outside of its premises (gates, fences, police, Assyesh office, primary health units, primary and secondary schools, ..). It also legitimises the presence of soft components including (re)formulating laws to condition the new arrival’s access rights to this aid in relation to




Diagram of Aid as Help Transaction (Author, 2021)





Diagram of Support as Help Transaction (Author, 2021)

geographies; for instance, being registered as a refugee is the first condition to rights in camp spaces: entitlement of aid (a plot, a tent, NFI, food vouchers, access to education and health services ...).

These networks of routes, spaces and programs are the canvas where aid operates. The presence of aid activates the camps' spatial agency as receptors, refugee's agency (moving to the camp, registering, ..) and creates a momentum of aid presence that affects time, materials and sometimes saved earnings. By relying on aid networks, the camp-dweller reaches a certain degree of survival that needs maintenance, especially within the emergency phase. However, conditioned and limited by the hosting context, time frames and conflict over property rights vs entitlements, reliance only on aid might result in dependency syndrome, hostility, and extreme forms of othering, especially if existing fragile locals are not appropriately addressed.

7.4.2. Support networks

The use of support in humanitarian crises commonly describes a help practice on a prolonged basis. Support operates within networks of patronages loaded with subsidies, access to these networks in a camp is conditioned by context, available funding, camp occupational group and host community. These networks appear in the preliminary stages of prolonged crisis and post-emergency phases, coated by empowerment, skill-upgrade, and developing resilience. In principle, support enables refugees to reach a level of self-sufficiency to make do and cover reoccurring extended needs. The goal of support is to structure the possible field of action for refugees and constitute possibilities to 'move ahead', decreasing dependencies and pressures on humanitarian actors, hosting governments and communities.

Support in relation to camps functions as a two-directional form of 'exchange' services handed from the supporter to the supported, while the supported offers back sets of services (in)directly feeds back to the supporter and a more comprehensive network of beneficiaries. Support in humanitarian crisis has three main transaction forms as follows:

- Direct: Government to government or International organisation to government (setting the camp) support includes infrastructure upgrades with expectancy of refugee-hosting and developing policies to help integrate them (roads, tailored zones for businesses, water treatment plants). An example is the Japanese government's support of the KRG in constructing waste-water treatment plants (JICA, 2018). LHR (local humanitarian regime) to refugee households in CFW (Cash for work) paradigms: granted for those who can 'make use' and 'give back' in the forms of working time or payments that reach the household labourers, skilled individuals, refugee entrepreneurs. This support could also cover refugees hiring other refugees in the camp.
- Indirect: On an institutional scale: coordination within the humanitarian regime partners with expectations to smooth and facilitate humanitarian procedures. On host-community-refugee community scale: building and supporting projects with host and refugee communities as beneficiaries, such as upgrading health centres and public spaces and hiring host-community individuals and businesses. The expectations here are to mitigate hostilities between the communities that may result from the hardship the host experiences. An example is the A2PS UNHCR project for area-based interventions of building schools and upgrading health centres (UNHCR Iraq, 2022a). On the refugee camp scale, this includes materials provision and soft-skills courses with expectations of utilising these services in finding or sustaining a job and (mental) well-being. For

instance, the KRG provided bread to camp dwellers in the emergency phase, and this provision ended indefinitely due to budget constraints and product waste (WFP, UNHCR Iraq, & Reach, 2014). Before the end of the project, the LHR supported refugees in opening and running in-camp bread bakeries in the camp. Hence, they transferred the task to refugees to meet camp demands.

- Ad-hoc: NGOs with short-term/project-based limited funding that supports filling a gap outside the existing framework and/or as a testing ground. This includes similar aid/ direct and indirect support activities: provision of new typologies of tents and materials, .. , upgrading of specific spaces within the camps, training programs for certain skills, .. etc.

7.4.3. Solidarity networks

The use of solidarity in humanitarian and refugee crises commonly describes a moral appeal for international and local communities to help affected ones. For the international and local humanitarian regime, solidarity is often invoked in calls for donations campaigns as an act of standing by each other in times of crisis.

The moral correlation between 'community' and solidarity solidifies in extreme situations, contested with observed, announced and experienced hardships, belonging and expectations (or lacking them). Solidarity swings between formal and informal redistribution practices of resources at hand accessed only by the giving party within a particular spatial-temporal register. Solidarity is always associated with emotional and symbolic rewards as a way of giving back to the more powerful party and a condition for future alliances, loyalties and (temporary) group formation (Gierer, 2001; Markovsky & Lawler, 1994). Solidarity, as such, operates within groups' levels of international and local governments and communities. Materially, solidarity, similar to aid, is a top-down one-directional transaction in terms of power: the (generous) givers to refugees, the 'passive' recipients. In practice, these transactions are not consistent, as the reward of emotional satisfaction diminishes quickly (Markovsky & Lawler, 1994) after the crisis intensity declines.

- Solidarity has specific time frames of :
- Crisis peak: Such as the early Syrian influx in 2013, Turkish operations in NES 2019 and covid-19. In the early Syrian crisis phase, the Gulf governments one-time donations for spatial upgrades, host communities donations of used applicants...).
- Seasonal timings of religious or national festivities (Eid, Christmas, national holiday,..) local and international government, community religious leaders and philanthropists.
- Political and humanitarian figures' visits to camps (PM Barzani's visit to Bardarash in 2019, Angelina Jolie's donation for Domiz 1 in 2015 and 2018,..).

Despite their fluctuations, solidarity practices impact the camp's spaces progression and the life within them. The donated, given and granted flows and circulates within the camp's provisional networks: used furniture refurbished and sold, and food and clothing denotations either used or exchanged.




Diagram of Solidarity as Help Transaction (Author, 2021)



Figure : Banner of solidarity project donated by the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development in Domiz 1 Refugee Camp. The project aimed to construct 150 dwelling units, improve 1200 ones, sewerage rehabilitation and construction and install solar street lights. The logos are (left to right) UNHCR, KRG, Kuwait Responds and Kuwait Fund. The banner is written in Arabic and Kurdish (Sorani) (Author, 2018)

7.4.4. Collaboration networks

The use of collaboration in humanitarian and refugee crises stems from aid gaps and access to opportunities, and partial ability to address the gap yet can hardly be covered without assistance. Collaboration practices in refugee camps are tied to human and non-human flows' consistencies. These flows are, in turn, conditioned by the porosity of camps' boundaries in terms of freedom of movement (of people, capital and goods), access to employment and connectivity to out-camp active urban cores and markets constituting consistent flows.

Collaboration usually lies within communities, groups and individuals outside the institutional frames (yet reacts and builds on it). Simply put, to collaborate, both parties have complementary capacities and/or capabilities to respond to a particular demand. Therefore, collaboration practices tie these two parties through (partially) equivalent power transactions, which means it has an almost horizontal direction. Collaboration appears in the refugee camp's emergency phase as a form of skills and labour exchange to achieve a goal together with a (material) outcome: building an entire unit (construction, electricity, plumbing, ..), minimizing costs and maximizing benefits (sharing a taxi, opening a business,). In post-emergency phases, these transactions also occur on broader scales of investments within and outside camps' boundaries. These transactions evolve into investments or partnerships with profit expectations for both parties concerning their investment. The more stabilised the camp becomes, the more geographically embedded these collaboration ties concentrate and expand: business partnerships emerge (local-refugee, refugee – refugee or transnational partnership of remittances exchange). The growth of business also leads to spatialized activities of (economic) exchange spaces such as markets and shops within and outside camps' premises (such as Kurdistan St. Market in the camp and the emergence of a market at its gates). Additionally, these collaboration practices steer (in)directly in-camp aid and support practices of refugee businessmen providing denotations or hiring other in-camp refugees.





Diagram of Collaboration as Help Transaction
(Author, 2021)



● Dwelling unit location.

Up: The façade Abu Jwan's brother in-law Dwelling unit. The family collaborated in buying the materials together, and collectively constructed these structures. (Author, 2018)

Down: Diagram of Abu Jwan's brother in-law Dwelling unit in 2018. (Author, 2021).



7.4.5. Care networks

Care systems emerge in different forms and transform based on changes in power concentration within individuals/groups. Care in camps is more entangled with facing (everyday) hardship; care helps one to endure, get by and make do. Care systems adapt to evolving and recaptured norms and values of a common tradition encircled with barbed wires and result in what appears to be a spatially (re)rooted homogeneity for generations under¹¹⁸ and a “common belief system” (Durkheim, 1973) that roots care as a moral duty in the camp society. All presented stories carried elements of the ways in which care activated a sense of safety: from being hosted in a tent, sharing a dwelling unit, and living in the camp together.

In the emergency phase, care networks appear out of the ‘unity of the situation; they depart from moral obligations towards everyone in need’. The processes become selective and linked to ‘reputation’ and social credit in the following stages and changes in power concentrations. Care networks shift and take forms of in-group based (kinship, trust circles), as the ‘favour’ given becomes a currency and connected to expectations when you ‘owe’ it to someone. The other form is group-group based; it relates to aligning ‘the groups’ interests’ and reaching to a ‘camp community needs,’ communicating them to the humanitarian regime to activate camp-level changes. Care, hence, creates a mood of inter-dependency that allows mutual exploitation of the current opportunities in the forms of collective appeals, a transition of ‘my interest’ into ‘our interest’ proved more effective and rewarding when it comes to ‘digging aid’ (Jansen, 2018).

Care relies on in-group interdependencies in the form of transferring/sharing partially power concentration (of resources, connections, skills) from active nodes to the (partially) non-active ones to broaden their opportunities. It emerges on all power levels (top-down, bottom-up, horizontal) as long as conflict of interest is out of the equation (R. Brown & Gilman, 1960). Care systems are, thus, relational to survival needs, bonds of kinship, neighbourliness, and the sentiments of living together. The traditional practices of care resurfaced with the presence of patches of (extended) families and communities relocated and weaved with the camp structures. Khunaf went back to live in Domiz1 among families and friends, Emad found help within the camp spaces and dwellers in times of personal crisis, and Abu Sipan hosted newcomers. Care, therefore, ties camp dwellers together as they facilitate and maintain momentum (stabilisation), normalisation, and optimistic scenarios, resulting in co-dependency (rise of a community) and camp inclusion. Furthermore, care networks are in a constant state of (re)production and (re)formation in all camp stages, driven by former and current norms and values, a sense of obligation that, in many cases, transforms into social (inescapable) pressures. Care-based networks’ has multi-scaler spatialities: overseas and cross remittances from and to the camp through transnational ties (sending and receiving money from/to Europe, Syria..), city-urban areas- camp through work and kin-ties (provision of work, hosting possibilities), in-camp (occasional hosting, visiting) and in-household (taking care/ hosting indefinitely extended-family members).





Diagram of care as Help Transaction
(Author, 2021)

¹¹⁸This phenomenon is also omni-present in majority of today's protracted refugee camps in the south (for example see Refugee Camps in Kenya in the work of (Agier, 2002), Jansen (2018), Tanzania: Malkki (1995), I. I. Sheikh Hassan (2015) on Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon, Peteet (2005), Bshara (2014) on Palestinian Refugee Camps in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Herz (2013) on Sahrawi Refugee Camps in Algeria etc...).

Each node within these networks has its own care sphere/premises that form a cluster where the direct transactions occur. Each node could be the cluster centre but also may exist within the network of different ones, hence increasing its access to resources and giving it more stability. Care receivers usually share most of the help benefits within their care clusters, evolving a distribution system that concatenates and densifies transactions to those who appear in need.



Azadi Community Garden was established by Lemon Tree Trust Foundation in Domiz refugee Camp in 2015. The project aimed to support women's well-being and support interested individuals for agricultural activities. Photo By Britt Willoughby Dyer, 2020

7.5. Conclusion Remarks: To Help in a Refugee Camp

With the increase of insecurities and othering politics related to refugees in camps, interdependency networks (re)formed by help practices become pillars for refugees to endure uncertainties. This chapter clarified the ways in which various help practices legitimise and contribute to conceiving and reappropriating a refugee camp. The emplacement of a (temporary) refugee camp is to legitimise and operate humanitarian aid tasks and support hosting governments to manage a particular situation effectively. Nevertheless, even temporarily, the camps' mere presence steers the weaving of a whole set of help practices (re)shaping in-camp networks geographically and socially conditioned. Due to a chronic crisis, Different worlds collided in Domiz1 refugee camp: the material conceived, the humanitarian perceived, and the everyday lived. The camp became the arena where top-down aid and support, solidarity and bottom-up collaborations, and care contribute to creating and developing (new) social ties that expand and solidify in (temporary) time-space frames. These ties enmeshed with camp spaces are indeed interdependent, and their intensity and complexity are conditioned by the concentration and direction of help practices. In turn, these interdependent networks and camp's (infra)structures become foundational, enabling refugees to survive, endure, get by and sometimes move ahead. Stories from Domiz1 exhibit the ways in which refugees' agency, capabilities and capacities are (partially) reactivated by help practices, which in turn set spatial progress on the course.

Narratives of the forced displacement lived experience of Domiz1 refugee camp's dwellers highlighted sets of clustered networks where refugee seeking/granting practices took place. In this chapter, the interdependent networks (read as nodes and segments) form and intersect between territorial history, locational assets, collective memory, and help practices of both the refugees and their hosts. Through this exploration, the chapter classified five practices with multi-scaler geographical spheres and material manifestations of spatial adjustments within specific time frames: aid, support, solidarity, collaboration and care. This classification also addressed the nature and directions of 'help' transactions and clustering that may stem from being engaged in more than one network.

Nonetheless, the Janus faced help between assisting, sharing and transferring burdens reveal itself with prolonged crisis as neoliberal rational and market logics. On the one hand, it conveys (partial) power transactions as (top-down) empowerment and enablement practices for refugees to take responsibility through: (physical) aid in terms of material items (plots/shelters) and subsequent laws (refugees, right to work, freedom of movement), support in terms of material and skill upgrading and solidarity to create capital and material surges and to mitigate host-refugee tensions. On the other hand, it steers bottom-up help forms of how these responsibilities are shared and divided via collaborations and care. Scenes from Domiz 1 refugee camps are live records of how human and non-human interdependent networks steer processes of anchoring, dwelling and even homing. However, when top-down help practices of aid, support and solidarity fluctuate or are put on hold, it (slowly) incapacitates collaboration and care practices, resulting in crippled spaces and frozen lives. As such, the presence and intensity of these practices and networks condition how time is perceived and projected between getting-by (circular), making-due (cyclical) and moving ahead (linear).

Home is the place where, when you have to go there, they have to take you in.
(Frost, 1914).

Chapter 8

8. Who/What Is Doing What? Dwelling and Homing Practices in Syrian Refugee Camps – The Kurdistan Region of Iraq¹¹⁹

8.1. “This is your home, and we welcome you with open arms”

In November 2019, the Turkish government initiated the ‘Peace-Spring’ military operation against Kurdish forces in Rojava, controlling the north-east parts of Syria¹²⁰. Consequently, this attack produced waves of forcibly displaced populations crossing nation-state borders to seek refuge in adjacent countries. These waves, preceded by many since the Syrian conflict erupted in 2011, landed in the autonomous Kurdistan region of Iraq (KR-I)¹²¹, and many displacees found shelter in camps in Duhok governorate¹²². In his official visit to this Bardarsh camp¹²³, Masrour Barzani, the Prime Minister (PM) of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), announced a commitment to “providing humanitarian aid and everyday needs”: he emphasised the ‘international partners’ whose ‘responsibility’ it is to ‘support’ his regional government’s efforts to ‘shelter’ people in need in this ‘global crisis’. PM Barzani addressed the newly displaced Kurds on Twitter following the visit: “This is your home, and we welcome you with open arms” (RUDAW, 2019). This official statements, promising a ‘welcoming home’ to the extended families to ‘shelter’ and to aid the vulnerable, signify perplexing ‘hospitality’ policies of the KRG regarding these arrivals: how do these temporary camps become homes for refugees recently ruptured from another?

Historically tracing this specific geographic zone on a map, one can trace the (dis)appearance of interconnected geopolitical narratives of the Kurdish inhabitants’ continuous presence in regions of departure and destination. The (imagined) Fatherland¹²⁴: Kurdistan (Homeland of the Kurds), ‘[t]rapped between the map and reality’ (O’Shea, 2004) since 1900s, has been heavily fuelled by (re)assertions of and conflicts of nationalist ideas (Syrians/Iraqis (Arabs)/ Turkey(Turks) vs Kurds) linked to territory (King, 2014; McDowall, 2004) Tejel, 2009). Such (re)assertions of home (re)created strong “sentiment [that] dwells at the very heart of a generation’s identity” (Davis, 1979), forming a sense of collective

¹¹⁹ This chapter has been co-authored with Prof. Nurhan Abujidi and Prof. Bruno de Meulder, peer-reviewed and published as Zibar, L., Abujidi, N., & de Meulder, B. (2022). Who/What is Doing What? Dwelling and Homing Practices in Syrian Refugee Camps - The Kurdistan Region of Iraq. In L. Beeckmans, A. Gola, A. Singh, & H. Heynen (Eds.), *Making Home(s) in Displacement: Critical Reflections on a Spatial Practice*. Leuven: Leuven University Press. The change is only in its layout to match the format of the manuscript.

¹²⁰ Syrian Kurdistan is often called Western Kurdistan or Rojava. Today, the name Rojava is commonly used to refer to the de facto autonomous parts in north-eastern Syria.

¹²¹ The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I) is an autonomous region of the Federal Republic of Iraq, established in 1991. It has state-like status with broad authority over administrative and internal affairs and reports to the Iraqi central government. The region has four governorates (Duhok, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Halabja), and the majority of its population is of Kurdish origin.


¹²² This movement led to the reopening of the decommissioned Bardarash IDP camp to house refugees and the setting up of an extension to the Gawilan camp (OCHA, 2019; UNHCR, 2019a).

¹²³ Bardarash was at first an IDP camp. The KRG and UNHCR decommissioned the camp with the return and relocation of its IDPs in 2017. It was opened again later in 2019 to become the ninth refugee camp for the Syrian Kurds.

¹²⁴ In this article, motherland refers to the geography of citizenship and birthplace and early life memories and experiences, while fatherland refers to the geography of ancestral and clan belonging generationally transmitted. Although both might fall into what many define as the homeland, the differentiation is crucial as part of (re)identifying the self with geographies, memories and meanings of belonging at individual and group levels.

identification ascribed over what many perceive as Kurdistan's territory. Hence, a sense of Kurdish nationalism, of what counts as home for the Kurds, follows Edward Said (1994) statement: "Nationalism is an assertion of belonging in and to a place, a people, a heritage. It affirms the home created by a community of language, culture, and customs, and, by so doing, it fends off exile, fights to prevent its ravages." (1994, p. 139).

For the Kurds, such assertions spring from the collective experiences embedded in territorial and generational presences of (up)rootedness and fight for national citizenship rights and against the various practices of marginalisation exercised upon them by the (territorial) nation-states (Gunes, 2019) (Gunes, 2019; (McDowall, 2004); Tejel, 2009), resulting in a collective and territorial sense of unfulfilled nationalism and territory to call HOME. In other words, HOME for the Kurds becomes entangled with demarcated geographical boundaries infused with generationally transmitted tangible and intangible bonds. In this respect, despite the rupture of refugeehood – enacted by the involuntarily dislocation from ones' customary home- the case of being in KR-I for the Syrian Kurd may not portray the 'full elimination' or 'homelessness', but represents falling out of Syrian citizenship into a (presumed) longed-for sense of 'Kurdishness' (once claimed in time and space). This specific geography seems to become, for these refugees, a hybrid form of 'home' and an 'exile' of some sort. It is a journey of returning to 'a lost home in the future', a chance for (re)foundation that conveys multi-layered future expectations, or this is what it appears to be.



Kurdistan identified by population distribution. Source (Stansfield, 2003, p. 28)

Viewed from a distance, the idea of 'the refugee' often brings to mind the links between territorial dispossession(s) and the elimination from what was supposedly a fixed home into an endless exile. Such eliminating experiences – defined as rupture in this text- covers the uprooting of the habitual geographical belonging to citizenship rights, former social ties generational time-space continuity and a familiarized sense of belonging(s). Cut off from their habitus, refugees' experience of 'being' – in the Heideggerian sense – becomes unanchored (Heidegger, 1971). Refugee camps appear in the rifts of liminalities as materialised forms of this unanchored being: to safeguard the un-homed 'shelter provision' becomes the immediate response. Rendering the image of a 'refugee' as an abnormality insofar as s/he, 'all', fall outside the "national order of things" (Malkki, 1992), the generic media mainstream exhibits them 'everywhere' experiencing this 'unanchored being' as homelessness, enfolded with temporariness and uncertainty. In these generic images of homelessness the forcibly displaced are "exiled from the home they have known for centuries" (Sennett, 2017). Intellectuals, such as Said, Homi Bhabha, Gloria Anzaldúa, Eva Hoffman and Mourid El-Bargouthi depict uprootedness and rupture of home as "the unhealable rift between a human being and a native place, between the self and its true home" (Said, 1994). Home is, for them, the rooted identity, violently pulled up and thrown into exile, consequently, the 'banished' rupture from home are trapped in an endless heroic search, crave return to a utopia that they may never have experienced beyond stories and 'the good old world' (collectively) recalled.

Nevertheless, other academic and intellectual voices challenge this generic understanding of home as a smooth continuity from past to present in place. Devika Chawla (2012), for example, moves beyond this geographically rooted home in the past, differentiating between the move as coercive circumstances or choices. For her, "[h]ome has never been about returning, but about moving ahead. It was not an absence, but a search" (Chawla & Rodriguez, 2012, p. 5). Thus the mundane everyday phrase of 'going home' is related to a present experience of reaching and aspiring a place where one can be oneself, at ease, fulfilling (basic human) needs, in (supposed) sanctuary from the everyday stresses, and a stable ground to support the future. Thus, by having the choice to change and relocate home and contextual conditions, the former home becomes perceived as childhood home, a home-town and for many, the motherland.

Intriguingly, for Syrian refugee camps' dwellers in KR-I after years of displacement, sentiments of home surface in their descriptions of their presence in KR-I camps as "here is somehow home too", while Syria "is a burned mark on the heart" and "will be forever longed for[home]".

But then, what if the rupture from one home results into an 'enactment of homecoming' towards another? What if, in leaving and seeking refuge, one returns to one's roots? Where and what is home then? Coming closer to our case, how does the particular socio-spatial formation of supposedly 'temporary' refugee camps develop and evolve into homes in the making?

This chapter explores these questions and sheds light on the material manifestation of the perplexity of 'home' and the process of homing refugeehood in KR-I Syrian refugee camps. By developing a conceptual framework based on the ethnographic fieldwork of the first author between 2018 and 2019 and a series of semi-structured interviews with camp dwellers and humanitarian aid workers, the authors endeavour to understand homemaking processes and agency(ies) of/through the (re)production of the camp spaces and their significance in this particular case.

8.2. In search of a definition of home

Home is the place where, when you have to go there, they have to take you in.


(Frost, 1914)

Depicted in literature, the idea of home has been correlated with an assumed continuous state of a positive (emotional) condition. It is portrayed as “[t]he safe place where we can go as we are and not be questioned” (Angelou, 1987), and “where you find light when all grows dark” (P. Brown, 2015). It is a place “[t]o awaken from sleep, to rest from awakening, to tame the animal, to let the soul go wild, to shelter in darkness and blaze with light, to cease to speak and be perfectly understood” (Solnit, 2007): as such home renders unconditional forms of belonging and freedom. Home also represents – for many – an aspiration as a future project, a place to lay down new roots where prospects of warmth and continuity take shape and grow. T. S. Eliot writes “[h]ome is where one starts from” (Eliot, (1943)2009), that is, where the turn of an old life leads to a new beginning; it is a smooth transition of an uninterrupted self-continuity.

Reading home as such, in the absence of it, one experiences *algos* (suffering)

in an endless desire for *nostos* (homecoming). Illustrated beautifully in Homer’s epic *Odyssey*, Ulysses suffers the pain of rupture from his wife, home, people and native land. In this rupture experience, nostalgia, generally defined as homesickness, develops and “invokes home in its very meaning” (Blunt, 2016). Being without a home for Ulysses seems to become an “irrevocable condition” experienced individually (Baldwin, 1956), where parts of the self are left behind (Mercier, 2007)¹²⁵. To recollect the fragments, Ulysses sets out on a sacred future quest to return, enduring all kinds of suffering, and puts all manner of effort into going back home, regardless of its greyness. Home becomes – for the ruptured – an endless search for the condition to be ‘at ease’ again.

Through this search for a definition of home in literature, nested descriptions bombard the researcher: of what, when, where and with whom it could be: the entanglement of relations between location, people, action and time keep (re)surfacing. Home situates in continuously interwoven tangible and intangible bonds. The tangible is the home embedded in the spaces and the people, rooted in multiscale temporal and geographical trajectories, while the intangible bonds are saturated by connecting the (former) self with the (positive) emotional condition embodied in the (former) home. In questioning what home is, nostalgia – and its scales – can hardly escape questions of self-continuity¹²⁶ (Diagram. 1.): the identity and belonging interlocked with space and time.



Self-continuity between cyclical and linear time uninterrupted. (authors, 2020).

¹²⁵ “We leave something of ourselves behind when we leave a place, we stay there, even though we go away. And there are things in us that we can find again only by going back there.” (Mercier, 2007)

¹²⁶ “Self-continuity, defined as the perceived connection between one’s past and present, is considered a prerequisite of identity formation” (Wildschut et al., 2019).

8.3. Homelessness of refugeehood: The camp

Coming closer to refugeehood's particularity, being a refugee is – in its essence – a partial or full (violent) uprootedness from 'home'. This essence brings to mind Stegner's (1971) description¹²⁷: "Home is a notion that only nations of the homeless fully appreciate and only the uprooted comprehend." This uprootedness ruptures the relational position of self-continuity of 'home' with time, space, political and collective belonging(s). Creating a form of self-discontinuity, which becomes an unbridgeable rift between life as it was and the uncertainty of where, with whom and how it will be. Indeed, 'home' is fully realised only when one leaves it. Through the rupture, a sense of homelessness surges in what Jaspers calls "conscious of the lack" (Jaspers, 1971): the refugee camp's spatiality and the refugees' bodily emplacement in 'alien geographies' represent the material manifestation of such 'lack' and irrevocable 'homelessness'.

A wealth of refugee scholarship juxtaposes refugee camps' spaces with waiting zones of 'limbo' (Dunn, 2018) and spatial forms of 'exception' (Agamben, 1998). These spaces represent the danger of being 'crime-ridden zones' and spatial arenas for 'power and control' (Hassan & Hanafi, 2010). In such spaces refugees are 'out of place' (Hyndman, 2000), experience a severe loss of familiarity (Said, 2000) and are looked upon with suspicion as a threat to the security of the people and the state. Their homes (metaphorically and territorially) exist somewhere only in the past. Therefore, studies as such juxtapose 'temporariness' and 'homelessness' with 'permanence' and 'home' seen in terms of territorial and nation-state belonging (Rajaram, 2002; (Malkki, 1992)

Unlike in former juxtapositions, other scholars, including ones of migration, transnational and refugee studies, heavily criticise this binary thinking, questioning the assumption "that boundedness, rootedness, and membership in a single national, ethnic, or religious group are the natural order of things" (Levitt, 2012). Instead, they shift to the "emphasis on the fluidity of home, on the prevalence of 'routes' over 'roots' in shaping its experience, or even on its de-territorialization" (Boccagni, 2017, p. 108). Various scholars indeed believe that camps may constitute islands where forms of support and hospitality are present (Ramadan, 2010), time machines preserving heritage for (refugee) generations to come (Bshara, 2014), and localities where refugees are in the process of (re)inventing and (re)formation of their identity (Malkki, 2015).


These conservative tendencies of conflicted debates invited empirical academic research to emphasise the dynamic processes of refugees' attempts to revoke this loss of worldly anchorage(s). Several scholars emphasise that homing processes can materialise within temporariness and alienation, and camps become accidental cities in the making (Betts et al., 2017; Brun, 2001; Brun & Fábos, 2015; Herz, 2013; Jansen, 2018). Associating the concept of 'homing' with practices exercised on/within the physical space, scholars link homing to socio-spatial personalisation that contributes to security and identity (re)assertion recognised by the group (Porteous, 1976), place-making (Easthope, 2014), as well as demarcation(s) of spaces of domination (Somerville, 1989). By (re)articulating the given (humanitarian) structures of 'care and control', various actors initiate a transitional process from a 'shelter' to 'home', and from a 'space' to a 'place'. This 'homing' process becomes a form of

¹²⁷ Pulitzer Prize-winning novel, 'Angel of Repose'.

(re)producing familiarity, (re)activating various forms of agency and reclaiming power over the self through space (Bshara, 2014; Ramadan, 2013a). Still, fragments of the making/(re)production of given space, being in a place, being 'at home', the time factor and the agency that activates them do not fully align together: who/what is doing what? it is essential to demist the entanglements of human agential powers and the spatial agency (Awan, Schneider, & Till, 2011) in the camp in order to understand the ways in which homing processes occur in refugeehood's materiality.

8.4. Revisiting frames of home between sheltering and homing in refugeehood

In order to understand and answer the questions posed in the sections above, we use the relational entanglements of tangible and intangible bonds of home as the main frame of thinking. The tangible bonds are located in the embeddedness of home within spaces and people, rooted in multiscale time-geography trajectories, entangled with the intangible bonds which are saturated by connecting the (former) self with the emotional condition embodied in the (former) home. The recent uprootedness of the previous habitual homeland is this chapter's point of departure: the rupture from an 'earlier home' setting in motion a chain of events that link refugeehood to homing. To illustrate our point we use the following developed diagram of the 'homing' process (Diagram 2).



Proposed Refugee Camp Homing Cycle diagram from a past home to an imagined one. (Authors, 2020).

The Refugee Camp Homing Cycle explains how homing is (theoretically) reached in a refugee camp. It starts with violent disruption from 'life as it was', followed by dispossession from multi-layered belonging to a territory, group and expected continuity. Then, by the act of moving and crossing nation-states' borders, refugees became subject to two dramatic changes: political status (citizen to a refugee) and alienation, which is caused by their partial (if not full) separation from earlier social networks embedded in locality. However, the severity of the rupture's impacts depend mainly on the mood of displacement and the international and local humanitarian regimes' attitudes towards the displaced within the host environment.

Consequently, by being pushed to cross state borders to seek sanctuary, refugees become unanchored floating fragments created by such uprootedness some arrive and land to wait in the camp. In the emergency phase, refugees temporarily disembark, addressing their basic need for shelter and protection, relying on provided and improvised structures (e.g. tents, camp, aid), living in the eventuality of 'making do'. With prolonged displacement needs extend in prolonged temporariness, and the floating fragments start to familiarize and relate (physically and emotionally) in attempt to bridge the rifts between the time-space past's fixities and present/future uncertainties within the 'alien' surroundings. Refugees start to bond with situational groups and adapt to 'longer stay' probabilities. As time goes by, the temporariness becomes ever more permanent; life in the camp descends into the (new/camp) ordinary and refugees exploit the possibilities of dwelling in its fixity. They become more anchored and rooted in this stable uncertainty. Homing, as an action, then emerges within the possibilities yet is rarely accomplished; however, the final 'home' seems to be fixed in an improbable future and recalled from the lost past.

First, to understand the spatial progression and the agency behind it from 'landing' to 'homing' we borrow two conceptual frameworks: the frame proposed by Handel (2019) and the one proposed by Brun and Fábos (2015). Handel (2019)'s work allows us to move the act of provision beyond the humanitarian arena of care and to exercise control of "regimes of exception" (Agier & Bouchet-Saulnier, 2004), to incorporate the spaces as a homing canvas. In his work Handel (2019) delineates 'house' and 'home' concepts through two layers: a housing regime with broader institutional/state planning actions and active dwelling as an engine for homemaking. By substituting housing with sheltering, this understanding brings the agency of humanitarian regime services (Hilhorst & Jansen, 2010) at the material level (i.e. the camp's set-up in terms of planning, infrastructure, shelter provision, upgrade, etc.) into the equation.

The second step is to link scales/meanings of home to the homing process in forced displacement. This triadic constellation of home in Brun and Fábos's (2015) work introduces the following:

- 'home' as the meanings prompted by and the routinisation of day-to-day living experiences, done and undone by everyday practices (see also De Certeau (1980)).
- 'Home' represents feelings and intangible dimensions based on memories, traditions and an ideal dream exercised collectively at a group level.
- 'HOME' to include Nostalgia and the 'lost homeland' in the protracted displacement debate.

Although Handel (2019)'s and Brun and Fábos's (2015) respective works can cover multiple aspects of homing at individual and group levels, few gaps remain. First, the temporary forms of adaptations after sheltering and prior to homing: using the camp as a performative space habitually negotiated on individual and collective levels (Connerton, 1989). Second, spatial references to the ways in which meanings are (re)attached to the material in order to familiarise oneself with the space-time alienation experience of the shelter/camp before becoming a 'home'. Third, the mental stimulation of a depiction of home to be imagined, expected and pursued (De Brigard, 2017) and the gap of a spatio-temporal understanding in terms of cyclical and linear time comprehension (i.e. everyday cycle, past-oriented and future-directed) in the protracted waiting are still missing.

To cover the first gap we expand on Handel (2019)'s and Brun and Fábos's (2015) frameworks to incorporate and expand on 'dwelling' as a form of occupancy: a stage that follows the act of making/building and predates homing. Although a 'dwelling' – as a noun – refers to a physical condition beyond a temporary shelter, a stable structure, when read as a verb dwelling brings the time factor into the equation: live, stay, continue and linger in a particular physical setting and/or a condition to initiate another action or result. In our perception dwelling asserts a form of agency over the routinised habits and exploring the probabilities of 'moving along', a transitional period between sheltering and homing.

For the second and third gaps we include the work of Wildschut et al. (2019) in experimental social psychology. In their work with Syrian refugees in Saudi Arabia they examine the positive attributes of Nostalgia (past-oriented and future-directed) as coping mechanisms with present stresses of displacement. Furthermore, as memories carry the material characters of the surrounding, recent studies assert the mental simulation of possible scenarios of future events and 'what could have been', as a form of Nostalgia (De Brigard, 2017)). We use their framework of the psychological functions of Nostalgia mentally to initiate and stimulate the process of 'homing' in refugeehood and reset the perception of time from cyclical loops frozen in limbo towards a linear future. They organize these functions in four general domains:

- a) Existential: (re)triggers self-continuity, meanings, core values and identity (re)formation.
- b) Self-oriented: (re)activates a sense of self-worth by revisiting positive self attributes and increasing self-esteem.
- c) Social: fosters connectedness, attachments, feelings of security, support, empathy and openness towards others.
- d) Future-directed: the evocation of better possibilities and ideas, and motivation to enact (homing) innovative ideas.

In the following section we explore the case of Syrian refugee camps in Iraqi Kurdistan at the intersection of the proposed and borrowed frames; we aim, in this respect, to unfold the complexity of home and homing in this particular case.

8.5. Syrian Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan: The (up)rooting of home

Since the Syrian conflict erupted in 2011, 11.6 million have been displaced, with 5.5 million registered as refugees (UNHCR, 2020d). Syrian refugees crossed nation-state borders and followed networks of help and support regarding shelter and protection in urban areas or camps. In the case of the Syrian Kurds in KR-I, these networks were embedded in ethnic similarities, political aspirations, territorial belonging and the concentrations of opportunities that paved the way for a more particular situation to arise.

Despite the violent character of the conflict portrayed in the mainstream media, Syrian Kurds in the North-East experienced the displacement slightly differently. By mid-2012 non-state actors had seized control over Rojava (Allsopp, 2015; Harling, 2013), while flows of internally displaced Kurds from other rural and urban areas clogged the region's towns and cities. The existing safe and stable home, at that time known to them, was damaged: increasing poverty, contestation, non-state militarisation; all adding to the escalating threat of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and ever-latent danger escalating and approaching from the Turkish borders. All these factors added to the existing challenges for the historically marginalised ethnicity in Syria (Tejel, 2009).

With the generationally rooted fear of being persecuted by the ambiguous tides of power as enemies of the sovereign, waves of Syrian Kurds crossed the borders to KR-I to arrive at their imagined fatherland's realised part: 'KURDISTAN'.

8.6. Spatialising Refugeehood in Iraqi Kurdistan: The Camps

8.6.1. Rupture(s) and Camps

The geographical axis between the Syrian and Iraqi parts of Kurdistan has always had its share of violent events since World War I (WWI), with hundreds of sites of destruction and tales of coercive movements, uprootedness and collective loss of homes (King, 2014; McDowall, 2004; Tejel, 2009). The spatio-temporal pattern of chronic conflict and tides of forced displacements have asserted the prolonged humanitarian presence. These tides of forced displacements have simulated active coordination processes between KRG and the United Nations (UN) since the 1980s. This continuous presence and co-ordination led to the development of humanitarian actors' strategies and governmental bodies' creation, with the (conditional) blessing of the Iraqi Central Government¹²⁸, constituting the local humanitarian regime in the KR-I.

Upon arrival, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the KRG registered people crossing borders from Syria (without official entry permits) as refugees. With the registration document, refugees became officially entitled to humanitarian protection rights and various aids and support modalities. These modalities included setting up camps and developing institutional synergies to facilitate them. Many of these refugees' routes, therefore, ended in these settings. Indeed, camps were mushrooming their way up to becoming the spatial representation of this arrival and locality of the support. Today (2021), nine planned refugee camps¹²⁹ are scattered throughout KR-I's urban landscape,


¹²⁸ Iraq is not a signatory state of The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 and its 1967 protocol.

¹²⁹ These camps are Domiz 1, Domiz 2, Gawilan and Bardarsh in Duhok governorate; Kawergwes, Dara Shakran, Queshtapa and Basirma in Erbil governorate; and Ar-bat in Sulaymaniyah governorate.

housing more than 40 per cent of the Syrian refugee population in Iraq, mostly Kurds¹³⁰. These humanitarian support modalities also held extended tolerance for ‘Brothers and Guests’: in addition to the rights to shelter, free access to health service and education, Syrian Kurds also have minimum labour restrictions, freedom of movement in KRI, and are permitted to seek work (Etemadi)¹³¹ (Khan et al., 2020; Yassen, 2019).

8.6.2. Setting up camp spaces in the (chronic) state of crisis

With the Syrian conflict and the rise and fall of ISIL since 2011, KR-I has been acting as the substantial humanitarian operation arena for the masses displaced¹³². The humanitarian regime in KR-I utilised ‘the masterplan approach for refugee settlements’ (UNHCR, 2016b) as an emergency response in order



Displacement Camps in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Redrawn based on maps by UNHCR (2017), Reach (2019) (authors, 2019).

¹³⁰ Syrian Refugees in KR-I are Kurds and Arabs. Almost all Syrian Arab refugees stay in urban areas. Hence, this percentage in the existing data does not accurately reflect the concentration of Syrian-Kurdish refugees (camps and urban areas).

¹³¹ Although Syrians receive refugee status in KRI, their status in Iraq is considered ‘illegal’. There were 135 IDPs Camps scattered in the region by the end of 2019 (Khan et al., 2020).

¹³² In November 2020, the Iraqi Government announced the closure of all camps outside the Kurdish-governed and -controlled territories. According to NRC, IOM and BBC News, this eviction started in August 2019, and was interrupted ‘temporarily’ by the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic (BBC, 2020).

to set up camps (whether for refugees or internally displaced persons or IDPs)¹³³. The approach has proven effective in the peak moments by providing the necessary infrastructure and sheltering units, and acting as a spatial apparatus to cope with sheltering the massive (Middle East Research Institute, 2015). The response's strategy momentarily blends elements of emergency with overall development intentions, that is, with long-term initiatives to strengthen existing systems. The use of the 'masterplan approach' to set up temporary camps is clear evidence of this strategy. Furthermore, to coordinate humanitarian tasks, on the one hand, the KRG in 2014 established an institutional body for coordination and management, called the Joint Crisis Coordination Centre (JCCC) (JCC, 2016), which was followed later, in 2015, by the Board of Relief and Humanitarian Affairs (BRHA) as there were non-stop waves of displacement of both refugees and IDPs pouring into Duhok governorate (BRHA, 2015). On the other hand, the UNHCR shelter sector works closely with other Interagency Standing committees represented by clusters' (shelter cluster, wash cluster, etc.), which work as Inter-Agency Standing Committees, developing contextual strategies together and with the host governments (GSC et al., 2018).¹³⁴

During the (pre-)emergency phase, setting up the camp included clearing the land to 'plant' camps: more than 40 standardised modular grids covered the region and served a primary urban function: sheltering. After being processed, each family (6 people) is assigned a single plot, tent and access to communal washing facilities. The 'conceived space' (Lefebvre, 1991) of the fenced modular grid¹³⁵ is (mostly) tiled with communities each of 16 shelters. Blocks are groups of communities with fluid spaces in between to allow movements and become future roads. A break in the grid is subject to site characteristics (topography, flash flood, etc.) or to accommodate parallel (urban) structures dedicated to serving the recipients of aid exclusively (administration, schools, primary health centres, etc.). Adult camp dwellers have access to (Sorani) Kurdish and English classes, a form of support to help them be integrated into the labour market (Middle East Research Institute, 2015), including local and international NGOs¹³⁶. At the same time, their youngsters also receive the similar linguistic education at schools in order to become 'qualified' later to enrol in the region's universities (Khan et al., 2020).

Nevertheless, the camps' future scenarios, socio-spatial progression and meanings are closely related to occupant groups' possibilities to be integrated according to the host preference of the hosted group (refugees or IDPs). In different reports, 'sustainable solutions' are described as the IDPs' systematic return to their pre-displacement geographical locations, in contrast to the pro-motion of integration policies for the Syrian refugees. This contrast manifests itself through the decommissioning of IDP camps while upgrading refugee ones (physical and socio-economic components) (Khan et al., 2020; UNHCR, 2018)

¹³³ Shelters and settlements are interrelated and need to be considered as a whole. 'Shelter' is the household living space, including the items necessary to support daily activities, whereas 'settlement' is the wider location in which people and community live (Sphere Association, 2018).

¹³⁴ These clusters serve as coordination mechanisms and as a platform to support multilateral agencies' different field efforts on the ground. Governmental agencies, such as the Department of Sewage, Electricity Department (connection to the leading electricity, water supply and sewage networks), also contribute to the provision of services. At the same time, other departments on the governorates' level play a role in the provision of more intangible services in terms of security (Police and Asayish Office), health, education (Department of Education) and labour (Department of Labour and Social Affairs (UNHCR Iraq, 2019b).

¹³⁵ In the Kurdistan Region of Iraq the modular unit is labelled a community: a standardised 16 plots (plot size 7 m*14 m built-up area). To begin with, each plot has a concrete slab for the standard UNHCR tent, in addition to brick walled kitchen, bathroom, and toilet. All these are connected to one septic tank per community. All the roofing materials are temporary and removable (sandwich panels, corrugated sheets).

¹³⁶ "Basic and secondary education in [refugee] camps are mainly provided through schools operated by Kurdistan's Ministry of Education, complemented in some cases by facilities run by international NGOs. The government provides for the curriculum as well as the necessary funding for running the facilities and for teachers, who are frequently Syrian refugees with the right skills" (Middle East Research Institute, 2015).

8.6.2.1. Unanchored: Refugees arriving at the camp

Domiz refugee camp was the earliest Syrian refugee camp in KR-I, followed by seven planned ones within a year. UNHCR and KRG worked together to set up the camps at the same time as ‘processing’¹³⁷ refugees to grant the registration document (forma). For Domiz, the designed capacity was only for 30,000 refugees., however, with the refugee influx, the camp’s population peaked at 80,000 refugees in 2013. Within a year, the opening of the other camps and the redistribution of refugees, the number decreased and stabilised at about 31,000 registered individuals in 2020, most of them coming from the same geographic region in Syria (UNHCR Iraq, 2020).

In all camps, administration and services have prefabricated units acting as ‘field offices’ for the patchwork of international, regional, national and local bodies present (Holzer, 2013; Wilde, 2008), to ensure an ‘optimum’ performance in aiding the refugees.

Regardless of the ‘home-welcoming’ treatment, refugees arrived at the camp as ‘occupational groups’ in the early emergency phase, and many zones of the camp were as chaotic as the conditions that had produced them. In early days of Domiz camp in 2012, aid workers supported refugees set up their fabric tents after being allocated to a plot. The distributed tents occupied only part of the plot, leaving space for household activities, such as cooking and cleaning. Later after in the newly set camps¹³⁸, the strategy to shelter provision is the use of the improved shelter typology: each unit consists of plot with a concrete base, at- tend, and brick built kitchen, latrine and the bathroom.

One of the interviewees described his first memory of his arrival at Domiz camp in 2012: “I could not understand, I felt thrown naked in the middle of nowhere” as “Our women were exposed to the public”. Such statements emphasised the unfamiliarity of the physical structures. Upon their arrival, the camp space seems to be a “fluid and strange setting totally lacking familiar reference points” (Halbwachs, 1950) and refugees, still in shock, can hardly recognise and navigate round their surroundings. The camps’ ‘provisional’ and ‘fluid’ settings heightened the reality of the loss and the associated homelessness. Further- more, it demonstrated the fundamental mismatch of expectations and norms between the provider and the provided. Hence, in this arrival to the nowhere, the refugees experience the rupture as being out of sync with space, time continuity limited to waiting and the loss of power, as their needs became exposed and reduced to basic survival.

These estrangement notions catalysed the need to recreate a sense of privacy, security and familiarity through different improvised making and unmaking practices exercised upon the physical setting provided. Swinging “between vulnerability and agential power” (Brun & Fábos, 2015), these needs mentally stimulated many refugees to “take the matter with their own hands” (Bshara, 2014). By evoking the role of the self-oriented and social domains of nostalgia, (spatial) memory became the reference to introduce familiarity to the alien surroundings.

The refugees began with the ‘walling up’ of plots by patching them with various materials: wooden poles, metal frames, sheets from ruined tents, (corrugated) metal sheets. Whether these materials were

¹³⁷ This includes detailed information (including biometric data) about the house- hold and the individual family members; reviewing and authenticating documents issued by the country of origin, identify vulnerabilities.

¹³⁸ The exception to this rule is Basirma refugee camp, which was made up of caravans which have since been systematically replaced by improved and upgraded shelters

distributed, exchanged, bought or found, they were put to use, creating a rigid demarcation between the public/ common and the private domains (Porteous, 1976; Raglan, 1964). Refugees followed and (or) paralleled this demarcation with internal articulations of the unit: they mainly set these divisions to facilitate the separation the everyday activities domains. These articulations included: setting private latrines, changing the kitchen's size and location, and separating the living/guest room from and the 'other room', which was used depending on the family size and need (sleep- ing, storage, girls' room, etc.). These improvised material forms are assembled to 'endure', and 'make do for now' (Simone, 2018). However, 'now' at that stage has an uncertain endpoint in the immediate future.



Improvised structures at Domiz camp for Syrian refugees in Duhok, KRI. Caption from Video (Submarine Channel, 2013)

8.6.2.2. Bridging: Building the 'tent-free' camp

The harsh environmental conditions and the uncertain end-date of the Syrian conflict have encouraged setting more permanent structures. Consequently, moving into 'more durable shelters' became the general strategy for Syrian refugee camps in KR-I. With the blessing of the camps' management, many NGOs¹³⁹ provided materials and cash for refugees to upgrade their shelters. This upgrade was conditioned within guidelines that mainly ensured a degree of permanence within the plots' boundaries (brick walls, temporary roofs of either corrugated sheets or sandwich panels). Within a few months the humanitarian regime adopted 'improved shelters' instead of mere tents, adding brick-built latrines, bathrooms and kitchens for each plot¹⁴⁰.

Early camp arrivals saw this material provision of shelter and protection, combined with other forms of aid, as an opportunity. With access to internet connections and social media on both sides of the border, information travelled fast. Many refugees recommended their relatives (especially single males or newly married couples) to "seize the existing opportunity instead of waiting" or "come and wait here". As a result, fragments of the former social networks started arriving at the camps and filling the spatial structures, and new net- works developed through 'being in it together, camp bonds started interweaving

¹³⁹ For example, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Peace Winds Japan (PWJ).

¹⁴⁰ This model is present in newly set-up camps (IDPs & Refugees).

with the fixed grid and through socio-spatial (re)articulations. Evoked by the collective retrieval of former social codes, Nostalgia turned into a positive driver to bridge former spatial memories with the alien spaces in camps.



Tents stretch into the distance at Domiz camp for Syrian refugees in Dohuk governorate. (UNHCR/j.Seregni, 2012)

In 2015 the UNHCR initiated the “tent-free camp”¹⁴¹ campaign for the refugee camps in the KR-I. According to the PWJ report, the ‘self-building’ project’s main goal was to “ensure that refugees live in more durable, semi-permanent shelters” (PWJ, 2019b)¹⁴², which came with built-in livelihood and participation components. Whether the standardised plots included partially built shelter forms (as the improved ones do) or not, the modular grid became a foundation for infrastructure and public works to follow camp upgrades later (such as pavements, water and sewage systems, electricity networks, street lights, etc.). Acting as a particular form of John Turner’s sites and services, the modular grid pre- forms as a canvas that supporting self-generated semi-permanent shelter forms. In similar projects, the NFOs’ personal (PWJ in the tent-free project) provide technical guidance on and supervision of the building process and develops skilled labourers to “help refugees help themselves” as a form of self- reliance. Through giving the participants ‘know-how’, these skills are presumed to be useful in the labour market and to qualify these candidates to be available for other job opportunities. Using ‘cash for work’ as a strategy, the majority of NGOs hire and pay the participants for shelter construction (whether as

¹⁴¹ Funded by the US Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration BPRM and approved by the humanitarian regime (UNHCR, KRG), these shelter upgrade projects are also being undertaken to this day (2021) in other Syrian refugee camps. Peace Winds Japan is the leading implementation partner (IP) in this project.

¹⁴² The ‘self-building project’ in Erbil camp included providing orientation sessions to the self-built process, standardised shelter layout, bills of quantity (BOQ) and labourer payments (phased into eight stages). While the participation component includes informing sessions and focus group discussions with beneficiaries, it intersects with the livelihood one by adding incoming generating opportunities for refugees (PWJ, 2019b).

beneficiaries or as labourers). In addition, the presence of the displacement camps with such projects generate 'well-paid' employment majority opportunities for host communities: locals are either contracted by INGOs, hired by them or they form their own local NGOs.

Combining these (re)generated socio-spatial bonds and various actors steered the camp's active building processes that spread virally. The interdependencies between camps and surroundings formed economic socio-spatial flows with urban centres (labourers, humanitarian aid, volunteers...). These flows accelerated an urbanisation process in the areas adjacent to the majority of the camps as well. In a short time, camps started to resemble many existing urban areas in the region, gradually shaking down their 'temporary' facades.



Tent Free Camp Campaign. PWJ Process of Shelter Upgrading Source: (PWJ, 2019)

8.6.3. Anchoring

As stated above, different projects aspired to 'upgrade' the spatial conditions in refugee camps to ensure better living conditions and ease the hand-over to the KRG. These upgrades with socio-economic models of 'self-reliance' having been embedded, access to various employment models activated the refugees' agency. Through their engagement with (re)shaping their material realities (i.e., building, investing, working), refugees (partially) transitioned from passive recipients of care to active participants.

Nevertheless, the degree of refugees' investment in physical adaptation varies according to their personal projects. In the interviews, these projects varied between planning to start a family, staying until things were resolved, or waiting until a better opportunity (of resettlement) arose. The waiting stretches to a further point in the uncertain future in the camp. As a result, advanced (spatial) needs came forward, and refugees responded in having near-future prospects, and refugees responded by adjusting the basic amenities provided/altering in the post-emergency phase to suit these planned prospects.

Refugees with access to capital seem to experience more comfortable living conditions, reflected in investing in upgrading their dwelling units. Extra rooms are added to the standardised shelter designs, kitchens relocated, new connections to the existing sewage networks are made, and, if possible, internal court-yards are fashioned; in other words whatever the plot size allowed to accommodate the occupant's extended needs. The degree of this personalisation seem to relate to what it is 'desired to have' and/or 'wanted to have back' in such temporary settings. Hence, the internal makeshift re-alignments with these statements reflect the resurgence of a former spatial memory (embedded with cultural norms) in a poor

attempt to claim an equivalent settings of how 'dwelling' is supposed to be despite the shadows of temporariness. These nostalgic memories become existential and future-oriented; they help populations come to terms with displacement and to move forward, although their homes in Syria are, in their view, 'something else' compared with the provisional present. Many refugees consider their dwellings to be spaces in which to "just get by till things are clear".

For Um Ibrahim, the end of her single life in Syria and becoming a refugee and a wife in the KR-I was indeed a new beginning (Eliot, (1943)2009). In late 2016 she crossed the border as a new bride to join her husband in Domiz camp through an arranged marriage. The camp management assigned the new family a plot together with the UNHCR forma and marriage certificates. Arriving in winter and becoming pregnant, the tent hardly accommodated the new circumstances. Um Ibrahim and her husband moved in with her in-laws for three months in a rented residence just outside the camp. It was 'crowded' at her in-laws', and they could no longer wait for the *mounzamt* (NGOs) to help them. During this period her husband and his brothers (camp dwellers now) constructed brick walls so that the space would become 'habitable'. To finance this construction, her husband borrowed money from 'here and there' and worked as an 'ordinary construction labourer' in Duhok city:

"We are still in debt, but we are paying it gradually. [...] I like it here more. I sleep when I want; wake up when I want; and cook (or not) whenever I want [...] You know, the female feels more comfortable in her place. Soon, we will paint the walls. I also want to buy a wardrobe". (Um Ibrahim, Interview, 2018).

When asked to draw or describe her former 'home', she asked if the 'home' was that belonging to her in-laws or her childhood one.



Interior shot of Um Ibrahim's living room. Aid agencies gave them the mat-tresses, while they bought the tv and ceiling fan from the market in the camp. Photo Credits: Layla Zibar, 2018.

This form of arrival and the change of where home is/with, represent the overlaps and (partial) transitions between temporary waiting (tent) and anchoring in laying roots in the (presumed) continuity of marriage, children (brick built rooms, furniture). "Homing [acts] as a way of managing the distance between real and aspired homes in the biographical field(s)", argues Boccagni (2017). Indeed, in Um Ibrahim story, these spatial readjustments of the camp's material surroundings became indistinguishable part of her family's autobiography. Thereby seeking betterment through personalising one's unit (i.e. appropriation by addition), one can retrieve and fulfil a desire based on the 'now' and on 'being' in the camp which goes beyond dwelling there, so that homing starts.

Homemaking started with (re)rooting and anchoring in the camp: new arrivals building their 'new lives' despite the temporariness. The anchoring extends to the group levels through: the engagement of social activities performed together, such as hosting guests or cooking together. The social use overflows into units' threshold areas. Many families use their front porches as gathering places resembling their former habitual places. Um Ibrahim and her neighbour sit outside "like we used to in Syria" while their children play together. These uses extend to the roads on special occasions to host more prominent collective activities, such as celebrations or funerals, (usually) overlooking the formal multi-purpose hall, mimicking how these activities took place prior displacement (in their hometowns). Consequently, refugees keep 'their' outdoor spaces maintained and clean, and even furnish them with chairs and plants. Such practices – imported from past contextualised practices – (re)introduce welcome threshold zones as spatial cues other camp dwellers recognise. Therefore, the fluid space becomes a container for fragments of cultural habits restored from the past through these spatial adaptations; a more fluid culture reshaped by refugeehood seems to emerge (Hannerz, 1992).

Furthermore, other refugees have more entrepreneurial-oriented ideas for their living spaces. Based on the unit location, a room with an opening facing towards the public space could be used as a shop to generate income. According to many interviewees, one can still 'sell' his upgraded shelter to camp dwellers looking for one in which to start their married life or other refugees on the waiting list, and 'the list is long'.

Um Ibrahim's story (similar to many others) represents the transition from the refugees' experience of vulnerability to "recognising individual and social accomplishments" (Boccagni & Brighenti, 2017). In anchoring and the statutory gradual shift within the humanitarian status to hybridize with a social one (Brun, 2015), a camp community(s) rises in the rearticulation of material settings and spatial upgrades. The inclination to meet group expectations, past recollections and possible future aspirations (guest rooms, welcoming porches, ...) trigger the need for points of reference retrieved from spatial memories, hence directing Nostalgia's positive function in (re)anchoring refugees in time-space after disruption (Wildschut et al., 2019). In anchoring and remembering together. Homing, starts in cracking the time-frozen waiting linked to temporariness of the camp and refugeehood, and allowing cyclical time to relate with 'today', bridge it with yesterday and connect it to a possible tomorrow.

The use of wiring and greenery to define boundaries and multi-thresholds. Kawergosk Refugee Camp, KR-I. Photo Credit: Layla Zibar, 2018



Use of outdoor spaces for group activities. Domiz Refugee Camp. KR-I. Photo Credit: Layla Zibar, 2018



8.7. Where is HOME now?

In the previous sections we have examined the 'family-welcoming' KRG integration policies for the Syrian Kurds in camps, weaving a canvas of enabling structures and programs to drive camp refugees' soilless roots more deeply into the territory. With individual and collective acts which patch fragments of now and then, the 'temporary' physical structures convert from mere physical containers to a meaningful socio-spatial reality in the making (Thompson, 1978).

In arriving in Kurdistan, the imagined 'fatherland', a longed for 'landing' is (partially) achieved for the ethnically marginalized Syrian Kurds. In the interviews, examples of refugees responses to describe this landing are "finally arriving at the real home", one which "brought tears to the eyes". This generational dream of an improbable future to be free in one's fatherland became a reality only as a result of the violent displacement from the former reality. The thirst for belonging becomes, for many, a driver to reassert and rearticulate the Kurdish identity in the newly constructed space. When one visits these refugee camps, Kurdistan's flags¹⁴³ and pictures of its leaders cannot go unnoticed, thereby showing loyalty and gratitude to the generous hosts. Whether in the dwelling unit or public spaces, through forms and symbols, refugees verbally express their Kurdish belonging: "we are home here too". This expression also extends to include the active engagement in learning the written language (Sorani Kurdish), enlisting with the Peshmerga, the official Kurdish Army, proudly serving to fulfil the 'duty' in protecting the fatherland¹⁴⁴. In camps many Syrian Kurds started practising their 'Kurdishness publicly', without fear of persecution, by voting for the Kurdish referendum in 2017, thereby exercising what they believed to be their political right to decide the fatherland's future.

Nevertheless, it is not only about 'where' one lands but also 'how' it happens. Even under what seems to be one unifying identity, that of being 'Kurds', differences are omnipresent; after all, Syrian Kurds are still, legally speaking, refugees in KR-I. They are not 'legal' citizens, and they may never become such. Furthermore, when walking through the camp spaces one still can recognise temporary roofs, upside-down UNHCR logos on reused tent sheets, and the blue UNICEF logo on water tanks. An array of 'donor' logos adorns the signboard of every primary health care centre, school and even sanitary bag. These ever-repeated patterns and never-completed settings, combined with continuity of the humanitarian programmes, (re)assert notions associated with refugeehood and a situational sense of temporariness and camp-belonging.

Moreover, the non-conformities of historical trajectories between the host and the guest articulate sub-group cultural and habitual differences. They are the 'Syriakan' (Syrians in Sorani Kurdish), as the host community calls them with non-conformities of Kurdish dialects (Kurmanji for the refugees and Sorani for the hosts). These factors, adding to many, appear to be limitations on the 'integration process' (Khan et al., 2020).

These (legal) ambiguities and embedded non-conformities render the Syrian Kurds again the 'other' in their 'imagined' land, and "the memory of the life in Syria is becoming an irrevocable pain, they [the

¹⁴³ Including flags of the Kurdish Democratic Party.

¹⁴⁴ This army is recognised only by the Iraqi central government. It is a source of pride among families if they have a member in the Peshmerga, not to mention the financial and other privileges that come with it.

Iraqi Kurds] cannot comprehend”, as one of the interviewees stated. This situation, coupled with the economic hardship, creates push factors leading to in-camp migration¹⁴⁵.

Refugees seem to (re)construct versions of small Kurdish Syria(s), a Rojava Island(s) in camps’ spaces. People visiting or living there compare it to “going back to Syria” (UNHCR, 2012) without leaving Kurdistan. Correspondingly, the camp spaces represent the crystallisation of the hybrid forms of political citizenship and ethnic memberships materialise. The political borders refugees crossed gradually become attached to the camp’s physical boundaries. Regardless of their temporal permeability, these boundaries convert into socio-cultural ones. Mohammad and his brother-in-law, for example, moved back to the Domiz camp from Duhok city despite their steady job there. “We know how to walk and talk here [in the camp]. We invested much money to build this unit. It is better to be here; we know each other [...] It feels right”, Mohammad noted.

Fragments of a recent past in Syria still find their way to the present reality. Most of the camp shops have banners that explain their services in Arabic¹⁴⁶ side by side with Sorani Kurdish. External cues such as businesses and stores named after famous Syrian TV shows and locations (Bab El Hara, Deriek, ...), the Syrian food shops offering Shawarma and Syrian Bread, and Arabic and Kurdish¹⁴⁷ music streaming from shops all blend together in the street and are hardly noticed by camp dwellers; it is just another feature of an ‘ordinary’ day. In other words, these visual and sensual cues become “emanations of [a] reality” and “fabricated representations of it” (B. Anderson, 2016). These different retrieval forms appear to (re)foster



Using the symbolism by painting Kurdish Flag to mark an entrance – Darashakran Refugee Camp, KR-I – Photo Credit: Layla Zibar, 2018

¹⁴⁵ The economic crisis became severe in relation to the war with ISIS, along with economic siege and the penalties executed by the Iraqi central government in the background related to the referendum enacted by KRG in September 2017.

¹⁴⁶ In Syria, Arabic is the official language taught in mandatory schooling, because the government banned Kurdish (Tejel, 2009).

¹⁴⁷ In the field work, the first author, being a Syrian Kurd, recognised songs by Fairouz, Um Kalthom (Arabic), Ciwan Haco and Zakaria Abdullah (Syrian-Kurdish).

a sense of connectedness, a reformation of identity that dwells in Nostalgia's existential and social domains;

to borrow Levitt's (2004) term, it is a matter of "redefining the boundaries of belonging". The refugees are homing the camp by bringing to it positive security attributes, (re)fostering former and new attachments, and bringing forward what they identify with culturally from the past and ascribe it to this fragile present. It appears that a broader sense of belonging to a homeland and a nation-state crystallises physically: an 'us' that (re)asserts familiarity and homes the camp.

8.8. To conclude: Syrian-Kurds' Refugee Camps in KR-I – Homes and Towns in the making


This chapter aimed to reveal the complexity of 'home' meanings and their material manifestation of homing refugeehood in KR-I Syrian refugee camps. First, the chapter introduced the perplexing multi-layered belonging of the displaced group in the host territory: nation-belonging and arrival in the longed-for 'fatherland' embodied in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq by the violent rupture from Syria, the former homeland and the country of citizenship. Second, it endeavoured to unfold this perplexity and understand the homing process; in this case, the chapter revisited the meaning of home in forced displacement by reframing it in relation to space and time. In doing so, it expanded on the borrowed conceptual frameworks of 'what is home' by Handel (2019) and on 'making home in displacement' by Brun and Fábos (2015) by adding to them the notion of 'dwelling' as using the camp's physical structure as a performative space. Furthermore, the chapter built on Wildschut et al.'s (2019) work on 'psychological functions of Nostalgia' to understand (re)anchoring and (re)rooting: in its existential, self-oriented, social and future oriented aspects that catered identity (re)formation when practised spatially.

In the case of Syrian-Kurdish refugee camps in the KR-I, the author followed the Refugee Camp Homing Cycle introduced earlier and linked it to the expanded conceptual frameworks to examine this cycle and the (re)articulation of home. This started by examining the refugee camps' case after the rupture by a crisis and crossing the nation-state borders from customary home and the former socio-political bonds. The uprooted groups act like floating fragments which land unplanned in a limbo of (new-set) temporary camps and tents as shelters. Temporary camp, provisional structures and unfamiliar physical surroundings reflect this unanchored arrival. The idea of bridging between the traces of former homes and the new alien realities appeared in the socio-spatial practices of re-assembling/re-uniting the former and new networks within the camp fixed grid and (re)form its material structures. Refugees involvement with camp upgrades and self-development programmes repeated in periodic rhythms plays a significant role in helping refugees to 'rest' their ruptured roots in the given space. Material vocabularies, symbols and personalised components reflect this resting and encourage the previous floating fragments to start to root. The bridging notion defined earlier is widened in this particular case to include bonding with the host through various forms of interlocking inter-dependencies and an (imagined) belonging tied to refugees' arrival to camps seeded to this specific geographic context.

The transition to anchoring in the camp is a result of spatial (re)calibrations processes enacted by the humanitarian regime, camp dwellers and the enabling material structures and programmes catalysing and conditioning these processes. As time goes by, re-setting everyday refugees' cyclical perception through work, near-future prospects and routinised activities, refugees start to recapture 'today' and

'tomorrow'. Indeed, by reconnecting with ones' past and (the immediate) future, being in the place and engaged in the act of building breaking the temporally frozen loops of waiting, this active forms of dwelling and laying roots reflect such anchoring. These (re)calibrations appear to be associated with references to spatial memory, recalled with different domains of the psychological functions of Nostalgia (in each (re)adjustment): what it should be, what it was, and what it could be. Refugees recalibrate the meaning of home, a lost one and one on the way back to another. On the individual level, it relates closely to the autobiographical story, the need to retrieve what was lost or to construct what could be.

Anchoring and homing in camps seem to expand for this particular group to (re)identify their - collective - belonging in the camps' locality within KR-I: the multi-layered generationally inherited belonging of being a Kurd; the situational one of being a Syrian refugee in KR-I; and the final home which has always existed 'somewhere else' and never 'here'. It is true that 'finding home' is the 'natural' reaction to uprootedness (Baum, 1900); the separation from home opened up the opportunity for an improbable future of an active belonging in Kurdistan to come forward. When asked about the future, camp refugees reply with answers varying between 'we are here now' and 'we belong here', 'I am at home somehow'. However, this identification with a possibility for a home in the KR-I locality could not blur the camps' temporary reality of refugees' status: home could have been here and there, but it is never fully here or there.






Kawagosk Refugee Camp, KR-I – Photo Credit: UNHCR, 2019

Started as temporary built environments to host the vulnerable, these planned camps appear to be taking steps towards permanence for the Syrian Kurds inhabiting and homing them. Indeed, these towns in the making are products of the KRG's willingness to accept 'brother and sisters'. These (re) productions ascribe to: the humanitarian actors spatial (upgrading) projects embedded with livelihood components, and the dwellers' efforts in participating in the spatial (re)production process. Nevertheless, the long-term scenarios for these emerging urbanities still linger in the unpredictable future for both the refugees and the host region. Becoming permanent in occupancy and physical structures does not hide their fractured forms of urbanity (Agier, 2002). These unfinished projects are susceptible to political statutes, funding fluctuations/declines, unfolding crises within geopolitical chronic instability, unsurprisingly, resulting in the reproduction of exhausted and fragile realities. Regardless of the efforts to promote resilience, most of these settlements' dwellers are still heavily aid-dependent, while other extensive funds and resources are committed to constructing temporary camps doomed to closure.

Part 4: Conclusion Remarks and Key Recommendations

Documented Forced displacement receiving sites in the Kurdistan region of Iraq since 1975 onwards. these emerging urbanites are live records of refuge seeking and granting practices, and mirror a historical and ongoing state of chronic displacement. (Author, 2022)



-  Roads
-  Water Bodies
-  Administrative boundaries
-  KRI Federal Boundaries
-  Main Cities
-  Humanitarian Camps (IDP, Refugees)
-  Collective Towns (1970s-1990)



Chapter 9

9. Rooting on Routes: Forced Displacements and Emerging Urbanities

9.1. Reflections

9.1.1. on Theoretical Framework:

In tracing the KR-I territorial forced displacement biography, one can observe the ways in which spatial insertions and removals have periodically reshaped the form of the territory (King, 2014; McDowall, 2020; van Bruinessen, 1992; White, 2017). Employing Corboz's (1983) urban landscape as a palimpsest, Gregotti (2009) 's architecture of the territory and Lefebvre's (1991) production of space as an initial analysis lens have indeed supported the examination of how forced displacements reshape territories and narratives. Using Corboz's (1983) and Gregotti's (2009) 's frames to examine the forms of the KR-I's territories and read them as palimpsests have been foundational for this research. These frames allowed us to trace the territorial (re)formations and the spatial aggregations in dialectical relations with shifting power structures. Involuntary dislocations, relocations, and time-space distortions appear on the KR-I's palimpsest as traceable inscriptions and continuously changing stories. The installations in the KR-I's (urban) landscapes are depositories of how the (dis)continuities of Kurds' presence in space and time are practised and (de) materialised. These installations have been products of conflicts in shifting territorial power structures, whether tribal or religious, emirates, empires, nation-states and political aspirations. Such shifts changed the form of the Kurds' inhabited areas, as they were concomitant with the erasing and rewriting of the territorial palimpsest: easing by (massive) destructions of customary homes' habitability and inscribing with routes that waves of displacees followed, and the (new) spaces that received them (Fischer-Tahir & Wagenhofer, 2017; King, 2014; Lange, 2022; Leezenberg, 2015; McDowall, 2020; van Bruinessen, 1992). Therefore, Periodic crises and instabilities seem to constitute a "norm" in the KR-I's case and layering its landscapes by the precarious mix of generational (dis)continuities.

Indeed, many of KR-I's receiving geographies appear on maps as constellations of spaces, settlements and networks' ensembles. The use of Lefebvre's (1991) production of space triade, therefore, supported the reading of the narratives of seeking/granting refuge. The conceived, perceived and lived triade served in understanding the categorical "brothers" and "guests" spatially by examining the ways in which the "right to" and the "right in" space and place are spatially practised. It helped by providing the lens to read the socio-spatial accommodation of the "(un) desirable others" materialised and progressed and how these "others" claimed rights to (temporarily) re-root in their receiving sites and structures through socio-spatial (re)appropriation. In the KR-I, making and appropriating were diverse endeavours of modernisation and development roots: oscillating from indigenous tribal guest houses and villages emanations, the spread of Sufi centres, forced emplacements and relocations in disciplinary spaces and settlements and arriving the protection spaces with standardised humanitarian interventions (Leezenberg, 2000, 2004; McDowall, 2020; van Bruinessen, 1992).

These sites' socio-spatial realities, progressed or decayed, are material registers of what and whom these displacements bring along. The combination of Corboz's (1983), Gregotti (2009) 's and Lefebvre's (1991) initial analysis lens did support the framing of how these realities came to be; however, they hardly served to capture the ways the objective and subjective time differed and operated in the fragmented socio-spatial settings. The initial frames that followed how linearity of past to future was challenged by the ethnographic fieldwork and interviews revealed. The data collected showcased that the future was changing the past, and both dismissed the present, all reflected in patchworked uncertain multi-scalar spatial frames (camp, refuge, tent), imposed binaries (refugee/host, temporary/permanent, us/other) and survival sociability. Delving deeper into the contextual complexities to build the stories across time and in space needed secondary frames of thinking, which were developed during the research: ruptures, time-space (dis)continuities, nostalgia and home. Using ruptures caused by the crisis as transition thresholds did shed light on how the post-rupture trajectories differed and fed the time perceptions and constructs, decisions of different inhabitation socio-spatial practices, (claiming) territorial rights and (re)setting inhabitation cycles.

Furthermore, combining these frames illuminated different factors, agencies, practices, and scales of the ways in which forced displacement receiving sites transform into emergent urbanities. These frames allowed reading how forced displacement urbanisms are (re)shaping not only the KR-I territory but also constructing its dwellers' political and lived realities. The displaced human condition and collective memories are preserved and morphed spatially, within and beyond different objective and subjective space-time frames.

9.1.2. Home no-where, somewhere.

Doing this research has indeed been a life-changing experience. Following the routes to find a "place" in the world revealed the different and constantly shifting and merging moods of belonging that "I" walking under a "researcher" hat can carry and experience. I changed hats at each physical border and social boundary: I was the traveller with a Syrian passport at nation-state borders with a European residency card. I was the "foreign" Syrian researcher from a European university when asking for ethical and research permission from the KRG authorities. I was a Kurdish-Syrian woman allowed into the camp dwellings as "one of us", and when the interviews started, I became "one of them". Finally, I have been just "another researcher" in humanitarian NGOs' cars to see the work done to support the displaced. Each of these hats was present at a specific time-space frame and absent in another; they were never present all the same moment.

Visiting the Fatherland in the KR-I, moving closer to the Syrian borders, staying in the camp and being displaced all made me question the definition of "home" at its core. I found myself unconsciously hunting ideas, images and signs representing what I once imagined as "home".

"Something about these mountains [in Duhok] is quite familiar, yet my past never had mountains [...]. The way people move treats time as ever-present, like an infinite resource. Walking alone in the camp at night was safe, yet, I still felt the eyes of the people following my unwelcome presence (as a single woman) this late. [...]."

I found that "my home" is everywhere, yet no-where. "Home" for me is scattered along routes, chipped and reshaped over and over, and scattered across Land. The fragments of what home "was" and "could

be" have surpassed the nation-state borders, yet these fragments are rooted in the spaces and places lived once in the past and once in the future, yet it is missing in my present.

9.2. Refuge practices and the (un)making of Kurdistan.

For the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, this research constructed a territorial biography from a forced displacement oscillating between the macro, mezzo and micro levels. The goal has been mainly to analyse the ways in which the articulation of answering the four Ws: where, when, why, and by whom refuge is articulated, between seeking and granting. Using these four Ws helped shed light on the materiality of what constructs a refuge, the time span of short, long, temporary, territorial and geographical distances and fixation and lastly, the constellation of actors and networks activating (self) rebuilding and homing processes.

9.2.1. Granting and denying refuge.

To seek refuge, whether pushed out by violence, forcibly displaced and/or persecuted, means to abandon one place in the world, a once known home, and get accustomed to a situational safety by landing in another. Depending on the hosting and political climate, this landing could be temporary or permanent.

To grant refuge means to carve a space to take in and help new arrivals in one's current home and constitute an enclave of protection to ensure the refuge seekers' arrival and well-being during this stay. This "taking" in and "protection" are yet 'time' constructed; it starts as temporary and might conditionally become prolonged and even timely unbound.

Nonetheless, the KR-I's forced displacement territorial biography revealed that seeking and granting refuge convey practises to claim power over the group, the land and the resources in place, by asserting end or expanding spheres of protection. These spheres of protection are territorially and specially bound, but they are also time constructed, and these space-time boundaries are not porous or unconditional for every protection seeker. They define who is "in" and who is "out": undesirable guests and potential brothers.

9.2.2. Brothers and (undesirable) Guests

Being a refuge seeker in the land does not automatically mean an unconditional stay. Access to land and resources is granted, conditioned and even denied by the hosts. In the KR-I's case, traditionally, such access is granted similar to religious (Islamic) customs, by being announced publicly in front of the hosting community by the figure of authority (Shoukri, 2010; van Bruinessen, 1992), and in our contemporary days, access is tied to the UNHCR forma and residency permit (Qadir, 2019; UNHCR Iraq, 2022b). This access also means that basic protection rights are granted, yet to be accepted, traditionally meant to be allowed to join every day in peace and conflict times (van Bruinessen, 1992). Interestingly, traditional practices survived the changing modes of sovereignty in the KR-I. Syrian Kurds, as refugees, had such access and acceptance; they are permitted to join the everyday by working with and for the hosts in peace times, while in war times, many sided with and joined the Kurdish Peshmerga in the recent wars against ISIS.

For the undesirables, access is usually denied to protect the boundaries of the power spheres. The need to protect from these undesirable results also in space-time confinement. These undesirables stay in known locations to the group for a specific period. Traditionally this period was three days in the village guests' house, conditioned by movement restrictions to obstruct interaction and protect the hosting group, and a safe passage till they depart the hosting territory within the time limits. In contemporary days in the KR-I, these space-time boundaries are related to paper of obstacles, movement restrictions and geographical distancing to minimise interaction. However, with overlapping protection spheres between the international humanitarian actors, the KRG and the Iraqi state, such space-time restrictions are spatially manifesting in geographical isolation, control gates and basic shelters. Despite the prolonged stay, the temporary here does not change with linear time progression. IDPs are stuck between being suspended and anchored; they live between the eventual and the inevitable, and their roots may only rest temporarily, with limited aid and support in the 'here and now'. After all, there is no home for them here.

9.2.3. Making Space, Places and Communities

Granting refuge in traditional times meant making a place for the new potential members: villages' lands and their structures absorbed the newcomers, and in turn, the newcomers' presence also led to the group's growth and even territorial expansion as new satellite villages emanated from the original receiving ones enmeshing the territory (van Bruinessen, 1992).

For contemporary camps in the KR-I, making spaces and places included planning with expectations of fixity and growth. Temporary spaces (in town's schools and administrative buildings) and camps (such as Arbat and Bahkra) (REACH & UNHCR Iraq, 2013) were only transitional loci and a short waiting phase for a more proper stay (REACH & Iraq, 2013; REACH & UNHCR Iraq, 2013). Geographically allocating the land was proportional to the territorial sphere of the KRG. Places for the brothers were set close to former collective settlements (such as Qushtapa and Kawergosk) with a future vision of integration (Al-Khateeb & UNHCR Iraq, 2022; UNHCR Iraq, 2021). Furthermore, with the increasing numbers of arrivals, the allocation was also building camps in empty lands, in the cases of Darashakran and Gawilan camps (ACTED, 2013; REACH & UNHCR Iraq, 2013). These camps timely unbound presence, seen as permanent by the KRG, are just another assertion of their control over the territory.


On-site, making place included setting infrastructures for a prolonged presence collaboration between the KRG and humanitarian actors in setting these structures in terms of financing, planning, and construction, allowed to speed up this building process. The direct physical act of building steered a whole range of chain effects that supported building communities, both hosts and refugees, by being involved in the building process, whether by the active physically constructing through hiring labour and service providers or by building capacities through training and feeding professional experiences through employments. Beyond the camps' boundaries, making a place on a territorial scale was translated into making connections and facilitating possibilities of more durable encounters and engagements between the host and the displacees. Highways, roads, wastewater treatment plants, schools and health primary centres that serve both populations, encouraging refugees and local partnerships, all seemingly heading towards community building (JICA, 2018; KRG, 2020; UNHCR, 2020b; UNHCR Iraq, 2022a).

Furthermore, the international humanitarian actors and interventions did indeed support in times of crisis and ruptures. With the overturn of events of 1991 and 2003, these interventions did subvert the forcibly displaced receiving spaces in meanings and use. Many of the collective towns built for disciplinary and exclusionary purposes became later loci for hospitality and inclusion (Francesca Recchia, 2014; UN Habitat, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2022). Between humanitarian development programmes since the 1990s, many of these locations stabilised and grew despite their violent history, becoming spaces of protection in various moments of crisis absorbing unexpected displacements and accommodating people in need (DRC, 2013; Genat, 2013; Moldoch, 2017; Recchia, 2012; UNHCR, 2007a).

Despite the restrictive political climate imposed by the central government of Iraq on the progression and development of such projects, displacedes' presence and steps towards their inclusion or indeed a factor of the region's progression.

9.2.4. Inhabiting and homing the camp.

The presence and intensity of help practices and networks condition how time is perceived and projected between getting by (circular), making do (cyclical) and moving ahead (linear). Nevertheless, in each phase, crisis and/or conflict-induced forced displacement does indeed alter the ways in which geographies, time, populations and urban forms are conceived, perceived, lived and (re)coded with meaning (Martin et al., 2020; Ramadan, 2010; Zibar et al., 2022). These alterations are grasped after the space-time ruptures accelerate help practices and (re)capturing (distorted) timelines, all reframed between memories of former habitual homes and the new (temporary) ones in the making (Brun, 2015; Brun & Fábos, 2015; Bshara, 2014; Musmar, 2021). Being in a place after rupture despite the hosts' efforts is also conditioned by the ways in which the displaced recaptures time after distortion. Different stories in chapters 7 and 8 showed that the questions of foreseen and unforeseen futures guided displacees' (spatial) practises to partially pass through space-time discontinuity resulting from crisis disruptions and rapture distortions. In general, to recapture time and develop modes of continuity, landing in the camp even temporarily gave a kick start foreign inhabitation process to take course. As the former chapters have exhibited, this process has been conditioned by the hosting practices in relation to the camp's occupational groups: the undesirable guests and the potential brothers.



Inhabiting the camp: theoretical frame to rethink how the displacees arrive to the camp, and which phases they go through, and which ones they get stuck with. This frame is developed for refugees and IDPs and can be tested in non-camp forced displacements (Author, 2022).

9.2.4.1. Ruptured and uprooted by crises.

As crisis-induced forced displacement causes the dislocation of time-space trajectories for different affected scales and groups, it also means the deviation and relocation of these trajectories. This relocation by violent choiceless separation causes frictions and ruptures of spatiotemporally embedded bonds depending on its timespan and distance. Lived and perceived time in humanitarian camps are deeply influenced by inherited realities of such frictions and ruptures. Losing these relational anchorages redirects trajectories towards finding new ones. For both categories, landing in the camps' basic shelters emphasises the state of uprootedness and rupture in a harsh contrast between how it was and how it came to be. Such contrast has been hard to grasp in short periods; as such, every action of the displacees is guided by contingencies and fed by aid practices present within camps' boundaries.

9.2.4.2. Suspended and unanchored in the camp

After the rupture from customary homes (networks), the uprooted groups act like floating fragments which land unplanned in a limbo of (new-set) temporary camps and transit sites. Accommodated in basic shelters, in the emergency phase, the camp's make-shift structures and unfamiliar physical surroundings reflect a state of suspension and experienced frozen loops of waiting. In this state, the actors' actions are limited by inevitabilities and eventualities of bodily protection and existential needs.

By pausing in place, the displacees experience of frozen now resets to a cyclical time, partially slowing down to catch up with the linear passing. Recapturing time as such helps in shaking off the limbo shock and steers the displacees actions to start to familiarise themselves with their unanchored presence. With routinised and intensified aid and solidarity practices, materially, these actions and perceptions steer spatial practices of improvising and adjusting to the given to suit the inevitable needs of a today and an eventual tomorrow.

In all cases, the degree of spatial progression in this phase and transition to the next is heavily conditioned by the fluctuating top-down support and solidarity practises and relying heavily on in-group care (if it existed) in degrees of isolation of camp spaces. For the undesirable guests, root resting is surrounded by uncertainties in a temporary time frame with a restrictive political climate, which pushes for camp closure and repatriation. As such, the undesirables are stuck, unanchored and in a constant state of stagnation and waiting; there is no probability of 'building' a home here.

Similar to the (undesirable) guests, desirable guests and refugees arrive at the camp and experience suspension and un-anchorage. However, time spans for transitions are shorter; the transition from being unanchored is permitted by the welcoming political climate, minimum restrictions, and constituency of interactions with the host communities crossing the camps' boundaries. The frequency of the human and non-human theory inflows come other provided, and they give to self-build, and the opportunities coming from support and collaboration allow the inhabitation process to start and continue smoother and faster than the ones in the IDP camps.


9.2.4.3. Bridging

Humanitarian rhythms and help practices activate the agency of human and non-human actors and play a significant role in helping refugees to 'rest' their ruptured roots in the given space as the response addresses the post-emergency phase. Nostalgia provides visual imprints for bridging the traces of former homes and the new alien realities. Bridging appears in the socio-spatial practices of re-assembling/re-uniting the former, and new networks within the camp fixed grids and (re)form the given. Refugees start adapting and building guided by probable needs of things likely to happen, spatially manifesting in more durable materials of metal frames and adding new spaces to the basic shelters. With the current knowledge of what could happen, refugees' spatial practices support (re)aligning the cyclical time to the linear one and moving along slowly to plausible futures. Material vocabularies, symbols and personalised components reflect this resting and encourage the previous floating fragments to start to root.






9.2.4.4. Anchoring and Rooting

The transition to anchoring in the camp results from probabilities and plausibilities of a protracted foreseen future. As time goes by, resetting everyday refugees' cyclical perception through work, near-future prospects and routinised activities, refugees start to recapture the spiral time of capturing a 'tomorrow' beyond the 'now' but also reconnecting with the past. Refugees continue the building, but then they are guided by possible needs of things that might happen, spatially consolidating the former adaptation, replacing the rest of provisional materials and (re) articulating shelter spaces further to suit a more communal presence. Indeed, by reconnecting with one's past and (the immediate) future, being in the place and engaged in the act of building and dwelling. These (re)calibrations appear to be associated with references to spatial memory. Self-oriented and social Nostalgia domains (De Brigard, 2017; Wildschut et al., 2019) reactivate the sense of self-worth and direct practices for connectedness: unfinished spaces become assemblages of what they should be, what it was, and what they could be. Camp dwellers (re)produce images of many homes in this present: collages of a lost one and one in the making, driven by the need to retrieve what was lost and/or to construct what could have been.

With the current knowledge of what could happen, refugees' spatial practices support (re)aligning the cyclical time to the linear one and moving along slowly to plausible futures. Anchoring and homing in camps expands to (re)identify their -collective – belonging and territorial scales of home within unforeseen prospects. When asked about the future, camp refugees reply with answers varying between 'we are here now' and 'we belong here' and 'I am at home somehow'. In the KR-I camps and preposterous belonging to a united Kurdistan: home could have been here and there, but it is never fully here or there.



Humanitarian Camp Phase	Preparedness & Contingency	Transit Emergency	Emergency	Post-Emergency	Care and Maintenance	Durable Solutions	Exit strategies
Time Experienced		Emergency Response	Shock Limbo	Humanitarian Rhythm	Situational Everyday	Protracted Displacement	New home ?
Practices Guiding Criteria		Contingency	Inevitability	Eventualities	Probabilities	Plausibility	Possibilities
Occupational Group		Undesirable Guest Desirable Guest (Potential) Bother	Undesirable Guest Desirable Guest (Potential) Bother	Undesirable Guest Desirable Guest (Potential) Bother	Desirable Guest (Potential) Bother	(Potential) Bother	(Potential) Bother
Help Practices		Aid Solidarity Care Collaboration Support	Aid Support - Care Solidarity Collaboration	Aid Support Care Solidarity Collaboration	Support Collaboration Aid Care Solidarity	Support Collaboration Aid - Care Solidarity	Collaboration Support Care Aid
Provided Shelter		Basic/Emergency Tent	Basic/Emergency Tent Winterization Kit	Improved Shelter	Improved Shelter Materials for self-upgrade	Upgraded Shelter	



9.3. In practice: Camps and Chronic Crisis in the KR-I

Chronologically tracing involuntary dislocation and relocation triggers and waves within the KR-I boundaries emphasised the chronic crisis character tied to its territories. Being situated in geographies with ever-shifting sovereignties' spheres, the KR-I's (urban) landscapes have been in constant (re)configurations of in-out forced displacements and (re)placements. Furthermore, the KR-I territorial biography outlined that despite the change of regime, chronic conflict and involuntary dislocations are features of the KR-I, being both producers and receivers of forced displacement movements (King, 2014), with partial and/or complete rupture from their former habitat. Forced displacement receiving sites, as a consequence, are in constant reincarnations, reproduced in different purposes and meanings sharing similar features: iron-grid schemes and layouts, care /control mentality, with no future beyond stretched 'now'. Despite these features, the potentials of these receiving (infra)structures (including camps), with prolonged (unplanned) survival, were sites to operate and activate help between the humanitarian and development, and (a quasi) state (re)building in the KR-I.

Through examining different periods and (socio-spatial) endeavours of development, confinement, relief, reconstruction, rehabilitation and humanitarian models, the chronic conflict attributes of relative stabilities with interruptions of shocks and waves of crises and emergencies seem to incapacitate any long-term visions of reconstruction, rehabilitation or integration. Such attributes, cascades of following crises, result in fragile socio-economics, exhausted (physical) infrastructures and aid-dependent populations (both displacees and hosts). The situation for the sites' components and host contexts is in continuous and incremental degradation.

9.3.1. Camps for the displaced: effective response or new problems?

Born out of chaos and needing a 'fast deployable solution' to 'manage and provide' (Herz, 2013), planned camps/settlements set anew were indeed top-down tools to address the refugee and displacees influx of the KR-I. These sites' physical and soft components differed based on the geopolitical and expected duration. Similar to pre-modern times, the hosting practices reflected the host's (future) perception of the displaced groups: (potential) brothers or (undesirable) guests. However, the interaction between its components (the hard and the soft) activated by the site users' help and inhabitation practices (operators and dwellers) has been the primary determinant of spatial progression.

9.3.1.1. Safe Havens, Opportunities and Interdependencies

In the KR-I, forced displacement receiving sites find roots in exhausted, conflict-ridden contexts. Acknowledging this historical lesson, the current policies regarding these sites seem to incorporate a hybrid form of former camp and settlement paradigms and neo-liberal ideas of (partially) self-built models. The flexibility of the grided layouts, the explicit relief and the (implicit) development logic indeed eased the response in the emergency phase of sheltering and covering survival needs. With the intensive presence of various help practices, forced displacement receiving sites seem to represent enclaves of opportunities to 'make do' in the waiting - especially in the initial phases- these sites act as magnets for the forcibly displaced.

The agency of human and non-human actors has been in tandem to activate the conceived spaces for help and humanitarian aid within the changing limitations of the political climate in the KR-I. Hosting and

help practices, interdependency nodes and networks were geographically embedded and embodied within former and newly set displacement receiving sites. Former structures (Domiz Mouskar), former *mojama'at* (collective towns Queshtapa, Arbat, Basirma, Bahrika), and decommissioned temporary camps (Bardarash and transit Arabt camps) played an essential role in providing spaces for displaced temporary reception, shelter and more prolonged stay within their locations existing and (periodically) vacant structures (DRC, 2013; Recchia, 2012; UNHCR Iraq, 2012e). Hosting practices were (re)articulated for the newly set camps depending on the occupational group. On the one hand, for the temporary camps of (undesirable) guests, the LHR focused on providing basic needs and short-term ad-hoc (spatial) interventions, where the dwellers are perceived as the recipients of aid, and their appropriation of spaces fit the probabilities to repatriate. On the other hand, for (semi) permanent camps of desirable guests and brothers, the LHR have longer-term visions of physical upgrades and integration with the host, where the dwellers are perceived as a component to be incorporated in the upgrade project (participation, employment, investment), and the appropriation of their spaces fit the prospects to stay (UNHCR Iraq, 2018c; Yassen, 2019).

So far, the intensity of such humanitarian operations has also stimulated various projects and economic opportunities to serve both populations: the displaced and host (communities). These upgrade projects are enacted directly and indirectly on various scales: support of large infrastructural projects (highways and road construction and rehabilitation, waste management and wastewater treatment plants, electricity projects, ..), area-based interventions and communities (re)building in (urban) areas where camps exist (for instance, UNHCR A2PS projects serving Kawergosk camp and town (former collective) in-camp construction projects and the support of self-built models. Such projects come with intensive institutional cooperation (with KRG departments and ministries), funding (local) NGOs, contracts for local (construction) companies, bids for goods provision, and training programs open for the displaced and the hosts (JICA, 2018; KRG, 2020; UNHCR, 2020b; UNHCR Iraq, 2021, 2022a). Last but not least, all users have some sort of employment opportunities, whether through the staff hiring process (locals and refugees) within (international) NGOs, short-term contracts in and outside of camp, and CFW for camp dwellers.

9.3.1.2. (Re)generated Problems?

Short or long life-span, planned or not, these camps/settlements still impose, just like any habitat, pressure on natural resources and livelihood opportunities, while their infrastructures still fall short in terms of service provision with the gradual retractions of funding (Grafham & Lahn, 2018). In chronic conflict zones, such as the KR-I, the funding retraction is also linked with the need to work with other refugee crises and help other groups with repatriations (Crisp, 2003). According to World Bank (2015), these humanitarian camps cost hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars between installation, operation, and stabilisation. Despite the intensive efforts, these camps' emergence and population growth in a very short time have undoubtedly added unprecedented pressure on the region's fragile socio-ecological infrastructures. The same reports acknowledge the irrevocable ecological impact affecting the land, surface water, and livelihoods of the historically vulnerable region (World Bank, 2015). Such problems resurface in all camp contexts, and there have been urgent and unexpected problems in the continuous need for correction moves and a quick fix. In the absence of a continuous presence of nurturing milieu

with such fragilities and threats, the aspiration to link relief and development to achieve sustainability and resilience that neglects these interruptions' frequency. Moreover, the nature of the provision leading consumption-based practices barely considers the sustainability models beyond mitigation. Despite their attempts, the camp operators' linear spatial provision policies and the forcibly displaced habits of endurance seem to go into a vacuum.

Therefore, adding camps/settlements in such crippling situations will only (re)produce unfinished urban forms and human conditions, both relying heavily on humanitarian responses, with irreversible impacts on the land and the ecological system, all in endless need of a 'boost'.

9.4. The Myth of Sustainability in Contemporary Refugee Situations

Planning to sustain is not a new concept; it has been the centre of urban planning academia and practices for decades. The particularity of (forced) displacement and the promotion of self-sustaining (displacement) sites dated back to the earliest designs of cities of refuge to post-war mass housing projects, significantly accelerated after WWI and intensified after WWII (Lewis, 2016). However, changing the 'refugee' and IDP figures from victims of circumstances into a temporary (political) presence challenges these sustainability concepts' application to move beyond green-washing foils. These definitions dramatically impacted the built environment's characters that receive the displaced populations, between reverting to temporariness and moving along promises of permanency. Being situated in chronic conflict zones, naturally, the humanitarian response can only bypass the human vessel upkeep by rethinking possibilities of 'sustainability' purposes that the displacement receiving site may uphold.

9.4.1. Failing to Sustain

The IHR has advocated sustainable approaches and durable solutions for the forcibly displaced groups to align with the SDGs (UNHCR, 2016b, 2016c). In 2018, the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) emphasised the need to ease pressure on the host countries and enhance refugees' self-reliance (United Nations, 2018). This future-oriented thinking has invited many initiatives to (re)apply, (re)develop, and (re)tailor 'sustainable solutions' in these camps/settlements (UNHCR, 2014, 2016c). The LHR practices in the KR-I camps range from reusing old caravans to developing more 'durable' dwelling typologies to facing harsh winters on the dwelling unit level. Moreover, on the infrastructural level, the LHR aim to follow 'a more conscious approach' to include solar panels, wastewater separation (black-grey), small-medium scale decentralised wastewater treatment systems and reuse of water for small-sized agricultural activities. At the same time, such practices have been backed up with institutional and community capacity building and skills upgrades. The aim is that the forcibly displaced reach resilience and self-sufficiency as the humanitarian mission phases out.


Nevertheless, in chronic conflict zones, these attempts still lack a feasible milieu for effective activation, feasible markets and (profitable) employment opportunities to accumulate means for a safe return or achieve a viable integration. Despite the efforts of different ad-hoc projects and piece-meal interventions, such solution 'solutions' did not bypass the temporary time-space boundaries, acting as a low-quality bandage on an inflammatory problem. As such, all factors combined, the existing solutions mismatch the unstable contexts and hinder any practical and effective sustainability steps. As long as humanitarian and development approaches in such regions are locked in linear processes and rely on fragile settings, the existing problems are expected to (re)surge and multiply for the displaced and host population and threaten the (local) ecological system at large.

9.4.2. Circularity: a Correction Move?

Circularity, as an approach to "rethink from the ground" (OECD, 2020), has been portrayed as a practical correction move to the misuse of natural resources and drastic effects feeding the global climate crisis (Ellen MacArthur Foundation, 2019). By promising to make amends to "overcome the contradiction between economic and environmental prosperity" (Pomponi & Moncaster, 2017), the Circular Economy

(CE) is rising to the stage as an inclusive concept that promotes 'a well-being vision of tomorrow'. CE aligns economic flourishing with the SDGs "where no one is left behind." This alignment has also been central to the engagement policy and commitments to the SDGs and 2030 agenda announced by UNHCR (2019a) through developing 'strategic guidance to UNHCR field operations.' that aspires for inclusivity (UNHCR, 2019c). The guidance note includes advocating and supporting different goals that ensure 'adequate access for housing, basic services, equitable sanitation, clean water, clean energy, and economic growth.' in order to include the vulnerable groups and reduce inequalities aiming to reach inclusive, sustainable cities and communities (UNHCR, 2019a, 2019c).


Circular thinking starts by looking and acting into the present as a proactive rather than a preventative measure. It marches to rebalance resource scarcities and ecological impacts while revitalising local and regional economies (Calisto Friant, Vermeulen, & Salomone, 2020). Recent studies embarked on exploring circularity in the built environments proposing frameworks for designing with (urban and material) flows and resources management (Athanassiadis, 2017; Marin & De Meulder, 2018; Pomponi & Moncaster, 2017; Williams, 2019). By bringing urbanism to the circularity table, Marin and De Meulder (2018) for example, suggest that the urban landscape design discipline has the capacity to work with place-specifies and tap on concealed multi-scaler transition relations to become drivers for circular thinking.



UNEP Circularity Approach: the Circular economy processes (UNEP, 2020)

For circular models to function and be attained, Calisto Friant et al. (2020) proposed the “Circular Society” term, accentuating societal dynamics’ importance in realistic visions of circularity. Hence, including societal aspects within resources’ sustainable loops of “wealth, knowledge, technology and power [...] circulated and redistributed throughout society.” (Pomponi & Moncaster, 2017) through circular behaviours oriented towards value retention options: Refuse (R0), Reduce (R1), Re-sell/Reuse (R2), Repair (R3), Refurbish (R4), Re-manufacture (R5), Re-purpose/Rethink (R6), Re-cycle (R7), Recover (R8), Re-mine (R9) (Reike, Vermeulen, & Witjes, 2018).

Planned displacement camps and settlements are, by nature, designed as reduced forms of urbanity to support basic needs. Through cuts and reductions of physical, operative, and consumption patterns to a minimum standard of prolonged ‘right-now’ solutions, the users aim to keep these lifesaving machines operative (Boano, Matén, & Sierra, 2018; Genel, 2006). However, these sites, as the former chapter exhibited, share with cities being places where users live, consume, dispose and work (international, local, and displaced). Through the historical review of the interaction between the contextual conditions, political climate, meanings, and the spatial progression of such receiving sites, one central fact remains the same: the ensembles grided layouts with the adaptive capacity to be (re)calibrated and act as enablers. This fact manifests on different scales of these (re)adjustments and (re)uses vary: everything flows to the camp and keeps finding ways to embody a physicality.




Flow of materials into Domiz refugee camp in the KR-I at the early stages of displacement, including aid, materials, goods and second hand appliances donated by the host community. Within the camp, different moods of recycling, refurbishing and reusing took place to upgrade the physical environment. (Author, 2021).

9.4.3. The Forcibly Displaced Endurance Practices

Different ad-hoc practices of various international and local NGOs take place in these sites with announced aims to make life bearable, serve the displaced, and enable them to support themselves. The scarcity of these provisions, retraction of aid, and/or existence of different forms of capital and networks push the forcibly displaced groups to take the matter into their own hands and readjust their spaces (Bshara, 2014). Value retention is embedded and developed within the dwellers' strategies and habits to endure and make do. Endurance practices include reducing (material) waste and (if possible) maximising gains by carefully examining and exhausting the existing (objects) before becoming disposable waste. Everything can be repaired, refurbished, reused and repurposed: in the displacement camp; the deteriorated tent fabrics become temporary roofs isolations, corrugated sheets become additional (internal) spatial divisions or demark spaces for communal and commercial activities, donated clothes are reused and upcycled, while second-hand appliances get refurbished and are sold in the camps-market. The dynamics and presence of these endurance practices relate primarily to spatial and material flows, and with the presence of aid, it fills the missing gaps and creates foundations for a circular society.

Zooming out and exploring larger geographical scales, many cases have accentuated the use of vacant existing structures as opportunities. Mining the remaining materials from destroyed villages to build new shelters in Rizgary (Sumud) (Moldoch, 2017), recovering power plants in Zakho (R. J. Brown, 1995), reusing Domiz Mouskar and Qushtapa town vacant structures (REACH & UNHCR Iraq, 2013), and (re)mining, recovering and reusing transitory and temporary camp sites to accommodate refugees and IDPs waves (Reach, 2019). These practices seem to fall in the right direction to prioritise a contextual-based circular approach (Lacovidou & Purnell, 2016).



Flow of materials into Basirma refugee camp in the KR-I at the early stages of displacement, t. (Author, 2021).

9.5. Towards a Self-sustaining Paradigms New Camps/Settlements for Chronic Conflict

Though thinking of camps/settlements as isolated geographies is problematic, it would be interesting to think of their infrastructures as such. It appears that camps/settlements act, even with conditioned presence and capacities, as loci of opportunities to (re)tailor such understandings or circularity. These sites' optimised design, scale, and (semi) isolation can be seen as an opportunity to apply such circular 'systematic shift' to slow down, narrow, and close consumption loops to become independent sites. Earlier camps and organised settlement models in the 1960-1970s highlighted such possibilities (Armstrong, 1990; Cuny, 1977). The idea is to incorporate decentralised infrastructural solutions retrofitted on multiple scales (communities, blocks, sectors/villages, camps/settlements). Developing fast responses and flexible prototypes of components for the emergency phases to be upgraded and scaled up while considering the possibilities for design for (dis)assembly (Rios, Chong, & Grau, 2015). By definition:

"Design for Disassembly is the design of buildings to facilitate future changes and dismantlement (in part or whole) for recovery of systems, components and materials, thus ensuring the building can be recycled as efficiently as possible at the end of its life-span. The strategy builds on an increasing acknowledgement of the fact that the majority of the built environment has a limited life-span and that every building represents a depository of resources, which, rather than ending up in a landfill, should find their way back into the "reduce, reuse, recycle" loop" (Cutieru, 2020).

Therefore, readjusting camp designs, construction phasing, and spatial interventions between phasing out and decommissioning would be a more practical approach than the unattainable goal of the UNHCR Hand-Book for Emergencies to "ensure the site is returned to its previous condition" (UNHCR, 2020f)

Furthermore, it is paramount to (re)assess and investigate complementary structures' needs to ensure that designing does not leave the residual waste untreated on a larger scale (recycling, faecal sludge treatment, wastewater treatment..). Several innovative solutions and ideas are already emerging in applied research and practice within this frame of thinking. For example, BORDA has been developing septic bags designed for emergencies to treat wastewater for safe disposal. These bags can be replaced and scaled up to reuse the wastewater treated for agricultural purposes (BORDA, 2018). Similarly, solar farms are set to reduce fuel use to run camps: Zaatari Camp has a solar farm to supply the camp with power (UNHCR, 2019a). Scaling down the panels' use on a refugee dwelling and block level could also save maintenance costs for large solar farms and reduce consumption on a domestic level, electricity costs and co2 emissions of generators (Guardian, 2015). These complementary structures serve both: the displaced and the host. This thinking can bring new light to the possibilities of maintaining enormous humanitarian expenditure to set up and run these sites and recirculate the values within its spaces and users.

10. Key Recommendations for humanitarian practitioners

This research aimed to chronologically trace forced displacement receiving sites between the conceived, perceived and lived in the KR-I through intersecting lenses of crises, ruptures, seeking/granting refuge practices, interruptions and (in)stabilities. The lessons learnt from the particularity are enormous, and many still need to be unearthed. Still, a few key recommendations are due, and they are as follows:

- 1) It is essential to analyse Chronic Conflict in space-time frames: identify the relatively stable (territorial) pockets, emergency rhythms hosting and help practices, and moods of interdependencies. This analysis will support designing spatial configurations that suit the displacements' temporality, relief and development responses. Many chronic crises today fit into such descriptions, including Syria, Afghanistan, Yemen, Sudan, etc.
- 2) Within the reality of unexpected flows of displacees in such (periodically) unstable geographies, there is a need to rethink what is temporary and what is fixed in terms of spaces and occupational groups. Groups can be hosted in fixed transit spaces for temporary waiting (Several days to a few months). Such spaces can be mapped of seasonally or permanently vacant sites and structures. These spaces can help support the efforts of humanitarian workers and local governments to respond fast to displacement with minimum pressure on host communities' structures.
- 3) Mapping existing localities that need economic boosts to support hosting newcomers, to benefit from human and non-human flows and the (in)direct economic boosts and employment opportunities.
- 4) Generally, the presence of the forcibly displaced Camp/ settlement generates opportunities for the forcibly displaced and host communities. Hence, there is a need for further research on the ways in which such opportunities can self-regenerate with the retraction of funding to support self-reliance and expand to the potential of (financial) improvements. These improvements support the safe return as well as practical integration.
- 5) Incorporate decentralised solutions to work on camps/settlement levels that can be expanded and enlarged with complementary structures to become enablers and support the healing of fragile contexts.
- 6) Thinking of possibilities within the limitations. Help and homing practices of the forcibly displaced emerge within their situations' conditionalities; hence they develop know-how through spatial practices to readjust spaces on their perception of need and socio-economic and spatial habits of endurance. Further research is needed to map and understand effective ways to incorporate such habits within humanitarian and development responses.
- 7) Sustainability in chronic conflict can hardly be achieved as a linear process, and it is paramount to rethink the meaning beyond service or end product. Further research is needed to investigate and test how the sustainability steps can be retrofitted to the time-space structures of sudden shocks, prolonged crises and relative stabilities.

- 8) It is recommended to revisit Cuny's concepts and (re)tailor them to become paradigms of self-sustaining camps/settlements incorporating and testing circular thinking to achieve self-regenerating economies.
- 9) With the ever-growing housing needs, it would be paramount to develop strategic approaches for the newly set (infra)structures for future expansions and use. Hence, it is recommended to set the infrastructure according to re-activation ideas.
- 10) Further research is needed to develop new paradigms of camps and settlements adopting the circular thinking of closing the short loops of value retention, consumption and waste on communities and blocks and camps scales.

* * *

More focused research is required to understand the role of camps/settlements within chronic conflict situations. The need is to grasp the reality of the ways in which emergency and relative (in)stabilities structure a modified time-space, and fragmented existences (de) materialised. In combination with intensive research for tailored solutions, the practical knowledge of camps/settlements field operators and dwellers can provide insights into possibilities within limitations. This know-how will feed into developing paradigms incorporating circular concepts for such sites to become self-sustaining settlements. Building on that, embrace the camp/settlement's role to bring these patches together and stretch to be dependent upon as enablers of the healing processes.

* * *

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