

The Iranian Bazaar as a Public Place: A Reintegrative Approach and a Method Applied Towards the Case Study of the Tabriz Bazaar

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by

Solmaz Yadollahi, M.Arch.

From Tehran, Iran

First Supervisor: Prof. Dr.-Ing. Silke Weidner

Second Supervisor: Prof. Dipl.-Ing. Heinz Nagler

External Examiner: Prof. Dr.-Ing. Michael Kloos

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Declaration

I, Solmaz Yadollahi, hereby declare that this dissertation was prepared and completed by myself and only with the use of the cited sources. This research has not been presented before, for the purpose of achieving an academic degree at the Brandenburg University of Technology Cottbus-Senftenburg or any other university.

Solmaz Yadollahi

Cottbus, Germany

September 15, 2017

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Solmaz Yadollahi', is written over the printed name and date.

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Abstract

The bazaar is an interwoven social and physical network, constructed through centuries of ongoing relations between the bazaar community, the states, the regular public and other actors, such as the *vaqf* supervisors and the religious clergy. Largely considered a privately owned commercial institution, the bazaar is a social and physical entity that is constantly interacting with its political, economic, social, and physical environment.

During the pre-modern era, the Iranian bazaar was the main public place, an integrated part, and the spine of the commercial city. However, the interactions of the bazaar with the interdependent political, economic, social, and urban management changes in the last century have altered its function within the city and created a growing gap between the bazaar and the city. By focusing on the bazaars in the Iranian commercial cities, this research explains the process that created this gap by introducing the concept of the *bazaar-city isolation process*. This thesis suggests that as an ongoing result of the *bazaar-city isolation process*, Iranian bazaars are facing a crisis regarding maintaining their meaning and function in the modern cities.

The forces that have created and directed this process are explored, arguing that if these causes exist today and continue to exist in the future, the isolation process will also continue. The only way to slow down and eventually stop this process is to target the factors causing its existence and continuance. This dissertation focuses on the issues derived from the contemporary centralized management system. Through a critical reflection on the traditional owner-centered management system and the modern state-centered management system in the bazaar, it is concluded that none of these top-down approaches have prevented or restrained the *bazaar-city isolation process*. By providing a multidimensional understanding of the bazaar and the problem it is facing, it is argued that the quality of the public presence within the bazaar significantly influences the bazaars meaning and function in the modern city. In this context, it is explained that today, bazaars are suffering from the lack of social capital because of the fact that the social diversity is limited within them. *Approaching the Iranian bazaar as a public place* offers a contribution towards adopting management strategies, to reintegrate the old bazaar with the modern city.

The methodology of this research is designed based on a qualitative approach, with a single case-study strategy. A combination of literature review and spatial ethnographic research techniques are used for data collection. Although the methodological approach of this work is interpretive and qualitative, in a few cases, quantitative observation techniques are applied in the fieldwork to test and support the qualitative results.

The main finding of this research is a methodological framework for assessing and mapping the fabric of bazaars in the Iranian commercial cities as public places. The presented method is designed based on indicators showing the publicity and privacy of spaces in terms of the four factors of *use*, *physical accessibility*, *ownership*, and the *local territory-defining culture*. The results of mapping out the bazaar regarding the mentioned four factors are juxtaposed to produce a map showing the publicity–privacy spectrum in a bazaar.

This mapping method is modified specifically for and applied towards the case of the Tabriz Bazaar. It is a tool to understand the current levels of responsibilities, rights, and vulnerabilities of public and private actors within different zones of the bazaar. In practice, it can be used as an expert-citizen communication tool, when the issue of power-balance is important or problematic. The ultimate aim of designing this mapping method is to offer a contribution towards the reintegration of the old bazaar with the modern city.

Keywords: Iranian bazaar, bazaar-city isolation process, public place, publicity-privacy spectrum, mapping method, Tabriz Bazaar

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List of Abbreviations

AIOC: Anglo-Iranian Oil Company

APOC: Anglo-Persian Oil Company

CG: Council of Guilds

ICC: City Council of Tabriz

ICHHTO: Iranian Cultural Heritage Handicrafts and Tourism Organization

ICHO: Iranian Cultural Heritage Organization

M: Municipality

MBTB: Management Base of the Tabriz Bazaar

MIT: Massachusetts Institute of Technology

MRUD : Ministry of Roads and Urban Development

NCCI: National Cartography Center of Iran

OEAO: Owqaf and Endowment Affairs Organization

PG: Provincial Governor

PPS: Project for Public Space

RUDO: Roads and Urban Development Organization

SCM: Steering Committees of Mosques in the bazaar

SCUPA: Supreme Council of Urban Planning and Architecture

SH: Solar Hijri Calendar

SWOT: Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats

THBC: Tabriz Historic Bazaar Complex

UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization

List of Persian and Turkish terms related to the bazaar

Persian	Turkish	Definition
<i>Bazaarcheh</i>	<i>Bazaarcha</i>	A cluster bazaar.
<i>Bazaari</i>	<i>Bazaari</i>	A prominent and influential merchant in the bazaar community.
<i>Chahar Sough</i>	<i>Chahar Sough</i>	An important junction of two <i>rastehs</i> .
<i>Dalan</i>	<i>Dalan</i>	A covered wide corridor, which has a connecting and commercial function in the bazaar.
<i>Dokkan</i>	<i>Dokkan</i>	A shop.
<i>Hammam</i>	<i>Hammam</i>	A bathhouse.
<i>Hojreh</i>	<i>Hojra</i>	A small room located along <i>rastehs</i> and in other buildings in the bazaar. <i>Hojreh</i> can be used as a shop, office, residential unit in a <i>caravanserai</i> or a room in a seminary school's dormitory.
<i>Jame' Mosque</i>	<i>Juma Machidi</i>	The cathedral mosque.
<i>Madraseh</i>	<i>Madrasa</i>	A seminary school in the bazaar (its general meaning is a school).
<i>Meydan</i>	<i>Meydan</i>	A square.
<i>Negahban</i>	<i>Odabashi</i>	A guardian.
<i>Pol-Bazaar</i>	<i>Pol-Bazaar</i>	A bazaar on a bridge.
<i>Rasteh</i>	<i>Rasta</i>	A usually covered pathway with several <i>hojrehs</i> on both sides, which connects different spaces of the bazaar to each other.
<i>Sara</i>	<i>Sara</i>	A building with a central courtyard, in which specialized functions, such as wholesale, workshops, commercial offices, and storehouse are located.
<i>Timcheh</i>	<i>Timcha</i>	A building with a covered central common space, in which specialized functions, such as wholesale, workshops, commercial offices, and storehouse are located.
<i>Vaqf</i>	<i>Vaqf</i>	The Islamic endowment.
<i>Yakhchal</i>	<i>Yakhchal</i>	A building used for storing ice.
<i>Zur Khaneh</i>	<i>Zurkhana</i>	A traditional gymnasium.

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1. Knowledge Interest

The bazaar is an interwoven social and physical network, constructed through centuries of ongoing relations between the bazaar community, states, the regular public, and other actors such as the *vaqf*¹ supervisors and religious clergy. Largely considered a privately owned commercial institution, the bazaar is a social and physical entity that is constantly interacting with its political, economic, social, and physical environment. Depending on the function of a bazaar, it can be interdependent to changes at local, national, or international levels.

In the pre-modern era, the bazaar was an integrated part and the spine of the socio-spatial structure of the commercial city, and its main public place. However, the reactions of the bazaar to the political, economic, social, and urban management² changes in the last century have changed its meaning and function within the postmodern city. During the last century, the pace of development within the bazaar has slowed down, whereas, the development in the city has continued rapidly. Therefore, the development of the bazaar has fallen behind the city's development in social, economic and physical dimensions. This phenomenon created a growing gap between the bazaar and the city and limited the possibility of both parties contributing towards each other's development.

Focusing on the bazaars in Iranian commercial cities³, this research explains the reasons and the processes that created the gap between the city and the bazaar. This continuous phenomenon is explained in this thesis by introducing the concept of the *bazaar-city isolation process*. In this work, the *bazaar-city isolation process* is addressed and thoroughly explained as the starting point and

¹ The Islamic Endowment

² The term *management* in this dissertation is used in its general sense. It refers to the administrative system of managing the urban affairs. When there is an intention to refer to an inclusive approach, the terms *governance* or *participatory urban governance* are used (UN Habitat, 2015).

³ Bazaars in cities such as Tehran, Isfahan and Tabriz that represent the most complete social and physical structure of the Iranian bazaars.

central problem. It can be said that all of the bazaars that are within the scope of this research are under a *bazaar-city isolation process*. Nevertheless, depending on their cultural, economic and spatial attributes, the situation of different bazaars in the cities and their challenges in being integrated parts of cities are different. In the first part of this dissertation it is argued that as an ongoing result of the *bazaar-city isolation process*, Iranian bazaars are facing a crisis in terms of maintaining their meaning and function within the postmodern cities.¹

The causes of the existence and continuum of this process are explored, arguing that if these causes exist today and continue to exist in the future, the isolation process will also continue. The only way to slow down and eventually stop this process is to target the factors causing its existence and continuance. This dissertation focuses on causes that originate from the centralized management system, which has influenced the use and development of the Iranian bazaars during the last century. The social, economic, and political issues are not ignored in the course of discussions because all these dimensions are interrelated with management issues.² Nevertheless, the ultimate contribution of the thesis falls into the urban heritage management domain.

A critical reflection is presented on the reactions of the bazaars, as commercial institutions, to the economic, political, and social changes, during the times when they were under the traditional owner-centered management system and the modern State-centered management system. An explanation of these management approaches and how they caused the creation and continuum of the ongoing problem is provided. It is concluded that none of these top-down approaches have offered a solution for the confrontation of the bazaar with the problem of *bazaar-city isolation process* in future.

By providing a multidimensional understanding of the bazaar and the problem it is facing, it is argued that the quality of the presence of the regular public in the bazaar has significantly influenced the development of the bazaars' physical and social-economic structure and its function within the city. Accordingly, the need for a public-inclusive governance approach, which aims to reintegrate the bazaar and the city is highlighted.

Since the understanding of the concept of the public and their rights towards the public space has changed during the last century in Iran, it is argued that traditional bazaars have to embrace and

¹ See chapters Two and Four for the reviewed literature about the Iranian bazaars and chapters Six and Seven for the research on the Tabriz Bazaar.

² The contribution of this dissertation is based on my disciplinary background in architectural and urban heritage conservation. Throughout this work, when it is necessary to consider issues that are out of the domain of my field, I refer to research done by scholars from corresponding disciplines.

welcome the contemporary perception and definition of the public. The discussions in this research put a stronger focus on women because the reviewed literature and the field works conducted by the author reveal that this group is the most marginalized group in the public life in the Iranian bazaar.

In brief, this dissertation opens the discussion about tolerating and facilitating the presence of diverse social groups and valuing their potential and ongoing economic and non-economic investments within the Iranian bazaars. In this context, it is explained that bazaars are suffering from the lack of social capital¹ because the social diversity is limited within them. Therefore, I argue that approaching the *Iranian bazaar as a public place* offers a significant contribution towards reintegrating the old bazaar with the modern city.

Viewing the bazaar as an urban heritage, this dissertation recommends a public-inclusive methodological approach towards adopting governance strategies for the bazaars. In this regard, the bazaar is viewed as a dynamic whole that needs to be an integrated part of the city in its tangible and intangible dimensions².

The foundation on which policies can be developed for achieving the goal mentioned above is a scientific understanding of the multi-dimensional fabric of the bazaar as a public place. Therefore, this dissertation offers *a method to understand and mapping* this multi-dimensional fabric through achieving the following objectives and addressing their corresponding questions;

For conceptualizing the Iranian bazaar as a public place, the following questions are addressed:

- What are the general spatial and social attributes of bazaars in the Iranian commercial cities?
- When, how and why did the *bazaar-city isolation process* begin, and continued until today?
- What are the key characteristics of public life in the large Iranian cities?
- What are the key attributes of the bazaars of the Iranian commercial cities as public places, regarding the cultural norms of public life in them, their spatial-functional structure, and their management and administrative system?

¹ The concept of social capital refers to the capital that is driven from social connections and can provide access to resources. As the French sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu (1986) explains, by exchanging available resources, the members of a social network or an institution can benefit from a shared capital.

² Examples of the latest discourses in the field of urban heritage management with a holistic approach can be seen in the edited volumes by Labadi and Logan (2016), Bandarin and Oers (2016).

The second objective is to offer a methodological toolbox for studying the *bazaar-city isolation process*, as well as a methodological framework for the assessment of the levels of public and private control in the bazaars. This objective is achieved through answering the following questions:

- What are the indicators for assessing the situation of a bazaar¹ (or areas of a bazaar) in the *bazaar-city isolation process*?
- Which dimensions have to be considered to assess and map the levels of public and private control in different spaces of a bazaar?

The third objective is to explore and explain the state of the problem of the *bazaar-city isolation process* in Tabriz, and explaining the ways in which this issue influences the function of the bazaar as a public place. The corresponding questions to this objective are the following:

- What are the economic-political, social and urban management causes of the *bazaar-city isolation process* in Tabriz?
- How is the Tabriz Bazaar structured as a public place?

The final aim is to justify the practical application of the presented approach and the offered methodological framework to assist the management system of bazaars in facilitating the reintegration of the bazaars with the postmodern commercial cities.

1.2. Methodology

The methodology of this research is designed based on a qualitative approach, with a single case-study strategy. This is an in-depth inquiry into the specific case of the Tabriz Bazaar within its real-world setting. The choice of the Tabriz Bazaar as the case study is due to its higher position in terms of physical scale as well as the completeness and intactness of its spatial and social networks among the Iranian bazaars (ICHHTO, 2009)². For researching the case of Tabriz Bazaar and its context, a combination of literature review and spatial ethnographic research techniques are used for data collection.

The concerns of *readability* and *credibility* are considered in the design of the research structure³. Necessary information about the context in which the case-study is located is given step by step and

¹ When used as a general term, bazaar in this thesis refers to the category of Iranian bazaars that fall within the scope of this research (see Chapter Two, 2.1.3. bazaar in Iranian commercial city)

² In its World Heritage nomination dossier, the Tabriz Bazaar is compared with 11 bazaars in Iran and seven international marketplaces (ICHHTO, 2009).

³ The structure of the work and the consideration of principles such as credibility, readability are designed based on Robert Yin (2009).

is followable as a chain of evidence in the overall structure of the work. The principle of triangulation in terms of methods and types of data sources is considered in the research to assure the reliability of the results. As Yin (2013) explains, there are four types of triangulation; *Source* triangulation, *analyst* triangulation, *theory/perspective* triangulation, and *methods* triangulation. In this research, the *data source* and *methods triangulation* were used in the cases in which qualitative results acquired by one source of data or collected by one method appeared to be weak.

The collected data is documented and archived in the form of recorded interviews and their transcripts, field notes and schemes, photographs, and in some cases videos. A selection of the documented data is presented in the appendix part.

The first four chapters on understanding bazaars as public places in Iranian commercial cities are written mainly based on a review of the selected literature and documents such as maps, legal texts, and official news reports. The acquired literature review in these chapters is from the fields of urban design, urban management, political sciences, sociology, anthropology, as well as the contemporary political and social history of Iran.

The chapters that focus on the Tabriz Bazaar case are developed based on a spatial ethnographic research and also reflecting on official documents, maps, and relevant literature. Here, in some cases, quantitatively collected data is used for testing and supporting the qualitative results. For designing the methodological framework of this part, the *placemaking* approach in urban planning and experiences of urban researchers such as William H. Whyte (1980), Jan Gehl (1989), and Gehl and Svarre (2013) are used.

To assure the reliability of the fieldwork results, I collected the data in four phases of fieldwork; March 14th-19th 2013, March 16th to April 9th, 2014, November 17th and 18th, 2014, and September 22nd, 2015. It should be noted that I have acquired familiarity with the Tabriz Bazaar and its current management system, due to my previous cooperation with ICHHTO¹ for the preparation of its World Heritage nomination dossier. Some of the used photographs² are from my earlier field observations in September 2008 and August 2010 during the preparation of the nomination dossier and my Master's thesis (Yadollahi, 2010), which dealt with the management and conservation of the *Sadigiyya* Complex of the Tabriz Bazaar. Nevertheless, the systematic fieldwork in the Tabriz Bazaar, which followed the specific objectives of the present dissertation, started in March 2013. In the case in which I have used my former personal experiences and observations to make arguments in the

¹ Iranian Cultural Heritage, Handicrafts and Tourism Organization

² It should be mentioned that I have personally taken the photographs of the Tabriz Bazaar used in this dissertation. In exceptions, the source of the photograph is mentioned.

present work, I have provided additional sources of evidence that can backup and provide further explanation for the statements made.

The data collection techniques used for studying the *bazaar-city isolation process* in Tabriz are:

- In-depth Semi-structured and unstructured expert interviews
- Observation of public members (counting and serial photographing)
- Observation of the bazaar's built structure and its surrounding areas
- Semi-structured and unstructured interviews with the regular public (Inside the bazaar and in other selected urban spaces in Tabriz) and members of the bazaar community
- Literature review
- Review of urban management documents (mostly legal documents) and maps
- Review of the relevant recent NEWS releases

For mapping the fabric of the Tabriz Bazaar as a public place, the following data collection techniques were used:

- Observation of the general public (serial and single photographing, recording traces of human activities, tracing and counting)
- Semi-structured Interviews with public members (in the Tabriz Bazaar)
- Observation and documentation of the bazaar's built structure
- Review of relevant legal documents and the management plan of the Tabriz Bazaar

The collected material was organized, filtered and analyzed according to the keywords generated from the main research objectives and their corresponding sub-questions. The collected data from different sources was organized based on thematic coding¹. After putting the collected data from various sources in data grids² based on the key terms, the content was analyzed and triangulated. The qualitative content was analyzed with consideration of the local cultural and social conditions in Tabriz. In addition to the reviewed literature, my personal background and the fact that I am from Iranian Azari family were helpful in understanding the context and working with the collected data without cultural and language-related barriers.

In general, the methodological approach of this work is qualitative. However, as explained, in few cases, quantitative observation techniques are used in the fieldwork to test and support the qualitative results.

¹According to Flick, Uwe (2009), *An Introduction to Qualitative Research* "4ed/, Thematic Coding and Content Analysis.

² The data grid for analyzing the data collected by the interviews can be seen in Appendix 2.

1.3. The Structure of This Work

This work is organized into four main parts based on the main research objectives. Each of these parts includes chapters addressing a specific research question. The present chapter is an introduction, which presents the knowledge interest and the overall logic of the work. The next seven chapters are grouped into four parts as follows:

Part One: The Iranian Bazaar as a Public Place

Chapter 2: Understanding the Iranian Bazaar: A Conceptual and Real-World Introduction

In this chapter, the state of the art and literature review, concerning the Iranian bazaar includes a variety of disciplines such as sociology, ethnology, urban planning, and architecture. Reflecting on the precedent research, the chapter introduces the conceptual understanding of the Iranian bazaar before being affected by modernization, which represents common characteristics of large bazaars within Iranian commercial cities. This conceptual understanding presents the initial and pure purpose of building and developing a bazaar in an Iranian commercial city. Then, the literature on relevant case studies is presented to explain the situation of real bazaars challenged by social, political and economic changes. Highlighting the gap between the conceptual and empirical understanding of the bazaars reveals the problem of bazaar-city isolation.

Chapter 3: An Introduction to Public Space in Iran

This chapter gives a two-step introduction to the understanding of public spaces in Iran. In the first step, the term *public space* is clarified through a reflection on the international understanding of public space in urban planning, sociological and political literature. In the second step, reviewing the same type of literature focusing on Iran, an introduction on the *meaning of public space in Iranian cities* is presented.

Chapter 4: The Iranian Bazaar as a Public Place: An Interconnected Network of Private and Public Spaces

This chapter consists of three sections. The first section provides an understanding of the function of bazaars as public places in the social lives of commercial cities until the present time. The second section delivers a schematic model of general spatial organization of Iranian bazaars in the major commercial cities and is presented to show how bazaars typically facilitate public life within their physical structure. The last section provides a critical analysis of the management system of bazaars as urban heritage and as public places. This chapter, together with the previous chapters, builds the

foundation for the research approach and the methodological framework that this dissertation offers to study and explains the Iranian bazaar as a public place.

Part Two: A Method for Understanding the Fabric of the Bazaar as a Public Place

Chapter 5: A Methodological Framework for Mapping the Publicity-Privacy Spectrum in the Iranian Bazaar, considering the influence of the *bazaar-city isolation process* on its *publicness*

Pointing out that the publicity and privacy of urban spaces makes a continuum in which specific borders cannot be identified, this chapter provides a method *to study and map the spectrum of publicity and privacy* in Iranian bazaars. This method is based on four factors of *use, physical accessibility, ownership and local culture of territory-defining* in the studied place. It also suggests a set of indicators that can be used as a toolbox to assess the situation of a bazaar in the process of bazaar-city isolation.

Part Three: The Case Study

Chapter 6: The Relationship of the Bazaar and the City of Tabriz: The Process of a Multidimensional Isolation

By utilizing the findings of Part One, which explained the *bazaar-city isolation process* within the Iranian bazaars, this chapter specifically explains this process in Tabriz. Chapter 6 explains to what extent Tabriz has been affected by the *bazaar-city isolation process* in political, economic, religious, cultural, as well as physical and functional aspects. The main focus of this chapter is the management of the bazaar and in the overall structure of the urban heritage management in Iran.

Chapter 7: The Current Fabric and Function of the Tabriz Bazaar as a Public Place

This chapter goes into a detailed explanation of levels of public and private control in different spaces of the Tabriz Bazaar. It maps the fabric of the Tabriz Bazaar as a public place. Justifying the dependency of bazaars by public users, it is argued that the governance and conservation of them should follow an approach, which views the bazaars as a public place. In fact, this chapter presents an example showing how the method, offered in Chapter Five, of understanding the fabric of the Iranian bazaar as a public place, can be used in practice.

Part Four: The Conclusion

Chapter 8: The Scope of the Publicity-Privacy Assessment Method Towards the Reintegration of the Bazaar and City

This part highlights the main findings of this research and gives a brief justification of the adopted approach. It explains how the recommended publicity-privacy assessment methodological framework can be used in the study and management of the Iranian bazaars.

The appendixes provide supplementary information and evidence that help better understanding the main body of the thesis. Appendix Six provides additional planning and management ideas of the author that can be used and further developed by local experts. This section was placed in the appendixes because this research was not initially designed to produce a planning outcome.

1.4. Research Contribution

The main finding of this research is a methodological framework for assessing the fabric of the Iranian bazaars as public places. Facilitating the active presence of diverse social groups, and valuing their potential and actual economic and non-economic investments in the bazaars is the central logic behind the structure of this methodological framework.

The presented method, which can be used as a governance tool is designed with the bases of incorporating publicness indicators and the four factors of *use, physical accessibility, ownership and local culture of territory-defining*. The results of mapping out the bazaar regarding the mentioned four factors are juxtaposed to produce a map showing the publicity–privacy spectrum of a bazaar. This method is modified specifically for and applied towards the case of Tabriz Bazaar.

The method provides a practical tool, which can be used in navigating urban heritage management strategies when the issue of power-balance is important or problematic. Practically and professionally speaking, this place-based understanding of the current effectiveness of the actors involved helps the managers identify and prioritize the negotiation strategies for each zone. It is a tool to understand the current levels of responsibilities, rights, and vulnerabilities of public and private actors in different zones of a bazaar.

Furthermore, the outcome of this method, the final publicity–privacy map, is easily understandable for the actors involved. Therefore, as an expert-citizen communication tool, it can facilitate a knowledge-based negotiation process in the participatory governance. This is how the presented methodological tool offers a contribution towards the reintegration of the old bazaar with the postmodern city.

Part One: The Iranian Bazaar as a Public Place

Chapter 2: Understanding the Iranian Bazaar: A Conceptual and Real-World Introduction

In this chapter¹, I review the literature on the Iranian bazaar, from disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, urban planning, and architecture. Reflecting on precedent research, I first introduce the conceptual and abstract understanding of the Iranian bazaar, which represents common characteristics of the large bazaars found in Iranian commercial cities, prior to the changes brought on by modernization. Second, I turn towards case study literature to explain the situation of real-world bazaars within Iranian commercial cities. The aim of introducing the mentioned theoretical understanding is to identify the initial aim of building a bazaar, before discussing the bazaar, which is currently challenged by political and economic changes. Highlighting the gap(s) between these two conceptual and real understanding of the bazaar reveals the main problem discussed in this research. Furthermore, by reflecting on various methods and approaches used to define and study the Iranian bazaar, this chapter aims to come up with a comprehensive and multi-dimensional understanding of the Iranian bazaar within relation to the contemporary city.

¹ An early, preliminary version of some of the investigation results, presented in sections 2.1, 2.2, 6.2, 6.3, and 7.1 is published in Yadollahi, S., Weidner, S. (2014b).

2.1. The Iranian Bazaar as a Concept

2.1.1. The Meaning of the Term “Iranian Bazaar” From Semantic and Ontological Points of View

This segment reflects on academic research, which explains the function and form of the Iranian bazaar, while not referring to particular cases. The *conceptual* understanding of the Iranian bazaar as described in the presented texts is presented. This conceptual understanding, which is at times highly romanticized, is constructed with bases upon the initial aims, which have shaped and developed the bazaars. It reveals the ideal function of a bazaar, in relation to the commercial city. This viewpoint observed in the presented texts deals with the physical and functional positions of bazaars during the time of pre-modern Iran, an era before industrialization and centralization of the state policies in the 19th century resulted in significant changes in the bazaar-city relationship.

Ali Akbar Dehkhoda¹(1994) suggests that the origin of the term “bazaar” goes back to the middle-Persian² term “wazar” (wacar). He defines a bazaar as “two rows of shops, parallel to, and in front of each other, usually connected by a vaulted roof and dedicated to trade.”³ Dehkhoda (1994) gives a significant number of examples of different meanings of the term “bazaar” in Persian poetry and literature. Some of these examples clarify the meaning of bazaar in Iranian culture. For instance, as he suggests, bazaar can refer to a “crowded place” which refers to its open and public character. Another concept, which is usually connected to the bazaar is “stress and chaos,” implying the complexities associated with a bazaar. Meanings such as “reputation or popularity, price, a manner of behavior” or “convention and agreement” show that a bazaar is formed by certain socio-economic agreements (ibid.).

The Encyclopedia IRANICA⁴ also relates the word bazaar to the middle-Persian language. According to the IRANICA, a bazaar can refer to a *specific time* (a market day) or a *specific location* (a fair held at particular times), or the *physical marketplace with a specific architectural design*.

The following examples of research addressing the ontological question; ‘What is a bazaar?’, will make the conceptual meaning of a bazaar more clear and evident.

¹ Ali Akbar Dehkhodā (Persian: علی اکبر دهخدا; 1879–March 9, 1956), the author of the most reliable and extensive Farsi dictionary

² Middle Persian, the major form of which is called Pahlavi, was the official language of the *Sāsānians* (ad 224–651) (Encyclopedia BRITANICA)

³ Online dictionary: <http://parsī.wiki/dehkhodasearchresult-fa.html?searchtype=0&word=2KjYp9iy2KfYsQ%3d%3d>[Accessed 25 July 2015]

⁴ Online Encyclopedia IRANICA: <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/bazar-index>

In her article “*The Human Ontology in the Bazaar*,” Zohreh Rouhi (2014)¹ approaches the concept and term of bazaar by analyzing it as a public space². Explaining the concept of “*relation*” from an existential point of view, and referring to Heidegger, Marx, and Nietzsche, she argues that being “*in relation*” is the basis of the existence of a human in the world, and human being needs a “*place to be in relation to others*.” She suggests that existence of a bazaar depends on the social existence of individuals who create the bazaar as a place for relationships. In her view, an ideal model of a bazaar is a place that allows *discussion, free choice, and diversity*. Finally, she calls the bazaar “*the most democratic place in the public realm*.”

The sociologist, Mohsenian-e Rad (2004) also introduces the bazaar as a space of communication. His research is not investigating physical space of the bazaar, but using the bazaar as a concept to understand and explain modern mass media. Therefore, he is interested in the bazaar, as an intangible space. Illustrating the capability of bazaars as spaces of social communication, he explains the modern mass media system (i.e., the internet social networks) is similar to traditional bazaars in terms of social communication. By comparing these two “*communication systems*,” he suggests that bazaars represent “*the largest pluralistic and diversified media space*” in human history, regarding communication (ibid. p.1).

The semantic and conceptual understanding of a bazaar suggests that the Iranian bazaars are formed by certain economic and social *relations* and follows certain *social conventions*³ in a defined *boundary of place and time*. Since bazaars depend on socioeconomic conventions and norms that obviously change through time, it can be said that, at least in its theoretical meaning, bazaars are adaptive. They are dynamic because they constantly change to adapt themselves to its socio-physical environment.

Furthermore, the bazaar is a *place*, as understood in urban studies terminology. From this point of view, the term place “*carries the resonance of homestead, location and open space in the city as well as a position in a social hierarchy*”(Hayden, 1995, p. 15). This specific architectural design is the factor that turns the bazaar into an urban landmark within Iranian cities. The bazaar’s central location and its architectural design prove that the physical space for social communication plays a major role in conceptualizing it as a public place.

¹ Online article: <http://anthropology.ir/node/14922> (Accessed 25 April 2013).

² In her essay, the term *space* is used in its non-physical sense. The term, *place*, however holds a tangible sense.

³ Here, meant accepted and agreed norms and orders in a society

2.1.2. Conceptualization of the Iranian Bazaar as a Bounded Social and Built Entity

To illustrate the general understanding of the Iranian bazaar, sociological and urban planning literature is reviewed in this section. These studies describe and compare attributes, observed in several cases of Iranian bazaars and generalize these attributes to define the *Iranian bazaar*. In general, the literature suggests that conceptually speaking, the bazaar consists of inter-related social and physical (spatial) structures with identifiable social and physical boundaries.

Since the bazaar is a socio-spatial network, the social integrity and solidarity of the bazaar community are one of the important factors of the bazaar's structure. Therefore, it is necessary to mention the basis of this idea, before exploring the concept of social integrity in the Iranian bazaar introduced by different authors. Therefore, in the next pages, the relevant literature is explored to answer questions such as; who are the members of bazaar community? What forms this community? What keeps its members connected and dependent on each other?

In brief, different scholars describe the way in which the bands of common economic interests connect those who work together under the roofs of the bazaars. This group or community, known as the *bazaar community*, forms a *social entity*, strongly associated with the bazaar. Focusing on the relationships inside the boundaries of the bazaar community, the presented literature review aims to clarify the economic, political and social characteristics that differentiate this particular community from other social groups in the commercial cities.

Many social scientists who worked on the Iranian bazaar suggest that the *bazaar is a social entity*, implying that, from a sociological point of view, *the bazaar* is equal to *the bazaar community*. Ahmad Ashraf (1989) describes the bazaar community as a "*closely knit community*." He believes that due to the enclosed physical space, merchants could observe one another and be aware of each other's public activities. Therefore, they could develop a social network that links them to each other.

Ashraf (1988) describes the social hierarchy, which still exists in bazaars such as Tabriz and Tehran. At the top of the social hierarchy of bazaars were "*the big merchants (tujjar)*, then, there were the *headmen and the masters of artisans and shopkeepers of guild-like associations (asnaf)* at the middle level, and the masses of apprentices and footboys at the bottom, with some marginal elements such as poor peddlers, dervishes, and beggars at the lowest level." (Ashraf, 1988, pp. 540–541).

The sociologist Arang Keshavarzian (2007), who has done extensive research on the bazaar community (particularly in the Tehran Bazaar) views the bazaar from political and economic-sociological perspectives. He applies a network approach to analyze the relation of the bazaars, with

the Pahlavi monarchy¹ and the post-revolutionary state² in Iran. His work explains the interrelation between the bazaar community, as a *social entity*, and its motivations in interacting with the state. He defines the bazaar as “*bounded spaces containing a series of ongoing and socially embedded networks that are the mechanism for the exchange of specific commodities*”(Keshavarzian, 2007, p. 70). Although emphasizing that the physical space of the bazaar define its boundary and provides space for social interaction, almost in entire passages of his book, when mentioning the term *bazaar*, he means the *bazaar community* (which is also common in the Farsi language). The actors of the social network, which he explains, are people who work in the bazaar. Bazaar community members, interviewed by Keshavarzian (2007), see themselves different from the traders outside of the bazaar. In this sense, being a member of this community means being more “*reputable*,” more “*skillful*” and rooted in the established traditions of trade. In other words, the social network of bazaar has a boundary, and the other social groups are *outside* this boundary. Similarly, when talking about public life in the bazaar, he is not interested in the “*outsiders*” who come to the bazaar (as customers and passengers), but in bazaar community members involved in social relationships with each other (ibid.).

Other sociologists, such as Harris, Kevan (2010) and Ghafarian (2009), have similar approaches in studying the *bazaar as a social entity*. Authors who have worked on Iranian social history, such as Ashraf (1988), Kasravi, Ahmad (2003), and Katouzian, Homa (2009; and 2011), also understand the bazaar as a social and political entity, which was influential in the Iranian political arena. These works are mainly focused on the political dynamics of bazaars, particularly in Tehran, Isfahan, and Tabriz, in the last two centuries.

All of the named scholars agree that, because of its wealth, powerful and well-organized *informal social networks*, the bazaar³ was able to become an economic, and consequently, a political pole in Iran. Therefore, when its interests were threatened by the States, it supported anti-state political movements in Iran. The most important of these movements were the 1905-1911 Constitutional Revolution, the 1953 events that resulted in the nationalization of Iranian oil production, and the 1977-79 Islamic Revolution. As a consequence of these political actions, the bazaar has been considered a threat to the state, especially since the beginning of the twentieth century. The bazaar-state relationship and its influence in creating the present situation of Iranian bazaars will be further discussed in this chapter.

¹ 1925-1979

² Since 1979

³ Referring to the bazaars in the Iranian commercial cities.

Discussing the attributes of integrity and *boundedness* of the bazaar can also be seen in works of architects, urban planners, and scholars such as anthropologists who deal with the abstract and conceptual presentation of bazaars in the formal and architectural sense. This perspective is based on generalizing the spatial-structural patterns that are repeated in the major Iranian bazaars.

Typically, a large bazaar consists of several commercial buildings such as caravanserais, *timchehs*¹, covered caravanserai inside the bazaar, and *dokkans*² or shops. In addition to commercial buildings, there are buildings with socio-cultural and religious functions. Mosques, traditional religious schools called *madrasesh*³, teahouses, bathhouses, known as *hammams*⁴, and in some cases, gymnasiums, referred to as *zurkhanehs*⁵ can be found within the bazaar. Rows of shops form the main axis of this spatial structure. Caravanserais and other larger buildings are located and organized along the main access lines. By comparing the architectural elements found in the large Iranian bazaars that have developed until the 19th century, architect Esfandiar Biglari has schematized their general structure as can be seen in Figure 2-1 (Mashhadizadeh, 1996).




Figure 2-1. The developed structure of bazaars in 18th -19th century, in the Iranian cities (Mashhadizadeh, 1996)

¹ The plural form of *timche*. *Timches* (arcades) are covered buildings with a central common space. They provide spaces for offices and wholesale shops.

² The plural form of *dokkan*, which means shop.

³ The plural form of *madreseh*.

⁴ The plural form of *hammam*, which means bathhouse.

⁵ The plural form of *zur khaneh*, which means gymnasium.

As shown in Figure 2-2, the structural order in the presented four examples of Iranian bazaars follow the general pattern, seen in Figure 2-1. This general pattern, which is repeated in the bazaars within the scope of this research, is further discussed in chapter four. For this brief introduction, it can be said that the built bazaar is conceptualized as a network of inter-connected open and covered spaces.¹

The architect, Mohammad Mansour Falamaki (2007) describes the bazaar as an organized chain of spaces that create a covered area for the purpose of social and public services, manufacture, and commerce. He also presents this description based on the general patterns that can be observed in the spatial and functional characteristics of the bazaars in the commercial cities of Iran.

Similarly, the American geographer and specialist of near eastern studies, Michael E. Bonine defines the Iranian bazaar as a “*unified, self-contained building complex of shops, passageways, and caravanserais, interspersed with squares, religious buildings, bathhouses, and other public institutions*” (Bonine, 1989)². Although he uses empirical examples and mentions the 20th-century developments that affected bazaars, when *defining* the Iranian bazaar, he puts the modern changes aside, uses the simple present tense, and defines the unchanged, conceptual idea of the bazaar. Therefore, we should note that in his definition, the bazaar is considered as an ideal prototype that represents the large and important bazaars in pre-modern Iran.

¹ For further information see Sections 4.1 and 4.2.

² Online article, available from: <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/bazar-i>[Accessed 12.6.2013]



Figure 2-2. Examples of spatial structure of bazaars in commercial cities (source of the maps: ICHHTO archive, Tehran)

Bonine (1989) characterizes the bazaar by its physical wholeness and its multi-functionality. Calling the bazaar as a “*traditional commercial center*,” he continues, explaining the physical form and building techniques that represent the specific traditional architecture used in the Iranian bazaars. Since this kind of architecture with rows of vaults and domes at junctions is traditionally applied in bazaars, Bonine’s definition shows the existence of a physical boundary for the bazaar, identified by its typical traditional architecture which makes it different from the rest of the city fabric. However, the specific architecture explained by Bonine is mainly in central Iran. Bazaars in southern and northern areas of Iran, along the Caspian Sea coasts, follow the same spatial structural logic but are built with building techniques more suited to the climate conditions.

As mentioned and to be further discussed in the following pages, the reviewed scholars who are interested in the soft layer of the bazaar or social network and those who deal with the physical bazaar, both identify an attribute *wholeness* and *integrity of the bazaar* and study the bazaar as a bounded social and built entity. These two characters will be applied in this research to understand and explain the behavior of the Iranian bazaar as a social-spatial entity when reacting to the changes in its social, economic and political environment. Since addressing all typologies of Iranian bazaars is beyond the scope of this research, the following section narrows down the focus on the bazaars in commercial cities of Iran.

2.1.3. The Bazaar in the Iranian Commercial City

Even when defining the bazaar conceptually, we cannot generalize certain characters to all types of Iranian bazaars. Therefore, the contextual differences of bazaars should be considered. Pourahmad (1997) for example, groups Iranian bazaars according to their geographical location, economic production potential, architectural characters, and largeness. Based on the scale of trade in these bazaars, he categorizes them into; international (such as bazaars in Tabriz and Isfahan), national (such as bazaars in Shiraz, Qazvin, and Kerman), regional (such as bazaars in northern Iran, along the Caspian Sea coast), local bazaars, daily bazaars in villages, and small clusters bazaars called *bazaarcheh*. He points out that the globalization process can influence a bazaar and turn it into another type of bazaar within the groups mentioned above.

This time-geography oriented logic can be found in the work of the Iranian pioneer architect and urban planner (Falamaki, M. Mansour, 2005). He draws a line between the function of bazaars in pre and post-industrialization era and differentiates bazaars according to the type of city in which they are located. He does not precisely define the term bazaar but explains the origin and function of bazaars through investigating the history of the formation of Iranian cities. He categorizes Iranian

cities according to their main origin of development and their current economic and cultural importance. His categorization consists of cities with military and religious origins of development, cities of environmental and natural importance, and *commercial cities*. The focus of this research is on the bazaars in these *commercial cities*.

Eckart Ehlers (1991) gives a clear categorization of Iranian cities regarding their scale of economic importance and urban development in the 1960's. He ranks Tehran, as the Iranian metropolis, and Isfahan, Tabriz, and Mashhad as the top ranking provincial capitals. Then, cities like Shiraz and Yazd were listed as the second and third ranking provincial centers. According to Falamaki (2005), commercial cities, which have developed along the trade routes, were economically and socially self-dependent before the industrialization era, and are still the largest and most economically influential cities in Iran (Figure 2-3). Isfahan, Tabriz, Kerman, and Shiraz are examples of this group. Ehlers considers the modern developments in ranking the cities, and Falamaki considers the historical records of commercial activities of the cities, in addition to their current development state. Although these ranking logics are different, one can conclude that cities like Tabriz, Tehran, Kerman, and Isfahan are commercial cities, which have historical bazaars at their centers.




Figure 2-3. Important commercial cities along ancient trade routes of Iran (Pirnia and Afsar, 1991, p. 18)

Reviewing the role, spatial structure and location of bazaars in Iranian cities, Falamaki (2005 and 2007) suggests that bazaars in commercial cities represent a complete model of the Iranian bazaar

because they have developed an advanced spatial and social structure. Due to their functional and spatial similarities, these bazaars in commercial cities can be studied under one category. Therefore, when talking about the Iranian bazaar in this research, the focus will lay on these commercial cities.

Falamaki is not the only scholar who argues that bazaars of commercial cities have similar characters. Hossein Soltanzadeh (1986) gives a representative picture of the location and role of a bazaar in the spatial structure of an Iranian commercial city. He mentions the main elements of commercial cities being; the city gates, walls, castle, square, bazaar, residential areas, Jame' or cathedral-mosque, neighborhood centers, and dwellings.

In Iranian cities, the courtyard of the cathedral-mosque was built as a public space with a “*specific religious rather than secular character*” (Madanipour, Ali, 2003, p. 184). Central open spaces of neighborhoods were typically cluster-scale public spaces. Pointing out that the bazaar is the *spine* of a commercial city, Soltanzadeh (1986) highlights the idea of *bazaar as the city spine* by a schematic diagram which is a result of comparative analysis of Iranian commercial cities in the Islamic period (Figure 2-4).

As Figure 2-4 shows, the Jame' Mosque and the city square are connected to each other by the bazaar. On the other hand, the neighborhood centers, which are public spaces at a cluster level, also connect to the main public spaces through the bazaar. Soltanzadeh's work highlights the bazaar's centrality and its character as the *connector* element in the structure of the typical Iranian commercial city. This role makes the bazaar the most important public space in the pre-modern city.




Figure 2-4. A typical structure of an Iranian commercial city in the Islamic period (Soltanzadeh, 1986, p.297)

Falamaki (2005) also refers to the bazaar as *the spine* of the Iranian commercial city. Making a comparative analysis of Iranian commercial cities, he concludes that the bazaar and its branches were located and developed in three ways. In some cases, the bazaar was formed around the first architectural-urban elements of the city (usually governmental and religious buildings), in other cases, the bazaar was formed from the expansion and integration of two or more residential cores,

or it was added to the existing urban context as a project by the city governors. Viewing the city as a system which grows and works based on its natural, social and financial context, he points out the dynamic nature of Iranian bazaar in relation to the city. Also, by mentioning the role of the *bazaar as the connector* of public spaces of the city, he emphasizes the role of bazaars in *reinforcing the citizenship motivations and social interactions* in the city.

The dynamic interrelationship of the bazaar and the commercial city is studied by other scholars. For instance, Mehrdad Ghayumi Bidhendi (2004) explains that the morphological formation of bazaars depends on the city development pattern. “*In cases that the commercial city was developed along trade routes, the bazaar formed along the most important caravan route and expanded gradually according to commercial and production capacity of the city*” (Ghayumi Bidhendi, 2004, p. 105)¹. Biglari also has investigated the growth and development of the Iranian bazaars along the roads, connecting them to the neighbor cities (Figure 2-5) (Mashhadizadeh, 1996). In brief, these scholars have shown that the social and built structures of the bazaars were constantly developed and adapted according to the economic setting of cities in which they were located.




Figure 2-5 The axial growth the bazaars in Isfahan, Kerman, and Shiraz (Mashhadizadeh, 1996, p. 293).

¹ In chapter 6 this is specifically explained for the case of Tabriz bazaar.

2.1.4. The Conceptual Definition of the Bazaar in Iranian Commercial City

The literature on bazaar typologies in Iran, suggests that having developed complex and complete social and spatial networks, bazaars in commercial cities illustrate the advanced social-spatial structure of the Iranian bazaar in a generalized sense. In other words, their common characteristics represent an ideal model of the Iranian bazaar. Although this research does not generalize its empirical results about the Tabriz Bazaar to all the Iranian bazaars, it should be clarified that the Tabriz Bazaar belongs to the category of bazaars in the Iranian commercial cities. Therefore, the overall approach used in this research can be applied to bazaars in this category, after necessary modifications based on local social and geographical contexts.

Through overlapping the reviewed works, a conceptual description for the Iranian bazaar, which shows the characteristics of the bazaar in Iranian commercial city before being affected by modernization and industrialization of cities was presented in the previous sections.

On the one hand, this bazaar is the social network, being constantly regulated by social and economic norms and conventions of the society through time. On the other hand, it is a spatial network being constantly structured and restructured, according to social and economic relations. In fact, the concept of the bazaar is not imaginable, without considering its both social and spatial networks forming a dynamic and adaptive whole.

A bazaar is a *place*. It is a central space of the commercial city that has become a *place* through hosting ongoing socio-economic activities. Its functional, and physical centrality in the city has turned it into a *place of communication*. Therefore, the network of open and accessible spaces in the bazaar, as a whole, forms a public place. In this research, the statement of *the bazaar as a public place* refers to the integrated network made by an *individual* but *connected* to the public spaces in the bazaar as a public place.

However, a bazaar is different from other public places of the city, because it is mainly owned and developed by the state, but by the bazaar community. That is why, as a social entity, the members of bazaar community have a sense of ownership and territory towards their bazaar. In other words, the physical bazaar defined by its traditional architecture is their territory. Obviously, the bazaar needs the regular public for commercial and retail activities. As a result, the bazaar is made open and accessible to the *outsiders* to keep the trade going on.

The discussed conceptual definition of the Iranian bazaar was presented as the foundation of understanding the real, contemporary bazaar, in its social and physical dimensions. Can the characteristics of the conceptual model of Iranian bazaar be generalized regarding case studies? Are

Iranian bazaars such central, integrated, inclusive public places? In the following chapters, these questions are answered by reflecting upon empirical research examples on bazaars in Iranian commercial cities. The conclusion will be tested and applied to the case of the Tabriz Bazaar.

2.2. Statement of the problem: Real-world bazaars in relation to commercial cities, and causes of the bazaar-city isolation process¹

As discussed, it is agreed that conceptually, a bazaar has a social and physical boundary in an Iranian city. A review of academic studies on the behavior of contemporary bazaars towards social, political, economic and changes in urban planning is briefed within this section. All these works whether dealing with social dimensions of the bazaar or its architectural, physical features, develop their arguments based on the emergence of the modern phenomenon of old versus new and traditional versus modern *duality within* the bazaar-city relationship in Iran. They argue that this *duality* is isolating the old, traditional bazaar from the constantly modernizing city. Putting the findings of different researchers from different disciplines together, this section aims to provide a multi-dimensional explanation of how the process of the *bazaar-city isolation* started and continued until today.

It is important to note that the state of, “being bounded” as mentioned in the present discussions, should not be understood as being closed, isolated, and unconnected from outside. It simply means that the bazaar has identifiable social and physical boundaries. So, it does not hold a negative connotation nor is by nature problematic. In fact, it is a character that cannot be detached from the Iranian bazaar. In a similar way, the duality by itself is understood as a neutral situation, which is a result of differences of interests and characteristics of the bazaar, the areas or social groups out of it. On a conceptual level, the bazaar has its boundaries, while at the same time, integrated into the city. The situation of a bazaar gets problematic when this difference creates and enforces the *process of bazaar-city isolation*.

In general, the reviewed authors have three assumptions about causes of the mentioned old-new *duality* and the *process of bazaar-city isolation*. The duality has been viewed in religious, political, and technological development matters. Firstly, it is assumed that in contrast to the modern city, bazaars are traditional and attached to conservative religious beliefs. Secondly, it is believed that since the establishment of the 1906 constitution, the bazaar became a powerful economic

¹ A brief summary of this section is published in; Yadollahi, S. Weidner, S. (2014a) The influence of commercial modernization on public life in Iranian bazaars, Case study: Tabriz bazaar, in: proceedings of the City and Retail international conference at the Institute of Urban Development and Construction Management, University of Leipzig.

organization and therefore became a powerful political actor. Consequently, it was considered a threat to the central power of the state. Therefore, states have weakened the bazaar through economic policies. It is argued that, by being weakened by the state, bazaars have not been able to develop within the pace of technological development and modernization of trade. The other argument is focused on the effect of modern urban development policies and the rapid urban growth, which as a result, has impacted the importance of the city center and the bazaar within Iranian cities. It highlights the rapid urban changes which, therefore, made the city center and the modern neighborhoods physically, functionally, and socially different.

Based on the literature on the Iranian social and economic history, ethnographic research in bazaars, urban planning history, and archaeology of trade routes in Iran, I discuss the relation of these three assumptions pertaining to the problem of bazaar-city isolation in the following pages.

2.2.1. Bazaar's Religious Orientations: The Traditional Bazaar in the Context of Social Modernization

In his IRANICA encyclopedia article, sociologist Ahmad Ashraf (1989) explains the emergence of a socioeconomic, cultural, and spatial *"duality"* within bazaar-city relationships in large Iranian cities after modernization. He defines the Iranian bazaar as *"a central marketplace and craft center located in the old quarters of the town, a primary arena, along with the mosque, of extra-familial sociability, and a socio-cultural milieu of a traditional urban life-style"* (Ashraf, 1989, para.1). As understood from his definition, the bazaar is *"old"* and belonging to the *"traditional life-style"* versus modern life-style. Also regarding urban development, he sees the bazaar versus modern avenues.

Explaining the case of Tehran, Ashraf (1989) differentiates the lifestyle in the bazaar area from the lifestyle in the newly developed city. As he puts it, a modern lifestyle emerged in newly developed urban areas, while the *"traditional lifestyle"* remained in the old city center, including the bazaar area. According to Ashraf, the *"main careers of the traditional lifestyle"* were the traders, shopkeepers, and craftsmen who lived in or outside the central city. He further explains some of the characteristics of this social group. *"Their family recreation often included visits to the holy shrines at Ray¹ or Qom². Their wives, daughters and unmarried sisters would rarely be seen outside the home without the veil (chador). There was also a higher rate of endogamous marriage among the petty traders and craftsmen within the Bazaar than among other groups"* (Ashraf, 1989, para. 24). In an

¹ A Shia shrine containing the *Shah Abdol Azim's* (Persian: شاه عبدالعظیم) tomb, located in Rey (in southern Tehran).

² The city of Qom or Ghom (Persian: قم) is a Shia holy city due to the Shrine of Ma'sume, the sister of Imam `Ali ibn Musa Reza.

interview in the weekly journal *Shahrvand-e Emrooz*¹ (Today's Citizen) in September 2011, Ashraf (2011) states that he believes that the bazaars have become shopping centers for the traditional middle-class Iranians because they have always maintained this religious and traditional lifestyle.

The religion-bazaar relationship is a widely debated topic and discussion in the literature about the bazaar. Many scholars such as Arang Keshavarzian (2007) use Ashraf as a reference when discussing the bazaar-religion relationship. However, some works even go further and romanticize the religious tendencies of the bazaaris², by viewing bazaars as *holy places*.

For instance, the ethnologist Asle Sarirai, Fatemeh (2007)³ suggests that the religion remains a significant factor in social relations in bazaars (particularly in the Tabriz Bazaar). She believes that, due to the dominance of Islamic values in bazaars, it is a predominantly masculine place where women have a lesser share of the activities. Asl-e Sarirai calls the bazaar a “*symbol of resistance of tradition towards modernization.*” She concludes that “*the religious spirit of the bazaar makes one respect it and acknowledge all its affairs as holy*” (Asl-e Sarirai, 2007, p. 291).

Similarly, the World Heritage nomination dossier of the Tabriz Bazaar⁴ (which is a more of a political rather than scientific document) prepared by the Iranian Cultural Heritage Handicrafts, and Tourism Organization (ICHHTO, 2009), exaggerates the ideological orientation of bazaars. Chapter four of this document challenges the conservation and protection of the bazaar, mostly in architectural aspects. However, when it comes to justifying the Tabriz Bazaar’s Outstanding *Universal Value* (OUV⁵) for World Heritage inscription, instead of the (real) Tabriz Bazaar, the perfect model of a bazaar or the discussed conceptual bazaar is presented. Without giving enough empirical evidence, the document states that the social system of the Tabriz Bazaar controls “*any changes within the complex*”, and has survived until today “*without being negatively affected by tourism or modern commercial systems, but rather maintaining its traditional values and characters*” (ICHHTO, 2009, p. 287). In chapter 3.b

¹ A political reformist weekly news magazine, which was closed down in 2011.

² *Bazaaris* is a term, which refers to the big merchants in the bazaar. Other members of the bazaar community, such as shopkeepers, and artisans do not have the same social status, wealth and political influence of the bazaaris.

³ The Persian version of the work is used in this dissertation. However, the translated version of the same work is available in the appendix of the Tabriz Bazaar’s World Heritage nomination file (ICHHTO, 2009).

⁴ The Tabriz Bazaar was inscribed on the World Heritage list in 2010. In the dossier, it is called the Tabriz Historic Bazaar Complex (THBC).

⁵ In the framework of the 1972 World Heritage Convention, *Outstanding Universal Value* means cultural and/or natural significance, which is so exceptional as to transcend national boundaries, and to be of common importance for present and future generations of all humanity. (Source : Operational guideline of the World Heritage Convention, Available from : <http://whc.unesco.org/archive/opguide13-en.pdf> [Accessed on: 25.8.2015])

the document introduces these “*traditional values and characters*” by suggesting that the “*Iranian-Islamic bazaar*” is a “*holy place, impressed by Islamic beliefs,*” encouraging “*freedom, and avoiding deceit, hypocrisy*” (ibid., p. 298).

A similar viewpoint can be seen in some parts of Mansour Falamaki's (2005) work which investigates the problem of bazaar-city isolation from an urban planning point of view. When talking about Iranian bazaars in general, he overvalues the religion-related function of bazaars. After pointing out the multifunctional nature of the Iranian bazaar, he mentions three core functions of bazaars in commercial cities: economic development of the city, social-cultural development of the city, and *religious – ethical reinforcement of the society*. In the following discussion, I suggest that religious and *moral strengthening of the society* has not been the interest of a bazaar's activities.

The fact that some *bazaaris* have used *the display of religiosity* for gaining reputation and for their political and economic interest is mentioned by observers of bazaars such as Ashraf¹, Benjamin Smith (2004) and Keshavarzian (2007). Asl-e Sarirai (2007) mentions that a “*religious image is one of the reasons of the reputation of bazaaris*” (Asl-e Sarirai, 2007, p. 38). However, she does not precisely discuss the phenomenon of a *religious display* in the Tabriz Bazaar.

An example of research which mentions this issue is Keshavarzian's (2007) work. His interviews with the *bazaaris* in Tehran reveal that that religion of the trade partners does not matter in commercial activities. However, his work implies that the tendency to “*display religiosity*” have existed in the Tehran Bazaar. *Bazaaris* interviewed by him said that they “*carefully distinguish the pseudo-religious (mazhabi-nama) from those who truly abide by the norms of Islam for unworldly gain*” (ibid., p. 95). So, this means that within the Tehran Bazaar community, there are those who display religion to achieve economic gains.

Smith (2004) extensively describes the phenomenon of religious display. His statements are based on his research in Isfahan and Tehran bazaars. He gives a number of reasons why some *bazaaris* display *outward piety*. He argues that, since religious leaders had a direct influence on opinions of regular publics, the *bazaaris* could justify their prices as fair if a religious authority approved them as true Muslims. Furthermore, outward religiosity could legitimize public display of wealth.

Generally, the reviewed scholars agree on the fact that bazaars are traditional and have a close relationship with the clergy. The question that interests this research is the role and importance of religion in creating the discussed *duality* between the traditional bazaar and the modern city.

¹ In the weekly political journal of *Shahrvand-e Emrooz*, issue 79, in 2000. The article is in Farsi, Available from: <http://www.tarikhirani.ir/fa/news/All/bodyView/1237/index.html> [Accessed: 14 July 2013]

The findings of research on the contemporary and ancient history of trade in Iran, show that religion has not played a leading role in determining the directions in which bazaars went through. In fact, this assumption that religious belief is a definer of the *bazaaris* political and economic actions leads to a paradox in the bazaar-religion relationship. This phenomenon is most especially observed in the political context of a country like Iran, in which religion is integrated with politics, from the State government level to the city management level.

The history of the *bazaaris'* relations with social groups outside the bazaars suggests that even in the case of truly religious bazaar members, religion did not lead their commercial and political activities. In his article "*Collective action, with and without Islam*" Smith (2004) criticizes the claim of the *natural* alliance between *bazari* and *ulama*¹. Giving historical evidence of the cooperation of *bazaaris* with the clergy, secular groups, intellectuals and students in political movements of the 19th and 20th century in Iran, he suggests that the main motivation of the bazaar in cooperating with *ulama* pertained to their economic survival and not their religious beliefs. Harris (2010), a sociologist, also agrees with this idea in his short paper in *The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy*. Referring to the political positions of the *bazaaris* especially after the Islamic Revolution, he concludes that the bazaar reacts to the political and economic changes in Iran, and believing in the existence of one united *bazari mentality* of Iranian bazaars is not correct.

Another issue that must be kept in the forefront is that bazaars existed in Iran before Islam. As explained, the term *bazaar* is linked to ancient Pahlavi language. This proves the existence of a bazaar in pre-Islamic Iranian cities. Furthermore, archeological findings, show the fact that the trade system before the Islamic era in Iran was adapted to the social-economic and religious contexts of pre-Islamic Iran.

Architects, Mohammad K. Pirnia and Keramatollah Afsar (1991) compare the location of archeological remains of pre-Islamic Iranian cities and trade routes with the structure of today's trade road network. They conclude that the key points and structure of current commercial routes are almost the same as the routes constructed in the Median² and *Achaemenid*³ era (see Figure 2-3). Hossein Naderi Ghara Baba and others (2009) also explain the origin of Iranian bazaars by referring to the archeological findings along the ancient routes in Iran. Their findings also indicate that the existing Caravan routes are developed on the basis of The Royal Routes, established by *Achaemenid*

¹ A few members of Islamic clergy who are highly influential, both religiously and politically.

² The Median Dynasty (ca. 700-550 BC)

³ The *Achaemenid* Empire (ca. 550-331 BC)

Empire. They conclude that the bazaars located along these historic routes formed a network linking the commercial cities to each other.

Similar to the mentioned authors, Ahmad Pourahmad (1997) refers to historical documents about the Silk Roads in Iran, and the order of the state-merchant relations during the Parthian¹ and *Sasanian*² era, to give evidence for the existence of national and international trade in that time. He points out that the origin of today's bazaars can be traced back to ancient Iranian cities. He also refers to archeological findings that prove that the "Royal Banks" organized and facilitated trade existed in *Sasanian* Empire. Further archeological evidence about commercial cities such as Semnan, Qazvin, Zanjan, and Tabriz, that were located along the east-west Silk Roads, show the long history of active international trade in these cities (Bastani Parizi, 2000).

In conclusion, Iranian commercial cities have certainly developed built and social structures for facilitating large-scale national and international trade under Zoroastrian empires, such as the late *Achaemenid* and *Sasanian* empires. In fact, the present Iranian bazaar is an evolved form of pre-Islamic bazaars. So, from architectural and social points of view, it is not scientifically correct to consider Iranian bazaars as *Islamic* bazaars. As an economic organization, the bazaar naturally adapted itself to the social context and the state in which it was embedded during different periods. According to the presented historical literature, *bazaaris* have always been interested in making good business deals whether with Zoroastrians, secular groups or with Muslims. Therefore, linking the bazaar with *religious and ethical beliefs*, and *especially Islamic beliefs* can be misleading in understanding the nature of the bazaars behavior in relation to the city. In fact, it is important to comprehend that being ideologically tolerant has been a successful strategy of a bazaar to survive economic and political changes.

However, as discussed, the conservative and religious approach of the bazaar toward daily social relations in the past century has created a gap between the bazaar and modern-oriented middle-class social groups. This is the main effect of religious orientation of a bazaar in creating and continuing the *bazaar-city isolation process* in social terms. Will the Iranian bazaars lose their meaning and function, if they change their religious orientations to attract wider social groups?

The aim of this section was answering to this question through exploring the causes of the religious orientation of the *bazaaris*. It was clarified that religion has been an orientation of the bazaar, but has never been one of the reasons for its existence, and one the core principles of its meaning and

¹ The Parthian Empire (247 BC – 224 AD)

² The Sasanian Empire (224 CE -651 CE)

functionality. This means that bazaars have tolerated different religious orientations to survive the changes of their economic-political environment. The bazaar is capable of showing this tolerance in the future, without losing its fundamental meaning and function.

2.2.2. The Bazaar-State Political and Economic Relations in the Last Century

Scholars such as Ashraf (1988), Kasravi (2003), Katuzian (2009; 2011) and Smith (2004) have written about bazaar-state conflicts since late 19th century. Smith (2004), for instance, believes that the homogeneity of bazaar community as a social entity that is able to organize and perform a collective political action is a relatively new phenomenon, which began in the late nineteenth century. According to Smith (2004), the first motivation of the bazaars is to resist the State, and this appeared during the twentieth century. As discussed before, the integrity and solidarity of the *bazari* social network is a fundamental characteristic of Iranian bazaars, making them capable of protecting their interests as commercial organizations. Scholars such as Lambton, Ann K. S. (1991) and Ashraf (1989) mentioned the existence of integrated social networks in bazaars during the medieval period in Iran. However, Smith (2004) is correct by stating that the period of the nineteenth and twentieth century is the time in which the tension between bazaar and state was remarkably intense.

A brief political and economic background will be presented to understand why and how the political power structure in Iran resulted in conflicts between bazaars and states and made the bazaar community one of the powerful social actors that acted against the state during the mentioned period. The period that is pertinent towards this discussion starts from the late 17th century because the economic and political decline of the Iranian state in the 19th century is rooted in political changes during this period. Afterward, the influence of the Iranian Constitution on the bazaars, during the early 1900s, will be discussed. This political change is critical because the constitution was a turning point in shaping the general order of the state and its relation with the bazaar as a social and economic entity.

How the Bazaar Became a Powerful Political Actor in Iran

According to the historical texts, the bazaar-state relationship before the nineteenth century was without serious tensions. The *bazari* enriched the financial resources of the State by paying taxes, duties, customs, and road tolls, while the state provided security in caravan routes and cities. According to Ashraf (1989), guilds were directed by leaders who represented their interests in dealing with state authorities. State authorities, merchant families, and *ulama* usually had close relationships due to intermarriage and economic bands. Usually, the royals or even *shahs* (kings)

were involved in commerce. For example, the Safavid king, Shah Abbas (mid-17th century) was known in history as Iran's greatest silk merchant (Blow, David, 2009).

Since the bazaar-state conflicts are driven by economics, to understand what happened after the nineteenth century that caused serious disputes between the Iranian states and the bazaar, I start from the moment in history in which Iranian economy began to decline. I refer to the works of writers such as, Mohammad Ebrahim Bastani Parizi (2000), Nikki R. Keddie (1971), and Javad Tabatabai (Ghazimoradi, 2012), who explain the reasons for the political, cultural¹ and economic decline of Iran between 17th and 19th centuries.

Since the Arab conquest, Iran was governed by regional tribes. The *Safavid* Empire was the first Iranian central power after the *Sasanian* Empire (Katouzian, 2009). In his book "*Policy and Finance in the Safavid Era*," Bastani Parizi (2000) pictures the economic and political environment of Iran under Shah Abbas. According to Bastani Parizi, during that time, the Iranian currency was of international high value and guilds were socially and economically active and efficient. In fact, Shah Abbas himself was involved in international trade. The central State provided safety and essential infrastructures for commercial activities. As Bastani Parizi explains, due to the political chaos after the death of Shah Abbas (1629), Iran experienced a growing economic crisis, which caused a dramatic fall in international export (ibid.).

Four *Safavid* Shahs ruled after Shah Abbas, until Isfahan, the *Safavid* capital was conquered by Afghans in 1722. As a result of the ignorance of the rulers, the country suffered from economic inflation and depreciation of Iranian currency in the late 17th century (Katouzian, 2009). Statements of Jean Chardin, the French traveler illustrate the crisis. He came to Iran firstly in 1656 during the rule of Shah Abbas, and then in 1677 in the time of Shah Suleiman². According to Chardin's observations, the economic conditions of Iran were unprecedentedly fragile. As it seemed to him, the country's wealth was decreased to half during this 12-year period (Bastani Parizi, 2000).

Since there were no unified states in Iran, the country was politically unstable between 17th and 18th centuries. Tabatabai for instance, calls the period between the early *Safavid* (17th century) and early Qajar (late 18th century), *the transition period* or the period of the *collapse of Iran* (Ghazimoradi, 2012)³. According to Katouzian (2009), this was a *dark period* in Iranian history, when all wealthy and poor social groups suffered from war and insecurity. Obviously, the manufacture and trade suffered

¹ Cultural decline here means a decline in terms of arts, literature and other cultural productions.

² Suleiman I (شاه سلیمان) ruled from 1666 to 1694.

³ A review on Tabatabai, Javad (2002) *Dibachih-i bar nazariyyih-i inhitat-i Iran* [An introduction to the theory of Iranian decadence]. Tehran: *Nigah-i Mu'asir*.

from the lack of security and predictability of commercial possibilities and conditions, both in terms of economic investments and road transportation.

A significant change came during the presence of the British, the French and Russians in Iran. During this period, these mentioned empires flourished, which was simultaneous with the decline in Iran. Although Iran was never colonized, these empires sought their interests within the Iranian territory. For instance, due to the weakness of late *Safavid* shahs, some of the north-western provinces of Iran were occupied by Russians. Although Nader Shah-e *Afshar*¹, who rose to power after the *Safavids*, had stopped Russian occupations, the tensions in Northern provinces continued until the 19th century, during the rule of the Qajar dynasty. The tensions in the North² were one of the reasons why Iranian Shahs sought support from Britain and France against Russia (Katouzian, 2009).

Although, as Katouzian (2009) states, Iran was reunited by the Qajars in 1797, yet the stability and peace were only relatively better than the precedent dark period. Similarly, Keddie (1971) in her article in the *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, mentions the lack of central power during Qajar dynasty (ca. 1785 to 1925). She states that during the Qajar period, the power of a king was actually very little outside Tehran (the capital), and the provinces were governed by provincial governors and tribal leaders. However, as Keddie explains, with the support of foreign governments, the Qajar shahs could prevent any single tribe or social group from becoming too powerful and a threat to their power. *ulama*, landlords, tribal leaders, and large merchants were dominant groups in Iranian Qajar society. However, their power was controlled by the State and other powerful groups.

As explained, under the Qajar period, the economic crisis continued, but because of the presence of the European countries in Iran, international trade was able to continue and grow. However, this was not a commercial relationship between equal countries. Through these commercial relations, Iran became one of the providers of raw materials for industrializing Europe. According to Ashraf (1989), Bastani Parizi (2000), and Katouzian (2009), due to the industrial growth in Europe, and the growing political and economic influence of Europeans in Iran, the Iranian international commerce changed its tendency from exporting secondary products (like carpets and textiles) to importing them from Europe. Instead, the export of primary products like cotton became more fashionable. This resulted in a remarkable change in the power structure of Iranian society, and the state—bazaar relationship.

¹ Nader Shah-e Afshar (افشار نادرشاه) the founder of the *Afshar* dynasty, ruled from 1736–1747.

² These conflicts led to the 1813 *Golestan* Treaty due to which Iran lost some of its northern provinces to Russia.

The growth in international trade, in this particular time, should not be considered as an economic development force in Iran. These commercial relations, which were based on an economic crisis and lack of industrial development in Iran, enriched few big merchants, *bazaaris*, who involved in foreign trade and weakened the large populations of lesser bazaar community members and the regular public, who were involved in local trade and manufacturing.

The important effect of the mentioned international trade on the power structure of Iranian society is explained in Keddie's (1971) work, but Ann K. S. Lambton (1991) describes it in a more detailed way when she writes about the Iranian social classes in the Qajar period. According to her, in late nineteenth century, when large merchants became economically powerful, they started to buy the royal family's lands and gradually became landlords. It should be mentioned that before the early twentieth century, the only owner of all lands and properties was the *Shah* or king. The local governors who usually were members of the royal family controlled the lands. However, the *Shah* could take the land at any time (Katouzian, 2009). The emergence of a powerful group of *bazaaris* (as landlords), which was approximately simultaneous with the change in the land ownership system, created an unprecedented opportunity for *bazaaris* to shift to an upper social level.

On the other hand, as the writings of authors such as Keddie (1971) and Ghazi-Moradi (2012) explain, via support from the Shia *Safavid* rulers, the *ulama* had the control over public education and law courts. They also had a significant influence on the masses through *Fatwas*¹. Furthermore, they were the direct receivers of Islamic taxes. All these factors made the Iranian Shia *ulama* wealthy and socially powerful. As Gazi Moradi (2012) explains, after *Safavids*, and during the period of chaos, particularly during the rule of Sunni Afghan in Iran, most of Shia clergies migrated to Karbala and Najaf², and formed a political-ideological group, away from the influence of the Sunni rulers. The cohesion of *ulama* and their political power during Qajar era was due to the mentioned sequences of events, which gave the Shia *ulama* an opportunity to found a powerful establishment, which was well linked with other social groups such as *bazaaris* and the regular urban public.

In brief, the political and economic changes in the 19th century turned the *bazari* and *ulama* into quasi-independent groups from the State and made them powerful enough to become a threat to the state power. Furthermore, the *ulama*, who could act independently from the state, started to give *Fatwas* against the foreign influence. The uprising of the less powerful groups and the general

¹ A *fatwa* (فتوى) is the formal opinion and teaching of *ulama*, which is announced to the public and considered as an Islamic law.

² Karbala (كربلا) and Najaf (نجف) are Shia holy cities in modern day Iraq.

public, who were under pressure due to the economic crisis, and under the influence of the *ulama*, led to social movements against the Qajar state.

Bazaaris demanded the State to stop interfering with the market and to limit the Western competitors. Therefore, they participated in social movements such as the protest of the bazaar against the establishment of the ministry of commerce¹ in the mid-1880s, and the movement against the British tobacco monopoly in 1891-2 (Ashraf, 1989; Kasravi, 2003; Keddie, 1971). All these economic and political dissatisfactions led to further social movements, which finally resulted in the constitutional revolution in 1906.

This section attempted to summarize the historical events to explain how *bazaaris* became powerful enough to resist the state. In the next section, I will explain the decline of *bazaaris* economic and political power, which changed the bazaar-state relationship and led to the emergence of bazaar-city isolation process.

How the Political Power of the Bazaars Started to Decline

As mentioned, due to commercial relations with Europe, the power of wealthy *bazaaris* has increased in the early 20th century. Katouzian (2009), Keddie (1971) and many others, such as Ashraf (1989) call this period of post-1906, another transition period of Iran, and the modernization of Iran's legal and economic structure. The 1906 constitution had strengthened, yet weakened the bazaar's power.

The Constitution, as Katouzian (2009) puts it, led to an emergence of a new order under the law in the governing the country. As suggested by selected texts, the Constitution did not put an end to the inequality of the social groups in Iran. Nevertheless, the fact that the constitutional revolution had a significant role in educating people and creating the concept of civil society within Iran is stated by Katouzian (2009), Kasravi (2003), and Keddie (1971).

In the new social order, the public citizens, except women, gained the right to participate in urban administration through voting. Although in 1906, women did not have the right to vote and to become elected officials, the constitution paved the way for women to gain the right to vote and to become members of parliament in 1962. In sum, regular citizens started to get present in the country's political arena, which at least theoretically, changed the idea that the landlords, *ulama*, and the rich *bazaari* are of more social privilege.

¹ *Wezarat-e Tejarat*

However, in practice, Constitution empowered the landlord and the *bazaari* in some ways. According to Katouzian (2011), the Constitution actually enhanced the political and economic power of landlords and merchants. According to the new legal order in land affairs, they gained private ownership rights. Therefore, comparing to their situation in the pre-constitution, in which all the lands belonged to the king, they became more secure and independent from the State but, as mentioned in the following pages, under the *Pahlavis* rule, they lost much of their independence.

The other influence of the new order was that all the main political and economic, administrative infrastructures were centered within Tehran. This was the start or the beginning of Tehran Bazaar's role as the main commercial center of Iran and marginalizing other provincial bazaars from international trade, making them less active and less politically powerful. This situation is ongoing until the present day.

As mentioned, the modernization and centralization of the government in Iran started during the last years of *Qajars'* rule. However, in the 1920's and the 1930's, during the rule of *Pahlavis*, that the modern and central military, governmental industries and bureaucratic government were developed in Iran. Reza Khan¹ who was an army commander under the *Qajars*, came to power in 1925, after deposing Ahmad Shah² the last Qajar king. Being a nationalist, he had a reformation plan based on *modernization, centralization, and the secularization* of Iran. He followed the post-constitutional nationalist ideas and aimed at unifying the army, building a modern nation-state, separating religion from politics, extending modern secular education, promoting modern industry, and improving the status of women (Katouzian, 2009). Katouzian (2009) calls his era the *modern arbitrary rule* because Reza Shah tried to develop the mentioned missions by force and in a short time.

Obviously, Reza Shah's approach threatened the position of the *ulama*. As referred to in the previous pages, before the modernization of the education and judicial systems in Iran, Shia *ulama* ran the traditional schools and the courts according to Islamic rules. Furthermore, the *ulama* have been traditionally against the presence of women in public affairs, such as political elections. As a result, they opposed the Shah's modernization policies. As Kiddie (1971) mentions, the new government regulations for Vaqf properties also limited the power of *the ulama*. Regarding the situation of landlords under Reza Shah, as Kiddie (1971) states, Reza Shah limited their power by confiscations. As a result, the Shah himself became the biggest landowner in the country.

¹ Later, Reza Shah Pahlavi (رضا شاه پهلوی), 1878 – 1944. Ruled Iran from 1925 to 1941

² Ahmad Shah Qajar (احمد شاه قاجار) ruled Iran from 1909 to 1925.

Furthermore, under Reza Shah, taxes were heavy, because he financed his modernization projects, such as new railway and road constructions and new government-owned industries mainly through taxes. The taxes paid by merchants increased caused great dissatisfaction. One of the policies of Reza Shah, which weakened the bazaar, was monopolizing the trade of some essential products, such as wheat, in favor of the government (Katouzian, 2009). Although the State had to issue foreign trade licenses for merchants in many cases, it had full control over trade, and merchants did not have a free hand in commercial activities as before (ibid.).

The modernization policies continued under Reza Shah's son, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. Mohammad Reza Shah's *White Revolution* or the *Revolution of the Shah and the People* in 1963 influenced the power hierarchy of Iranian society. Although his revolution falls under criticism, the country benefited from the reforms in areas such as land ownership, women's rights, and education. Also, his reforms facilitated the transferring of the land ownership from the landlords to the peasants. Furthermore, as argued by Ashraf (1989), the establishment of governmental economic foundations such as city-village cooperative markets¹, chamber of guilds², the Special Tribunal for the Prosecution of Price Gougers³, and the Association for the Protection of Consumer Rights⁴ in the 1960s, were policies of the State for controlling and centralizing commerce (ibid.).

The discovery and export of oil also had a major influence on the Iranian economy and the bazaars in this period. Oil, discovered by the British in 1901, was not under the control of the Iranian State, both in the framework of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC), founded in 1908, and in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) founded in 1935. Nationalization of the Iranian Oil Company and the dramatic increase in the price of oil during the 1960's resulted in a dramatic increase of State wealth. Although the oil economies benefited bazaars, in particular, the Tehran Bazaar, oil was a lucrative reason for changes in Iran's economy and consequently, the bazaar-state relationship in 1960's and 1970's. According to authors such as Katouzian (2003) and other scholars⁵, the oil economy was one of the factors which consolidated the arbitrary force of governments in Iran since Pahlavi rule. As they argue, because of being the only domestic receiver of the oil export income, the State became independent from the tax revenues. As a result, the State gained control of the free market, even more than before.

¹ in Persian: شرکتهای تعاونی شهر و روستا

² in Persian: اتاق اصناف

³ in Persian: دادگاه کیفر گران فروشان

⁴ In Persian: انجمن ملی حمایت از مصرف کننده

⁵ The discussion between Katouzian and the Iranian economist Shahin Fatemi on oil economics and democracy in Iran can be viewed in the following link:

https://www.facebook.com/bbcpargar/posts/793998557280868?stream_ref=5

Smith (2004) states the policies of Pahlavis towards the *bazaaris* in a short and clear way. As he explains, the State began to support the working class, peasantry, and foreign investors and traders, at the expense of marginalizing the bazaar. The increasing competition and the price control turned the bazaar against the state. He quotes from Mohammad Reza Shah that, "*the bazaaris are a fanatic lot, whose time is past*" (Smith, 2004, p. 193). Ashraf (1989) also describes the tension and conflicts in the bazaar-State relationship under Pahlavi rule. He points out that, in this area, the Iranian bazaar became highly motivated for supporting political protest movements. The dissatisfaction, of mainly the *ulama* and the Bazaar, led to their alliance to enforce and support the Islamic Revolution.

The Islamic Revolution took place between 1977 and 1979 and led to replacing the Pahlavi monarchy with the Islamic Republic regime. Sociologists generally agree that it was a revolution supported by different social classes, regardless of their social, economic, or ideological differences. As Katouzian (2009) states, it was the whole society that was determinate to remove one man, the Shah. *Bazaaris* were among the most active supporters of the Islamic revolution.

Recent research shows an interesting paradox in the *bazaari-ulama* relationship. Although the Islamic Republic was led by the Shia *ulama*, who are traditional allies of the bazaar, post-revolution Iran reflects a weakened solidarity of within the *bazaari-ulama* community.

Keshavarzian (2007), who has studied the relationship of Tehran bazaars with the Pahlavi regime and with the Islamic Republic, states that the bazaar was more marginalized after the Islamic Revolution. Referring to the fact that *bazaaris* were powerful enough to be influential in the Islamic Revolution, he concludes that the bazaar could survive the modernizing Pahlavi regime, but it was "*radically restructured and weakened under the unabashedly traditionalist Islamic Republic*" (Keshavarzian, 2007, p. 1).

His research shows that the solidarity in the bazaar community gave its place to *secrecy*. He mentions a number of reasons for this change. The first and most important is the emergence of a group in the bazaar who were specifically supported by the government. He calls these *bazaaris* "*dawlati*," a term, which means to be associated with the government. As he explains, after the Islamic Revolution, a voluntary organization was established in the bazaars by the Islamist elements of the bazaar that have supported the revolution. He focuses his study on the Society of the Islamic Associations in Tehran Bazaar¹, which was established in the year 1980. According to him, the main duty of these associations was to "*maintain the Islamic character*" of bazaars and to assure that "*they followed government regulations and pricing*" (ibid., p. 161). However, according to his

¹ In Persian: جامعه انجمن های اسلامی اصناف بازار تهران

interviews, the Islamic associations have lost touch with the members of the bazaar community because, in the eyes of *bazaaris*, they represented the interests of the state and not the bazaar.

In short, he believes that the modernist Shah neglected the social power of the unified informal networks in the bazaar. This ignorance gave the bazaar the possibility to “*govern itself, (so that it could) developed a corporate identity, and eventually mobilized in support of the revolution*” (Keshavarzian, 2007, p. 185). However, after 1979, these “*networks have been a rejoinder to an institutional setting that attempts to control all commercial activities in order to redistribute them via personalistic patronage*” (ibid., p.185).

Another work which focuses on the bazaar-state relationship in post-Islamic revolution period is the research done by the Islamic reformist sociologist, Ghafarian ¹(2009). He also puts his focus mainly on the Tehran bazaar. Based on document analysis and in-depth interviews he has conducted with the *bazaaris* and politicians involved in the bazaar-state discourse, he has investigated the interaction of bazaar and the Islamic Republic State from 1978 to 1988. Similar to the reviewed authors, he sees the bazaar as a social entity, which takes certain political positions in political ups and down. In general, he puts the issue of the *bazaari-ulama* alliance at the center of his argument. As he believes, before the Islamic Revolution, the collective actions against the State were directed by large merchants, while the *ulama* followed the bazaar. However, during and after the 1977 -1979 events, the retailers and smaller members of bazaar community followed the *ulama* (ibid.).

When discussing the relationship of the bazaar with politicians in the Islamic Republic, Matin Ghafarian (2009) believes that the bazaar is by nature a traditional, conservative social entity, whose political position supports the conservative right wing within the Islamic Republic. The most significant result of his research for this thesis is his findings regarding the *problem of division* among the *bazaari* groups. His findings suggest that after the Islamic revolution, the bazaar community was divided into “*Government Supporters*” who supported the conservative left-wing politicians in the Islamic Republic, and the group he calls “*Muslim Bazaaris*”², who are the followers of Ayatollah Khomeini³. Although it can be said that he underestimates the ideological and political diversity in the bazaar, and forms his argumentation mainly around the relationship of *bazaaris* and Shia *ulama*, his study reveals some of the reasons for the emergence of mistrust, which damaged the solidarity within the *bazaari* community. As Ghafarian (2009) explains, the conflicts between the right and left wings, which led to a political “*dead-end*” in the country, resulted in the bazaar-state conflicts from

¹ He writes for *Mehrnameh*, a reformist journal in Iran.

² The term *bazaaris* the plural form of the term *bazaari*.

³ Ruhollah Mostafavi Moosavi Khomeini(روح الله خمینی), the Shia leader and the leader of the 1979 Islamic Revolution

1978 to 1988. Naturally, these conflicts reduced the economic and political power of the bazaar. The other reasons he mentions, for the bazaar-state conflicts, are the economic policies of the left-wing government that were against the bazaar, and the authorization of foreign commerce by the state, especially during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988).

Keshavarzian (2007) suggests that the entering of the new government-oriented actors also changed the commercial exchange and governance in the bazaar from the old *cooperative hierarchy* to *coercive hierarchy*. This created an atmosphere of competition. Naturally, the close social interactions were weakened, as a result of the new competitive atmosphere.

He also notes that the commercial network in the past three decades has become dependent on governmental agencies and the black market. As a result, *bazaaris* who could adapt to the new network enjoyed more privileges than others. In sum, the new commercial network was based on inequality. In this situation, as one of the Keshavarzian's interviewees says: "*there is little trust between people (in bazaar community¹) and most only think of themselves instead of each other. The old structure of the Bazaar has been lost*" (Keshavarzian, 2007, p. 125). In general, he concludes that the result of an integrated social network within the Tehran Bazaar has been negative and seriously damaged the bazaar after the Islamic Revolution.

In the previous pages, I attempted to mention the political forces, which kept bazaar behind the developing commerce outside it and pulled it down from its central economic and political position. Although not directly, this process of weakening the bazaar led to the starting of the bazaar-city isolation process in both social and physical dimensions.

Commercial Modernization in the Context of Political Changes of the Past Century

The marginalization of the Iranian bazaars from the economic and political arena of the country did not happen only due to the State policies. In fact, the State policies were effective by bringing the bazaar to the position that made it unable or not strong enough to make instant and appropriate reactions to the rapid modernization and globalization of commerce. Over the past century, the demographic growth and the increase in production and import of goods increased the total amount of commercial exchange. Furthermore, the modern transportation possibilities, telecommunication, and later, the internet have modernized the methods of commerce in Iran².

¹ The term is added to the original text by Yadollahi

² Although Iran is not advanced in e-commerce or telemarketing, policies of transformation to modern commerce is being increasingly encouraged and implemented by the Iranian government (According to the official reports prepared by the Deputy of Management at The Ministry of Industry, Mine and Trade, Iran.

In the traditional bazaars, the commercial exchanges normally depend on a geographical location (bazaar area) and a specific period of time. For example, usually, *bazaaris* refrain from working on Fridays, as well as the evening and night hours through the working days. Whereas, modern shopping areas and commercial complexes have fewer limitations in terms of working hours and space available for large volumes of goods exchange.

This expansion of international commercial relations and the increase in the amount of exchanges have changed the balance of economic power among the bazaars in different cities, as well as the merchants in individual bazaars. For instance, as Keshavarzian (2007) explains, the free-trade zones in the Persian Gulf, and the international transit hub of Dubai in the past decades has remarkably decreased in importance, although it features spatial centrality and was the former international commercial pole. According to the *bazaaris* interviewed by him, "*the commercial world is divided into 'inside' and 'outside' the Bazaar*" (Keshavarzian, 2007, p. 177). They believed that the *real* trade or at least the significant commercial activities are *outside the Bazaar's borders*.

He also explains that the globalization of economic trends in Iran resulted in the *delocalization* of the commercial networks, and changed the terms of trade in bazaars. The new order in commercial relations increased the instability of exchange and introduced new actors to the bounded social networks of traditional bazaars. These trends have put members of the bazaar community in a competitive ambiance, and have damaged their traditional solidarity, which kept the bazaar integrated for centuries (ibid.).

In a similar way, Ashraf (1989) states that the modern competitive trade has led to the extension of commercial activities and caused specialization of trade. As he concludes, this has resulted in inequality in terms of economic power and status and has caused *a social distance* among the members of bazaar community. Consequently, those *bazaaris* who were involved in export businesses became remarkably wealthier than others who dealt with local trade.

I should add here that the traditional hierarchy of the bazaar is not formed based on equality. Naturally, the big merchants, smaller traders, shopkeepers, and peddlers do not enjoy equal social status. I assume that here, Ashraf means that the new order in commerce deformed the hierarchical social structure of the bazaar and led to social distance and consequently, declined in the power of the bazaar as an economic and political entity.

Reports available at: <http://imp.mim.gov.ir/>). So, we should expect future impacts of modern commerce on bazaars. Actually, the initial signs of this impact can be seen today.

A Summary of Political and Economic Causes that Enforced the Bazaar-City Isolation Process

To summarize the reaction of the Iranian bazaars to the political and economic ups and downs, it can be said that during and after the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, until the 1979 Islamic Revolution, *bazaaris* cooperated with the powerful *ulama* in many movements against the state. Between the early Qajar dynasty until the present time, the position of the *bazaaris* in relation to the State can be explained in three periods.

From early Qajar dynasty to Iranian Constitution of 1906, the *bazaaris* became stronger than they were previously. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the effect of State policies on the bazaar, or better said, the reaction of bazaars to political and economic actions of the states started a process of marginalization of the bazaar from the political and economic arena in Iran.

During the years between 1920 and 1979, political and economic marginalization of the bazaar was enforced through the direct modernization policies targeting the bazaar. Although becoming less potent, as a reaction to the State policies, *bazaaris* used their traditional social networks to maintain their solidarity against the Shah and support the Islamic Revolution.

Since 1980, the fall of the centrality of the bazaar was due to the effect of economic and political State policies, which were not clearly and directly targeted against the bazaar. During this period, due to the emergence of new state-oriented actors within the bazaar community, the integrity and solidarity in the bazaars turned into secrecy and competition.

In other words, the decline of the bazaar had already started after the 1906 constitution, when bazaar began to fall from its peak of power. However, this falling was gradual because *bazaaris* had maintained and used their informal social and economic tools to resist against the modernizing state. As the reviewed literature suggests, the bazaar community lost its power to cope with the changing political and economic environment. The integrity of the bazaar's informal social networks broke down. Since the bazaar as an economy-based social entity started to lag behind the economically developing *world outside*, the scale of its commercial and social activities decreased from national and international levels to mainly local trade (in many provincial bazaars such as Zanzan Bazaar and Shiraz Bazaar). The Tehran Bazaar and Tabriz Bazaar retained some of their international and national functions. In general, the scale of social groups interested in bazaars for their daily and large-scale commercial needs has been shrinking significantly since the mid-twentieth century. Therefore, the fragmentation of the internal socio-economic network of the bazaar caused the breach in its links to the socially and economically active groups outside it.

The simultaneous changes in modern urban planning have also influenced the bazaar-city relations at social and physical levels. The modernization of commerce and urban planning policies has resulted in the change of land-use zoning in Iranian cities. The changes in urban zoning have altered the social groups (customers) who are attracted to the bazaars for retail services. Following the changes in the majority of public citizens who go to the bazaars, the nature of public life within the bazaars has changed. A detailed explanation of this phenomenon is in the following section.

2.2.3. Modern Urban Development Policies

The causes of the *bazaar-city isolation* are also rooted in the modernist urban development policies. In this section, the managerial and planning forces that created gaps between the bazaar and its surrounding built environment are discussed in terms of function and accessibility. Then, the literature showing how this gap has affected accessibility and attractiveness of the bazaar for certain social groups is reviewed. Since urban planning policies followed State policies, this discussion follows the chronological order of changes in economic and political approaches of states (as presented in the previous section).

Before the nineteenth century, urban development was based on the local geographical and economic conditions. Falamaki (2005) states that governors were the main effective forces in forming Iranian cities. By saying so, he means local governors with local power¹ shaped most of the Iranian cities. Falamaki (2005) also mentions the role of citizens in urban development, especially in times of disasters, such as rebuilding cities after wars and natural disasters. However, he does not go into detail in explaining the quality of participation of different social groups such as landlords, merchants and regular publics, including women. Since this research is centered on the topic, public place, it is important to understand patterns of public participation in urban planning. The participation of the public in forming the city and its public areas will be discussed in Chapter Three.

The discussion presented in the following pages concerns the urban planning approaches since the beginning of the twentieth century when the Iranian parliament passed the *Law of Municipalities*² in 1309. As the reviewed literature suggest, before this time there was no central legal supervision of urban planning issues. The individual local governors ruled the cities with the assistance of a local administrative organization (Madanipour, 2016). Therefore, development activities were local and according to the geographical conditions and economic productivity of cities. According to Ehlers,

¹ As discussed before, according to Keddie, (1971) and Katouzian (2009) , the policies made in local scale was mainly based on the decisions of local governors and land lords who were associated with the royal family.

² The Persian title of the Law: *Ghanun-e Shahrdari ha* or *Ghanoon-e Baladieh*, 1309 in Solar Hijri Calendar (SH.)

Eckart (1991) and Falamaki (2005), the first state-oriented projects for restructuring Iranian cities happened in Tehran in the late nineteenth century. Ehlers reports that these projects were the beginnings of modernization of Iranian cities. In this period, similar projects were conducted in commercial cities such as Tabriz (Yadollahi, 2010). With the increase in the urban population in the early twentieth century, the urban growth and urban renewal projects increased in number and pace.




Figure 2-6. Ehlers's model of urban modernization projects in the 20th century. (Ehlers, 1991)¹

The large-scale renewal and development projects, which changed the layout of many Iranian cities were launched in the 1930's by Reza Shah Pahlavi and followed by Mohammad Reza Shah until 1970's. Legal tools, such as *The Law on Development of the Streets*² passed in 1941 backed up the modernist urban planning policy. Falamaki (2005) calls this urban planning approach a type of *replacement urbanism*, the replacement of the old with the new urban layout. Ehlers's (1991) model of urban modernization projects in 20th century explains this phenomenon in an abstract way. Figures 2-7 and 2-8 show examples of this dense urban fabrics and bazaars in Isfahan and Shiraz cut by modern streets.

¹ Online available from: <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/cities-iv> [Accessed: 12.3.2014].

² The Persian title of the Law: Ghanun-e Tose-ey-e Maaber, in 1320 SH.




Figure 2-7. The modern street layout, cutting through the old city fabric and the bazaar in Shiraz (ICHHTO, 2009, p. 385).



Figure 2-8. The modern street layout, cutting through the old urban fabric and the bazaar in Isfahan (ICHHTO, 2011, p. 226).

These projects followed a standard layout with a hierarchy of main and secondary streets cutting through the organic, dense fabric of cities including the bazaars. In the new planning system, the bazaars were cut by one or several new streets. As explained earlier, the social and built networks

shape the Iranian bazaar as a whole. Therefore, the physical *boundedness* and integrity of bazaars are important factors in maintaining their social integrity. Therefore, the early and mid-twentieth century urban renewal projects affected the physical and social integrity of the Iranian bazaars¹. The discussed approach in urban planning was followed in the 1960's, following the passing of *The Law of Renewal and Urban Construction* (1966)² and preparation of comprehensive urban development plans or master plans³ for Iranian cities.

One of the most significant consequences of modern urbanism was the emergence of a new land economy mechanism in Iranian cities. As Falamaki (2005) explains, the lands in urban peripheries began to become increasingly attractive for the public and private developers. Residential areas in newly developed districts started to grow. Consequently, the financial investments and the infrastructure-building activities were concentrated in the newly developing urban areas. This flow of the investment of financial and human capital of cities in the new areas gradually created a duality in terms of urban infrastructure and well-being in the old and new urban areas. The effects of this new order of urban economics on residential areas and bazaars were different but deeply interrelated. Literature suggests that the modern urbanism led to similar effects on the bazaars in large cities like Tehran, Tabriz, and Isfahan.

According to Ashraf (1989), after modernization projects, the bazaar of Tehran gained a strategic importance in local, national and international commerce. As he and many others such as Keshavarzian (2007) explain, small provincial bazaars engaged mostly in local and retail trade. However, they note that large provincial bazaars, such as bazaars in Tabriz and Isfahan, maintained their role in international trade to some extent. In general, this means that due to the centralization of policies of the State, the commercial role of Tehran bazaar increased at the expense of declining the economic and political power of other smaller provincial bazaars. This caused a dramatic change in function of bazaars in relation to each other. Experiencing a remarkable decline in terms of commercial activities, smaller provincial bazaars such as the Ghazvin Bazaar and Zanjan Bazaar lost their livelihood and centrality. While, larger bazaars, such as Tehran bazaar were affected in an opposite way.

Keshavarzian (2007) and Ashraf (1989) discuss the notion of the *relocation* of the retail activities from the bazaars to the modern streets. As they explain, after modernization and change in

¹ Tabriz bazaar area was one of the exceptions in terms of being physically affected by the central urban renewal projects (See chapter 6)

² The Persian title of the Law: Ghanun-e Nosazi va Omran-e Shahri, in 1347 SH.

³ In Persian: *Tarh-e Jame* (طرح جامع)

production and distribution activities, the new style of trade with its remarkable increase in the volume of exchange could not be facilitated by the traditional bazaars.

On the one hand, Keshavarzian (2007) explains that, particularly about commercial cities, although *bazaaris* started to move away from the bazaar area, most of the merchants and retailers still had their shops and offices inside the bazaar, or in the central city area around the bazaar. Therefore, the focus of the business was yet on the bazaar area.

On the other hand, according to Asharaf (1989) and Falamaki (2005), large bazaars started to turn into centers of mainly wholesale trade, which provided the goods for the retail centers and shops in streets all around the cities. The retail activities of bazaars decreased, and they became mostly wholesale centers and centers for small-scale workshops. So, the regular customers who used to go to bazaar on a daily basis chose to go to the new retail shops in streets. The shopkeepers who had retail businesses in the streets went to wholesalers in the bazaar to provide the goods for their shops. The urban growth and development of several new neighborhoods in cities also enforced this process. This also means the decline of residential quality and social diversity in the neighborhoods surrounding the bazaars.

In fact, in the case of large bazaars, the change did not affect their physical and economic centrality. It altered their function and the nature of their contribution to the commercial activities of the cities. As Ashraf (1989) states, Iranian bazaars started to experience a *transition* in their function since the early 20th century. From his arguments, it is evident that by mentioning the term “*transition*,” he means a gradual decline.

In short, the concentration of wholesale activities in the central city and bazaar area was simultaneous with the concentration of development and investments in the newly built areas. The *National Strategic Document for Revitalization, Rehabilitation, Renovation, and Reinforcement of Deteriorated¹ and Dysfunctional Urban Fabrics²*, prepared by the Ministry of Roads and Urban Development (MRUD) in September 2014, discusses this problem. This document was prepared according to Article 16 of the 2011 law for *Supporting the Revitalization, Rehabilitation, Renovation, of Deteriorated and Dysfunctional Urban Fabrics³*. Article 3 of the approval letter of this document suggests that the average level of urban development services in the old zones of cities is lower than

¹ The term “deteriorated” refers to the decayed urban fabrics due to aging and neglect (Collins Dictionary: http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/urban-decay#urban-decay_1, [Accessed: 16.06.2015]).

² The Persian title of the document: Sanad-e Melli-e Rahbordi-e Ehya, Behsazi, Nosazi, va Tavanmandsazi-e Bafthay-e Farsodeh va Nakaramad-e Shahri (MRUD, 2014b).

³ The Persian title of the Law: *Ghanun-e Hemayat az Ehya, Behsazi va Nosai-e Bafthaye Farsudeh va Nakaramad-e Shahri* (2011).

other regions of cities. Falamaki (2005) also, notes that the notion of *development* of historic cities and bazaars was out of the question in the framework of modern urban development, because the cities' capital was invested in the projects *outside of* the old city.

This change in the function of the bazaar and the central city changed the balance of commercial-residential zones in Iranian commercial cities. Before modernist urbanism, mostly *bazari* families and local people occupied neighborhoods around the bazaars. After the rapid urban growth, and when bazaar area adopted the character of urban wholesale and business center, many of the residential areas turned into storehouses, offices, and workshops. Concerning the remaining residential areas in city centers, it should be said that the decline in their physical and infrastructural qualities caused the replacement of most of the local inhabitants with workers who were involved in the business in the bazaar area, as well as low-income social groups. Therefore, as a wealthy social group, most of the merchant families did not stay in old residential areas near the bazaars. They moved to the newly developed neighborhoods that offered a higher standard of living.

As Falamaki (2005, p. 159) puts it, being "*shocked and confused*" by the modern urbanism, the old city now belonged to members of the lower social class or the ones whom he calls *the surrenders*. This phenomenon created a *duality* in the built and social structures of the old and new neighborhoods in cities. Ashraf (1989) and Ehlers (1991) also mention the creation of this *duality* in social, economic and physical dimensions by calling the old city traditional versus the modern new neighborhoods. Ashraf points out the difference between the lifestyle of the merchant families who stayed in bazaar neighborhoods with the modern middle-class families living in the trendy neighborhoods (Ashraf, 1989).

What can be concluded from the mentioned process is that although several industries and new commercial centers, mostly in retail-scale, were developed in the newly-built parts of the cities, bazaars did not lose their centrality. However, the role of old bazaars in cities started to change. Bazaars gradually became central in a different sense, in a destructive sense. In the 20th century, the pace and volume of trade and urban growth became too rapid to be followed by the bazaars and city centers. This posed an intense pressure on the built and social structures of the old cities. Furthermore, the pressure caused by economic exploitation and little investment in maintenance and infrastructure building damaged and misdirected the development in bazaars. This process of physical decay and functional change was one of the leading causes of the creation of the *process of bazaar-city isolation* in physical and social aspects.

The Modern Approach Towards City Centers: The Problematic Inner-City as Urban Heritage

Understanding the logic behind the contemporary approach that viewed the bazaar as urban heritage in the organizational and legal context of urban development planning in Iran is necessary for explaining the *process of bazaar-city isolation*. In this planning approach, the tasks of approving and implementing plans for historical urban fabric zones is divided between organizations working on city development affairs and organizations that undertake urban heritage protection.

Here, I give a short introduction about the formation of the current planning system in Iran. Through reflecting on legal texts, patterns of organizational structures for urban heritage management in Iran, and reviewing relevant research, the urban planning approaches and policies towards historical city zones and bazaars will be explained. This section will be closed with a discussion on the influence of these policies on the *bazaar-city isolation process*.

In Iran, valuing cultural heritage in legal terms started in early 20th century. The first Iranian law related to cultural heritage was passed in 1910 by establishing the Ministry of Knowledge, Owqaf¹, and Handicrafts². The initial approach towards heritage was mainly monumental, and it continued until 1970's. The *Law of Municipalities*³(article 111) allowed the municipalities to buy the lands in the city centers for the purpose of renovation of the old fabric, widening the existing pathways, constructing new streets, building large-scale complexes, and conservation of the historic buildings.

In the 1970s due to the rapid deterioration and loss of urban heritage, the professionals and researchers in the field of urban planning started to consider urban conservation more seriously. This tendency in Iran was triggered, also as the result of the international concern for urban heritage protection. This was the time when the Iranian parliament passed the laws of ratification of Iran to *Conventions for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage* (1972) on December 29th, 1974. Later, Iran ratified the *Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict* (1945) in 21st of May 1975. As Ehlers (1991) states, this period was the time of a *national awareness* about urban heritage in Iran. The improvement of the financial status in Iran, resulting from the increase in Oil prices, also enforced the interest and investments of the State in the heritage protection movement, by initiating state-supported urban conservation projects.

¹ Owqaf is an organization responsible for managing Waqf or Islamic endowment properties. Since a great number of buildings, objects, and documents of historic and cultural importance belong to this organization, Owqaf has always been an influential actor in use and protection of cultural heritage properties in Iran.

² In Persian: Vezarat-e Maaref, Owqaf, va Sanaye'e Mostazrefeh (وزارت معارف، اوقاف، و صنایع مستظرفه)

³The Persian title of the Law: Ghanun-e Shahr-dari ha.

We should consider that the modernist urban planning approach in the period between 1930 and 1980 (that was discussed in the last section) was very influential in shaping the present structure of Iranian cities. This period was simultaneous with the urban conservation movement. It is interesting to note that what was perceived 'the problematic inner city,' was 'the city' a few decades before. Rapid modernization faded out this period of 'a few decades' from the collective memory of urban publics and urban planners in charge. The heritage protection movement actually attempted to remember and remind the values of the city center as the core and source of the urban development.

The passing of the *Law of Establishment of the Supreme Council of Urban Planning and Architecture (SCUPA)* in 1973¹ was one of the first and most important steps in approaching the city and the inner city with a more investigative manner. It attempted to enhance and legalize the participation of local residents and research activities in urban planning. The establishment of SCUPA influenced the former process of preparation of master plans by emphasizing the necessity of the participation of city councils and municipalities. SCUPA was a higher council directed by Farah Diba², in the *Ministry of Development and Housing*³. It consisted of governmental authorities, urban planners, and researchers who determined and supervised general policies and approaches of urban legislations and urban comprehensive (master) plans. Falamaki (2005) states that like many other urban planning legal tools, this law does not present a comprehensive framework for dealing with issues of urban conservation. However, he believes that legal instruments such as the Law of Establishment of the SCUPA provided some basics for urban conservation in Iran. Pirouz Hanachi⁴ and others (2007) believe that in the framework of SCUPA, the radical modernist urban development approach was revised, and urban heritage conservation was considered necessary. However, as mentioned, the approach to conservation was still monumental. Examples such as the conservation projects of the *Sheikh Safi-edd in Ardabili* shrine in Ardabil and the project of *Amir Chakhmagh* monument in Yazd illustrate this approach (Figure 2-9).

¹ The Persian title of the Law: *Ghanun-e Tasise Shoray-e Aali-e Shahrsazi va Memari*, in 1351 SH.

² Farah Diba, the former queen of the Iranian monarchy is an architect.

³ Ministry of Development and Housing (in Persian: وزارت آبادانی و مسکن). The SCUPA is today under The Ministry of Roads and Urban Development (MRUD) (in Persian: وزارت راه و شهرسازی)

⁴ Hanachi was the vice minister of the Housing and urban development from 1997 to 2005, and currently is the vice minister of Roads and Urban development.



Figure 2-9. An example of the monumental conservation planning approach in 1970's – Urban fabric around the *Amir Chakhmaq Complex* in Yazd (Google Maps, 2017)

Following the establishment of SCUPA in 1972, the legal framework of the urban planning system in Iran has formed based on comprehensive urban plans¹ or master plan model. Falamaki (2005) and Ehlers (1991) have researched the urban development patterns in Iranian cities before and after the Islamic Revolution. They state that the development patterns did not change significantly, but due to political and economic crisis after the revolution, the conservation was one of the last priorities in urban development policies. The eight years of destructive war with Iraq² caused a dramatic decline in the economy. The State launched urban reconstruction, urban development and later, urban heritage conservation projects mainly after the war.

In 1990, Isfahan, Shiraz, Tabriz, Kerman, and later *Hamedan* were considered by the SCUPA as Cultural-Historic cities. Especial development plans called *Historic Axis Plans* were prepared for these cities with the aim of developing cultural centers within them (Kalantari, Hossein, and Pourahmad, Ahmad, 2005). These projects could not achieve the expected outcome of reconnecting the old and new parts of the cities, due to the unclearness of their position in the overall urban development agenda (M. Taghi Rahnamaei and Parvaneh Shah Hosseini, 2012). Hanachi and Diba (2007) state that these plans were based on a *museum approach*, and were not even implemented completely.

¹ This concept of urban planning was developed by Geddes and Abercrombie and conceived mainly as a way to predict and shape future land use and development patterns. These land use maps were re-evaluated at five yearly intervals" (Farhoodi and others, 2009, p. 335).

² September 1980 to August 1988

The general function of the SCUPA has remained the same since the general policy of urban development has not changed since 1972. However, the laws and organizations concerning urban heritage have changed. Following the passing of the *Law of Establishment of the Iranian Cultural Heritage Organization*¹ (ICHO) in January 1986, the ICHO was established under in the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education². This organization, which was later, turned into *Iranian Cultural Heritage Handicrafts and Tourism Organization*³ (ICHHTO) did not play a major role in urban management scale. According to the law of *Fourth Plan of Economic, Social and Cultural Development of the Islamic Republic of Iran*⁴, ICHHTO has the responsibility of issuing permission documents for interventions in historic areas. It is also a key agent in decision-making for the conservation of buildings and public spaces inside the boundaries of bazaars.

In the history of urban management system in Iran, the conservation agent, ICHHTO and the development agents, municipalities (who is usually the economically stronger actor) have been in constant conflict. This conflict is one of the main obstacles in implementing urban conservation projects (Rahnamaei and Shah Hosseini, 2012). In Chapter Four, the approach and role of ICHHTO will be discussed in further detail.

The Current System of Preparation and Implementation of Development Plans in Historical Urban Fabrics in Iran

One of the recent laws related to the interventions in historic urban fabrics in Iran is *the Law for Supporting the Revitalization, Rehabilitation, Renovation, of Deteriorated and Dysfunctional Urban Fabrics*, approved by the Islamic Parliament in 2011. This law, as well as legislations related to roles and administrative structures of the key involved organizations in urban heritage management, is the basis of our discussion. This introductory part is then followed by a thorough review of the literature on the effectiveness of legal tools and performance of the involved organizations.

¹ In Persian: Sazeman-e Miras-e Farhangi-e Keshvar (سازمان میراث فرهنگی کشور)

² In Persian: Vezarat-e Farhang va Amuozesh-e Aali (وزارت فرهنگ و آموزش عالی)

³ In Persian: Sazeman-e Miras-e Farhangi, Sanaye'e Dasti, va Gardeshgari (سازمان میراث فرهنگی، صنایع دستی و گردشگری)

⁴ According to the 1972 Planning and Budget Law (*Ghanun-e Barnameh va Budjeh*), Development plans are comprehensive plans prepared for five years and passed by the parliament. These laws clarify the economic and social development goals and policies for the period of five years. In the following pages, these plans are referred to as *Development Plans*.

As mentioned before, since 1972, the legal framework of the urban planning system in Iran is shaped based on a comprehensive urban plan or master plan¹ model. Figure 2-10 shows the general regime of spatial planning in Iran from the national level to the local level.




Figure 2-10. Hierarchy of spatial planning system in Iran² (Mohammadi, 2010, p. 42).

The plans in the lower levels shown in Figure 2-10 follow the policies defined in the upper-level plans. According to the *Law for Establishment of SCUPA* and the *Law of Supporting the Revitalization, Rehabilitation, and Renovation of Deteriorated and Dysfunctional Urban Fabrics (2011)*, the so-called *detailed plans*³ for historical zones of cities are prepared at the local level, in the context of the cities' master plans.

The SCUPA based in MRUD⁴ acts as the leading policymaker. Members of SCUPA are authorities such as the Minister of Roads and Urban Development (as the director), The Deputy Minister for Urban

¹ In Persian: *Tarh-e Jame'* طرح جامع

² The plans discussed in this chapter are marked in Mohammadi's diagram.

³ In Persian: *Tarh-e Tafssili* طرح تفصیلی

⁴ The Ministry of Roads and Urban Development

Development and Architecture, the Ministers of Interior's, Economy and Finance, Culture and Islamic Guidance, and Education. According to the Article 166 of the *Law of the Fourth Development Plan* (2005), the head of *ICHHTO* became a member of *SCUPA*, and a representative of *ICHHTO* became members of provincial councils of *SCUPA* called *commissions for Article 5*¹. Therefore, *ICHHTO* can review development plans of cities to assure that they do not negatively affect heritage properties.

Practices related to historic urban fabrics in Iran can be categorized in five general steps. These five steps are policy-making, preparing development plans, approving the plans, implementing the plans, and controlling/supervising the preparation and implementation of plans. The *Law of Safeguarding the Revitalization, Rehabilitation and Renovation of Deteriorated and Dysfunctional Urban Fabrics* (2011), shows a general overview of this process².

The local authorities and Islamic City councils have to prove the necessity for development plans and receive an approval and a budget for preparing and implementing the plans. The municipality or local branches of the *MRUD* prepare the development plans, usually through hiring consultants. After being reviewed and approved by organizations such as *ICHHTO*, *Islamic City Councils*, municipality, and provincial governments, the development plans are finally approved by a provincial representative of *SCUPA* that is called the *Commission for Article 5* for each province. The implementers of the approved plans are municipalities and the local branches of the *MRUD* (also usually through hiring private contractors). Assessing and supervising the implementation of the national regulations and the final approval of plans are responsibilities of *SCUPA*. *The Urban Development and Revitalization Organization*³ based in *MRUD* is another organization, which performs this task.

Initially, the process mentioned above seems clear. However, a comparative review of legal texts about the responsibilities of the mentioned actors reveals the ambiguity of their relation to each other and their parallel duties during the process. In their book⁴, "*Process of urban planning in Iran*," Rahnamaei and Shah Hosseini (2012) point out that the organizations, involved in the decision-making and implementing of urban development plans in Iran are numerous and their administrative regulations are not in precise harmony with each other. Adding the factor of the powerfulness and relative independence of municipalities of the large cities to the mentioned

¹ In Persian: *Komision-e Made' Panj* ماده 5 کمیسیون

² This process can be slightly different depending on the particular case. However, the aim here is to present the overall logic of the existing structure.

³ In Persian: *شرکت مادر تخصصی عمران و به سازی شهری ایران*

⁴ This book is published by the *SAMT* governmental publisher that publishes educational textbooks for university programs.

factors, they argue that the outcomes of urban plans prepared at different scales are sometimes not compatible (ibid). Specifically, in historical zones, the process gets even more complicated due to two key reasons; firstly, the separateness of modern urban areas and historic zones in the urban planning system, and secondly, the parallel duties of different actors.

Master plans typically point out general characteristics and problems of the historic zones, and do not offer detailed solutions for them. Therefore, the preparation and approval of detailed plans for historical zones is a separate process from the preparation of the city master plans. However, the historic zone detailed plans are meant to be integrated within the city master plans. This specialization has positive and negative effects on the historic city centers. For example, urban heritage-related projects get specialized supervision from organizations such as the *ICHHTO*, the *Urban Renovation Organizations*¹ based in municipalities, and the *Organization of Deteriorated Urban Fabrics*², under *MRUD*. Nevertheless, the overlapping duties of these organizations dealing with historic centers make decision-making and interventions in these zones complicated.

When comparing the statements of legal responsibilities of these organizations with each other, several unclear and repeated terms and statements such as *control*, *supervision*, *policy-making*, and *preparation of plans* come into play. For instance, as Article 3 of the *Law of the Statute of the ICHHTO* suggests, *ICHHTO* is responsible for “*research, supervision, conservation, revitalization and introduction*” of cultural heritage. In fact, if one does not read the other laws, they might think that *ICHHTO* is the only responsible organization for all steps of protection and use of urban heritage. In reality, *ICHHTO* does not have a leading role in any of the mentioned five levels of policy-making, implementation, and supervision of the plans within historical cities. Some of its legal duties are overlapping with the responsibilities of the *SCUPA* (on the level of policy-making), and some other are the same as municipalities’ duties³ (on the level of preparing plans and interventions). Another example of this task confusion is the contrast of Article 7 of the *Law of Establishment of the SCUPA*, which mentions municipalities as organizations who make interventions, and Article 3 of the *Law of the Statute of the ICHHTO*, which states that *ICHHTO* is responsible for conservation and revitalization of heritage, including urban heritage.

Due to these sorts of complexities, preparation and approval of plans in historic zones go through a slower and a more conflicting process. Scholars such as Farhoodi and others (2009) point out this

¹ In Persian: سازمان نوسازی شهری

² In Persian: اداره بافت‌های فرسوده شهری

³ It is important to mention that municipalities of large cities in Iran have sub-municipalities for historic districts.

lack of integrity in urban development planning in Iran in different levels such as comprehensive and detailed planning and renovation planning for old urban fabrics.

Another significant influence of this specialization in planning is the creation of a kind of isolation of historic city from the rest of the city, due to the difference in time and responsible agency for preparation of plans. In many cases, the master and detailed plans are prepared by two different consultants and in different times. For instance, the period between the preparation of the master plan of Shiraz and the detailed plan for its historical zone was ten years (Falamaki, 2005). In the case of Yazd, the comprehensive development plan was prepared in 1975, the detailed city plan in 1982, and the detailed plan for the historic zone in 1992 (Kalantari and Pourahmad, 2005). Similar to the other scholars mentioned, Kalantari and Pourahmad mention the overlapping of duties of different actors in the urban heritage conservation project in Yazd, which has caused problems in cooperative urban development.

Since the master plan is an important source of information for the preparation of the historic zone detailed plan, the time difference between the preparation of the two plans causes inaccuracies in detailed plans. In such conditions, it is naturally a challenge to integrate these two plans with each other, considering the changes in the city in the time gap, and possible differences in planner's approaches. Furthermore, the overlapping of duties of different organizations should be taken into consideration.

Farhoodi and others (2009) give a general overview of this problem, in their critical study of Iranian urban development planning system. They believe that the current planning system is *weak and undeveloped*, and point out the need for changing the whole system to a *strategic planning model*¹. They argue that the disconnection between the preparation and implementation processes, and lack of integrity and cooperation of organizations is a major problem of the system.

To address the problems mentioned above, the MRUD has approved a document called "*The National Strategic Document for Revitalization, Rehabilitation, Renovation, and Reinforcement of Deteriorated and Dysfunctional urban Fabrics*"² (National Strategic Document) in September 2014 (MRUD, 2014b). This document was prepared based on the suggestion of MRUD, the Ministry of

¹ According to Farhoodi and others, the strategic development plan is "*a highly flexible instrument and is not constrained by national planning standards. The preparation is entirely optional and self-funded by the local government*" (Farhoodi and others, 2009, p. 355).

² In Persian: Sanad-e Melli-e Rahbordi-e Ehya, Behsazi va Nosazi va Tavanmandsazi-e Bafthay-e Farsudeh va Nakaramad-e Shahri (MRUD, 2014b).

*Interior's*¹, and the *ICHHTO*. According to the first article of this document, the *MRUD* aims to create integrity in the approach and management enforced by national and local actors in protection and development of the urban fabrics that are in the focus of *National Strategic Document* (MRUD, 2014,b).

According to its preamble, through creating a common understanding among the organizations and institutes, *the National Strategic Document* attempts to re-integrate the *old and dysfunctional zones* of the city to the rest of the zones. This document points out that the infrastructures and administrative services in the mentioned zones are lower than that of the developed parts of the cities and states that the *average level of services* in the old and deteriorated zones should be raised to an equal level to the modern areas of cities until 2025. According to Article 1 of the document (on the statement of the problem and specification of the urban regions that are the subjects of this document), big bazaars in commercial cities such as Tehran, Tabriz, and Isfahan do not fit into the framework of this document, but the fabrics around them do. In general, *The National Strategic Document* shows the national concern about the lack of managerial integrity in the old and new parts of cities (MRUD, 2014b). This document reveals one of the causes of the main problem discussed in this research, the *bazaar-city isolation process*.

Although the document gives general guidelines for addressing the problem, it does not suggest practical and legal solutions. Furthermore, the definitions of terms such as *revitalization*, *renovation*, *regeneration*, and *inner development* are very vague and unspecified. However, this document is an attempt for a more effective cooperation between the involved organizations.

Due to their location at the city centers,² bazaars are surrounded by the discussed problematic urban fabrics. Although bazaars enjoy private investment from *bazaaris*, they are not immune to the negative effects of the low physical and functional qualities of these so-called *dysfunctional* and *deteriorated* urban fabrics. In short, the quality of their immediate surroundings, naturally, affects their accessibility and attractiveness as economic and social centers (Figure 2-11).

As a natural consequence, the discussed managerial separation of old and new parts of the cities enforces physical, and indirectly, social separation of the old and new urban zones.

¹ In Persian: وزارت کشور

² See diagrams of Soltanzadeh (Figure 2-4) and Ehlers (Figure 2-5).




Figure 2-11. The *dysfunctional, deteriorated*, old urban fabric as a barrier to the social and physical integrity of the bazaar with the modern city (Yadollahi).

2.3. Discussion: An Explanation of the When, How, and Why of the Beginning and Continuation of the *Bazaar-City Isolation Process*

This chapter aimed to provide a multidimensional understanding of the situation of bazaars in commercial cities. Since different research works (reviewed in this chapter) consider this category as the type representing the most complete and developed model of the social and physical structure of Iranian bazaars, their characteristics were used to define the common attributes of the Iranian bazaar.

On a conceptual level, the Iranian bazaar is a network of private and public spaces, which contains and facilitates commercial and social relations. Bazaar is maintained and managed mainly by the bazaar community. In fact, the bazaar is not merely a physical or a social network. The social network of a bazaar deeply associates itself with the location of the bazaar and its architectural-physical boundaries. The bazaar's inter-dependent social and physical networks form a bounded and definable whole. This characteristic makes the bazaar different from other shopping areas and commercial centers around the city. It is important to mention that conceptually speaking, the bazaar is socially and physically adaptive, interconnected and integrated in relation to the city.

A thorough reflection on the social and political history of Iran was necessary to understand when, why, and how the transformation of the bazaar slowed down in terms of adapting itself to the city. The chapter also provided a review of the legal documents and administrative organizations that

affected bazaars. In order to back up the mentioned sources of information, a literature review was pertinent to diagnose some empirical examples, showing bazaars affected by the *bazaar-city isolation process*.

The reviewed scholars mention the notion of *old-new* and *traditional-modern* duality in the bazaar-city relationship. In fact, the roots of bazaar-city isolation can be narrowed to the time point when this duality became problematic and caused the old, traditional bazaar to gradually lag behind the constantly modernizing city. The reviewed research works and documents suggested three principal cause of the *bazaar-city isolation process* through the past century. Firstly, the differences of the bazaar with the city, regarding *social life style*, secondly, its *political and economic strategies*, and thirdly, the *modernist urban development policies* (Figure 2-12).




Figure 2-12. The inter-effective factors that have caused the creation of the *bazaar-city isolation process* in the last century (Yadollahi).

Regarding the history of *bazari-ulama* alliance, it was concluded that this cooperation was a strategy of the bazaar in order to support its economic interests. In general, religious beliefs did not largely determine political or economic orientations of the bazaar. However, the traditional and conservative approach of bazaars has affected the public life in the bazaars and limited the diversity of their everyday users. This issue will be extensively discussed in the coming chapters.

The reviewed historical documents suggest that the process of disassembling of the bazaar from the city network started in the early twentieth century. Due to the introduction of the new legal system in the country after the Iranian Constitution of 1906, the bazaar began to lose its former dominance in commerce. However, *bazaaris* had maintained and used their informal social and economic tools to resist the modernizing state. In fact, the bazaar community's political and economic power declined dramatically, when the integrity of its informal social network was damaged (mainly happened after the Islamic Revolution).

The decline of the political and economic role of the bazaar resulted in its marginalization from the international and national trade. Although large bazaars in cities such as Tehran and Tabriz retained their international and national functions to some extent, in general, the bazaars' contribution to Iran's economy and politics has been shrinking significantly since the mid-twentieth century. Naturally, this affected the social and economic status and attractiveness of bazaars for potential customers and investors.

The bazaar's position regarding Iran's twentieth-century urban modernization was strongly influenced by the new political and economic status of the bazaar. In the modern agenda of city development, the function of the bazaar area in the urban economy started to change. Although the Iranian bazaar maintained its commercial centrality, the urban growth and increase of the trade volume created an intense pressure on its old built-social fabric. The economic exploitation, accompanying a lack of new investments in the physical and infrastructural well-being of the bazaar area, almost stopped the natural development of it, and started a gradual physical and functional deterioration. This process was simultaneous with the rapid development and growth of the modern urban areas surrounding the city center.

We also discussed how the managerial separation of the old and new parts of cities had enforced a further physical and social separation. Because of new forms of urbanization, the bazaars are today surrounded by the so-called, *dysfunctional* and *deteriorated* urban fabrics that strongly affect the social and economic attractiveness of the bazaars as commercial centers and public spaces.

Starting from introducing the conceptual bazaar, we have set a benchmark to assess the present situation of the real world bazaars. The conceptual bazaar is the spine of the city, it maintains its social and physical boundaries, and has a meaningful inner integrity. At the same time, when necessary, it maintains generates connections with its environment. The reactions of the bazaar to the discussed forces, which have worked together in an inter-effective way, has created the today's Iranian bazaar that suffers from a lack of integrity in its inner networks, as well as with the city. Figure 2-12 and Figure 2-13 respectively present general and detailed schematic overviews showing the interrelation of factors that caused the emergence of the *bazaar-city isolation process*.




Figure 2-13. The main factors that enforced the emergence of the bazaar-city isolation process between late 19th and 21st centuries (Yadollahi).¹

¹ The circular, rectangular, and hexagons shapes in this diagram correspond the shapes used in Figure 2-12

Chapter 3: An Introduction to Public Space in Iran

This chapter develops a discussion on public space in Iran in two steps. In the first step, the term *public space* is clarified through reflecting on the international¹ understanding of public space in urban planning, sociological and political literature. In the second step, the same type of literature focusing on Iran is reviewed to provide a contextual background for the discussion on the Iranian bazaar as a public place. This chapter aims to give a general introduction to the norms and rules shaping the governance and social life in public space of Iranian large cities.

¹ Since the United States and Europe produces the largest portion of literature written on the topic of public space, the term “international understanding” refers to the North American and European understanding of public and public space.

3.1. The Concept of Public Space ¹

The human self is shaped and developed based on social interactions with others. Although modern technological developments have caused a growing tendency to perform social interactions in the virtual public sphere, the unique value of face-to-face interaction is undeniable. It is in the physical public space that members of society share the control and use of space. Therefore, public space is, and has historically been, the space of practicing social co-existence.

Research on public space has always been an interdisciplinary one. In this chapter, I will reflect upon the understanding of public space in different disciplines, before focusing on the methods of studying and assessing public space in Chapter Five. It is important to mention this dissertation uses the concept of *space* in its abstract meaning, without referring to any specific location and cultural or physical attribute. The concept of *place*, however, carries the meaning and the unique *personality or characteristic of a location*, to which people make attachments (Hayden, 1995).

Providing a historical background on the function of public space within Greek and Roman civilizations and referring to political thinkers such as Hannah Arendt², scholars such as the urban planner Ali Madnipour (1996 and 2003) and political scientist John Parkinson (2012), call the public space the sphere of *interpersonal communication*³. These scholars relate public space to concepts of participation, democracy⁴, and diversity.

Hannah Arendt's concept of the "*common world*," which represents the physical public space, shows the multidimensional nature of public space. She defines the common world as a "*shared and public world of human artefacts, institutions, and settings which separates us from nature and which provides a relatively permanent and durable context for our activities*" (D'Entreves, 2008)⁵. The consideration of the publically shared human artifacts in a given setting, embracing public

¹ The literature review presented in section 3.1. is published earlier as a part of: Yadollahi S. (2015) A reflection on methodological approaches to assessing and implementing social sustainability in historical public spaces, in: Albert, M (ed.), *Perceptions of Sustainable Development of Sustainability in Heritage Studies*, Berlin, De Gruyter, pp: 159-172.

² German-Jewish political philosopher (1906-1975), she had used the term *der öffentliche Raum*, translated as 'public space' (Madanipour, 2003, p. 151).

³ Interpersonal communication is an area of study. However, in this discussion it refers to the act of exchanging information between two or more human beings through verbal or nonverbal messages. The term communication here does not refer to the communication theory, which is also a specific scientific debate.

⁴ Here, the understanding of democracy is not related to any particular political system. The term is understood as "*Government by the people exercised either directly or through elected representatives*" (The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 2015)

⁵ Online available from: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/arendt/> [Accessed:25 Nov.2012]

institutions and public activates in her definition of the common world, making this concept one of the most used concepts in urban public space research. Scholars have used her ideas and similar ideas to argue that for democracy and social diversity, physical public space is needed. For instance, Madanipour believes that “*public space is the institutional and material common world, the in-between space that facilitates co-presence and regulates interpersonal relationships*” (Madanipour, 2003, p. 205).

Urban historian and architect Dolores Hayden (1995) has explored how social and physical spaces become inseparable in public places. For her, public places are influential in the process of “*social reproduction*.” Hayden borrows the concept of “*social reproduction*” from the French sociologist, Henri Lefebvre. In her book, she does not give an exact definition for it. However, considering the context of her book, one can conclude that by the term “*social reproduction*,” she means the process in which social structures are recreated based on the old structure so that the whole social system can continue.

Similar to others, Hayden (1995) points out the importance of interpersonal communication, which leads to social flourishing and social reproduction. *Interpersonal communication*, of course, needs a physical space in which it can take place. This is the most important function and value of public spaces.

Historical public spaces have an additional substantial value because of their ability to tell the stories of societies. The idea of *storytelling* is reflected in the literature on historical monuments and urban spaces. For example, according to Hayden (1995), social memory relies on storytelling, and that “*place memory*” can trigger social memory through the urban landscape. In fact, she believes that memory is *place-oriented* or at least *place-supported*, because places engage all human senses (sight, sound, smell, touch, and taste), thus making them powerful sources of memory. She argues that the relation of places with social memory is the key power of historical urban places to remind citizens their public pasts and help them to be connected with those who share a common past. Therefore, she calls urban landscape a *resource for public history*.

The sociologist and philosopher Maurice Halbwachs (1992) points out the influence of the durability of space and spatial images on the collective memory of the society. He argues that the image that members of a group have in mind from their shared milieu plays a significant role in shaping their idea from their community. We change and our hectic life goes on, but the stones of the city remain. Although the stones are moveable, our relationship with them does not change so easily (ibid.).

Similarly, the urban planner Madanipour (2003) argues that historical public places create the opportunity for us to share the experience of being in the same physical spaces. According to him, being in a historical public place is experienced by past and present generations.

If historic public places are conserved, they can be perceived by the future generations. Thus, the experience of being in historical public places can bind the past, present, and future generations. In other words, through telling the story of the formation of societies, historic public places can be sources of identity for present and future members of a changing society.

Reflecting upon the key concepts used by different scholars when they define public space is an alternative way to clarify the meaning of public space. The following paragraphs will discuss the similar way in which scholars from various disciplines define public space. The purpose of mentioning these similar definitions is to reveal the commonly agreed key concepts, which build the conceptual meaning of the physical public space. The clarification of these definitions paves the way to understanding how physical and social components of public spaces are intertwined. Using these concepts, in the coming chapters, I will highlight key attributes of the bazaar as a public space.

Viewing physical public space through a political lens, Parkinson (2012) argues that democracy¹ highly depends on the accessibility of the *physical public space*. Although Parkinson (2012) is a political scientist, he is mainly concerned with the physical space. Therefore, his understanding can help open the discussion on the relations between political, social and physical components within the public space. He provides a four-fold definition of the physical public space, which takes into consideration its *legal, social, political* and *architectural* aspects. As Parkinson (2012) defines it, public space is “*openly accessible, and/or uses common resources, and/or has common effects, and/or is used for the performance of public roles*” (Parkinson, 2012, p. 16). In this definition, *openness, accessibility*, and being *common* are the key attributes of public space.

These attributes are seen in the definitions presented by others. Under the title of “*Common Ground*,” Anthony M. Orum and Zachary Neal (2010) have collected some of the most important literature on public space from disciplines such as sociology, political science, art, and urban studies. They define public spaces as “*all areas that are open and accessible to all members of the public in a society in principle though not necessarily in practice*” (Orum and Neal, 2010, p. 2). According to Orum and Neal, a space is *open* when people are free to use the space regardless of political opinions, religion, age or gender. A space is *accessible* when its use is not limited by barriers of language, physical or mental ability or geographic mobility. According to this definition, public

¹ Parkinson has a liberal conception of democracy.

spaces are theoretically supposed to be open and accessible to all members of the public. However, due to reasons such as lack of facilities or indirect discouragement of users, they might not meet these characteristics. In general, in this definition attributes of *openness* and *accessibility* are central in defining public space. Of course, as their definition suggests, this openness and accessibility to public space is a common right for all public members.

Madanipour (2003) provides a similar definition of public space, using the criteria of *access*, *agency*, and *interest*. According to him, public space is shared by all members of a community, controlled by the public (governmental) authorities and is open and available for everybody. To him, *openness*, *accessibility* or *availability*, *control*, and being *shared* by the community members are the factors that define public space. However, he argues that a generalized definition of public space becomes an ideal type, because the real-world public spaces may or may not be managed by legitimate agencies, and may or may not be accessible for all members of a community. Therefore, he suggests that a more accurate definition of public space can be based upon the observation of real-world cases.

Although the reviewed works are from different disciplinary backgrounds, there is one common approach in them, and that is being critical¹ in dealing with public space. In fact, it is almost impossible to do research on public space and have a non-critical approach towards the sharing of the use and control of the space. This critical approach is often adopted when defining who the public members are. In different political systems, the meaning of public can be understood differently. In certain political contexts, the term public can exclude a group of people. However, as suggested by the reviewed authors, since the discussion concerns the conceptual public space without addressing any local context, the term public here, refers to all people as a whole, regardless of their gender, age, political or religious background.

In brief, public space is actually the physical and durable basis for a *face-to-face interaction* for members of society. Ideally, it is where members of a society equally share the occupation and control of the physical space. In principle, public space is a space of human *communication* that allows *diversity*, of people and ideas. Furthermore, historical public spaces can be sources of public history and the *collective identity* of a society. Putting its definition to an abstract level, we can say

¹ The term “critical” here refers to the use of the term in “critical theory”. Research drawing from critical theory has critique (assessment of the current state and the requirements to reach a desired state) at its center (Budd, 2008, P. 175).

that *commonness*, *openness*, and *accessibility* are the key concepts building the meaning of public space.

This research associates the term *openness* to political, legal and cultural factors. This attribute has much to do with the power, control, and territory defined by the social groups in public spaces, and is sensitive to issues such as ideological expressions and cultural taboos. *Accessibility* is used in relation to physical conditions and availability of facilities. Features such as geographical location, visual accessibility, availability of public infrastructures for all are considered under the attribute of *accessibility*.

Conceptually speaking, attributes of *commonness*, equal *openness*, and *accessibility* (which supports the diversity of groups attracted to the place), equality in *participation in control and governance* of the space are hidden in the very meaning of physical public space. However, in all real-world cases, public space is (in different degrees) conditioned by political, economic and cultural forces.

3.2. An Introduction to the Public and Public Space in Iran

Public space is locally and culturally conditioned. To understand why and how Iranian bazaars should be considered as public places, we need to understand the meaning of public and public space within the Iranian context, and then in the Iranian bazaars. The other vague issue regarding the general definition of a public space is the ambiguity of boundaries between private and public spaces. Again, this is a local issue, which depends on factors such as legal ownership and cultural, invisible lines between the public and the private. These issues will be addressed in the following section and the next chapter concerning the Iranian bazaar as a public place.

3.2.1. Public and Public Members in Iran; A Terminological Introduction

In Persian literature and legal texts, three different words can be found that refer to people; *ommat*¹, *mellat*², and *omum*³ (*āmmeh*⁴ or *mardom*⁵), which have Arabic origins (except for *mardom*). In the context of the present discussion, it is important to understand their differences and how the limitations implied in the meanings of *ommat* and *mellat* better clarify the meaning of *omum*, which is equal to the term *public*.

¹ In Persian: اَمّت

² In Persian: مَلّت

³ In Persian: عَموم

⁴ In Persian: عَامّه

⁵ In Persian: مردم

The term *ommat* refers to the people who are “*the followers of the prophet*” (Dehkhoda)¹. It is used to distinguish groups of people according to ideological and religious differences. *Mellat* can also refer to people. As defined by Dehkhoda, *mellat* refers to “*followers of a religion*” and “*people of a country*” (Dehkhoda)². Having the same meaning with the term nation, the term *mellat* is mainly used to address all people who are under the civil law of Iran.

The term *omum* is the term used in an equivalent manner as the word *public*, in the Iranian legal texts, and in the Persian literature. *Omum* in Dehkhoda dictionary means “*all,*” “*all people,*” and “*containing all people*” (Dehkhoda)³.

In the Civil Law of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the term *omum* is used several times, but the law gives no clear definition of it. However, the meaning of the word *omum* suggests that the people who are considered as being a member of a public might or might not be a member of the *mellat* or *ommat*. The term public, described as an adjective in the Dehkhoda dictionary, is “*everything which belongs to and is related to all people*” (Dehkhoda)⁴. So, in principle, members of the public do not have advantages over each other. When the term *public* is used in the Persian language, it simply means *not private* and *related to all people*, regardless of their nationality, gender, class, and ideological background.

However, the way the public is understood in everyday life is influenced by issues of gender, religion, class, and politics. In the following pages, a brief introduction is given about the changes that the concepts of public and public space have experienced in the last century in Iran. Here, I attempt to provide an understanding of the nature of public space in the contemporary cultural and political climate of commercial cities⁵ in Iran. Therefore, I reflect on literature showing how the public spaces have been used and managed in the last century. I will look at the power balance of regular public members (*omum*), and governmental organizations in using and controlling urban public spaces within Iranian commercial cities.

¹ Online available from: <http://parsi.wiki/dehkhodasearchresult-fa.html?searchtype=0&word=2KfZhdmR2Ko%3d>[Accessed:25 Jan 2013]

² Online available from: <http://parsi.wiki/dehkhodasearchresult-fa.html?searchtype=0&word=2YXZhNmR2Ko%3d>[Accessed:25 Jan 2013]

³ Online available from: <http://parsi.wiki/dehkhodasearchresult-fa.html?searchtype=0&word=2LnZhdml2YU%3d>[Accessed:25 Jan 2013]

⁴ Ibid. Online available from: <http://parsi.wiki/dehkhodasearchresult-fa.html?searchtype=0&word=2LnYp9mF2ZHZhW%3d%3d> [Accessed:25Jan 2013]

⁵ The nature of public life and relations of social groups in villages and rural areas is and have been different from the large cities. This paper is only interested in understanding the public life in commercial cities, which have been the largest cities in Iran.

As discussed in Chapter Two, Iran faced two determinative phenomena during the late 19th century and the early 20th century; the rapid urban modernization and the political movements, which led to the Iranian Constitution of 1906. Iran hit a turning point in reshaping the general order of contemporary social, administrative and physical structure of its commercial cities. The modern meaning of public members, public properties, and public places in Iran was remarkably influenced by the Constitution and the historical events that proceeded. As a result of the Constitution, the regular public members gained the right to vote, and then, in 1962 women were considered politically active citizens. Therefore, this discussion starts by giving a brief introduction on this historical background.

3.2.2. Historical and Cultural Background of the Use and Control of Public Spaces in Iranian Commercial Cities

The transformation of public spaces in Iran into their present state has experienced three main phases;

First phase: Before the 1906 Constitution

Reviewing the literature on the social history of Iran, this section provides the basic information about rights and roles of actors within social structures and management systems of public spaces in Iranian cities in the early 20th century. As Homa Katouzian (2003) defines, the actors in Iranian society of that time consisted of the *state*, the *ulama*¹, and the *urban society*, including landlords, merchants, and the regular public members. He starts his explanation of the power relationship, between the mentioned actors, by clarifying the historical and ideological backgrounds to understand power in Iran. As he states, “*the power of rulers was both absolute and arbitrary*² *for the simple reason that, in the first instance, they owed their position to the Grace bestowed upon them directly by the Divine Will*” (Katouzian, 2003, p. 78). Therefore, the governance of the country and as a result, the control and use of land were not an issue of the ownership right. As he explains, the land ownership was a privilege given by the Shah to some groups and individuals who were close to the ruling dynasty. Therefore, property right was not stable and could be taken back upon the Shah’s will.

Lambton (1991) illustrates the governance system in Iran during the early 20th century in a more detailed manner. Her way of identifying social classes is not exactly the same as Katouzian’s (2003)

¹ A few members of the Islamic clergy who are highly influential, religiously and politically.

² There is an important difference between absolute and arbitrary rule. Absolutism can be based on law, while arbitrary rule is “*the absolute power of exercising lawlessness*” (Katouzian, 2003, p. 68).

but is absolutely justifiable considering Katouzian's explanation of power relationship within the Iranian society. Lambton categorizes the Iranian city population in two groups, the *a'yān*, the *notables* and the '*āmma*'¹ (regular publics). She categorizes the '*ulamā*', the *large landowners* or *landlords*², and the *big merchant* typically gathered in bazaars, under the *a'yān*, the higher social class who was close to the State. According to Lambton (1991), the central government was not directly involved in local affairs. Therefore, the notables were the key influential actors in governing cities. She places the other part of the population, including the *lesser 'ulamā*'³, *shopkeepers*, and *artisans*⁴ in the '*āmma*', a social class that did not enjoy the economic and political advantages of the *a'yān*.

Traditionally, urban public spaces of Iranian cities during this era were spaces such as neighborhood centers and alleys, *meydan*⁵ or squares, cemeteries, bazaars, and open spaces of mosques and other religious spaces. Based on the reviewed works, it can be concluded that in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a central law did not influence the boundaries of public and private spaces of cities. In this time, the concepts of public/private property did not exist in its modern sense. The central State did not have a direct interest in local city management issues. As a result, the *notables* could control the administration and use of open spaces in the cities according to their interests. Eman Shabani and Jamal Kamyab (2013), who have studied contemporary urban policies in Iran between 1920 and 1941, also mention this fact. We should consider that ordinary people were responsible to build their houses. So, they had an influence on the form of the outer area or public space. But, their construction activities had to follow the norms defined by the dominant power hierarchy. So, we can say that the *āmma* or regular public members did not have a considerable role or right in deciding about the physical form or use of public spaces.

Even among *regular publics*, not all people enjoyed equal rights. Similar to the global situation, in Iran, the traditional tendency for dividing male and female members of the public has marginalized women from the public life in Iran. Gender segregation has shown itself in different fashions in the face of different political and economic systems.

¹ This how Lambton pronounces the word *Āmmeh* (in Persian: عامه)

² Since ownership was not absolute at this time, we follow Katouzian use of the term "landlord".

³ It should be noted that the lower level clergy are not called '*ulamā*'. So, here Lambton probably means regular clergy.

⁴ Most of the shopkeepers and artisans also worked in the bazaars. Therefore, they were members of the bazaar community. The wealthy and powerful merchants are usually called *bazaaris*.

⁵ In Persian: میدان

Political scientist Hamideh Sedghi (2007) gives a historical and cultural understanding of the position of Iranian women in politics and public life from the early 1900's, until the post-Islamic revolution period after 1979. In her book *“Women and Politics in Iran; Veiling, Unveiling, and Reveiling”* she pictures the position of women as citizens by asking the question; *“Why were urban women veiled in the early 1900s, unveiled from 1936 to 1979, and reveiled after the 1979 Revolution?”* (Sedghi, 2007, preface). In the early 20th century, under the Qajar dynasty, according to what she calls it, a *“Qoranic gender division of labour,”* the role of the majority of urban women in economic production was domestic and within the boundaries of their household (Sedghi, 2007, p. 274). Although women participated in the urban economy as *“carpet weavers, vendors, domestic laborers, and seamstresses,”* the gender division of labor resulting from the *“patriarchal control over women’s sexuality”* during this period kept women in the household and under veil (Sedghi, 2007, p. 274). As a result, women were associated with the private sphere, while men were associated with the public domain. So, women normally did not *appear* in public spaces, let alone having a role in the control and policy-making issues related to public spaces.

In general, before the Iranian Constitution of 1906, the use and management of public spaces followed an informal social and political power hierarchy. After the Constitution, a legal order was introduced to the discussed social and political system which altered its hierarchy. Figure 3-1 shows a schematic overview of the power relationship of Iranian urban social actors within the public sphere. Based on the reviewed literature, this diagram schematically shows the levels of power within the Iranian urban public sphere before the 20th century.




Figure 3-1. A qualitative presentation of the levels of power within the Iranian urban public sphere before the 20th century¹ (Yadollahi).

¹ The three levels of political power and effectiveness in public spaces are presented schematically. The size of circles symbolically shows the effectiveness of actors in public spaces, and the arrows show the dominant

Second Phase: Post- Constitution Era Until 1979

The beginning of the 20th century was a turning point for Iran's economic and political systems. The following discussion is based on a comparison of three widely cited works on the social and political history of Iran during the focus period; Mohammad Ebrahim Bastani Parizi (2000), Ahmad Ashraf (1989) and Homa Katouzian (2009).

The three mentioned authors suggest that there was a growing inflation throughout the 19th century. This inflation weakened the central State. In addition, the change in the Iranian international commerce enriched few *bazaaris* who were involved in foreign trade and weakened the regular publics involved in local trade and manufacture. As bazaaris became more economically powerful, they started to buy the Royal lands and gradually became landlords.¹ On the other hand, the modernization and growth in international trade increased social communication and public awareness, particularly within commercial cities that were centers of commercial and cultural exchange. As described in Chapter Two, the social injustice, in addition to these factors, triggered several social movements that led to the Constitutional Revolution.

The Constitution, as Katouzian (2009) states, at least on the surface, resulted in a new legal order in governing the country. The legal definition of the *private land ownership* and the notion of *public property*, in its modern sense in Iran, are results of the Constitution. In terms of controlling public property in the cities, the State became the authority, while all other actors had the chance to participate through electing parliament members. In the new social order, the former power and privilege of the *notables* (*bazaari*, *ulamā'*, and landlords) declined. It was the first time that urban publics gained the right to participate in urban administration through voting. We should note that in the first six decades after the constitution, women were not considered as politically active citizens. So, we can say that they were not included in the legal understanding of public members.

There were other rapid changes in the form of new regulations. The Municipality Law or "*ghanoon-e baladieh*"² in 1930 brought urban management under the power of municipalities. Although the *notables* were still in high positions within State organizations, it can be said that at least officially, the new legal tools centralized urban management in Iran, and enhanced the rights of regular public members. For example, the Municipality Law considered "*the priority of public right to private rights*

political influence of each actor on others within the public sphere. In this period, women are identified with the private sphere. Therefore, their position is out of the public sphere.

¹ As explained also in Chapter Two.

² The Persian title of the Law: Ghanun-e Shahrdari ha or Ghanoon-e Baladieh

in streets and pathways" and the right of pedestrians to enjoy safer and cleaner sidewalks (Shabani and Kamyab, 2013, p. 20).

Other regulations passed during this period indirectly resulted in the establishment of governmental economic foundations, such as the *City-Village Cooperative Markets*, the *Chamber of Guilds*, the *Special Tribunal for the Prosecution of Price Gougers*, and the *Association for the Protection of Consumer Rights* (Ashraf, 1989). These actions limited the influence of the previously privileged groups, such as *bazaaris*, on the country's economic affairs and supported the ordinary publics.

This process was enforced by the modernization projects and the development of urban management organizations during the Pahlavi period, creating more opportunities for public participation. Although urban governance was still a highly political issue, at least at the legal level, regular people gained some basic rights. On January 25th, 1949 "The *Law for Establishment of Municipalities, and City/Village Councils*"¹ was passed. According to this law, every municipality should have a council, and members of these councils should be elected by citizens every four years. However, we should note that although the city councils existed formally in the urban management regulations (city council is also mentioned in the Municipality Law, 1930), they did not have a considerable influence on the urban management processes (Madanipour, 2016).

As discussed in Chapter Two, the establishment of *The Supreme Council of Urban Planning and Architecture of Iran* (SCUPA) in 1973 was a key event in the history of Iranian urban management. According to the *Law for Establishment of the SCUPA (1972)*, the land-use plan and physical planning of the cities were prepared by professional urban planners and approved by municipalities as master plans. This law brought urban planning under the influence of experts rather than politicians. Although this modern expert-centered approach to urban management was far from participatory governance, it was an important step towards democratization of urban governance in Iran.

In general, the early 20th century until the 1970's was a period in which regular publics gained some civil rights. Although several feminist movements happened during that time, women gained the basic right of being included in the concept of public members later than men. The women's right to vote was advocated by some in the 1906 parliamentary debates, but the *ulama* strongly rejected it. Sedghi (2007) describes the reaction of Sheikh Asadollah, the cleric deputy in the 1906 parliament, to this suggestion. She narrates the response of Sheikh Asadollah according to his speech:

"Never in a life of misfortune had his ears [been] assailed by such an impious utterance." Women lack "souls" and "rights," he argued: "God has not given them the capacity" to participate in "politics

¹ The Persian title of the Law: Ghanun-e Tashkil-e Shahrdariha va Anjoman-e Shahrha va Ghasabat

and elect the representatives” of the country, nor have women “the same power of judgment as men have.” Should “the weaker sex” be enfranchised, he asserted passionately, the entire system would crumble and that “would mean the downfall of Islam” (Sedghi, 2007, p. 49). Eventually, women gained the right to vote in 1962, under the Pahlavi dynasty.

The centralization and modernization of economy and politics during the rule of the Pahlavi dynasty (1925–1979) pushed the power structure in control and use of public spaces towards secularization. Sedghi (2007) believes that the rapid integration of Iran in the global market and the boost in the Oil industry weakened the traditional gender division paradigm. She explains how the economic development in this period demanded active participation of women in the new market, and women became increasingly active in traditionally masculine occupations such as health and education sectors, as well as the newly developed industries. In other words, because of the change in the market, the traditional gender division of labor had to change rapidly. Therefore, women had to be suddenly active and visible in the public sphere, without having provided with the cultural and social foundations to be prepared for the new situation. Women were unveiled by force in this period. However, gradually, these policies of the Pahlavi dynasty created a group of educated middle-class female professionals, who represented a modern way of the presence of Iranian women in the public sphere. Figure 3-2 shows a schematic overview of the new power relationship of urban social actors in public domain in the post-constitutional era and the 1960’s. We should mind that this figure shows the official picture or the intention of the modernization project of the State.




Figure 3-2. Schematic overview of the power relationship of social actors in Iranian public sphere in commercial cities¹ (Yadollahi).

¹ The three levels of political power and effectiveness in public spaces are presented qualitatively. The size of circles symbolically shows the effectiveness of actors in public spaces, and the arrows show political influence of each actor on others in the public sphere.

Although this new legal order brought the regular public members into a higher position, in comparison to their position in the former social hierarchy, it was too fast and highly authoritarian. This rapid change was not accepted by many social groups in Iran and was one of the motivations that led to the Islamic Revolution¹.

Third Phase: Since the 1980's

As Katouzian (2003) mentions, after the regime change in 1979, the general structure of the Constitution did not change. Regarding the power balance between the actors involved in the management and use of public spaces, the State-centered approach remained in the policy-making arena.

In terms of urban administration, the order of voting for parliament and the official role of the city councils did not experience a significant change. In fact, the changes were not in the overall legal and administrative structure, but in the ideological approach. For example, the city councils changed into the Islamic city councils. Although the Islamic city councils were mentioned in the Constitution Law of the Islamic Republic of Iran, they started their activities in 1998 (Madanipour, 2016). The *Higher Council for Architecture and Urban Planning of Iran* continued to function as the principal supervisor of urban development plans. However, the policies were re-evaluated and replaced according to the values of the Islamic Revolution.

Major changes happened in public life according to the Islamic rules demanding certain patterns of appearance and behavior of citizens, particularly, women in public places. For instance, socializing of male and female citizens had to follow the Islamic values and gradually Islamic clothing, or the *hijab* became a condition for the presence of women in public spaces. As a result, social and cultural activities that could not fit into this value system were driven into the private space. As Masserat Amir-Ebrahimi (2006) explains, during the 1980's, a part of Iranian society learned to live their social life within their homes. A woman's behavior and appearance in public spaces were influenced by this new approach, as the moral police supervised their appearances and activities.

Today, the *hijab* is still a condition for the presence of women in public spaces of Iran. The type of *hijab* is also important. One can always see posters and billboards in the streets encouraging women to choose the *preferable hijab* or the *chador*², as a guarantee for receiving respect and safety in public spaces.

¹ This is explained in further detail in Chapter two.

² A long cloth covering all the body except the face

In addition to the moral police, citizens are also encouraged to safeguard Islamic values in public spaces. On April 22, 2015, the parliament passed a law regarding the Islamic principle of “*The Enjoining Good and Forbidding Wrong.*”¹ Based on this law, citizens are encouraged and would have the legal right to comment on each other’s behavior and appearance in public spaces. Within this law (Article 5), spaces that are in public view without inspection (such as the common spaces of the residential buildings, hotels, hospitals, private vehicles) are not considered as private sphere, and the mentioned principle can be practiced in them.

The phenomenon of *hijab* in Iran has been widely studied, also by female social scientists and urban planners. As Sedghi (2007) and Amir-Ebrahimi (2006) explain, the mandatory *hijab* was an opportunity for women from traditional and religious families to come out of the households, and be more active in the public spaces. Amir-Ebrahimi (2006) gives a background to explain middle-class urban women’s attitude towards obligatory *hijab*. As she explains, due to the economic crisis and the loss of many young men during and after the war in 1980’s, many women had to work, and therefore, had to be present in public spaces. Furthermore, some of these women have been socially and professionally active before the revolution. She concludes that the group of women who have already been present in public life did not consider *hijab* as an opportunity. Sedghi (2007) and Amir-Ebrahimi (2006), both discuss how the mentioned group of in middle-class women found alternative ways to react to the new situation, for example, by *modifying* and *redefining* their *hijab* and being more present in the job market and universities.

Due to this process of embracing the *hijab* by some women, and resisting and redefining it by some other, a range of different expressions of *hijab* can be seen on streets of Iranian cities. One can identify a spectrum of *hijab* choices, from the traditional type to the liberal type. Figure 3-3 shows common types of *hijab* in public spaces of Iranian large cities. In fact, it is possible to differentiate women with traditional or stronger Islamic background from the women who belong to the discussed middle-class social group by paying attention to their choice of *hijab*.

In the fieldwork conducted for this research, these differences are considered for interpreting data collected in addition to behavioral observations. These interpretations are the, triangulated with interview and counting results. The results are ultimately used for identifying groups of women in public spaces in the Tabriz Bazaar and study their behavior and expectations in public spaces of the bazaar.

¹ The Persian title of the Law: Ghanun-e Hemayat az Ameran-e be Maroof va Nahian-e az Monkar [The Law for Supporting the Enjoining Good and Forbidding Wrong]



Figure 3-3. Examples of types of *hijab* in Iranian public spaces. left: Isfahan, 2011, right: Tabriz, 2013 (Yadollahi)

In the last two decades, the contribution of women in the job market and higher education is growing in general. This growth naturally influences and gradually changes the traditional idea of public man- private woman. In 1988, there were 178,887 male and 71,822 female university students in Iran. In 2013, the number of male students reached 2,550,273, and the number of female students was 2,253,764¹. This shows the growing tendency of Iranians pursuing higher education and also the improvement in gender inequality issues, at least in education. In 2002, “71 percent” of the university students were women (Sedghi, 2007, p.221). After the election of the moderate president Mohammad Khatami,² women became more active, and public spaces experienced more gender diversity. Under the conservative government of President Ahmadinejad,³ governmental policies were adopted to limit the acceptance of women in universities⁴. Since then, the number of women being accepted in universities has decreased. However, it is not likely that the gender inequality in education would return to the low numbers Iran witnessed in 1988.

To discuss the middle-class women in urban societies in Iran, this section refers to recent social studies in Tehran. Of course, these numbers cannot be generalized to all commercial cities, but they can at least show the overall situation in the major cities such as Tabriz and Isfahan. Women are

¹ Online available from: <http://www.amar.org.ir/Default.aspx?tabid=99>[Accessed: 21.5.2015]

² The reformist president of Iran from 1997 to 2005

³ The sixth President of Iran from 2005 to 2013

⁴ Available from:<http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/22/iran-ensure-equal-access-higher-education>[Accessed: 26.5.2015]

about half of the human capital of Iran. In the social studies done in 2010 in Tehran, 72.2 percent of Tehrani women categorized themselves as middle-class citizens (Naderi, 2013). This categorization was mainly based on education and income. Sara Naderi's (2013) surveys show that middle-class women enjoy higher levels of education, political and cultural awareness, in comparison to the women coming from a lower-class background (25.7 percent of Tehrani women)¹. Her findings suggest that the middle-class women belong to the group, who is willing to be socially active as an independent civil society, has been active in the enhancement of women's rights before and after the 1979 Revolution.

The reviewed works, especially the book written by Sedghi (2007) suggest that in the contemporary history of Iran, the control over women's appearance in public spaces has been used by different states as a symbol of political power. Women's collective history in relation to their public life, indeed, shapes their attitude and approach towards the presence and participation in today's public life. Throughout the last century, they have tried to adapt themselves to the political and cultural conditions through empowering themselves in academic and financial aspects. They have become influential citizens, and have appeared as active citizens in the public sphere. Given the discussed history, today is the era of the "*emergence of women as potent agents of political and social change*" in Iran (Sedghi, 2007, p. 273).

Chapter Six and Seven give empirical information regarding the position of female public members in the public life of Tabriz bazaar. This short introductory section was necessary to better understand the political and cultural context of public spaces in the bazaar when dealing with mapping the culture of *territory-defining* in the spaces of the Tabriz Bazaar in Section 7.2.4. Section 7.3 discusses how these cultural norms contribute to the spatial distribution of power in the bazaar as a public place.

3.3. Discussion: The Defining Characters of Public Space in Iran in a Nutshell

The literature that forms the methodological approach of this research is mainly written in and for the European and North American contexts. Therefore, giving an introduction about what the public and public space mean in Iran was necessary for developing a realistic framework for studying the bazaars in Iran. Through a review of the historical changes of the idea of the public, this section provided a basic understanding of the legal and cultural norms in the Iranian public spaces. After the 1906 constitution, the modern form of State and nation was born in Iran. Terms such as *raiyyat*, or

¹ In this study, 2.1 percent of Tehrani women considered themselves belonging to the higher class group.

peasants without legal rights, gradually lost their function for referring to regular public members. In 1962, women were considered active members of the Iranian nation. After the Islamic Revolution, following the Islamic norms became an important condition for the use and appearance in public spaces.

In addition to legal and political forces that shape the understanding of public space in a country, the cultural background of a given local setting strongly affects the public space. In dealing with the changes in cultural understanding of public space and roles of citizens in them in the major Iranian cities, the gender factor was indeed very eye-catching. In fact, the gender issue is not the center of focus in this research. But, after reviewing the literature on public space in Iran and doing the fieldwork in Tabriz, I was convinced that it is not possible to oversee this issue when studying a bazaar as a public place.

As we will see in chapters Six and Seven, the way in which people show their ideology and gender in public spaces can limit or enhance the openness and accessibility of public spaces for them. Their chance for participation, management, and use of public spaces is also influenced by the mentioned cultural and political forces. This situation is affecting women more strongly because as stated, their appearance and behavior in public space have a symbolic political and cultural meaning.

Chapter 4: The Iranian Bazaar as a Public Place: An Interconnected Network of Private and Public Spaces

Having discussed the background on the Iranian bazaar at conceptual and empirical levels and the understanding of the public space in the Iranian context, in this chapter a critical reflection on the use and management of the Iranian bazaars as public places is presented.

This work uses both the term *space*, which is widely utilized in the reviewed literature and the term *place*, which holds a deeper cultural. The term *place* holds a deeper meaning because it also refers to the values and characters of a location that cause people make attachments to it (Hayden, 1995). Madanipour (1996) also mentions the difference between place and space. He views space as an *open and abstract expanse*, while the *place* has a locality by being occupied by something or someone and being identified by values and meanings. In this research, the bazaar is understood as a public *place* that holds historically formed layers of collective meanings and values.

To provide a critical analysis of the bazaars as public places, the dimensions of public space (*commonness, openness, and accessibility*), discussed in Chapter Three, are used. Similar to the previous chapters, when necessary, a chronological approach is used to explain the reason why Iranian bazaars are such public places, as they are today. The period of focus remains on the early twentieth century until today.

The following discussion builds a multidimensional understanding of what publicness means in the bazaars of Iran, with consideration of political, cultural, spatial, and legal issues. Here, in addition to using the literature and documents on the bazaars of the Iranian commercial cities, I refer to my observations in three examples of bazaars under this category (Isfahan, Tehran, and Tabriz) to explain the shared patterns and attributes of the architectural form, use, management and public life observed in

them. Examples of bazaars in other commercial cities of Iran such as Kerman, Ardabil, Ghazvin, Zanjan, and Semnan are provided when supplementary information is needed.

This chapter consists of three sections. Firstly, the role of the bazaars as public places in the social life of the commercial cities and its change until today is explained. Secondly, a schematic picture of the general spatial organization of Iranian bazaars under this category is presented to show how bazaars typically facilitate public life within their physical structure. Thirdly, a critical analysis is made regarding the management system of the bazaars as urban heritage and public places. Based on the shared characteristics of bazaars in Iranian commercial cities, the outcome of this chapter will be the foundation for the methodological tool designed and presented in the next chapters.

4.1. An Introduction to the Cultural Norms¹ of the Contemporary Public Life in the Iranian Bazaars

As discussed in the last chapters, due to their economic centrality until the twentieth century, bazaars traditionally functioned as the backbone of commercial cities in social and geographical terms. Therefore, they were the central public places connecting essential elements of the commercial city to each other. Today, the bazaar is an element of a commercial city that is no more able to regenerate and develop itself at the same pace as the city does. As a result of urban growth, many other public spaces are emerging in the newly developed neighborhoods. Enjoying various alternatives in their vicinity, middle-class, and upper-middle class people, as mentioned previously, prefer to live in modern neighborhoods and do not normally go to the city center for recreational or optional² activities. This influences the public life in the city center and bazaar indirectly. For bazaars, this change means that they are becoming public places that are gradually forgotten by a large group of citizens. The present chapter will show the majority of citizens from urban middle class and upper-middle class social groups who no longer perceive bazaars as desired public places. This phenomenon causes the problem of the *bazaar-city isolation process* on a social level. Examples of empirical research from the bazaars and the old city centers in the major Iranian cities that have proven this phenomenon will be discussed. Following the extended discussion in Chapter Two, these empirical examples show the difference between the historical origins of the political and social orientations of their owners and regular users with those of the modern neighborhoods. This section also reflects on the influence of the location of bazaars in the city and the cultural norms in them pertaining to the gender difference in the use of public spaces in them.

Political and social background of bazaars

Sociologist, Arang Keshavarzian (2007) who has done extensive fieldwork in the Tehran Bazaar, believes that today, the social role of the bazaar has diminished due to its traditional and conservative approach towards political and social relations. This conservative character keeps the bazaar different and isolated from the rest of the city. Therefore, he states that the *publicness* of the bazaars has been replaced with secrecy and isolation in the last three decades. His empirical research in the Tehran Bazaar suggests that the social activities and interactions in the bazaar have decreased in general. Accordingly, the engagement of bazaars with the social groups that he calls “*the new publics*” has declined. Keshavarzian (2009) categorizes the middle-class, educated groups, such as journalists, bloggers, dissident intellectuals, students, and women, as “*the new publics.*”

¹ Social behaviors that have been traditionally established as norms of using spaces of bazaars.

² For a definition of the *optional activities*, see the review of Gehl and Svarre (2013) in Section 5.1.

Nevertheless, he notes that there are people who believe in social and political reform among the bazaar community. As he states, that is why some of the bazaaris in Tehran voted for the reformist president Mohammad Khatami in the 2001 elections (ibid.). His findings suggest that the bazaar community, and particularly the young members, believe that it is necessary to engage with the *world outside the bazaar* (ibid.).

His opinion is compatible with the views of other sociologists, such as Sedghi (2007) and Amir Ebrahimi (2006), whose works were reviewed in Chapter Three. All of these authors point out that the citizens who represent the *new publics* have been active for gaining political rights in the early twentieth century. The contemporary social history of Iran shows that this group has gradually gained more power for participation in the public sphere.

Regarding the position of bazaars within the contemporary society, Harris (2010) argues that the absence of *bazaaris* during the 2009 demonstrations of the Green Movement¹ indicates that as *social entities*, they are not linked with the democratic society, or as Keshavarzian (2009) puts it, *the new publics* outside them. However, he suggests that the examples of successful bazaar-driven protests over the government's economic policies in 2008 and 2010 exemplify that bazaars are still influential in the Iranian political arena. Harris's (2013) and Keshavarzian's (2007 and 2009) findings demonstrate that although reformist tendencies can be observed in the bazaar, as a social entity, it mainly considers economic interests in its political and social orientations, and the bazaar community members are obviously more conservative than *the new publics*. In brief, we can say that *bazaaris* and *the new publics* are two social groups with different historical motivations and various political interests in the last century. However, as discussed in Chapter Three, research shows the increasing influence of *the new publics* in the socio-political arena in Iran, especially in the major cities.

The location of the bazaar in the old city center is another factor enforcing the difference between the public life in the bazaar area and modern neighborhoods of the city. As highlighted in Chapter Two, the fact that bazaars are today surrounded by the so-called *dysfunctional* and *deteriorated* urban fabrics negatively affects their attractiveness for receiving economic and social investments. So, the bazaar area and its adjacent neighborhoods have remained traditional, conservative, and have significant cultural differences compared to public spaces in modern neighborhoods within the cities.

¹ Social movements against the 2009 presidential election in Iran, which resulted in presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Location of the Bazaars in the Cities

Architects Mohammadzadeh and Fallahnejad (2009) illustrate an example of the spatial consequences of this cultural difference in the case study of the Tabriz Bazaar. According to their comparative analysis of the bazaar and a new shopping street (Tarbiat Street) in Tabriz, the bazaar is *socially less desirable* than the new street. They believe that the undesirability of the bazaar is because it is not physically and functionally integrated with its surrounding urban fabric (ibid.).

Similarly, findings of Fereshteh Sadeghi (2006) indicate that the Tehran Bazaar suffers from the same social and physical isolation. Approaching the problem of isolation in the Tehran Bazaar from an urban planning point of view, she believes that the biggest problem of Tehran Bazaar is the lack of integrity with the surrounding urban fabric. Traffic jam problems and the growing number of the major commercial complexes around the Tehran Bazaar are affecting the integrity of the bazaar with the city (Figure 4-1 and 4-2).



Figure 4 -1. Traffic jam in *Panzdah-e Khordad* Street near the Tehran Bazaar (Silke Weidner, November 2014)¹



Figure 4-2. Construction of a new commercial complex in *Panzdah-e Khordad* Street (a part of the Tehran Bazaar is behind this massive building) (Silke Weidner, November 2014).

¹ All photographs by Silke Weidner are published with her permission.

However, as Sadeghi (2006) has observed, the *bazaaris* are aware of this problem and are willing to participate in the reintegration of the bazaar and the city. She argues that the centralization of twenty-five percent of the job opportunities of Tehran inside the bazaar zone shows the economic power of this place and should be considered in policy-making for this area.

Cultural Norms in Terms of Gender Difference in the Use of Public Spaces

The traditional approach in dividing or differentiating the use of public spaces for male and female citizens is a common characteristic of traditional neighborhoods in Iran. Because of the lack of gender-related research in the public life in the Iranian bazaars, academic research illustrating this issue in the old city centers of Iran is also reviewed. Although not all the examples of the reviewed literature specifically deal with the bazaars, they can help us generally grasp the situation in them because bazaars are typically located in the city centers.

Recent anthropological and architectural research suggests that the culture of public life in bazaars has remained traditional and conservative. Findings of anthropologist, Asl-e Sarirai (2007) show that religion remains a significant factor in social relations in bazaars, particularly in her case study, the Tabriz Bazaar. According to her study, the bazaar is a *symbol of resistance of tradition towards modernization*, and due to the dominance of Islamic and traditional values in bazaars, it is a *predominantly masculine* place, where women have a lesser share of activities¹.

Urban planners' reflections on the relationship between urban spaces and gender norms of societies provide an overall picture of the power relationship in the use and control of the historic public spaces in Iran. In general, these works suggest that the logic behind the design and functionality of urban spaces in most of the regions of Iran has traditionally followed the social construct of private woman/public man. Therefore, women traditionally use public spaces for *necessary activities*² such as passing by or shopping. In this traditional culture, women do not stay in public spaces for recreational purposes.

For example, Madanipour (2003) believes that traditionally, public spaces such as streets, squares, and the bazaar have been considered masculine spaces. The architecture of historical urban public spaces, especially in the large cities, also shows this division of public and private spaces according to the idea of gender division.

¹ My fieldwork in the Tabriz Bazaar proves this statement. See interview data grid in Appendix 2.b.

² For a definition of the *necessary activities*, see the review of Gehl and Svarre (2013) in Section 5.1.

In her research on “*gender structure and spatial organization in Iranian traditional spaces*,” Minoosh Sadoughianzadeh (2013) explores two different architectural styles in Iran. She has studied the introvert architecture and urban planning, which is common in the cities located in central Iran. The introvert style is a design style following the social norm of gender division. She compares the *introvert* architecture with the *extrovert* style, which is common in northern Iran, along the Caspian coast, and in mountainous areas, and explains how extrovert style shows more “*flexibility*” in gender division.

The examples presented in Figure 4-3 show how public and private spaces are rigidly divided in the introvert planning style. Houses with central courtyards are divided from the public space with high walls with a minimum number of openings and windows. Historical neighborhoods in Kashan, Isfahan, and Yazd are designed with this style.




Figure 4-3. Left: The introvert organization of urban space in Iran (Yazd City) (Sadoughianzadeh, 2013, p.4). Right: Extrovert urban fabric in a mountainous village¹ (ibid. p.8).

We should note that in rural areas such as villages in northern Iran, women participate in agricultural activities, so they have to appear in public spaces. Whereas, in the major cities, middle class and upper-middle class urban women were mostly involved in the private sphere and working was a sign of the economic poverty of a woman (Naderi, 2013). In addition to the geographical and climate-related factors, the design of urban spaces in cities and rural areas are influenced by these economic and social forces. Therefore, old urban spaces in the large commercial cities, such as Tehran, Isfahan, and Tabriz are typically designed based on the introvert style following the private woman/public man idea.

¹ In such cities in northern and mountainous areas of Iran, boundaries between public and private spaces are softer. As can be seen in the extrovert example, the courtyards of some houses are actually the roofs of other house and are not divided from the street.

Lahsaeizadeh and Yousefinejad (2011) have studied women's experiences of sexual harassment in public spaces in Shiraz, a city in the southern part of central Iran. They explain that sexual harassment is a "form of sex discrimination that includes both verbal and nonverbal behaviors—such as wolf whistles, leers, winks, grabs, pinches, catcalls, and street remarks" (Lahsaeizadeh and Yousefinejad, 2011, p. 17). Their research focuses on female university students in Shiraz. They believe that the sexual harassment is a kind of punishment posed from the side of people who believe in gender rules (in the case of Iran, Islamic rules), applied towards the women who do not obey these rules. Their interviewees have stated that in the downtown (old) area of the city, sexual harassment is more often and more physical, compared to the modern neighborhoods. Their explanation for this fact is that people who live in the downtown neighborhoods are usually from the lower educational and economic classes.

In her Ph.D. dissertation, Nazgol Bagheri (2013) has pictured Tehrani women's experiences and preferences in modern and traditional Tehran, respectively, located in the northern and middle/southern areas of the city. Her observations show that Tehrani women feel less freedom, and experience less equality when they are present in the old, traditional neighborhoods of Tehran. However, in these old, male-dominated spaces, a sense of nostalgia and identity is experienced, which connects them to their past. In contrast, due to the continuous change and relatively more cultural openness in the social life of modern urban areas, they provide a sense of connection to the future (ibid.). Bagheri (2013) does not place the gender inequality in the traditional city at the center of her argument. She states that women simply switch their *gendered identity*, when using each of these spaces, with the strategy of appearing with more conservative clothing and less makeup in the traditional neighborhoods. Bagheri's interviewees stated that it is not the architectural style, but the social structure of spaces that causes different styles of public life. She argues that interpretations of the presence of women in public spaces are influenced by the local culture and historical background in each neighborhood. Women should traditionally be invisible in public space. Therefore, according to Bagheri (2013), they try to be flexible and adapt themselves to different urban spaces by changing their appearance and behavior standards.

From these works and the discussions in Chapter Three, it can be understood that since women were historically¹ not included in the public realm, they were *invisible* to, or unnecessary to be seen by the original planners of the historic built environment. Therefore, their needs remain marginalized in the physical structure of the public spaces in the historic city. It is obvious that the cultural atmosphere of an urban district is influenced by the people who regularly live and work in it.

¹ Discussed in Section 3.2.2. See Figure 3.1.

So, the social influence of the present traditional character of the historic public spaces in Iran is clear. However, the assumption that the traditional gender division in the design of the old urban spaces influences the current public life in them needs to be more strongly approved by several case studies.

In general, we can conclude that due to political and social differences, their location in cities, and cultural norms, regarding gender gap in the use of public places, historic city centers and bazaars are nowadays considered as less attractive public spaces for some social groups. A large group of urban publics including the younger generation, middle and higher class social groups and women prefer to use alternative urban spaces for their public activities.

However, despite the fact that the social role of Iranian bazaars has declined, as mentioned before, there are signs of a *tendency in them to reintegrate* with the social and physical structure of the cities. Therefore, there is an undeniable potential for the bazaars to become active public spaces in the context of the contemporary city. Fig. 4-4 shows the change in the position of the bazaar as a public place in an Iranian commercial city in the course of the last century.




Figure 4-4. The position of the bazaar in the pre-modern city and the modern city (Yadollahi).

4.2. The Spatial-Functional Structure of Bazaars

This section aims to provide an overall understanding of the relation between public life and the spatial and functional structure of bazaars of the Iranian commercial cities. As mentioned in Chapter Two, a typical bazaar in an Iranian commercial city is a complex area of buildings used for commercial and social activities. Bazaars of cities, with a history of commerce, are usually developed gradually through adding new commercial or public buildings along the existing trade routes. In most cases similar to the streets and pathways, bazaars follow the natural topography of waterways (Pourahmad, 1997). Bazaars can end at city gates, at the main square of the city, near the *Jame'* Mosque¹ (cathedral mosques) or simply in adjacent neighborhoods. The endings, which meet important elements of the city become the main entrances of bazaars and usually have monumental gates. As can be seen in Figure 4-6, the spatial organization of bazaars in Isfahan, Tabriz, Kerman, and Tehran follows a common logic. They are developed along one or several lines. In all of them, *rasteh* functions as the backbone. *Rasteh* is usually a covered corridor with several *hojreh*s² on both sides, connecting open and covered spaces to each other. *Hojreh*³ is the name of small units along *rasteh*s⁴ and other buildings in bazaars. *Hojreh* can be used as a shop, office, a residential unit in a caravanserai, or a room of a seminary school dormitory.



Figure 4-5. Map of Tehran in 1269, the bazaar line connects the city gate to the royal palace. (ICHHTO, 2012, p.80)

¹ In Persian: مسجد جامع

² The plural form of *hojreh*, which means the shops in the bazaar.

³ In Persian: حجره

⁴ The plural form of *rasteh*.



Figure 4-6. Examples of spatial structure of bazaars in commercial cities (source of maps: ICHHTO archive, Tehran)




Figure 4-7. Spatial organization of spaces with different functions in the Isfahan Bazaar, the building functions are located according to (ICHHTO, 2009) the base map (ICHHTO Archive, Tehran).

Figure 4-7 is an example of the Isfahan Bazaar that shows a close-up view of the spatial structure, connecting mosques, Caravanserais, *timcheh*¹ (arcades), *saras*², seminary schools, and *hammams*³ (bathhouses) to each other and the square, the palace, and neighborhoods. Normally, public infrastructures such as ice storage and water storage buildings are built adjacent to bazaars. Figure 4-8 presents three examples of *rasteh* in the bazaars of Ghazvin, Kerman, and Semnan. The main endings of *rastehs* are in some cases closed by gates during nights, but many *rastehs* are simply open

¹ In Persian: تیمچه

² The plural form of *sara*, in Persian: سرا

³ The plural form of *hammam*, in Persian: حمام

at both ends. Figure 4-9 shows the main entrances of the bazaars in Isfahan and Tehran and their monumental gates.

Due to their high accessibility and their mainly retail function, *rastehs* at their first floor are the most open and physically accessible spaces in bazaars. The second floor that is typically used for workshops and offices (and therefore) is not as accessible and as crowded as the first-floor *rastehs* (Figure 4-10).




Figure 4-8. Left to right: *Rastehs* in Ghazvin Bazaar (March 2008), Kerman Bazaar (July 2005) and Semnan Bazaar, September 2006, (Yadollahi).



Figure 4-9. The entrances of the Isfahan Bazaar (June 2012) and the Tehran Bazaar, March 2013, (Yadollahi).



Figure 4-10. Left: Tehran Bazaar, two-story *rasteh zargarha* (March 2013). Right: a one-story *rasteh* in the Zanjan Bazaar, April 2009, (Yadollahi).

The location at which two important *rastehs* meet is called Chahar Sough¹. The difference of Chahar Sough with other junctions in the bazaar is its character as a landmark (usually because of its functional importance), its architectural form and decorations. Chahar Sough is usually covered by a dome, larger than domes covering *rastehs*. Figure 4-11 shows the interior and aerial view of the *Sadigiyya Chahar Sug* in the Tabriz Bazaar.




Figure 4-11. The *Sadigiyya Chahar Sug* (CH1)², Tabriz Bazaar, the interior view, September 2008, and a 3D aerial view (Yadollahi).

Sometimes, a highly accessible point of a *rasteh* finds a monumental and landmark character, which makes it comparable to Chahar Soughs. For example, along the main *rasteh* of Semnan bazaar, a

¹ In Persian: چهارسوق

² See Figure 7-2

public takiyeh¹ is built (Figure 4-12). A *takiyeh* is used for public gatherings during the Shia religious ceremonies in the month of Moharram².



Figure 4-12. The *Chahar Sug* in the Semnan Bazaar, which is used as *Takiyeh-Nasar*, a space during *Moharam* for the Shia community to perform mourning rituals, May 2007, (Yadollahi).

Shrines and mosques are public buildings, accessible to everyone who follows the religious preconditions. In many documents, such as the World Heritage Nomination Dossier of the Tabriz Bazaar (ICHHTO, 2009), the *Jame' mosques* are introduced as a component of the bazaar. Although bazaars are developed adjacent to important public buildings and areas such as mosques, palaces, and main squares, these spaces should not be considered as parts of bazaars. Mosques inside bazaars are different from the *Jame' mosques* in terms of their function and scale. The mosques inside bazaars are actually integrated elements in the spatial-functional structure of bazaars. They are normally built by *bazaaris* to meet needs of both *bazaaris* and customers, whereas *Jame' mosques* are built by governments as political symbols the public large-scale ceremonies and collective prayers. Although mosques inside bazaars are physically accessible for everyone, some cultural barriers limit their openness for certain members of the public. For instance, participants of public prayers in these mosques are mostly *bazaaris* who also use the mosques to pray and meet each other during lunch and prayer break in the afternoon. Male customers also have the option to pray in the mosques. Traditionally, it is not preferred that women participate in the public prayer in these mosques.

¹ In Persian: تکیه

² In Persian and Arabic: محرم

The bathrooms of the mosques are usually and traditionally the only bathrooms available in the bazaars. All people, including women, are allowed to use them. Figures 4-12 illustrates the two mosques in the Tabriz Bazaar.




Figure 4-13. Two mosques inside the Tabriz Bazaar. Left: The Shahid Ghazi Mosque (M25) mosque (March 2013). Right: The *Molana Mosque* (M6)¹, August 2010, (Yadollahi).

Saras, *Caravanserais*, *timches*, and *dalans*² are spaces in which specialized functions, such as wholesale, workshops, commercial offices, and storehouse are located. Therefore, the main regular users of these spaces are the people who work in them. *Dalans* are covered corridors, wider than *rastehs*, which have a connecting and commercial function. Their connectivity and accessibility are less than *rastehs* because they are not necessarily located on the main axis of the bazaars, they are usually closed after working hours by gates, and are not necessarily dedicated to retail.

A *caravanseraï*³ is a space to facilitate temporary residence of caravans. *Saras* are similar to *caravanserais* in terms of architectural design, but they are not built for serving the residential needs of caravans. They normally include merchant offices and wholesale shops. Since there are no caravans today, *Caravanserais* and *saras* are used similarly. *Timches* are covered buildings for offices and wholesale stores, usually for goods like textile, carpet, and jewelry. In the spatial organization of bazaars, *saras*, *timches* and *Caravanserais* have one or more openings, which can be controlled and closed after the working hours. To lock the doors, and to protect the goods, merchants normally employ a guardian⁴. The design of these spaces allows private owners to adjust accessibility in different hours of the day. Although they are physically accessible during working hours, and customers are encouraged to visit them, due to functional and ownership issues, there is a stronger

¹ See Figure 7-2 and Figure 7-3.

² The plural form of *dalan*, in Persian: دالان

³ *Caravanserais* are built also out of cities along trade routes.

⁴ According to my interviews in the Tabriz Bazaar and observations in the bazaars of Tehran and Qazvin.

sense of privacy in them comparing to *rastehs*. All *hojrehs* in different spaces of the bazaars follow these accessibility rules because, like the *saras*, *timchehs*, and caravanserais, they are privately controlled spaces with controlled access or openings. In short, the possibility of the private control, provided through architectural design, places buildings of a bazaar at different accessibility levels. These desired accessibility levels should be clarified and respected in the policy-making for contemporary architectural interventions in bazaars.



Figure 4-14. A craftsman is repairing a carpet in front of his workshop in the *Razavi Sara* in the Qazvin Bazaar. A level of privacy is culturally justified in *saras* as working spaces (Yadollahi).




Figure 4-15. *Malek Timcheh* (left) and *Sara* (right) in Isfahan bazaar, the small white kiosk at the entrance is used by the guardian of *Sara*, September 2011, (Yadollahi).

Access to *hammams*, *zurkhanehs*¹, and other facilities of bazaars are conditioned by paying the entrance fee to use the services. Most of the traditional *hammams* that I observed in bazaars are not used nowadays. Turning them into restaurants or museums is very fashionable in Iran. If they are active (as bathhouses), using them is limited in time for men. *Zurkhaneh* is a traditional gymnasium for men. The conditions of its use are similar to the *hammams*.

In the bazaars that I have observed, infrastructures such as *hammams* and water cisterns, as well as seminary schools are usually integral parts of the bazaar's economic structure. In fact, the income gained from such public buildings is used to run and maintain other buildings in the complex. Traditionally, the money collected from the rent of *vaqfi* shops, or entrance fees for *hammams* are utilized for the maintenance of religious buildings such as mosques, shrines, and seminary schools.

Normally, seminary schools in bazaars are not open to the public. They are used by students and people who are somehow associated with the activities in them. In some cases, they share a courtyard with a public mosque. If the courtyard is accessible to the public, using it is conditioned according to the Islamic rules. The map of the Isfahan Bazaar (Figure 4-7) shows an example of the location of a mosque and a seminary school in relation to other public buildings, such as *hammams* that are economically connected to them.

All in all, bazaars are made of bounded social and spatial networks. The space inside bazaars, especially the ones that are developed gradually is experienced like a labyrinth formed by interconnected open/covered, public/private spaces. Fig. 4-16 is a schematic picture showing the logic of the spatial structure of a typical bazaar.

¹ The plural form of *zur khaneh*, which means gymnasium, in Persian: زورخانه




Figure 4-16. A schematic model of the spatial structure of a bazaar¹ (Yadollahi).

The openness of spaces in bazaars depends on their function and local cultural norms of using them. Their accessibility is influenced by factors of physical form and their location in relation to the main *rasteh(s)* and streets. The next chapter will provide a method to map the spectrum of public and private control levels, which considers openness and accessibility layers in bazaar spaces.

To sum up, it can be said that although physical boundaries of buildings in bazaars are identifiable, it is not possible to precisely categorize spaces in a bazaar, based on the types, functions, and their form. A bazaar offers a mixture of commercial, cultural and recreational activities during working hours, normally between 9.00 to around 16.00, from Saturday to Thursday. For example, one can normally find *bazaaris* chatting with each other and drinking tea, taking a nap or having lunch in shops. Although theoretically, their main function is retail, in real life, shops cannot be considered as spaces used merely for commercial purposes. Similar are other spaces with commercial function, as well as spaces that formally are religious spaces, or function as *third places*. In a mosque or a coffeehouse, one can pray, rest, discuss business, and buy or sell something.

Likewise, it is not possible to draw lines to define boundaries for public and private spaces in bazaars. The architectural form of spaces can influence publicity level, but it is not the only definer of accessibility level. The number and width of openings in spaces, transparency, and availability of

¹ The commercial areas are marked with the darker shade, comparing to the buildings for religious and public uses.

public transportation in the vicinity, stairs, and public infrastructures are factors that define the level of physical accessibility of bazaars. In addition to design and planning features, openness and accessibility of spaces can be influenced by particular functions attracting different user groups. Finally, the openness of spaces follows local political, legal and *cultural norms*. The term *cultural norms* here, refer to the manners and conventions in which occupation and use of spaces are socially established throughout history. When dealing with urban spaces with a long historical background, planners must carefully consider these *cultural norms*. To the point, identifying private and public spaces in bazaars requires taking all the mentioned factors into consideration. Chapter Seven on the Tabriz Bazaar is an empirical example showing the discussed layers of accessibility and openness.

4.3 The Management of Bazaars as Historic Public Places

Here, the discussion on the management aims to explain the power relations of the interested groups in the use and control of bazaars as public places. As discussed in Chapter Three, one of the key characteristics of a public place is the existence of equal participation in its control and use. In this context, the role of actors in the management of bazaars and the approach of this management structure will be discussed in the following pages. Data obtained from legal texts and other sources of data such as the news and interviews will be triangulated in order to reflect on the quality of participation in the current management system of the Iranian bazaars.

Being physically and economically developed by the *bazari* communities, bazaars have been traditionally managed by them. After the centralization of urban management, their role in the management of the large-scale affairs of the bazaar was almost diminished. The existence and powerfulness of these communities in different cities vary. Therefore, a general¹ background about their traditional function and the new institutions that replaced them as local and non-governmental management agents is presented here. However, the main part of this section will explain the governmental management, which has the same structure in all bazaars in Iran and is the main influential management framework today. This will be a background for discussing the ownership, legal control and power relations in the Tabriz Bazaar.

¹ In the Chapter Six, which is specifically on the Tabriz Bazaar, I will explain the management system in a more detailed way.

4.3.1. The Traditional Management of Bazaars: A Private Owner-Centered approach

Before the State started to dominate the organization and function of the bazaars' management system, they were mainly managed by the *bazaari* communities. The hierarchy of the *bazaari* community was simply a reflection of wealth levels. As explained by Ashraf (1989) and Keshavarzian (2007), as well as three interviewed merchants in the Tabriz Bazaar¹, at the top of the bazaar community, were the prominent merchants, usually involved in international trade. Then, on the next level, there were currency exchange agents and wholesalers who were wealthier than smaller retailers. Others such as brokers, craftsmen, shopkeepers, peddlers, apprentices, and porters were generally at the bottom of the hierarchy. Brokers are considered "*the network makers*" because they transfer up-to-date information, credit, and goods in all around the bazaar (Keshavarzian, 2007, p. 83).

The process of collecting taxes, providing public service and security issues, involved local government officers that were in contact with the guild leaders who were elected by the guild members (Floor, 1989). According to the statements of the elderly *bazaaris* that I interviewed in Tabriz, as well as Mr. Taghizadeh,² a native of Azerbaijan and the former head of the ICHHTO branch in East Azerbaijan Province, in the pre-modern times, the maintenance and security under the roofs of the bazaar were mainly under the responsibility of the *bazaari* community. The government was responsible for safeguarding the top of the roofs and the surrounding neighborhoods.

As Willem Floor (1989) explains further, since the number of shops needed to be fixed, due to the necessity of controlling market and demand balance in each neighborhood or bazaar area, the number of new stores and their locations was supervised by the guild leaders. Members of each guild had their part in the bazaar. They often used the same mosque and coffeehouses. Therefore, economic policies of guilds had a significant influence on the physical and social structure of bazaars.

Vaqf supervisors also influenced the bazaars structures. Several shops and other commercial buildings are built in Iranian bazaars to financially support religious buildings, hospitals, seminary schools, public infrastructures and charity activities (Floor, 1989, and Bonine, 1989). The influence of *vaqf* is durable, sometimes for centuries because the manner of using the *vaqf* income has to follow the *vaqf* document prepared by the endower. Furthermore, the *vaqf* ownership could not be transferred to public or private ownership.

¹ The interviews are listed in the appendix 2.b. (interview number 10).

² Mr. Taghizadeh was interviewed by the author in Tehran on 10.06.2010.

In general, although the State had some influence on the bazaars, it can be said that the physical development of the bazaars and the proper use of spaces in them were defined and sustained by the guild leaders and merchants who traditionally advocated benefits of the bazaar as a whole. *Vaqf* supervisors were also influential in the physical structure and use of the *vaqf* properties in the bazaars. We should note that each guild was responsible for the area it occupied in the bazaar. However, there was cooperation between the guilds at the bazaar level. Keshavarzian (2007) believes that the solidarity and group identity of the bazaar community were strongly associated with the physical wholeness of the bazaar.

The structure and nature of the *vaqf* system have also changed in the last century. Before the Constitution, a minister of the Shah supervised the *vaqf* affairs. After the Constitution, managing the *vaqf* affairs became a responsibility of the *Ministry of Knowledge, Owqaf, and Handicrafts*¹. Under the Pahlavi regime *vaqf* was supervised by the deputy of Prime Minister and today, it is under the supervision of the *owqaf* and endowment affairs organization, the head of which is selected directly by the supreme leader².

Until the early twentieth century, the traditional management system was practiced in bazaars. After the Constitution and the launch of the modernization projects by Reza Shah Pahlavi, the system started to change. Taghizadeh (2010) explained how this happened, firstly in Tehran and then in Tabriz and other cities. According to him, the change was started by the physical interventions of the municipalities in bazaars by destroying the roofs of bazaars for providing light and improving health conditions in them. He believes that this was when the government started to get the control of bazaar from the *bazari* community and began to marginalize them from management activities related to the bazaars. He views this as a political shift in power, which was first rejected by the *bazari* community. Pointing out that through history, cities, and bazaars have been developed and maintained by people, he criticizes the government policies that centralized the management of bazaars. From his point of view, most of the managerial problems Iranian cities are facing today, are linked to this point in history.

The insights of Mr. Taghizadeh include useful information. However, we should have in mind that the integrity of the *bazari* social network, which is the main factor, putting the structure in an integrated whole was mainly damaged after the Islamic Revolution³. Another point that is discussed

¹ In Persian: وزارت معارف و اوقاف و صنایع مستظرفه

² For more information visit: www.awqaf.ir

³ As discussed in Chapter Two.

earlier in this work¹ and worth noting is that we should not simply consider the bazaaris and those who played a role in shaping the cities as “people.” They are, of course, a part of people. But, due to their superior social position, they do not represent all people.

All in all, it is not possible to say that the traditional social networks in bazaars are completely diminished. However, today, in the context of the State-centered management, their role is marginal. These informal social networks were attempted to be replaced by the *Societies of the Islamic Associations of Bazaar*², supported by the State. The members of these societies are from the bazaar community but are well-connected with the State. Keshavarzian (2007) and Taghizadeh (2010) both state that these so-called *non-governmental* associations have not been trusted by the *bazaaris* in Tehran and Tabriz. Therefore, this new form of governmentally supervised associations simply could not replace the traditional network of the bazaars. Consequently, the internal management system of the bazaars has almost lost its function.

The pre-modern and modern urban management systems in Iran were discussed in Chapter Two. In the following pages, the governmental management system, which is today effective in physical interventions, use, and the maintenance of the bazaars is described.

4.3.2. The Modern Management of Bazaars as Urban Heritage and Public Places: A State-Centered Approach

As discussed in Chapter Two, ICHHTO does not have a leading role in the policy-making, implementation, and supervision at an urban planning level. It was also mentioned, that its duties are overlapping with the responsibilities of the SCUPA, on the level of policy-making, and some of its other tasks are same as municipalities duties, on the level of preparing plans and interventions. However, ICHHTO is a key agent in the management of the physical affairs inside the bazaars, as well as their interpretation and presentation to the public.

According to the Law of Protection of National Heritage³ (1930), all properties built before the end of the Zand dynasty (1794) can be enlisted as national heritage. Bazaars were registered on the national heritage list as building complexes or as separate buildings. After being enlisted in the national heritage list, the management of these bazaars is affected by laws related to heritage properties under the supervision of ICHHTO. The following bazaars are some early examples that have been registered as national heritage, according to the ICHHTO (2009) reports;

¹ See Section 3.2.2.

² In Persian: جامعه انجمن های اسلامی اصناف بازار

³ The Persian title of the Law: Ghanun-e Raje' be Hefz-e Asar-e Melli , 1309 HS

- The *Moshir* Bazaar in Shiraz in 1968 (registration Nr. 454,)),
- The *Vakil* Bazaar in Shiraz in 1972 (registration Nr. 924),
- The Tabriz Bazaar in 1975 (registration Nr.1097),
- The Tehran Bazaars in 1977 (registration Nr.1540),
- The Zanjan Bazaars in 1977 (registration Nr.1440),
- The Ghazvin Bazaars in 1977 (registration Nr.1021),
- The Isfahan Bazaars in 1998 (registration Nr.2117),
- The Yazd Bazaar in 1999 (registration Nr.2248).

Since ICHHTO supervises most of the physical and functional changes in the bazaars, giving a short background is necessary to provide an understanding of ICHHTO's approach towards urban heritage, before providing an explanation of how the bazaars' management system functions.

The first Iranian law related to cultural heritage was passed in 1910 by establishing the Ministry of Knowledge, Owqaf, and Handicrafts. Later in 1964, this ministry was turned into the Ministry Culture and Art¹. Similar to many other countries, during the 20th century, the conservation approach in Iran focused on the monumental buildings and overlooked their relation to the urban fabric surrounding them. The approach of the government towards heritage management is evident from the heritage-related legal texts of that time.

According to Article 26 of the *Civil Law*² (1928-35), heritage properties cannot be privately owned. However, the law states that exceptions can happen after approval of the Parliament. Accordingly, Article 102 of the Law of Municipalities (1930)³ mentions that if a historical object or building is found during a construction project, it should be reported to the Ministry of Culture and Art to decide about the protective boundaries and conservation. First, this shows that the government was interested in buildings and objects rather than urban fabrics (normally with mixed public and private and *vaqf* ownership status). Second, the interventions in heritage buildings were supposed to be conducted by the governmental agencies.

Later legislations show a slight change in this State-centered approach. For example, the 1930 Law for Protection of National Heritage⁴ attempted to balance the rights of private owners and the state, in favor of the protection of historic buildings. The law on *Adding a Note to the Article 26 of The*

¹ In Persian: وزارت فرهنگ و هنر 1343

² The Persian title of the Law: Ghanun-e Madani-e Iran '1307, 1313 and 1314 HS

³ The Persian title of the Law: Ghanun-e Shahrdari ha or *Ghanoon-e Baladieh*

⁴ The Persian title of the Law: Ghanun-e Raje' be Hefz-e Asar-e Melli, 1309 HS

*Renewal and Construction Law 1968*¹ foresees some financial advantages to convince private owners to protect their heritage buildings. This law declares the owners of the listed heritage buildings free of taxes, provided that the property is not commercial. This particular law was not effective in commercial areas of the bazaars. *Bazaaris* had to pay taxes, due to the commercial status of their historical properties. However, sometimes bazaars are affected by such heritage conservation laws because they are national heritage, and some areas in them are non-commercial.

Before the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the *Ministry of Culture and Art* was responsible for the protection of monuments and museum objects. After 1979, the mentioned monumental approach was continued, but the approach of the new organization, ICHO (*Iranian Cultural Heritage Organization*) was also influenced by the Islamic perception of the past and heritage, which gives priority to the *educational value* of heritage.

Following the passing of the *Law of Establishment of The Iranian Cultural Heritage Organization*², in January 1986, the *Iranian Cultural Heritage Organization* (ICHO) was established under in the *Ministry of Culture and Higher Education*³. Being influenced by the policies of that ministry, ICHO functioned mainly as a research institute. The Ph.D. dissertation of Mehdi Hodjat⁴ (1996), the first head of ICHO after the Islamic revolution can picture the government's approach to heritage at this time. He viewed Iranian cultural heritage policy-making through the lens of Islam's perception of heritage. Although he emphasizes on "*Iranian*" perceptions in the understanding of the past, he mainly uses the Quran for developing justifications and discussions in his book. As Hodjat suggests, in Islam the primary reason for referring to the past and heritage is the *guidance of humankind*.

Between 1986 and 1994, ICHO was under the *Ministry of Culture and Higher Education* and the *Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance*. In 1994, the organization entirely merged with the *Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance*⁵ that was involved with managing tourism and cultural handicrafts. Consequently, these topics were added to the duties of ICHO. In 2004, after the *Establishment of the Iranian Cultural Heritage and Tourism Organization*, it started its activities under the *Iranian Presidential Administration*. Since 2004, the head of ICHHTO is the Vice-president and is directly appointed by the president. Later, in 2006, by merging the Organization for Handicrafts with ICHTO,

¹ The Persian title of the Law: Ghanun-e Elhagh-e Yek Tabsareh be Maddey-e 26 Ghanun-e Nosazi va Omran-e Shahri, 1347 HS.

² The Persian title of the Law: Ghanun-e Tashkil-e Sazman-e Miras-e Fahangi-e Keshvar.

³ In Persian: وزارت فرهنگ و آموزش عالی

⁴ He directed ICHO between 1987 and 1991.

⁵ In Persian: وزارت فرهنگ و ارشاد اسلامی

its name was changed to the *'Iranian Cultural Heritage, Handicrafts, and Tourism Organization'*¹ (ICHHTO).

The aim of integrating tourism and heritage can be understood from the *Law of Establishment of ICHTO*², especially the articles 7, 8 and 9 that are concerned with the enforcement of tourism. This law follows the policies of the *Third Plan of Economic, Social and Cultural Development of the Islamic Republic of Iran*³. In fact, since the approval of the *First Development Plan* in 1990, there is a growing tendency to decentralize the economy by moving the focus from the Oil industry to other industries such as tourism⁴. In Article 114 of the 2004 *Law on the Fourth Development Plan*⁵, the aim of the tourism development policies is explained as “wealth production,” “creation of occupation possibilities” and “cultural exchange.”

The heritage and tourism-related legislation texts show that a leading strategy for financing the development of tourism industry is to attract the participation of the private sector. Article 2 of the *Law of Establishment of the ICHHTO* points out the importance of privatization policies in ICHHTO activities. Since Article 83 of the Constitution Law bans private ownership of national cultural heritage properties, the discussed method of privatization of heritage is leasing the property or delegating its management to a private body.

Following the mentioned policies, the 2004 *Law on the Fourth Development Plan* specifies modes of privatization concerning tourism and restoration and reuse of historic buildings. According to Article 114 of this law, to attract the participation of the private sector, ICHHTO is allowed to issue certificates for private conservation workshops and institutes, and also gives certificates to the private sector for restoration and reuse of historic buildings.

Due to this tourism-centered approach of ICHHTO, the tendency of the organization to inscribe properties on the World Heritage List has meaningfully increased. Since the ratification of Iran to the *Conventions for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage* (1972), in 1974⁶ Iran has inscribed 21 sites on the World Heritage List. Out of these 21 sites, 17 are listed after 2004. Due to

¹ In Persian: سازمان میراث فرهنگی، صنایع دستی و گردشگری

² The Persian title of the Law: Ghanun-e Tashkil-e Sazman-e Miras-e Farhangi va Ghardeshgari

³ The Persian title of the Law: Ghanun-e Barnamey-e Sevom-e Tose-ey-e Eghtesadi, Ejtemai va Farhangi-e Jomhuriy-e Eslami-e Iran.

⁴ According to the Articles 3(15) and 3(16).

⁵ The Persian title of the Law: Ghanun-e Barnamey-e Chaharom-e Tose-ey-e Eghtesadi, Ejtemai va Farhangi-e Jomhuriy-e Eslami-e Iran

⁶ Until September 2016.

the focus on international conventions, listing natural and intangible heritage¹ has also been considered a part of ICHHTO's policies. This shows that the importance of the country's international cultural and political image and development of international tourism has become the priority in ICHHTO policies.

In order to enhance tourism development, most historic buildings are being restored for tourism-related uses. For this purpose, the *Revitalization and Utilization Fund for Historic Places*² was established in accordance with Article 114 of the *Fourth Development Plan*. The duty of this institute was to introduce the restorable historic building, except the “*nationally unique heritage*”³ properties for tourism-related functions such as hotels, motels, and tourist service centers. With the participation of the private sector, several historic buildings are being turned into hotels and restaurants in the framework of the revitalization project of *Pardisan*⁴, which is associated with the *Revitalization and Utilization Fund for Historic Places*. It should be added here that because there is not a clear definition for “*nationally unique heritage*” properties in the existing legal texts, according to Principle 84 of the *Constitution Law*⁵, ICHHTO experts define it and decide about it by case. In fact, the projects of the *Revitalization Fund* (that is an ICHHTO-associated institute) should be evaluated by the ICHHTO. So, ICHHTO is both the evaluator and the conductor of these projects!

Another example that shows the nature of decentralization policies in ICHHTO was the decision about limiting and closing the *ICHHTO Higher Education Centre*⁶, which offers Bachelor programs in heritage conservation since 1989. The decision in the 136th session of the *Supreme Council for Governmental Organizations*⁷ in 2010 banned the ICHHTO Higher Education Center from admitting new students. The mentioned decision was not fully implemented, due to wide criticism and student objections. The budget of the center, which used to be provided by ICHHTO, was cut⁸. These decisions and the way in which these legislations are formulated show that decentralization policies of ICHHTO were mainly concerned with the short-term economic benefits. In order to ensure the long-term sustainability of decentralized heritage conservation and use, the existence of

¹ Iran has also ratified the 2003 international Convention on Intangible Cultural Heritage.

² In Persian: صندوق احیا و بهره برداری از امکان تاریخی و فرهنگی

³ In Persian: نفایس ملی

⁴ In Persian: طرح پردیسان

⁵ The Persian title of the Law: Ghanun-e Asasi-e Jomhuri-e Eslami-e Iran

⁶ In Persian: مرکز آموزش عالی سازمان میراث فرهنگی

⁷ In Persian: شورای عالی اداری

⁸ The author was a student at ICHHTO Higher Education Center, when the decision of closing the center was made. This was during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, when the right wing, populist political party was in power in Iran. Today, most of the members of the current management team in the ICHHTO are from the reformist political party, who are attempting to rehabilitate the center.

knowledgeable professionals who can form and manage the private sector is necessary. Obviously, shrinking educational activities of ICHHTO was a strategic mistake in favor of economic interests.

Sayed Mohammad Beheshti who was the head of ICHO during 1997-2004 has criticized the change in policies after the Fourth Development Plan in an interview with the *Cultural Heritage News Agency* (CHN)¹. He believed that the tourism-centered approach has an “*incorrect*” and “*superficial*” understanding of both heritage and tourism, and is in practice “*purely economic.*” The economic and tourism-oriented policies of *ICHHTO* is widely debated and criticized. Similarly, Mehdi Hodjat (2001) has criticized these policies in his book, *Cultural heritage in Iran, Policies for an Islamic Country*.

In addition to what has been discussed, the most important factor that should be considered regarding the privatization in Iran is that many of the so-called *private institutes* that have been founded after the launch of privatization policies are informally state-associated. As a result, what has happened in Iran as decentralization of the government is in fact, *the expansion of the body of the state*.

Harris (2013) states that privatization in Iran has resulted in the emergence of a *subcontractor State*. Similarly, Shirzad Azad (2010) characterizes the Iranian economy by *an extensive State presence*. He suggests that the privatization policies have not eliminated the political interference of the State in the economy. He believes that the “*change of ownership appears to have advanced the interests of politically well-connected business elites, which are not even likely to be potential entrepreneurs*” (Azad, 2010).

The mentioned authors are Iranians who have done their research abroad. Even some authors inside Iran have similar opinions. In their paper on the political economy and privatization in Iran, two professors of political sciences at the University of Tehran, Hmid Ahmadi and Sajjad Sattari (2013) have explained the political-economic nature and problematic factors in the development of privatization in Iran. They state that historically, the paradigm of power in Iran has tended to develop a *State capitalism* that considers the private sector as a force in contrast with the traditional power paradigm in Iran.

However, the important problem is that without financing the projects through the private sector money, the buildings cannot be restored by ICHHTO, due to lack of budget. The Tehran Bazaar is one such example. Keshavarzian (2007) describes the Tehran Bazaar as *old, overcrowded, overused, and neglected, with a poor physical condition*. The *bazaaris* he interviewed complained that ICHHTO does

¹ Available in Farsi from: <http://www.chn.ir/NSite/FullStory/News/?Id=67892&Serv=0&SGr=0> [Accessed 18.10.2024].

not allow renovation. According to one of his interviewees, ICHHTO “protects the bazaar by not letting anyone touch the buildings” (Keshavarzian, 2007, p. 182). Keshavarzian argues that a reason why commercial activities are moving outside the bazaar is the lack of necessary physical interventions within it (ibid.).

To sum up, comparing the current approach of ICHHTO with its previous approaches, it can be said that it has become a politically independent organization with a more economy-driven approach since 2004. This is evident from three facts;

- First, when the ICHO was under the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education, it was a research center with a research-based approach. It worked under the supervision of the Minister of Culture and Higher Education who could be impeached by the Parliament.
- Second, the integration of tourism sector in the organization naturally enforced the economic aspects of its approaches towards heritage management.
- Third, separating the organization from the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education and putting it under the direct supervision of the Presidential Administration, gave it an economic and political independence.

Major Organizational Phases of <i>ICHHTO</i> (resulting in changes in its policies)	Central Interest(s) and Approach(es) ¹	Main Focus of Heritage-Related Regulations and Activities
I. Before 1978: Under the Ministry of Culture and Art	Cultural, Educational	Monumental and museum-based protection
II. 1986: Under the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education (active mainly as a research center) Title: <i>Iranian Cultural Heritage Organization (ICHO)</i>	Educational	Protection and use of monuments based on Islamic values, Research
III. 1994: Under the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance; Title: <i>Iranian Cultural Heritage and Tourism Organization (ICHTO)</i>	Tourism-oriented, economic	tourism, intangible heritage, and Attention to heritage sites in the urban context ² ,
IV. 2004: Under the Presidential administration Title (since 2006): <i>Iranian Cultural Heritage, Handicrafts, and Tourism Organization (ICHHTO)</i>	Tourism-oriented, economic, with stronger political character	World Heritage, natural and intangible heritage, urban heritage

Table 4-1. Organizational phases of ICHHTO, and its approaches in each of these phases (Yadollahi).

¹ Political interest is a central character of the institutionalized and state-centered heritage protection. Therefore, the political motivation is not repeated in the table.

² See chapter 2

Since the Parliament is not able to impeach the Vice-president, as the representative of regular publics, it does not have a considerable influence on the performance of ICHHTO. Naturally, this limits public participation in the management of heritage properties. Furthermore, the discussed nature of the current privatization policies in Iran gives more independence to ICHHTO. The changes of ICHHTO's organizational position in relation to its approaches towards heritage management is presented chronologically in Table 4-1.

4.3.3. The Current Management System of Bazaars as Heritage Properties and Public Places

The followings are the effective actors in the management of areas adjacent to the bazaars and inside the bazaar zones;

- *ICHHTO* and its associated organizations, such as the *Revitalization and Utilization Fund for Historic Places*,
- The *Ministry of Roads and Urban Development (MRUD)* and its related institutions, such as the *SCUPA*, *Provincial Commissions for Article 5*, *Urban Development and Revitalization Organization*, the *Organization of Deteriorated Urban Fabrics*,
- Municipalities and their associated institutions such as municipalities of historic districts, urban renovation organizations, public transportation organizations, fire, security and risk management organizations, institutes for controlling industries and occupations in cities,
- Actors such as the police, the *Islamic City Council*, *Societies of the Islamic Associations of the Bazaar*, and guilds associations.

Table 4-2 shows the main organizations involved in the management of bazaars and their duties (according to their official duty- statement).

As mentioned in this chapter and Chapter Two, according to policies enforced by the development plans, non-governmental organizations such as *Islamic City Council*, *Societies of the Islamic Associations of the Bazaar*, and guilds associations should participate in the planning processes in bazaars. Regarding their duty clarifications, terms such as “*control*,” “*supervision*,” “*reporting*,” and “*cooperation*” can be found in laws such as the Constitution Law, the Second and Third Development Plans. Nevertheless, descriptions of the actual type of participation of non-governmental institutions in the legal texts are very vague.

Regarding the cooperation and leadership of activities, it can be said that, in historic buildings (therefore, inside the core zone of bazaars), ICHHTO acts as the supervisor of activities of the above-mentioned organizations. While, outside zones of the bazaars, the main supervisor is the MRUD. As

discussed in Chapter Two, there are many overlapping responsibilities of different organizations at the urban fabric scale. Implementation of laws and interpreting them by each of these actors make the situation more difficult. Table 3 categorizes groups and organizations involved in the management of the bazaars as urban heritage. The legal responsibilities column is based on current legal texts, organizational charts, and official duty-statements of the reviewed organizations.

Organizations \ Legal Responsibility	MRUD	ICHHTO	Municipalities and their Associated Institutes	Islamic City Councils	Societies of the Islamic Associations of Bazaar	Guild-associations	Owqaf
General Supervision of the Preparation of Development Plans at Urban Scale (in historic city)		involved		Participation			
General Supervision of the Implementation of Plans in Urban Scale (in historic city)		involved		Participation			
Supervision of Conservation, Land-Use Management, Research, Monitoring and Infrastructure-Building (inside the bazaars)					Participation	Participation	Directly influential in case of <i>vaqf</i> properties
Public Presentation and Interpretation, of Bazaars, Registration of Sites on the National and World Heritage Lists							
Risk Management (at the local level)		Involved			Participation	Participation	Participation
Management of Political, Cultural and Religious Events in the Bazaars							Participation

Table 4-2. Duties of main involved organizations in the management of historic cities and bazaars (Yadollahi).¹

¹ This table is prepared based on the following sources of data:

The laws for the Second (1994), Third (2000), and Fourth (2005) Development Plans, The Law of Municipalities (1930), the Law of Establishment of The Iranian Cultural Heritage Organization (1986), The Civil Law of Iran (1928-35), the Law for Supporting the Revitalization, Rehabilitation, Renovation, of Deteriorated and Dysfunctional Urban Fabrics (2010), the Law of Establishment of The Supreme Council of Urban Planning and Architecture (SCUPA) in 1972.

Sources for organizational charts and official duty statements: ICHHTO (2012b), MRUD (2014a), and Islamic Republic of Iran, Ministry of Interior (2014).

Note: The darkest cells show the cases in which the responsibility of an actor is clearly mentioned in legislations. The cells colored in the middle -gray shade show cases in which an actor is involved in decision-making. This means that the related agency has the legal power to act as an advisor and not as a decision maker. The light-grey shade (participation) shows the cases in which legal texts state very general terms such as participation, reporting, and supervision without any specific clarification.

In the case of bazaars that are World Heritage properties, the *management bases* that are representatives of ICHHTO are responsible for the observation and coordination of activities inside the bazaars' core zones and buffer zones. In my interview on March 13, 2013, with Mr. Esmaili, the head of the management base of the Tabriz Bazaar, he mentioned that through these local bases, ICHHTO is active on issues such as giving permission to private owners to repair buildings in the bazaar. As Esmaili (2013) stated, maintenance activities and renovating the infrastructure and interventions in spaces with public ownership is accomplished the bases. Figure 4-17 shows the position of such management bases in the organizational chart of ICHHTO.




Figure 4-17. The ICHHTO organizational chart¹. The English translation is done by the author. The original chart is updated in November 2012 (ICHHTO, 2012, b).²

The budget for the maintenance of bazaars and preparation and implementation of plans is mainly provided from a mixture of State and private sources. More precisely, the conservation and maintenance of public spaces within bazaars are usually State-financed (for example by ICHHTO).

¹ It should be noted that the cell, showing the relationship of the head of ICHHTO with the president is added by the author to the original chart. The colored box (Bureau of management bases affairs) shows the organizational position of World Heritage management bases.

² The position of the president in relation to ICHHTO is added to the original chart by the author.

Physical interventions, in spaces with a private or *vaqf* ownership, are financed by the owners or *vaqf* representatives. A fixed percentage for private, public or *vaqf* financing cannot be calculated for bazaars because in each bazaar the level of economic motivation that usually causes financial participation of owners varies.

Bazaars have private, public and *vaqf* ownership status, are public places and at the same time are heritage properties. Therefore, in regards to their management, this complexity requires an understanding of two main issues. The first issue is the power level of the involved actors (the owners, the governmental bodies, and the regular publics). The second important issue involves the interests, which can create the motivation and willingness of the dominant actor(s) to create room for the involvement of others.

Among the legal persons¹ mentioned in Table 4-2, the key role of ICHHTO is evident in regards to affairs related to areas inside the bazaar boundaries. According to Article 727 of the Islamic Penal Law (1996)², ICHHTO is the only (private) claimant and the only actor responsible for all technical and legal affairs related to national heritage. Naturally, this State-centered approach limits the participation chance of other actors, at least inside the bazaars.

In other words, ICHHTO is the steward, the contract giver, and the contractor! In addition, as mentioned, the Parliament has no control over ICHHTO's performance. Therefore, in the current legal system, the chance for legal protection of heritage properties against ICHHTO's possible mistakes or misperformances of the duties is remarkably low. Of course, a way to improve the existing situation is to provide legal possibilities for public participation in decision-making for the governance of bazaars. But, legal tools should be backed up by the willingness of the principal actors (such as ICHHTO) to involve others. ICHHTO's interest in involving others and the way in which it perceives the notion of public participation can be understood from the reviewed legal texts about the privatization of cultural heritage, as well as the actual local experiences of the ICHHTO authorities.

In my interviews with Taghizadeh (2010) and Mr. Esmaili (2013),³ it is evident that when these authorities refer to *people*, they both mean private owners in the bazaar, not the regular public members who use bazaars. For example, Taghizadeh states, "*It is not correct to intend to manage the bazaar. We do not need to manage the bazaar; we should learn management from the bazaar*".

¹ A legal person can be a private or State organization or institute.

² The Persian title of the Law: Ghanun-e Mojazat-e Eslami

³ Taghizadeh is the former director of the Cultural Heritage Organization of East Azerbaijan province and Esmaili is the current director of the Tabriz Bazaar World Heritage management base.

The reason why the bazaar is deteriorated today is the state-centered management, which has humiliated the bazaar, believing that bazaaris cannot touch the bazaar". Using strong statements such as *"who are we to manage the bazaar?!"* or *"we should leave the bazaar business to the bazaaris,"* he argues that ICHHTO should act as an actor who does the research, offers consultation and controls the quality of conservation projects. When talking about his experiences in negotiating with the *bazaaris* of the Tabriz Bazaar for the conservation of buildings, his main emphasis is on their financial participation. He mentions that in 1996, the projects were funded by a twenty percent investment from the *bazaaris* and an eighty percent investment from ICHHTO. In 2005, the *bazaaris* contributed a ninety-eight percent of the budget, while ICHHTO contributed a mere two percent. When I asked about the role of actors, other than ICHHTO and *bazaaris*, he pointed out that to conserve the authentic identity of the bazaar in the future, we should educate *bazaaris* to know how to confront and give services to new customers and tourists. He believes that if the *bazaaris* are convinced that an introduction of new customers and visitors is to their benefit, they would openly accept them. He also states that people who should be involved with the bazaar management should be from the bazaar, or should be *"a piece of bazaar's body."*

His arguments are mainly related to the *bazaari-ICHHTO* relations. Although he does not directly mention it in the interview, as I understood from his statements, he views regular publics as outsiders to the bazaar. Indirectly, he confirms that the bazaar is a closed social community that is conservative in terms of letting others get involved in its management. He explains that the dominance of the State in the management of the bazaar has been a power struggle, out of the control of the *bazaaris*.

I observed this approach towards regular publics also in the current management of the Tabriz Bazaar. When I asked Esmaili (2013); *"what is the role of people other than bazaaris in the management of the Tabriz Bazaar?"* He replied; *"They don't help; because they think bazaaris are rich enough to maintain the bazaar," "it is not necessary to get help from the regular publics."* I also asked him when they have planned to activate their webpage, which can create connections with young people. He said in the near future¹. I did not get a cogent response to my question about the ways in which the base is in relation with regular publics.

¹ The interview was in March 2013. The website was not activated in July 2017. However, one can find general information about the bazaar on the websites of *Cultural Heritage Organization of East Azerbaijan* (2017) and the website of the *Bureau for Management Bases* (2017). These websites are clearly designed to provide information for visitors, rather than creating a platform for public participation.

What is obvious is that public involvement needs initiatives and willingness from the side of the more powerful actor (in this case ICHHTO). We cannot simply expect people to participate voluntarily when the administrative context is not prepared for participation, and a culture of participation does not exist yet.

The interviews have been conducted with the ICHHTO authorities in the Tabriz Bazaar show the general approach of the management of bazaars, because local branches of ICHHTO act based on central policies. In fact, the mentioned statements are well in harmony with the discussed legal context and policies of ICHHTO. Putting all the reviewed data together, we can see the dominance of the State-centered management framework and the bold economic-oriented mentality regarding the issue of participatory urban conservation.

4.4. Discussion: Approaching Bazaars as Meaningful Places for the Regular Public; the Need to Enhance the Capacity and Tolerance in the Iranian Bazaar for Social Diversity

A significant character of the Iranian bazaars is that individual open and accessible spaces in them are not experienced as independent and separated public spaces. The interconnected public spaces are experienced as an integrated whole, making a large and complex public place. Of course, there are several private spaces in bazaars. Nevertheless, due to the connectivity and interdependence of spaces and functions in the bazaars, the whole structure is experienced as one entity. Similar to many other multifunctional urban spaces, it is not possible to precisely define borders that divide public spaces from private spaces. It is only possible to define a *publicity-privacy spectrum* in a bazaar.

Based on the discussions in this chapter and the previous chapters, it can be argued that in terms of their function as public places in cities, bazaars have been able to keep their commercial centrality, and they still attract particular groups of people who are interested in the services and goods they offer. In the last century, they have certainly lost their centrality as public places. Being surrounded by the so-called *old and dysfunctional urban fabrics*, today, bazaars are not desirable shopping centers and public places for the middle class and upper-middle class urban youth and women in particular.

As discussed earlier, the existence of cultural norms in the traditional and old urban districts and the bazaars is another factor that limits the diversity of their users. The tendency in them for homogenizing manners of public behavior and public appearance has resulted in the decline of social

diversity (in terms of social class, gender, and age)¹ in them. This has naturally affected the quality of public life in the bazaars.

It was explained in Chapter Two that the bazaars have historically been understood and used as public places. Even today, bazaars in the major commercial cities are normally extremely crowded. Nevertheless, a critical view on the public life in them triggers the following questions:

- Does *crowdedness* necessarily mean *publicness*?
- Does the crowd in a bazaar represent all groups of the urban public? If no, who are the public groups that are not interested in the bazaars, and where is their preferred public place?
- Is the presence of these missing groups vital or even helpful for the safeguarding and development of the bazaars?

Regarding the management of the bazaars, from the reviewed literature and legal texts, it can be concluded that the traditional management system in them has been almost entirely replaced by a State-centered management system. As the principal actor in the bazaar's management, the State understands the notion of participation as a mainly financial issue and is primarily interested in interacting with the private owners, and not the regular publics who do not have a direct economic influence on the conservation projects.

Here I argue that the regular public members should be considered as providers of what the sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu (1986) calls social capital. This vision is not far from the economic mentality of the governmental authorities. Because by social capital, Bourdieu refers to a kind of capital that is driven by social connections and can turn into economic capital. As he explains, by exchanging available resources, the members of a social network or an institution can benefit from a shared capital. In the case of bazaars as social, commercial, and spatial networks, this capital can be available in the form of resources such as talent, creative business ideas, knowledge, commercial or political reputation, or money. This idea, therefore, is negotiable with the governmental organizations. The assumption of this thesis is that approaching the bazaars as public places can promote social equality in using and managing the bazaars on the one hand. On the other hand, this approach can have long-term and lasting economic benefits for the bazaaris and the State.

Another important point in terms of safeguarding the authentic meaning of the bazaars is that as public places, commercial centers, and urban heritage, without the presence of *all public members*, the bazaars are far away from their purpose of existence and meaning. If we accept that a bazaar is

¹ These factors will be empirically explored in the case of Tabriz Bazaar.

originally built to connect people for trade and social interaction, today, bazaars are facing a meaning crisis because of their problem regarding the issue of social diversity. They are losing their social function for the middle-class and upper-middle-class social groups and are becoming commercial spaces that are able to attract a limited part of the urban publics. With the modern methods of commerce and social interaction, the role and meaning of the bazaars in cities are to be challenged even more in the coming decades. By keeping in mind the reviewed history of the development and changes of the bazaars in the Iranian commercial cities, it is not so unrealistic to say that their capacity for a commercial function at an urban level will be hardly sufficient in the near future.

Obviously, addressing these challenges would not be possible using only State resources. Financial and social participation of *bazaaris* and other social groups are needed for protecting the bazaars and developing them as integrated parts of the dynamic post-modern city. But, how logical is it, to expect that people who are not welcomed in the bazaar or are not familiar with the bazaar participate in its development?

In fact, being actively present in the urban public life is, by itself, a valuable social participation and investment. This can gradually increase the tolerance for social diversity in urban spaces. In the case of the bazaars, the enhancement of social diversity can create opportunities to widen the groups of economic investors (who are interested in target groups, different from the current ones in the bazaar). Naturally, this can trigger the development in bazaars, as well as their reintegration with the city.

As discussed, *the new publics*, including the middle-class and upper-middle-class groups, women and educated young generation are not usually attracted to the old urban districts and bazaars for shopping and especially for public activities. Throughout this research, there was an emphasis on this group because of the growth in their presence and influence in the political and economic arenas¹. It was mentioned that these groups are mostly educated and interested in cultural heritage. Therefore, opening up the bazaars to all public members including the mentioned groups is a strategy for involving them in the future of the bazaars.

The aim here is not advocating the urban intellectual elite. Being aware of the consequences of gentrification, this thesis aims simply highlighting the necessity of *social diversity* in the bazaars. This approach is based on the fact that in order to develop, cities need to attract, nurture and re-create resources of *talent* and *creativity* (Florida, Richard, 2005). Richard Florida is widely criticized

¹ See Chapter Two and Chapter Three.

because his idea of *the Creative Class* can potentially be interpreted in an elitist way and result in the exclusion of the *non-creative* groups.¹ Agreeing with Florida on the fact that cities need to create and re-create resources of *talent* and *creativity*, it is necessary to emphasize that an elitist approach is not meant here. Another point worth mentioning is that the capacity for tolerance in a city, of course, depends on its local social and cultural context and can change in time. Therefore, this is a topic that needs to be publically reflected on, on a regular basis.

In brief, this thesis argues that focusing on the potential of bazaars for becoming inclusive public places can be *an integrative governance strategy*. Approaching them as public places can be a contribution towards slowing down the *bazaar-city isolation process* in the post-modern cities. Reintegrating bazaars with cities is the only solution for preventing their functional and meaning crisis in the near future. To achieve this, we must have an empirical understanding of the socio-spatial fabric of a bazaar. We should know how it currently works as a public place.

The first four chapters of the present research show general patterns of physical structure, ownership types, functions, and norms of public life in the discussed bazaars.² In addition, the management framework, which controls the cities and bazaars in Iran and is relevant to all of the bazaars in the scope of this research, was described. In the next chapter, a method to study power relations between public and private actors and users that influence the bazaars of the Iranian commercial cities will be introduced. This method is developed based on the presented literature on the characters of the bazaars in Iranian commercial cities. However, since there can be differences in cultural and economic conditions in various cities, the presented method has to be modified to fit into the contextual conditions of a particular bazaar.

¹ For instance, see Jamie Peck (2005).

² Namely, the bazaars of Tehran, Isfahan, and Tabriz.

**Part Two: A Method for Understanding the Fabric of the
Bazaar as a Public Place**

Chapter 5: A Methodological Framework for Mapping the Publicity-Privacy Spectrum in the Iranian Bazaar, considering the influence of the *bazaar-city isolation process* on its *publicness*

As discussed in the previous chapters, merely physical boundaries cannot divide the public and private spaces in cities. Empirically speaking, the publicity and privacy of urban spaces form a continuum or spectrum of *publicity and privacy*. This chapter reflects on the examples of empirical research attempting to link physical and social components of public spaces¹. The works presented here are mainly examples of research on historic public spaces.

As discussed in Chapter Three, *openness, accessibility, and commonness* are the key concepts and criteria that shape the meaning of public space. The mapping method presented in this chapter approaches the concept of *publicness* within the Iranian bazaars based on these three core concepts. The aim of this chapter is to introduce a method that can be adjusted according to the cultural, spatial, and functional dimensions of the bazaars in the Iranian commercial cities. This section looks for a solution to break the criteria of publicness (*openness, accessibility, and commonness*) into factors that can be mapped in a bazaar. The suggested factors are; *use, physical accessibility, ownership, and the local culture of territory-defining*.

¹ Similar to the reviewed literature, the term *space* is used in this work to address general issues regarding public space. However, when referring to a specific *place*, such as the Tabriz Bazaar the term *place* is used (for more information see chapter Three, section 3.1. and also MIT, 2013 and Hayden, 1995). When the Iranian bazaar is referred to as a *public place*, its political and social background and its cultural meaning for its users is emphasized.

5.1. A Reflection on the Literature of *Publicness* Assessment Methods¹

Since the late twentieth century, schools of thought in architecture and urban planning have transformed from functionalism and formalism to more socially sensible approaches. Urban planning and regeneration movements such as the ‘*Sustainable City*,’ ‘*Right to the City*,’ ‘*Self-Made City*’ and ‘*Placemaking*’ rose to new heights, after and as a reaction, to modern urbanism². These movements commonly advocated the consideration of user needs in urban planning, as well as providing cities with lively welcoming public spaces for all.

Among the current urban planning approaches, the *Placemaking* approach deals more specifically with building or improving public spaces. As Peter Newman and Jeffrey Kenworthy (1999) and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT, 2013) state, academics and professionals, who believed in the necessity of changing the modernist planning approach began to advocate the improvement of street life in the cities. Such scholars and practitioners supported urban heritage conservation, and enhancement of the quality of urban public spaces by creating pedestrian-friendly cities rather than car-dominated ones (ibid.). In short, the aim was to give back the urban public spaces to the public. The idea behind *Placemaking* is that the community “makes” a “place” out of space. In this approach, “*the important transformation happens in the minds of the participants, not simply in the space itself*” (MIT, 2013, p. 3).

MIT’s 2013 publication on *Placemaking* gives an overview of this approach and its background. According to MIT, the movement started in the 1960s in the United States through the efforts of a group of urban thinkers such as Jane Jacobs (1961) and William Whyte (1980). In the *Placemaking* approach, the main message is to create places for the people and by the people, and the urban planner is viewed only as the adviser body. It advocates the fundamental right of citizens to the city and concerns issues such as healthy living by creating safe and fun public spaces. It also encourages the use of existing resources through urban heritage conservation (ibid. 2013).

The mentioned urban thinkers commonly believed that there is a correlation between the level of social, cultural, political, economic activity of a public space and the decline or improvement of its

¹ The literature reviewed in section 5-1 is partially published in; Yadollahi S. (2015) A reflection on methodological approaches to assessing and implementing social sustainability in historical public spaces, in: Albert, M (ed.), *Perceptions of Sustainable Development of Sustainability in Heritage Studies*, Berlin, De Gruyter, pp: 159-172.

² The twentieth century was the era of dominance of the modernist approach to urban planning, creating rationally structured, automobile-dominated urban spaces that were divided into areas such as business and residential zones. This top-down modernist urbanism resulted in environmental and social damages (Newman and Kenworthy, 1999).

maintenance and quality (Carmona et al., 2008). Therefore, to improve the quality of public space, they advocate planning for *inclusion* rather than *exclusion* of different groups of public members. Generally, the methods used in their works are based on asking public members about their experience in public spaces and observing their behavior in public spaces.

For example, in his book, *The Social Life of Small Urban Spaces*, William Whyte (1980) provided a detailed analysis of public life in plazas by observing what people do and by taking their interviews. His main data-collecting method was behavioral observation through time-lapse cameras. Whyte suggested some indicators noted in the most used and successful urban spaces in New York. For example, according to him, successful spaces provide more seating areas¹. These areas are made attractive with a mixture of activities such as food and retail shops, they are equipped with toilets and public infrastructures, and typically, more couples and women are observed in them. Finally, he mentions that the *triangulation* factors or catalysts of socializing people, such as artists and musicians, sculptures, and events improve the quality of public spaces². He also attempted to estimate the effective capacity of an urban space by asking the question “How many people are too many?” To answer this question, he suggests the average number of 60 people per 100 feet, in reference to seating areas (Whyte, 1980, p. 68). Comparing his findings in New York, with results of similar studies in Tokyo and Milan, he suggested that some of the mentioned factors, such as a mixture of activities, are universally similar in city centers.

Inspired by Whyte’s work based on observations and interviews, a group of professionals and researchers following the *Placemaking* approach have founded an international non-profit organization for helping communities to improve their public spaces. Founded by Fred Kent, a colleague of William Whyte in 1975, the Project for Public Space (PPS) organization has developed a set of indicators for assessing the capability of public spaces in hosting public life. The tools they use for this purpose are introduced in the official web page of Project for Public Spaces. They categorize their indicators under the four key attributes of “*sociability*,” “*uses and activity*,” “*access and linkage*,” and “*comfort and image*” (Project for Public Space, 2009). In this framework, the number of women, children and elderly people, identifiable social networks, volunteerism, evening use and street life in urban spaces indicate their *sociability*. To assess *uses and activity*, they study factors such as land-use patterns, property values, and rent levels. For *access and linkage*, they use indicators such as traffic data, pedestrian activities and parking usage patterns. Finally, for assessing *comfort and image*, they study crime statistics, sanitation rating of spaces, built and natural

¹About 10 percent of the whole open space designed for seating (Whyte, 1980, p.39).

²Of course, it should be noted that these catalysts are different in Iranian cities and bazaars. This will be discussed in the following chapters.

environmental data. For the purpose of this research, their experiences provide a broad range of indicators for identifying and assessing public spaces.

Danish architect Jan Gehl (1989; Gehl and Svarre, 2013) studied and practiced public space studies with a similar approach. For example, by conducting street life observations aiming to extend the pedestrian zones, he has studied how social change has led to changes in the patterns of use of public spaces in the historic center of Copenhagen. He sees public spaces as places for direct communication and cultural exchange. The city resembles a *party* in which he advocates the free enjoyment of all (Gehl, 1989).

In a European context, this perception of public space is usual. Kaschuba, Wolfgang (2004) explains the historical and epistemological background of the nature of contemporary public spaces in Europe. Starting from the political position of Jürgen Habermas on public space, he explains how European public spaces have transformed from political places for “*bürgerliche Öffentlichkeit*” or “citizen openness” to platforms for cultural representation of diverse groups and identities (Kaschuba, 2004, p-p. 41-43).

This perception and approach towards public space cannot be directly applied to the Iranian context¹. However, the observation techniques used in the international works are used in this research to monitor and understand behaviors of user groups in the Tabriz Bazaar and their choices and motivations.

The Copenhagen studies included several projects. One of them was the research project, which started in 1967, for studying public life in *Strøget*, a pedestrian street located in the historic center of Copenhagen. In the book, “How to Study Public Life,” Gehl and Svarre (2013) explained how, in this project, *Strøget* was used as an urban laboratory to observe the patterns in the use of public space. The observations aimed to document how the street functioned regularly, during certain days and events. Methods applied by Gehl are mainly based on behavioral observation of pedestrians. In this methodological framework, the researcher would trace the individual public space user or observe large groups of users, writing field notes and taking pictures to document the used routes, times, pleasures and problems (ibid2013).

During Gehl’s street studies, the relationship between the pedestrian flow, or the number of people per minute, and the activity level of the street, the number of people on 100 meters of the street, was studied to evaluate the changes in street life through the year. Naturally, the low flow of people shows that people are staying, moving slowly and talking, and this indicates a stronger possibility of

¹See Chapter Three and Chapter Four

social interaction. Gehl found out that during summer, cultural events and during the absence of automobiles, the studied place offers more possibility of social interaction (ibid., Gehl and Svarre, 2013). In his series of studies in Copenhagen, Gehl has also ascertained that there is a direct relationship between “*the physical qualities of public space and the volume and character of life there*” (Gehl, 1989, p. 15).

To understand where, how, and for how long the activities take place and who is involved in them, they use a broad range of observation techniques such as counting, tracking, looking for traces left by the users, photographing, using observation notes and making test walks (Gehl and Svarre, 2013). They also categorize activities in public spaces into “necessary” and “optional.” For them, activities such as “shopping, walking to and from a bus stop, or working as a parking enforcement attendant, police officer or postman” are necessary. For optional activities, they give examples such as “jogging, sitting to rest or read, or simply enjoying life while walking around or seated” (ibid.2013, p. 16).

The reviewed works are based on indicator-based methods supported by behavioral observations, interviews, and observations of the built environment. According to research questions and local conditions, data collection can be done using qualitative or quantitative techniques. In fact, when the research question is related to social life, triangulation¹ of data collected through different methods can develop a strong methodological framework.

As mentioned before, the discussed understanding of public space from a North-American and European point of view does not fit in the political and cultural conditions of public space in Iran. Yet, the reviewed works provide the knowledge, based on which we can develop a method to study and understand Iranian bazaars as public places.

5.2. Discussion: A Methodological Framework for Assessing *Publicness* in the Iranian Bazaar²

From an urban planning viewpoint, social dynamics are always understood in connection with particular locations. Therefore, providing a location-based understanding of the social, legal and economic status of an urban area (i.e., mapping them) forms the basis for understanding its *publicness*. Depending on the desired outcome and the scope of research, this mapping system can zoom in or out to cover different scales of the city. The discussion in this dissertation is focused on

¹Here, triangulation is used in a different meaning from the way Whyte uses it. Here it refers to comparing data collected by different methods to assure the accuracy of judgments.

² An extended summary of the discussions in section 5.2 are published in; (Yadollahi, Weidner, 2017). A brief explanation of the rationale of the applied method (including Table 5-1) is published in; (Yadollahi, Weidner and Nagler, 2017).

an urban district scale. In fact, this section presents a method for mapping the multi-layered fabric of a public place inside the historic bazaars.

As mentioned, understanding the *publicness* of a public place always involves the problem with the ambiguity of public-private boundaries from within. Due to the compound, overlapping forces that influence urban space use, physical boundaries cannot be drawn between public and private spaces. Therefore, in reality, the publicity and privacy of urban spaces are experienced as a continuum in which many “semi-public or semi-private spaces can be identified” (Madanipour, 2003, p. 210). To map the continuum or the spectrum of the publicity–privacy of a space, we have to convert the *publicness* qualities, mentioned in the previous chapter, into factors that can be defined and assigned to individual places. In other words, this section looks for a solution to break the criteria of openness, accessibility, and commonness into factors that can be mapped in a bazaar.

Ideas presented by scholars, such as Canter, David, and Habraken, John about the organization of the built environment takes us one step further. Approaching the phenomenon of a place from an architectural-psychological point of view, Canter (1977) explains it as a product of *conceptions, actions, and physical environment*. Similarly, Habraken (1998) argues that the built environment is organized by three types of order: *physical structure, control and territory, and common understanding*. With a view to being able to map the fabric of a public place, these dimensions were elaborated into measurable factors.

The soft (social) and hard (physical) structures that make up a public place are constructed by physical accessibility, legal control (enforced by ownership), the local *culture of territory-defining* and the current use of spaces of a bazaar. In other words, influences enforced by these four factors jointly define the levels of public and private control in a public space. These four factors help to compare *publicness* qualities, openness, accessibility, and commonness of different spaces and to map the differences. We can use them to define the position of each area in the spectrum of publicness–privacy in a public place (Figure 5-1).




Figure 5-1. The four factors, influencing the publicity and privacy of a space (Yadollahi).

Naturally, the types of use in spaces can attract different numbers and types of people. The structure of the physical space also influences the publicity–privacy situation by facilitating the control of access to space by various groups at different times of the day. In addition, to assess the commonness of spaces and the participation of actors in their use and control, their ownership status must be taken into account. Considering the factor of ownership ensures that the rights of private owners are respected when the *publicness* spectrum is mapped.

As explained before, the traditional management system in bazaars was mainly based on ownership, and the modern management system relies on a government-centered legal system. Chapter Seven will explain a major part of the conflicts between government authorities and *bazaaris*, for managing affairs inside the bazaar, are rooted in this change in the management system. Consideration of ownership within the mapping system assures that the rights of the bazaar community members will be respected as private owners.

The cultural norms that form the patterns of use and territorial definition, also shape the character of a public place. Before entering a more detailed discussion in this regard, the approach of this dissertation towards the concept of *culture* should be clarified. The term *culture* is employed from an anthropological point of view. According to Malinowski, Bronisław¹ “*Culture is a well-organized unity divided into two fundamental aspects—a body of artefacts and a system of customs.*”² (Prinz,

¹Polish anthropologist and ethnographer (1884–1942).

²Available from: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/culture-cogsci/>. [Accessed: 9.3. 2015].


2013). The term *culture*, in relation to a public space, refers to the patterns of use of spaces that have been developed and learned by a community through history. More precisely, *culture* is understood as the repeated and established patterns of relationships between people and places that can be studied through ethnographic research.

Therefore, what is referred to in this research, as the *culture of territory-defining*, is identified and explained by observing repeated and culturally established human behaviors such as sitting, resting, chatting, drinking tea and standing in the spaces studied. All activities indicating that a particular group considers a space safe and culturally appropriate to slow down from necessary activities, such as passing by or shopping, for having the above-mentioned optional activities, help to identify the territory definers and those who merely act based on the defined territories. The patterns of territorial definition need not to necessarily follow the patterns of ownership or physical form. As discussed below, these traditional territories may be defended, questioned or challenged by different user groups.

Taking into account the reviewed methods and indicators to study *publicness* qualities in public places, and the discussed characters of the Iranian bazaars, the diagram presented in Figure 5-2 shows the whole process of assessment of a bazaar as a public place, as well as the recommended data collection techniques for mapping the aforementioned four *publicness* factors in a bazaar.

The first step of this assessment is studying the influence of the *bazaar-city isolation process* on the *publicness* of a bazaar. Although the overall aspects of the *bazaar-city isolation process* can be observed in all bazaars within the focus of this research, the situation of a bazaar in each of the discussed aspects of isolation can be different. For example, a bazaar can be more affected by the isolation process in social aspects rather than physical aspects. Therefore, the isolation process of a bazaar should be studied based on its local conditions. The second step will be mapping the publicity-privacy spectrum of a bazaar.

Indicators for Assessing the Influence of the <i>Bazaar-City Isolation Process</i> on the <i>Publicness</i> in a Bazaar (or areas of a bazaar)	Recommended Techniques of Data Collection
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The current commercial position of the bazaar - Availability of public transportation - Permeability - Automobile traffic - Air pollution - Quality of the built environment in surrounding neighborhoods - Physical and visual barriers blocking the bazaar and its entrances - Pedestrian flow - Activity level - Diversity of offered goods and services in the old city and in the bazaar - Diversity of users in terms of age and gender, and social class comparing to other public spaces in the city (considering the official population statistics of the city) - Existence and of public infrastructures - Safety 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Literature review - Unstructured and semi-structured expert interviews - Observation of users (counting, serial photographing) - Observation of the built structure of the bazaar and its surrounding areas - Semi-structured interviews with regular publics and members of the bazaar community - Review of the urban management documents-maps



<u>Factors for Mapping Publicity-Privacy Spectrum of the Bazaar</u>	
<p><u>Physical Accessibility</u></p> <p>Through analyzing architectural typology of spaces based on the level of private control they facilitate</p> <p><u>Techniques of Data Collection:</u></p> <p>Photography, field sketches</p>	<p><u>Current Use</u></p> <p>Through mapping functional status of buildings</p> <p><u>Techniques of Data Collection:</u></p> <p>Field observation</p>
<p><u>Legal Status of Land Ownership and Control</u></p> <p>Through mapping legal status of buildings</p> <p><u>Techniques of Data Collection:</u></p> <p>Questionnaires or using existing legal documents</p>	<p><u>Territory-Defining Culture</u></p> <p>Through behavioral observations and interviews</p> <p><u>Techniques of Data Collection:</u></p> <p>Semi-structure Interviews, behavioral observation (serial and single photographing, recording traces of human activities, tracing), counting users</p>

Figure 5-2. Techniques of data collection for studying the situation of a bazaar (or certain areas in a bazaar) in the *bazaar-city isolation process* and mapping its publicity-privacy spectrum (Yadollahi).

As explained below, inserting the four factors defining public or private power levels into a matrix helps relate them to each other (Table 5-1 shows this matrix). The matrix has one row for each factor. The columns indicate the degrees of publicity–privacy that can be identified in an urban area.

The number of columns depends on the precision of the study and the identifiable categories of physical accessibility, use diversity, ownership types and the diversity of user groups. The precision of the study is, of course, a strategic decision that should be made according to the desired and practical outcome of a survey and the budget and time in hand. The number of categories or levels between publicity and privacy of spaces highly depends on the results of the qualitative empirical research in a particular bazaar.

Level of Public /Private Control Factors Defining Openness and Accessibility	The Spectrum of the Public-Private Control in the Studied Spaces				
	Public				Private
Physical Accessibility	Spaces providing the highest level public accessibility				Spaces designed to ensure maximum private control on accessibility
Current Use	Uses attracting the largest volume of users with the greatest social diversity				Functions that mainly involve owners or limited (filtered), users
Legal Status of Land Ownership and Control	Public – State ownership				Private and vaqf ¹ ownership
Culture of Territory Defining	Places in which the highest level of diversity of groups, engaging in optional activities is observed.				Places that are culturally considered as territories of certain groups or individuals

Table 5-1. The publicity–privacy spectrum matrix for Iranian bazaars (Yadollahi).

This matrix is a tool to understand the current levels of responsibility and rights of public and private actors in particular zones in the bazaar. It is not meant to show the desired state of publicity–privacy. It only reflects the current fabric of the public space in this regard. In the next chapter, this presented method is used to assess the *bazaar-city isolation process* of the Tabriz Bazaar and map its publicity–privacy spectrum.

¹ *Vaqf* (endowment) properties are inconsumable properties like buildings. *Vaqf* properties cannot be sold, and are not considered as private or public properties because they are supervised by the *Owqaf and Endowment Affairs Organization* (www.awqaf.ir/pages/showpage-397.aspx [Accessed: 26.7.2015]). The director of the *Owqaf* organization is elected by the supreme leader (www.awqaf.ir/pages/showpage-384.aspx [Accessed: 26.7.2015]). At least in Iran, regular public members have no legal right to manage these properties. Although they don't have a private owner, the OEAO acts very similar to a private owner. Therefore, in this matrix, *vaqf* is considered close to private ownership.

Part Three: The Case Study

Chapter 6: The Relationship of the Bazaar and the City of Tabriz: The Process of Multidimensional Isolation

In Chapter Two, an explanation of the *bazaar-city isolation process* within Iranian bazaars was presented. This chapter specifically describes this process in Tabriz. The Tabriz Bazaar is selected as the case study of this research because it is one of the most complete and less-damaged examples of the socio-spatial structure of the bazaars in the Iranian commercial cities (ICHHTO, 2009). Here, the political and economic, religious and cultural causes of the gradual process of isolation of the Tabriz Bazaar from the city are explained. This part also reflects on the physical and functional changes in the modern Tabriz. This process of change or the replacement of the old with the new is viewed as a normal procedure that must exist in a developing city. The interest of this chapter is to provide a foundation to discuss how we can reassemble the bazaar as a heritage of the old urban life in the city of today. Therefore, the purpose of this discussion is to problematize the position of the bazaar in the contemporary development of the Tabriz City.

6.1. The Bazaar-City Isolation Process in Tabriz; in the Context of Economic and Political Changes in the City

6.1.1. A Political and Economic Background of Tabriz and its Bazaar

Tabriz is the center of the East Azerbaijan province in Iran. From the south, Tabriz borders the *Sahand*¹ mountain range, and from the north, it borders the *Einali*² Mountain. The *Ajichai*³ River passes Tabriz from the north and northwest, and the *Mehran-Rud*⁴ River (*Quri Chai*) passes from its middle.

Due to its strategic importance, and the high possibility of earthquakes, Tabriz's history includes several disastrous historical points, which affected the city economically and politically. Discussing the detailed history of Tabriz is not in the scope of this dissertation. In this chapter, only those historical highlights will be mentioned that can help us to establish an understanding of Tabriz's overall political and commercial position in the region and country.

Being located in the mountainous area of Azerbaijan, which connects southern cities of Iran to the northern and western countries, Tabriz played a strategic role in commerce (Figure 6-1). In the 13th century, it became one of the most important commercial cities of Iran (ICHHTO, 2009). Tabriz was one of the cities along the main ancient military and trade routes of Iran (Pirnia and Afsar, 1991). As can be seen in Figure 6-2, and according to diaries of many travelers, such as Marco Polo and *Ibn Battuta* (a 14th-century traveler), Tabriz has been one of the connecting points along the silk roads (ICHHTO, 2009).

Due to the Iran-Ottoman Wars in the Azerbaijan region, in the 16th century, during the *Safavid* era, the economic development of Tabriz was interrupted. The city was attacked by Ottomans several times in the 16th and 17th centuries and was occupied by them between 1585 and 1603. Finally, the city was completely taken back by *Shah Abbas-e Safavi* in 1603 (Jonabadi, 1999, p. 768). In early 19th century, Tabriz became more peaceful, and the seat of crown prince under Qajar dynasty (Nader Mirza, 1994). Consequently, commerce grew again in the city. Due to its commercial importance, when the city was severely destroyed by the 1780 earthquake, the bazaar that was completely destroyed was reconstructed exactly at its previous setting and with its earlier structure (ICHHTO, 2009). This careful reconstruction shows the strategic and economic importance of the bazaar for

¹ In Persian: سه‌ند

² In Persian: عینعلی

³ In Persian: آجی چای

⁴ In Persian: مهران رود

the livelihood of the city and the region. This is the reason why the bazaar is considered an influential political actor within Iranian commercial cities.




Figure 6-1. The strategic geographical location of Tabriz. The base map: (Google Earth, 2014).




Figure 6-2. The ancient trade and military routes of Iran which exist today (Pirnia and Afsar, 1991, p. 18).

believed that this political approach towards Azerbaijan and especially Tabriz continues until today and affects the political and economic importance of the Tabriz Bazaar.¹

Nevertheless, in spite of the mentioned political challenges, in many ways, Tabriz has been a unique city in Iran. As a result of its historical commercial importance and its strategic location as the northwest gate of Iran, many innovative ideas and developments have appeared earlier in Tabriz, in comparison towards other Iranian cities, including Tehran. Therefore, Tabriz is known as the *City of the Firsts*; the first publishing house, the first book translated from English, the first illustrated children's book, the first school for the deaf, the first school for the blind, the first kindergarten, the first modern school, the first public library, the first cinema, the first telephone line, the first municipality and the first women's political association were created in Tabriz (The Municipality of Tabriz, 2015). Also, the city's leading role in the 1906 Constitutional Revolution made it politically outstanding among other large cities in Iran. Although after the Constitution events its political role decreased, Tabriz is still the prominent city of Azerbaijan, *the head of Iran*².




Figure 6-4. President Rohani at the House of Constitution in Tabriz, 21, May 2015 (Tasnim News Agency, 2015).

¹ The issue of the tendency for independence in Azerbaijan and Tabriz was also mentioned by two of the *bazaaris* I interviewed in the Tabriz Bazaar. Although they did not directly mention their opinion about it, they complained that the state makes less economic investments in Azerbaijan to prevent the region from becoming developed and powerful (see Appendix 2. b, interview number 2 and number 9).

² Due to its sensitive political history, and geographical location, many politicians such as the supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei have called Azerbaijan '*the head of Iran*.'

6.1.2. The Current Commercial Role of the Tabriz Bazaar in the City

In the 19th century, Tabriz was still one of the primary international carpet centers (Edwards, 1989). During the mid-20th century, coping with the impact of the growing Oil industry was beyond the economic and infrastructural potentials of Tabriz and many other commercial cities. As a natural consequence, Oil economy attracted investments to the south and affected the importance of Azerbaijan and the commercial cities in the north of Iran. The international trade connections in the Persian Gulf region and the centralization of political power in Tehran affected the international commerce in cities like Tabriz. However, Tabriz remains one of the significant exporters of carpet in Iran. The East Azerbaijan Province, with Tabriz as its capital, had a share of about “40 percent” of the entire carpet export amount in Iran in 2007 (Marsousi and Bagher Khani, 2011, p. 145).

After the US sanctions, the commercial relations of Iran, including carpet trade, with most of its international partners, was profoundly affected (Hudson, 2012). Most of the merchants and also customers that I interviewed in Tabriz mentioned the economic downfall after the *US Iran Sanctions Act of 1996* (U.S. Department of State, 2015). These sanctions included the limitation of international banking possibilities for Iran, which became tougher in 2010. After the election of President Rohani, and the *Lausanne- Switzerland* negotiations¹ in April 2015, new hopes appeared for the improvement of the international commercial relations. However, according to the US government, the agreement framework did not result in a significant relief in the existing sanctions (U.S. Department of Treasury, 2015).

Regardless of the status of Iran and Tabriz in the international commerce, the role of the old bazaar in current economics is shrinking remarkably. The old bazaar does not play a leading role in the current strategic plan for the city and its future economic development. For example, the foreseen location of the international carpet trade in Tabriz is not only the Tabriz Bazaar. In 2009, the Municipality of Tabriz and its partners from private sector launched the construction of the *World Trade Center of Iranian Carpet* in District 1 of Tabriz, in the northeastern area of the city (Tasnim News Agency, 2014). There is a similar project in the same district called, *Tabriz World Trade Center* (Figure 6-5). According to a local news agency that interviewed the mayor of District 1, seventy percent of the project was finished in May 2015 (Nasr News Agency, 2015).

The *Shahid Beheshti* Square, near the Blue Mosque, is another large commercial project in Tabriz (Figure 6-6). This project was launched to expand the business potentials of the city center.

¹ The negotiations between Iran, United States, and the P5 + 1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, coordinated by the European Union’s High Representative.

Regardless of its formal incompatibility with the old city and the pending status of activities in it¹, the important aspect of this project for our discussion is that it shows the intention of the urban management system for developing new commercial poles in areas that are relatively far from the old city center. This process of the replacement of the old with the new is, in fact, a normal process that must exist in a developing city. The point is how we reassemble the bazaar as a heritage of the old urban life and commerce in the new form of urban life and commerce in Tabriz. Therefore, the purpose of this discussion is to highlight the position of the bazaar in today's development of the Tabriz City.

The bazaar community is aware of the decreasing of the political and economic power of the traditional bazaar. Out of thirteen bazaar community members I interviewed, six had a pessimistic view of the current and future effectiveness of the Tabriz Bazaar on political and economic policies of the state. Pointing out that the bazaar does not have a leading political and economic role anymore, others believed that the Tabriz Bazaar, in connection with other large bazaars, namely the bazaars in Tehran and Isfahan, still have some influence on the economic and political changes in the country.




Figure 6-5. The location of the Tabriz Bazaar, the projects related to the future commercial development of the city (Base image: Google Earth, 2015).

¹As far as I observed in November 2014, the shops and offices have been vacant for a long time.



Figure 6-6. *Shahid Beheshti* Square and its hybrid large commercial complexes near the Blue Mosque, November 2014 (Yadollahi).

All in all, this natural process of replacement of the old with the new is gradually isolating the traditional bazaar from modern commerce. Modern commerce demands facilities that are beyond the infrastructures of the old bazaar. The bazaar has lost its old function of being a leading international trade center and the only commercial pole in Tabriz. Of course, the Tabriz Bazaar has not lost its importance completely, but the reviewed process of change in commercial and political roles of the urban districts of Tabriz shows a declining process for the bazaar.

6.2. The *Bazaar-City Isolation Process* in Tabriz in the Context of Social Geography of the City

For viewing social dimensions of public life in the bazaar, we first discuss the influence of the traditional character of the bazaar community and their religious orientations on the public life inside the bazaar. Second, the bazaar is viewed as a zone in the city that attracts or discourages certain social groups due to its location, the traditional attitude of the bazaar community, and the services offered in it. This section aims to explain the influence of these factors on the social diversity in the bazaar. For this purpose, the official demographic statistics of the city is briefly reviewed. Based on this general information about the inhabitants of the Tabriz City, we will be able to judge the state of social diversity, observed in the bazaar area.

With an area of 2167.2 Km², Tabriz is one of the largest commercial cities in Iran. The first language of Tabrizi people is Turkish, and their religion is mostly Shia Islam. In November 2011, the population of Tabriz was 1,695,094 (Azerbaijan Governorship, 2013). It can be said that Tabriz is a Turkish-speaking metropolis with historical roots in commerce and industry.

The 2011 surveys in Tabriz County show that 91 percent of the population (1545491 individuals) lived in urban areas (ibid). These statistics suggest that men are about 51.2 percent of the whole

population of Tabriz and make 89 percent of the workforce. According to 2011 statistics, men mostly work in independent jobs. Women who are about 11 percent of the labor force are usually government employees (Azerbaijan Governorship, 2013). The statistics of the job market in Tabriz is an example showing the traditional mentality regarding job market, public sphere, and gender issues discussed in previous chapters. As the traditional norms suggest, in general, it is better to keep women out of the public and professional sphere. However, governmental jobs are usually considered safer and less risky for women since the work environment at State organizations is controlled and managed based on Islamic values.

According to the city's Master Plan (Aban consultant engineers, 1995)¹, the population growth in Tabriz showed a decrease, while education conditions were improving. Naturally, this has caused the creation and growth of a young and educated middle-class population, half of which are women.

Regarding education and gender equality, the demographic surveys indicate that in the major Iranian cities like Tabriz, there is a tendency to escape the traditional limits. In 2011, 10.85 percent of the whole urban population in Tabriz had university degrees, and 6.39 percent of the residents were studying at universities (Azerbaijan Governorship, 2013). The mentioned document suggests that about 46.86 percent of college students were women. As one of the large cities of Iran, the pattern of education and gender issues follows the trends mentioned in Chapter Three. That is to say, in spite of the governmental gender restrictions in the recent decades, there is still a strong appeal from the women's side to have access to higher education.

The mentioned statistics show that the male and female percentages of the population of Tabriz are almost equal. Furthermore, although the education statistics do not precisely divide traditional and non-traditional groups in the population of Tabriz, they can show the tendency of Tabrizi women for getting out of the household and contributing to the activities in the public sphere. Obviously, like all metropolises, the population living in Tabriz is made of a blend of traditional and non-traditional social groups. The question is; why the mentioned gender and social class proportions of the city were not observed in the bazaar?² Is it because of the traditional character of the *bazaar* community or because of the services and goods offered in the bazaar? The following two sections discuss this issue.

¹ The third master plan for Tabriz is being prepared under the supervision of Municipality of Tabriz (2016), information (in Farsi) available at: : <http://tshs.tabriz.ir/News/322/> [Accessed: November 16th, 2016]

² See Chapter Seven.

6.2.1. The Influence of the Traditional and Religious Orientations of the Bazaar Community on the Commercial and Social Openness of the Tabriz Bazaar

In order to understand the impact of religious orientations of the *bazaari* community on the political, commercial, and everyday social relations of the Tabriz Bazaar with social groups, we should consider some historical facts.

Firstly, the diverse international partners of the merchants of the Tabriz Bazaar through history and the fact that it was a bazaar along the Silk Roads made them open to foreigners who had different ideologies. As documented by Khamachi (1997)¹, the Tabriz Bazaar was in ongoing commercial relationships with international business partners, such as Russian, German, and British companies. So, although the goods sold in a bazaar were provided for the local customers (who were mostly Muslims), the merchants did not consider religion a defining factor in selecting business partners.

Secondly, according to the documents archived in the Constitution House Museum of Tabriz², documents presented by Kasravi (2003) and Khamachi (1997), in the course of the constitutional movements, *bazaaris* had cooperation with both religious and secular forces. Furthermore, although this was not an ideologically accepted in Iran, women participated in the democratic movements in Tabriz in the form of independent civil society associations and armed forces³ (Kasravi, 2003; Khamachi, 1997). These historical facts show that the political orientations of Tabriz and the bazaar (which had a leading role in the movements for Nationalization of Oil and Constitutional Revolution) were not necessarily in favor of religion⁴.

Khamachi (1997) reports that before the Islamic Revolution, there were many Jewish merchants in the Tabriz Bazaar, but many of them gradually moved out of the bazaar after 1979. Nevertheless, Tabriz has shown a sympathy and tendency to cooperate with the Turkish ethnic group and to support their political and social interests. For instance, Khamachi (1997) mentions that in the last two centuries, the first significant political action of the Tabriz Bazaar against the State was demanding support from *Fath-Ali Shah*⁵ to protect the Azeris of Caucasus during the Iran-Russia Conflicts in 1813-1828 (1228-1243 AH). This ethnic solidarity exists still in the Tabriz Bazaar. In her

¹In his book he has collected trade documents of the Tabriz Bazaar with trade partners from cities such as Hamburg (p. 77- 80) and London (p.70).

²*Khaney-e Mashroutehy-e Tabriz*, خانه مشروطه تبریز, located in *Rasta Kuche* Street in the southwest of the Tabriz Bazaar.

³Such as Zeinab Pasha and her armed group who were active in the course of constitutional movements (Khamachi, 1997).

⁴Also explained in Chapter Two.

⁵In Persian: فتحعلیشاه

anthropological study in the Tabriz Bazaar, Asl-e Sarirai (2007) mentions the importance of the Turkish language in the social relations in the Tabriz Bazaar. During my fieldwork and interviews, I observed the same mentality in the Tabriz Bazaar¹.

As explained in Chapter Two, like other bazaars in Iran, in the Tabriz Bazaar has a tendency to express religion in daily public life. According to my interviews and observations, this religious orientation in the bazaar was not as strong as what Asl-e-Sarirai (2007) mentions in her work. In fact, as she suggests, her fieldwork shows that the traditional mentality of the bazaar is fading away. However, in conclusion, she appreciates the religious and traditional atmosphere of the bazaar. In general, we can say that although the phenomenon of religious display in public is still common in the bazaar, among the young members of the bazaar community, there are those who do not see any necessity in showing themselves as religious people. Smith (2004), Keshavarzian (2007), and Harris (2010) have observed a similar situation in the bazaars of Tehran and Isfahan.²

As the reviewed literature in this chapter and Chapter Two suggests, and as was observed during the fieldwork, in general, it can be said that for centuries, the bazaar community in Tabriz publically showed their Shia Islamic identity as an essential characteristic of the bazaar. It was also a tool used by the bazaar community for perusing its economic interests. However, it has not been a leading factor in bazaars' approach in choosing political and commercial partners.

Regarding its effect on the everyday life of the bazaar, we can say that the atmosphere of public life in the Tabriz Bazaar is still traditional and religious. The fieldwork results of this research show that the public life in the bazaar is more traditional than what is observed in the modern shopping areas of Tabriz. However, we should note that as the younger generation inherits the bazaar from the older generation, the bazaar community becomes less conservative. The interview results in the Tabriz Bazaar reveal that the bazaar community is willing to open up the bazaar to all potential customers and users, including the non-traditional young people.³

Here, there is a point that we should note, if we want to understand why social life in the bazaar is still traditional. The secular and tolerant approach of the bazaar community in dealing with business and political partners does not mean that they manage their everyday territory, or what they call '*under the roofs of the bazaar,*' with the same secular and tolerant manner. The bazaaris from the old generation still are among the wealthiest members of the bazaar community. Therefore, their influence on the everyday social norms in the bazaar is not deniable.

¹See appendix 2.

² See section 2.2.1.

³See appendix 2.

6.2.2. The Social Fabric of the City Center and the Bazaar of Tabriz

This section focuses on identifying the social groups who do and do not prefer working in and using the inner city and the bazaar.

Based on the detailed plan of Tabriz (Figure 6-7), industrial activities are located at the edges of the city, while the governmental services, major universities and commercial units are concentrated in the city center. The detailed plan suggests that 50 percent of the money exchange in Tabriz takes place at the city center, and most of the male residents of this area are involved with trade-related jobs such as retail, production, and transportation (Aban consultant engineers, 1995).¹ This affects the balance of residential and commercial activities in the district.

In the last decade, the area dedicated to commercial functions was about 1.3 times more than the residential area in central Tabriz (Esmaili Sangari, 2004, p. 43). A similar proportion of residential and commercial functions in the city center can be seen in the Detailed Plan of Tabriz. We should consider that this is the official number, which is less than the real number of commercial units in this district. The field observations, done by the author in March 2013 and the detailed plan of Tabriz city center by Naghshe-Jahan Pars (1998) suggests that many of the buildings that are officially registered as residential ones have mixed, workshop or storage use.

Due to the density of the commercial and governmental functions in the city center, which results in high automobile traffic, the district suffers from air pollution. As surveyed by Moharamnejad and others (2010), sixty-three percent of the air pollution in Tabriz is caused by the transportation sector and is mainly in the central city. This is one of the reasons for the social undesirability of the bazaar area². Some of the regular public members whom I interviewed also mentioned the air pollution and traffic jam problem as one of the reasons why they do not prefer to visit the Bazaar on a regular basis for shopping and public activities.

¹ We should consider that this information is valid for 1995. But, the recent Master Plan of the city shows that the commercial character of the city centre has not changed dramatically (The Municipality of Tabriz, 2011).

² This will be further discussed in Chapter Seven.

The density of commercial and administrative functions in this area chases away the residents or at least those residents who are financially able to choose their desired housing neighborhood. Based on prices announced by local real-estate agencies (Amlak 118, 2015), the expensive housing areas in Tabriz are in *Valiasr* and then *Abresan* neighborhoods, in the eastern part of the city. *Manzarriyeh* in the southwest is another neighborhood, which holds high-quality housing areas. All of these neighborhoods are out of the city center zone. This shows that the upper-middle class social groups live away from the central area. We should consider that the modern shopping centers and large commercial centers like the future World Trade Center of the city are located in these modern areas. As the map of the deteriorated urban districts¹ prepared by the Municipality of Tabriz (2011 b) shows, the mentioned wealthier districts located in District 1 and District 3 are mostly out of the deteriorated zones, (including District 8, with the bazaar at its center). The causes mentioned above have affected the social life of the inner city. Yet, the social diversity within the bazaar is even lower than other shopping areas located in the inner city.




Figure 6-8. Deteriorated areas (areas with low quality of the built environment) in urban districts of Tabriz (The Municipality of Tabriz, 2011 b).

¹ Old districts in which the quality of the built environment is low.

A study conducted by Mohammadzadeh (2009) shows the lower social attractiveness of the bazaar comparing to a shopping area adjacent to it. Mohammadzadeh has compared the *Tarbiat Street*¹ with the Tabriz Bazaar, in terms of social popularity. According to his comparative analysis, the old bazaar is less socially desirable than the *Tarbiat Street*. Mohammadzadeh argues that the undesirability of the bazaar is due to it not being physically and functionally integrated with its surrounding urban fabric (ibid). Mohammadzadeh’s research is one of the few works related to the social life in the Tabriz bazaar. Therefore, re-testing his results and triangulating them with the findings of this research can support this discussion.

The Tabriz Bazaar, especially in the southern areas of its central block is a crowded place. Through regular quantitative surveys and qualitative observations, the diversity of users who go to the bazaar and the *Tarbiat Street* was studied in this research (Figure 6-9). The results obtained from Tabriz Bazaar and Trbiat Street were compared. The *Tarbiat Street* was selected as an example to highlight the differences of the bazaar with a relatively modern shopping area at the city center.




Figure 6-9. Location of surveyed areas shown on the base map (MBTB archive, Tabriz).

¹The regeneration of the Tarbiat Street was one of the successful projects started in 1992 in Tabriz. The project facilitated the former automobile-dominated street (originally constructed in 1930's) for pedestrians use. This street has become one of the popular shopping areas in Tabriz.

- Results of the Surveys in March 2013:

<i>Gizbasdi Rasta</i> ¹				Safi Rasta				<i>Sadiqiyya Rasta</i>			
Time	User group	Users/ hour	percentage	Time	User group	User/ hour	percentage	Time	User group	User/ hour	percentage
14.3.2013 13:30- 14:30	M	555	90.26%	14.3.2013 14:23- 15:23	M	1050	79.07%	17.3.2013 14:00- 15:00	M	144	74.23%
	F	54	8.77%		F	252	18.97%		F	46	23.71%
	C	6	0.97%		C	26	1.96%		C	4	2.06%
	Tot.	616	-		Tot.	1328	-		Tot.	194	-
On Friday 14.03.2013 the <i>Gizbasdi</i> entrance from <i>Talebiyya</i> School was closed				16.3.2013 14:20- 15:20	M	1516	72.75%				
					F	524	25.14%				
					C	44	2.11%				
					Tot.	2084	-				

- Results of the Surveys in March, April, and November 2014:

<i>Gizbasdi Rasta</i>				<i>Safi Rasta</i>				<i>Sadiqiyya Rasta</i>			
Time	User group	Users/ hour	percentage	Time	User group	User/ hour	percentage	Time	User group	User/ hour	percentage
16.3.2014 14:15- 15:15	M	652	84.9%	16.3.2014 14:45- 15:45	M	1420	86.37%	16.3.2014 13:00- 14:00	M	444	90.24%
	F	104	13.54%		F	216	13.14%		F	48	9.76%
	C	12	1.56%		C	8	0.49%		C	0	0%
	Tot.	768	-		Tot.	1644	-		Tot.	492	-

<i>Gizbasdi Rasta</i>				<i>Safi Rasta</i>				<i>Sadiqiyya Rasta</i>			
Time	User group	Users/ hour	percentage	Time	User group	User/ hour	percentage	Time	User group	User/ hour	percentage
9.4.2014 13:25- 14:25	M	840	93.33%	9.4.2014 14:25- 15:25	M	1464	86.52%	9.4.2014 14:00- 15:00	M	1200	88.49%
	F	36	4%		W	192	11.34%		F	120	8.85 %
	C	24	2.67%		C	36	2.14%		C	36	2.66%
	Tot.	900	-		Tot.	1692	-		Tot.	1356	-

<i>Tarbiat Street</i> ²											
Time	User group	Users/ hour	percentage	Time	User group	User/ hour	percentage	Time	User group	User/ hour	percentage
7.4.2014 15:25- 16:25	M	1404	31.53%	9.4.2014 14:30- 15:30	M	552	32.16%	19.11.2014 16:00- 17:00	M	1316	30.04%
	F	2580	57.95%		F	1044	60.84%		F	2565	58.53%
	C	468	10.52%		C	120	7%		C	501	11.43%
	Tot.	4452	-		Tot.	1716	-		Tot.	4382	-

- Results of the Surveys in September 2015:

<i>Gizbasdi Rasta</i>				<i>Safi Rasta</i>				<i>Sadiqiyya Rasta</i>			
Time	User group	Users/ hour	percentage	Time	User group	User/ hour	percentage	Time	User group	User/ hour	percentage
22.9.2015 10:40- 11:40	M	730	94.19%	22.9.2015 13:40- 14:40	M	1152	86.42%	22.9.2015 11:45- 12:45	M	840	86.59%
	F	29	3.74%		W	156	11.70%		F	110	11.34 %
	C	16	2.06%		C	25	1.88%		C	20	2.07%
	Tot.	775	-		Tot.	1333	-		Tot.	970	-

Note:

* Observed user groups: M= Male, F=Female, C= Child (the appearance of the person shows the person is below the average age of adolescence)

* Tot= Total number of individuals observed.

* The figures have been obtained for the number of passenger per 10 minutes, and then were converted to passenger per 1 hour.

Table 6-1. Results of the quantitative population surveys in the Tabriz Bazaar and *Tarbiat* Street (Yadollahi).

¹ In the Turkish language, *rasta* is equal to the Persian word *rasteh*. Therefore, the *rastehs* in the Tabriz Bazaar are called *rasta*. Both terms refer to the pathways inside the bazaar.

² The quantitative survey in the *Tarbiat* Street was not repeated, because the data is backed up by literature such as Mohammadzadeh (2009) as well as qualitative observations.

As the figures in Table 6-1 show, although both shopping areas are in the inner city, the Tabriz Bazaar lags behind the *Tarbiat* Street in terms of attracting women and children. This issue was studied in this research also by a qualitative method. Serial photographs taken in the old bazaar were compared to similar pictures taken in the *Tarbiat* Street.

My Turkish background and familiarity with the culture and language of Tabriz influenced the choices of ethnographic techniques I used to identify the traditional and non-traditional user groups. The data was collected through observing and documenting the appearance¹ of people, their behavior, doing short interviews with public members, and listening to their conversations with each other. The field notes and serial photographs are also backed up by data collected through short open interviews. The interview guides can be seen in the Appendix 2.a.

The visual documentation of spaces through serial photographs makes possible to identify the social groups, interested in each shopping area. The categorizing of the users in traditional and non-traditional groups is based on analyzing the pictures, in terms of the appearance of users and triangulation of this data, with the interview and behavioral observation results. The serial pictures of the bazaar were taken every 10 seconds in the selected locations. The *Rasta Bazaar Jadid*, which is a cloth and textile retail area, was chosen because it attracts relatively more women due to the goods offered on it. The *Gizbasdi* entrance was also observed because it is connected to the grocery and carpet markets. The *Sadigiyya* entrance was observed because it is located in the northern area of the central bazaar. As will be discussed in the following pages, this area is, in general, less active than the southern parts.

Figures 6-10 to 6-12 are examples of the archived serial pictures. The pictures show that in comparison to the bazaar, more family groups go to the *Tarbiat* Street. Females observed in the bazaar were mostly in traditional clothing. In the *Tarbiat* Street, the traditional and non-traditional women were approximately equal in number. 12 women were interviewed in the *Tarbiat* Street during the four phases of the fieldwork. The interviews were in the form of relatively short, unstructured interviews. Six of the ten interviewees in the *Tarbiat* Street said they come to walk or window shop. This was not the case in the bazaar. All non-tourist women interviewed in the bazaar (except for a young Tabrizi photographer) said they come to bazaar only for shopping and will leave the bazaar just after they find the product they need. In general, the qualitative studies show that the Tabriz Bazaar attracts more traditional people, comparing to the *Tarbiat* Street. The average age rate, observed in the bazaar is higher than that of *Tarbiat* Street. In addition, the number of men is remarkably higher than the number of women in the bazaar.

¹ A short background on the dress types used by women in public spaces of Iran is presented in Chapter Three.



The Taza (Jadid) Rasta, Tabriz Bazaar, 16 March 2013, 12:10-12:11 PM (Yadollahi).



The Taza (Jadid) Rasta, Tabriz Bazaar, 17 March 2013, 12:10-12:11 PM, (Yadollahi).



The Tarbiat Street, 16 March 2013, 17:15-17:16 PM (Yadollahi).



The Tarbiat Street, 17 March 2013, 17:15-17:16 PM, (Yadollahi).

Figure 6-10. A qualitative comparative analysis of the Tabriz Bazaar and the *Tarbiat* Street, March 2013, (Yadollahi).



Taza (Jadid) Rasta, Tabriz Bazaar, 29 March 2014, 15:10-15:01 PM, (Yadollahi).



Gizbasdi Bazaar, Tabriz Bazaar, 19 November 2014, 14:00-14:01 PM, (Yadollahi).



Tarbiat Street, 29 March 2014, 16:00-16:01 PM, (Yadollahi).



Tarbiat Street, 19 November 2014, 16:30-16:31 PM, (Yadollahi).

Figure 6-11. A qualitative comparative analysis of the Tabriz Bazaar and the *Tarbiat* Street, March and November 2014, (Yadollahi).

Note: This time, the entrance of one of the largest carpet trade zones was observed and compared to the *Tarbiat* Street. The results were similar to the 2013 results.



Amir Bazaar (Gold bazaar), Tabriz Bazaar, 22 September 2015, 10:10-10:11 AM (Yadollahi).



Davachi Bazaar, Tabriz Bazaar-Northern area, 22 September 2015, 13:00-13:01 PM (Yadollahi).



Tarbiat Street, 22 September 2015, 17:10-17:11 PM (Yadollahi).

Figure 6-12. A qualitative comparative analysis of the Tabriz Bazaar and the *Tarbiat* Street, 22 September 2015, (Yadollahi).

Note: As seen in figures 6-10 to 6-12, in the *Tarbiyat* street is a shopping area for families (a mixture of men, women, and children). The population observed in the bazaar generally represents the older and more traditional social groups (see Chapter 3). The majority of the users of the bazaar are men.

The appearance of citizens and activities in areas with religious functions are commented on and controlled more strictly. For instance, at the *Gizbasdi Rasta's* entrance (R15) from the *Talibiyya* Seminary School (Sc5)¹ courtyard, there is a caution board, stating moral rules about the appearance and behavior of people (Figure 6-13).




Figure 6-13. A poster at the *Gizbasdi Rasta's* entrance from the *Talebiyeh* Seminary School courtyard, March 2013, (Yadollahi).

A staff member of the library stated that only men can use the *Jafariyya 'Public Library'* (Figure 16-13 and Figure 6-14). Of course, it is understandable that in religious spaces, such as seminary schools and mosques, users are divided according to gender. This example is mentioned to reveal the kind of interpretation and presentation of the term *public* in the Tabriz Bazaar. ICHHTO and other involved governmental managers tend to present the bazaar to the international and national visitors as a successful example of a public place. There is an attempt to trigger national pride and attract tourists by focusing on the positive social and architectural aspects of the bazaar (that certainly exist) and overlooking the everyday problematic realities of the public life in the bazaar. The documents prepared by the state organizations such as ICHHTO (2009) (in the World Heritage nomination of the bazaar)² present the bazaar as an active public space, and apply the term *public* in a general sense, especially in the case of open spaces, mosques, and schools.

By taking a closer look at the public life in the Tabriz Bazaar, this research follows a constructive purpose. I argue that presenting a beautiful and harmonious picture of the bazaar and overlooking or underestimating its real problems cannot offer a solution for improving its position in the developing city. Therefore, examples such as the mentioned non-public '*public library*' library are

¹ See Figure 7-2.

² For more examples see section 2.1.

given only to raise a basic question: *Who is typically considered as a public member in the Tabriz Bazaar?*



Figure 6-14. The *Jafariyya* Library¹. November 2014 (Yadollahi).

In general, as the reviewed documents and statistics suggest, normally residences of the inner city are citizens with lower economic status. They are the majority of the users of retail areas of the bazaar. In general, people who do not live in the central city go to this area only for necessary activities, such as going to governmental organizations and universities. As the interview results suggest, in general, young people who don't live in the city center prefer to go to recreational and shopping centers such as *Laleh Park* and several centers in the *Valiasr* neighborhood (Figures 6-15).




Figure 6-15. *Laleh Park* Shopping Center, Tabriz, November 2014 (S. Weidner).

¹ The *Jafariyya* Library is located adjacent to the *Talibiya* School (Sc5) in the Tabriz Bazaar.

As interview and observation results show, in comparison to modern shopping areas in the inner city, the level of social diversity in the bazaar is low in terms of age, gender, and social class. However, the bazaar is a good place for buying good-quality local grocery, handicrafts, and leather products. Other sorts of goods such as home appliances, clothing and cosmetics can be found in the bazaar with lower prices. However, such goods normally do not represent the best quality and the recent styles. Similarly, the gold and jewelry offered in the bazaar match the preferences of the traditional target groups.

All in all, as a result of the hectic and polluted environment surrounding the bazaar and the type of goods and prices offered in the bazaar, mainly the residents of the city center and the people from villages of the region are attracted to the bazaar. As the discussed comparative studies show, the bazaar lags behind the modern-style shopping areas, even located in the streets of the old city in terms of meeting the needs of diverse users. We should note that the old city, in general, lags behind the modern shopping areas in the new neighborhoods of the city, concerning social popularity.

In spite of the gradual change in the conservative approach of the bazaar community, the dominant traditional mentality of the bazaar still enforces a traditional character in it. This traditional atmosphere is in harmony with the majority of the users of the bazaar. Nevertheless, almost all the *bazaaris* interviewed were willing to open up the bazaar to wider groups of customers, including the so-called *new publics*¹. This can indicate the willingness of the bazaar community for revising the norms of public life in the bazaar.

¹ See Chapter Three.

6.3. The Bazaar-City Isolation Process in Tabriz in the Context of Urban Management, and Spatial - Functional Changes of the City

The historic area of Tabriz City is located at its center and occupies an area of around 241 hectares (Naghsh-e Jahan Pars consultant engineers, 1998). This district includes the area inside the former 18th-century city walls, called *Najafgholi Khan Barbican* with the bazaar at its center (Figure 6-16). These fortifications do not exist today. However, their traces are identifiable in the central urban fabric (ICHHTO, 2009, p. 62)¹.




Figure 6-16. The central geographical location of Tabriz Bazaar in the 18th-century city (Yadollahi). The map is prepared based on Google Earth, 2015 (the historical location of the city is marked, according to ICHHTO (2009, p. 294).

Note: The structure of the old city in maps and illustrations dating back to 18th and 19th centuries shows that Tabriz was formed along the main trade routes linking it to other commercial cities of Iran and the world.

According to the archaeological studies of Aminian and Omrani (2008), the central location of the bazaar in the city before urban modernization projects started in the 20th century and also historical narratives, suggest that the bazaar was formed gradually as a result of building *caravanserais* and

¹ The World Heritage nomination document (ICHHTO, 2009) uses the studies on the old Tabriz conducted by local staff of the *Management Base of the Tabriz Bazaar*, Aminian, Omarni and Farzaneh in 2008. The original document is available in the archive of the *Management Base of the Tabriz Bazaar*.

other commercial and public infrastructures along caravan routes (ICHHTO, 2009; Khamachi, 1997). The traces of these commercial routes can be clearly seen in the present structure of central Tabriz. This shows the strong influence of the bazaar centered trade in the city's structure before modernization (Figure 6-17). The bazaar area is about 29 ha (ICHHTO, 2009).




Figure 6-17. The strong influence of the location of the city gates on the city's structure in the 18th century. (Yadollahi). This map is prepared based on Google Earth, 2015 and ICHHTO studies on the historical evolution of the Tabriz Bazaar (ICHHTO, 2009, p.294).

The structure of the historic city of Tabriz actually shows the strategy of urban development in the period between the 13th and 20th centuries, in which the city had a strong commercial function. Since in this period commercial networks were based on ground routes, the city equipped itself for ground routes oriented regional and international trade. When the methods of transportation of information and goods started to change, the former physical structure of Tabriz was not relevant anymore within the modern economy. Naturally, the city had to adapt its physical structure in order

to use the new possibilities provided by automobiles, air transportation¹, telephone, and finally the internet. Figure 6-20 shows the development of the new street layout between 1925 and 2015. The following section will discuss the reactions of the bazaar with these physical changes, interacting with functional and economic changes in the central city area.

6.3.1. Reactions of the Tabriz Bazaar to the Development Projects, Launched by the Modern Urban Management System Since the 1920's

As explained in Chapter Two, bazaars are by nature bounded entities that constantly give input and receive feedback from their environment. Conceptually speaking, they are supposed to be developable urban complexes, managed mainly by the bazaar community. Therefore, bazaars can be understood as social and built entities that interact with cities at physical, economic, and social levels. In the course of modernization in Iranian cities, the notion of development and the bounded, integrated nature of bazaars turned into a contradictory relationship. This was because modernization at this time demanded rapid change, which was not in harmony with the continuous and gradual development patterns established in the bazaars. As discussed in Chapter Two, the bazaar lacked political and infrastructural facilities to adapt itself to the new commercial and social demands of the time.

One of the reasons why the bazaar lacked sufficient power to react to the urban development was that the modern urban government limited the bazaar community's power. A comparative analysis of the management system of the Tabriz Bazaar, before modernization of the urban governance in the 1920's with the current system, shows this shift in power.

This analysis is based on the reviewed literature on the history of urban management in Iran, the legal documents discussed in Chapter Two and Chapter Four, as well as the ownership map (Figure 7-38) prepared by the Management Base of the Tabriz Bazaar (MBTB). The low, medium and high levels are qualitatively defined based on the role of each actor in making decisions about changing the built structure and defining or changing the land use inside the bazaar. Based on their administrative role and patterns of using the public spaces in the Tabriz Bazaar, the actors involved in public life are categorized into three groups; the *bazaar community* (including the *bazaaris*, shopkeepers, vendors), the *governmental authorities*, and the *general public*.

Following the management structure explained in Chapter Four (Figure 4-17), the current administration system of the bazaar is established in the Management Base of the Tabriz Bazaar

¹Tabriz airport was constructed in 1950.

(MBTB). MBTB is a subsector of the Office for Bases Affairs under the ICHHTO Deputy of Cultural Heritage. According to the management plan of the Tabriz Bazaar, a steering committee, based in MBTB is responsible for policy-making and administration of the affairs related to the bazaar (ICHHTO, 2009). Members of this steering committee are representatives of The Islamic City Council of Tabriz (ICC), The Council of Guilds (CG), The Municipality (M), The Roads and Urban Development Organization (RUDO), The *Owqaf* Organization, The Steering Committees of Mosques in the bazaar (SCM), The Provincial Governor (PG), the head of ICHHTO, as well as professional counselors. In this administrative structure, the regular public has the chance to participate by selecting members of The Islamic City Council. For major policy-making issues, the bazaar community is involved in the decision-making process through their representative in the CG¹.

According to the 2010 interview that I conducted with Mr. Akbar Taghizadeh, the former head of *The Cultural Heritage Organization of Eastern Azerbaijan*, the bazaar community had a remarkable financial participation in the ICHHTO restoration projects from 1994 to 2005. As Mr. Hosein Esmaili Sangari, the current manager of MBTB (interviewed in March 2013) stated, financial participation of the bazaar community is limited to the private properties, and the government provides the budget for projects in public spaces. Although ICHHTO was successful in attracting the financial participation of the bazaar community, especially from 1994 to 2005, the bazaar community still believes that the administration system is *ICHHTO-centered*. The members of the Tabriz Bazaar community, whom I interviewed, mentioned (as also discussed in Chapter Four), that the notion of participation for governmental authorities is mostly limited to financial affairs. In general, interview results with members of the Tabriz Bazaar community suggested that since they are not involved in decisions made for major projects, which affect their properties, they prefer to avoid having conflicts or close cooperation with ICHHTO. In my conversations with them, I could assume that due to a lack of trust, they prefer to keep a distance from the governmental organizations in general.

As the Diagram 6-18 shows, although the former administrative system was authoritarian, the land ownership and the effectiveness of the actors in decision-making had a direct relationship. The new system is a different form of an authoritarian system. The difference is that in the new system, the majority of the owners (bazaari community) have less administrative power in comparison to the old regime. This explains the negative attitude of the interviewed bazaar community members towards MBTB and ICHHTO. So, we can say that after modernization and centralization of urban governance in Iran, *bazaaris* were legally limited to react to the modern urban development. The diagram also

¹ This description is based on the management structure of the bazaar, explained in its World Heritage nomination dossier (ICHHTO, 2009). My personal observations, as a former coworker in the ICHHTO, are used in some cases to explain the function of each element of the presented structure in reality.

shows that although the notion of the *public property* appeared after the Constitution, in both administration models, the decision-making effectiveness of the regular public remains the least.




Figure 6-18. Patterns of power relations of the key actors in the traditional and modern administrative systems of the Tabriz Bazaar¹ (Yadollahi).

Urban modernization projects under the Pahlavi regime, conducted between 1925 and the late 1970's, strongly influenced the large bazaars such as the Tabriz Bazaar. These projects mainly included construction of streets and expanding the city. The second major series of projects were conducted under the Islamic Republic and after the Iran-Iraq War. These regeneration projects were conducted when the international attention to historic cities as heritage was rising. It can be said that in general, the regeneration projects of this period focused on increasing the economic productivity of the city center. The following pages present a reflection on the reactions of the Tabriz Bazaar to these state-directed projects.

Modernization Projects from 1925 to the Late 1970's

During the first activities for urban modernization in Iran, traditional urban fabrics and bazaars were subjected to major deconstructions. Many bazaars were cut into several pieces by contemporary

¹ Note on the diagram: The two systems are compared based on the relation between the land ownership and the effectiveness of the actors in making functional and physical changes in the Tabriz Bazaar.

In the diagram showing the current management system; the percentages are based on ownership map prepared by the ICHHTO (See map 7-38, Chapter Seven). The power relations of the actors are based on legal texts regarding urban heritage management in Iran (see Chapter Two, section 2-2-4 and Chapter Four, section 4-3).

In the diagram showing the pre-modernization power relation patterns; the ownership information is based on comparing the current ownership map, interviews with Taghizadeh (see the appendix 2.c), and the reviewed literature on the use and control of public spaces in Iranian commercial cities (See chapter three, section 3-2-2 and Chapter Four, section 4-3-1).

streets. Unlike almost all Iranian bazaars, the Tabriz Bazaar was relatively successful to survive the urban modernization projects by insisting on maintaining its physical integrity.

*Ferdousi Street*¹ was one of the urban development projects in Tabriz between 1925 and 1932. It was designed to cut through the main body of the bazaar and divide it into two western and eastern pieces. According to statements of local ICHHTO experts² and an old merchant in Tabriz Bazaar, who was interviewed³ in the summer of 2009, the bazaar community opposed the construction of *Ferdousi Street*. Thus, the street construction was left unfinished. The aerial picture of the bazaar shows the outcome of this historical event (Figure 6-19).



Figure 6-19. The unfinished *Ferdousi Street*, constructed in 1928 (shown with the yellow line) cutting a part of the Tabriz Bazaar (The base map from MBTB archive, Tabriz).

Due to the political instability of Iran and also the World War II, central Tabriz, including the bazaar was not developed in terms of urban infrastructures during the mid-20th century. As Khamachi (1997) states, based on historical texts and documents, from 1941 to 1946, the Tabriz Bazaar was simply miserable. He mentions the remarkable area of vacant spaces in the bazaar, which had turned into shelters for street dogs.

When the political and economic conditions were improved after World War II, the urban government continued the development projects. At this time, the central city and the bazaar were viewed as problematic areas of the city, which should be destroyed and rebuilt. As Taghizadeh

¹ A street at the southern side of the main body of the Tabriz Bazaar (see Figure 6-20).

² I had personal discussions with the MBTB staff, Mr. Chatruz and Mr. Yazdani, in the course of preparing the UNESCO World Heritage nomination dossier of Tabriz Bazaar in 2009.

³ Personal interview (see Appendix 2, the data grid of all interviews with the bazaar community and the regular public).

(2010)¹ mentions, *Musa Maham*, the governor of East Azerbaijan Province in the late 1950's, wanted to destroy the bazaar due to the lack of public infrastructures and health problems that existed in the bazaar area. After *bazaaris* opposed his destruction plan, *Maham* was reluctantly convinced to cover the whole bazaar with a white facade.

Regarding the reaction of the Tabriz Bazaar to the *Ferdousi* Street project and *Maham's* decisions, we should consider that although it is the bazaar community that develops and maintains the physical bazaar, (as mentioned in Chapter Two) *bazaaris* traditionally tend to associate their identity with the physical location and even the architectural style of the bazaar. The *bazaaris*, interviewed by the author use the expression of "*under the roof of the bazaar*" to refer to the bazaar in terms of its functional, social and physical entity. So, we can say that by safeguarding the bazaar's physical structure, they actually wanted to protect the social structure that kept the bazaar alive.

This was how the central body of the bazaar survived the modernization wave of the 20th century. The economic productivity of the bazaar started to grow since the urban development projects provided new access lines around the bazaar. These streets changed the traditional, functional and economic order in the bazaar.

As explained before, traditionally, in Iranian bazaars there is a hierarchy of merchants and guilds². This hierarchy is reflected in the physical structure of bazaars. Normally, wealthier guilds and merchants are located in the areas of the bazaar that enjoy easier accessibility for attracting customers. In the traditional form of development in the bazaar, this economic-physical structure is formed gradually with the pace of urban development. The introduction of automobile access to certain areas of the Tabriz Bazaar happened in the short time span of less than ten years. This immediately affected the location of guilds in the Tabriz Bazaar and created a large gap between the economic productivity of different areas of the bazaar. Consequently, the inequality and gap in the bazaar community was also increased. In other words, the time of construction and the location of the new streets connected to the bazaar have a crucial impact on the dynamics of the bazaar, because the distance from these streets has created an economic competition among different areas of the bazaar.

Between 1925 and 1932, the southern area of today's bazaar enjoyed being connected to the *Shah Bakhti* Street (*Jomhuri* Street). Through *Shah Bakhti* Street, the Amir Bazaar area was connected to the *Pahlavi* Street, which was the only east-west access line of the whole city in that time. As a

¹As he stated at the beginning of the interview, he is originally from Tabriz and has talked with *bazaaris* who witnessed this events.

² See Chapter Two and Chapter Four, section 4-3-1.

result, more economically dynamic businesses, such as gold and carpet were attracted and settled down in these areas. Khamachi (1997) and Marsousi, Nafiseh (2011) also mention this movement of the guilds in the Tabriz Bazaar. Today, the Amir complex (mostly dedicated to gold trade) is located at the intersection of *Shah Bakhti* Street and Darai Street (today called *Shahid Madani* Street), which was constructed between 1956 and 1967¹. Large and high commercial complexes and shopping malls were built on the eastern side of the bazaar, alongside the *Darai* Street. As a result, the bazaar was visually and physically blocked on its eastern side. Today, the areas inside the bazaar in the east are not as wealthy as the southern areas.

As understood from the available aerial pictures, *Rasteh Kucheh* Street (Today's *Motahari* Street) was built in the period between 1956 and 1983. *Rasteh Kucheh* Street was adjacent to residential areas and not directly to the bazaar. Furthermore, when it was constructed, the guilds have already changed their locations in bazaar. In fact, it can be said that the residential block acted as the gap between the bazaar and *Rasteh Kucheh* Street. So, the street did not have a remarkable influence on the relocation of guilds in the western bazaar.

Later, in the framework of the *1995 Regeneration Projects*, the residential areas in the bazaar's western side were changed into commercial areas. These projects will be discussed more thoroughly in the coming pages. This residential fabric acted as a block, which reduced the bazaars accessibility to the western street. When its function was changed to commercial, it was rebuilt in the form of a large commercial box, again, limiting access to the bazaar. Naturally, this has affected the social and commercial functions of these parts of the bazaar.

The street in the northern area of the bazaar was constructed much later than the other three streets (after 1995). Since the historical bazaar bridges on the *Mehran-roud* River have been destroyed a long time before the construction of this street, the river also disconnected the northern and southern areas of the bazaar. This factor decreased the commercial value of the northern bazaar (*Saheb Abad* and *Davachi* or *Shotorbanareas*) (figures 6-20 and 6-21)².

¹ By comparing the aerial pictures of the city in these years, we can say that *Darai* Street was built in this period.

² For the location of the mentioned element, see Figure 7-2, B2.




Figure 6-20. The development of the new street layout in Tabriz between 1925 and 2015¹. Analysis done by Yadollahi is shown on the base map (MBTB archive, Tabriz).

¹ The information about the historic routes and location of the gates is according to: ICHHTO (2009, p. 294).




Figure 6-21. The modern streets that surrounded the bazaar before 1995 regeneration projects and the areas that limited the direct access of the bazaar to them. (Yadollahi, the source of the base map (MBTB archive, Tabriz).

Yet, we should consider that after the construction of the modern streets, the economic productivity of areas in the bazaar became dependent by being near to the main access lines. This change mainly

influenced the central body of bazaar. The other small parts were already disconnected from the main body of bazaar due to street constructions.

Regeneration Projects after 1995

In 1995, The *Detailed Plan of Historic-Cultural District of Tabriz*¹ began in District 8 of Tabriz. This Detailed Plan was aligned with the general principles of the city's master plan². The Municipality of Tabriz was the main administrative body to implement this plan. The local ICHHTO branch in Tabriz also participated in the management and decision-making in the historical district. It should be noted that the detailed plan borders for the historic-cultural district of Tabriz do not include the bazaar area. Management of the bazaar area is mainly the responsibility of ICHHTO. As mentioned in Chapter Two, also in case of Tabriz, the time difference and the difference between preparer bodies cause many management inconsistencies.

In the framework of the mentioned project, the Municipality launched sub-projects, which attempted to attract investments to the inner-city, by providing access lines and constructing large commercial complexes around the bazaar (Figure 6-22). ICHHTO cooperated with these projects under the title of *The Project for the Historical-Cultural Axis of Tabriz*. As S. Hosein Esmaili and Behrouz Omrani (2006) state, as a supporter of the mentioned larger project, this project aimed to promote cultural, touristic and recreational activities of the historical district of Tabriz. Esmaili (2004) points out problems such as air pollution, traffic jam, the large number of vacant spaces (20 percent of the old city), and the low quality of buildings (about 50 percent of the buildings are reported to be destructed) in the city center. He mostly suggests touristic, cultural and museum-related functions for the areas within the mentioned project (Esmaili, 2004, pp. 43–44).

¹ This master and detailed plan-based management system is a general model applied for all large cities in Iran. Urban development projects are defined and justified within the framework of this master plan system (see Chapter Two).

² Currently, it is being revised by the Municipality (according to the director of the *Management Base of the Tabriz Bazaar*).




Figure 6-22. Areas of the main regeneration projects after 1995. By Yadollahi, shown on the base map (MBTB archive, Tabriz).

As a part of the 1995 projects, the bridges of the Tabriz Bazaar, *Pol-Bazaar*, were rebuilt in order to reconnect its southern and northern areas. At the same time, the underground way, *Azadegan Boulevard*, and the *Sahib-ul Amr* commercial complex were constructed in the northern area of the bazaar (Figure 6-23).



Figure 6-23. The *Azadegan Boulevard*, November 2014 (Yadollahi).

The large complex of *Sahib-ul Amr*, on the edge of *Azadegan Boulevard*, was finalized on January 23, 2005. Until November 2014, when I visited the place, most of the shops of this complex were vacant (Figure 6-24). In the western area, along *Rasteh Kucheh Street*, the commercial complex called *Bazaar-e Mashrooteh*, is another large box, suffering from the lack of commercial activities. *Bazaar-e Mashrooteh* was constructed in the framework of The *Gharb-e Bazaar* (at the west of the bazaar) Regeneration Project (Figure 6-25). As explained previously, most of the shops in these commercial complexes have been vacant since the construction project was finished, especially in the *Sahib-ul Amr* complex. Both are blocking direct visual and physical access to the bazaar.




Figure 6-24. The *Sahib-ul Amr* complex. Top: 19 November 2014, 11:00, bottom: 22 September 2015, 10:30 (Yadollahi).



Figure 6-25. *Bazaar-e Mashrooteh*, November 2014, at 14.30, (Yadollahi).



Figure 6-26. Vacant shops (relatively new constructions) at the northern edge of the central body of the bazaar, left: March 2014, right; September 2015, (Yadollahi).

A *bazaari*, whom I interviewed on 17 March 2013, criticized the investment system in *Sahib-ul Amr* project. He argued that the government used public pathways for building the *Sahib-ul Amr* center¹. Therefore, this project is not legally and religiously fair. He added, most of the shops in the complex are not sold because of the conflicts between the owners and the investors from governmental and private sectors. According to him, the ownership of many of the shops in the complex was transferred to contractors, hired for the project, in return for their services. He believed, because these owners are not professional traders and merchants, they could not integrate their properties to the overall activities in the bazaar. In February 2014, I had an informal conversation with the person who was at that time in charge of selling the shops at his office in the complex. He also had the same point of view regarding the problem of the existence of several vacant units in the complex due to the unfamiliarity of the new owners. As both explained, the ownership is shared by a private developer company, the Municipality and several individual private owners who gained the shops in return for their contracts within the project. When I last visited this place in 2015, a large number of these shops were vacant (for more than 10 years) after the project was finalized.

Another project in the *Khaghani Block* that includes the *Karanei Khane Bazaar* (the grocery and vegetable market) was conducted in the southern bazaar. The strategy in this project was to rearrange the existing functions and spaces, with no substantial physical intervention. The *Khaghani Block* project is a good example of a successful plan, which has kept the area active and lively (Figure 6-27). The quality of the built structure of the bazaar in this area has also significantly improved since 2008, when I first visited the place.

¹ See Appendix 2.b, interview number 12.



Figure 6-27. The entrance of *Karaneikahna* from *Artesh-e Shomali* Street, November 2014, (Yadollahi).

In the framework of the 1995 Detailed Plan, a project was launched to regenerate the area around the Blue Mosque (Figure 6-28). This project is not finalized yet. Its main strategy is the promotion of cultural tourism functions within the area. This project is in progress and has foreseen museum and exhibition spaces in the area (Esmaili Sangari, 2004).



Figure 6-28. The *Masjed-e Kabud* (Blue Mosque) project, left; November 2014, right; September 2015, (Yadollahi).

The central bazaar, surrounded by four streets, is actually the main body of the bazaar. Other branches of the bazaar that were cut from its main body by modern streets are still active but do not enjoy the same economic productivity as the southern part of the bazaar's central body. These are; *Karanei Khana Bazaar (B6)*, *Kohna Bazar (B8)*, *Rahli Bazaar (B7)*, *Angaji Bazaar (B4)*, *ShishegarKhana (B5)*, and *Davachi Bazaar (B2)*¹.

¹ See Figure 7-2 and Figure 7-3.

Sorkhab Bazarche, which is a small cluster market located at the northeastern section of the Tabriz Bazaar, is considered to be a part of the Tabriz Bazaar in the World Heritage nomination file. This cluster bazaar does not have a function within the social, commercial and physical structure of the Tabriz Bazaar. Therefore it is not considered as a part of the bazaar in this dissertation. *Sorkhab Bazaarcheh* (B1) is currently under conservation and is not an active market at the moment (Figure 6-29).



Figure 6-29. *Sorkhab Bazaarcha* (B1), March 2013, (Yadollahi).

Looking at the current location of guilds in the Tabriz Bazaar¹, we can say that even after the construction of new access lines and streets around the bazaar, as well as the 1995 regeneration projects in the west and the north of the bazaar, the guild location pattern, which was formed in 1930's, did not change significantly. Today, two different zones can be identified in the Tabriz Bazaar; the wealthy southern zone and the poor northern area.

Putting the use map (Figure 7-37) and the pedestrian flow map² (Figure 6-29) of the bazaar together can help us to generally identify the location of the zones with low and high economic productivity (Figure 6-30).

¹ See the use zone map, Figure 7-37

² Prepared based on the March 2013 and November 2014 field work.




Figure 6-30. Pedestrian flow zones in Tabriz Bazaar. Fieldwork done by Yadollahi is shown on the base map (MBTB archive, Tabriz).




Figure 6-31. Estimation of the average economic prosperity zones in the Tabriz Bazaar, in relation to the access lines, after the 1995 regeneration projects.¹ Fieldwork done by Yadollahi is shown on the base map (MBTB archive, Tabriz).

¹ Economic activity levels are estimated (not precisely surveyed) based on the pedestrian flow and the economic importance of the guild zones such as gold, carpet, textile, clothing and food. Due to the lack of access to precise land price and economic productivity of each guild, this method was used to provide an overall understanding of the distribution of prosperity in different areas of the Tabriz Bazaar (See Figure 6-30

6.4. Discussion: The Historic City of Tabriz; Isolated, Shrinking Islands

The reactions of the bazaar to the described process of street construction and the construction of the surrounding commercial complexes influenced its spatial and functional balance. Although southern parts of the central bazaar are more active than the northern parts (on the north side of the *Mehran-roud* River), as explained in the previous chapters, the bazaar area in general lags behind the modern commercial and social activities in the city. We should consider that when discussing the *bazaar-city isolation process*, we are talking about a *process*. This process started as a result of the political, economic, social, and urban planning changes in the past century and continues until the present. Studying the morphological changes that happened in the urban fabric around the Tabriz Bazaar illustrates this process.

The morphological analysis presented in Figure 6-32 shows the influence of the introduction of the modern access system in the Tabriz city center. In this map, the area of the 18th Century city is analyzed to show the contemporary changes in the old fabric of the city. The documentation of the process of rebuilding and changes in the city blocks, and individual buildings from 1956 to 1983, and then to 2015, can explain that the process of modernization and reconstructions in the city, started from the street edges and gradually moved into the center of the urban blocks.

This process has influenced the balance in regards to the economic value of the lands within each urban block. Naturally, the areas at the edges of the access lines became more valuable, due to enjoying the opportunity of changing their function into commercial and economically productive uses. Areas within the deepest cores of the urban blocks declined in terms of economic value since they could not compete with the edges in terms of generating business and financial benefit.

The surveys conducted in Tabriz in the 1990's also mention this economic dynamics (*Naghsh-e Jahan Pars* consultant engineers, 1996). According to these surveys, the buildings and households adjacent to the streets gained higher economic value. Therefore, their residential functions were usually replaced with commercial related uses. As approaching the center of each block, the land price and quality of the built fabric go down. Consequently, at the central cores of the urban blocks, the residential buildings are used for storage space, as well as small production units and workshops. At the time of conducting these studies, among all these commercial uses, there were relatively few buildings with only residential function (*Naghsh-e Jahan Pars* consultant engineers, 1996). My field observations in 2015 show that this land-use pattern continues until today (Figure 6-33).

and Figure 7-37). Preparing a precise, economically-informed map that shows the current financial productivity of areas in the bazaar can be considered in further research on the Tabriz Bazaar.




Figure 6-32. The process of new constructions in the old city started from the edges of the new streets and moved inwards the blocks have created islands at the centers of each block that mostly remains from the historic urban fabric¹. Analysis is done by Yadollahi on the base map (MBTB archive, Tabriz).

¹ This map is based on aerial pictures of Tabriz in 1956 and 1983, and the Google Earth, 2015.

As can be seen in Figures 6-32 and 6-33, this construction process has gradually formed *islands* in the middle of each block. These *islands* are today at lower levels in terms of access, land-price, as well as built and infrastructural qualities. These islands became physically smaller in the course of the construction process. They have also shrank in terms of social and economic status. They are usually remained areas of the historic urban fabric. The assumption of the author is that if this process of isolation continues, it will lead to the disappearance of the islands, which means the disappearance of the residential parts of the historical fabric of Tabriz.



Figure 6-33. Examples of the areas at the center of the urban blocks around the Tabriz Bazaar. September 2015, (Yadollahi).¹

The bazaar is one of these isolated, shrinking islands. However, it is different from others in three ways; firstly, due to its (still) strong economic function and secondly because of its heritage status. The third reason is that the bazaar community is still active (in spite of the described limitations) and has been able to prevent further physical shrinking of the bazaar (see section 6.3.1).

Due to the attachment of the bazaar community to the bazaar (as a place that defines their identity), and the national heritage protection regulations², the main physical body of the Tabriz Bazaar was not replaced with new buildings. Nevertheless, the surrounding large commercial boxes, some of which lack social and commercial vitality, have impacted the social and commercial liveliness of the bazaar. Therefore, today the bazaar is in danger, in terms of losing its meaning and integrated function in the city.

¹ See Figure 6-32

² See section 4.3.2

Having reflected on the isolation process of the Tabriz Bazaar from the city, it should be noted that this dissertation discussed a *process* of isolation, which has started from the early 20th century and is still present today.¹ More precisely, the absolute isolation of the bazaar from the city has not happened. But, if the process goes on, as it has continued during the last century, then the bazaar will face a complete economic, social, physical and functional isolation from the city in future. This indicates that there is a high possibility that in the future, the existence of the bazaar as an integrated and active part of the city will no longer make sense. If this process continues, in the most optimistic way, the bazaar can retain its function, meaning, and value as a heritage monument, a tourist destination or as a lower-level retail and workshop center.

In other words, although the bazaar's physical wholeness and integrity are not facing a remarkable threat, the meaning and function of the bazaar are shrinking. The bazaar's meaning has been shrinking from a multifunctional commercial complex and a central public place to a center for second-class retail shops and workshops. What is shrinking is the *content*, not the *body*. The heritage protection system has paid attention to the preservation and restoration of the physical expressions of what a bazaar can be or should be. But, if the content or the meaning that defines what a bazaar should be fades away, we will lose the authentic bazaar. And once we lost it, re-making it seems impossible or very hard in the future.

Having the scope of this research in mind, we should note that the diversity of social groups for whom the bazaar has a meaning as a public place is also shrinking. As described earlier, the current functions in the bazaar mostly attract social groups, such as local people coming to buy affordable or low-quality goods or good-quality local groceries, students of shia seminary schools², villagers from the region, and of course, due to the heritage status of the site, tourists. Of course, these groups have the right to use the bazaar, but where are the others?

In this chapter, an overview of the demographic state of the Tabriz City was presented. The next chapter focuses on the fact that the population who use the Tabriz bazaar on a regular basis do not represent all layers of the demographic fabric of the city. The mapping method presented in the next chapter to study the publicity-privacy spectrum in the Tabriz Bazaar is presented in order to clarify the multi-layered factors, which are causing the shrinking of the meaning of the Tabriz Bazaar as a public place in the Tabriz City.

¹ The most important events that influenced the *bazaar-city isolation process*, in both negative and positive ways, in Tabriz are summarized in Appendix 4.

² Three important and active shia seminary schools are located in Tabriz Bazaar; *Talibiyya* School and *Haj Safar Ali* School for male and *Sadigiyya* School for female students of Islamic schools.

Chapter 7: The Current Fabric and Function of the Tabriz Bazaar as a Public Place

In Chapter Six, different dimensions of the *bazaar-city isolation process* in Tabriz were explained. It was argued that the meaning and function of the bazaar in the modern city is shrinking, while its physical structure is preserved. It was also discussed that in order to reintegrate the bazaars within the modern cities, urban conservation policies has to pay attention to both their content (meaning) and to their physical entity. Therefore, for surviving in future, bazaars need to welcome and tolerate diverse groups of users as potential investors. This chapter goes into a detailed explanation of levels of public and private power of controlling different spaces of the Tabriz Bazaar. The outcome is a map that shows the fabric of Tabriz Bazaar as a public place. Arguing that the governance and conservation of bazaars should approach them as public places, this chapter provides a method to facilitate public negotiation processes.

7.1. An Overview of the Current Public Life in the Tabriz Bazaar

When walking through the spaces of the Tabriz Bazaar, the experienced is a reminiscence of a maze, formed by interconnected opened and covered, public and private spaces, with a mixture of activities. In order to explain the fabric of the Tabriz Bazaar as a public place, it is necessary to understand and map the patterns that shape the structure in the physical spaces, as well as the public and private activities in the bazaar. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind the discussions of this dissertation on the meaning of public space in Iran and the structure of Iranian bazaars.

As concluded in Chapter, the publicness qualities of an urban space include; the tolerance for the presence of diverse social groups, the possibility of social *communication, equal openness, and accessibility*, as well as the *commonness* of its control and governance. It was also argued that in Iran, the way in which individuals perform their ideology and gender can limit or enhance openness and accessibility of public places for them. Because of the political and cultural sensitivity of their public behavior and appearance, the conditions are stricter for women, especially in places like bazaars where traditional norms are still dominant¹.



Figure 7-1. An aerial picture of the Tabriz Bazaar² (2005), the UNESCO World Heritage site's core zone is shown with the red color (Iranian Cartography Organization Archive, Tehran).

¹ See Chapter Three and Chapter Four.

² The bazaar area is about 29 ha (ICHHTO, 2009).

To identify and categorize users of the Tabriz Bazaar and their motivations for coming to the bazaar, regular qualitative observations were conducted in the four fieldwork phases¹. Table 7-1 shows the observed user groups, identified in the course of interviews and observations in the Tabriz Bazaar and in modern shopping areas in Tabriz such as *Laleh Park*, *Tarbiat Street*, and *Valiasr Street*. The *Laleh Park* and *Valiasr* shopping areas were visited occasionally. The differences of the bazaar and the modern shopping malls are clear. However, it was important to compare the bazaar with a modern shopping area within the historic city center. Therefore, in *Tarbiat Street*, a systematic fieldwork was conducted.

At the first stage of the fieldwork, the observations were only conducted inside the bazaar. In the first phase of observations, it was clear that the number of users with a traditional appearance² in the bazaar was remarkably higher than the modern middle-class groups. One can easily notice that the majority of goods offered in the bazaar are for the traditional target groups and those with a lower budget for shopping. Of course, food, carpet, handicrafts and leather products have wider target groups in the bazaar. In order to know where other people go for shopping, modern shopping areas in the city were observed to identify groups who are not interested in the bazaar as a shopping center.

The other eye-catching issue in the Tabriz Bazaar was the remarkably larger number of men compared to women and children. This was also a reason why quantitative surveys were also conducted in the *Tarbiat Street*. Table 6-1 shows the results of quantitative surveys, in the form of the percentage of male and female adults, as well as children in the Tabriz Bazaar and *Tarbiat Street*. These quantitative surveys are conducted to test and support the results of the qualitative observations (behavioral mapping and serial photographing³) as well as interviews.

Figures presented in Table 6-1 show that the percentage of male users in the Tabriz Bazaar was observed to be between around 72.75% and 94.19% of the total users, including women and children. It is noteworthy that the number of children using the bazaar in relation to adults did not go higher than 2.67% in the Tabriz Bazaar. In *Tarbiat Street* this figure was observed to be up to 11.43%.

In reference to the difference of *Tarbiat Street* and the Tabriz Bazaar, in terms of the diversity of age, gender, and social groups, it can be said that due to the balanced percentage of female, male

¹See the introduction chapter, section 1.2.

²An introduction about the cultural and political interpretations of the public appearance of the regular public (especially women) is given in Chapter Three.

³See Chapter Six, section 6.2.2.

and child users in *Tarbiat* Street, it is experienced as more of a family place. As we will explain further in this chapter, this quality was not observed in the Tabriz Bazaar.

Table 7-1 shows the observed user groups in the Tabriz Bazaar, their motivations for coming to the bazaar, and methods that were used for identifying and studying them. The following pages show a summary of the conducted observations in the Tabriz Bazaar. These pictures and descriptions are presented as an introduction to understand different spaces and functions in the Tabriz Bazaar. The analysis of the fabric of the bazaar as a public place is presented after this introduction.

In the following pages, the early presented pictures show spaces in which the highest public activities were observed. The level of public control gets lower as we approach the lastly presented spaces. The last pictures show the places with the lowest level of *publicness* which were observed in the bazaar. The level of public activities was assessed based on the diversity of regular user groups in each category of space. During the fieldwork, I was unable to have access to a few private, locked, and vacant spaces.




Figure 7-2. Key Map A: Spaces in the Tabriz Bazaar¹ (MBTB archive, Tabriz, and ICHHTO, 2009, Chapter Two).

¹ Names of spaces of the Tabriz Bazaar in this map and in this chapter are written in the Turkish language, since the sources of information are mainly prepared in Tabriz. In Azari, the words *timcheh*, *rasteh*, *bazarcheh* are pronounced; *timcha*, *rasta*, *bazarcha*.




Figure 7-3. Key Map B: Spaces in the Tabriz Bazaar (MBTB archive, Tabriz, and ICHHTO, 2009, Chapter Two)

Legend of figures 7-2 and 7-3 (MBTB archive; ICHHTO (2009) Chapter Two):

 **Sarā**

- S1 - Himmat-Ali
- S2 - Kishmish-chilar
- S3 - Nasriya (mahdia)
- S4 - Buyok-Shāzdā
- S5 - Bālā-Shāzdā
- S6 - Mirzā-Shafi
- S7 - Darabbāsi (Darb Abbāsi)
- S8 - Mirzā-Jalil
- S9 - Jafariya
- S10 - Kechachilar
- S11 - Iki-Gāpilār (Do Dari)
- S12 - Hāj-husen-Gadim
- S13 - Hāj-husen-Miyāni
- S14 - Taza-Hāj-Husen
- S15 - Mirzā-Abulhasan
- S16 - Mirzā-Mammad
- S17 - Hāj-Mammad-Quli
- S18 - Mirzā-Ismāyil
- S19 - Hāj-Ali-Akbar
- S20 - Gurjular
- S21 - Mirzā-Mehdi
- S22 - Umud
- S23 - Sāhib-Divān
- S24 - Ālmānli-lar
- S25 - Amir
- S26 - Sajjād

 **Timcha**

- T1 - Mirzā-Shafi
- T2 - Malik
- T3 - Hāj-Rahim
- T4 - kharazilar
- T5 - Mirzā-Abulhasan
- T6 - Muzaffariyya
- T7 - 1-inchi-Hāj-Sheykh
- T8 - 2-inchi-Hāj-Sheykh
- T9 - 3-unchu-Hāj-Sheykh
- T10 - Hāj-Safar-Ali
- T11 - Hāj-Mammad Quli
- T12 - Hāj-Taqi
- T13 - Boyuk-Sherbāflār
- T14 - Bālā-Sherbāflār
- T15 - BadamChilār
- T16 - Fath-Ali-Beyg
- T17 - Bālā-Sheykh-Kāzim
- T18 - Boyuk-Sheykh-Kāzim
- T19 - Amir-Shumāli
- T20 - Junubi Amir

 **Bāzārchā**

- B1 - Sorkhāb
- B2 - Davachi (Shotorbān)
- B3 - Yākhchāl
- B4 - Angāji
- B5 - Shishegar Khānā
- B6 - Karanei-Khānā
- B7 - Rahli
- B8 - Kohna (khiābān)

 **Chārsug**

- Ch1 - Sādiqiyya
- Ch2 - Butchular
- Ch3 - Talischilar
- Ch4 - Tāzā-Rāstā-Bāzāri

 **Rāstā**

- R1 - Misgar-lar
- R 2 - Gan-Dallazan
- R 3 - Yamanduz
- R 4 - Sādiqiyya
- R 5 - Dār-Dallazan
- R 6 - Tāzā-Rāstā-Bāzāri
- R 7 - Āināchilār
- R 8 - Butchu
- R 9 - Gadim-Rāstā-Bāzāri
- R10 - Talischilar
- R11 - sarājān
- R12 - Jumā-Machid
- R13 - Gand-chilar
- R14 - Bālā-Gand-chilar
- R15 - Gizbasdi
- R16 - Pānbikh-chilar
- R17 - Razavi
- R18 - Hāj-Ali-Akbar
- R19 - Huseyniyya
- R20 - Safi
- R21 - Safi-Rāstā-Bāzāri
- R22 - Najjār-lār
- R23 - Mabar-ul-ulamā
- R24 - Shahidi
- R25 - Bāshmākh-chilār
- R26 - Haram-Khānā
- R27 - Amir
- R28 - Amir-Bāzārinin-Dālisi
- R29 - Jāmbur-lar
- R30 - Bazzāz-lar

 **Dālān**

- D1 - Āgā
- D2 - Mirzā-Shafi
- D3 - Sharif-ul-ulamā
- D4 - Mirzā-Jalil
- D5 - Dabbāg-Khānā-Guzari
- D6 - Gāni
- D7 - Sāqatchilar
- D8 - Midqālchi
- D9 - Miyānā
- D10 - Qumpāni
- D11 - khān
- D12 - Mirzā-Abul-hasan
- D13 - Hāj-Sheykh
- D14 - Mirzā-Mammad
- D15 - Abāchi
- D16 - Jumā-Machi-Kuchasi
- D17 - Hāj-Ali-Akbar
- D18 - Sheyikh-Kāzim
- D19 - Birinji-Hāj-Abulqāsım
- D20 - ikınji-Hāj-Abulqāsım
- D21 - Hāshimiya
-  Meydāni [Square] (Me)
- ME1 -Sāhib-ul-Amr

 Pol-Bāzār [Bridg] (P)

P1&2 - Pol-Bāzār

 **House**

h1 - Koucha-Mishkiyan

 **Gate (G)**

G1 - Khyābān-Qāpisi

 **Mosque**

- M1 - Seyid-Alāgā
- M2 - Hasan-Pādishāh
- M3 - Siqqat-ul-Islām
- M4 - Hāj-Safar-Ali
- M5 - Sādiqiyya
- M6 - Molānā
- M7 - Dār-Dallazan
- M8 - Aharilar Mosque
- M9 - Qarā-bāqilar
- M10 - Bālā-Machid
- M11 - Khosroshāhi
- M12 - Hāj-Mammad-Quli
- M13 - Dinavary
- M14 - Bālā-Hujjat-ul-Islam
- M15 - Hujjat-ul-Islām
- M16 - Jumā-Machidi
- M17 - Khāloglu
- M18 - Ālchāq
- M19 - Ātmish-uch-Sutun
- M20 - Imām-Jumā
- M21 - Shahidi
- M22 - Khālkhālli
- M23 - Qizilli
- M24 - Mofid-āgā
- M25 - Shahid-Qāzi
- M26 - Mirzātagi-marhum
- M27 - Hāj-Rizā
- M28 - Kabud (Goi-Machid)

 **Mausoleum**

- Ma1 - Sāhib-ul-Amr
- Ma2 - Dort-Qabirlar
- Ma3 - Shahid-Qāzi

 **School**

- Sc1 - Hasan Pādishāh
- Sc2 - Akbariyya
- Sc3 - Sādiqiyya
- Sc4 - Hāj-Safar-Ali
- Sc5 - Tālibiya

 **Library**

- L1 - Kalkatachi
- L2 - Jafariyya
-  Zorkhānā [Gymnasium](Z)

Z1 - Garshāsb

 **Hammām (H)**

- H1 - Jahāngirkhān
- H2 - Mirzā-Mehdi
- H3 - Seyyid-Gulābi
- H4 - Qāzi
- H5 - Razavi

 **Yakhchāl [Ice Huose] (Y)**

Sādiqiyya

Observed Groups		Methods of Identification	Main Purpose for Coming to the Tabriz Bazaar	The Key Characteristics of the Groups
The Bazaar Community	Men	Semi-structured interviews, Various observation techniques <i>(explained in the text)</i>	Working	They are the majority of the bazaar community and are generally satisfied with the current openness and accessibility conditions in the bazaar.
	Women		Working	They are the minority group. They do not enjoy the same degree of openness and accessibility of the public spaces in the bazaar as their male colleagues. They are not easily observable in the bazaar as shopkeepers (only one example was observed in the Tabriz Bazaar). Normally, they are not seen by the other users because they usually work in workshops and offices on the second floors. Note: Only one female shopkeeper was interviewed during the fieldwork. Her brother and father who were also working in the same shop (a shop offering traditional goods for wedding ceremonies) said that she could work in the bazaar because she is supported by two male family members and her participation is needed in the family business, because most of customers are young women, shopping for their wedding.
	Children /Teenagers		Assisting the adults	They learn and inherit the business in the bazaar from their fathers or relatives (in most cases). Teenagers work in the bazaar in their free time, especially during the summer. According to my observations, they know the spaces in the bazaar very well and can freely and comfortably use public spaces.
The General Public	Men	-Various observation techniques <i>(explained in the text)</i> Note: <i>To identify female groups, cultural norms of clothing and behavioral norms followed by traditional and non-traditional women were also observed.</i>	Shopping from wholesale and retail stores, studying, socializing, site seeing	In addition to regular customers, many shopkeepers and vendors from Tabriz, villages and small cities near Tabriz come to the bazaar to provide goods for their small businesses outside the bazaar. Students and people who work in the seminary schools in the bazaar also belong to this group. Most of them are absolutely satisfied with openness and accessibility conditions in the bazaar's public spaces.
	Traditional Women		Retail shopping, studying	This group mostly includes local housewives, or women from cities and villages in the region, who come to the bazaar for shopping. They usually wear the <i>chador</i> (a full <i>hijab</i> , which covers all the body except hands and face). According to the interviews, they are generally satisfied with the accessibility and openness conditions. According to the observations, however, they prefer not to use restaurants, toilets, libraries, and benches, especially when they are alone. A few number of these women study at the seminary school in the <i>Sadigijya</i> complex in Tabriz Bazaar, which has an entrance at the outer side of the bazaar.
	Non-traditional Women	-Semi-structured and informal interviews Note: <i>Because the interview results did not generally differ in terms of openness and accessibility indicators for the male participants, men are studied under one general category.)</i>	Site seeing, educational purposes, wholesale shopping for their businesses outside the bazaar	They usually have a university education; their appearance is not traditional, they wear makeup, and use colorful clothes. Most of them do not wear the <i>chador</i> . Most of them are tourists and university students who come to the bazaar rarely. Some of them come to the bazaar to buy goods for their small businesses in the city. Except for grocery, carpet, and handicrafts, they think that the products offered in the bazaar do not have sufficient quality. They complained about cultural barriers that limit their access to public spaces in the bazaar. Some of them said they were sexually harassed in the bazaar. Some of them don't mind going to places in which they do not feel culturally welcomed.
	Children		Accompanying adults	In terms of openness and accessibility of the bazaar for them, we can say that the conditions for them depend on the conditions for the adults with whom they come to the bazaar. Due to the crowdedness of the bazaar, parents are concerned about safety issues regarding their children. This concern is one of the main causes of the low number of children in the bazaar.

Table 7-1. Key groups of the users of the Tabriz Bazaar as a public place (Yadollahi).

Note: Disabled and elderly public members are included in the above-mentioned groups. However, this research does not put a major focus on these groups. A detailed research in regards to levels of openness and accessibility of the spaces in the bazaar for them should be done.

Retail Areas that Attract Diverse Groups

These areas are the most crowded areas in the Tabriz Bazaar. The regular public does not usually sit in these areas. The retail areas near the main southern streets are usually rush-zones¹. Naturally, the crowdedness and the social groups who use these spaces change depending on their location in relation to the main streets and their function. The following pictures present examples of retail areas.




Figure 7-4. The Amir Bazaar (R27)², a center for gold and fine jewelry retail. The photography above, from left to the right: 14 September 2008 (12:00), 2 April 2009 (11:30), 15 March 2013 (13:00) (Yadollahi).

Note: Most of the customers in the Amir Bazaar are women. Something that was eye-catching here was that the style of jewelry was according to traditional taste. Finding modern style jewelry is very hard, if not impossible.



Figure 7-5. The *Taza Rasta Bazaar* (R6). The photography above, from left to right: 15 March 2013 (13:00), 17 March 2014 (13:00), 18 November 2014 (13:30) (Yadollahi).

Note: Textile, cloth, and cosmetic vendors are the major retail activities in the *Taza Rasta Bazaar*. People from villages and cities near Tabriz come here for yearly shopping and also for traditional wedding shopping. Owners of small businesses in the city also come here to do shopping for their businesses. The style of goods offered in this bazaar is mainly for the traditional target group.

¹ See Table 6-1 and Figure 6-30.

² See the key maps: Figure 7-2 and 7-3.




Figure 7-6. The *Gizbasdi Bazaar* (R15). The photography above, from left to right: 3 April 2009 (10:00), 2 August 2010 (11.30,), 16 March 2013 (10.30), 16 March 2014 (13.00) (Yadollahi).

Note: The *Gizbasdi Bazaar* is dedicated mainly carpet retail. Most of the customers are men having carpet businesses in Tabriz or other cities. Since buying carpet for personal use does not happen on a short-term basis, carpet markets are generally territories by merchants.



Figure 7-7. The *Sadigiyya Chahar Sug* (CH1) and two *rastehs* connected to it. The photography above, from left to right: 19 March 2013 (12.15) 8 April 2014 (10.00), 18 November 2014 (13:00) (Yadollahi).

Note: This area is used for a mixture of carpet-related wholesalers, workshop, and retail activities. This area is not as crowded and as wealthy as the *Muzeffariyya Bazaar* (T6) and the *Gizbasdi Bazaars* (R15). In terms of territory defining, it can be said that women and children can freely come here, but the spaces are mostly used by people who work here.



Figure 7-8. The *Karanei Khana* (B6). The photography above, from left to right: 4 April 2009 (11:00), 15 March 2013 (14:00), 19 November 2014 (13:00) (Yadollahi).

Note: This place has been cut from the main body of the bazaar by *Jomhuri Street* and is a vegetable market used by various groups of people on a daily basis.



Figure 7-9. The *Rahli Bazarcha* (B7). The photography above, from left to right: 4 April 2009 (10:00), 16 March 2013 (9:00), 19 November 2014 (11:00) (Yadollahi).

Note: This place is mainly used by carpet retailers. Some traditional jewelry workshops are also located here. Due to being relevantly far from the heart of the bazaar, this area is not as crowded and as wealthy as the carpet retail center in the southern area of the central bazaar.



Figure 7-10. The *Sahib-ul-Amr Square* (ME1). The photography above, from left to right: 15 September 2008 (10.30), 17 March 2013 (15:00), 18 November 2014 (14:30), (Yadollahi).

Note: This place has been the governmental square of the city in the 15th century and is used as the vegetable market today (ICHHTO, 2009, P.252). This area is used on a daily basis by different groups of people.



Figure 7-11. The *Pol-Bazaars* (P). The photography above, from left to right: 19 September 2008 (11.00), 15 March 2013 (12.15), 4 April 2014 (10:00), 18 November 2014 (14:15) and 22 September 2015 (Yadollahi).

Note: They were constructed in the framework of the 1995 regeneration projects. Most of the shops in them are vacant. The active ones are mainly used for grocery retail. They are the connections of the central bazaar with the northern areas, which are mostly vegetable and grocery markets. In general, *Pol-Bazaars* and northern areas are not as active as the food market in the central bazaar.



Figure 7-12. The *Pol-Bazaars* (P) and the *Mehran-roud* River. The photography above, from left to right: March 2013 and March 2014 (Yadollahi).

Note: The river sides were being prepared for public use during the fieldwork. So, this area has the potential to become a public place in the future.

Central Courtyards and Arcades Used for Slowing Down and Resting by Regular Public

Central courtyards and arcades are usually open spaces used for slowing down, sitting and resting. During lunchtime and during the post-lunch tea breaks, (between 12:00 and 14:30) they get more crowded. In terms of the diversity of social groups they attract, they are similar to retail areas. Female users use these areas remarkably less than male users. Normally, in these areas, the number of regular publics is equal or higher than people who work in the bazaar.



Figure 7-13. *Ferdousi* Street, the entrance of the *Shahidi* Bazaar (R24). The photography from above, from top left to bottom right 14 March 2013 (9:50), 20 March 2014 (13:00), and 22 September 2015 (13:30) (Yadollahi).

Note: This place is an open space created by the intersection of *Ferdousi* Street, which was constructed to cut across the bazaar (but was stopped) and the *Shahidi* bazaar. This space is more crowded during the lunch time (between 12:00 and 14:30). This intersection is a common location for street food stands and also vendors who usually sell clothes and belts. Most of the seating areas are typically used by men.



Figure 7-14. Amir Sara (S25). The photography above, location as stated: 24 September 2008 (top left and right) (11:00), 17 March 2013 (middle left) (15:00), 19 March 2014 (middle right and bottom left)(15:30 and 11:00), 18 November 2014 (14:30) (Yadollahi).

Note: This place is mainly dedicated to jewelry workshops and offices. Some carpet retailers are also located in the Amir Complex (the *sara* (S25), the two *timches* (T19 and T20) and the *rasta* (R27)). Although this *sara* is mainly a workplace area, because it is near to the main streets (*Jomhuri* and *Darai*), it is one of the most popular open spaces in the Tabriz Bazaar. People from different groups were observed sitting around the pond and standing near the green spaces. However, similar to most parts of the bazaar, women and children are the minority group here.

Publically Accessible Central Spaces: Mixed Wholesale, Storage, Retail Spaces, and Office Areas

Places categorized in this group are privately owned workplaces that are public-friendly due to their function and location. In most cases, retail and wholesale services can be found in such spaces. These areas are open to the public during the working hours (around 9:00-15:30). Their security is ensured by *odabashi*, a person hired by merchants to protect and keep the inventory of goods within the building (based on an interview with Akbar Taghizade).



Figure 7-15. The central space of the *Muzaffariyya Timcha* (T6). The photography above, from left to right: 26 September 2008, 15 March 2013 (Yadollahi).

Note: This place is used for working and sitting, mainly by those who work there. Carpet retail and commercial offices are located here, and it is open to the public during the working hours.




Figure 7-16. Examples of central spaces. The photography above, from top left to bottom right: *Amir Shomali Timcha* ((T19), 21 September 2008 (10:00), *Amir Jonubi Timcha* (T20) 15 March 2013 (13:30), *Malik Timcha* (T2), 15 March 2013 (11:00), *Haj Taqi Timcha* (T12), 18 March 2014 (11:00), *Mirza Mammad Dalan* (D14), 2 August 2010 (13.30), *Mirza Jalil Sara* (S8), 18 November 2014 (10:00), *Mirza Shafi Timcha* (T1), 18 November 2014 (14:00) (Yadollahi).

Corners and Spaces Used as Third Places¹ (Mostly by the People Who Work in the Bazaar)

In addition to the coffee houses that can be found all around the bazaar, transitional spaces, entrances, and in general, spaces that are formed by the gaps along the *rastehs* are filled with portable tea-corners. These tea-corners are usually used by the shopkeepers, merchants, and male customers. Tourists sometimes use these spaces. The following pictures show examples of third places in Tabriz Bazaar.



Figure 7-17. The entrance of the *Muzaffariyya Timcha* (T6). The photography above, from left to right: we (as tourists) are drinking tea at the northern entrance of *Muzaffariyya Timcha* on 18 November 2014, (12:30), (picture by Weidner), left, 14 March 2013 (14:00), right, 8 April 2014 (13:00) (Yadollahi).

Note: The corners are used as a space for sitting, chatting and drinking tea (mainly by men and particularly by members of bazaar community).

¹ The term is used to refer to informal socializing places, such as coffee houses, which provide a space between home and workplaces (Ray Oldenburg, 1989).



Figure 7-18. Bazaari community members are sitting in tea corners at entrances of the buildings. The photography above, from left to right: *Malik Timcha* (T2), 15 March 2013 (13:00) and *Haj Ali Akbar Dalan* (D17), 18 November 2014 (14:00) (Yadollahi).




Figure 7-19. Bazaari community members and customers, having tea at the *Shar Bafan Bazaar's* entrance (R10). The photography above, from left to right: 17 March 2013 (14:30), 19 March 2014 (15:00) (Yadollahi).



Figure 7-20. Teahouses of the Tabriz Bazaar. The photography above: left, a teahouse in *Yachchal Bazarcha* (B3), 12 September 2008 (14:00), right, a tea house in the *Davachi Rasta* (B2), 23 September 2008 (11:00), (Yadollahi).



Figure 7-21. Teahouses in the Tabriz Bazaar. Left, the teahouse (see Figure 7-20) in *Davachi Rasta* (B2), 18 November 2014 (15:00), right, a teahouse in the *Shahidi Bazaar* (R24) on 16 March 2013 (13:00) (Yadollahi).

Note: The author and two architecture students from Tehran decided to have tea in this coffee house, to experience *third places* that are usually only used by men.

Mosques in the Bazaar

There are 28 mosques inside or attached to the Tabriz Bazaar. All of the small mosques inside the bazaar are *vaqf* properties and usually financed by merchants (ICHHTO, 2009). Most of the mosques inside the Tabriz Bazaar complex are accessible to the public, but traditionally used by members of the bazaar community and male customers.

In March 2013, when I asked if women can enter the *Shahid Ghazi Mosque* (M25), the guardian said “of course!”, but one day later, when I asked if I can pray in the mosque, the same person told me “you can take pictures, but women do not pray here.” Due to this experience, I conducted a general survey covering almost all mosques of the Tabriz Bazaar on 22 of September 2015. All the guardians of the mosques that I was able to access were asked if women can pray in the mosque. The *Haj-Mammad-Gholi Mosque* (M12) was for men only. However, in mosques such as the *Seyid Alaga Mosque* (M1), the *Khosroshahi Mosque* (M11), *Dinavary Mosque* (M13), the *Molana Mosque* (M6) and the *Kalkhalli Mosque* (M22) there were temporary spaces of about 6-10 q² available for female prayers. These spaces are corners in the mosque, which can be divided by a curtain, in case a woman goes to the mosque.

The mosques inside the bazaar are usually built by the *bazaaris* to be used by the bazaar community. They are not similar to the larger mosques such as the *Jame’ Mosque* (M16) or other mosques in the city. Therefore, in the *publicness* assessment when assessing the factor of territory-defining culture,

mosques located inside the bazaar are considered within the category of spaces where more than 90% of the regular users are men.



Figure 7-22. The *Shahid Ghazi* Mosque (M25). The photography above: the top two photos of noon public payer, 17 March 2013 (13:00), bottom two pictures of people resting and chatting in the mosque after prayer 29 March 2014 (14:00) (Yadollahi).




Figure 7-23. Muslims praying in the *Shahidi* Mosque (left) (M21) (ICHHTO, 2009, P. 182) and the *Qizilli* Mosque (right) (M23) (ICHHTO, 2009, P183).




Figure 7-24. The above photography: The *Molana Mosque* (M6), 14 September 2008 (13:00), the *Molana Mosque*, 2 August 2010 (14:00), the *Atmishuchsutun Mosque* (M19) (bottom left and middle photos), 12 September 2008 (9:30), 18 November 2014 (14:00), the *Bala Machid Mosque* (M10) (bottom right photo) 18 November 2014 (14:30) (Yadollahi).



Figure 7-25. The *Goi-Machid* or *Masjed-e Kabud* or *Blue Mosque* (M28). The photography above, from left to right: 2009 (ICHHTO, 2009, P.186) 20 September 2008 (9:00), 18 November 2014 (9:30) (Yadollahi).

Note: This mosque was originally built in the 15th century (ICHHTO, 2009, P. 184). Today it is open for prayer, but mostly serves as a tourist attraction. In the UNESCO World Heritage nomination dossier, this building is considered to be a part of the Tabriz Bazaar since it is located at the end of *Kohna Bazarcha* (B8). However, it was originally built as a monumental mosque and was not built as a part of the bazaar or financed by the *bazari* community (ICHHTO, 2009). Therefore, in this dissertation, the Blue Mosque is not considered as a part of the bazaar. After the conservation activities, it was opened for prayer¹. The last picture shows the seminary school students having an ideological, religious discussion.

¹ For information about the conservation activities within the Blue Mosque, see ICHHTO, 2009, Chapter Five.

Non-Commercial Institutions (Schools, Libraries, and Museum)

Using the inner spaces of buildings, such as the seminary schools and the libraries is usually conditional to membership. Tourists and the regular public do not usually enter internal spaces of the buildings in the seminary schools (Sc1-5). The *Talibiyya* School (Sc5) in the southern part of the central bazaar is an exception. Its courtyard is used as a shortcut from *Rasteh Khucheh* Street to the entrance of the *Gizbasdi* Bazaar (R15). However, in its courtyard, there are posters and signs about public activities that might disturb the activities of the school. A student whom I interviewed also mentioned the problems they are facing, especially with women who have undesirable *hijab*. It should be noted that the strict rules are especially for Iranian women and not for tourists. As discussed in the last chapter, the library in the *Talibiyya* School (Sc5) is used only by men. Its members are usually students of the seminary schools in the bazaar and the residents of the neighborhoods near the bazaar. In the *Sadiqiyya* complex at the north of the central bazaar, there is a seminary school for women (Sc3). Entering the *Sadiqiyya* School is not usually possible. I was allowed to enter it only to take pictures from the courtyard and the mosque.




Figure 7-26. The courtyard of *Talibiyya* Seminary School (Sc5). The photography above, from top left to bottom right: top left, 23 September 2008 (14:00), top right and bottom left and middle, 15 March 2013, showing a political event in the *Jame'* Mosque, at 09:00 and 12:00, bottom right, 25 March 2014 (14:00) (Yadollahi).

Note: The school's courtyard connects the *Rasteh Kucheh* Street and *Gizbasdi* Bazaar's entrance (R15). The *Jame'* Mosque of Tabriz (M16) is also located in this area. Therefore, the courtyard of this school is more open in comparison to the other schools in the Tabriz Bazaar. It is noteworthy that this school is one of the most important seminary schools in Iran. The *Jame'* Mosque (M16) is sometimes used for political and religious events of the city.




Figure 7-27. The *Jafaryyya* library adjacent to the *Talibiyya* School (Sc5). The photography above, from left to right: ICHHTO, 2009, P. 193¹, 15 March 2013 (14:00), (Yadollahi), 18 March 2013 (14:00) (Yadollahi).

Note: This library is open to male users. The picture at the right side shows the space near the library, used as a bookstore and an internet café. This space is open to the public.



Figure 7-28. The *Sadigiyya* School (Sc3). The above photography, top: 15 September 2008 and bottom: 2 August 2010 (Yadollahi).

Note: This school is only for women. The students usually use the entrance located on the street, outside of the bazaar. The other entrance (inside the bazaar) was mostly closed during my fieldwork. The photography from above, the top photo is the entrance inside *Sadigiyya Rasta* (R4), the courtyard of the school, bottom, the entrance of the school, and outside and inside of the bazaar.

In spite of the disagreements of the ICHHTO, the Vaqf Organization destroyed the historic building of this school and constructed a new building at its place (Taghizadeh, 2010).




Figure 7-29. The *Saqqat-ai-islam* Mosque (M3) and *Sahib-ul-Amr* Mausoleum (Ma1), which is used partially as a Quran museum, (Yadollahi).

Note: The place is open to the public, but the entrance is controlled. The photograph above was taken on 12 September 2008 (Yadollahi).

¹ As I have observed, this space is not located in the *Jafaryyya* Library (L2) in the key map (Figure 7-2 and Figure 7-3). There must be a mistake in the World Heritage nomination file prepared by ICHHTO in 2009.

**Accessible Workplaces that are Not Culturally Open or Welcoming For All Public Members
(Workshops and Wholesale Areas)**

Most of the places in this category are physically accessible to everyone (although not all of them are accessible for the disabled), but due to their function, they are mainly used by the people who work in them. Naturally, their location can also influence their public openness. According to the conducted fieldwork between 2013 and 2015, more than 90% of the regular users of such spaces are men¹. Normally, the quality of buildings in such areas is not as good as the wealthier and more publicly open places. Courtyards of *saras* in the wholesale, storage and workshop zones, especially those spaces located in the northern areas of the bazaar are within this category.

ICHHTO has a scheduled plan to restore all buildings in the bazaar (ICHHTO, 2009, pp. 515-522). The built quality of spaces in the Tabriz Bazaar is continuously improving since 2008, and especially after the nomination of the bazaar for the inscription in the UNESCO World Heritage List. Due to the constantly changing and improving the state of the built structure, this research does not precisely focus on the relation of the quality of buildings and openness and accessibility in the bazaar.



Figure 7-30. The *Haj Husen Miyani Sara* (S13). The photography above: top (left and right) 14 March 2013 (15:30), bottom-left, 25 March 2014 (14:00) and bottom-right, 22 September 2015 (14:00), (Yadollahi).

Note: The *Haj Husen Miyani Sara* is used mainly by textile wholesalers. The central space is used for storing goods. Similar to the *Taza Haj Hossein Sara*, its central location makes it a shortcut. Here, one can usually find porters with their carrier wagons, resting and waiting for clients.

¹ See the field notes presented in Appendix 1.



Figure 7-31. The courtyard in the *Taza Haj Hossein Sara*. (S14) The photography above: top left 12 September 2008 (12:30), top right 15 March 2013 (15:00) two female architecture students are visiting the place, middle photography (left and right) 17 March 2014 (14:30), bottom (left and right): 22 September 2015 (11:00) (Yadollahi).

Note: The place is mainly used for storing textiles. It is mostly used by the people who work there. Due to its location at the center of the bazaar, porters rest here and wait for clients. In addition, it also is used by the customers as a short-cut. This makes it more publicly open, comparing to spaces with similar functional characteristics.



Figure 7-32. The *Haj Husen Gadim Sara* (S12). The photography above: top left on September 25, 2008 (12:30) (ICHHTO, 2009, p.446), top right and bottom left on 28 March 2014 (15:00), bottom right on 18 November 2014 (14:00) (Yadollahi).

Note: The *Haj Husen Gadim Sara* is also mainly a storage space. Therefore, like the other similar *saras*, it is traditionally a territory of porters, workers, and people who work in the bazaar.



Figure 7-33. The *Bala Shazda Sara* (S5). The photography above, from left to right: 14 September 2008 (12:30), 2 August 2010 (14:00), (Yadollahi)

Note: The place is occupied by workshops and storage rooms. It is mainly used by people who work there.



Figure 7-34. The *Mirza Mehdi Sara* (S21). The photography above is a textile and wholesale storage space, from left to right: 17 March 2013 (15:00), 29 March 2014 (15:00) (Yadollahi).

7.2. A Fourfold Method for Mapping the Publicity and Privacy Levels in the Tabriz Bazaar

In Chapter Five, based on discussions on the understanding of the Iranian bazaar and public space in Iran, a matrix¹ was suggested to define levels of publicity and privacy of spaces in bazaars. It was argued that the influence of the factors of physical accessibility, use, legal control (enforced by ownership) and the local *culture of territory-defining* creates a level of publicity or privacy in each space. Here, a spectrum of publicity–privacy in the Tabriz Bazaar is presented based on the mentioned method.²

7.2.1. Physical Accessibility

Following the conclusions of Chapter Four and Chapter Five, here, the physical accessibility levels are defined based on categorizing architectural solutions, making private control possible. In terms of physical accessibility, in the Tabriz Bazaar, five typologies of spaces were identified. These typologies are based on the number of openings, their size, the largeness of the area of privately controllable space and the number of controlled transitional spaces. These transitional spaces are designed in the form of narrow and short corridors with doors, usually with a slight height difference from the public pathway. The privately controllable buildings in the bazaar are not accessible to the public before and after the working hours (usually 9:00 - 16:00). Small areas (around 6-10 m²) such as *hojrehs*, where the access is controlled by closable doors are the most privately controllable spaces in the bazaar. Larger areas such as central spaces of *timches* and *saras*, in which access is physically controlled, are less privately controllable comparing to *hojrehs*.

The pathways and *rastehs* opened at both ends are considered the most physically accessible spaces, and shown with the code 5. Central spaces of buildings that are controlled by transition spaces and gates, but are accessible through more than two entrances are under the second category (code 4). Dead ends that are controlled by transitional spaces and gates are under category 3.

To code *hojrehs*, a few factors were considered. In the Tabriz Bazaar, there are two types of shops. In the small shops, there is space for the shopkeeper to sit and the customer cannot enter the shop, while in the larger shops there is enough space also for customers (Figure 7-35). However, the

¹ See Table 5-1.

² A summary of Chapter Seven (including the figures; 7-36, 7-37, 7-38, 7-40, and 7-41) is published in is published in; (Yadollahi, Weidner and Nagler, 2017).

The findings of section 7.2 and some parts in section 7.3.1 are published earlier in; (Yadollahi, Weidner, 2017).

regular and dominant user of *hojrehs*, shops, and offices are people who work there. Therefore, *hojrehs* are considered as spaces with the two lowest levels of public control.



Figure 7-35. On the left, a shopkeeper is having a nap in front of his small shop. The customers usually do not enter such *hojrehs*. The left photograph was taken in September 2008. On the right, a larger shop where customers can enter, March 2013 (Yadollahi).

Hojrehs along the open pathways are open and accessible to the public during the working hours. On the one hand, these *hojrehs* are less accessible than the central spaces in *saras* and *timches* because the controllable space in them is small in size (therefore, easier to be observed and controlled by the owner). In addition, their size decreases their capacity, and therefore, accessibility for a large number of people. On the other hand, their accessibility level is higher than the *hojrehs* that are located in the controlled buildings like *timches*. Therefore, *hojrehs* along the main *rastehs* (pathways) are categorized under the category shown with code 2. The spaces at the back of *hojrehs*, basements, as well as *hojrehs* in privately controlled buildings are considered the most private spaces in the bazaar. They are shown with code 1. Figure 7-36 shows the physical accessibility map of the Tabriz Bazaar.




Figure 7-36. Physical accessibility map, the Tabriz Bazaar. Fieldwork by Yadollahi is shown on the base map (MBTB archive, Tabriz).

7.2.2. Use

The term use is applied here as a factor that considers specific functions and their regular consequential activities in spaces of the Tabriz Bazaar. The Australia Burra Charter (2013, article one, paragraph 10) defines the term *use* as “*the functions of a place, including the activities and traditional and customary practices that may occur at the place or are dependent on the place.*”

In terms of use, for categorizing the spaces in the Tabriz Bazaar, both aspects of social diversity and crowdedness were considered. First, the capacity of each use-zone to attract diverse groups of public members; and second, the number (quantity) of users heading to these areas because of their specific function.

The outcome of this categorization actually shows to what extent each use-zone depends on the presence of the public users. Retail areas with short-term shopping potential that attract a high number and a wide range of public members are considered under category shown with code 5. These use-zones are related to mixed retail zones for grocery and vegetable. As mosques are generally regarded as public spaces, they are also categorized under code 5.¹

Code 4 shows the use zones mainly occupied with retail areas offering goods with yearly and monthly shopping potential. Code 3 indicates areas of gold and carpet workshops, storage spaces and offices, mixed with retail function. Due to the type of goods prepared, presented or stored in them, these areas are the clean workplaces and offices that are at the same time welcoming spaces for the public users. However, the merchants and their limited customers are the ones who are regularly involved in these spaces.

Code 2 shows the types of use that limit the users according to some sort of control, for instance, membership or the need for buying a ticket for entering, or other institutional rules. The seminary schools, libraries, and the museum are under this category.

Workshops, wholesale, and storage spaces that demand large space for storing goods and are noisy or visually undesirable belong to the category with the least potential for attracting public members. These areas are shown with code 1.

¹ The gender-related cultural norms in using the mosques inside the Tabriz Bazaar are taken into consideration in mapping the factor local culture of territory defining.




Figure 7-37. The Use-zones Map of the Tabriz Bazaar. Field work by Yadollahi is shown on the base map (MBTB archive, Tabriz).

7.2.3. Ownership

As explained in the previous chapters, the traditional management system in bazaars was strongly influenced by ownership. The fact that most of the commercial and religious buildings in the Tabriz Bazaar are named after the merchants and endowers, who founded and financed them, shows the traditional importance of the individual owners in the bazaar.

It was discussed in Chapter Four that the physical development and land use policies in the bazaars were mainly directed by the merchants and the guild leaders. Today, the management in the Tabriz Bazaar (and of course, other bazaars), is based on the discussed state-centered management system. As explained in Chapter Six, a major part of the conflicts between the government authorities and the bazaar community in the Tabriz Bazaar, about managing the affairs inside the bazaar, are rooted in this change in the management system. This was mentioned by most of the *bazaaris*, whom I interviewed, except for one of them who was very conservative when speaking about the State and the government.¹

In terms of *vaqf* properties, as explained in Chapter Five, these properties are inconsumable properties like buildings, which cannot be sold and are not considered as private or public properties. The Owqaf and Endowment Affairs Organization (OEAO) supervises all of the *vaqf* properties in the bazaars. The OEAO is under the supervision of one individual, who is elected by the Supreme Leader of Iran. In fact, the *vaqf* supervisor acts as the advocate of the endower to control and manage the property according to his or her statements in the *vaqf* document. Furthermore, the regular public members have no legal right in making physical and functional changes these properties. Thus, the level of control in them is considered the lowest level of public control, which is shown in code 1². Since the level of public control in the privately owned spaces is as low as *vaqf* properties, the private spaces are also shown with code 1. The State-owned properties or the public properties are indicated under code 5, in the publicity-privacy assessment matrix. Figure 7-38 is the ownership map, prepared by the ICHHTO. In general, the ownership factor defines the level of private legal control over the openness and accessibility of spaces for the public users.

Considering the governance-related application of this mapping system, including the factor of ownership in the publicity–privacy spectrum is necessary because as mentioned earlier, the private owners see public authority as a threat to their freedom in making decisions for their properties. Giving absolute freedom to owners to make radical changes in the UNESCO World Heritage site is

¹ see Appendix 2.B

² See Chapter Five, descriptions on Vaqf in Table 5-1

not the point that is being made here. After having discussed with *bazaaris* and the government authorities during the fieldwork, the argument in this dissertation is that balancing the power of actors in policy-making will give the management system the chance to protect heritage values of the bazaar as it develops.

Regarding the relevance of the factor of ownership to the *publicity-privacy assessment method* we can say that including it as one of the four defining factors can re-check state of the authority of governmental organization in the negotiation processes. For example, it can limit the ICHHTO control within the private domain of the bazaar and increase the influence of the owners in decision-making for such spaces. At the same time, it aims to highlight the need for increasing opportunity for regular public users to influence the spaces within the public domain of the bazaar. Naturally, to provide this opportunity, the influence of the State and private owners in such spaces has to be decreased.




Figure 7-38. Ownership Map, the Tabriz Bazaar (ICHHTO, 2009, p. 496- Fig. 444).

7.2.4. The Local *Territory-defining Culture*

In this section, the local culture is approached in an anthropological sense¹. More precisely, culture is understood as the repeated and established patterns of relationships between people and spaces.

The *culture of territory-defining* in the Tabriz Bazaar is identified and explained through an ethnographic research, by observing repeated and culturally established human behaviors such as sitting, resting, chatting, drinking tea and standing in the spaces of the bazaar. Recording activities indicating that a particular group considers a space safe and culturally appropriate to slow down from necessary activities such as passing by or shopping, for having the above-mentioned optional activities, helps to identify the territory definers and those who merely act based on the defined territories. This helps the researcher to be able to categorize the users of spaces, and the types of relations they have with the spaces they use. In short, the regularity and quality of activities within the spaces of the Tabriz Bazaar were observed and recorded on a regular basis². In the sample spaces, results of the qualitative and quantitative observations were recorded in the form of field notes and serial photographs.³

Territory-defining patterns that were observed in the Tabriz Bazaar resulted in categorizing the space into four groups. Naturally, territory defining patterns are influenced by the physical space and use. So, after collecting and categorizing the results of ethnographic research, the patterns of cultural behaviors of user groups showed a relation with the use and physical accessibility categories.

The most public areas should represent spaces with a relatively equal share of territories among all users. It can be said that this equal pattern of territory defining was not observed in the Tabriz Bazaar because it is mainly a private place and almost⁴ all of the shopkeepers and the bazaar community are men. The other factor is the time in which space is being occupied. Customers are, in general, temporary users and passengers, while *bazaaris* dwell for longer periods of time. The figures presented in Table 6-1 and pictures presented in section 7-1 show this pattern of territory defining in the bazaar. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter Two and Chapter Four, bazaars have historically developed a traditional cultural atmosphere. In such cultural contexts, women mainly belong to the private sphere and men to the public realm. Therefore, women usually use the public

¹ See Chapter Five, Section 5-2.

² I took 5383 photographs from the spaces in the Tabriz Bazaar between September 2008 and September 2015. The photographs that are not presented in this publication are archived based on the fieldwork date.

³ See Chapter Six and Appendix 1.

⁴ During the observations between 2013 and 2015, the author has witnessed only one female shopkeeper (see Table 7-1).

spaces only for the necessary activities. Therefore, as the presented fieldwork results and literature suggest, the traditional bazaar as a public place is dominated by male users.

Sitting or resting in open spaces of the bazaar is commonplace for men. In open spaces like Amir Sara (S25), members of the bazaar community and the customers (male and female) sit around the central fountain to rest. The areas near the entrances and around green spaces in the central courtyards are other areas used for slowing down, sitting or standing. Normally, members of the bazaar community use stored goods and most especially carpets as resting and seating areas.¹

In order to better understand the female use patterns in the Tabriz Bazaar, a two-phase technique was applied during the fieldwork. The first phase entails semi-structured interviews with the female users. In the second phase, the female users were followed and observed during their activities and routine in the bazaar in order to see how they actually use the spaces in the bazaar. Although many of the interviewed² women, particularly traditional women, said that they are satisfied with public facilities in the bazaar, research from the two-phase technique revealed that they did not use the public facilities for optional activities.

This was not the only sign showing and explaining this contradiction. Four of the female interviewees with traditional Islamic *hijab* pointed out that *they are comfortable in the bazaar because they have a proper hijab*. This can imply that those women without a “*proper hijab*” do not deserve to be comfortable.

However, female students, tourists, and the non-traditional women had many complaints, especially about the dominant masculine culture in the bazaar. Two of the female interviewees reported sexual harassment, stating that it is not usually from the bazaar community, but from male customers. Pointing out the traditional character of the bazaar, nine members of the bazaar community said that bazaar could not be a suitable workplace for women due to its masculine atmosphere³.

The lack of separate lavatories for women was observed in all areas of the bazaar. Although women can use men’s toilets, they prefer not to use toilets in the bazaar, especially those women who are more conservative.⁴ At 15:00, on March 17th, 2013, people using a public toilet in *Gizbasdi Rasta* (R15) were observed. Out of 39 users in 15 minutes, there were thirty-three men, four women, and

¹ See Section 7-1.

² See the interview data-grid in Appendix 2.b.

³ See Appendix 2.b.

⁴ Interview results also prove this finding.

two children. Counts were repeated at this location and in the same fashion as well as in the public toilet in the *Talebiyya School* (Sc5). The results were very similar¹.

Although the observation of bathrooms cannot precisely indicate the culture of public use of facilities in the Tabriz Bazaar, keeping them in mind together with other findings can certainly help to identify the territory-definers and the ones who adapt themselves to the defined territories.

The contradictions in interviews with the two different female groups, both traditional and non-traditional, as well as the contradictions in the results of interviewing and tracing traditional women are remarkable. These actually show that the traditional female users have decreased their expectations from the bazaar as a public place, to the level of what the current culture offers. However, the younger and non-traditional female users question the current traditional norms in the bazaar and ask for more rights.

Figure 7-39 shows an example of the behavioral mapping in the southern area of the central bazaar. In this area, gold, clothing, textile, house appliances, carpet retailers, and wholesalers are located. Since observations in March and April 2014 showed very similar results, the map prepared for March 15th, 2013 is presented as an example, which can be generalized to other similar times and similar spaces in the bazaar. Therefore, it can be said that map 7-39 shows regular activities, which are repeated on a daily basis during similar hours. This sample map includes observations in Amir Sara (S25), Mirza Mehdi Sara (S21), the entrance *Shahidi Rasta* (R24-25) from *Ferdousi Street*, and *Muzeffariyya Timcha* (T6).

Although the number of female customers in *rastehs* such as the *Amir Rasta* (R27) and *Taza (Jadid) Rasta* (R6) are relatively high, the behavioral patterns show that women are present in these spaces for shopping, which is a necessary activity. Since no space with an equal public territory-defying pattern was identified, in the bazaar the coding in this category starts from 4. In the publicity-privacy mapping matrix designed for the Tabriz Bazaar, code 5 is given to a shopping street, *Tarbiat Street*, which is located near the bazaar². *Tarbiat Street* was included in this map to provide a benchmark for measuring social diversity in the bazaar's public life.

¹ See Appendix 1.

² For detailed quantitative information about *Tarbiat Street* see Table 6-1 and for qualitative information see figures 6-10 to 6-12.




Figure 7-39. A result of the behavioral observation in sample spaces¹ in the southern area of the central bazaar, March 15th, 2013. Fieldwork by Yadollahi, shown on the base map (MBTB archive, Tabriz).

¹ See the pictures of these spaces: Fig. 7-13: The *Ferdousi Street - Shahidi Rasta* (R24), Fig. 7-14: The *Amir Sara*, Fig. 7-15: The *Muzeffariyya Timcha* (T6), Fig. 7-16: The *Jonubi Amir Timcha* (T20), and Fig. 7-34 The *Mirza Mehdi Sara* (S21).

The results of the research and discussions on gender issues, presented in this dissertation are reflected in the publicity-privacy map by considering this factor in preparing the *territory-defining culture* map. Including the gender factor for the case of the Tabriz Bazaar is due to the fieldwork results that showed a need for surveying gender-driven behaviors in the bazaar. For studying the publicity-privacy spectrum of other Iranian bazaars, other important factors might show up during the fieldwork. In a touristic city like Isfahan, for instance, tourists might have a greater influence on the culture of public life in the bazaar.

The levels, defined with codes, considered for categorizing the spaces in the Tabriz Bazaar is presented in the publicity–privacy spectrum matrix (Table 7-2). Code 5 indicates spaces in which a relatively equal mixture of people from different age, gender, and social groups is observed, engaging in optional activities such as sitting, drinking tea and chatting with others. In areas coded with the number 4, between 35 and 10 percent of the regular users who engage in optional activities are women and children. In the areas defined with code 3, less than 10 percent of the regular users were observed to be women and children. Normally, these are spaces for storing goods and places where porters rest. Mosques that are normally used by men also belong to this group¹. Seminary schools and other institutes that are managed by institutional rules and are mainly used by limited groups of users, according to membership or entrance payment, are coded with number 2. Workplaces and workshops that are clearly under the control of the owners and the staff are shown with code 1.

Map 7-40 shows the results of the observation of the territory-defining habits in the Tabriz Bazaar. The borders defined in *the territory-defining culture* map are mainly based on the spatial structure of the spaces in which territorial zones are defined by the users. It should be noted that through the change in the color shades, it is aimed to show zones under the strong or regular influence of particular user groups. Obviously, since this study is dealing with a cultural phenomenon, the boundaries, defining these zones cannot be absolutely rigid.

¹ See section 7-1, Mosques in the bazaar.




Figure 7-40. The local culture of territory-defining in the Tabriz Bazaar.¹ Field work by Yadollahi is shown on the base map (MBTB archive, Tabriz).

¹ The percentages mentioned in the legend represent the average numbers in the spaces of each category. The quantitative information is included only as a proof for the qualitative findings that play the main role in the conclusions. For detailed information see the discussions in Section 6.2.2 and Table 6-1.

7.2.5. The Publicity–Privacy Spectrum Matrix in the Tabriz Bazaar

In Chapter Four and Chapter Five, general levels of openness and accessibility in different spaces of a bazaar were introduced. In this chapter, the same logic and method are followed to map the Tabriz Bazaar. In other words, the presented method is adjusted according to the categories of spaces, identified in the Tabriz Bazaar.

Table 7-2 shows the matrix, designed to achieve a qualitative understanding of the current publicity–privacy spectrum in the Tabriz Bazaar. The interpretation of this matrix is based on the identification and behavioral studies of the groups involved in public life in the bazaar. The studied groups include the bazaar community (men, women, and children or teenagers) and the regular public (men, traditional women, non-traditional women, and children)¹.

The codes (1-5) in the matrix are indicators to compare spaces in terms of the levels of public or private control within them. These indicators do not represent quantitative values. The mapping system is designed in a way that the codes given to each of the four factors can indicate the level of the influence of that particular factor in the character of a space, in terms of publicity or privacy. The allocation of these codes to the factors is based on the local characteristics of the spaces in the Tabriz Bazaar, which were identified through the spatial-ethnographic research. This means that these codes represent categories of spaces, identified in the Tabriz Bazaar and can certainly change within a place with a different cultural, spatial and legal context.

Code 1 indicates the highest level of private control of a space assessed within the ownership, cultural *territory-defining*, use or physical conditions of a space or zone. Code 5 represents the highest level of public control that a space can have in the bazaar. The final row showing the levels of publicity–privacy, results from adding the indicators for each factor in the first column. The result reveals five zones in the bazaar, with their specific characteristics regarding publicity and privacy.

Scores of 17–20 represent spaces under zone 5, which are the most legally, culturally, physically and functionally open and accessible zones to everyone. Obviously, Zone 5 does not mean absolute openness and accessibility. Instead, it indicates the highest level of *publicness* within the Tabriz Bazaar, considering the current physical, legal, functional and cultural conditions. Similarly, spaces with an indicator score of 4–7 indicate the most private zones (zone 1) in the bazaar.

This matrix is a tool to understand the current levels of responsibility and rights of public and private actors in distinct zones in the bazaar and shows the current socio-spatial fabric of the public space in

¹ See table 7-1 for more detailed information about the groups.

this regard. However, this tool can be a basis for decision-making about the future (desired) fabric of the bazaar as a public place. Figure 7-41 illustrates the publicity-privacy spectrum in the Tabriz Bazaar.

Level of Public Control Factors Defining Openness and Accessibility	5 (Public)	4	3	2	1 (Private)
Physical Accessibility (Identified by the architectural typology of spaces, photography, and field sketches)	<i>rasteh</i>	central spaces in <i>saras</i> , caravanserais, <i>timches</i> , <i>dalans</i> , mosques with two and more controllable openings	central spaces in <i>saras</i> , caravanserais, <i>timches</i> , <i>dalans</i> and mosques with one controllable opening	<i>hojrehs</i> (small rooms used for various purposes) in open <i>rastehs</i>	<i>hojrehs</i> in privately controlled buildings
Current Use (identified by field notes)	retail with weekly and daily shopping potential and mosques	retail with yearly and monthly shopping potential	gold and carpet workshops, storage spaces and offices mixed with retail	non-commercial institutions (accepting individuals based on payment or membership)	workshops and storage spaces (noisy, requiring plenty of space)
Ownership (legal status of land ownership)	public (State ¹)	-	-	-	private and <i>vaqf</i> ownership ²
Culture of Territory-Defining (identified by interviews, tracing and counting)	a relatively equal mixture of people from different age and gender groups is observed	10–35% of regular users are women and children	less than 10% of regular users are women and children (these normally are spaces for storing goods and places where porters rest)	seminary schools and other institutes (used mainly by certain users)	used primarily by staff (workplaces and workshops)
Result: The level of publicity-privacy in each zone	17-20	16-14	13-11	10-8	7-4

Table 7-2. The publicity–privacy spectrum matrix in the Tabriz Bazaar (Yadollahi).³

¹ In this dissertation, the terms State and public are not used equivalently. In fact, the author is against the idea that the State necessarily speaks for the public, and therefore, is equal to the public. However, in terms of ownership (legal control over the so-called public properties), the decisions in such properties are theoretically and legally supposed to be taken with consideration of the interests of the general public, and the public has higher chances to influence decision-making processes in them.

² For explanation, see section 7.2.3 in this chapter and Chapter Five, descriptions on *vaqf* in Table 5-1.

³ This table is published earlier in (Yadollahi, Weidner, 2017).




Figure 7-41. The publicity-privacy spectrum in the Tabriz Bazaar. The results generated by Yadollahi are shown on the base map (MBTB archive, Tabriz).

7.3. Discussion: The Patterns of the Spatial Distribution of Public and Private Control Power in the Tabriz Bazaar

The five identified zones within the publicity-privacy spectrum of the Tabriz Bazaar are analyzed in this section, to discover patterns that explain the current fabric of the bazaar as a public place. These patterns reveal how the level of public or private power and influence in the *accessibility, use, ownership, and culture of territory-defining* of a zone makes the public life in it different from other zones. In fact, understanding these patterns helps us to explain the reasons why the bazaar is the kind of public place that we know today. The outcome of this analysis can also help us to illustrate the physical domains within the bazaar that are formally or informally under the influence or control of public and private¹ actors /users.

SWOT analysis

Using the findings of Chapter Six and the present chapter, a SWOT analysis is presented in this section in order to explain the interrelation between the current state of public or private control in each of the five zones of the bazaar and the bazaar-city isolation process in Tabriz. As explained in the introduction and will be discussed in Chapter Eight, the analysis specifically targets the problem of the centralized management system in the bazaar as a public place. The SWOT analysis also highlights the key characteristics and the roles of these zones in the overall fabric of the bazaar as a public place.

Throughout the presented analysis, there is a particular focus on the level of the public or private control in the zones. The appropriateness of this level is justified according to the role and character of spaces in the bazaar complex as a whole. The judgment is actually based on the dependency of a zone on the presence or involvement of the regular public, based on the kind of goods or services offered on it. For instance, according to their functions, pathways, retail areas, mosques or libraries highly rely on the presence and involvement of public users on a daily basis. However, storage areas or merchant offices have a lower dependency on the presence or participation of the regular public to perform their functions. This is mainly represented by the *use* factor in the mapping method.

¹ Vaqf and private ownership results in lower public influence in the spaces of the bazaar. In the course of the following discussion, instead of repeating the term *vaqf or private*, the term *private* is simply used in order to avoid long sentences. Therefore, when mentioning terms such as private actors, private domain, and private control in this chapter, I am referring to non-public actors, non-public domains, and a limited public control.

Zone 5: Main Connectors

Key Characteristics	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - They form the spine of the bazaar, which keeps the elements of the whole structure together and connects the bazaar to the city structure. - They are <i>rastehs</i> with both ends open (their physical accessibility level is between 5 and 4). - Their ownership status is Public (level 5). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The shops along these <i>rastehs</i> are normally shops with daily, weekly, and monthly shopping potential (the use factor level in them is between 5 and 1). So, they are mostly crowded <i>rastehs</i>. - A relatively equal mixture of people from different age and gender groups was observed on them. The level in the <i>culture of territory-defining</i> factor in them is mainly 4 and rarely 3.
The Current State of Functionality in the Overall Fabric of the Bazaar as a Public Place	
<p><u>Strengths:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - They are good connectors, due to their high accessibility. They connect the spaces inside the bazaar to each other and to the outside of the bazaar. - They are open during different hours of the day. - Comparing to other zones in the bazaar, a higher level of social diversity was observed in them (Ten percent to thirty-five percent of the regular users are children and women). 	<p><u>Weaknesses:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Their narrowness makes the access difficult for vehicles. - They are over-crowded¹. - There is a lack of infrastructures addressing the needs of children, women, and the elderly and disabled citizens (i.e., lack of toilets for women and the disabled, ramps, places for short-time staying or sitting, light during the evening). - The level of social diversity in them is low, comparing to other public places in the city. - Zone 5 areas are public properties. Therefore, there is a lack of clarity in their management, due to the following reasons;

¹ See Figure 6-30 and the interview data grid in Appendix 2.b.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Theoretically and legally, they are public properties. However, in reality, the public ownership of them results in a strong State control. - As the interview with the director of MBTB reveals; private owners do not show interest to participate in the maintenance of public properties. However, the bazaar community members who were interviewed expressed their concern for the maintenance of the public areas of the bazaar. They complained that the State authorities do not involve them in issues regarding the common spaces in the bazaar. Interventions of the State organizations often happen through a long administrative process and are financially limited¹. - Despite the ICHHTO's attempts to re-connect them visually, using architectural methods², there is a lack of interconnection between the ends of <i>rastehs</i>, connected to the modern streets.
<p><u>Opportunities:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Jomhuri</i> Street, which is one of the main streets of Tabriz with a strong connection to the overall transportation structure of the city, is connected to the Zone 5 network. - Metro of Tabriz, which has recently been opened to the public, has stations near the bazaar. This can reduce the traffic jam and air pollution in the bazaar area. - Zone 5 areas are adjacent to areas with high commercial productivity. 	<p><u>Threats:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Zone 5 areas are adjacent to highly active commercial streets, therefore, exposed to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Air pollution - Traffic jam - High volume of development and reconstruction pressure, especially before the UNESCO World Heritage inscription of the bazaar

¹ See Chapter Four, Appendix 2.b and Appendix 2.c.

² For instance, the construction of the *Pol-bazaars* (PI 1-2) and the conservation project in the *Shishegar Khana Bazaar* (B5).

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The Municipality is preparing the river area as a public open space. - Due to its World Heritage status, the bazaar enjoys special regulations for controlling the development in its core and buffer zones¹. This includes the protection of the visual accessibility of its entrances. - There is a high level of private (financial) participation in their adjacent private areas, which poses a positive effect on their regular maintenance (according to the interview with Mr. Taghizadeh)². 	
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Table 7-3. SWOT analysis of Zone 5 (Yadollahi).

¹ See Appendix 5.

² See appendix 2.c.

Zone 4: Secondary Connectors

Key Characteristics	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - They are pathways or spaces with two or more privately controllable openings (their physical accessibility level is between 5 and 3). - They can have public or private ownership. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - They connect spaces in which the public presence play a major role in the continuity of their uses (the use factor level in them is between 4 and 2). - The level of the <i>culture of territory-defining</i> in them is between 3 and 4.
The Current State of Functionality in the Overall Fabric of the Bazaar as a Public Place	
<p><u>Strengths:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - They are transitional spaces between some of the Zone 5 areas and other zones. - The pedestrian flow is relatively slow in them¹. They are not considered as rush zones. - They enjoy medium to high level of accessibility. - The level of private control in them is medium to low, which makes the chances for public participation higher in them, comparing to the Zone 3 spaces. - Usually, adjacent spaces to these areas are <i>vaqf</i> or private properties and have a mixture of working spaces and shops. So, if a <i>dalan</i> or a dead-end is located in Zone 4, it means that commercially, it is functioning well and enjoys the presence of 	<p><u>Weaknesses:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Their narrowness makes them not easily accessible for vehicles. - A lack of infrastructures, addressing the needs of social groups including children, women and disabled users is observed in them. - Taking their connective function and the type of shops along them into consideration, the level of social diversity is relatively low in them (especially in the northern areas of the bazaar). This lack of cultural openness chases away potential female and children users. - Lack of involvement of the regular public in the management process of the public properties, which is a general problem in the urban planning system in Iran,¹ is observed in the Tabriz Bazaar.

¹ See Figure 6-30.

¹ See chapter four, section 4.3.2 and Chapter Six, section 6.3.1.

<p>enough number of daily customers. On the other hand, it is not too crowded or too empty.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The slowness of pedestrian flow and the medium level of crowdedness¹ in them creates the opportunity of designing spaces for short stays near Zone 4 areas. 	
<p><u>Opportunities:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - They are adjacent to spaces with yearly and monthly shopping potential. In the southwest and central parts of the bazaar, the offered products in them are carpet, textile, and cloth, which attract a high number of female customers. The economic dependence of these areas on female users can be a motivation for investing on infrastructures to create clean and safe shopping areas with a slow pedestrian flow and an appropriate level of crowdedness³. 	<p><u>Threats:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In the northern areas, these spaces are blocked by high buildings or alleys with low accessibility. This limits the commercial attractiveness of spaces adjacent to the areas in Zone 4. - Zone 4 areas in the northern half of the central bazaar are adjacent to storage spaces, workshops, and vacant spaces that affect their commercial and social attractiveness⁴.

Table 7-4. SWOT analysis of Zone 4 (Yadollahi).

¹ See Figure 6-30.

³ For example, Whyte (1980, p. 68) suggests that the average number of “60 people per 100 feet” is appropriate. The appropriate density of crowd in spaces of the Tabriz bazaar was not studied in this dissertation. Depending on the physical conditions and the function of spaces, quantitative indicators can be developed to assess and identify the current and desired levels of density of crowd in the spaces.

⁴ See figures 6-21 to 6-26.

Zone 3: Orange Zones- Highly Accessible Spaces Fostering the Presence of Public Users

Key characteristics	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Their physical accessibility level is 3 or 4. Most of them are central spaces in <i>saras, caravanserai, timches, dalans, mosques</i> with two or more controllable openings. - The level of the presence of diverse social groups in them is 3 or 4 (they are relatively culturally open or have the potential to welcome the presence of children and women). - Their use factor ranges from level 5 (uses attracting the highest diversity of users) to level 1 (uses demanding a strong privacy). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - They can be public, <i>vaqf</i>, or private properties. However, publicly owned spaces are rare in them. If a space is public property and belongs to this zone, it means that its use is not so public-dependent. - The majority of them play the role of central public spaces in the overall structure of the Tabriz Bazaar. The bazaar owes its present level of vitality as a public place to the publicness of these Orange Zones.
The Current State of Functionality in the Overall Fabric of the Bazaar as a Public Place	
<p><u>Strengths:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - They enjoy high physical accessibility from the main <i>rastehs</i>, and they are well-connected to each other. - They have mixed uses. Therefore, they attract mixed user groups. - They are open or covered large spaces at the center of mosques, <i>caravanserais</i>, and <i>timches</i>, that are right places for slowing down when the users enter them from the rush zones¹. Their architectural design (largeness, centrality, and physical accessibility) makes them good places for events and gatherings. - Due to the green space in them, compared to other zones in the bazaar, a higher level of social diversity is observed in them. 	<p><u>Weaknesses:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A low level of social diversity was observed in them, comparing to other public places in the city. - There is a lack of infrastructures, addressing the needs of social groups including children, women and disabled users. - They do not enjoy strong physical connections with the urban fabric surrounding the bazaar (except for the Amir Bazaar). - The involvement of the regular public in their management process is remarkably low.

¹ See Figure 6-30 and figure 7-39.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The private ownership of the majority of spaces in them increases the chance of the participation of owners in their maintenance. An active and engaged steering committee and guild community in the bazaar is an opportunity for improving the cultural image and economic productivity of the place. 	
<p><u>Opportunities:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The High accessibility to the main streets and the commercial activeness of the southern bazaar has resulted in more density of orange areas (Zone 3) in the south compared to the northern bazaar. - The regeneration of the river banks for public use¹ can attract public users and customers to the shops in that area and can be an opportunity to turn the Zone 2 areas into orange areas. - The interest of private owners for attracting diverse groups of users mainly due to economic motivations² is a chance to attract their participation in the activities in Zone 3 areas. - ICHHTO assures the constant maintenance of the buildings due to the UNESCO World Heritage status of the bazaar. 	<p><u>Threats:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The surrounding urban fabric with a low physical quality limits the access and interest of potential users and investors to the bazaar.³ The fabric near the western side of the bazaar includes a mixture of storage houses, workshops, parking areas and few residential areas⁴ that also block the access and interest to the bazaar. The residents in such areas are usually from low-income social groups who depend on activities of the bazaar for a short time⁵. Furthermore, according to the expert interviews, they are not involved in the management process for the bazaar. - Due to the commercial character of the central Tabriz, there are several development projects and reconstructions around the bazaar. This causes the constant shrinking of the historic fabric⁶. The new structure of the urban fabric surrounding the bazaar is not spatially well connected with it⁷.

Table 7-5. SWOT analysis of Zone 3 (Yadollahi).

¹ See figure 7-12.

² According to interviews (See Appendix 2.b.)

³ See figures 6-21 to 6-26.

⁴ See Figure 6-33.

⁵ Explained in Chapter Six.

⁶ See Figure 6-32.

⁷ See figures 6-21.

Zone 2: Semi-Private Zones- Private Spaces with a High Dependency on Public Users

Key Characteristics	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Physical accessibility level in them is between 4 and 1. - The ownership is private in all of the spaces in them. - They can be central spaces in privately controlled buildings, a mosque for the students of a seminary school, or hojrehs in open <i>rastehs</i>. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Their use factor ranges from level 1 to 5. This shows the high dependency of the spaces in them to the presence of the public users. - The spaces in Zone 2, which have a commercial function can be called the <i>potential Orange Zones</i> because there is interest from the owners' side to turn them into public places.
The Current State of Functionality in the Overall Fabric of the Bazaar as a Public Place	
<p><u>Strengths:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - These spaces are the everyday workplaces of the members of the bazaar community. Therefore, it can be said that the physical and commercial development of the bazaar as a commercial institution depends on the functionality of these privately owned spaces. - As discussed in Chapter Six, the Tabriz Bazaar has a relatively functional merchant community, who are open to changes that can increase the wealth of the bazaar¹. - The level of private control in these areas is suitable for the seminary schools that prefer to control their openness to the general public (for instance, the <i>Sadeghiyya</i> School (Sc3), which is open for women who study there). - The level of public presence in these areas is suitable for workshop 	<p><u>Weaknesses:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Considering the level of physical accessibility in them, the level of social diversity is low in such spaces. Of course, this can be said only about the cases, which have uses with high dependence on public users. We should also note that the low social diversity in most of them is due to their small size. - As can be seen in the publicity-privacy map, the density of Zone 2 spaces in the northern bazaar is higher than its southern areas. Considering the accessibility problem, and the low commercial productiveness in the northern areas, it is evident that the low level of public presence is not something intended or desired by the owners. This situation is a result of the lack of investment and lack of efficient management. - The high density of areas in Zone 1 and 2 in the northern parts of the

¹ See the interview results in Appendix 2.

<p>and offices.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The private ownership of them increases the chances of the participation of the owners in their physical maintenance. The existence of the steering committee and guild communities in the Tabriz Bazaar is an opportunity to start a negotiation process to improve the cultural image and economic productivity of the place. 	<p>bazaar results in the tendency of the owners to move out from these areas, due to the lack of economic productivity. It also makes the area not attractive for potential investors.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The members of the <i>bazaari</i> community do not agree with State management methods and the ICHHTO regulations¹ and do not feel involved in the management process. On the other hand, the State organizations view the bazaar community as financial project partners. Therefore, there is a mistrust and high risk of conflicts in the management processes.²
<p><u>Opportunities:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In the central bazaar, the adjacent Orange Zones (areas of Zone 3) to the Zone 2 areas can enhance the presence of the regular public in them (that functionally depend on the public users). - The vacant building complexes near the bazaar can be used for balancing the use of spaces in the bazaar. Storage spaces, workshops, and some types of offices (that should not necessarily be in the bazaar) can be moved to these empty buildings. This will open space inside the bazaar for uses, which trigger economic productivity and attract customers and investors to the bazaar. 	<p><u>Threats:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The large vacant building complexes adjacent to the western and northern bazaar negatively affect the current and future commercial attractiveness of the bazaar. - There is a lack of presence of the local community and residents of the surrounding neighborhoods in the empty spaces near the bazaar. Although these areas are officially controlled by the State organizations, they are not observed and used by the local people. Therefore, assuring their safety is not easy, especially after the working hours.

Table 7-6. SWOT analysis of Zone 2 (Yadollahi).

¹ See Appendix 5.

² See Chapter Six and the interview results in Appendix 2.

Zone 1: Private Cells- Private Spaces With a Medium to Low Dependency on Public Users

Key Characteristics	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - They are the least physically accessible spaces (the level of accessibility in them is 1, 2 or 3). The majority of spaces in Zone 1 are <i>hojrehs</i> in the privately controlled buildings or <i>hojrehs</i> normally adjacent to Zone 3 areas. - They are mainly used and controlled by the owners or people who work in them (<i>culture of territory-defining</i> level in them is 1 or 2). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Their use ranges between levels of 1 and 4. - They are owned privately or by the <i>vaqf organization</i>. - They are private spaces in which the owner or the supervising organization has the power to decide about changes in the use and physical form. Of course, these owners are supposed to follow the national laws for heritage protection¹.
The Current State of Functionality in the Overall Fabric of the Bazaar as a Public Place	
<p><u>Strengths:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The clear state of their private ownership makes it easy to define negotiation policies for decision-making in them. The main stakeholders to be negotiated with are the owners. - These spaces are the everyday workplace of the members of the bazaar community. Therefore, it can be said that the physical and commercial development of the bazaar as a commercial institution depends on the functionality of these privately owned spaces. - The character of a bazaar as an institution is defined by the level of solidarity, communication, and cooperation between the 	<p><u>Weaknesses:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Most of the <i>hojrehs</i> are not suitable for modern shopping style and high retail volume. Some of them are too small for the customers to enter. - The members of the <i>bazaari</i> community do not agree with State management methods and the ICHHTO regulations² and do not feel involved in the management process. On the other hand, the State organizations view the bazaar community as financial project partners. Therefore, there is a mistrust and high risk of conflicts in the management process.³ - However, the informal private control in these areas has resulted in

¹ Discussed in Chapter Four.

² See Appendix 5.

³ See Chapter Six and the interview results in Appendix 2.

<p>owners of these <i>hojrehs</i>. As discussed in Chapter Six, the Tabriz Bazaar has a relatively functional bazaar community.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The fieldwork and interview results show the motivation of the owners for constant maintenance of their private properties. The existence of the bazaar’s steering committee and guild communities in the Tabriz Bazaar is an opportunity to start a negotiation process to improve the cultural image and economic productivity of the place. 	<p>interventions inside these spaces that violate ICHHTO protective regulations. For example, several cases were observed by the author, in which an elevator was constructed in the space to connect the ground floor to an upper story of a <i>hojreh</i>. A curtain is usually used to hide such elevators. In several <i>hojrehs</i>, owners build a basement, simply by digging the floor (ICHHTO, 2009, p. 483).</p>
<p><u>Opportunities:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Usually, <i>hojrehs</i> in Zone 1 are near to zones with a slow pedestrian flow¹. This makes them suitable for uses such as commercial offices and handicraft workshops. - Lower land prices and rents of the <i>hojrehs</i> in the northern parts of the bazaar make them more affordable and attractive for potential young business persons. 	<p><u>Threats:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Due to security issues and heritage protection regulations, water pipes, modern ventilation, and hitting/cooling facilities cannot be installed in <i>hojrehs</i>. There is a high risk of fire accidents due to the old hitting and electrical system (ICHHTO, 2009).

Table 7-7. SWOT analysis of Zone 1 (Yadollahi).

¹ See figure 6-27 that shows the pedestrian flow zones in the Tabriz Bazaar.

Patterns Revealed by the Publicity-Privacy Mapping

Table 7-8 is a schematic presentation of the features, observed in the five zones, identified in the Tabriz Bazaar. It shows the patterns of public and private power or influence regarding factors of *accessibility, use, ownership, and culture of territory-defining* within each zone. Table 7-8 is a result of comparing the publicity-privacy spectrum map (Figure 7-41) with maps showing each of the four factors. The patterns, revealed by this table can also be followed in the SWOT analysis.

		Levels of public control in:			
		Physical Accessibility	use	Ownership	Territory-defining culture
Zone 5: Main Connectors	Public: 5	Dark Brown	Dark Brown	Dark Brown	
	4	Red	Red		Red
	3				Orange
	2				
	Private: 1				
Zone 4: Secondary Connectors	5	Dark Brown		Dark Brown	
	4	Red	Red		Red
	3	Orange	Orange		Orange
	2		Yellow		
	1			Yellow	
Zone 3: Orange Zones (Highly Accessible Spaces Fostering the Presence of Public Users)	5		Dark Brown	Dark Brown	
	4	Red	Red		Red
	3	Orange	Orange		Orange
	2		Yellow		
	1		Yellow	Yellow	
Zone 2: Semi-Private Zones (Private Spaces with a High Dependency on Public Users)	5		Dark Brown		
	4	Red	Red		
	3	Orange	Orange		Orange
	2	Yellow	Yellow		Yellow
	1	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Zone 1: Private Cells (Private Spaces With a Medium to Low Dependency on Public Users)	5				
	4		Red		
	3	Orange	Orange		
	2	Yellow	Yellow		Yellow
	1	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow

Table 7-8. The patterns revealed from the publicity-privacy assessment in the Tabriz Bazaar (Yadollahi).

- In areas of Zone 5, the strongest factor that defines their character as public spaces and *main connectors* is their use. The high physical accessibility and public ownership in them are also effective but not determinative. In other words, the strongest magnet that attracts public users in them is the factor of use in their adjacent space. Although the factor of physical accessibility gets one level closer to the private level in Zone 4, in regards to this factor, Zone 4 is not significantly different from Zone 5. In terms of ownership, Zone 5 is the only zone with only public ownership. However, it should be noted that the most powerful and influential actor in decision-making for Zone 5 is the State and not the regular public.
- In spaces of Zone 4, the factor defining their character as *secondary connectors* is their higher level of physical accessibility, comparing to Zone 3. What make them less public than Zone 5 is their private ownership and the use of their adjacent spaces. The level 2 in the use factor is because of an exception in one case, where the open pathway is adjacent to a seminary school (with a use level of 2). The powerful and influential actors in Zone 4 are the State and the private owners or the Vaqf supervisors.
- What makes Zone 3 different from Zone 4 and Zone 5, is the factor of use in it, which is less dependent on public users. The lower levels in the physical accessibility and the *Territory-defining culture* factors result from the more private uses in it. The level of physical accessibility in these *Orange Zones* can be tuned during day hours. Their architectural design allows free entrance on the one hand and makes private control of the openings possible on the other hand. However, because the uses of them do not demand strong privacy, the private or Vaqf ownership and the stronger level of private control do not completely limit the public access to them, the Orange zones have become the centers of public life in the Tabriz bazaar. Accordingly, the social diversity of the regular users who engage in optional activities in such spaces is higher than the other areas of the bazaar. The private owners and Vaqf supervisors are the main decision-makers in these spaces¹.
- A meaningful shift from a public to a private character can be observed in factors of physical accessibility, ownership, and *Territory-defining culture* in Zone 2. The private owners and Vaqf supervisors are the main decision-makers in these spaces.
- In Zone 1, the three factors of physical accessibility, use, and *Territory-defining culture* have stronger private character, comparing to Zone 2. However, due to the mixed use of some

¹ Their power is limited by the heritage protection laws, discussed in Chapter Four.

areas in it, even Zone 1 is relatively depended on the presence of the public user. The private owners and Vaqf supervisors are the main decision-makers in these spaces.

The first clear outcome of the explained patterns is that even in highly private zones, the *factor of use* significantly depends on the presence of the public users. The *culture of territory-defining* in Zone 1 and Zone 2 is clearly in favor of private control. In private zones, this level is between 1 and 2, whereas, in the other zones, this level is 3 and 4.

Another significant finding is that no space with a level of 5 for the factor of *territory-defining culture* was observed in the Tabriz Bazaar. Thus, it can be said that despite the high level of their functional dependency on the public users, even the public zones in the bazaar are not welcoming to a broad range of public members. In other words, the power of public members in shaping territories in the bazaar is limited. Among the public users, women and children are the most marginalized groups. The State, the private owners, and the supervisors of the *vaqf* properties are the actors who mainly define the norms of public life in the bazaar. Considering the high dependency of the bazaar on the involvement of the regular public on the one hand, and the level of the social diversity observed in it, on the other hand, we can argue that as a commercial institution, the bazaar is making a strategic mistake regarding its approach towards the public users.

The reviewed literature and the presented results of the ethnographic research show that the younger generation and women ask for more openness. This is a clear message to the bazaar community and the State organizations, involved in the management of the bazaar. In order to reconnect to the city and citizens, the bazaar has to be able to give a relevant response to this message. This research has provided empirical evidence, showing that there is a need for revising the Iranian bazaar as a public place. As a commercial institution and a public place, the bazaar has to reflect on its current culture of public life and question the established patterns of territorial definitions in it. Accordingly, in the management processes affecting the public domains, a chance should be given to the voices and needs of the groups who are today, marginalized from the public life in the bazaar. This issue was discussed earlier and will be further discussed in the next section. The next section uses the presented publicity-privacy spectrum map and presents a zoomed-out perspective of it in order to make it useful for priority-setting in decision-making processes.

7.3.1. The Public and Private Domains in the Tabriz Bazaar

As can be seen in the publicity-privacy spectrum map (Figure 7-41), the darkest areas (zones 5 and 4) form a spine that keeps the elements of the whole structure together. Without these connectors, the bazaar would be a miscellany of adjacent private and semi-private spaces without constituting a

meaningful whole. This underlines the vital role played by the presence of diverse social groups (associated with these public and private areas) in preserving the integrity of the bazaar as a marketplace and a public place.

The Orange Zones (areas in Zone 3) are currently the middle zones regarding public and private control. Typically, these zones are privately owned central spaces that are physically open to the public, and suitable for slowing down and taking part in social interactions. In other words, public and private actors are both involved in shaping the activities in these zones. Since a bazaar is generally a privately owned commercial complex and a public place, the high number of Orange Zones means that these legally private properties are capable of welcoming the regular public. Although the brown and red zones (Zones 5 and 4) show a high level of public presence, they cannot have this quality (similar to the orange zones) because they are actually the pathways, which mainly function as connectors.

We should note that the stronger public character of the Orange Zones, comparing to other zones in the Tabriz Bazaar does not mean that they are open, accessible, and attractive to all people in Tabriz. As explained in the last section and shown in the map of the *culture of territory-defining* (Figure 7-40), in the Tabriz Bazaar there is no level 5 regarding this factor. In other words, no space with equal influence and power, shared by different users was observed in the Tabriz Bazaar. The highest rate recorded for women and children involved in optional activities in the bazaar spaces was 35% of all regular users.¹ This indicates the limited ability of the Tabriz Bazaar as an urban public place to foster social diversity regarding gender and age.

In the current socio-spatial fabric of the public life in the bazaar, enhancing the involvement of women and children appears easier in Orange Zones because these areas are usually safe, neither overcrowded nor empty, their use is typically public-dependent, and the architecture allows public access during the working hours. Accordingly, these spaces should be the first to be facilitated for public use. If these Zones start to attract a wider diversity of people, they will influence other adjacent open spaces that today are classified under Zone 2. This will consequently generate growth in the density of the Orange Zones in the bazaar. If the policy of enhancing the current Orange Zones is successful and leads to the emergence of new public zones, the next step would be equipping the new Orange Zones with public infrastructure. Of course, the quality of adjusting the density of Orange Zones in the bazaar should be discussed with the involved users and owners.

¹ These findings were obtained by regular quantitative and qualitative ethnographic studies in Tabriz Bazaar between March 2013 and September 2015 (see Chapter Six).

Areas in zones 2 and 1 are *hojrehs* (used as shops, workshops, and offices) inside privately owned and controlled buildings or along pathways. The key groups who should be considered as the main negotiation partners in decision-making processes that influence these zones are the bazaar community members and the involved State organizations. As explained above, as we approach zones 3, 4, and 5, the public involvement in the decision-making processes has to rise.

The levels of influence and power of the involved actors in the current management system of the Tabriz Bazaar were discussed in Chapter Six. Considering the role and influence of the actors as well as the public and private characters of the five zones presented in this chapter, we can identify three domains in the bazaar:

- | | |
|---|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Public Domain A:
Connectors (Zone 5 and Zone 4) | <p>Mainly controlled by the State organizations, and highly used by the regular public for necessary activities.</p> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Public Domain B:
Orange Zones (Zone 3) | <p>Mainly controlled by the State organizations and private owners, and used by the Bazaar community and general public for optional activities.</p> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Private Domain:
Private spaces (Zone 2 and Zone 1) | <p>Mainly controlled and used by the private owners.</p> |

These domains reflect the state of commonness in the bazaar. They provide an overview of the legal, economic, and cultural influence of each actor within the physical boundaries of the bazaar. They also show the groups that can be affected by any change or intervention in different locations of the bazaar. As can be seen above, although all public and private the zones in the bazaar are economically and culturally influenced by the presence of public users, the public members do not have an influence on decision-making for any of these zones.

During my fieldwork in the Tabriz Bazaar, none of the interviewed public members showed a desire for being involved in the management of the bazaar. The interviewed architecture students, who were trying to address the problems bazaar is facing, were the only group who showed an interest in the management issues of the bazaar.¹ We should note that when spending time in the bazaar, they identified themselves not as regular public members, but as professionals aiming to study and diagnose the bazaar. The other interviewees only expressed their satisfaction or dissatisfaction regarding the current conditions in the bazaar.

In general, the public members who were not satisfied with the bazaar as a public place expressed their expectation and did not mention that they expect to have the right to influence the

¹ See Appendix 2.b., interviews 26 and 27.

management process in the bazaar. Due to the limited number of my interviews, these results only cannot be generalized. However, the interview results can indicate the lack of a sense of civic responsibility among the everyday users of the bazaar. This also shows the absence of an effort from the side of the authorities to encourage such a feeling of responsibility. The expert interviews¹ also show the lack of interest of the authorities in involving the regular public.

In the private domain of the bazaar, the most powerful actors are the members of the bazaar community as owners, tenants, and regular users of these spaces. In the national heritage protection regulations and administrative system,² the level and manner of their participation are ambiguous. As discussed earlier in Chapter Six, the bazaari community provides the most important source for financing the interventions in the private spaces of the bazaar. The problem is that the current management system has a tendency to view private owners as financial supporters rather than decision-making partners.

<i>Public Domain A</i>	<i>Public Domain B</i>	<i>Private Domain</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The general public (actual and potential users of the bazaar) - Residents of the surrounding neighborhoods - Potential investors and entrepreneurs - Local universities - Private owners, vaqf supervisors of the properties in the bazaar, and members of the bazaar community - Owners of the properties in the surrounding commercial complexes - ICHHTO - The Municipality of Tabriz - The City Council - The Urban Development and Revitalization Organization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The general public (actual and potential users of the bazaar) - Public and private agencies such as local universities, schools, and cultural, educational institutes - Residents of the surrounding neighborhoods - Steering members of the mosques in the bazaar - Private owners, vaqf supervisors of the properties in the bazaar, and members of the bazaar community - Potential investors and entrepreneurs - ICHHTO - The Municipality of Tabriz - The City Council 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Private owners and tenants of properties in the bazaar, and the members of the bazaar community - <i>Vaqf</i> supervisors and managers of the seminary schools in the bazaar - Potential investors and entrepreneurs - Owners of the properties in the surrounding commercial complexes - ICHHTO - The Municipality of Tabriz - The Urban Development and Revitalization Organization

Table 7-9. The key groups to be involved in the decision-making processes that can affect each of the public and private domains of the Tabriz Bazaar (Yadollahi).

¹ The interview texts are available in Appendix 2.c.

² The Tabriz Bazaar is a World Heritage Site. Nevertheless, it is mainly and actually affected by the national law, because the 1972 UNESCO Convention is not legally binding.

It seems that we need to introduce the solution of *non-economic* public and private participation in the current management system of the bazaar. Table 7-9 presents the key groups who are affected by the policy-making in public and private domains of the Tabriz Bazaar and the groups who can influence the publicness of the bazaar. These are the main groups to be involved in the decision-making processes that affect each of the domains.¹

The process and tools for achieving a governance regime in which all the mentioned groups have a due voice have to be further studied and discussed with the consideration of Iran's legal framework for urban heritage management. The presented findings can be used for this purpose. Referring to the discussions regarding the *bazaar-city isolation process* in Tabriz and the socio-spatial fabric of the bazaar as a public place, the following strategies are suggested for enhancing the functionality of the bazaar as a public place in the city of Tabriz;

- Enforcing the residential quality and character of the surrounding neighborhoods in the city center of Tabriz,
- Revising the current strategies for vitalizing the commercial complexes on the northern and western sides of the bazaar, and assessing the possibility of transferring some of the shops and businesses in the over-loaded areas in the southern bazaar to these complexes,
- Re-enforcing the connectivity of the Connectors (Zone 4 and 5),
- Widening social diversity within the Orange Zones (regarding gender, age, and social class),
- Re-enforcing the integrity of the private zones (zones 1 and 2) with the functional network of the bazaar and improving their economic productivity (in the case of commercial spaces).

The case study part (Chapter Six and Chapter Seven) presented an *understanding* and an *explanation* of the *bazaar-city isolation process* in Tabriz, and the socio-spatial fabric of the Tabriz bazaar a public place. In the main chapters, this dissertation does not offer recommendations and detailed solutions for the management of the Tabriz bazaar. First, this work does not aim to present a commercial or purely applied research. Therefore, giving direct recommendations is not realistic and aimed, using the data collected for the scope of this research. Second, updated and detailed information about the current state of the economic plans and human and technical resources of the governmental organizations is needed for offering such consultations. So, giving an exact action plan for the place is not scientifically and ethically justifiable. However, as an architect who has studied the Tabriz bazaar since 2008, I feel a responsibility to share my ideas about how the place can improve.

¹ Chapter Four, section 4.3 presents more detailed information about the heritage protection regulations in Iran and the actors involved in the current management of the bazaars. See Table 4-2 and Figure 6-18 for an overview.

Therefore, in Appendix 6, principles and strategies for each identified zone are presented for further reflections of researchers, professionals, and managers involved with the Tabriz Bazaar.




Figure 7-42. The public and private domains in the Tabriz Bazaar. Results, generated by Yadollahi are shown on the base map obtained from (MBTB archive, Tabriz).

Part Four: The Conclusion

Chapter 8: The Scope of the Publicity-Privacy Assessment Method Towards the Reintegration of the Bazaar and City

This closing chapter is a short clarification and justification of the approach adopted in this dissertation for studying the bazaars in Iranian commercial cities. The rationale and possible practical uses of the publicity-privacy assessment method in the governance of such bazaars is discussed in this conclusion.

A re-clarification for the use of the terms *public space* and *public place* in this dissertation is necessary for concluding the discussion on the scope of this research. In Chapter Four, it was explained that the Iranian Bazaar is considered a *public place*, which is an interconnected network of private and public *spaces*. The term *place* for addressing the bazaar as a whole is chosen to emphasize its cultural, social, and political background, which makes it a *place* for its users.¹

Naturally, individual spaces within a bazaar are associated with meanings for their users. However, within the scope of this research, studying the detailed architectural and social characteristics of each of the several spaces in the bazaar was not necessary and relevant. The term *place* is used to convey the idea that a bazaar should not be managed as a privately owned heritage site, in which the main actors are the Iranian State and the private and *vaqf* owners of the properties in it. The previous chapters justified the idea that there should be a paradigm shift in the management system of the Iranian bazaars from the state-centered and private owner-centered approach towards an approach², which also considers the bazaar a *place* for the regular public. Therefore, when addressing the bazaar as a whole, the term *public place* is used.

¹ See Chapter Three, section 3.1 for the explanation of the difference between the terms *place* and *space*.

² See Chapter Four, Section 4.3.

8.1. Justification of the Adopted Approach

In Chapter Two, the problem of the *bazaar-city isolation process* in the bazaars of Iranian commercial cities was explored and explained. Chapter Two discussed examples of bazaars in Iranian commercial cities and their economic, social, political, and historical background, and identified the key causes of the multi-dimensional isolation of these bazaars from the modern cities. These leading causes are social change, the centralization of the political and economic affairs, and the centralization of the urban management system in Iran, in the early twentieth century. In Chapter Six, the bazaar-city isolation process was explained in the case of the Tabriz Bazaar. Accordingly, this dissertation offers a contribution towards addressing the problem of *bazaar-city isolation process* through targeting the urban management-related causes of this process (figure 8-1).

The main finding of this research is a methodological framework for studying and mapping the socio-spatial fabric of such bazaars, by approaching them as public places. Facilitating the active presence of diverse social groups and valuing their potential and actual economic and non-economic investments in the bazaars is the central idea behind the structure of this methodological framework. More precisely, approaching the Iranian bazaar as a public place is a step towards providing bazaars with the social capital they need for maintaining their active role in the future of the modern cities.




Figure 8-1. The contribution of this dissertation concerning the inter-effective factors that have caused the creation of the *bazaar-city isolation process* in the last century (Yadollahi).

As it was explained earlier in this work, Iranian bazaars are commercial complexes, made of interwoven and interconnected social and spatial networks. The State, the private owners, and the supervisors of *vaqf* properties are the actors who mainly define the norms of public life in the

bazaar. In this context, the concept of social capital, as defined by Bourdieu (1986), was applied in order to highlight the importance of the presence of regular public members in the public life and governance of the bazaars. In this context, expanding the social network in a bazaar was suggested to be a reasonable strategy for enhancing its survival chance in the future.

After introducing the fundamental characteristics of Iranian bazaars, justifying their dependency on public users, and reflecting on the development of their management system¹, this dissertation suggested that the management system for developing and safeguarding these urban complexes should approach them as public places. This approach is not meant to convey the message that the bazaar as a public place can or should transfer its ownership or management to the public authorities. The point here is also not to load the bazaar with additional retail shops or other functions to attract more people to the bazaars, which in turn would make them even more crowded than they are today. Crowdedness does not always indicate social diversity. Giving empirical evidence, this research highlighted this fact in the Tabriz bazaar. Therefore, the aim should be enhancing the *diversity* of the groups of people involved with the bazaar, in terms of gender, age, and social class. These groups that can be included in the bazaar in the role of customers, investors, social activists, or users of public spaces and institutions within the bazaar, can provide the bazaar with social capital. This kind of capital does not entirely depend on the State resources and can be passed from generation to generation.

8.2. The Application of the Recommended Method

As explained in the last section, the main aim of this dissertation is to contribute towards the enrichment of the bazaars in terms of social diversity². The presented method was based on *publicness* indicators and the four factors of *use, physical accessibility, ownership and local culture of territory-defining*. The results of mapping the bazaar, regarding the mentioned four factors, were juxtaposed to produce the map of the publicity–privacy spectrum of the Tabriz Bazaar (Figure 8-2), which can facilitate the achieving of the mentioned aim.

The present methodological framework offers a tool for assessing levels of public and private control in the Iranian bazaars. It can be utilized for processing the coordination of the relationships among the involved actors, who sometimes have conflicting interests. In other words, it provides an

¹ In Chapter Four, Section 4.3, it was explained that the primary interest of the current State policies for heritage management is tourism-oriented (see Table 4-1). Approaching the bazaars as public places calls for a critical revision of this tourism-oriented approach.

² Section 8.2 is an elaborated version of the publication, Yadollahi and Weidner (2017).

instrument, which can guide urban heritage management strategies regarding the involvement of different actors, when the issue of power-balance is important or problematic.




Figure 8-2. The process of producing the publicity–privacy spectrum map for the case of the Tabriz Bazaar. This map is prepared by Yadollahi, using the base map from MBTB archive (Yadollahi, Weidner, 2017).

This research does not argue for or against any specific traditional social order of using a public place. However, it argues that the present state of the public life in the Iranian bazaars needs to be analyzed, understood, and explained. The aim is to understand the patterns of the distribution of influence and power of the different user groups in the bazaar. In the governance process of a public place, sooner or later a community has to reach a point at which it can discuss and decide whether it wants to sustain or transform certain cultural behaviors. It is this community who should openly discuss and come to a conclusion about whether or not existing cultural norms enhance values such as social justice and inclusive use in their common urban spaces. In this regard, the role of urban research is to scientifically explain the current multi-layered fabric of the public place and facilitate a knowledge-based public discussion.

The idea of the '*public man*' and '*private woman*' is something that we have inherited from the past. So, one can argue that the way in which bazaars are used by the public members is also a heritage. But, the question is, do we have to apply all aspects of our heritage to our present life? This thesis

argues that we have not only the option, but also the responsibility to understand and revise our heritage and contribute our creative solutions for integrating it into our present life. As Lowenthal (2000) suggests, heritage protection has to be a publically inclusive and *creative stewardship*, which encourages a *prudent confidence* for making *careful alterations* in the heritage. This research has provided empirical evidence, showing that there is a need for revising the Iranian bazaar as heritage and as a public place.

The territory defining map, seen together with the publicity–privacy map highlights the diversity of social groups with respect to the dominant culture in the public and private spaces. This is particularly sensitive in historic urban areas in which traditional norms control the social hierarchy of public places. By highlighting the current power levels in the use of a bazaar, this mapping system enables the territory definers and those who follow the defined territories to develop a more conscious and responsible understanding of their public life rather than overlooking or ignoring the conflicts and viewing the present situation as unquestionable and unchangeable.

Professionally speaking, the presented place-based understanding of the current effectiveness of the actors involved helps the managers identify and prioritize the negotiation strategies for each identified zone. It is an instrument for illustrating and understanding the current levels of responsibilities, rights, and vulnerabilities of public and private actors in different zones.

This mapping system has a temporal nature and is not designed to show the ultimate or desired state of publicity and privacy in a public place at the first step. Regular monitoring of the four factors affecting the publicity of spaces and mapping these factors repeatedly can show us the direction a bazaar is going through in terms of its public life. The regularity of mapping should follow the likelihoods of changes in the legal, physical, functional, and cultural status of a bazaar in certain periods of time.

A map showing the desired publicity-privacy state can only be prepared based on the strategic decisions of the governance network that includes all the involved actors. However, the mapping method can highlight the differences between the expected and existing situations. It also helps planners and business persons to identify the interrelation of functional, legal (ownership-related), physical and cultural causes of the attractiveness or unattractiveness of an area within the bazaar. This knowledge provides the basis for land-use planning in the bazaar and navigating the path from the current publicity-privacy situation to the desired situation. Table 8-1 summarizes the potential contributions of the method towards decision-making processes.

To the point, the approach and method presented suggest that urban heritage management in bazaars needs to be flexible in regards to the publicity–privacy spectrum, indicating the current

power relations of different actors in each zone of them. It provides a place-based and a culture-based model of the bazaar as a public place. The outcome of this method (the final publicity–privacy map) is easily understandable for the actors involved. It can be used as an expert-citizen communication tool that facilitates a knowledge-based negotiation process (which is the basis for a participatory governance regime). This is how the presented methodological tool contributes to the reintegration of the old bazaar with the modern city.

<u>Leading Questions in the Strategy-Making Process:</u>	<u>The Contribution of the Presented Method:</u>
<p>First Step:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Who is involved, to what extent and where? - Who are current the key negation partners in each zone? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Showing the current publicity-privacy fabric of the place. - Showing the legal, cultural, economic influence of actors in each zone.
<p>Second Step:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Who should be involved in which zone, to what extent? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Facilitating the defining of the expected publicity-privacy patterns in each zone. (by illustrating the current situation)
<p>Third Step:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - How to attract and involve the actors who are excluded from the decision-making process, or are needed for the liveliness of the place? - How to solve conflicts between the actors? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Providing the knowledge, necessary for the understanding of power relations between actors. - Providing the basic knowledge needed for the identification of the interrelation of functional, legal, physical, and cultural causes of attractiveness or unattractiveness of spaces in a bazaar. - This knowledge also reveals causes of conflicts among the actors.

Table 8-1. The contribution of the publicity–privacy spectrum mapping tool to the management process in bazaars, particularly when the issue of power-balance is important or problematic (Yadollahi).

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Appendixes

Appendix 1: Field Notes from March 2013, March 2014, November 2014, and September 2015

Jafariyya Library (L2)

16.03.2013, 8:10-8:30

The library is empty.

The staff member said March is not the active time of the library. The students come here in November and December to prepare for the university entrance exam.

The books are mostly about religious topics and history.

At 12:00, there was a book exhibition in the school's courtyard.

14.03.2014, 9:30-9:40

The library is empty.

17.11.2014, 14:00-14:10

19 users (all men) entered the library.

The staff member told me that the library accepts only male members.

Ferdousi Street, Shahidi Bazaar Entrance (R24)

16.03.2014, 9:50-10:05:

8 men are having breakfast around two food stands. A couple is seated next to the green space having breakfast. The vendor said usually people who come to the bazaar are from villages and cities around Tabriz. They depart very early from their town and have their breakfast here.

17.03.2014, 9:50-10:00:

10 men and 2 women are having breakfast.



Figure A-1. Ferdousi Street. Top: 17 March 2014-9:55, Bottom: 22 September 2015-16:45 (Yadollahi).

Malik Timcha (T2)

14.03.2013, 13:00-13:10

8 merchants are drinking tea within the tea corner at the entrance.

16.03.2014, 13:10-13:20

13 men are drinking tea within the tea corner at the entrance.

Muzaffariyya Timcha (T6)

14.03.2013, 13:00-13:10

Gizbasdi Entrance: 17 men are drinking tea at the tea corner.

Talischilar Entrance: 9 men are drinking tea at the tea corner.

Passengers: 56 men, 6 women, and 1 child.

16.03.2014, 12:30-12:40

Gizbasdi Entrance: 15 men are drinking tea at the tea corner.

Talischilar Entrance: 8 men are drinking tea at the tea corner.

Passengers: 42 men, 4 women.

Serial Photographing: 22.09.15, 14:00




Figure A-2. *Muzaffariyya Timcha* (T6), September 2015, (Yadollahi).

Internet Café at the Talebiya School (Sc5) Near the Jafariyya Library (L2)

13.03.2013, 12:15-12:45

3 men are looking at the books, 2 men are using the computers, 6 men visited the shop and asked for religious books.

16.03.2013, 8:10-8:30

The bookstore is closed.

16.03.2014, 11:00-11:10

2 men are using the computers, 19 men came to buy books and to print documents.

17.03.2014, 11:00-11:10

10 are men using the computers and looking at around within the bookstore.



Figure A-3: The internet café at the *Talebiya School (Sc5)*, 16 March 2013, (Yadollahi).

Haj Ali Akbar Sara (S19)

14.03.2013, 13:40-13:50

9 men are sitting and talking within the central space.

17.03.2014, 10:40-10:50

Bazaaris chatting in the *Haj Ali Akbar Dalan (D17)*, 6 *bazaaris* and 6 customers are chatting.

Amir Sara (S25)

15.03.2013, 12:40-13:20

27 men, 5 women, and 1 child sat near the basin for more than 10 minutes.

17.03.2014, 12:45-12:55

31 men who (apparently) work in the bazaar are standing at the center, near the pond, discussing work.



Figure A-4: *Amir Sara (S25)* 13 March 2014, 12:45 (Yadollahi).

A Restaurant in Shahidi Rasta (R24)

14.03.2013, 12:50-13:35

9 men and 2 couples are present. Both women wear the *chador*.

15.03.2013, 14: 50-15:15

15 women, 25 men, and 1 child had lunch at the restaurant during the time I was there. 11 women and the child were in two groups. I assume both groups are here to shop for the *Norooz*.

17.03.2014, 13:00-13:20

25 men, 15 women, and 1 child had lunch. The *Norooz* is approaching. Traditional people prefer to shop in the bazaar for the *Norooz* ceremony.

Haj Husen Miyani Sara (S13)

14.03.2013, 10:45-11:35

11 men are resting on the stored goods and benches. From their discussions (in Turkish) and the way they talk to each other, it is obvious that they are all local and work in the bazaar. Most of them are porters, waiting there with their wagons.

17.03.2014, 10:50-11:00

10 men sitting (mainly porters and people who work in the bazaar) speaking in Turkish.

Passengers: 39 men and 2 women.



Figure A-5: *Haj Husen Miyani Sara (S13)*, 22 September 2015, 14:15 (Yadollahi).

Haj Sheikh Dalan (D13)

17.03.2014, 11:00-11:10:

8 porters and people who work there are resting in the central space.

Passengers: 39 men, 8 women and 2 children.

Taza Haj Husen Sara (S14)

14.03.2013, 12:35-12:45

5 porters and 4 people who work there are sitting and chatting in Turkish.

Passengers: 54 men, 4 women.

17.03.2014, 11:10-11:20

7 porters are sitting on the benches.

Passengers: 93 men, 8 women (2 of them are architecture students) and 1 child.



Figure A-6: Taza Haj Husen Sara (S14), 22 September 2015, 14:00 (Yadollahi).

Mirza Abulhasan Sara (S15)

14.03.2013, 11:00-11:10

2 men are sitting near the stored goods.

17.03.2014, 11-10-11:20

No one is seated. Most of the space is used for storing goods.

Public Toilet in the Talebiyya School (Sc5)

The lavatories are not separated for male and female users. As you go inside, you are guided to use one of the men's toilets. The washrooms are relatively clean.

Thursday, 14.03.2013, 10:00-10:10

33 men, 4 women and 2 children used the toilet.

Friday, 15.03.15

Closed.

Saturday, 16.03.2013, 11:25-11.35

15 men, 5 women and 1 child used the toilet.

Appendix 2: Interviews

A. Interview Guides

The field work in the Tabriz Bazaar that was conducted in March 2013 attempted to provide data for testing the feasibility of the research objective and addressed the research questions through a combination of interview and observation methods.

As a part of the fieldwork in the Tabriz Bazaar, this guide is prepared for conducting semi-structured interviews, targeting three groups involved in the Tabriz Bazaar; bazaaris, the regular public, and the governmental authorities involved with the management of the bazaar.

The interview guides are designed based on the main research objectives. The conversations were designed in the form of semi-structured interviews, which also gives appropriate freedoms to the interviewees, in case the interviewees were interested in sharing their experiences and suggestions. The control of the interviewee was increased in the case of expert interviews. For instance, the interviews with three elderly bazaaris and Mr. Taghizadeh, the former director of the Eastern Azerbaijan ICHO were open-ended.

Target Group: The Bazaar Community

1. General Information

- Age
- Gender
- Job

2. Members of the Social Network in the Bazaar

- With whom are you in contact in the bazaar? (their age, gender, social class)
- How often do you meet these people?
- Do you have the opportunity to have short talks with your customers about topics other than selling and buying goods?
- Could you explain about your gatherings or any kind of social relationships with other *bazaaris*?

3. Relationship of Social Network Members with the Built Network

- Where do you usually meet and talk to people in the bazaar area and its vicinity? (In shops, corridors (*rastas*), mosques, coffeehouses, courtyards and etc.)
- Do these places provide you a comfortable and pleasing atmosphere for meeting people and having social communication?
- In your opinion, how could these places improve for hosting a better social communication?

4. Opinion of *Bazaaris* Regarding a More Active Involvement of Different Public Members in the Social Life of the Bazaar

- Do you agree with allocating some of the space in the bazaar area to non-commercial functions such as cultural, educational or entertainment services? Why?
- Where do you see the position of women in the bazaar? (As customers or as potential co-workers?) Why?

5. Value and Influence of the Research Objective

- How influential do you think bazaar is in the economic, social and political affairs of the country today?
- How do you see this influence in future?
- Do you think that changes in social and built structures in the Tabriz Bazaar could influence bazaars in other cities like Tehran and Isfahan?

Target Group: The Regular Public

1. General Information

- Age
- Gender
- Education

2. Involvement in the Social Network of the Bazaar

- Why and how often do you come to bazaar?
- Why do you choose the bazaar for these activities?
- With whom do you have dialogue and communication in the bazaar?

3. Openness and Accessibility of Places in the Bazaar for the Users

- Which places do you usually use in the bazaar (corridors, shops, mosques, libraries, banks, restaurants, coffeehouses, and lavatories)?
- Do you have any problems in entering and using these places? If not, what kinds of obstacles limit your access (physical, social, legal)?
- Are there places where you wish to use, but because of the mentioned obstacles, they are not accessible to you?

4. Opinions and Needs of Users for Improvement of the Bazaar as a Public Place

- What kind of services which you require are not provided in the bazaar?
- If services such as educational and cultural activities are provided inside or in the vicinity of the bazaar, would you be interested?
- Any suggestions for a better management of the bazaar?

Target Group: Authorities Involved With the Management of the Tabriz Bazaar

1. General Information

- Name
- Position
- Profession
- Duration of working in current position

2. Main Policies and Attributes Towards the Bazaar:

- What is the main principle in allocating the human and financial resources for your (the governmental institution) activities in the Tabriz Bazaar?
- What have been your major research activities about in the last 5 years?
- Where in the bazaar have you conducted major conservation projects during the last 5 years?
- Are there any significant research or conservation projects to be carried out in future?

3. Position Among Members of the Social Network in the Bazaar

- How do you generally picture the position and role of governmental authority and non-governmental parties in managing the bazaar?
- Are the non-governmental parties only *bazaaris*, or other people are involved in the management of the bazaar? How?
- In which ways are you in contact and collaboration with stakeholders such as *bazaaris*, everyday users of the bazaar, other governmental organizations, UNESCO and etc.?
- Do you have any kind of problem in working with these groups?
- Do you have plans to improve this cooperation?

4. Policies Regarding Public Spaces in the Bazaar:

- How is the responsibility of improving the publically used places in the bazaar (such as restaurants, mosques, open spaces, teahouses and etc.) shared between the stakeholders?
- Have you had any specific project for improving the accessibility and openness of these places for all users?
- Do you have plans or recommendations to prepare the existing and potential public areas inside or in the vicinity of the Tabriz Bazaar for a better public use?

B. Interview Data Grid

(Interviews with the members of the bazaar community and the regular public)¹

Interview	Key Terms ²	Culture of Territory Defining			Physical Accessibility		Commonness of the Management of the Bazaar as a Public Place
		Regular Optional Activities and Social Interactions	Sense of Having a Territory Within the bazaar ³	Assumptions About The Gender Diversity In The Bazaar	Public infrastructure: The Quality of Public Toilets, Furniture, and Infrastructure in the Bazaar	Possibility of Having Occasional Optional Activities	
The Bazaar Community							
1	<p><u>Date: 14.03.13</u> <i>Bazaari</i> (carpet merchant) Age: 70 Gender: Male</p>	<p>All the men who go to the teahouses in the bazaar are not trustworthy people. If someone is busy with work and family, he won't waste his time in the teahouses.</p> <p>Daily conversations with his colleagues in the bazaar.</p> <p>The Turkish language is important in communications in the bazaar.</p> <p>The <i>bazaaris</i> have social interactions, especially in the</p>	High	The number of men and women is equal.	Not satisfied with the equipment available in his shop, and in the bazaar in general.	Has no problem for finding somewhere to sit or rest.	No comment

¹ The interviews were recorded (except for cases that the interviewee did not agree with recording their voice).

² The key terms are driven from the research questions, regarding publicity-privacy spectrum of the Tabriz Bazaar.

³ The interpretation of the interviewer based on statements of the interviewee about the bazaar and his or her experiences in the bazaar.

		<p>mosque, in the prayer time.</p> <p>They talk about daily news and business.</p>					
2	<p><u>Date: 15.03.13</u></p> <p><i>Bazaari</i>, silver merchant, and shopkeeper</p> <p>Age: 37</p> <p>Gender: Male,</p>	<p>Most of his social interactions are with colleagues, and in his shop or in the tea houses.</p> <p>The topics of conversations are mostly the politics and economics.</p> <p>Within the bazaar, you cannot find female shopkeepers. This is due to the traditional culture of the bazaar.</p>	<p>High</p> <p>The traditional architecture of the bazaar is important for the interviewee in associating himself with the bazaar.</p>	<p>The number of women is lower than men in the bazaar.</p>	<p>Not satisfied with the technical equipment available in the bazaar.</p>	<p>There is room for improvement.</p>	<p>Opening up the bazaar for the young generation will have financial benefits for the bazaar in future.</p> <p>Educational and cultural activities can enrich the culture and economic gaining of the bazaar. The Municipality and ICHHTO should use the space in the bazaar for such cultural and educational purposes.</p> <p>Recreational and cultural activities for the <i>bazaaris</i>, after the working hours of the bazaar.</p> <p>Today, what happens under the roof of the bazaar does not have the political power that they used to have before. Now, the State decides everything.</p> <p>The development of the Turkish regions is not a priority in the government policies.</p> <p>He mentioned the negative effect of the US sanctions on the economy of the bazaar.</p>
3	<p><u>Date: 15.03.13</u></p> <p><i>Bazaari</i> (carpet, merchant).</p> <p>Age: 70</p>	<p>Most of his social interactions are in his shop, with his colleagues.</p> <p>He prefers not going to teahouses, because <i>bazaaris</i>, and in general men with a good reputation do not go to</p>	<p>High</p>	<p>No comment</p>	<p>Satisfied with the equipment he has in his shop.</p>	<p>No comment</p>	<p>Cultural and educational activities could be beneficial for the bazaar.</p> <p>Bazaars in different cities can influence each other positively or negatively.</p> <p>Has no problem with the present</p>

	Gender: Male	<p>teahouses.</p> <p>The main topic of discussion is economy.</p>					governmental management approaches.
4	<p><u>Date: 15.03.13</u></p> <p><i>Bazaar</i> antique shop</p> <p>Age: 65</p> <p>Gender: Male</p>	<p>Most of his socialization is in the teahouses and Mosques.</p> <p>Daily social interaction with other <i>bazaaris</i> and also customers.</p> <p>The main topic of discussion is the economy.</p> <p>The economic changes have influenced social reactions in the bazaar. The trust among the <i>bazaaris</i> has weakened in the last decades.</p> <p>The Turkish language is necessary for communication in the bazaar.</p> <p>Under the roof of the traditional bazaar, you cannot find female shopkeepers. This is due to the traditional culture of the bazaar.</p> <p>Social interaction with women is very limited. However, comparing to the old times, the today's culture is more open and tolerant for women.</p>	High	The number of men is more than women and children in the bazaar.	No comment	No comment	<p>The structure of the bazaar has changed. <i>Bazaaris</i> are not modern and do not belong to the modern time.</p> <p>Today, the bazaar has no influence in the politics.</p> <p>The influence of the bazaars in different cities on each other has decreased.</p> <p>The Tehran Bazaar is today the most powerful bazaar in Iran.</p> <p>Educational and cultural activities in the bazaar could not be successful because such activities don't bring direct financial income.</p>

5	<p><u>Date: 15.03.13</u> a shopkeeper in a carpet shop Age: 25 Gender: Male</p>	<p>Most of his socializations are mainly in his shop.</p> <p>Daily social interaction with other shopkeepers, carpet producers, and customers.</p> <p>The topics of conversations are mostly the politics and economics.</p>	Low	No comment	Generally satisfied with the existing level of equipment available in his shop.	No comment	<p>Cultural and educational events might benefit the bazaar.</p> <p>Not sure about the level of the political power of the bazaar.</p> <p>The Tabriz Bazaar does not have an influence on other bazaars.</p> <p>Investing in the bazaar is not financially justified. The gain would not be worth it.</p>
6	<p><u>Date: 16.03.13</u> Shopkeeper in a Jewelry shop (The Gold Bazaar) Age: 28 Gender: Male</p>	<p>Social interactions are usually in restaurants and mosques.</p> <p>Everyday social interacting with colleagues and customers.</p> <p>The topics of conversations are mostly about politics, sport, and economics.</p> <p>In the traditional bazaar, you cannot find female shopkeepers. This is due to the traditional culture of the bazaar.</p>	High	The number of men and women is equal.	Satisfied	No comment	<p>Cultural and educational events can benefit the bazaar.</p> <p>The bazaar still has an influence on the national economy.</p> <p>He mentioned the negative effect of the US sanctions on the economy of the bazaar.</p>
7	<p><u>Date: 16.03.13</u> <i>Bazaari</i> in a Jewelry shop (The Gold Bazaar) Age: 49 Gender: Male</p>	<p>Most of his social interactions in his shop, with his colleagues. Conversations are mostly about gold price and currency rates.</p> <p>Does not go to teahouses, because people who regularly go to the tea houses do not have a good reputation among the <i>bazaaris</i>.</p> <p>Has not seen a female shopkeeper</p>	High	In the gold bazaar, the number of female customers is more than men.	<p>Absolutely satisfied.</p> <p>He uses the lavatory in the mosque near his shop.</p>	No comment	<p>ICHHTO is against any kind of change and development in the bazaar.</p> <p>Cultural and educational events don't benefit the bazaar. However, they can benefit young people in the bazaar and city center.</p> <p>Today, the bazaar has no influence in the politics.</p> <p>He mentioned the negative effect of</p>

		in the bazaar (at least not in the gold bazaar).					the US sanctions on the economy of the bazaar. The bazaars in different cities (especially the Tehran Bazaar) still have an influence on each other.
8	<u>Date: 17.03.13</u> <i>Bazaari</i> , food vendor (assistant of the old owner of the shop) Age: 51 Gender: Male	The young generation in the bazaar is the minority. Most of the <i>bazaaris</i> are old. Bazaar community is willing to open up to new generations. Women are not able to work. They just study with no purpose. Also in the bazaar, if the business is serious, women should be out of it.	High	No comment	Satisfied	No comment	He agrees that cultural and educational events can benefit the bazaar. Today, the bazaar has more influence in the politics, comparing to the past.
9	<u>Date: 17.03.13</u> <i>Bazaari</i> , Jeweler Age: 53 Gender: Male	Women do not work in the bazaar. The ones, who work here, are in the workshops. You cannot usually see them. The bazaar in Tabriz is more traditional than the bazaar of Tehran. He does not prefer to be in contact with the bazaar community. The conversations in the bazaar are mostly about politics. His social interactions are out of the bazaar. The current comparative	Low	The number of women is less than men.	No comment	Satisfied	Cultural and educational events can benefit the bazaar. Such activities can change the conservative mentality in the bazaar. ICHHTO is following the ideological policies of the state, by inscribing sites such as Tabriz Bazaar and <i>Sheikh-Safi-eddin</i> Shrine in Ardabil in the World Heritage List. Thinks that the Azerbaijan Province is marginalized in the central policies of the state. In general, the bazaar is not influential in the politics and the economy. He mentioned the negative effect of the US sanctions on the economy of

		economy has made the <i>bazaaris</i> and investors more conservative, comparing to the past.					the bazaar.
10	<u>Date: 17.03.13</u> <i>Bazaari</i> , electronic devices Age: 78 Gender: Male	Most of his social interactions in his shop, with his colleagues. The importance of Turkish language. Bazaar community is willing to open up to the new generation. There is no (or very few) female shopkeeper in the bazaar.	High	The number of women is less than men.	Satisfied in general. The cooling and heating systems are not efficient.	No comment	He explained the hierarchy of bazaar community to the author (mentioned in Chapter Four). The bazaars in different cities (especially the Tabriz, Tehran and Isfahan Bazaars) still have an influence on each other.
11	<u>Date: 17.03.13</u> <i>Bazaari</i> , food retailer Age: 61 Gender: Male	Most of his social interactions in his shop, with his colleagues. Bazaar is not suitable for women as a workplace.	High	The number of women is less than men.	Satisfied in general.	No comment	He agrees that cultural and educational events can have financial benefits for the bazaar, by attracting more passengers and potential customers. He mentioned the negative effect of the US sanctions on the economy of the bazaar.
12	<u>Date: 17.03.13</u> <i>Bazaari</i> in an antique shop Age: 71 Gender: Male	The bazaar community is willing to open up to the young generation. The religious people in the bazaar and the clergy should be less controlling in regards to the public life of the bazaar community. The social interactions in the bazaar are limited due to the strict Islamic rules.	High	No comment	Not satisfied	No comment	With the interference of the ICHHTO, the story of the bazaar came to an end! ICHHTO does not care about using experiences of the bazaar community. They ignore us and our viewpoints. He complains about the existence of several vacant shops inside the bazaar, as well as large, vacant commercial complexes around the bazaar. Criticizes the Sahib-ul Amr project, at

		<p>Under the roof of the bazaar, things are more traditional than the outside.</p> <p>The original <i>bazaaris</i> are going.</p>					<p>the northern bazaar. They could not even sell fifty percent of their shops! These projects mainly follow the financial interests of the government. The owners of the new shops are not merchants. They gained the shops as a deal, in return for their services and investments in the project of constructing the commercial complexes.</p> <p>They do not know how to work in the bazaar.</p> <p>Criticizes the Azadegan Boulevard project, due to several accidents happened in it (including one deadly accident).</p> <p>Suggests providing more accessibility for the areas in the north of the bazaar.</p> <p>Suggests opening local libraries for the bazaar community, organized and supported by the members of this community.</p> <p>Suggests allowing the <i>bazaari</i> to have non-religious recreational activities after the working hours of the bazaar, such as traditional music.</p> <p>The traditional bazaar is not as powerful as it was in the past.</p>
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13	<p><u>Date: 17.03.13</u></p> <p>Shopkeeper selling goods used for wedding celebrations.</p> <p>Age: 29</p> <p>Gender: Female</p>	<p>She works with her brother and father in the shop.</p> <p>She is responsible for selling goods, such as cosmetics and female underwear.</p> <p>Her brother says that she could not work in the bazaar without her male family members. This is because of the traditional atmosphere of the bazaar.</p>	High	In their shop, they have more female customers.	She feels not comfortable when she has to use the toilets that other male colleagues usually use. They usually use the lavatories in the mosque near their shop.	No comment	No comment
The Regular Public: Female							
14	<p><u>Date: 02.03.14</u></p> <p>Purpose of being in the bazaar: shopping</p> <p>Age:46</p> <p>Orientation¹: Non-traditional</p> <p>Education: Bachelor's degree</p>	<p>She does not feel comfortable in the bazaar because the traditional culture in the bazaar is not welcoming for women like her (not wearing proper <i>hijab</i>).</p> <p>She believes that usually, people from the lower social classes regularly go to the bazaar for shopping.</p> <p>She does not visit the bazaar so often.</p> <p>She prefers the Tarbiat Street for shopping because the quality of the goods offered there is better and the goods are more modern.</p> <p>The people who go to the</p>	Low	No comment	The quality is very poor.	Low	She would be interested in educational and cultural activities within the bazaar.

¹ Interpretation of the author based on the statements of the interviewee and her appearance (see the explanations about the dress code and its types in Iranian public spaces in Chapter Three and the serial pictures of the Tabriz Bazaar and Tarbiat Street in Chapter Six).

		shopping streets, such as Tarbiat Street are from the middle class with a more open culture. Therefore, she feels more comfortable in the Tarbiat Street.					
15	<p><u>Date: 13.03.13</u></p> <p>Purpose of being in the bazaar: Site-seeing (from Hamedan)</p> <p>Age:23</p> <p>Orientation: Non-traditional</p> <p>Education: finished High school</p>	<p>She does not speak Turkish, and that limits their social interaction.</p> <p>The atmosphere is too male-dominated.</p> <p>She preferred to enter only the spaces, where already some women were present in them.</p> <p>She does not feel culturally comfortable and welcomed.</p> <p>She has experienced sexual harassment by looks and comments. She has had a similar experience in the Hamedan Bazaar in their hometown.</p> <p>She does not like the quality and style of the goods, offered in the bazaar.</p> <p>She does not go to bazaars for shopping, because of the lack of cultural openness in them.</p> <p>She prefers to shop in modern shopping centers.</p> <p>Social interactions in the bazaar have been only for necessary issues such as buying souvenirs or finding their direction.</p>	<p>Low</p> <p>She has experienced sexual harassment in the form of looks and comments.</p>	<p>The number of women is less than men.</p>	<p>She has not used the toilets in the bazaar.</p> <p>She has got lost often and mentioned the lack of signboards in the bazaar.</p>	<p>Low</p>	<p>No comment</p>

16	<p><u>Date: 14.03.13</u></p> <p>Purpose of being in the bazaar: Site-seeing and shopping</p> <p>Age:45</p> <p>Orientation: Traditional</p> <p>Education: finished High school</p>	<p>She is waiting for her husband who is praying in a mosque. She cannot pray in the mosque because there is no space for female prayers in the mosque.</p> <p>She believes that the bazaar is too crowded.</p> <p>The bazaar is not an appropriate place for women.</p> <p>She only goes to the bazaar of her city for necessary shopping.</p> <p>She goes to the bazaar once in a month. (in her hometown, <i>Orumiyeh</i>)</p> <p>She thinks Tabriz Bazaar is too big. This makes her confused and makes it hard to find the goods she needs.</p> <p>Her conversations with people have been only about shopping.</p>	Low	She assumes that the number of female users in the bazaar is lower than men.	Generally, satisfied, but has never used toilets in the bazaar.	No comment	She would not be interested in cultural and educational activities within a bazaar, due to its crowdedness and inappropriateness for women.
17	<p><u>Date: 17.03.13</u></p> <p>Purpose of being in the bazaar: shopping</p> <p>Age:48</p> <p>Orientation: Traditional</p> <p>Education: finished</p>	<p>She only visits the main <i>rastehs</i>. Does not go to random places in the bazaar.</p> <p>She does not come to the bazaar without company.</p> <p>She visits the bazaar only for shopping.</p>	Low	No comment	<p>Absolutely satisfied.</p> <p>She does not use the toilets in the bazaar.</p>	She does not need to sit in the bazaar.	No comment.

	secondary school						
18	<p><u>Date: 2.02.14</u></p> <p>Purpose of being in the bazaar: site-seeing (from Tehran- with Turkish ethnic background)</p> <p>Age:59</p> <p>Orientation: Non-traditional</p> <p>Education: finished High school</p>	<p>The middle-class and upper-middle-class social groups usually shop in the city (not in the bazaar).</p> <p>The atmosphere in the bazaar is very traditional and masculine. Women usually work in the governmental organizations.</p> <p>The general mentality in the bazaar does not accept women as co-workers in the bazaar.</p> <p>The appearance and the type of <i>hijab</i> are crucial in the bazaar.</p> <p>In the Turkish language, there is a word, "<i>bazaar Yetimi</i>." This is how we call the young boys who waste their time walking in the bazaar and disturbing women. The harassment usually is from such people, not the bazaar community. The bazaar community in Tabriz has a good reputation. However, they also don't seem to see the unnecessary presence of women in the bazaar appropriate.</p> <p>Most of the young members of the <i>bazaari</i> families do not prefer to continue the family business in the bazaar.</p>	<p>Low</p> <p>She has experienced physical, sexual harassment in the bazaar.</p>	<p>The number of women is less than men.</p> <p>The number of children is also very low. People don't bring their children to the bazaar due to the possibility of losing them in the crowd.</p>	<p>Does not use toilets in the bazaar.</p> <p>She has experienced no physical barriers to access places that she wanted to go to.</p>	<p>No comment</p>	<p>Cultural and educational activities within the bazaar are not suitable for girls, due to the masculine atmosphere in the bazaar.</p>

19	<p><u>Date: 2.02.14</u></p> <p>Purpose of being in the bazaar: site-seeing (from Tehran)</p> <p>Age:31</p> <p>Orientation: Non-traditional</p> <p>Education: Master's student</p>	<p>The atmosphere in the bazaars is not welcoming for women. For example, she would not like to use the teahouses in the bazaar, due to the strong masculine atmosphere within them.</p> <p>In general, she does not feel comfortable in the bazaar.</p> <p>She goes to the bazaar only for buying the goods that are available with reasonable prices only in the bazaar (for example gold).</p> <p>She might go to the bazaar maximum two times in a year.</p> <p>She has had no necessary conversations with people in the bazaar.</p> <p>Women do not work in the bazaar.</p>	Low	The number of women is less than men.	<p>She does not use toilets in the bazaar.</p> <p>She has gone to restaurants in Tabriz and Tehran bazaars.</p>	The buildings are old, and the spaces in the bazaar are too small and narrow and crowded.	<p>She would be interested in educational and cultural activities in the bazaar area. However, there are accessibility problems in this area, due to the air pollution, lack of proper public transportation and traffic jam within the city center.</p> <p>She thinks if trendy restaurants and coffee shops, modern bands and the trending fashion get into the bazaar, the young generation go to the bazaar more often.</p> <p>Bazaar needs more marketing to attract the young generation.</p>
20	<p><u>Date: 17.03.13</u></p> <p>Purpose of being in the bazaar: site-seeing (from <i>Hamedan</i>)</p> <p>Age:51</p> <p>Orientation: Traditional</p> <p>Education:</p>	<p>Not knowing Turkish can limit your social interactions in the bazaar.</p> <p>She preferred to enter only the spaces, where already some women were present in them.</p> <p>She does not come to the bazaar without a company.</p>	Low	No comment	She has not used the toilets in the bazaar.	No comment	No comment

	secondary school						
21	<p><u>Date: 14.03.13</u></p> <p>Female</p> <p>Purpose of going to the bazaar: shopping</p> <p>Age:32</p> <p>Orientation: Traditional</p> <p>Education: finished High school</p>	<p>She was sitting in the Tarbiat Street.</p> <p>She is comfortable in the bazaar because she has a proper <i>hijab</i>.</p>	High	Equal	Satisfied	No comment	No comment
22	<p><u>Date: 17.03.13</u></p> <p>Purpose of being in the bazaar: shopping</p> <p>Age:46</p> <p>Orientation: Traditional</p> <p>Education: finished secondary school</p>	<p>She does not come to the bazaar without company.</p>	Low	No comment	Satisfied	<p>No comment</p> <p>She sits sometimes in the open spaces in the <i>saras</i>.</p>	No comment

23	<p><u>Date: 18.10.14</u></p> <p>Purpose of going to the bazaar: shopping</p> <p>Age:53</p> <p>Orientation: Traditional</p> <p>Education: finished High school</p>	<p>She was sitting on a bench in the Tarbiat Street because she was bored and wanted to spend some time out. She said she would not do the same thing in the bazaar.</p> <p>Tabriz is traditional, and the bazaar area is more traditional than the modern neighborhoods.</p> <p>She goes to the bazaar for buying good quality local grocery, with reasonable prices. The prices are low in the bazaar.</p> <p>She doesn't talk to people in the bazaar.</p> <p>She just does the shopping and gets out.</p>	Low	No comment	She doesn't use public facilities and toilets.	No comment	She agrees that cultural and educational events can be interesting for housewives living in the surrounding neighborhoods.
24	<p><u>Date: 18.10.14</u></p> <p>Purpose of being in the bazaar: shopping</p> <p>Age:32</p> <p>Orientation: Traditional</p> <p>Education: finished High school</p>	<p>She prefers going to Tarbiat Street.</p> <p>In Tarbiat the goods are of better quality, and the prices are not high.</p> <p>But she is comfortable in the bazaar as well because she has perfect Islamic <i>hijab</i>.</p> <p>She just shops in the bazaar. Mainly in <i>rastehs</i>.</p> <p>She doesn't talk to people.</p>	Low	No comment	Satisfied	No comment	She does not find cultural and educational centers necessary and useful.
25	<p><u>Date: 18.10.14</u></p> <p>Purpose of</p>	<p>She is perfectly comfortable in the bazaar.</p>	High	No comment	She doesn't use public facilities and	No comment	Cultural activities can be interesting in the bazaar.

	<p>being in the bazaar: photographing</p> <p>Age:27</p> <p>Orientation: Non-traditional</p> <p>Education: Bachelor's student</p>	<p>But she is comfortable in the bazaar because she has perfect Islamic <i>hijab</i>.</p> <p>She enjoys photographing the daily life in the bazaar.</p> <p>She doesn't talk to people.</p>			toilets.		
26	<p><u>Date: 18.10.14</u></p> <p>Purpose of being in the bazaar: Fieldwork for studies</p> <p>Age:24</p> <p>Orientation: Non-traditional</p> <p>Education: Master's student</p>	<p>She is one of the architecture students, studying the architecture of the bazaar.</p> <p>She was born in Tabriz, but this is the first time that she came.</p> <p>She finds the atmosphere too traditional.</p>	Low	Women are less in number.	She and her classmates have used the toilets in the bazaar.	She and her classmates sit on the benches in open spaces when they are in the bazaar.	<p>Educational and cultural activities in the bazaar can be interesting for her because she likes the historic architecture of the bazaar.</p> <p>At the university, they are also interested in finding ways to reconnect the bazaar and the city.</p>
27	<p><u>Date: 18.10.14</u></p> <p>Purpose of being in the bazaar: Fieldwork for studies</p> <p>Age:23</p> <p>Orientation:</p>	<p>She is one of the architecture students, studying the architecture of the bazaar.</p> <p>She is from Tehran.</p> <p>She has visited the Tabriz Bazaar before coming to Tabriz as a student.</p> <p>She finds the atmosphere too</p>	Low	Women are less in number.	She and her classmates have used the toilets in the bazaar.	<p>She and her classmates sit on the benches in open spaces when they are in the bazaar.</p> <p>She has also used the coffee corners at the</p>	<p>Educational and cultural activities in the bazaar can attract the younger generation to the bazaar.</p> <p>At the university, they are working mainly on physical issues and seeking architectural solutions for reconnecting the bazaar and the city.</p>

	<p>Non-traditional</p> <p>Education: Master's student</p>	<p>traditional.</p> <p>However, she said that she is comfortable because she doesn't usually pay attention to the looks and comments. She simply does her work in the bazaar.</p>					<p>entrances of the <i>saras</i>, with no special problem. Although she felt that she does not belong to that space, nobody mistreated her.</p>	
28	<p><u>Date: 28.07.17</u></p> <p>The place of interview: Cottbus, Germany</p> <p>Age:28</p> <p>Orientation: Non-traditional</p> <p>Education: Master's degree in architecture</p>	-	-	-	-	-	<p>The interviewee is a Tabrizi architect. She explained about her experience of applying for an internship (about five years ago) to gain experience in the conservation workshops inside the Tabriz Bazaar.</p> <p>The MBTB authorities have rejected her application because of her gender. However, they have offered her a possibility to work inside the MBTB office, arguing that a woman can be active in our office but working inside the bazaar would not be appropriate.</p> <p>She said that one of her female classmates had a similar experience.</p>	

The Regular Public: Male

29	<p><u>Date:</u> <u>17.03.13</u></p> <p>Purpose of being in the bazaar: shopping</p> <p>Age:40</p> <p>Education: finished High school</p>	<p>He regularly goes to the wholesale shops in the bazaar to buy goods for his shop in the city .</p> <p>The price is the first important factor in the bazaar. With the shopkeepers</p> <p>Topics are about business.</p>	High	No comment	Satisfied, but there is room for improvement.	Very good	He thinks cultural and educational activities might benefit the bazaar.
30	<p><u>Date:</u> <u>17.03.13</u></p> <p>Purpose of being in the bazaar: shopping</p> <p>Age:42</p> <p>Education: finished High school</p>	<p>He is here for the yearly shopping for <i>Norooz</i> (the Persian New Year).</p> <p>He does not talk to strangers in the bazaar.</p>	low	No comment	Satisfied	Very good	No comment
31	<p><u>Date:</u> <u>18.10.14</u></p> <p>Purpose of being in the bazaar: spending free time</p>	<p>He was there together with his younger friend for spending their spare time.</p> <p>He likes walking in the bazaar.</p>	High	No comment	Satisfied	Satisfied	Cultural activities within the bazaar can be interesting for him.

	Age:18 Education: High school student						
32	<u>Date:</u> <u>18.10.14</u> Purpose of being in the bazaar: site- seeing Age:49	Together with his relative, they came from the Kurdistan region of Iraq. They were buying food from a street food vendor. They are interested in talking to people and get to know the culture. They are familiar with the Turkish language.	Low	No comment	Satisfied	Satisfied	No comment
33	<u>Date:</u> <u>17.03.13</u> Purpose of being in the bazaar: shopping Age:62 Education: finished High school	I interviewed him in a traditional tea house. He was chatting with other men in the tea house. He regularly goes to the wholesale shops in the bazaar to buy goods for his shop in the city . He likes the traditional architecture in the bazaar.	High	No comment	Satisfied	Satisfied	No comment
The Members and Staff of the Seminary Schools in the Bazaar							
34	<u>Date:</u> <u>17.03.13</u> Purpose of	The atmosphere in the bazaar (especially areas around the seminary schools) should be controlled according to the	High	No comment	Satisfied	Satisfied	He thinks that cultural and educational activities in the bazaar can be beneficial for connecting the seminary schools and universities in

	<p>being in the bazaar: Student of a Seminary school Age:21 Gender: male</p>	<p>Islamic values.</p> <p>Women can pray in the mosques, but usually, they do not have proper <i>hijab</i>. The local women should be controlled. However, the rules for female tourists should not be so strict.</p> <p>Some of the students of the seminary schools live within the bazaar. The traditional architecture of the bazaar is important for him.</p> <p>He has daily social interaction with the <i>bazaaris</i> about religious topics.</p> <p>The discussion topics with other students are mainly about expanding the international activities of the seminary schools.</p>					<p>the city so that the universities can develop in terms of Islamic cultural values.</p> <p>The inactive seminary schools in the bazaar should be revitalized.</p>
35	<p><u>Date:</u> <u>17.03.13</u></p> <p>Purpose of being in the bazaar: works in the bookshop of the <i>Talebiyya</i> Seminary School Age:21</p>	<p>Everyday social interacting with customers, who are usually students of the seminary schools.</p> <p>Daily social interaction with the students of the seminary school.</p> <p>Topics are mostly history and religion.</p>	High	No comment	Absolutely satisfied.	No comment	<p>He agrees that cultural and educational events can benefit the bazaar.</p> <p>He recommends expanding the diversity of the books offered (more than only religious topics).</p>

	Gender: male Education: Bachelor's student						
36	<u>Date:</u> <u>17.03.13</u> Purpose of being in the bazaar: Library staff Age:29 Gender: male Education: finished high school	Students come here to prepare for exams and university entrance exams. Most of the library members are from the seminary schools. The library is only for men. The books are mainly about religious and historical topics. He has everyday social interacting with customers, who are usually students of the seminary schools. Discussions are about religious topics.	High	No comment	Satisfied	No comment	No comment

Table A-1. The interview data grid (Yadollahi).

C. Interviews with the Authorities Involved With the Management of the Tabriz Bazaar

Interview with Mr. Akbar Tagizadeh, the former director of the Iranian Cultural Heritage

Organization (ICHO) branch in East Azerbaijan Province, Iran (1993–2004)

Topic of the interview: A reflection on the contemporary history of the management of the Tabriz Bazaar

Date of Interview: 10.06.2010

Place: Tehran

A Summary of the Interview:

In the 1960's, the governor of the Eastern Azerbaijan, Mr. *Maham* starts regeneration projects at the city center in Tabriz. Now that I reflect on his strategies, I can say that he wanted to destroy the bazaar. The basis of the argument is that the bazaar is a dark and unhealthy place; he started to destroy some of the bazaar's domes. The *bazaaris* gather and oppose the destructions. Finally, they agree to cover the bazaar with a white façade. However, since the result was unpleasant for the *bazaaris*, they started to paint brick patterns on the white surface.

The centralized state-oriented management system has started from the time of Reza Shah. He wanted to have a totalitarian system with its center in Tehran. The government began to control the people's affairs. The people were marginalized from decision-making.

Before Reza Shah, people had more chances to participate in their own affairs. The reconstruction of Tabriz after several earthquakes is a proof of that. Another proof is the social system in the bazaar. The members of the bazaar give financial and social support to each other. The bazaar can solve its own problems.

That is why I believe that we should not think about managing the bazaar, rather we should learn from the bazaar. The bazaar can be a school of architecture, management, economics, and sociology. We should not humiliate the bazaar because it is old. We should not tell the bazaar community that "you do not know how to solve your problems." We should accept and trust in their rights and knowledge to manage their affairs. This large bazaar cannot be managed merely by governmental resources.

For example, traditionally, within the bazaar, the *bazaaris* are responsible for the protection of goods. Everything that is under the roof of the bazaar was observed and protected by the bazaar community. The safety and observation on the rooftops were the responsibilities of the government.

As a government, we should learn from the bazaar and use these traditional solutions for the management problems out of the bazaar.

If we decide to make changes in the bazaar, we should explain the reasons to the bazaar community. The bazaar is always interested in a good deal. Therefore, if the bazaar community is convinced that a decision is to their benefit, for sure, they will cooperate with it.

When I started working in the Tabriz Bazaar 1993, the quality of the physical structure of the bazaar was really poor. This was due to the centralized management system that did not allow the *bazaaris* to be actively involved in rebuilding the bazaar. The participation of the bazaar (in the conservation budget) was really low in those years, for example around ten percent.

Since I was from Tabriz and I knew some of the *bazaaris*, they started to trust us. Our aim was to increase the participation of the *bazaaris* gradually until it reaches 100%. The government (ICHO) would only be involved as the advisor and for the purpose of controlling the quality of the projects.

After the Islamic Revolution, we had marginalized the bazaar community. The Islamic Council of the bazaar was on our side. However, we (ICHO) did not want to negotiate with the Islamic Council of the bazaar because the *bazaaris* did not trust them and would not cooperate with them. We started the negotiations with the bazaar community. As a result of our negotiations, the rate of participation of the *bazaari* was increased up to 25 percent. When I was leaving the direction in some cases, this rate rose to even 90 percent participation from the *bazaari* side and two percent from ICHO. So, we did not have to spend money for the conservation projects.

We started to teach the *bazaaris* regarding the conservation techniques through hiring the young people from *bazaari*-related families as the ICHO staff. This created a trust in the bazaar community. I also had communications with the Municipality and the Organization for Economics in order to create cooperation and harmony in the policy-making about the bazaar.

The responsibility of ICHO is to educate and give consultations to the bazaar and leave the bazaar community to solve the problems in the bazaar. We should only facilitate the conservation.

The Interview Full Text in Persian

پس از توضیح در مورد هدف مصاحبه و موضوع پایان نامه کارشناسی ارشد مصاحبه شروع شد.

مهندس تقی زاده 10.6.2010

من زمان رو میخوام از اوایل دهه چهل آغاز کنم قدم به قدم بیام به سال 73 که یه کمی جدی تر شد نگاهها به سمت مردم بازار بازاریا. و یه نکاتی بود که شنیدم یا به خاطر دارم.. و سال 73 خودم درگیرش بودم.. بتونم مطالبی رو بگم. امیدوارم که کمک کنه.

دهه 40 نمیدانم چه سالش باید بگردم پیدا کنم بعد براتون بگم: یه استانداری بوده در آذربایجان شرقی به اسم آقای مهام سال 36. که آقای مهام بعدها شهردار تهران هم میشه و در تهران هم خیلی کار کرده در اون دوره و اسباب خیر در تهران بوده در حوزه عمرانی خیلی آدم کار بلدی بوده. تبریز که میره یه بازدید میره بازار و برمیگرده نظریه ای رو پخته میکنه توی حوزه خودش که الان که دارم من به اون مسئله نگاه میکنم این رو میبینم که میخواسته بازار رو تخریب کنه و میاد میگه که بازاریایی که من دیدیم همه بیماران، رنگشون زرده، و آفتاب نمیبینن و ما نباید بزاییم که مردممون اینجوری در اثر کمبود آفتاب مثلا از بین برن. و برای اینکه بتونه حل بکنه شروع میکنه به تخریب گنبد های بازار. بازاریا جمع میشن میرن پیشش و میگن که این چه مصیبتیه؟! میگه روی همتون زرده و بیمار شدید و نور آفتاب ندارید تو بازار. باهات تند برخورد میکنن و میگن ما نمیزاریم بازار تخریب بشه و حداکثرش اینه که بازارو سفیدش میکنیم که همه جاش نور باران بشه. من یادمه نهضت سفید کردن همه طاق گنبدای بازار. الان هم حتی یه جاهایی احتمالا بقایای اونن وجود داره. پس از اینکه سفید میکنند دیگه بهانه گرفته میشه. (با خنده) البته خیلی .. یه جور تخم مرغی عجیب و غریب بدی شد. بعد میان روی ایینو طرح آجر بارنگ چیز میکنن. میکشن روش. اون چند تا گنبد ریخته رو هم کسی دست نمیزنه. میمونه همونطور. تو چهارسوق مثلا کلاه دوزا پیکش هست.

- کلاه دوزا یه کم شمال بازاره

بله یه کمی پایین تر از صادقیه س. بعد ها حتی این چهارسوق رو بنا میارن از کرمان، آجر میبرن از تهران. حالا چرا از کرمان رو نمیدونم. اون موقع اوستا رضا که بعدها گنبد مسجد کیود رو اجرا کرد، مسجد دانشگاه شریف رو اجرا کرد. او همکاری نکرده با اینا یا چه شده هنوز این رمزا برام گشوده نشده. به هر حال موضوع عمده سیاسی بوده. اعتراضات بسیار جدی مردمی پشتش وجود داشته در ارتباط با این تخریب گنبد ها.

به تدریج کلا شروع میکنن آرام آرام اختیار بازاریا رو از حفاظت و مرمت بازار کم کردن.

- این همون دهه چهله؟

اینجا داره به تدریج زیاد تر میشه، دولت حضور بیشتری میخواد داشته باشه اما آغاز تفکرات و اندیشه این شکلی اساسا از 1300 به اینوره. یعنی زمانی که رضا شاه میاد، خیلی از کارایی که توسط مردم انجام میشد، رضا شاه اومد اینا ر حکومتی کرد. یکی از کارای بسیار بد رضا شاه که میشه بهش انتقاد بسیار جدی ای کرد همینه. که کارایی رو که مردم انجام میدادن رو به سمت خودش کشید که در جهت تمامیت خواهی بود و در جهت متمرکز کردن یا هر چی بود، یه کار بسیار عبث و بیهوده و بدی بود که مردم رو از صحنه به تدریج خارج کرد و مردم رو فرستاد به کارای جزئی.

بنده یه مثالی بزنم: همه ما میگیم که حکومت قاجار حاکمات فاسد بدن و کار نیمکردن و.. و شاید هم بوده. یه همچین حکومتیایی طبیعتا نمیتونستن که شهر بسازن! ما اینهمه دلریم زور میزنیم، پس از زلزله بم، با این همه امکانات و پول نفت.. هنوز موفق نشدیم بم رو کارشو تموم کنیم. سال 1193 ه ق. کاشان زلزله میشه. این سال درست سالیست که آقا محمد خان قاجار از شیراز میاد

به تهران که سلسله قاجاریه رو تاسیس کنه. این زلزله همه آنچه رو که روی زمین بوده از بین میبره. در آخر دوره قاجار کاشان از لحاظ کشاورزی و معماری شهر سازی به مرتبه بالایی میرسه. این شهر اگر ما میتونستیم بافتش رو حفظ کنیم بدون تردید یکی از بالا ترین شهر های ثبت جهانی عالم میشد. خوب همش اینا دوره قاجار ساخته شده.

درست در همین سال به زلزله دز تبریز میشه. متون میگن که جمعیت شهر بین 300000-400000 نفر بوده. پس از زلزله که 6-7 ماه طول میکشه. حتما پس لرزه هاشه، جمعیت شهر رو آمار میگیرن میشه 4030 نفر. یا میمیرن یا در میرن. باز متون میگن که هیچ چیزی بیش از نو و جب از روی خاک بالاتر نمونده بود. در همین دوره تبریز به یکی از شهرهای پر افتخار منطقه تبدیل میشه. هم از نظر تجارت و اقتصاد. کله به جز دو تا سه تا بنا هر چی در تبریز داریم از دوره قاجاره. اگر حکومت فاسد بوده اینا چه شکلی ساخته شده؟ با چه مدیریتی؟ کی بوده؟ نکته کلیدی اینه که مردم کار خودشونو خودشون انجام میدادن و حکومت کاری به کار مردم نداشت. شهر تونسته خودش خودش رو بسازه. یعنی مکانیزی وجود داشته که این بحران رو مدیریت کنه. علی رقم اینکه این همه ادم میمیرن، الگوها و مکانیزم ها نیممیرن و بازمانده ها با اون الگو و مکانیزم کار خودشونو پیش میبرن.

همین بازار با نهاد هایی که درون خودش ساخته یک دونه گدا نمیزاره تو شهر بمونه. یک دونه گدا الان پیدا نمیکند در شهر تبریز. یعنی مکانیزی درست کرده. در داخل همین بازار مکانیزی درست کرده که کمک میکنه به کسانی که شغل ندارند و بی بضاعت ها و کسانی که دخترشونو میخوان شوهر بدن و جهیزیه ندارن و ... باز مکانیزی رو میتونید توی بازار ببینید که کسانی که ورشکست میشن این به تدریج میاد مسئله شونو حل میکنه. اون آدمو میاره میشونه، طلب کاراشم میاره میشونه. چرا بره زندون؟ اون بره زندون که طلب تو وصول نمیشه. بزا سر پا باشه بره تو بازار چیزی گیر بیاره مال تو رو هم بده. یه وقتایی کمک میکنن قرض میدن. ملکی داره کمک میکنن به هروش ملکش. خوب این مکانیزم ها و پکیجش به ترتیبی طراحی میشه، به ترتیبی ریش سپیدانه این اتفاقا میافته که بازار معضلات خودش رو و مدیریت خودش رو میتونه سامان بده.

بنابراین اصلا درست نیست که بریم بازار رو مدیریت کنیم. که شما از من پرسیدید که چه شکلی بازار رو مدیریت کنیم؟ اصلا لازم نیست بازار رو مدیریت کنیم. مدیریت رو باید از بازار یاد بگیریم. کار خودشونو و بازاریم به خودشون. این امکان رو براشون فراهم کنیم. به رسمیتشون بشناسیم. بریم بها بزاریم کار خودشونو خودشون بکنن. ما چیکاره ایم اصلا؟! که بریم بهشون بگیم اینو اینجوری نیار اونجوری بزار. .. اون خیلی فارق تحصیل تر از بنده است. مطمئن باشید اگر بازار تبریز رو با این نگاه برید توش بچرخید، یه دانشگاهیست که توش رشته های متفاوتی وجود داره. اقتصاد، معماری، جامعه شناسی، مرمت و ... اینو ما به رسمیت بشناسیم. نباید اینو منکوبش بکنیم. نباید تحقیرش بکنیم. نباید بگیم که شما چیزی نمیدونید. بر عکس! باید بریم و زانو بزیم و یاد بگیریم ازشون. دلیل عمده پیر و فرتوت شدن بازار تبریز بر میگردد به این که ما به رسمیت نشناخته ایم بازار رو و گفتیم که این حوزه حوزه حاکمیتی حکومته و تو نمیتونی بهش دست بزنی. نمیتونی مرمت بکنی. نمیتونی دخالت بکنی. برو کنار من میخوام این کارو انجام بدم. اما منم این کارو نمیتونم انجام بدم. این سطح وسیع بازار رو یک گروه، دولت هم حتی نمیتونه .. تازه حالا اومدیمو یه دولت هم تونست. اونوقت دولت عوض میشه دولت بعدی یه سلیقه دیگه داره. مدیر بعدی یه روال و مشرب دیگه داره. خوب نمیتونه! بازار وایسته تا یه آدمی که با اون مشرب مثلا سازگاره بیاد سرکار. بنابراین ما در بازار باید شیوه های اجرایی رو انتخاب کنیم. این شیوه ها کمک بکنه به پایدار بودن "مدیریت سنتی" داخل بازار. مثلا در ارتباط با حفاظت اموال بازار از خیلی صدها قبل یه مکانیزی وجود داره. شب که میشه که بازار یا میرن خونه هاشون. داخل بازار رو خود بازار یا حفاظت میکنند. بام رو دولت. همین الان هم این شکلیست. یعنی شما برید به بازار (الان ساعت 5.30-6.00) دیگه بازار تعطیله دیگه. برید در کارونسرا ها رو بزید. یه نفر خواهد آمد درو باز کنه. اون آدم مسئول حفاظت اونجاس. حالا یه نفر، دو نفر بر حسب بزرگی کوچیکی. آجان نمیتونه بره اونجا. او مسئولیت حفاظت سطح 0+ رو داره. اون آدمی که اونجا داره.. نباید اسمشو بگم سرایدار.. ادا باشی یه مانیزم حقوقی داره. نمایان بگن بهش آقا 100000 تون حقوق توه. حقوق بگیر این شکلی نیست. چون حقوق بگیر این شکلی حقوقشو میگره به بنیه چیزی کاری نداره. ادا باشی از چیزایی که میاد داخل

کاروونسرا که می‌شماره آن چیزی که میره بیرون ازش پول میگیره. پس باید بدانه که چی وجود داره اینجا، چون اصلا زندگیش وابسته به آن چیز نیست که اینجا وجود دراه. و برای این مکانیزمی ساخته که وابسته به حقوق تولت نیست، وابسته و پول حجره دار نیست، وابسته به مالی است که ازش باید حفاظت کنه.

باید اینا رو شناخت و بزاریم که این سیستم روزآمد بشه نه اینکه این سیستم رو حذف کنیم. به عنوان دولت هیچ کاری نکنیم. اما به نهاد های پژوهشی خیلی سفارش میکنم. یک) بریم بگیریم اینا رو بشناسیم. و این الگو ها رو دولوپه بکنیم به جاهای مختلف دیگه. ما خیلی معضل داریم در جامعه مون و یک دانشکده وجود داره اونجا و اینارو تولید کرده. اگر روزآمدش بکنیم و بتونیم در جاهای مختلف سرزمینمون ازش بهره بگیریم خیل از معضلات جامعه مون حل میشه. و اگر بتونیم این رو پس از روزآمد کردن به بازاریا معرفی کنیم مطمئن باشید بازاریا قبول میکنند. بازار جایبست که مشتری کالای خوبه. حالا یه وقت این فرشه، یه وقت سخن خوبه. بازار یه همچین جایبست. هر آن چیزی که به دردش میخورده مشتریسه. اگر ما بتونیم در حوزه پژوهش مطلبی رو در خور بارار و متناسب با فهم بازار و شرایط اجتماعی-سیاسی بازار براش تولید کنیم. مطمئن باشید که بازار اونرو خواهد پذیرفت و اون شیوه مرسوم خودش رو روزآمد خواهد کرد.

من سال 73 که رفتم میراث، به یاد دارم که اگر از مثلا تیمچه امیر وارد بشیم تا بریم از جلوی صادقیه اون بالا و برسیم جلوی پل بازار 60-70 جا شمع زده بودند که طاقا نیاد پایین. طبیعیست که در همچین شرایطی آدمی که مغازه داره امن نیست شرایطش. حالا چطوری مشتری بره اونجا؟ خوب این رو شرایط اقتصادی بازار هم خیلی لطمه وارد کرده بود. دو مدیر قبل از من آقای وهاب زاده و آقای دکتر تهرانی اینا کار رو آغاز کرده بودند که بازاریا رو مشارکت بدن در مرمت کالبد بازار و خودشون دخالتشون کمتر بکنن چون قبل از اون همه این کارا توسط دولت انجام میشد. بازاریا رو ما گزاشته بودیم کنار. اگه بازاری خودش سرپا بود و میزاشتیم دخالت کنه نمیزاشت یه دونه از این شمعها بالا سرش باشه. ما حیات اقتصادی-اجتماعیش رو جان خودش رو اصلا به مخاطره انداختیم. بیچاره رو کاملا غیر فعالش کرده بودیم با روش های خودمون. منتها تا اون سال خیلی درصد مشارکت بازاریا زیاد نبود. شاید مثلا 10%.

خوب من بومی اونجا بودم. تعدادی از بازاریا فامیلمون بودن و میشناختن بازار رو. با تعدادی از این آدمای بازار آمدم چند تا جلسه گزاشتیم و آسیب شناسی کردیم. که چه کنیم که مدیریت مرمت بازار بشه به عهده خود بازاریا. حقیقتش این بود که من اعتماد داشتم که اینا میتونن این کاررو انجام بدن. و از اونور هم اونا به من اعتماد داشتند و این آغاز خوبی شد.

بازاری خیلی کم اعتماد میکنه. تاریخ بهش یاد داده که همیشه محافظه کار باشه. منتظر باشه چیزی رو تست بکنه... چند تا از اون آسیب شناسی حاصل درومد که تصمیم گرفتیم اینارو عوض کنیم. اصلا مدیریت مرمت مال خود بازار. تامین منابع مالی مرمت (از سوی بازاریا) به تدریج هر سال زیاد بشه تا 100% منابع مالی از طرف بازاریا بشه. دولت بشینه بیرون. ما جایگاهمون بشه فقط در حد نظارت و اجرای کیفی کار.

برای اینکه این کاررا انجام بدیم باید بریم به هر سرا و تیمچه و ریش سپیدان اونجا رو بهشون این چیز رو بدیم. رفتیم دیدیم همه ریش سپیدارو تاروندیم. اصلا ریش سپیدی نمونه. هستند آدمای پیر، منتهی دیگه اون اختیار رو نداره.

پس از انقلاب همه ریش سپیدای بازار رو یا واقعا حذف کرده بودیم یا اصلا از شهر رفته بودند. جاش انجمن اسلامی بازار رو گزاشته بودیم. ما نه البته حکومت. انجمن اسلامی بازار رو هم بازاریا باهانش کار نمیکردند. بهشون اعتماد نمیکردند. حضور داشتند اونا. ولی اون کار خودشو میکرد بازاری هم کار خودشو. ما اینکارو نکردیم که بریم با انجمن اسلامی بازار وارد مذاکره بشیم. هر چند که دوستامون بودند و کمکمون میکردن. ولی هر تیمچه و سرا رو که میرفتیم، با هاشون صحبت کنیم - که البته این در 3 یا 4 تیمچه و سرا اتفاق افتاد، بقیه خودش افتاد رو غلتک- یه بار یه الگویی درست شد و این الگو همینطوری قشنگ داشت

میرفت. این مذاکرات رو در 74 انجام دادیم. سال 75 اون 10% رو کردیم 20-25%. بقیه اش رو ما کمک میکردیم در غالب مصالحی که به بازار میدادیم یا نیرویی که تزریق میکردیم. این در عرض چند سال زمانی که من خارج میشدم 98% بازاریا بودن 2% ما بودیم. این 2% داریست بود و کسبه ای که واقعا مشکل داشتند مثل ورشکسته ها اونا رو کمک میکردیم به ترتیب خودشون و طوری که کسی نفهمه که اینا از کجا اومده. کرامت ها در بازار خیلی حفاظت میشه. با همین روال حفظ کرامت ها ما کمک های خودمونو انجام میدادیم. این بود که ما اصلن ریالی خرج نمیکردیم. به نظرم در سال 1384 شاید 2 میلیارد تومن بازاریا در بازار هزینه مرمت کردند بودند. اولاً ما اصلاً اون پول رو نداشتیم که بدیم. بعد تا این سطح نمیتونستیم انجام بدیم.

مثلاً آگه یه بخشی از مغازه ای استحکام بخشی بخواد. اونجا ملک من دولت نیست که توش کار انجام بدم. علاوه بر اون مغازه دار اون جا یه که ملک خصوصی داره. ما اصلن وارد همچین داستانی نمتونیم بشیم. اینا کارای خودشونو با کدخدا منشی با روال های خودشون حل میکنن. بهتره که من فقط یه ناظر باشم که فقط کیفیت کار رو نظارت کنم و چون دانشش رو دارم در قالب بچه هایی که درس خوانده این حوزه هستند خوب بهشون یاد میدن. که آگه اینشکلی کار کنی استحکام بخشی بهتری داره. یکی از بچه های مرمتی بازار رو من کردم همکارمون در بازار. که این خودش بچه بازاره. ما یه مرمتی داشتیم که فرزند بازار بود. بازار اینو به عنوان بچه خودش پذیرفت. و دیدیم دانش فنی رو هم داره از نظر مرمت. آرام آرام ما با دادن اطلاعات به بازار به نوعی دانش مرمت رو هم بردیم به بازار. حالا بازار میفهمه بلوکاژ چیه کانال نمزدا چیه. و آرام آرام آموزشش دادیم. علت کارهای مرمتی رو برایشون توضیح دادیم اگر مخالفت وجود داشت و میفهمید. یعنی این آموزش رو خیلی بردبارانه باید برد داخل بازار. با سبک و روش خودشون.

بازاریا خیلی وقتا به من میگفتن ما وقتی میریم سازمان میراث فرهنگی فکر نمیکنیم داریم میریم یه اداره، خونمونه. یعنی یک چنین ارتباطی رو برقرار کرده بودیم. یعنی وحشت دیگه نداشتند وقتی میومدن میراث. تو همون سالی که اومدم برای آسیب شناسی مشکلات بازار فهمیدم در بازار هم ما یه چیزی میگی هم شهرداری یه چیزی میگه. من رفتم با شهردار صحبت کردم گفتم آقا پروانه نده. گفت "چرا؟ قانون میگه پروانه رو من بدم" گفتم خوب خلاف میکنی. شهردار دوستمه. گفتم مثلاً پروانه میدی که اینجا رو بیاد پایه فلزی بزازه. توضیح دادم که اولاً غلطه. دو: قانون میگه که دخالت در همه حوزه های میراث فرهنگی و آثار تاریخی مال میراث فرهنگیه. ندانسته یه جرمیم کردی. گفت: "منافع داریم آخه ما". گفتم مگه منافعتون عوارض و اینا نیست؟ خوب ما به کسی پروانه میدیم که عوارضشو پرداخت کرده. بعد بیاد پیش ما پروانه بگیره. گفت آقا مخلصیم. پروانه اومد سمت ما. پروانه مرمت رو تو بازار دیگه ما دادیم. توی پروانه قشنگ آیتم هایی که باید کار بکنه عین آیتم های مرمتی برایشون مینویسیم. نفراتی که توی بازار داریم به عنوان ناظر اینا واقعا نظارت کیفی میکنن نه نظارت کمی.

اولین سرایی که کار میکردیم. ما بهشون گفته بودیم آگه مرمت بکنید اینجا واقعا خوب میشه. مشتریتون زیاد میشه. یکیشون برگشت گفت ما این کارو بکنیم خوب مالیاتچی پدر مارو در میاره. رفتم با مدیر کل اقتصاد و دارایی (که آدم بسیار فهیمی بود) صحبت کردیم. گفتم این اعتبارات شما به کی میره؟ گفت ما مالیات میگیریم میدیم به شما. گفتم خوب ما چیکار میکنیم میدیم مرمت بازار میکنیم. حالا این خودش میخواد مرمت کنه. بیایم چند سال ازش مالیات نگیریم یا کمتر بگیریم. حلاً تو دیگه نبین که اون چراغش خیلی روشن شده. بیایم یه کم بهشون مجال بدیم اون پولی رو که خرج کرده برگردونه. پذیرفت.

- مثلاً توی کره نی خانه دلیل اون وضع به حال خود رها شده گی بازار چیه؟ مگه اینا کاسب نیستند؟ چطور سقف داره میاد رو سرشون و کاری نمیکند؟

دلیل عمده شون برمرگرده به اینکه دولت اینا رو از مدیریت فضای تاریخیشون حذف کرده. آرام آرام ما باید بیاریم خودشونو مسئول زندگی خودشون کنیم.

اصلا بزارین به چیزی بگم. آبی که میخوریم چند سالیست دولتی شده. قبلاً آب شهرای مارو مگه دولت تامین میکرد؟ همین برقی که الان دولتی چند سال قبل مال بخش خصوصی بود. دوره ای که من جون بودم شهر تبریز 3 تا 4 تا کارخونه برق داشت. مال مردم بود. حالا اگه بخوایم دوباره بخش خصوصی یک کارخونه برق بسازه باید کلی روش کار بکنیم. چون ما اونو از گردونه انداختیم بیرون. ما بازاریارو روندیم تاروندیم از اون حوزه بلدی خودش انداختیم دور. حالا اگه اینو باری تو حوزه خودش آرام آرام میفهمه که بازارو چه شکلی باید مرمت کنه.

تکلیف ما اینه که جلوی کار اونو رو باز بکنیم. و همینکه با شهرداری به مدیریت به کاسه ای انجام بدیم با دارایی صحبت کنیم یا مثلاً تاسیسات زیربنایی بازار مال بخش خصوصی نیست. باید بریم اینا رو حل بکنیم. سال های آخری که من بودم دیگه به اینجا رسیدیم که بریم طرح تاسیسات زیربنایی بازار رو قرارداد ببندیم. که فاز اولش آماده شد. که 6-7 تا چیز رو مطالعه کرده. جمع آوری آبهای سطحی، فاضلاب، شبکه توزیع آب، شبکه اطفاع حریق و با بازاریا صحبت کردیم که شما زمستونا هرروز هرکدومتون به پیت دو سه لیتری نفت میبرید داخل حجره تون که باعث حریق میشه بایم اینو تبدیل به موتور خونه های متمرکز بکنیم و شوفاز داشته باشیم. که پذیرفتند که ما طراحی کنیم اجراشو خودشون بکنن. وقتی ببینه به نفعشه اصلن نیامد مقاومت بکنه. چون حیاتش مامتش و اقتصادش وابسته به اون چیز درسته میپذیره.

کم کم پذیرفته اند که دانش مرمت باید از حوزه تخصصی خودمون بگیرن. چون در زمینه دانش حفاظت اطلاعاتشون کمه. فهمیده اند که وظیفشون فقط حفاظت اموالشون نیست. حفاظت کالبد بازار هم هست. حالا من تصورم اینه که در مدیریت بازار ما کارای که واقعا از حیطة تخصص و توان های اونا خارجه دولت بره اون کارارو انجام بده. تمامی چیزایی رو که در توان اونهاست باید بزاره در اختیار خودشون و تشویقشون بکنه و نظام ریش سپیدی رو که - یادم رفت بگم : در هر کوچه و سرا که رفتیم شروع کردیم باهاشون صحبت کردن توی مسجد و اینا تشویقشون کردیم که بیاین سه نفر از ریش سفیداتونو انتخاب کنید و پولتونو بدید به اینا و حرفاتونم بگید به اینا اختیارتونو بدید به اینا. ما با اینا تعامل داریم. ما کمکمونو به اینا میکنیم. بعد به تدریج ریش سپیدا تو بازار پیدا شدن. آرام آرام آمدن بالا و نعماتش الان داره در بازار روشن میشه. که چقدر میتونن کمک بکنن در کارای غیر مرمتی حتی. مثلاً یکی دچار مشکل میشه کمکش میکنن یا با دلت رای زنی میکنن و برای راه انداختن کاراشون کمک میکنن.

Interview with Mr. Hosein Esmaili Sangari, the director of the MBTB

The topic of the Interview: The Current State of the Management System in the Tabriz Bazaar.

Date of Interview: 13.03.2013

Place: Tabriz

A Summary of the Interview

1. Main Policies and Attributes Towards the Bazaar

I have been the director of the Management Base of the Tabriz Bazaar (MBTB) since 2010. The management strategies in a dynamic World Heritage Site like the Tabriz Bazaar are complicated. At the moment 8000 shops are working in the bazaar. So, our job is to protect the dynamic character of the bazaar. In one sentence, we try to protect what has remained from the bazaar until today. We should not set strict conservation rules in the bazaar (like before). This will frighten the merchants.

The overall management system of the country is usually cooperative and does not create problems in this regard.

The principal investments of the MBTB on research projects in the Tabriz Bazaar are related to the consolidation of the physical structure, renovating the heating-cooling system and the drainage system. We have also continued with the documentation of the bazaar (preparing detailed maps of the buildings). However, we have a severe lack of budget in many fields. Sometimes we cannot even pay the salaries of our staff on time.

Due to the lack of budget, we have to prioritize the projects. At the moment, the priority is renovating the pathways in some parts. We also had to renovate the buildings in the central part of the bazaar, which was damaged because of the fire accident in the bazaar.

2. Position of MBTB Towards Members of the Social Network in the Bazaar

The present management plan of the Tabriz Bazaar is mainly based on the management plan in the World Heritage nomination dossier of the site. The future priorities could be continuing the consolidation of the physical structure because we have to be prepared for possible earthquakes. Architectural interventions within the areas, surrounding the bazaar could be another priority. We should re-connect the entrances of the bazaar with the vicinity (with architectural solutions).

About the participatory management, I should say that people are involved in all the affairs. The buildings that we have as heritage are their property. They have inherited the bazaar and developed it. 80 to 50 percent of the work in private properties are done through the financial participation of the owners. For the conservation of the private areas, the owners come to our office to get conservation permission. The interventions are under our (ICHHTO) supervision and financed by the owners. The maintenance of the public areas, mosques, central spaces of the *saras* and pathways is directly financed and done by us.

3. Policies Regarding Public Spaces in the Bazaar

Relating to the question about the involvement of the regular public; the regular public has not helped (in conservation projects of the bazaar). The *bazaaris* have enough money. Cooperation of the State and the *bazaari* is sufficient. Participation of the regular public is not necessary.

Regarding the questions about our communication with the involved actors and the regular public, we have meetings with other governmental organizations. Sometimes we use the opinions that suit us. The regular public also can enter the shops or come to us as a tourist or as a customer and share their opinions. People come here during the holidays. If their opinions are logical, we consider them.

Regarding the question about the Website of the MBTB, we are planning to activate our website for informing people and getting their opinions.

We are not in direct contact with UNESCO. The communications are done directly by the central Bureau for Management Bases in Tehran.

In Iran, similar to other developing countries, we have problems regarding heritage conservation. For example, we sometimes have problems with the Municipality and the MRUD. However, recently, due to the World Heritage status of the bazaar, the case of the bazaar is (politically) sensitive. Therefore, we have fewer problems now.

Every one to three months the Management Council of the Bazaar has meetings. The representatives of the City Governor and the Province Governor also attend these meetings.

Regarding the question about the policies of the MBTB for the public spaces and third places within the bazaar (viewing the bazaar as a large public place); we do not have specific plans. Even tourists from Japan or Germany know the popular restaurants in the Tabriz Bazaar. The bazaar has developed itself through centuries. We only follow and respect the original architectural patterns of the spaces. For example, it'd be nice if some investors would be interested in revitalizing the historic

bathhouses in the bazaar. Our most important problem is regarding the bathhouses. Other public buildings are active. Revitalizing such spaces depends on the participation of the private owners.

Regarding the questions about ways of attracting the young generation to the bazaar; this is not easy. We cannot only say that people should become interested in the bazaar. An in-depth cultural and educational work is needed. I always say to my students that it has always been this way. People are always attracted to the modern, shiny places. We are trying to stop the development of such shiny places in the bazaar area. We should think about what we could offer in the bazaar to make it attractive. For example, creating tourism camps in the bazaar, or holding workshops and educational events (with universities) in the bazaar could make it attractive. We could offer free museum tickets in the museums around the bazaar so that people come to the bazaar area and also visit the bazaar.

The Interview Full Text in Persian

مهندس اسماعیلی سنگری، مدیر پایگاه بازار تبریز

پس از توضیح در مورد هدف مصاحبه و موضوع پایان نامه دکتری مصاحبه شروع شد.

الف، بداللهی) از چه زمانی مدیر پایگاه هستید؟

ب، اسماعیلی) بیش از دو سال. تقریباً زمانی که پرونده در حال تکمیل بود و من مدیر پایگاه شهر تاریخی تبریز بودم و بازار زیر مجموعه بود، اسم مرا در پرونده بازار به عنوان مدیر پایگاه درج کردند.

الف) سئوالات من درباره‌ی سیاستهای کلی پایگاه در مدیریت بازار است. اصل کلی که شما برای مثلاً تخصیص بودجه یا تخصیص نیروی انسانی در نظر دارید چیست؟ اگر بخواهیم در یک کلمه خلاصه کنیم؟ به چه چیزی اولویت می‌دهید؟

ب،) در یک کلمه که نمی‌شود گفت، اما ماهیت سایتهای جهانی متفاوت است با مثلاً بازار که یکی از سایتهای منحصر به فرد در دنیاست بخاطر پویایی و سرزندگی، که هشت هزار کسبه در آن فعالیت می‌کنند. بنابراین کار شما بسیار متفاوت خواهد بود با سایتی مثل تخت جمشید یا چغازنبیل که فقط توریست برای بازدید می‌آید. بنابراین اینجا اصل اول حفظ و حفاظت از پویایی بازار است که به نظر من یکی از رازهای سرزندگی یک بنای تاریخی همان است که بتوانید زندگی را در آن جاری و ساری نگهدارید و در بازار این اتفاقات تا الان افتاده و حداقل باید سعی کنیم مانع آن نشویم و رضایتمندی کسبه هم باید تا حدی در نظر گرفته شود. بعضی وقتها ما با روش سختگیرانه وارد شده‌ایم که کسبه را بیزار کرده از بازار قبل از اینکه ثبت جهانی بشود. اینها همه ملاکهای مهم هستند، در یک کلمه بخواهیم بگوییم حفاظت از آنچه تا الان مانده.

الف) فکر می‌کنید مقامات بالاتر مثلاً میراث فرهنگی یا مدیریت پایگاهها هم همینطور فکر می‌کنند؟ آیا مشکلی داشته‌اید؟

ب) مشکلی نداشته‌ایم، به هر حال وقتی شما منطقی و علمی و دقیق بتوانید دلایل را بیان کنید نباید مانع تراشی بشود. چون به هر حال هدف هیچکس تخریب و ایجاد مشکل نیست.

الف) از زمانی که شما مسئول و مدیر اینجا بودید، چه فعالیتهای پژوهشی مهمی صورت گرفته؟

ب) از مهمترین فعالیتهای پژوهشی ما که در بازار انجام شد بحث مقاومتسازى بوده که یکی از بزرگترین دغدغه‌های ماست و هنوز به نتیجه‌ای نرسیده، بخاطر مصالح سنتی و ---؟ که هر جور بخواهید تکنولوژی واردش کنید اینها در مقابل لرزشها و تکانها شکننده هستند. در مقطعی با ژاپنی‌ها در رابطه با لرزمنگاری کار کرده‌ایم و بحث تاسیسات زیربنایی بازار که مشاورى روی آن کار کرده که طرحها تقریباً آماده شده و به دفتر فنی و استانداری داده‌ایم تایید کنند. بحث آب و فاضلاب و گرمایش و سرمایش و اینهاست، چون ما با بازاری‌ها گاز نمی‌دهیم چون خطرناک است. خیلی از جاهای بازار فاضلاب ندارد و مشکل بزرگیست. طرح راهبردی بازار را هم به مشاورى داده‌ایم کار کرده

الف) چه جوری؟

ب) بر پایه پلان مدیریت یک سری مطالعات در بازار انجام دادند. احتمالاً یادتان می‌آید که پرونده‌ی بازار تبریز خیلی عجله‌ای بسته شد و دقیق نبود. این طرح راهبردی فاز یکش انجام شده. اما به مرحله طرح که رسید بخاطر نبود بودجه متوقف شد. وضع مملکت طوریست که الان هفت هشت ماه است در هیچ زمینه‌ای بودجه نداریم. خیلی وضع خراب است. کارگروهايمان چند ماه است حقوق نگرفته‌اند. ولی در فاز اول بیشتر مطالعات و آسیب‌شناسی انجام شد و مطالعات دقیق‌تر شد، دانه به دانه، پلاک به پلاک، کارها انجام شده و نقشه‌های GIS را هم درآورده‌ایم و اینها کارهایی بوده که در این یکی دو سال سعی کردیم انجام بدهیم. یکی هم بحث مستندنگاری بازار که در زمان تکمیل پرونده تقریباً هفتاد عنصرش آماده بود و الان بیش از صد و بیست عنصر مستندنگاری و نقشه برداری کردیم.

الف) نظر عملیات مرمتی بیشتر کجاها لازم شده؟

ب) ببینید، اینجا بیست و هفت هکتار سازه‌ی سرپوشیده است، عملیات مرمت ما با بودجه‌ای که می‌دهند بیشتر معطوف به اولویت گذاری کارهای اضطراریست، یعنی اگر جایی احتمال ریزش یا رانش هست، سقف چکه می‌کند، و کارهای اضطراری. یک قسمت هم از آتش سوزی مانده بود که آنها را هم کامل کردیم، اما قسمتهای در طرح مرمت و پلان مدیریت می‌بینیم که جایی خیلی فرسوده است آنها را در اولویت می‌گذاریم و کارهای خیلی خوبی انجام شده، قسمتهایی کف سازی شده، قسمتهایی جداره ها، نمای سراها و بعضی وقتها استراکچر آنها کار شده.

الف) این پلان مدیریت همان است که در پرونده بود یا بعد کامل شد؟

ب) آن پلان که در پرونده بود است، بیشتر بر پایه ی همان است

الف) در چند سال آینده که از مسئولیت شما مانده، فکر می‌کنید چه چیزهایی لازم است؟ چه کارهای پژوهشی، یا مرمتی که در صورت وجود بودجه انجام شود؟

ب) یکی از مهمترین کارها به سرانجام رساندن بحث مقاومتسازى است. این شهر زلزله خیز است و یک زلزله در چنین ساعتی از روز بیايد شاید بالای دویست سیصد هزار نفر کشته بدهد. حجم عظیمی از آجرها روی سر مردم می‌ریزد و کشته می‌دهد. بعد بحث طراحی یکسری از قسمتها که شاید جزو بازار نباشند اما با بازار مرتبطند

الف) مثل؟

ب) بعضی ورودی‌های منتهی به خیابانها، یا محورهای قدیمی که به بازار منتهی می‌شود. بشود یک جوری چفت و بسطشان را با بازار انجام داد. اینها همه می‌توانند جزو اولویتها باشند

الف) سومین بخش سئوالات من درباره اینکه این پایگاه که نماینده میراث فرهنگی و یونسکوست، بین ذی‌نفع‌های دیگر چه جایگاهی دارد. اگر بخواهید یک تصویر کلی ارائه بدهید. از اینکه پایگاه، بازاری‌ها، مردم، چه کاره‌اند، این را چطور ترسیم می‌کنید؟ در اداره‌ی کل امور بازار.

ب) مردم که همه کاره هستند. به هر حال اینیه که ما در دست داریم مال آنهاست. ما نگیان هستیم و تلاش می‌کنیم حفاظت را به نحو احسن انجام بدهیم. ما در واقع یک راهنما و گاید هستیم وگرنه رضایتمندی مردم بسیار مهم است چون بازار را اینها دست به دست، سینه به سینه و نسل به نسل نگه داشته اند تا به ما رسیده. نقش‌ها تعریف شده هستند. ۸۰ درصد کارها با مشارکت مردمی انجام می‌شود، زیر نظر و تحت نظارت ما. می‌آیند پروانه می‌گیرند با هزینه خودشان و هزینه خودشان منتها با نظارت بچه‌های ما کار می‌گیرند. مگر فضاهای عمومی مثل معابر بازار، راسته‌ها، قسمتهایی از سراها، کفسازی‌ها، مساجد، که اینها را ما مستقیماً بودجه می‌گذاریم و نقشها تعریف شده هستند.

الف) یعنی مکانهای عمومی بودجه‌شان با دولت است.

ب) بله، و شخصی‌ها نصف- نصف، هشتاد بیست یا اینطور.

الف) به غیر از بازاری‌ها، بقیه‌ی مردم چطور؟ آنها نقشی دارند؟

ب) واقعیتش دروغ نباید بگویم، آنها کمکی نکرده‌اند. مردم معتقدند بازاری‌ها وضع خودشان به اندازه کافی خوب هست و پولدارهای ما بازاری‌ها هستند بنابراین نیازی نیست آنها کمک کنند. خودشان بخواهند می‌توانند از پس آن بریبایند. یا باید دولت کمک کند یا بازاری‌ها. لزومی ندارد مردم عامه هم بیایند کمک کنند

الف) راههای ارتباطی شما با ذی‌نفعهای دیگر، چگونه است؟ چون از نظر من مردم می‌توانند نه فقط از نظر مالی، بلکه مشارکت فکری کنند بالاخره اینجا بازار همه است

ب) در ارگانهای دیگر همیشه جلسه می‌گذاریم با مسئولین سازمانهای دیگر در ارتباط هستیم و نظرات آنها را می‌شنویم و خوب و بدش را سنجش می‌کنیم و خوبه‌ایش را انجام می‌دهیم اما مردم هم خب به عنوان توریست یا ارباب رجوع وارد مغازه‌ها می‌شوند و می‌آیند اینجا نظریاتشان را می‌گویند.

الف) پس اینجا هم می‌آیند؟

ب) بله. بخصوص در تعطیلات زیاد می‌آیند. نظری داشته باشند ما می‌نویسیم و اگر منطقی باشد، چون هر کس بر ظنه خودش نظر می‌دهند آنوقت سعی می‌کنیم انجام بدهیم

الف) شما وبسایتی دارید که وقتی من دیدم شماره تماس نداشت

ب) وبسایت ما چون تازه راه افتاده --- آقای مهندس ایلابی قرار شده سایت را به روز کنند. فعلاً دست روابط عمومی سازمان بود تازه می‌خواهند بدهند به ما که رویش کار کنیم

الف) هدفشان این است که با مردم ارتباط بیشتری داشته باشید

(ب) بله دیگر به هر حال وقتی شما وبسایت می‌نوویسی و اینتر آنطرف هر کسی بخواد نظر بدهد

(الف) با یونسکو چطور در ارتباطید؟ هر چند وقت یکبار؟

(ب) الان از تهران دستور داده‌اند خودمان مستقیماً ارتباط برقرار نکنیم و خودشان از دفتر مرکزی ارتباط برقرار کنند اگر نامه نگاری‌ست آنها تبادل می‌کنند

(الف) دفتر کاخ گلستان؟

(ب) نه. خود دفتر پایگاهها.

(الف) تا بحال به مشکلی برخوردیده‌اید؟ در همکاری با گروه‌های مختلف چه دولتی چه بازاریها. کارتان روان پیش می‌رود؟ مشکل خاصی هست که بخواهید برطرف بشود؟

(ب) ببینید واقعیت این است که در کشورهای جهان سوم یا در حال توسعه بحث میراث فرهنگی دغدغه‌ی خاص خودش را دارد. در اغلب کشورها خیلی جا نیفتاده. در کشور ما هم یک سری محدودیتهایی بوجود می‌آید یا پارادکسها یا تضادهایی بوجود می‌آید

(الف) مثلاً بین کی و کی؟ یا چی و چی؟

(ب) معمولاً بین ما و شهرداری، بین ما و مسکن شهرسازی، ولی من تلاش کرده‌ام تعاملات را بیشتر کردم و سعی کردم از انرژی‌ای که در شهر داری و شهرسازی هست به نفع میراث استفاده کنم. خوشبختانه از وقتی میراث جهانی شده حساسیت روی آن بیشتر است. سعی می‌کنند هر کاری را با ما هماهنگ کنند، نظر ما خیلی برایشان مهم است چون می‌دانند اگر گوش نکنند برایشان مشکل ساز می‌شود. تجربه‌ی اصفهان را دارند و برای همین کمی می‌ترسند.

(الف) شما یا میراث فرهنگی برای اینکه این تعاملات روانتر بشوند برنامه‌ای دارند؟

(ب) ما معمولاً هر دو ماه یکبار جلسات می‌گذاریم، سه ماه یکبار، یکماه یکبار جلسه داریم. جلسه‌ی شورای ساماندهی بازار که تحت‌المرکز معاون استانداری هم آنجا هست، فرماندار شهر هم هست. در این جلسات معمولاً معاملات بیشتر می‌شود

(الف) بخش چهارم سئوالات من، درباره‌ی سیاستهای پایگاه در مورد مکانهای عمومی موجود در بازار. شما در بخشی از صحبت‌هایتان اشاره کردید به اینکه وظایف ذی‌نفع‌های بازار چطور تقسیم می‌شود برای بهبود وضعیت یا کیفیت مکانهای عمومی در بازار مثلاً در تعریفی که من دارم، بعضی رستورانها از اماکن عمومی محسوب می‌شوند، یعنی هر جایی که افراد جامعه بتوانند در آن تعاملات اجتماعی داشته باشند. خود بازار یک مکان عمومی بزرگ است. فضاهای باز، قهوه‌خانه‌ها، مساجد، وظایف چطور تقسیم شده؟

(ب) از چه لحاظی؟

(الف) مثلاً ساماندهی فضاها از نظر ساماندهی کاربری یا اینکه آن فضاها چه کاربری‌ای داشته باشند چگونه استفاده شوند

(ب) اینها معمولاً در طول چند صد سال خودش کانالیزی شده و ما خیلی دخالت نمی‌کنیم چون سیر طبیعی‌اش دارد طی می‌شود مثلاً به عنوان مثال در بازار چلوکبابی حاج علی را داریم که طرف از آلمان یا یک کشور دیگر مثلاً ژاپن می‌آید می‌پرسد چلوکبابی حاج علی کجاست ما در این نقشی نداشتیم، خودشان با غذاها و کیفیت کارشان باعث شده. و به هر حال محیط سنتی است و نمی‌توانیم کانالیزه یا طراحی خاصی ایجاد کنیم جزو بدنه‌ی اصلی بازار است و از معماری همان الگو طبیعت می‌کند اما قسمتی از

آن تبدیل به چلوکبابی و رستوران سنتی یا قهوه‌خانه تبدیل می‌شود. فقط یکی دوتا سرمایه‌گذار پیدا شوند تا این قهوه‌خانه سنتی یا رستوران سنتی را تغییر کابری بدهند، مثلا حمام‌های بازار الان کار نمی‌کنند، مثلا حمام میرزا مهدی، اینها کار نمی‌کنند. اگر سرمایه‌گذاری پیدا شود! روی اینها کارهایی انجام بدهد با مشارکت خود مالک فقط اینطور می‌شود ساماندهی کرد. یعنی تنه‌امکانی که الان کار نمی‌کند در ابنیه‌ای که داریم، مثلا میدانید که زورخانه داریم که می‌خواهد احیا بشود، مسجد، راسته‌ها، همه کار می‌کنند اما حمامهای ما کار نمی‌کنند و می‌شود آنها را سوق داد به این مسیر.

الف) برای کسانی که کمتر به بازار مراجعه می‌کنند مثل جوانها که به پاساژها می‌روند برای گردش، از خیلی‌ها که پرسیدم احساس می‌کنم برایشان دسترسی راحت نیست، در آن فضا احساس راحتی نمی‌کنند. برنامه‌ای دارید که فضاهای عمومی موجود را برای اینجور آدمها قابل دسترس تر کند

ب) این کار مشکل‌تر است چون شعار دادنی نیست. شما باید یک کار فرهنگی انجام بدهید و در عین حال کار ساختاری انجام بدهید، تبلیغات لازم است، بحثی ست که از خانواده باید شروع بشود، فقط ما بیاییم بگوییم نمی‌شود، من همیشه در کلاس درس به بچه‌ها می‌گویم. همیشه همینطور بوده. اماکن پر زرق و برق جذابتهای خاص خودشان را داشتند و باید ببینیم چه چیزهایی را به عنوان جاذبه ارائه بدهیم خود بازاری‌ها هم می‌توانند خیلی نقش داشته باشند. سعی‌مان بر این باشد که اماکن پر زرق و برق را نگذاریم در کنار بازار شکل بگیرند، این راهکارها و تبلیغات. مثلا کمپ گردشگری در خود بازار بگذاریم یا کلاسهای آموزشی بگذاریم یا ورکشاپهایی را برگزار کنیم و نسل دانشجو را بکشانیم به اینجا. خوشبختانه استان ما نزدیک به سی هزار دانشجوی معماری دارد. می‌توانیم کلاس آموزشی برگزار کنیم در بازار که این کلاسها طوری باشد که بچه‌ها بیایند ببینند سؤال پرسند و غیره، به نظر من می‌تواند خیلی خوب باشد و اینها را آماده کند

الف) بله چون اصل فکر من این بوده که بازار محل گفتگو بوده در قدیم

ب) می‌شود یک گفتگویی به نظر من بوجود آورد کلاسها را اینجا برگزار کنند این اجازه را بدهیم بیایند داخلش و فضاها را لمس کنند این دانشجوها همان نسل جدید ما هستند، فردا هر کدامشان یکی از رفقایشان را بیاورند، خوشبختانه نسل جدید ما همه تحصیل کرده‌اند و کسی نیست درس نخوانده باشد. بنابراین شما می‌توانی در دانشگاهها فراخوان و آگهی بزنی سمینار یکروزه برگزار کنی یا در بازار ورکشاپ بگذاری یا بگوییم بازدید برای عموم آزاد است و موزه‌های اطراف را مجانی کنیم بیایند بازار را هم ببینند اینها کاهاییست که می‌شود ارائه دارد.

Appendix 3: Aerial Pictures from 1956 and 1983



Tabriz, 1956 © National Cartographic Center
of Iran (NCCI)



Figure A-7: Tabriz, 1956 (NCCI archive, Tehran).



Tabriz 1983 © National Cartographic
Center of Iran (NCCI)



0 250 500 1000m

Figure A-8: Tabriz, 1983 (NCCI archive, Tehran).

Appendix 4: The Most Important Events that Influenced the Bazaar-City Isolation Process in Tabriz

Year	A Highlight of Major Events that Influenced the Bazaar-City Isolation Process in Tabriz Since 1906 (The Iranian Constitution)	Main Aspect of Influence on the Tabriz Bazaar		
		Political, Economic	Social, Change	Urban Management
2010	The USA enhanced sanctions against Iran ¹ , which resulted in the decline of international commercial relations of Iran in General and also carpet trade in Tabriz.	■		
2009	The Municipality of Tabriz launched the construction of the World Trade Center of Iranian Carpet (in cooperation with private investors) in District 1 of Tabriz, at the northeastern area of the city. ²	■		
2004	According to the Law of Establishment of the Iranian Cultural Heritage Handicrafts and Tourism Organization, ICHHTO started its activities under the Iranian Presidential Administration. Since this time, the parliament has no supervision on the head of ICHHTO. This limits public participation in managing the bazaar.		■	
2000	Initial surveys for the construction of the Tabriz Metro started. Reports by the Tabriz Urban Railway Organization indicate that the Metro is estimated to be opened in 2015. ³ There will be three stations in the bazaar area, providing easier access.	■	■	
1995	The preparation of Historic Axis Plan of Tabriz was started, as Tabriz was considered one of the Cultural-Historic Cities of Iran by the SCUPA (Esmaili and Omrani, 2006). In the framework of 1995 projects commercial complexes, such as <i>Bazar-e Bozerg-e Mashrouteh</i> in the western part of the old bazaar and the <i>Sahib-ul Amr</i> commercial complex in the north (finalized in 2005, with its majority of shops vacant today) were built around the bazaar. The bridge-bazaars reconnected the southern and northern bazaar. These projects aimed to reintegrate the bazaar with the city, but due to economic issues, they have today created large blocks separating the bazaar from its northern and western areas. Streets in the northern area of the bazaar, on Mehranroud Riversides, were widened.	■	■	■
1986	The establishment of ICHO; separate and overlapping management policies for urban heritage, and ambiguity of responsibilities of ICHHTO, Municipality <i>Vaqf</i> , and other organizations. Later, this resulted in		■	■

¹ U.S. Department of State web page: <http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/index.htm> [accessed: 11.06.2015].

² <http://www.tasnimnews.com/Home/Single/578439> [accessed: 9.06.2015].

³ <http://tabrizmetro.ir/default.aspx?PageID=0> [accessed: 23.6.2015].

	<p>conflicts between managing bodies such as <i>Vaqf</i> and ICHTO. Reconstruction of <i>Sadiqiyya</i> School at the north of Bazaar by <i>Vaqf</i> organization was one example of these conflicts (Mr. Taghizadeh interview).</p> <p>The bazaar area was not directly included in the master plan of the city because its management was considered to be ICHO's responsibility.</p> <p>Traditional management for the maintenance of bazaars was almost entirely replaced by ICHTO management. (see chapters two, four and seven)</p>			
1980-1988	Iran –Iraq War; commerce was declined, and urban development was stopped (see Chapter Two).	■		
1975	The Tabriz Bazaar was registered on the National Heritage List with registration Nr.1097 (ICHHTO, 2009). The physical integrity of the bazaar was protected by law. However, the notion of development was limited in bazaars because of heritage conservation regulations.	■		■
1964	The Ministry of Development and Housing was Established. The first urban master plan of Tabriz started to be prepared.			■
1963	The White Revolution or the Revolution of the Shah and the People enforce reforms in areas such as land ownership, women's rights, and education. (see Chapter Two).	■	■	
1958	Until this time four streets were constructed around the city center, forming a rectangle with the bazaar at its center (MBTB archive).	■	■	■
Between 1956 and 1967	<i>Darai</i> Street was constructed on the eastern side of the main body of the Tabriz Bazaar (MBTB archive). This resulted in the construction of commercial complexes between the bazaar and <i>Darai</i> Street. In addition, <i>Darai</i> Street cut the Shoemakers Bazaar from the main body of the bazaar.(based on comparing aerial picture of Tabriz in 1956 and 1967)			■
1950	Tabriz Airport was constructed; rise in the volume of trade, which increased commercial activities in the bazaar, but also in other commercial centers of the city.	■		
1939-1945	World War II, commerce, and urban development were stopped in Tabriz and many other cities.	■		
1931	The <i>Shah Bakhti</i> Street (today <i>Jomhuri</i> Street) was constructed. This caused the moving of the wealthier merchants to the southern area of the Tabriz Bazaar (Khamachi, 1997). This new accessibility enriched the southern area of the main body of the bazaar and damaged the northern parts in economic, social and physical aspects. In general, it created an unbalanced effect in the bazaar, which continues until today.	■	■	■
1928	Mohammad Ali Tarbiat became the mayor of Tabriz. He started the construction of a number of streets, linking the Pahlavi Street to south and north areas of	■	■	■

	the city. Among these, <i>Ferdousi</i> Street broke into the southern area of Tabriz Bazaar but was stopped by the <i>bazaaris</i> (MBTB archive).			
1925	Reza Shah Pahlavi came to power, political and economic modernization was enforced in Iran. The first modern street in Tabriz (Pahlavi street- today Imam Khomeini Street) was constructed (MBTB archive). (See Chapter Two).	■	■	■
1908	The oil industry was launched, and the economic role of Azerbaijan and commercial cities in northern Iran was weakened.	■		
1906	Iranian constitution. Tabriz and its bazaar had a remarkable role in the constitution, resulted in political mistrust of the State about Tabriz Kasravi (2003) and Khamachi (1997). The economic and political power of merchants became limited. (see Chapters Two and Four)	■		

Table A-2. An overview of the most influential events regarding the bazaar-city isolation process in Tabriz (Yadollahi)

Appendix 5: The Protective Regulations of the Tabriz Historic Bazaar Complex World Heritage Site:

The entire text is quoted from ICHHTO (2009, P. 497-498).

Regulations of the Core Zone:

1- All activities that may damage the core zone area are prohibited.

2- All reconstructive activities including preparation, restoration, rehabilitation, re-organization or changing the function of all or a part of the various monuments without the permission of ICHHTO (THBC) are prohibited.

3- All activities that may damage the base of the core zone or its historical integrity including creating canals for water pipes, electrical wires, gas or telephone cables, installing vibrators, excessive trembling, smoky or excessively noisy systems, all advertising billboards and posters in addition to excessive traffic are all prohibited.

4- Erection of posters or advertising billboards which may compromise the visual integrity of the monuments is prohibited.

Regulations of the Buffer Zone:

1- All reconstructive activities including preparation, restoration, rehabilitation, re-organization or changing the function of all or a part of the various monuments without the permission of ICHHTO (THBCB) are all prohibited.

2- The maximum height of construction in the first area from the ground level to the roof is 7.5m with a maximum of two floors. All construction must be approved by ICHHTO (THBCB).

3- Architectural designs and outward appearances of structures which may compromise the visual integrity of the area must be in accordance with the surrounding structures.

4- All Urban development plans must be approved by ICHHTO (THBCB) in the feasibility stage.

Regulations of the Landscape Zone:

Large-scale plans include skyscrapers, industrial complexes, and development projects such as Highways, Subways and Railways must be agreed by ICHHTO (THBCB) in the feasibility study stage.




Figure A-9: The protective zones of the Tabriz Bazaar World Heritage Site (ICHHTO, 2009, Appendix 6).

Appendix 6: Recommendations for further Reflections on Goals, Strategies, and Measures for Managing the Tabriz Bazaar as a Public Place

This appendix offers proposals in the form of strategies, and measures in each of the public and private domains, discussed in Chapter Seven¹. These recommendations are offered for the purpose of creating a basis for further detailed studies and reflections based on the latest economic, technical, and human resources available for the management of the Tabriz bazaar. The interested agencies could be the *ICHHTO* and the *Management Base of the Tabriz Bazaar*², who are responsible for the management of the affairs inside the bazaar (according to the legal framework discussed in Chapter Four)³. In the approach presented in this dissertation, the *ICHHTO* is considered as the coordinator of the decision-making process. It is also the organization that should provide other involved actors with the professional know-how for the conservation and protection of the bazaar as a heritage site. Referring to the outcomes of the thesis, and in addition to the points explained in Section 7.3, the following principals are suggested to be considered decision-making for the Tabriz bazaar;

- An important strategy which can be recommended is to encourage the management system of the bazaar to depend mainly on local human and financial resources available in the city and the bazaar, rather than depending on the State budget and staff. In this context, finding solutions to attract the cooperation of local universities, the City Council and the regular public and attracting small private businesses to the bazaar is encouraged. Taking the interview results into account, it is realistic to assume that the presence of interested groups from universities, young entrepreneurs in the bazaar can gradually enhance its economic vitality and social diversity.
- Clear and transparent communication and cooperation of the State organizations is a crucial step towards an efficient management in the framework of the current urban heritage management in Iran⁴. *The National Strategic Document for Revitalization, Rehabilitation, Renovation, and Reinforcement of Deteriorated and Dysfunctional urban Fabrics*⁵ (MRUD, 2014b) has provided the

¹ An important limitation of the suggested recommendations should be mentioned here. Since the financial and human resources of *ICHHTO* and the *Management Base of Tabriz Bazaar* is limited -according to *ICHHTO* (2009) and my interview Esmaili (2013)- and unclear for the author, it is not possible to recommend a detailed, feasible action plan and a specific time frame for the suggested measures. Therefore, the recommendations are open for further discussion and can be reflected on by the local experts to revise the existing management plan of the Tabriz Bazaar, based on the available possibilities and conditions in their organization.

² The *Management Base of the Tabriz Bazaar* is an agency working under the *ICHHTO*.

³ See Figure 4-17 and Figure 6-18.

⁴ See Chapter 2 and Chapter 4.

⁵ Also called *The National Strategic Document*.

context and a possible platform for building an inter-organizational communication culture among the state-associated urban heritage management actors in Iran.

- Since the Tabriz Bazaar owes its vitality and development to trade and commercial activities, a tourism-centered approach applied on all areas of the bazaar is irrelevant to its character. To keep performing its function, the bazaar should be supported to define its own strategies for its future development.

- The participation of the *bazaari* community remains the most important resource for financing the maintenance of private spaces in the bazaar. However, as discussed in Chapter Six, in order to avoid future conflicts between the state-associated managers and the *bazaar* community, owners and members of the bazaar community should be involved in the first phases of decision-making for the future projects that affect the bazaar. In order to avoid more conflicts, the government has to consider involving them in directing the development of the bazaar, rather than viewing them merely as financial supporters.

In Chapter Seven, section 7.3.1, general policies for each domain were briefly presented. The following tables (Table A-3 to Table A-5) present strategies for enhancing the functionality of each domain in relation to the bazaar and the city.

Public Domain A: Connectors		
Strategy: To Reinforce the Connectivity of Spaces Within the Bazaar and the City		
Recommended Measures		Key Involved Actors
Calming the Traffic at the Edges of the Bazaar	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Widening the sidewalks around the edges of the bazaar: after the opening of the metro in Tabriz and the improvement of the public transportation system in the area (which is already foreseen by the Municipality of Tabriz), a high volume of transportation load will be facilitated by the Metro and the existing public transportation system. Therefore, streets around the bazaar can be narrowed in favor of widening the sidewalks and bicycle lanes¹. - Starting negotiations with the owners of the shops in the underground shopping area in Ferdousi Street² to change its function to a parking area. The shops 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Private owners of the properties inside the bazaar and the vacant spaces surrounding the bazaar - ICHHTO - The Municipality of Tabriz

¹ See Figure A-10.

² The underground space was initially built to become a parking area, but it is now used for cloth retail.

	<p>can be acquired by the Municipality or can be bartered (exchanged) with the vacant spaces in the <i>Mashrouteh</i> or <i>Sahib-ul-Amr</i> commercial complexes at the northern and western sides of the bazaar¹.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cooperating with the Municipality of Tabriz to foresee regulations to control car traffic in streets around the bazaar (particularly <i>Jomhuri</i> Street). - Assessment of the edges of the central body of the bazaar in order to select areas in front of the bazaar's entrances for loading goods coming from outside and going out from the bazaar. 	
<p>Enhancement of the Residential Quality of the Neighborhoods, Surrounding the Bazaar²</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Rehabilitation of the areas in the city center with a stronger focus on their residential character can balance the commercial and residential function of the city center. As explained in Chapter Six, one of the causes of isolation in the bazaar from the city is that it is surrounded by a deteriorating urban fabric³, which is overloaded by commercial uses. - Regular monitoring of the implementation of ICHHTO regulations for the buffer zone of the bazaar⁴. - Revising the prepared plans for regeneration of the surrounding residential areas at the northern and western areas of the bazaar according to the principles mentioned in <i>The National Strategic Document</i> (The National Strategic Document for Revitalization, Rehabilitation, Renovation, and Reinforcement of Deteriorated and Dysfunctional Urban Fabrics) with the involvement of the Tabriz Municipality, ICHHTO, The Urban Development and Revitalization Organization, the City Council, representatives of the Bazaar community and the representatives of the residents of these neighborhoods⁵. - In the above-mentioned cooperation framework, the regeneration of the residential areas at the eastern side of <i>Shahid Madani</i> Street (particularly the 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ICHHTO - The Municipality of Tabriz - Private owners of the properties in the surrounding commercial complexes and residential areas - The Urban Development and Revitalization Organization - City Council - Representatives of the bazaar community - Representatives from the residents of the surrounding neighborhoods

¹ See Figure A-10.

² These areas are shown in Figure A-10.

³ See figures 6-21 to 6-26.

⁴ See the regulations in Appendix 5.

⁵ See the role of the mentioned actors and information on the *National Strategic Document* in Chapter Two and Chapter Four.

	<p>pathway that connects shoemaker's bazaar to the river) should be considered.</p>	
<p>Encouraging Tourism, Recreational Functions for Shops Adjacent to the River and the Bridges</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In the framework of the 1995 projects in the bazaar, ICHHTO has presented ideas to develop tourism activities in the bazaar¹. Adopting this policy in the bazaar, in general, is not recommended in this dissertation. Because the bazaar owes its vitality to local, regional and international commerce and not to tourism. However, encouraging recreational activities (including cultural tourism) in the northern bazaar, and the river banks can help reconnect the southern and northern areas of the bazaar. The southern areas of the old city are rich in terms of tourist attractions. The northern area is recommended to be equipped in terms of tourism infrastructure because of its current lack of vitality². Other reasons why this area is suitable for such activities are; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The existence of the covered bazaar on the bridge (the <i>Pol-bazaars</i>) is one of the unique characteristics of the Tabriz Bazaar (ICHHTO, 2009). - The Municipality of Tabriz is currently facilitating the river banks for public use. - At the northern bazaar, there is a museum and an archeological site³. - ICHHTO has prepared a general plan to reconstruct the <i>Sahib-ul Amr</i> Square (Me1) according to its old form (ICHHTO, 2009, pp. 515-536). - In addition to the recreational activities, encouraging potential investors to open food and spice retail shops in the <i>Pol-Bazaars</i> can be recommended. This can connect the area to the vegetable and spices market (<i>Davachi Bazaar</i> (B2) and <i>Misgar lar Rasta</i> (R1)) at the northern side of the river. There are already a few of such shops on the <i>Pol-Bazaars</i> (PI 1-2). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ICHHTO - The Municipality of Tabriz - Private owners of the properties in the bazaar - Potential private investors - Residents of the surrounding neighborhoods

¹ See Chapter Six.

² See Chapter Six.

³ See Figure 7-2.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - As tourism can affect the area in positive or negative ways, the inhabitants of the areas surrounding the bazaar should be given a chance to share their ideas and concerns regarding tourism development in the bazaar. Therefore, open discussion events are needed before making any tourism development policy within the bazaar area. 	
<p>Enhancement of the Physical Accessibility of the Connectors Inside the Bazaar</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Enforcing the connections of the <i>rastehs</i> with the eastern side of the bazaar to <i>Shahid Madani</i> Street (which is a highly commercially active street). - Doing a feasibility study for opening the blocked end of <i>Haj-Husen Ghadim Sara (S12)</i> to <i>Shahid Madani</i> Street¹: this can form a strong East-West accessibility axis that connects the bazaar from both sides to the eastern and western streets. - Launching cooperation programs with the architecture and urban planning faculty of the Islamic University of Tabriz or other interested universities for re-connecting the <i>rasteh</i> ends that have been split by the construction of the modern streets (especially in the southern parts of the bazaar, along the <i>Jomhuri</i> Street). - Regular maintenance of the pathways. In the case of northern areas, the maintenance and improvement activities should be done in line with their revitalization plan. Investing in their physical accessibility is not economically justifiable before the existence of a use plan to enhance their economic productivity. - Assessment of the <i>rastehs</i> to locate security cameras, light, guidance maps, and wireless internet spots in them. - Conducting studies (or supporting such studies) to design an updated waste management system in the bazaar. - Updating the drainage and surface water 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ICHHTO - The Municipality of Tabriz - Private owners of the properties in the bazaar - Representatives of the bazaar community - Potential private investors - Local universities

¹ See Figure A-10.

	<p>management system (already foreseen by ICHHTO)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Building sidewalk along the <i>Allameh Tabatabaei</i> Street at the northern edge of the bazaar in the <i>Pol-Bazaars</i> and the river area¹. - Encouraging and investing in research for solving the mobility of goods, and designing a modern goods circulation system in the bazaar. 	
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Table A-3. Recommended strategies and measures to be adopted within the connectors (zones 4 and 5), (Yadollahi).

Public Domain B: Central Public Spaces		
Strategy: Enhancement of the Social Diversity		
Recommended Measures		Key Involved Actors
Encouraging Cultural, Educational Events Open to the General Public	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Creating an event management group including equal male and female members with the involvement of young members of bazaar community, university students, a member of the <i>Management Base of the Tabriz Bazaar</i> and a member of city council to plan and organize marketing activities to attract cultural events, commercial and non-commercial exhibitions to be held in open places of the bazaar. It should be mentioned that religious ceremonies such as mourning ceremonies during Ashura² period take place in open spaces of the bazaar. Encouraging other cultural, artistic, and educational urban events to be held in open spaces of the bazaar increases the diversity of users in the bazaar. - Negotiating with the owners of spaces in the <i>saras</i> and <i>timches</i> for the possibility of using the open spaces for the evening time (after the working hour of the bazaar) for cultural activities such as open traditional theater (<i>Naghali</i>), and small music events. The events have to be relevant for and open to the general public, regardless of gender, age, and economic status. - Holding public negotiation workshops and events 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Steering members of the mosques - Young members of bazaar community - ICHHTO (a member of the <i>Management Base of the Tabriz Bazaar</i>) - The Municipality of Tabriz - City council - Private or <i>vaqf</i> owners of properties in the bazaar - Potential private investors - Local universities, schools, and institutes - Representatives

¹ See Figure A-10.

² A Shia religious mourning period in the Islamic Calendar month of Muharram. In Arabic: عاشورا

	<p>related to the management of the bazaar and the city in the open spaces. In addition to the organizers (the bazaar community members, ICHHTO, or the Municipality), residents of the surrounding neighborhoods, young entrepreneurs, university student (for instance, from the fields of economy, urban planning, architecture, and sociology) shall be encouraged to take part in such discussions.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Encouraging functions such as traditional teahouses (open to the general public) and restaurants in the <i>hojrehs</i> inside <i>caravanserai</i> and <i>saras</i>. - Large open or covered spaces in the schools and mosques can be used for holding educational and academic events such as book exhibitions, university seminars, professional educational gatherings, and conferences. This can enforce the link between the religious seminary schools at the bazaar and non-religious universities and institutions of the city. - Negotiating with the steering members of the mosques to select some of the mosques in order to provide suitable space for female prayers. 	<p>from the residents of the surrounding neighborhoods</p>
<p>Enhancement of the Public Wellbeing Facilities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inviting and encouraging architecture and urban planning faculties of the universities in Tabriz to support study projects and internships in order to design suitable public furniture for the open spaces of the bazaar. This can also be by announcing a competition for the best furniture design for the bazaar. - Facilitating the central spaces with light for the evening use, wireless internet spots, public lavatories, and ramps at the entrances. - Investigating the spaces in Zone 3 for the possibility of creating one or two safe and monitored playing corners in the bazaar for children. - Preparing a plan for the regular maintenance of the green space and fountains with the participation of owners and ICHHTO.¹ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Local universities - ICHHTO - Private owners or <i>vaqf</i> supervisors of the spaces

Table A-4. Recommended strategies and measures to be adopted within the central public spaces (Zone 3), (Yadollahi).

¹ Location of the existing trees are marked in Figure A-10.

Private Domain		
Strategy: Reinforcement of the Integration of these Spaces Within the Bazaar’s overall Functional Structure		
	Recommended measures	Key involved actors
Catalyzing the Business Network Between Potential Investors from Outside of the Bazaar and the Bazaar Community¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To address the problem of the lack of economic productivity in Zone 2 areas of the northern and western bazaar, the issue of the existence of several vacant spaces in <i>Sahib-ul-Amr</i> and <i>Bazaar-e Mashrooteh</i> commercial complexes, adjacent to these areas must be solved². It is recommended to organize a series of meetings with the presence of private property owners, ICHHTO, representatives of the bazaar community, the Municipality and The Urban Development and Revitalization Organization to make the spaces available for small business owners with affordable rent. As discussed in Chapter Six, the majority of the owners of the properties in these newly built commercial complexes are not traditional merchants³. Therefore, a professional network, connecting these property owners, potential investors and the bazaar community should be created. This network can be a platform for discussing shared interests in order to develop strategies for enhancing the economic productivity and reputation of the bazaar and its surrounding area. - The cluster bazaar, <i>Sorkhab Bazarcha</i> (B1) at the northeast region of the bazaar and the large commercial complexes at the northern and western sides of the bazaar can provide a few alternative spaces for the shops that can function at a cluster/neighborhood level⁴. - After the negotiation team defines policies and strategies, it is recommended that a competition is 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ICHHTO - Municipality of Tabriz - Private property owners and <i>vaqf</i> supervisors in the bazaar - Private owners of the properties in the area surrounding the bazaar - The Urban Development and Revitalization Organization - Potential investors and entrepreneurs - Representatives of the bazaar community - Managers of the seminary schools

¹ It should be noted that this strategy is presented from an urban governance point of view; the detailed actions have to be economically justified. Therefore, adopting these strategies demands further economic research in the bazaar.

² See Chapter Six, section 6.3.1

³ Also see Appendix 2.b, interview number 12.

⁴ To convince the owners of such spaces in the bazaar to move out, in addition to financial motivators, the physical accessibility to the alternative commercial areas has to be enforced. See figure A-10.

	<p>announced to attract the best business plans for revitalizing the commercial complexes around the bazaar. The selection policies have to be tolerant in favor of young, creative entrepreneurs and women.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Encouraging the owners to make available their properties for rent, to be used for educational, artistic and cultural functions. Small businesses such as tailor workshops, handicraft workshops, internet cafes, architecture consultant offices, and art workshops are recommended. - Organizing bazaar community meetings to discuss strategies for attracting commercial brands that are popular among the young generation. 	
<p>Providing Affordable units for Public Recreational, Educational and Cultural Activities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Conducting a feasibility study to open a so-called “House of Culture”¹ in one the <i>saras</i>, particularly in the northern bazaar, or one of the houses adjacent to the bazaar in the northern area². These houses normally offer educational and cultural programs for target groups such as housewives, children, and school students. - As an alternative or addition to the House of Culture, feasibility studies can be done to provide spaces for small public libraries and workshops that offer services also for the youth, women, and children. - Encouraging the <i>vaqf</i> supervisors and the managers of the <i>Sadigiyya</i> Seminary School (a religious school only for women) to reconstruct the destroyed spaces in the <i>Sadigiyya</i> Complex (Sc3 and M5) and provide space for a library for women. - Facilitating the use of empty shops inside the bazaar zone along the <i>Allameh Tabatabaei</i> Street which offers services for visitors who come to spend time along the river and the nearby park at the western side of the bazaar (the shops could provide 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ICHHTO - The Municipality of Tabriz - Private property owners in the bazaar - Private property owners of the areas surrounding the bazaar - <i>vaqf</i> property supervisors - The management of the <i>Sadiyya</i> Seminary School (Sc3)

¹ Houses of Culture (*khaney-e farhang*) are small cluster-based institutions developed by local municipalities and managed with the participation of the *Organization of Islamic Culture and Guidance* and municipality and the civil society. There are other examples of such houses in Tabriz.

² The northern area is in priority because the southern areas are already enriched with existing of the Blue Mosque (M28), *Arg-e Alishah*, *Damir Gapisi* historical gate (G1), the municipality building and museums.

	<p>traditional street food shops or tourist information).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Preparing revitalization plans for the vacant traditional bathhouses ¹(these buildings can be used as traditional bathhouse with a touristic and recreational character), and the traditional gymnasium or <i>Zurkhana</i> (Z1). - Negotiating with the owners and tenants of the shops, constructed in the central spaces of <i>saras</i>, in order to move the functions to the areas outside of the bazaar or spaces available in the bazaar. The buildings constructed at the center of <i>Sahib-ul Amr</i> Square (the vegetable market at the northern area of the bazaar) should also move outside the square. This idea is also mentioned by ICHHTO (ICHHTO, 2009, p. 5013). 	
<p>Physical Maintenance and Technical Enhancement of the <i>Hojreh</i>s</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Improving the cooling and heating system, fire alarm, and earthquake alarm and security cameras (after a survey to find out the needs of the shopkeepers and other users, and technically feasible solutions). - Building infrastructures for public well-being, and providing information boards, illustrating the archeological surveys and conservation activities in the <i>Hasan Padishah</i> Mosque (M2) and School (Sc1) located in the northern bazaar. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ICHHTO - The Municipality of Tabriz - Property owners and tenants in the bazaar

Table A-5. Recommended strategies and measures to be adopted within the private space (zones 1 and 2), (Yadollahi).

¹ There are five bathhouses in the Tabriz Bazaar (H1 to H5).




Figure A-10. Recommendations regarding the strategic zones in the Tabriz Bazaar. Results generated by Yadollahi are shown on the base map (MBTB archive, Tabriz).