This paper provides an account of the argument/adjunct distinction implementing the ‘canonical
approach’. I identify five criteria (obligatoriness, latency, co-occurrence restrictions,
grammatical relations, and iterability) and seven diagnostic tendencies that can be used to
distinguish canonical arguments from canonical adjuncts. I then apply the criteria and
tendencies to data from the Nakh-Daghestanian language Hinuq. Hinuq makes extensive use of
spatial cases for marking adjunct-like and argument-like NPs. By means of the criteria and
tendencies it is possible to distinguish spatial NPs that come close to canonical arguments from
those that are canonical adjuncts, and to place the remaining NPs bearing spatial cases within
the argument-adjunct continuum.
The article identifies one of the two stops on Afanasij Nikitin's return journey through India, Suri. Based upon the newly found place, a new reconstruction of this part of his journey is proposed by the author.
Metaethics is traditionally understood as a non-moral discipline that examines moral judgements from a standpoint outside of ethics. This orthodox understanding has recently come under pressure from anti-Archimedeans, such as Ronald Dworkin and Matthew Kramer, who proclaim that rather than assessing morality from an external perspective, metaethical theses are themselves substantive moral claims. In this paper, I scrutinise this anti-Archimedean challenge as applied to the metaethical position of expressivism. More precisely, I examine the claim that expressivists do not avoid moral commitments when accounting for moral thought, but instead presuppose them; they do not look at ethics from the outside, but operate from within ethics. This paper defends the non-moral status of expressivism against anti-Archimedeanism by rejecting a new anti-Archimedean challenge which, on the basis of Hume’s Law, aims to exploit expressivist explanations of supervenience in order to show that expressivism is a substantive moral position.