Ingenieurwissenschaften und zugeordnete Tätigkeiten
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Achieving reliability in NDE for nuclear power plants is a complex challenge. As engineers we tend to focus on the equipment and the written procedures; they are easy for us to understand, measure and control. This focus addresses only one of the four aspects of the BAM holistic model, namely, Intrinsic Capability. Another of the model's modules, Application Parameters, also is engineering-oriented as examiners work to ensure that the equipment and procedure can be applied correctly in the actual examination environment as it is found in the field, though in addition to engineering it requires organizational foresight and commitment to understand and prepare for that specific environment well in advance. The Human Factors reliability module is harder for us to think about. The procedure developers think, "Of course all the examiners in the field will understand all aspects of my procedure and execute them correctly." Most of our bad experiences with reliability occur when this happy thought turns out to be untrue. And finally, perhaps the hardest reliability module to affect is Organizational Context. Getting all of the stakeholders -- the plant owner, the NDE company, the examiners, the regulators, the qualification body, the equipment suppliers -- to think about reliability in the same way, years in advance of the examination, to think about reliability at every step in the long process leading to the day of the examination itself, is a heavy lift indeed.
The aim of all the effort devoted to NDE reliability is to evaluate the reliability accurately, reliably and efficiently, in accordance with the specific requirements of industrial application taking into account the very different nature of influencing factors. The set up of the Modular Reliability Model in 1997 was a big step forward in the understanding of influencing mechanisms in terms of the three different main elements, i.e. the intrinsic capability (IC), the application parameters (AP) and the human factors (HF). The intrinsic capability stands for the pure physical-technological process of the signal detection caused by the waves or the rays from a material defect in the presence of noise (caused by the material and the devices). This intrinsic capability is the upper bound of the possible reliability. Already when measuring this intrinsic capability for thick walled components the original one-parameter POD should be extended to a multi-parameter POD, where, in addition to the defect size, a number of additional physical parameters, such as the grain size distribution (or attenuation), defect depth, and angle or surface roughness, must be considered. For real life cycle assessments it is necessary to evaluate the signal response from real defects. The industrial application factors, e.g. coupling conditions, limited accessibility, heat and environmental vibrations, diminish the reliability. The amount of reduction can be determined quantitatively, if the underlying conditions are controlled. In case they are not controlled it is necessary to count for a (unknown) fluctuation in the reliability in the field anyway. The third group of important influencing factors are the human factors, which do not only cover the individual performance capability of the inspectors but also the design of the working place, the procedure, the teamwork quality, interaction with systems, the organization, and finally, the relationship between the companies involved in the inspection process and to which extend the responsible parties are aware of it. Both the internal and external organizational context, affect not only the HF but also the IC and AP. After having analysed the single factors separately it is necessary to look how everything is interconnected. When comparing an “ideal inspection” with a “real inspection” it is worthwhile to look at the existing practices, rules and standards. How do they really support reliable testing? With respect to the industrial end user, it needs to be shown how the level of reliability of NDE, influenced by the different factors and their interaction, has an impact on acceptance or rejection of safety critical parts. The approach of analysis and synthesis will be illustrated by examples of the reliability investigation of the inspection of copper canisters for nuclear fuel deposit in Sweden and Finland and German Railway inspections (hollow axle testing).
Analyzing the reliability of non-destructive tests using the modular modell - a practical approach
(2016)
Non-destructive testing is an important tool to guarantee the safety of railway traffic.
The infrastructure with tracks, switches and sleepers is regularly tested, the
locomotives and wagons with their wheels, bogies and axles as well. Many years of experience and some events lead in Germany to a good practice in testing the railway components. Now, European authorities are drafting a system of common requirements and standards for the European Railway Market. The German practice combines an intensive training of the NDT-personnel including sufficient time for practical exercises with organizational measures of the companies, responsible for rolling stock and infrastructure. Through the example of UT-testing of railway axles it will be shown, how training and organizational measures influence the reliability of such testing.