Ingenieurwissenschaften und zugeordnete Tätigkeiten
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Non-destructive testing (NDT) is regarded as one of the key elements in ensuring quality of engineering systems and their safe use. A failure of NDT to detect critical defects in safetyrelevant components, such as those in the nuclear industry, may lead to catastrophic consequences for the environment and the people. Therefore, ensuring that NDT methods are capable of detecting all critical defects, i.e. that they are reliable, is of utmost importance. Reliability of NDT is affected by human factors, which have thus far received the least amount of attention in the reliability assessments. With increased use of automation, in terms of mechanised testing (automation-assisted inspection and the corresponding evaluation of data), higher reliability standards are believed to have been achieved. However, human inspectors, and thus human factors, still play an important role throughout this process, and the risks involved in this application are unknown. The overall aim of the work presented in this dissertation was to explore for the first time the risks associated with mechanised NDT and find ways of mitigating their effects on the inspection performance. Hence, the objectives were to (1) identify and analyse potential risks in mechanised NDT, (2) devise measures against them, (3) critically address the preventive measures with respect to new potential risks, and (4) suggest ways for the implementation of the preventive measures. To address the first two objectives a risk assessment in form of a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) was conducted (Study 1). This analysis revealed potential for failure during both the acquisition and evaluation of NDT data that could be assigned to human, technology, and organisation. Since the existing preventive measures are insufficient to defend the system from identified failures, new preventive measures were suggested. The conclusion of the study was that those preventive measures need to be carefully considered with respect to new potential risks, before they can be implemented, thus serving as a starting point for further empirical studies. To address the final two objectives, two preventive measures, i.e. human redundancy and the use of automated aids in the evaluation of NDT data, were critically assessed with regard to potential downfalls arising from the social interaction between redundant individuals and the belief in the high reliability of automated aids. The second study was concerned with the potential withdrawal of effort in sequential redundant teams when working collectively as opposed to working alone, when independence between the two redundant individuals is not present. The results revealed that the first redundant inspector, led to believe someone else will conduct the same task afterwards, invested the same amount of effort as when working alone. The redundant checker was not affected by the information about the superior experience of his predecessor and—instead of expected withdrawal of effort—exhibited better performance in the task. Both results were in contradiction to the hypotheses, the explanations for which can be found in the social loafing and social compensation effects and in the methodological limitations. The third study examined inappropriate use of the aid measured in terms of (a) agreement with the errors of the aid in connection to the frequency of verifying its results and in terms of (b) the overall performance in the task. The results showed that the information about the high reliability of the aid did not affect the perception of that aid’s performance and, hence, no differences in the actual use of the aid were to be expected. However, the participants did not use the aid appropriately: They misused it, i.e. agreed with the errors committed by the aid and disused it, i.e. disagreed with the correct information provided by the aid, thereby reducing the overall reliability of the aid in terms of sizing ability. Whereas aid’s misuse could be assigned to low propensity to take risks and reduced verification behaviour because of a bias towards automation, the disuse was assigned to the possible misunderstanding of the task. The results of these studies raised the awareness that methods used to increase reliability and safety, such as automation and human redundancy, can backfire if their implementation is not carefully considered with respect to new potential risks arising from the interaction between individuals and complex systems. In an attempt to minimise this risk, suggestions for their implementation in the NDT practice were provided.
The canister for the permanent storage of spent nuclear fuel used by SKB in Sweden consists of a cast iron insert surrounded by a five centimetre thick shell of copper. It is a safety critical component and in order to secure long-term structural integrity non-destructive methods are used to inspect 100% of the volume of each canister, before it is disposed of in the repository. One of the critical components that requires inspection is a sealing weld, joining the copper tube and the lid. The friction stir weld is inspected using an ultrasonic phased array system. The area of the weld is inspected with several inspection channels with different angles and varying coverage. To make sure that no defects that might occur in the weld are overseen, the reliability of the inspection must be quantified. The reliability of NDT is usually quantified with the probability of detection curves. The influence of the parameters that might influence the POD of the flaws in the weld is investigated analysing the experimental results, as well as with a help of a numerical simulation of the inspection.
Reliability analysis of the ultrasonic inspection system for the inspection of hollow railway axles
(2016)
Axles are safety critical train components that are subjected to significant cyclic loading during operation. If the crack is initiated in the axle, cyclic loading will lead to crack propagation. To maintain structural integrity, axles must be periodically inspected for fatigue cracks in the material. Deutsche Bahn uses mechanized ultrasonic inspection system to inspect hollow railway axles. The inspections are performed from the bore surface, using several conventional transducers with different incident angles, inspecting the axle along the entire length. As with the every safety critical system, the reliability of these inspections must be determined with regard to their flaw detection capabilities. Traditionally this is done according to the relevant standards for railway vehicles. To investigate the capability of the NDT system more thoroughly, we want to evaluate the capability of the inspection system to detect flaws by means of probability of detection (POD) curves. It will be shown that other parameters, beside the size of the crack, for example crack position in the axle, influence the detection of the crack. The influence of these parameters was evaluated using ultrasonic simulation. The evaluation served as an input for the manufacturing of the flaws in the real scale axle. Once these axles are inspected and the data evaluated, using data from both measurement and simulation, we will express the POD of the crack as function of influencing parameters using the multiparameter POD model.
Reliability analysis of the ultrasonic inspection system for the inspection of hollow railway axles
(2016)
Axles are safety critical train components that are subjected to significant cyclic loading during operation. If the crack is initiated in the axle, cyclic loading will lead to crack propagation. To maintain structural integrity, axles must be periodically inspected for fatigue cracks in the material. Deutsche Bahn uses mechanized ultrasonic inspection system to inspect hollow railway axles. The inspections are performed from the bore surface, using several conventional transducers with different incident angles, inspecting the axle along the entire length. As with the every safety critical system, the reliability of these inspections must be determined with regard to their flaw detection capabilities. Traditionally this is done according to the relevant standards for railway vehicles. To investigate the capability of the NDT system more thoroughly, we want to evaluate the capability of the inspection system to detect flaws by means of probability of detection (POD) curves. It will be shown that other parameters, beside the size of the crack, for example crack position in the axle, influence the detection of the crack. The influence of these parameters was evaluated using ultrasonic simulation. The evaluation served as an input for the manufacturing of the flaws in the real scale axle. Once these axles are inspected and the data evaluated, using data from both measurement and simulation, we will express the POD of the crack as function of influencing parameters using the multiparameter POD model.
The canister for the permanent storage of spent nuclear fuel used by SKB in Sweden consists of a cast iron insert surrounded by a five centimetre thick shell of copper. It is a safety critical component and in order to secure long-term structural integrity non-destructive methods are used to inspect 100% of the volume of each canister, before it is disposed of in the repository. One of the critical components that requires inspection is a sealing weld, joining the copper tube and the lid. The friction stir weld is inspected using an ultrasonic phased array system. The area of the weld is inspected with several inspection channels with different angles and varying coverage. To make sure that no defects that might occur in the weld are overseen, the reliability of the inspection must be quantified. The reliability of NDT is usually quantified with the probability of detection curves. The influence of the parameters that might influence the POD of the flaws in the weld is investigated analysing the experimental results, as well as with a help of a numerical simulation of the inspection.
Currently at Deutsche Bahn (DB) ultrasonic inspections in maintenance procedures for wheelset axles with a bore hole are, to the greatest possible extent, carried out using automated ultrasonic inspection system. Although the acceptance levels are in accordance with DIN 27201 part 7, the testing results have shown in recent years that in the case of true indications, the effective defect sizes were far below the level of acceptance. Due to this experience it can be assumed that the automated ultrasonic inspection systems are testing substantially more sensitively than required. This increased sensitivity leads to an increase in false indications, generally resulting in the unnecessary demounting of wheelsets. In Research cooperation between Federal Institute for Materials Research and Testing (BAM) and DB the effective flaw detection sensitivity of existing automated ultrasonic inspection system will be determined and the true/false indication ratio optimised. Through systematic investigations with the Probability of Detection method on the existing automated ultrasonic inspection system the results could be directly applied to the optimisation of existing ultrasonic inspections of wheelset axles with a bore hole in maintenance procedures and the level of reliability can be considerably increased.
Motivation: What can we learn from the history of aerospace?
State of the art: Detectability as the basis of probability of failure
Evaluationmethods: Consequences of decisions based on ndt
Advanced approaches: Probability of Detection: Evaluation of ndt systems are important!
Use of the POD: Out of the box: Finnish and Swedish project for final disposal of spent nuclear fuel
Reliability of NDT depends not only on the intrinsic capability of the measuring systems and on the application factors (the conditions under which NDT is applied), but also—and to a great extent—on human factors and the organisational context under which each inspection is carried out.
Adoption of a systematic approach to the identification and prevention of risks.
Critical defects could be missed, even if the inspection process is semi-automated. The causes of that risk lie in the technology, people and in the organisation. Currently installed preventive measures are insufficient to prevent from risks New preventive measures could be installed, e.g. further automation, installing alarms, implementing human redundancy, developing software and hardware solutions, optimising procedures, etc.
Human factors studies are not only essential for the operation but also during the development process.
Over the past couple of decades Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) has seen a significant increase in the use of automation. In addition to increased reliability, objectivity, consistency, repeatability, productivity, and so on, automating parts of the process is expected to decrease the potential for human error. However, the literature on human-automation interaction suggests that automation is not only associated with benefits, but also with new risks and risk sources. First, this paper will present the methodology used to identify—for the first time—possible risks associated with mechanised data acquisition and corresponding data evaluation. Moreover, it will highlight possible risks, their causes, consequences, and ways of preventing them. Second, those preventive measures will be further analysed by examining new risks that can arise from their implementation, i.e. potential for failure that can arise from (a) working with automated defect-detection and sizing aids, (b) implementing human redundancy, and (c) improvement of the inspection procedures without due consideration of the procedure users. And third, some optimisations strategies will be provided. The purpose of this work is to show that mechanised testing is associated with potential for failure and that the sources of those risks go beyond single inspectors and need to be looked at in the interaction of people with other systems, i.e. the technology, the team and, most importantly, the organisation.
Civil engineers, who are involved in nondestructive testing have to solve an essential task: the transfer of the results of NDT-research into practice. NDT in civil Engineering is a quite new discipline. The results must meet the needs of the infrastructure owners to convince them about the usefulness of NDT. The issue of reliability of the NDT-data was discussed.