Analytische Chemie
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Human factors (HFs) are a frequently mentioned topic when talking about the reliability of non-destructive testing (NDT). However, probability of detection (POD), the commonly used measure of NDT reliability, only looks at the technical capability of an NDT system to detect a defect.
After several decades of research on the influence of HFs on NDT reliability, there is still no commonly accepted approach to rendering HFs visible in reliability assessment. This paper provides an overview of possible quantitative and qualitative methods for integrating HFs into the reliability assessment. It is concluded that reliability assessment is best carried out using both quantifiable and non-quantifiable approaches to HFs.
Seit beinahe 50 Jahren werden Zuverlässigkeitsbewertungen zerstörungsfreier Prüfverfahren erfolgreich in unterschiedlichen Industriebranchen eingesetzt. Dennoch gibt es weiterhin viele Vorbehalte, da die Bewertungsgrundlage nicht standardisiert ist und konkrete Handlungsanweisungen fehlen. Dem gegenüber steht die Anerkennung in der ZfP-Community. Es ist bisher nur Wenigen bekannt, dass dem Wissen über die Zuverlässigkeit eines zerstörungsfreien Prüfverfahren eineSchlüsselfunktion für die ZfP 4.0 zukommt.
Im Vortrag wird die Notwendigkeit für eine Norm oder eine Richtlinie zum Thema Zuverlässigkeitsbewertungen aufgezeigt. Es wird darauf eingegangen, warum es bisher (in Deutschland) noch keine Richtlinie gab und gibt und was der:die Anwender:innen aus einer Richtlinie zur Zuverlässigkeitsbewertung von ZfP-Prüfverfahren erwarten kann.
Es werden konkrete Schritte und Vorgehensweisen zur Bewertung der Zuverlässigkeit eines Verfahrens aufgezeigt; von der Definition eines Anwendungsfalls, über die Herstellung geeigneter Testkörper bis hin zur Durchführung und Bewertung von Prüfungen unter Einbeziehung von menschlichen Einflüssen. Die Beispiele umfassen sowohl Anwendungen aus dem Bauwesen als auch aus dem Maschinen- und Anlagenbau.
Der Vortrag fasst die bisherigen und geplanten Arbeiten in dem WIPANO Projekt „Normung für die probabilistische Bewertung der Zuverlässigkeit für zerstörungsfreie Prüfverfahren“ zusammen.
Menschliche Faktoren sind ein häufig genanntes Thema, wenn wir über
die Zuverlässigkeit der zerstörungsfreien Prüfung (ZfP) sprechen. Die Probability of Detection (POD), das üblicherweise verwendete Maß für die Zuverlässigkeit der ZfP, betrachtet jedoch nur die technische Fähigkeit eines ZfP-Systems, einen Fehler zu entdecken. Nach mehreren Jahrzehnten der Erforschung des Einflusses der menschlichen Faktoren auf die Zuverlässigkeit der ZfP gibt es immer noch keinen allgemein akzeptierten Ansatz, um menschliche Faktoren in der Zuverlässigkeitsbewertung sichtbar zu machen. Dieser Beitrag gibt einen Überblick über verschiedene verfügbare Methoden zur Einbeziehung menschlicher Faktoren in die Zuverlässigkeitsbewertung. Das Thema ist ein essenzieller Bestandteil des laufenden WIPANO-Projekts "normPOD", das sich als Ziel gesetzt hat, die Standardisierung der Zuverlässigkeitsbewertung in Deutschland voranzutreiben und im Vergleich zu den schon bekannten internationalen Normen einen Fokus auf den Umgang mit den menschlichen Faktoren zu legen.
Whereas human factors (HF) in the non-destructive testing (NDT) of metallic components are a poorly investigated topic (in comparison to other industrial fields such as aviation), HF in the inspection of concrete components are even less known. Studies have shown that there is always some variability between individuals in their inspection results and that HF affect the reliability of NDT inspections. The aim of the ongoing WIPANO project is to draft a standard for a holistic reliability assessment, with concrete inspection as one case study. This includes also the HF. A human-oriented Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) was carried out to do the following: a) identify possible human-related risks in tunnel inspection processes using a laser scan method (including data collection,evaluation, and assessment of tunnel damage) and b) evaluate these human-related risks as regards their possible causes, consequences and probability of occurrence – in addition with respect to existing and possible preventive measures. The results show that the causes for possible failures can lie within people, the physical environment, technology, organisation, and extra-organisational environment. Whereas current preventive measures rely mostly on the individual and quality management practices, there is potential for even larger improvement at the organisational and extra-organisational level. The FMEA results were also used to develop a quantification method to further understand the HF in tunnel inspection, which could possibly be included in the information into the overall reliability assessment. The usage of qualitative and quantitative data collected through the human-FMEA within the proposed quantification method shows promise that HF can be quantified and could offer broader understanding of HF influences on inspection in various industries.
Whereas human factors (HF) in the non-destructive testing (NDT) of metallic components are a poorly investigated topic (in comparison to other industrial fields such as aviation), HF in the inspection of concrete components are even less known. Studies have shown that there is always some variability between individuals in their inspection results and that HF affect the reliability of NDT inspections. The aim of the ongoing WIPANO project is to draft a standard for a holistic reliability assessment, with concrete inspection as one case study. This includes also the HF. A human-oriented Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) was carried out to do the following: a) identify possible human-related risks in tunnel inspection processes using a laser scan method (including data collection,evaluation, and assessment of tunnel damage) and b) evaluate these human-related risks as regards their possible causes, consequences and probability of occurrence – in addition with respect to existing and possible preventive measures. The results show that the causes for possible failures can lie within people, the physical environment, technology, organisation, and extra-organisational environment. Whereas current preventive measures rely mostly on the individual and quality management practices, there is potential for even larger improvement at the organisational and extra-organisational level. The FMEA results were also used to develop a quantification method to further understand the HF in tunnel inspection, which could possibly be included in the information into the overall reliability assessment. The usage of qualitative and quantitative data collected through the human-FMEA within the proposed quantification method shows promise that HF can be quantified and could offer broader understanding of HF influences on inspection in various industries
Human factors (HF) are little understood, and particularly in non-destructive testing (NDT) experimental data is rare, samples are often small, and statistical methods are rarely used to evaluate results. HF have been widely implicated in major occurrences of technical failure, for example at North Anna Power Plant and on United Airlines Flight 232. Understanding HF is vital for reliable detection and prevention of failures. Reliability assessments, though known to be affected by intrinsic capability, application factors, and HF, have thus far only concentrated to a sufficient degree on intrinsic capability. The addition of HF to that assessment has proven difficult due to the lack of a method of quantifying HF. This paper presents the first attempt from a psychological perspective to quantify HF from qualitative data.
HF data was derived from qualitative human-oriented Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (Human-FMEA) workshops for visual inspection of tunnels by laser scanning and for ultrasonic testing of welds. Data was collected on human failure modes, causes, consequences and preventive measures, as well as eliciting a risk priority number (RPN). Using this data, a system of quantitative weightings was created to allocate errors to inductively derived HF categories for further allocation to existing HF categorisation models.
This weighting model proved useful for creating quantitative summaries of HF, informing and validating qualitative FMEA results, and comparing existing HF categorisation models. Further potential lies within a planned interface to quantitative reliability assessment methods such as POD (Probability of Detection). While providing quantifications, the method retains a qualitative and holistic nature, can, thus, bridge the gap between psychological and engineering concerns of HF and reliability, contributing to future interdisciplinary work.