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Organisationseinheit der BAM
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Eingeladener Vortrag
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In einer Versuchsreihe im Realmaßstab wurden drei Flüssigwasserstofftanks (LH2) unterfeuert. Hierbei sollte unter anderem geklärt werden, ob es, analog zu druckverflüssigten Gasen, zu einem BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Cloud Explosion) kommen kann. Die Experimente wurden auf dem Testareal Wasserstoffsicherheit des Testgeländes Technische Sicherheit der Bundesanstalt für Materialforschung und -prüfung (BAM-TTS) im Rahmen einer Forschungskooperation zwischen der BAM und Gexcon, als Teil des SH2IFT-Programms durchgeführt. Es handelte sich um doppelwandige, vakuumisolierte Tanks von 1 m³ Volumen. Die zylindrischen Tanks unterschieden sich durch ihre Ausrichtung (horizontal oder vertikal) und das verwendete Isoliermaterial (Perlit oder Mehrschichtisolierung (MLI). Der Füllgrad der Tanks betrug bei jedem der durchgeführten Tests etwa 35-40 %. Die Brandlast wurde homogen durch ein propangasbetriebenes Brennersystem erzeugt. Gemessen wurden die Bedingungen im Behälter (Temperaturen und Druck) sowie äußere Randbedingungen und Auswirkungen beim Versagen (Wärmestrahlung, Druckwellen, Flammenballentwicklung und Fragmentierung). Mit Bolometern wurde die Wärmestrahlung gemessen, die sowohl durch das Propanfeuer als auch durch einen möglichen Feuerball/BLEVE erzeugt wurde. Zur Messung der durch das Bersten von Behältern/BLEVEs erzeugten Druckwellen wurden sog. Pencil-Probes verwendet. Des Weiteren wurden mehrere Kameras zur Überwachung der Experimente eingesetzt: Normalbildkameras, Infrarot (IR)-Kameras und Hochgeschwindigkeitskameras, sowohl bodengestützt als auch mittels einer Drohne. Zwei der untersuchten Tanks, ein horizontaler und der vertikale, die beide mit Perlit isoliert waren, hielten der Brandbelastung stand, ohne dass es zu einem Behälterversagen kam. Der mit MLI isolierte horizontale Behälter barst nach 1 Stunde und 6 Minuten und erzeugte dabei einen Feuerball, Trümmerflug und eine Druckwelle. Neben der Beschreibung der Auswirkungen eines kritischen Versagens eines LH2-Tanks sind weitere Ziele der Arbeit die Identifizierung kritischer Behälterzustände sowie die Erstellung eines umfassendes Datensatzes der Trümmer des geborstenen Tanks. Die größten Abstände für kritische Abstände ergaben sich durch Fragmentwurf. Hier sollen 3D-Scans für die Verwendung in CAD und FEM Anwendungen bereitgestellt werden. Umfassende Daten zu den Fragmentwurfweiten, - massen und -positionen wurden bereits publiziert. Damit soll die Voraussetzung geschaffen werden, um vorhandene Wurfweitenmodelle, die bisher nur für einschalige Behälter konzipiert wurden auf ihre Eignung für mehrschalige Behälter zu überprüfen oder mögliche Anpassungen anhand der realen Daten vornehmen zu können. Zudem wurde damit begonnen die nicht geborstenen Tanks zu vermessen und zu zerlegen, um u.a. die Perlit-Schüttung auf Beeinträchtigungen durch den Transport und die Unterfeuerung zu untersuchen.
Within a research cooperation between BAM and Gexcon as part of the SH2IFT program, large scale experiments have been performed at the Test Site Technical Safety of the Bundesanstalt für Materialforschung und –prüfung (BAM) to determine the hazards emerging from a vacuum insulated cryogenic storage vessel containing liquified hydrogen (LH2) is caught in a fire engulfing it.
Experiments have been performed to determine whether a storage vessel containing LH2 and caught in a fire engulfing the vessel can result in a BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion) and if so its effects. The tests were performed at the Test Site Technical Safety of the Bundesanstalt für Materialforschung und –prüfung (BAM) in Horstwalde, Germany.
Three tests were performed using double-walled vacuum insulated vessels of 1 m3 volume. The cylindrical Vessels differed in orientation (horizontal or vertical) and the insulation material used (perlite or multi-layer insulation (MLI)). The degree of filling of the vessels was approximately 35-40 % in each of the tests performed. The fire load was provided by a propane fed burner positioned under the storage vessel and designed to give a homogeneous fire load.
The conditions in the vessel (temperatures and pressure) as well as external effects (heat radiation, blast waves, flame ball development and fragmentation) were measured.
All vessels were equipped with K-type thermocouples at several locations: inside the inner vessel in the gas phase and the liquid phase, on the inner and outer side of the inner vessel and on the inner and outer side of the outer vessel. The pressure inside the inner vessel (both in liquid, as a level indicator, and gaseous phase), and in the space between the inner and outer vessels (vacuum pressure) was measured.
Bolometers were used to measure the heat radiation generated by both the propane fire and that generated by a possible fireball/BLEVE. To measure blast generated by the vessel burst/BLEVEs blast pencils were positioned at three locations in two directions. Weather conditions were monitored at two weather stations. Further several cameras were used to monitor the events: normal cameras, infrared (IR)-cameras, high-speed cameras also on board of a drone.
Two of these vessels, a horizontal and a vertical vessel both insulated with perlite withstood the fire loading for 1 hour 20 minutes and 4 hours respectively without catastrophic failure. A horizontal vessel insulated with MLI failed by bursting after 1 hour and 6 minutes resulting in a fireball, fragments, and blast waves.
Experiments have been performed to determine the consequences of a storage vessel containing liquified hydrogen (LH2) is engulfed by a fire. The tests were performed at the Test Site Technical Safety of the Bundesanstalt für Materialforschung und –prüfung (BAM) in Germany within a research cooperation between BAM and Gexcon as part of the SH2IFT program. Three tests were performed using double-walled vacuum insulated vessels of 1 m3 volume varying the orientation of the vessel and the effect of the insulation material used (perlite or multi-layer insulation (MLI)). The degree of filling of the vessel was approximately 35 % in each of the tests performed. The fire load was provided by a propane fed burner positioned under the storage vessel and designed to give a homogeneous fire load. In one of the tests a rupture of the storage vessel occurred causing a blast, a fireball and fragments. Apart from measuring these consequences, the conditions in the vessel (e.g. temperatures and pressure) during the heating process were monitored in all three tests. The work described was undertaken as part of the project Safe Hydrogen fuel handling and Use for Efficient Implementation (SH2IFT).
Experiments have been performed to determine the consequences of a storage vessel containing liquified hydrogen (LH2) is engulfed by a fire. The tests were performed at the Test Site Technical Safety of the Bundesanstalt für Materialforschung und –prüfung (BAM) in Germany within a research cooperation between BAM and Gexcon as part of the SH2IFT program. Three tests were performed using double-walled vacuum insulated vessels of 1 m3 volume varying the orientation of the vessel and the effect of the insulation material used (perlite or multi-layer insulation (MLI)). The degree of filling of the vessel was approximately 35 % in each of the tests performed. The fire load was provided by a propane fed burner positioned under the storage vessel and designed to give a homogeneous fire load. In one of the tests a rupture of the storage vessel occurred causing a blast, a fireball and fragments. Apart from measuring these consequences, the conditions in the vessel (e.g. temperatures and pressure) during the heating process were monitored in all three tests. The work described was undertaken as part of the project Safe Hydrogen fuel handling and Use for Efficient Implementation (SH2IFT).
Large Scale Experiments have been performed to determine whether a storage vessel containing liquid hydrogen (LH2) and caught in a fire engulfing the vessel can result in a BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion) and if so its consequences. The tests were performed at the Test Site Technical Safety of the Bundesanstalt für Materialforschung und –prüfung (BAM) in Germany at the Hydrogen Test Area (H2TA) within a research cooperation between BAM and Gexcon as part of the SH2IFT program. Three tests were performed using double-walled vacuum insulated vessels of 1 m3 volume. The cylindrical Vessels differed in orientation (horizontal or vertical) and the insulation material used (perlite or multi-layer insulation (MLI)). The degree of filling of the vessels was approximately 35-40 % in each of the tests performed. The fire load was provided by a propane fed burner-system positioned under the storage vessel and designed to give a homogeneous fire load. The conditions in the vessel (temperatures and pressure) as well as external effects (heat radiation, blast waves, flame ball development and fragmentation) were measured. All vessels were equipped with K-type thermocouples at several locations at the inner and outer vessel shell. The pressure inside the inner vessel and in the space between the inner and outer vessels (vacuum pressure) was measured. Bolometers were used to measure the heat radiation generated by both the propane fire and that generated by a possible fireball/BLEVE. To measure blast generated by the vessel burst/BLEVEs blast pencils were positioned at up to three locations. Further several cameras were used to monitor the events: normal cameras, infrared (IR)-cameras, high-speed cameras also on board of an UAV. Two of these vessels, a horizontal and a vertical vessel both insulated with perlite withstood the fire loading for 1 hour 20 minutes and 4 hours respectively without catastrophic failure. A horizontal vessel insulated with MLI failed by bursting after 1 hour and 6 minutes resulting in a fireball, fragments, and blast wave.
An overview of test standards and regulations relevant to the fire testing of pressure vessels
(2021)
Fire exposure of storage and transportation vessels of hazardous materials (including pressure liquefied gases) can result in BLEVEs and other high-consequence incidents with large societal and economic impacts. To reduce risk most countries have numerous regulations, codes of practice and guidance notes covering the design, operation and maintenance of vessels and thermal protection systems. Yet despite such regulations there remains no internationally accepted fire test procedure for pressure vessel and accompanying thermal protection systems that is capable of meeting a range of regulatory requirements. This paper considers some of the regulations in place in the western world and considers the origin of these based on large and medium-scale testing conducted to date. It examines conditions found in these tests to propose a set of recommendations on which to base a standard method of test. These recommendations are proposed as being representative of a credible large pool fire scenario that may occur.
Exposure of pressure vessels to fire can result in catastrophic explosion and escalation of accidents. The safe transportation of cargo in pressure vessels therefore requires knowledge of what will happen to the cargo in the event of a vehicle derailment or rollover resulting in fire exposure. The chapter presents an overview of selected testing and modelling work undertaken to understand the thermohydraulic processes within a vessel that drive pressurization during fire. A series of experiments highlighting the importance of adequate design and selection of protection systems are summarized. It is concluded that pressure relief alone is typically insufficient to prevent vessel rupture, but the combination of relief and thermal coatings can be effective.
Again and again in case of a fire a bursting of acetylene cylinders occure. In the case of such a cylinder failure, these represent an enormous threat to fire and rescue services. BAM has been dealing for many years with the effects of acetylene cylinder failure. The presentation introduces BAM's experimental work in this area and outlines various options for action to reduce the risk for fire and rescue services. In the beginning BAM as well as the experimental possibilities at the BAM TTS are presented.
In case of a vehicle fire, an installed LPG (liquefied petroleum gas) tank with a malfunctioning safety device poses severe hazards. To investigate the consequences in case of tank failure, we conducted 16 tests with toroidal shaped LPG vehicle tanks. Three tanks were used for a Hydraulic Burst Test under standard conditions. Another three tanks were equipped with a statutory safety device and were subjected to a gasoline pool fire. The safety device prevented tank failure, as intended. To generate a statistically valid dataset on tank failure, ten tanks without safety devices were exposed to a gasoline pool fire. Five tanks were filled to a level of 20 %; the re-maining five were filled to a level of 100 %. In order to gain information on the heating process, three tem-perature readings at the tank surface, and three nearby flame temperatures were recorded. At distances of l = (7; 9; 11) m to the tank, the overpressure of the shock wave induced by the tank failure and the unsteady tem-peratures were measured. All ten tanks failed within a time of t < 5 min in a BLEVE (boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion). Seven of these resulted directly in a catastrophic failure. The other three resulted in partial failure followed by catastrophic failure. A near field overpressure at a distance of l = 7 m of up to p = 0.27 bar was measured. All ten tests showed massive fragmentation of the tank mantle. In total, 50 fragments were found. These 50 fragments make-up 88.6 % of the original tank mass. Each fragment was georeferenced and weighed. Fragment throwing distances of l > 250 m occurred. For the tanks with a fill level of 20 %, the average number of fragments was twice as high as it was for the tanks that were filled completely.