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Existing spent nuclear fuel (SF) and high active waste (HAW) management policies and practices worldwide are the result of past presumptions that sufficient reprocessing and/or disposal capacity would be available in the near term. Consequently, in the past many countries have developed specific solutions for different periods of time due to their individual national nuclear policies.
In Germany the concept of dry interim storage in dual purpose metal casks before disposal is being pursued for SF and HAW management and transport and storage licenses have been issued accordingly. The current operation licenses for existing storage facilities have been granted for a storage period of up to 40 years. This concept has demonstrated its suitability for over 20 years so far. Relevant safety requirements haven been assessed for the short-term as well as for the long-term for site-specific operational and accidental storage conditions. But in the meantime significant delays in the national repository siting procedure occured which will make extended storage periods necessary in the future.
This paper describes the current situation in Germany with regard to dry cask storage and focuses on current perspectives considering regulatory, technical, and scientific aspects for storage license renewal. Since there is one case of a storage license limitation to only 20 years due to administrative reasons, first experience is currently gathered in case of an expiring storage license. Subsequent license options have been pursued intensively including the extension of the initial storage license as well as shipping all casks to another storage facility considering an extended storage period at that storage facility as well. All safety relevant aspects have to be reviewed on basis of the current state-of-the-art which might be different from the initial safety demonstrations. That includes new safety assessment standards as well as improved knowledge base. Major issues are e.g. improved accident scenario analyses, assessment methods, and consideration of aging effects from previous operation periods. Inspection programs with respect, e.g. to bolts and seals to verify leak-tightness and lid screw pre-stress have been initiated to demonstrate proper cask conditions for extended storage as well as transportation to another storage facility.
German approach and feedback on experience of transportability of SNF packages after interim storage
(2014)
In Germany, the concept of dry interim storage of spent fuel in dual purpose metal casks is implemented, currently for periods of up to 40 years. The casks being used have an approved package design in accordance with the international transport regulations. The license for dry storage is granted on the German Atomic Energy Act with respect to the recently revised 'Guidelines for dry interim storage of irradiated fuel assemblies and heat-generating radioactive waste in casks' by the German Waste management Commission. For transport on public routes between or after long term interim storage periods, it has to be ensured that the transport and storage casks fulfil the specifications of the transport approval or other sufficient properties, which satisfy the proofs for the compliance of the safety objectives at that time. In recent years, the validation period of transport approval certificates for manufactured, loaded and stored packages were discussed among authorities and applicants. A case dependent system of 3, 5 and 10 years was established. There are consequences for the safety cases in the Package Design Safety Report, including evaluation of long term behaviour of components and specific operating procedures of the package. The present research and knowledge concerning the long term behaviour of transport and storage cask components have to be consulted as well as experiences from interim cask storage operations. Challenges in the safety assessment are e.g. the behaviour of aged metal and elastomeric gaskets under IAEA test conditions to ensure that the results of drop tests can be transferred to the compliance of the safety objectives at the time of transport after the interim storage period. Assessment methods for the material compatibility, the behaviour of fuel assemblies and the aging behaviour of shielding parts are issues as well. This paper describes the state of the art technology in Germany, explains recent experience on transport preparation after interim storage and points out arising prospective challenges.
German approach and experience feedback of transport ability of SNF packages after interim storage
(2013)
In Germany the concept of dry interim storage of spent fuel in dual purpose metal casks is implemented, currently for periods of up to 40 years.
The casks being used have an approved package design in accordance with the international transport regulations. The license for dry storage is granted on the German Atomic Energy Act with respect to the recently revised “Guidelines for dry interim storage of irradiated fuel assemblies and heat-generating radioactive waste in casks” by the German Waste management Commission (ESK).
For transport on public routes between or after long term interim storage periods, it has to be ensured that the transport and storage casks fulfil the specifications of the transport approval or other sufficient properties which satisfy the proofs for the compliance of the safety objectives at that time.
In recent years the validation period of transport approval certificates for manufactured, loaded and stored packages were discussed among authorities and applicants. A case dependant system of 3, 5 and 10 years was established. There are consequences for the safety cases in the Package Design Safety Report including evaluation of long term behavior of components and specific operating procedures of the package.
Present research and knowledge concerning the long term behavior of transport and storage cask components have to be consulted as well as experiences from interim cask storage operations. Challenges in the safety assessment are e.g. the behavior of aged metal and elastomeric gaskets under IAEA test conditions to ensure that the results of drop tests can be transferred to the compliance of the safety objectives at the time of transport after the interim storage period.
In Germany the concept of dry interim storage of spent fuel and vitrified high active waste in dual purpose metal casks is implemented (currently for periods of up to 40 years). The casks being used have an approved package design in accordance with the international transport regulations. The license for dry storage is granted on the German Atomic Energy Act with respect to the guidelines of the German Reactor Safety Commission for dry interim storage of spent fuel. Currently part of the assessment process of the cask design for transport on public routes is to evaluate the suitability of the used materials with respect to their properties and their compatibility for possible transport periods. For transport on public routes during or after long term interim storage periods, it has to be ensured that the transport and storage casks fulfill the specifications of the transport approval or other sufficient properties which satisfy the proofs for the compliance of the safety objectives at that time. This paper describes the state-of-the-art technology in Germany and points out arising prospective challenges and which related questions have to be answered in future. Present research and knowledge concerning the long term behavior of transport and storage cask components (such as gaskets and shielding components) have to be consulted as well as experiences from interim cask storage operations. Challenges in the safety assessment are therefore i.e. the behavior of aged metal and elastomeric gaskets under IAEA test conditions to ensure that the results of drop tests can be transferred to the compliance of the safety objectives at the time of transport after the interim storage period (aged package). Assessment methods for the material compatibility, the behavior of fuel assemblies and the aging behavior of shielding parts (e. g. influence of radiation) are further issues as well.
The safety and integrity of casks for radioactive waste in accidental scenarios is analysed by BAM Federal institute tor Materials Research and Testing. An accidental scenario in German interim storage facilities is the drop from a crane during the handling operation. To reduce the mechanical loads to the cask a shock absorbing footing with high energy absorption capability is used in these areas. In order to analyse and evaluate such impact scenarios of casks, numerical simulations are performed. For a comprehensive simulation of an accidental scenario the behaviour of the damping concrete footing has to be taken into account as well and therefor a material model is needed. Material parameters under different loading conditions are the basis for a numerical model. For that reason a government funded research project (Kasparek, 2012) was conducted to characterise damping concrete under quasi-static as well as highly dynamic impact loading conditions. The performed tests include compression tests with and without lateral constraint small-scale and midscale penetration tests with different indenters, and finally a full-scale drop test onto a damping concrete footing.
Mechanical loading conditions of transport and storage casks for radioactive materials in accidental scenarios are highly affected by the behavior of both: the impact limiters and the footing materials. To minimize potential damages during the handling of casks, a so called damping concrete is frequently used for the footings in interim nuclear facilities. It obtains its shock absorbing properties through admixing of polymer cells. For a comprehensive mechanical evaluation of casks, advanced material models are also needed for damping concrete. In order to characterize the mechanical properties and to develop numerical material models, penetration tests were carried out at different test facilities of BAM. The tests contain static and dynamic penetration tests on cubic specimen with an edge length of 100 mm as well as mortared specimen with a size of 240 x 240 x 50 cm³. Indenters with different geometries and diameters were used for these model-sized penetration tests. Subsequently a full-scale cylindrical cast-iron indenter with a diameter of 110 cm was dropped of 5 m height on a realistic damping concrete footing.
The design of a special form radioactive material has to resist a severe transport accident without undue loss or dispersal of radioactive material.
Safety assessment by authorities competent for design approval has to include besides the required test program (impact, percussion, bending and heat test) also the evaluation of the quality management system for design, manufacture, testing, documentation, use, maintenance and inspection.
These quality assurance measures have to assure that every specimen of the approved design is produced in the same verified quality and every specimen must be able to survive the severe mechanical and thermal tests without undue loss or dispersal of radioactive material at any time of its working life.
All important aspects in the design approval procedure by BAM as the competent authority for approvals of special form radioactive material in Germany are summarized in a guideline published in 2014. This paper will give additional explanations to some aspects in safety assessment, e.g.:
the applicability of leak test methods and the need to consider ageing aspects.
Internal cask content collisions during drop test of transport casks for radioactive materials
(2013)
In transport casks for radioactive materials, significantly large axial and radial gaps between cask and internal content are often present because of certain specific geometrical dimensions of the content (e.g. spent fuel elements) or thermal reasons. The possibility of inner relative movement between content and cask will increase if the content is not fixed. During drop testing, these movements can lead to internal cask content collisions, causing significantly high loads on the cask components and the content itself. Especially in vertical drop test orientations onto a lid side of the cask, an internal collision induced by a delayed impact of the content onto the inner side of the lid can cause high stress peaks in the lid and the lid bolts with the risk of component failure as well as impairment of the leak tightness of the closure system. This paper reflects causes and effects of the phenomenon of internal impact on the basis of experimental results obtained from instrumented drop tests with transport casks and on the basis of analytical approaches. Furthermore, the paper concludes the importance of consideration of possible cask content collisions in the safety analysis of transport casks for radioactive materials under accident conditions of transport.
TN®24 E, a new package design, was developed and applied for by Areva TN for German transport approval certificate. The certificate was issued by BfS, Federal Office for Radiation Protection, on 24th of July 2013. The package is designed as a dual purpose cask for transport and storage of up to 21 PWR spent fuel assemblies from German NPPs. BAM is the German competent authority responsible for the design assessment of RAM packages regarding mechanical and thermal safety cases, activity release analysis and all issues of quality assurance during manufacturing and operation of packages. Certain assessment experiences as well as new developments resulting from the BAM TN®24E approval procedure are presented. The mechanical safety case of the TN®24E is based mainly on finite element calculations, which were verified by the TN®81 1/3 scale drop test program performed at BAM. Thermal analyses rely upon calculations, while the activity release criterion is based upon leakage rate results of TN®81 drop tests. The BAM-GGR 012 guideline for the analysis of bolted lid and trunnion systems has been fully implemented. Due to requirements by BAM, AREVA TN developed a new assessment strategy for fracture mechanical evaluation of welding seams. The material qualification and documentation is also an important aspect of BAM assessment; the qualification of borated aluminum basket material, the determination of strength values for thermal aged hardened aluminum alloys for the basket or consideration of high burn-up fuel assemblies are remarkable issues in this context. In addition, the consideration of the material compatibility, especially taking into account a transport after 40 years of dry interim storage in German facilities, has gained significant importance in the licensing process of the TN®24E. Next to obvious mechanical issues such as the assessment of shell ovalization under 9 m drop test scenario and its impact on basket load, thermo-mechanical interactions had to be addressed in the safety case. Due to BAM requirements, AREVA TN performed a full thermo-mechanical analysis of the cask behavior under fire test conditions.
BAM as competent authority regarding assessment of mechanical and thermal design, activity release and quality assurance aspects of SNF and HLW transport packages developed a thesaurus of experience feedback topics from recent approval procedures. The list is structured according to the European PDSR guide. It involves issues, which from BAM point of view, needed clarification during last package design assessment procedures. The list contains issues from operation (e.g. deactivation of handling lugs not intended for package handling), maintenance (e.g. leak tightness of impact limiting devices) to technical assessment (e.g. formation of hydrogen by radiolysis and its impact on pressure and ignitability, consideration of ageing mechanisms, thermo-mechanical assessment, impact of gaps between content and flask, spent fuel behaviour) as well as to general and specific safety analysis report requirements (e.g. report structure and required data).