Eigenverlag BAM
Non-destructive testing (NDT) is regarded as one of the key elements in ensuring quality of engineering systems and their safe use. A failure of NDT to detect critical defects in safetyrelevant components, such as those in the nuclear industry, may lead to catastrophic consequences for the environment and the people. Therefore, ensuring that NDT methods are capable of detecting all critical defects, i.e. that they are reliable, is of utmost importance. Reliability of NDT is affected by human factors, which have thus far received the least amount of attention in the reliability assessments. With increased use of automation, in terms of mechanised testing (automation-assisted inspection and the corresponding evaluation of data), higher reliability standards are believed to have been achieved. However, human inspectors, and thus human factors, still play an important role throughout this process, and the risks involved in this application are unknown. The overall aim of the work presented in this dissertation was to explore for the first time the risks associated with mechanised NDT and find ways of mitigating their effects on the inspection performance. Hence, the objectives were to (1) identify and analyse potential risks in mechanised NDT, (2) devise measures against them, (3) critically address the preventive measures with respect to new potential risks, and (4) suggest ways for the implementation of the preventive measures. To address the first two objectives a risk assessment in form of a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) was conducted (Study 1). This analysis revealed potential for failure during both the acquisition and evaluation of NDT data that could be assigned to human, technology, and organisation. Since the existing preventive measures are insufficient to defend the system from identified failures, new preventive measures were suggested. The conclusion of the study was that those preventive measures need to be carefully considered with respect to new potential risks, before they can be implemented, thus serving as a starting point for further empirical studies. To address the final two objectives, two preventive measures, i.e. human redundancy and the use of automated aids in the evaluation of NDT data, were critically assessed with regard to potential downfalls arising from the social interaction between redundant individuals and the belief in the high reliability of automated aids. The second study was concerned with the potential withdrawal of effort in sequential redundant teams when working collectively as opposed to working alone, when independence between the two redundant individuals is not present. The results revealed that the first redundant inspector, led to believe someone else will conduct the same task afterwards, invested the same amount of effort as when working alone. The redundant checker was not affected by the information about the superior experience of his predecessor and—instead of expected withdrawal of effort—exhibited better performance in the task. Both results were in contradiction to the hypotheses, the explanations for which can be found in the social loafing and social compensation effects and in the methodological limitations. The third study examined inappropriate use of the aid measured in terms of (a) agreement with the errors of the aid in connection to the frequency of verifying its results and in terms of (b) the overall performance in the task. The results showed that the information about the high reliability of the aid did not affect the perception of that aid’s performance and, hence, no differences in the actual use of the aid were to be expected. However, the participants did not use the aid appropriately: They misused it, i.e. agreed with the errors committed by the aid and disused it, i.e. disagreed with the correct information provided by the aid, thereby reducing the overall reliability of the aid in terms of sizing ability. Whereas aid’s misuse could be assigned to low propensity to take risks and reduced verification behaviour because of a bias towards automation, the disuse was assigned to the possible misunderstanding of the task. The results of these studies raised the awareness that methods used to increase reliability and safety, such as automation and human redundancy, can backfire if their implementation is not carefully considered with respect to new potential risks arising from the interaction between individuals and complex systems. In an attempt to minimise this risk, suggestions for their implementation in the NDT practice were provided.
The tradition of discussing the newest achievements in the consideration of NDE reliability was continued with the 5th European American Workshop on Reliability of NDE (5th EAW) in Berlin in 2013. The Focus of this workshop was to determine the 'delta' between the laboratorylike conditions, in which reliability assessments are usually carried out, and the everyday field conditions. Which obstacles need to be still overcome and how do we get closer with our estimations to the real field reliability? With the joint effort of international researchers and in-field practitioners the up-to-date research was presented and discussed, culminating in a half-a-day long 'Open Space Technology' discussion. This paper presents the main conclusions of the workshop.
Since the beginnings of the European American Workshops (EAW) in 1997, the aim was to gather the experts in NDE reliability and discuss burning topics with the aim of identifying crucial problems and suggesting ways to move forward. This was usually achieved during the so-called break-out sessions, in which predetermined topics were discussed. During the 5th EAW, held in Berlin in 2013, this approach was replaced by an Open Space Technology (OST) approach. The benefit of this approach is seen in the freedom of topic choices, i. e., the topics are not predetermined but rather arise at that moment in that space and by the participants choice. The following topics arose: new reliability methods (Bayesian, MAPOD,
), structural health monitoring, definition of requirements of NDE by customer versus provider, what value of POD is good enough?, human factors, manual versus automated inspection, and basic concepts of reliability of NDE. The participants were encouraged to walk from one session to another and openly express their opinions. These were in the end summarized by a chosen group of moderators and presented in this paper.
Das Ziel des Artikels ist es eine Übersicht über neue methodische Ansätze und Verfahren zur Bewertung der Zuverlässigkeit von ZfP-Systemen in Übereinstimmung mit den spezifischen Anforderungen verschiedener industrieller Anwendungen zu geben. Nach einem Überblick über die in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten erreichten Fortschritte, wird der Fokus auf die gegenwärtigen Entwicklungen gerichtet. Für hohe Sicherheitsanforderungen wurde die quantitative Fehlerauffindwahrscheinlichkeit (probability of detection, POD) basierend auf 'hit/miss'- oder 'Signal-Response'-Analysen und die ROC-Analyse (Receiver Operating Characteristics) als typische Werkzeuge entwickelt. Im Rahmen des modularen Modells für die ZfP-Zuverlässigkeit unterscheidet man zwischen den rein physikalisch-technischen Einflussfaktoren, den industriellen Anwendungsfaktoren und den menschlichen Faktoren. Es hilft zum Beispiel zu erkennen, welche dieser Faktoren man in Modellierungsrechnungen bzw. mittels offenen oder Blindversuchen untersuchen kann. Ein neues Paradigma wird für die Betrachtung der POD als eine Funktion der gewählten Systemparameter und somit als Optimierungswerkzeug verwendet, anstelle sie für die endgültige Beurteilung zu nehmen. Zur Handhabung der Zuverlässigkeitsuntersuchung von realen Defekten in einer realistischen Umgebung werden ökonomisch vertretbare, aber dennoch präzise genug arbeitende Methoden, wie der Ansatz von Bayes oder modellbasierte Methoden vorgestellt. Die menschlichen Faktoren sind oft von ausschlaggebender Wichtigkeit für die Gesamtzuverlässigkeit. Hier hilft ein systematischer psychologischer Ansatz die Engpässe und Verbesserungsmöglichkeiten zu finden.
Der Artikel beschreibt eine arbeitspsychologische Analyse des Einflusses der menschlichen Faktoren auf die Zuverlässigkeit zerstörungsfreier Prüfungen (ZfP). Im Zeitraum von 5 Jahren wurde eine Serie von Untersuchungen zur wiederkehrenden Prüfung in Kernkraftwerken sowie zur Prüfung von Komponenten für die Endlagerung von radioaktivem Abfall durchgeführt. Dieser Beitrag gibt einen Überblick über vier Studien, diskutiert ausgewählte experimentelle Ergebnisse, und schlägt sich daraus ergebende Möglichkeiten zur Optimierung des ZfP-Verfahrens, der Prüfanweisung sowie zur Schulung des Personals vor. Die experimentellen Ergebnisse haben gezeigt, dass sowohl hoher Zeitdruck als auch hohe psychische Arbeitsbeanspruchung die Qualität des Prüfungsergebnisses negativ beeinflussen. Auffällig waren die Einflüsse der Einteilung des Arbeitsplans, der Kommunikation, der Prüfanweisung, der Prüfaufsicht sowie der Demonstrationsübung. Die abgewandelte Fehlermöglichkeits- und Einflussanalyse (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis FMEA) wurde zur Identifizierung potentieller menschlicher Risiken während der Datenaufnahme und deren Auswertung benutzt. Darauf basierend werden verschiedene Präventivmaßnahmen, wie z.B. menschliche Redundanz und Automatisierung vorgeschlagen, sowie sich daraus möglicherweise ergebende Probleme diskutiert. Die experimentellen Ergebnisse haben gezeigt, dass menschliche Redundanz bei kritischen Anwendungen, wie beispielweise der Fehleridentifizierung, zu anderen Fehlerquellen führen kann, wie sozialem Faulenzen bei den Prüfern. Die Verwendung automatisierter softwarebasierter Entscheidungshilfen zur Fehlererkennung bzw. Fehlergrößenbestimmung kann zu übersteigertem Vertrauen in das automatisierte System (automation bias) durch die Prüfer und somit zu Fehlentscheidungen führen. Dadurch kann die Zuverlässigkeit der Prüfung in ungewollter Weise beeinflusst werden. Um die Zuverlässigkeit und Sicherheit der technischen Prozesse zu gewährleisten ist es wichtig, als Hauptfehlerquelle nicht mehr nur das einzelne Individuum zu sehen, sondern ebenfalls die Organisation zu berücksichtigen.
The human factors approach relies on understanding the properties of
human capability and limitations under various conditions and the application of that
knowledge in designing and developing safe systems. Following the principles of
MTO (Man Technology Organization) approach, emphasis should be given to the
way people interact with technical as well as organizational systems.
A model describing human factor influences in relation to the performance shaping
factors and their effect on the manual ultrasonic inspection performance had been
built and a part of it empirically tested. The experimental task involved repeated
inspection of 18 flaws according to the standard procedure under no, middle and
high time pressure. Stress coping strategies, mental workload of the task, stress
reaction and organizational factors have been measured. The results have shown that
time pressure, mental workload and experience influence the quality of the
inspection performance. Organizational factors and their influence on the inspection
results were rated as important by the operators. However, further research is
necessary into the effects of stress.