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The decommissioning or refurbishment of nuclear facilities necessitates either the storage or disposal of large radioactive components such as steam generators, pressurizers, reactor pressure vessels and heads, and coolant pumps, to list the major contributors. These components or objects are large in size and mass, measuring up to approximately 6 meters in diameter, up to 20 meters in length, and weighing over 400 000 kg. In many situations, the components are transported off-site to a storage, disposal or recycling/treatment facility. Previously, many large objects had to be transported under special arrangement.
Since 2005, several European countries, coordinated by the European Association of Competent Authorities (EACA), have been developing a guide on contents and structure of the documentation demonstrating the compliance with the regulations for packages for the transport of radioactive material (package design safety report, PDSR). This guide has been periodically improved, considering feedback from Designers and authorities.
Taking into account the successful application of this guide in Europe, in 2013 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) decided to establish a similar guide as an IAEA document for promotion of worldwide use. The development of this IAEA guide started from the latest version of the European PDSR guide. In 2016/2017, during a 120-day review period, comments on the draft were received from member states and international organizations. These were incorporated into the draft in a series of meetings in 2017.
In another meeting in December 2018 the draft was updated to be in line with the latest revision of the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (SSR-6).
In this process the draft has been improved significantly, regarding structure as well as implementation of a graded approach depending on the package type, and clarified.
This paper points to the major considerations in developing the guide and important improvements over the last version of the European PDSR guide.
Im Gegensatz zu den zulassungspflichtigen Versandstücken für die gemäß der gefahrgutrechtlichen Regelwerksanforderungen eine behördlich ausgestellte Zulassung erforderlich ist, ist für die prüfpflichtigen Versandstücke lediglich eine behördliche Anerkennung und Überwachung des Managementsystems für die Auslegung, Herstellung, Prüfung, Dokumentation, den Gebrauch, die Wartung und Inspektion erforderlich.
In der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist gemäß den Festlegungen in der Gefahrgutverordnung Straße, Eisenbahn und Binnenschifffahrt die Bundesanstalt für Materialforschung und -prüfung (BAM) zuständig für die Anerkennung und Überwachung von Managementsystemen.
Die Regelwerksanforderungen für Verpackungen für den Transport radioaktiver Stoffe basieren auf den Empfehlungen der IAEA und werden über die verkehrsträgerspezifischen internationalen Regelwerke in nationales Recht umgesetzt.
Um die Anforderungen des Regelwerkes zu erläutern, entwickelt die Bundesanstalt für Materialforschung und -prüfung (BAM) Gefahrgutregeln (BAM-GGR), welche die Entwickler, Hersteller und Betreiber von Behältern über die von der BAM angewandten Verfahren bei der Umsetzung gesetzlicher Bestimmungen informieren und unterstützen sollen.
The decommissioning or refurbishment of nuclear facilities necessitates either the storage or disposal of large radioactive components such as steam generators, pressurizers, reactor pressure vessels and heads, and coolant pumps, to list the major contributors. These components or objects are large in size and mass, measuring up to approximately 6 meters in diameter, up to 20 meters in length, and weighing over 400 000 kg. In many situations, the components are transported off-site to a storage, disposal or recycling/treatment facility. Previously, many large objects had to be transported under special arrangement.
The latest 2018 edition of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, No. SSR-6 [1], incorporates regulations for the shipment of large objects as a new category of surface contaminated object, SCO-III, based on the IAEA “performance package” concept. This paper provides background and practical guidance on these regulations.
Additionally, the experiences of BAM with the appoval of two steam converters of the NPP Lingen are presented as the first approval process for SCO-III objects in Germany.
The primary additions to SSR-6 include SCO-III classification and requirements, approval and administrative requirements for the new classification, and the addition of SCO-III to the proper shipping
name for UN 2913. Advisory material drafted for the new requirements will be included in the next revision of SSG-26, Advisory Material for the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, expected to be published soon.
Note that at this time the proposed provisions for large objects do not include components such as reactor vessels, due to the more limited experience and greater radioactivity levels. The SCO-III concept lays the groundwork and may be extended to cover other large objects that are classified as low specific activity (LSA) material in the future.
The first German package design approval certificate for a dual purpose cask intended for loading with damaged spent nuclear fuel was issued recently. BAM as part of the competent authority system in Germany carried out a comprehensive assessment procedure with respect to the mechanical and thermal design, the release of radioactive material and the quality assurance aspects of manufacturing and operation. Packages for the transport and storage of radioactive material have been assessed by BAM for many years, thus the common assessment procedure is well-known and good practice. Up to now only SNF without defects or HLW with well-defined properties were designated for long-term Interim storage and transports afterwards. Due to Germany’s nuclear phase out all other kinds of spent nuclear fuel in particular damaged spent nuclear fuel shall be packed as well. Damaged spent nuclear fuel needs a tight closure with Special encapsulations and clearly defined properties in Germany. In addition, these encapsulations shall be long-term durable, because they are not accessible after loading in a packaging within periodical inspections. The main difference to Standard package components is that encapsulations with a permanent closure achieve their specified conditions not after manufacturing but only during operation, after loading and closing. To ensure compliance with the specific conditions, special measures for quality assurance are necessary during operation of each encapsulation, e.g. drying and sealing, which were assessed by BAM. The present paper gives an overview of the conducted assessment from BAM and point out the findings concerning to the special closure lid of the approved encapsulation, which is screwed and welded. A wide verification concept is necessary to show the specific tightness under transport conditions. Together with quality assurance measures during first operation steps these encapsulations with damaged spent nuclear fuel can be handled like standard fuel assemblies in approved package designs.
Damaged spent nuclear fuel (DSNF) can be loaded in German dual-purpose casks (DPC) for transport and interim storage. Encapsulations are needed to guarantee a safe handling and a tight closure, separated from the package enclosure. These encapsulations shall be durable and leak-tight for a long storage period, because they are usually not accessible within periodical inspections of the DPC. Due to the general design of DPCs for standard fuel assemblies, specific requirements have to be considered for the design of encapsulations for DSNF to ensure the loading in existing package designs. Especially the primary lid system of a DPC is designed for maximum loads due to the internal impact of the content during drop test conditions. The main difference of encapsulations for damaged spent nuclear fuel is that they have usually a much higher stiffness than standard fuel assemblies. Therefore the design of an internal shock absorber, e.g. at the head of an encapsulation is required to reduce mechanical loads to the primary lid system during impacts.
BAM as part of the German competent authority system is responsible for the safety assessment of the mechanical and thermal package design, the release of radioactive material and the quality assurance of package manufacturing and operation. Concerning the mechanical design of the encapsulation BAM was involved in the comprehensive assessment procedure during the package design approval process. An internal shock absorber was developed by the package designer with numerical analyses and experimental drop tests. Experimental drop tests are needed to cover limiting parameters regarding, e.g. temperature and wall thickness of the shock absorbing element to enable a detailed specification of the whole load-deformation behavior of the encapsulation shock absorber.
The paper gives an overview of the assessment work by BAM and points out the main findings which are relevant for an acceptable design of internal shock absorbers. The physical drop tests were planned on the basis of pre-investigations of the applicant concerning shape, dimension and material properties. In advance of the final drop tests the possible internal impact behavior had to be analyzed and the setup of the test facility had to be validated. The planning, performance and evaluation of the final drop tests were witnessed and assessed by BAM. In conclusion it could be approved that the German encapsulation system for damaged spent nuclear fuel with shock absorbing components can be handled similar to standard fuel assemblies in existing package designs.
Assessment experience on packages loaded with damaged spent nuclear fuel for transport after storage
(2018)
In 2017 the first German package approval certificate was issued for a dual purpose cask (DPC) design with encapsulated damaged spent nuclear fuel. At the Bundesanstalt für Materialforschung und -prüfung (BAM) a comprehensive assessment procedure was carried out with respect to the mechanical and thermal design, the containment design and quality assurance for manufacturing and operation. Main objective of this procedure was to verify the Package Design Safety Report (PDSR) fulfils the requirements according to the IAEA regulations SSR-6.
Until now only standard spent nuclear fuel assemblies were designated for interim storage and transports. Due to nuclear phase out in Germany all other kinds of SNF in particular damaged fuel has to be packed. Therefore specific requirements have to be considered in accordance with international experiences written in IAEA technical reports. In Germany damaged spent nuclear fuel (DSNF) needs a tight encapsulation with special encapsulations and clearly defined properties.
Due to the limited amount of DSNF these encapsulations are designed for storage and transport in existing packages. From the assessment experience it has been seen, corresponding PDSR need an extensively expansion to cover the design of these encapsulations and their influences on the package. Then such well-defined encapsulations can be handled like standard fuel assemblies. The main difference to standard package components is, encapsulations with permanent closure achieve their specified condition not after manufacturing but only during operation after loading and closing.
Thus specific handling instruction and test procedures are necessary especially for welding, where BAM is able to survey the quality of this first part of operation.
The presentation gives an overview about the current experiences of BAM regarding ageing management of transport packages in Germany.
The concept of the BAM-GGR 023 for ageing management of transport packagings will be described.
The fundamentals of BAM-GGR 023 will be shown, including the following key aspects:
-the organization of an Ageing Management System (AMS),
-the issue of an Ageing Management Plan (AMP),
-the ageing evaluation as a part of the AMP,
-the Ageing Surveillance Program (ASP) as a part of the AMP,
-the Ageing Management Documentation (AMD).
In accordance with the IAEA transport regulations Special Form Radioactive Material (SFRM) is either an indispersible solid radioactive material or a sealed capsule containing radioactive material.
The design of special form radioactive material has to resist a severe transport accident without undue loss or dispersal of radioactive material. The safety assessment for design approval shall include besides the required test program (impact, percussion, bending and heat test) also the evaluation of the management system for design, manufacture, testing, documentation, use, maintenance and inspection. The specified quality assurance measures have to assure, that every specimen of the approved design is produced in the same verified quality and every specimen must be able to survive the severe mechanical and thermal tests at any time of its working life.
Due to the long-term use of SFRM the consideration of ageing is an important aspect in the approval procedure by BAM, the competent authority for SFRM approval in Germany. Different fields of application imply a wide range of environmental conditions, from clean room atmosphere to highly aggressive industrial conditions. So, besides of radioactive content, corrosion is a main factor for possible design degradation.
This paper will describe major influencing factors to be taken into account to assess the ageing behavior of a SFRM design and will emphasize that there is a need for a regulatory specification of a SFRM-working life as basis for the aging evaluations.