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With integration of the new para 613A into SSR-6 [1] the consideration of ageing mechanisms is now obligatory for the design of packages and their approval. In addition, para 809(f) of SSR-6 [1] requires consideration of the effects of storage on ageing mechanisms, safety analyses and operation and maintenance instructions.
German competent authorities Bundesanstalt für Materialforschung und -prüfung (BAM) and Bundesamt für die Sicherheit der nuklearen Entsorgung (BASE) are considering the aspect of ageing in approval procedures. Ageing assessment is mainly focused on dual purpose casks (DPC) package designs which are long-term stored in interim storage facilities. For these package designs, the evaluation of ageing management is now mandatory for the maintenance of the package design approvals with a validity period of 5 years and beyond. The ageing management includes amongst others a gap analysis, the assessment of ageing effects and operational experiences during operation and interim storage.
BAM works on the compilation of a guideline for implementation of paras 613A, 809(f) and 809(k) for packages requiring competent authority approval at the application procedure in Germany. The paper describes essential items of ageing mechanisms and will give a foresight to the ageing management evaluation by BAM.
Transport packages shall satisfy various safety criteria regarding mechanical, thermal and radiation phenomena. Typical requirements focusing mechanical aspects are usually drop tests in accordance with IAEA regulations. The drop tests are usually carried out experimentally and, as an additional measure, finite element analyses (FEA) are performed. A specific part of the investigations presented is the evaluation of the welding seam connecting cask shell and cask bottom. Experimental results and FEA are presented and compared. The evaluation of the welding seam performed includes a variety of aspects. In addition to the experimental and analytical stresses determined, different standards are used to investigate a possible crack initiation. Several destructive and non-destructive tests are performed for quality assurance in the manufacturing process as well as for different input parameters. The necessary monitoring and non-destructive measurement methods to define the boundary conditions of the standards are introduced. Taking into account all required parameters, the welding seam is examined and evaluated using the failure assessment diagrams (FAD) of the respective standards. It can be shown under the given boundary conditions that considering the experimental data, the welding seam is in the context of crack initiation below the enveloping curve in the acceptable region. More critical drop tests to be conducted are proposed and need to be investigated in future work.
The decommissioning or refurbishment of nuclear facilities necessitates either the storage or disposal of large radioactive components such as steam generators, pressurizers, reactor pressure vessels and heads, and coolant pumps, to list the major contributors. These components or objects are large in size and mass, measuring up to approximately 6 meters in diameter, up to 20 meters in length, and weighing over 400 000 kg. In many situations, the components are transported off-site to a storage, disposal or recycling/treatment facility. Previously, many large objects had to be transported under special arrangement.
The latest 2018 edition of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, No. SSR-6 [1], incorporates regulations for the shipment of large objects as a new category of surface contaminated object, SCO-III, based on the IAEA “performance package” concept. This paper provides background and practical guidance on these regulations.
Additionally, the experiences of BAM with the appoval of two steam converters of the NPP Lingen are presented as the first approval process for SCO-III objects in Germany.
The primary additions to SSR-6 include SCO-III classification and requirements, approval and administrative requirements for the new classification, and the addition of SCO-III to the proper shipping
name for UN 2913. Advisory material drafted for the new requirements will be included in the next revision of SSG-26, Advisory Material for the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, expected to be published soon.
Note that at this time the proposed provisions for large objects do not include components such as reactor vessels, due to the more limited experience and greater radioactivity levels. The SCO-III concept lays the groundwork and may be extended to cover other large objects that are classified as low specific activity (LSA) material in the future.
Assessment of quality management for transport packages not requiring authority design approval
(2018)
The majority of transports of radioactive materials are carried out in packages which don’t need a package design approval of a competent authority. Low active radioactive materials are transported in such kind of packages e.g. in the medical and pharmaceutical industry and in the nuclear industry as well.
In Germany the decision to phase out nuclear energy leads to a strong demand for packages to transport low and middle active radioactive waste due to the dismantling and decommissioning of nuclear power plants. According to IAEA regulations the “non-competent authority approved package types” are the excepted packages and the industrial packages of Type IP-1, IP-2 and IP-3 and of Type A.
For the packages of Type IP-2, IP-3 and Type A an assessment by the German competent authority is required for the quality management for the design, manufacture, testing, documentation, use, maintenance and inspection. In general a compliance audit of the manufacturer of the packaging is required during this assessment procedure.
Assessment experience on packages loaded with damaged spent nuclear fuel for transport after storage
(2018)
In 2017 the first German package approval certificate was issued for a dual purpose cask (DPC) design with encapsulated damaged spent nuclear fuel. At the Bundesanstalt für Materialforschung und -prüfung (BAM) a comprehensive assessment procedure was carried out with respect to the mechanical and thermal design, the containment design and quality assurance for manufacturing and operation. Main objective of this procedure was to verify the Package Design Safety Report (PDSR) fulfils the requirements according to the IAEA regulations SSR-6.
Until now only standard spent nuclear fuel assemblies were designated for interim storage and transports. Due to nuclear phase out in Germany all other kinds of SNF in particular damaged fuel has to be packed. Therefore specific requirements have to be considered in accordance with international experiences written in IAEA technical reports. In Germany damaged spent nuclear fuel (DSNF) needs a tight encapsulation with special encapsulations and clearly defined properties.
Due to the limited amount of DSNF these encapsulations are designed for storage and transport in existing packages. From the assessment experience it has been seen, corresponding PDSR need an extensively expansion to cover the design of these encapsulations and their influences on the package. Then such well-defined encapsulations can be handled like standard fuel assemblies. The main difference to standard package components is, encapsulations with permanent closure achieve their specified condition not after manufacturing but only during operation after loading and closing.
Thus specific handling instruction and test procedures are necessary especially for welding, where BAM is able to survey the quality of this first part of operation.
For disposal of the German research reactor of the Technical University Munich FRM II a new transport and storage cask design was under approval assessment by the German authorities. The Bundesanstalt für Materialforschung und -prüfung (BAM) assessed the mechanical and thermal package safety and performed drop tests. The activity release approaches and subjects of quality assurance and surveillance for manufacturing and operation of the package were assessed by BAM as well.
The cask body is made of ductile cast iron and closed by two bolted lid systems with metal seals. The material of the lids is stainless steel. On each end of the cask a wood-filled impact limiter is installed to reduce impact loads to the cask under drop test conditions. In the cavity of the cask a basket for five spent fuel assemblies is arranged.
For the safety case a combination of experimental testing and analytical/numerical calculations were applied. In total, four drop tests were carried out at the BAM large drop test facility. Two tests were carried out as a full IAEA drop test sequence consisting of a 9m drop test onto an unyielding target and a 1m puncture bar drop test. The other two drop test were performed as single 9m drop tests and completed by additional analyses for considering the effects of an IAEA drop test sequence.
The main objectives of the drop tests were the investigation of the integrity of the package and its safety against release of radioactive material as well as the test of the fastening system of the impact limiters. Furthermore, the acceleration and strain signals measured during the tests were used for the verification of Finite-Element-Analysis (FEA) used for the safety analysis of the package design.
The finite-element models incorporated in the package design safety report include the cask body, the lid system, the inventory and the impact limiters with the fastening system. In this context special attention was paid to the modeling of the encapsulated wood-filled impact limiters.
Additional calculations using the verified numerical models were done by the applicant and assessed by BAM to investigate e.g. the brittle fracture of the cask body made of ductile cask iron within the package design approval procedure.
This paper describes the package design assessment from the view of the competent authority BAM including the applied assessment strategy, the conducted drop tests and the additional calculations by using numerical and analytical methods.
For disposal of the research reactor of the Technical University Munich FRM II a new transport and storage cask design was under approval assessment by the German authorities on the basis of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requirements. The cask body is made of ductile cast iron and closed by two bolted lid systems with metal seals. The material of the lids is stainless steel. On each end of the cask the wood-filled impact limiters are installed to reduce impact loads to the cask under drop test conditions. In the cavity of the cask a basket for five spent fuel elements is arranged.
This design has been assessed by the Bundesanstalt für Materialforschung und -prüfung (BAM) in view to the mechanical and thermal safety analyses, the activity release approaches, and subjects of quality assurance and surveillance for manufacturing and operation of the package.
For the mechanical safety analyses of the package a combination of experimental testing and analytical/numerical calculations were applied. In total, four drop tests were carried out at the BAM large drop test facility. Two tests were carried out as a full IAEA drop test sequence consisting of a 9m drop test onto an unyielding target and a 1m puncture bar drop test. The other two drop tests were performed as single 9m drop tests and completed by additional analyses for considering the effects of an IAEA drop test sequence.
The main objectives of the drop tests were the investigation of the integrity of the package and its safety against release of radioactive material as well as the test of the fastening system of the impact limiters. Furthermore, the acceleration and strain signals measured during the tests were used for the verification of finite-element (FE) models applied in the safety analysis of the package design.
In accordance with the IAEA transport regulations Special Form Radioactive Material (SFRM) is either an indispersible solid radioactive material or a sealed capsule containing radioactive material.
The design of special form radioactive material has to resist a severe transport accident without undue loss or dispersal of radioactive material. The safety assessment for design approval shall include besides the required test program (impact, percussion, bending and heat test) also the evaluation of the management system for design, manufacture, testing, documentation, use, maintenance and inspection. The specified quality assurance measures have to assure, that every specimen of the approved design is produced in the same verified quality and every specimen must be able to survive the severe mechanical and thermal tests at any time of its working life.
Due to the long-term use of SFRM the consideration of ageing is an important aspect in the approval procedure by BAM, the competent authority for SFRM approval in Germany. Different fields of application imply a wide range of environmental conditions, from clean room atmosphere to highly aggressive industrial conditions. So, besides of radioactive content, corrosion is a main factor for possible design degradation.
This paper will describe major influencing factors to be taken into account to assess the ageing behavior of a SFRM design and will emphasize that there is a need for a regulatory specification of a SFRM-working life as basis for the aging evaluations.
The first German package design approval certificate for a dual purpose cask intended for loading with damaged spent nuclear fuel was issued recently. BAM as part of the competent authority system in Germany carried out a comprehensive assessment procedure with respect to the mechanical and thermal design, the release of radioactive material and the quality assurance aspects of manufacturing and operation. Packages for the transport and storage of radioactive material have been assessed by BAM for many years, thus the common assessment procedure is well-known and good practice. Up to now only SNF without defects or HLW with well-defined properties were designated for long-term Interim storage and transports afterwards. Due to Germany’s nuclear phase out all other kinds of spent nuclear fuel in particular damaged spent nuclear fuel shall be packed as well. Damaged spent nuclear fuel needs a tight closure with Special encapsulations and clearly defined properties in Germany. In addition, these encapsulations shall be long-term durable, because they are not accessible after loading in a packaging within periodical inspections. The main difference to Standard package components is that encapsulations with a permanent closure achieve their specified conditions not after manufacturing but only during operation, after loading and closing. To ensure compliance with the specific conditions, special measures for quality assurance are necessary during operation of each encapsulation, e.g. drying and sealing, which were assessed by BAM. The present paper gives an overview of the conducted assessment from BAM and point out the findings concerning to the special closure lid of the approved encapsulation, which is screwed and welded. A wide verification concept is necessary to show the specific tightness under transport conditions. Together with quality assurance measures during first operation steps these encapsulations with damaged spent nuclear fuel can be handled like standard fuel assemblies in approved package designs.
German package design approvals were granted recently for dual purpose casks (DPC) intended for loading with encapsulated damaged spent nuclear fuel (DSNF). Comprehensive assessment procedures were carried out by the authority BAM with respect to the mechanical and thermal package design, the activity release of radioactive material and quality assurance aspects for manufacturing and operation of each packaging. The objective of each procedure was to verify the Package Design Safety Report (PDSR) and the relevant guidelines fulfils the requirements of the IAEA regulations.
Previous approvals of German SNF package designs consider mainly standard fuel assemblies with defined specifications and properties for transport and interim storage. Due to the nuclear power phase-out in Germany all kinds of SNF, e.g. damaged spent fuel rods shall be packed in DPC now. Therefore specific requirements shall be considered in accordance with international experiences including IAEA technical reports. The main requirement for DSNF is a tight encapsulation with specific defined properties under transport and storage conditions.
Due to the interim storage period of currently up to 40 years the encapsulation with DSNF in the casks shall also be long term durable. Thus specific loading and drying procedures are necessary and had to be qualified during the approval process. BAM assessed these drying procedures and could confirm the long-term behaviour of the encapsulation and the suitability of the drying equipment. This special equipment was qualified in a “cold handling”. In addition, it was shown that the behaviour of the test equipment used in the qualification process was comparable with the original equipment, e.g. test fuel rods or test encapsulation. In the development of the drying process, experience was obtained in how to put the requirements of the IAEA regulations and related IAEA technical reports into practice.
The paper gives an overview of approval assessment and testing experience made by BAM and point out the main resulting requirements on drying processes for these kinds of encapsulations with DSNF.