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The safety assessment of casks for radioactive material at interim storage facilities or in final repositories includes the investigation of possible handling accidents if clearly defined test conditions are not available from the regulations. Specific handling accidents usually are the drop of a cask onto the transport vehicle or the floor as well as the collision with the wall of the storage building or another cask. For such load cases an experimental demonstration of cask safety would be difficult. Therefore, numerical analyses of the entire load scenario are preferred. The lessons learnt from dynamic finite element analyses of accident scenarios with thick-walled cubical containers or cylindrical casks are presented. The dependency of calculation results on initial and boundary conditions, material models, and contact conditions is discussed. Parameter sets used should be verified by numerical simulation of experimentally investigated similar test scenarios. On the other hand, decisions have to be made whether a parameter or property is modeled in a realistic or conservative manner. For example, a very small variation of the initial impact angle of a container can cause significantly different stresses and strains. In sophisticated cases an investigation of simpler limit load scenarios could be advantageous instead of analyzing a very complicated load scenario.
Metal gaskets in the lid system of transport and storage casks for radioactive material have to guarantee leak-tightness and safe enclosure of the radioactive inventory under normal and accident conditions during transport, in case of accidents and for the longterm interim storage. For safety assessments by nurnerical simulation of the thermomechanical behaviour of a lid system with metal gaskets, the finite element method offers three options to use: i) special gasket elements, ii) complex three-dimensional modeHing with solid elements, and iii) a simplified axisymmetric approach. Gasket elements can be adjusted by many parameters, but they give only a global representation of the experimentally observed gasket behaviour. For calculations of the entire cask including the lid system with gaskets, nonetheless this approach is recommended. To investigate the hardly measurable impact behaviour in detail or to extrapolate the long-term behaviour, a local modeHing of all parts of a gasket and their interactions with effects like elastic-plastic deformation, creep, relaxation, and friction is necessary. The three-dimensional model can describe the change of contact area between outer jacket of the gasket and flange dependent on the load conditions, what overcomes an essential limitation of special gasket elements. To simplify the problern of investigating the underlying physical effects, an axisymmetric lid system can be modelled with axisymmetric finite elements. Usually an approximation is only necessary for the helical spring of a metal gasket. This paper explains basic ideas for an adequate finite element simulation of cask lid systems with metal gaskets and their thermo-mechanical behaviour under specific load scenarios.
This Presentation adresses the major needs and challenges of qualification processes for nuclear waste packages performed by BAM. Packages include those for high level radioactive waste like spent fuel as well as those for low and intermediate level waste to be disposed of in the Konrad repository.
Beginning with the current German nuclear waste management policy design testing capabilities and experience at BAM is explained followed by illustrating the major strategic process to identify future challenges including specific R&D needs.
The Bundesanstalt für Materialforschung und –prüfung (BAM) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in September 2012 to foster technical collaborations in the areas associated with the backend of the commercial nuclear fuel cycle. Specifically, the focus is on packaging, transportation, and storage of commercial spent nuclear fuel. The institutes meet about twice each year, alternating between institutes. This provides the opportunity for staff members from the host organization more exposure to technical issues that are of concern internationally and to collaborate with technical experts working on similar problems.
Since 2012, the focus of the meetings has been on technical issues associated with extended dry storage and subsequent transportation of commercial spent fuel. Topics range from hydride effects on cladding integrity, spent fuel response during Normal Conditions of Transport (NCT), finite element analyses of fuel and cask response to accident conditions, bolt and seal behavior over extended periods of time, and corrosion associated with bolts, metallic seals, and stainless steel canisters.
This MOU has provided an effective leverage for technical collaboration. For example, SNL is funding (through DOE), Savannah River National Laboratories (SRNL) to look at bolt and seal degradation issues. SRNL has an MOU with BAM to collaborate on bolt and seal degradation during extended storage. Likewise, Sandia and BAM are collaborating with the EC Joint Research Center on an International Nuclear Energy Research Initiative (I-NERI) to investigate spent fuel behavior when subjected to mechanical loadings. This important work will provide insight into failure mechanisms, as well as spent fuel release fractions, given a breach of the cladding wall.
This presentation provides an overview of high ranked technical issues associated with extended storage and subsequent transportation, as well as the work underway at BAM and SNL that are addressing these issues.
This presentation addresses the current German policy in nuclear waste management and illustrates significant changes throughout the last decades. With the reset of the high level waste repository siting process in 2013 the need for extending interim storage beyond initial license periods will become a future challenge. For that purpose knowledge needs to be enhanced and data gaps need to be closed timely. In addition, international collaboration in R&D and regulatory improvements are explained.
Integration across storage, transportation and disposal – important elements of the German program
(2016)
This presentation addresses the following issues. Unexpected changes in national nuclear policy have significantly affected spent fuel management strategies.
The initial German spent fuel and HLW disposal concept has been delayed and finally “reset” by federal law in 2013. Repository site selection criteria and procedures will be defined by the Disposal Commission’s report end of June 2016. Final site selection should be finished by 2031.
The consistent German concept of dry interim storage in dual purpose casks has proven to be a safe and secure spent fuel management strategy.
The need for the extended interim storage of spent fuel and HLW casks towards disposal implicates additional challenges for the nuclear waste management strategy in Germany.
Recently, governmental research programs have been adjusted to address technical and scientific issues also in the predisposal area.
Interim storage, subsequent transportation, and final disposal are closely linked. Integrated approaches concerning waste package designs and operations are supposed to be beneficial for the establishment of efficient long-term spent fuel and HLW management strategies.
Influence of impact angle and real target properties on drop test results of cubic containers
(2017)
Drop test scenarios with cubic containers without impact limiters at interim storage sites or in a final repository have been investigated by numerical simulations. An ideally flat drop is impossible to conduct as a free fall of a container even under laboratory conditions. Dynamic stresses and strains inside the container structure are sensitive to the impact angle. Even very small impact angles cause remarkable changes in the experimental or numerical results when a flat bottom or wall of a container hits a flat target. For drop tests with transport packages the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regulations define an essentially unyielding target. In contrast, potential accident scenarios for storage containers are derived from site-specific safety analyses or acceptance criteria in Germany. Each interim storage site or repository has a yielding or so-called real target with individual structural and material properties. The real target acts as a kind of impact limiter. A more conservative container design is required if the impact limiting effect of the target is not considered.
Low and intermediate level radio active waste has been produced in Germany for several decades. While a part of the waste had been deposited in the Morleben repository and the Asse mine which have been operated for just a limited period of time, the major amount is conditioned and packaged in temporarily stored waste containers.
Those containers are designated for final disposal in the KONRAD repository being currently under construction and expected to start operation in 2022. As a consequence, an assessment of the waste container documentation and safety is strongly needed to receive an approval for the KONRAD repository. This requalification is challenging because those old containers have to meet the same safety requirements as new containers.
This paper describes and discusses the major challenges of spent fuel management in Germany after the phase-out of nuclear electricity generation was decided in 2011 and a new repository siting procedure was implemented in 2013. Consequences from those decisions which were legally founded by amendments of the German Atomic Energy Act (AtG) result in the need to transfer all remaining spent fuel from limited reactor operation (last reactor shutdown until the end of 2022) into casks for subsequent dry interim storage on-site. Storage licenses are generally issued site-specific considering specific dual purpose casks (DPC) and their inventories and they are generally limited to 40 years so far. But the need for extending the interim storage period in the future has become obvious. Even though, this may not be an issue to be solved already today questions about additional safety demonstrations will arise as soon as licenses need to be extended. Certainly, these questions will ask for reliable data about the long term performance and safety of structures, systems, and components, e. g. the long term performance of cask components and materials like bolted closure systems including metal seals, or fuel rod behaviour concerning cladding materials under stress and temperature conditions. In case of dual purpose casks for storage and transportation this includes aspects on how to demonstrate transportability during or after several decades of interim storage. Long term investigations often require plenty of time and therefore need to be initiated timely.
The presentation focuses on the latest developments of the German nuclear waste management policy including restructering of responsible organizations and the restart of the repository site selection process for high level radioactive waste.
The second part illustrates latest results of long term investigations of metal seals at BAM with regard to extended interim storage periods.
Ongoing R&D work at BAM
(2018)
The presentation provides an update on the German nuclear waste management policy towards final disposal and related reasearch at BAM. Topics include long term investigations of metal seals, investigations of fuel cladding failure mechanisms, and the development of requirements and concepts for high level radioactive waste and spent fuel disposal containers.
Perspectives on extending interim storage of spent nuclear fuel (beyond the initial license period)
(2017)
The presentation adddresses the consequences and challenges of the German nuclear phase-out in conjunction with the restart of siting process for a high-level radioactive waste repository. Concerning spent fuel this will lead to extended interim storage periods for the dry storage casks beyond the initial licensing period of 40 years.
For extending storage periods additional safety assessments and data about the long term performance of materials, components and casks will be needed and BAM has already been lauching specific R&D projects addressing identified data gaps.
This paper describes and discusses the major challenges of spent fuel management in Germany after the phase-out of nuclear electricity generation was decided in 2011 and a new repository siting procedure was implemented in 2013. Consequences from those decisions which were legally founded by amendments of the German Atomic Energy Act (AtG) result in the need to transfer all remaining spent fuel from limited reactor operation (last reactor shutdown until the end of 2022) into casks for subsequent dry interim storage on-site. Storage licenses are generally issued site-specific considering specific dual purpose casks (DPC) and their inventories and they are generally limited to 40 years so far. But the need for extending the interim storage period in the future has become obvious. Even though, this may not be an issue to be solved already today questions about additional safety demonstrations will arise as soon as licenses need to be extended. Certainly, these questions will ask for reliable data about the long term performance and safety of structures, systems, and components, e. g. the long term performance of cask components and materials like bolted closure systems including metal seals, or fuel rod behaviour concerning cladding materials under stress and temperature conditions. In case of dual purpose casks for storage and transportation this includes aspects on how to demonstrate transportability during or after several decades of interim storage. Long term investigations often require plenty of time and therefore need to be initiated timely.
For the long-term storage of spent nuclear fuel and other high-Level radioactive waste, dual purpose casks for the transportation and storage are widely used. Usually, these casks consist of a thick-walled monolithic cask body and a bolted double barrier lid System equipped with metal seals (consisting of an inner helical spring and two outer metal layers with a total cross-section diameter between 5 and 10 mm) to ensure the long-term safe confinement of the radioactive inventory.
Based on analytical and experimental studies, such metallic Systems have been qualified of storage periods of up to four decades so far as long as proper manufacturing and assembling conditions are met. More than 20 years of Operation experience with a permanently increasing number of casks has shown full compliance with the expectations.
In the meantime many countries have to face a significant delay of establishing a high-level radioactive waste repository what leads to Need for extending interim storage periods for probably 60, 80 or 100 years.
For that reason the long-term performance of metal seals for such time periods is of specific internst to demonstrate their sufficient safety function and specific investigations have already been launched, e.g. by BAM, to gain more experimental data and to develop validated models to extrapolate the seal performance to longer periods of time and or requested temperature levels.