Filtern
Erscheinungsjahr
Dokumenttyp
Sprache
- Englisch (27) (entfernen)
Referierte Publikation
- nein (27) (entfernen)
Schlagworte
- Monitoring (4)
- Consequences (3)
- Sensor network (3)
- Air quality (2)
- Environment (2)
- Environmental monitoring (2)
- Failure of gas vessels (2)
- Fibre optic sensors (2)
- Gas explosion (2)
- Indentation (2)
Organisationseinheit der BAM
To examine the capability to detect and localise damage using the Measurement- and Model-based Structural Analysis (MeMoS), a small-scale truss bridge (1520 mm × 720 mm × 720 mm) made of aluminium profiles is built as a test specimen for this purpose. The truss frame of the test bridge is made of aluminium profiles with a sophisticated design of the cross-sectional area. In comparison, with solid profiles, only a fraction of the material is needed to produce the profiles, while their bending resistance decreases slightly. The profiles are built into a truss frame by connecting them by means of fastening sets made of steel. The bridge model is mounted on four steel bearings which each of them consist of a cylinder arranged between two plates. Fixed bearings are made by holding onto one end of the bridge. The bridge is subjected by an external load by placing a heavy object beneath it. At the same time, measurements can be conducted below the bridge. Therefore, the bridge specimen is elevated by attaching it on a pedestal with four columns. Damages can be induced by loosening the fastening pieces.
In robotic applications, it is often necessary to orient a sensor quickly. Spherical parallel manipulators (SPM) are well suited for this purpose since they offer superior dynamics and structural stiffness as compared to serial manipulators. To control them, however, the kinematic equations have to be known. In this paper, a SPM with three degrees of freedom and the kinematic equations describing its mechanical properties are presented.
Commercial, off-the shelf propane cylinders are subjected to high safety regulations. Furthermore, those cylinders are equipped with safety devices like pressure relief valves (PRV). Despite these regulations and safety measures, a failure of the Container is possible if exposed to an intense fire. The result of this is severe hazard for users, rescue forces and infrastructure. Within the framework of a destructive test series, 15 identical propane cylinders, without pressure relief devices, were exposed to an intensive fire in horizontal Position until failure. Each cylinder was filled with a mass of m =11 kg of liquid propane. Three different fire sources were used (wood, petrol, propane). The experiments revealed the failure of all cylinders in a time period t < 155 s. The failure lead to a fragmentation into several major parts with throwing distances of up to l =262 m. In all trials, the temperature of the cylinder wall (top, side, bottom), of the liquid phase inside and of the surrounding fire (top, side, bottom) was recorded. In addition, the inner cylinder pressure and the induced overpressure of the blast wave after the failure were recorded. Overpressures of up to p=0.27 bar were recorded close to the cylinder (l =5 m). AM tests were documented hy video from several positions (general view, close-up, high-speed 5000 fps). This test series creates the basis for further experimental studies in the field of alternative fuels for vehicles. The aim of this test series is to assess and analyse the consequences of the failure of gas vessels (for LPG, CNG, CGH2) in the aftermath of severe incidents.
Small, mobile propane gas vessels are widely spread and comprise additional hazards in case of a surrounding, intensive fire. The aim of the presented work is to holistically investigate the potential consequences of failure of these off-the-shelf propane gas vessels in case of an absence or malfunction of safety devices. In order to generate a statistically valid dataset, a total of 15 identical propane gas bottles without pressure relief device, each containing m = 11 kg of liquid propane, were underfired in horizontal position. For each selected fire type (wood fire, petrol pool fire, propane gas fire), five vessels were tested under identical conditions. Next to extensive camera equipment including a high-speed camera, systems to record the internal pressure of the gas cylinder, the resulting shock wave overpressure (three positions) and the flame and vessel temperature (three + three positions) during the underfiring were used. Also the unsteady, highly dynamical thermal radiation caused by the explosion of the expanding gas cloud was logged. The fragments were georeferenced and weighed after each test. The experiments prove the failure of all the gas cylinders at a burst pressure of pb = [71 … 98 bar] with a fragmentation into up to seven parts (average: four objects) and a subsequent explosion of the expanding vapour after mixing with the surrounding air. The overpressure measured in the close-up range (distance to the cylinder d = 5 m) resulting from the shockwave caused by the cylinder burst was up to pmax = 0.27 bar, which can potentially lead to significant injuries to humans and damage to building structures and infrastructure, especially in connection with the explosion and the resultant thermal radiation. The distance covered by the fragments after the failure was up to r = 260 m; 47% of the fragments hit the ground more than r = 50 m away from the position of failure.
15 identical off-the-shelf propane cylinders (m = 11 kg liquid propane) were underfired. The infrared Radiation of the Explosion, that occurred in the aftermath of the vessel failure, was recorded using four bolometers. These measurements are compared with an estimation of the Maximum intensity gained by an Analysis of the Video data, an Extended Version of the Stefan-Boltzmann law and a BLEVE model.
In continuation of a preceding test series involving sole LPG vehicle tanks, three passenger cars equipped with identical toroidal steel LPG tanks were set on fire. The tanks were installed in the space normally reserved for the spare tyre, in the car boot. No safety device was installed on the tank, in order to force critical failure of the cylinder. Two of the cars were equipped with a tank filled with liquefied propane to a level of 20 % (5.3 kg), the third one was filled completely (25.5 kg). The partially filled tanks failed critically within a time period of more than 20 min after the initiation of the fire. The fully-filled tank did not rupture; the propane was released continuously through a small leak that appeared during the fire. Comprehensive equipment was used to procure measurement data, enabling an analysis of potential consequences and hazards to humans and infrastructure within the vehicle surroundings. The inner status of the tank (pressure, temperature of the liquid phase and the steel casing), the development of the fire (temperature inside and around the vehicle) and the pressure induced in the near-field in case of tank rupture were recorded. The results were analysed in detail and compared against the data gained in tests involving sole, but identical LPG tanks.
Setting up sensors for the purpose of environmental monitoring should be a matter of days, but often drags over weeks or even months, preventing scientists from doing real research. Additionally, the newly developed hardware and software solutions are often reinventing existing wheels. In this short paper, we revisit the design of our environmental sensing node that has been monitoring industrial areas over a span of two years. We share our findings and lessons learned. Based on this, we outline how a new generation of sensing node(s) can look like.