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Due to delays in the site-selection procedure to establish a deep geological repository for spent nuclear fuel and high level waste and in construction of the already licensed Konrad-repository for low and intermediate level waste without heat generation, extended periods of interim storage become more relevant in Germany. BAM is involved in most of the cask licensing procedures and especially responsible for the evaluation of cask-related long-term safety issues.
The long-term performance of elastomer seals for lid Systems of transport and storage casks whether used as auxiliary seals in spent fuel caslcs or as primary seals for low and intermediate level waste packages is an important issue in this context (Jaunich, 2013; Jaunich, 2014; Kömmling, 2015). The polymeric structure of these seals causes a complex mechanical behaviour with time-dependent elasticity reduction and loss of elastic recovery.
The paper presents first results of a comprehensive test Programme consisting of several static and dynamic mechanical short- and long-term tests which have been carried out at BAM on specimens made of representative types of elastomers, fluorocarbon rubber (FKM) and ethylene propylene diene rubber (EPDM). The investigation of the test results used to identify material models and their Parameters as well as the development of two finite element models for the numerical Simulation of tension and compression tests using the finite element code ABAQUS® are described. The calculation results are presented in comparison to the test results. The influence of important material and test parameters was investigated and discussed in sensitivity analyses.
Existing spent nuclear fuel (SF) and high active waste (HAW) management policies and practices worldwide are the result of past presumptions that sufficient reprocessing and/or disposal capacity would be available in the near term. Consequently, in the past many countries have developed specific solutions for different periods of time due to their individual national nuclear policies.
In Germany the concept of dry interim storage in dual purpose metal casks before disposal is being pursued for SF and HAW management and transport and storage licenses have been issued accordingly. The current operation licenses for existing storage facilities have been granted for a storage period of up to 40 years. This concept has demonstrated its suitability for over 20 years so far. Relevant safety requirements have been assessed for the short-term as well as for the long-term for site-specific operational and accidental storage conditions. But in the meantime significant delays in the national repository siting procedure occurred which will make extended storage periods necessary in the future.
Mechanical drop test scenarios for Type B (U) packages according to the IAEA regulations have to be carried out onto the so-called “unyielding target” (usually with cask impact limiters) and onto the puncture bar respectively. They are predefined and do not require any further investigation of scenarios that really could happen on transportation routes. Cask accident scenarios in the framework of approval procedures for interim storage sites are derived from a detailed analysis of the handling procedures necessary from arrival of cask at the site to its storing position.
In that case, casks are usually handled without impact limiters. Dependent on possible drop heights, drop positions and floor properties, conservative cask accident scenarios are derived for further safety proofs.
According to the mechanical assessment concept of the considered approval procedure numerical calculations have to be provided by the applicant to demonstrate mechanical cask safety. Stresses and strains in the cask body as well as in the lid System have to be identified and assessed. Using the example of a 3-mvertical-drop of a transport and storage cask for spent fuel elements onto the floor construction made of damping concrete covered by screed, BAM developed a finite element model. The finite element code ABAQUS/Explicit™ was used. Results of experimental investigations are not available. Therefore parameter studies are necessary to identify the sensitivity of the finite element model to significant Parameters and to verify the finite element models according to the requirements of the Guidelines for the Numerical Safety Analyses for the Approval of Transport and Storage Casks for Radioactive Materials (BAM GGR-008).
The paper describes the modeling of the material behavior and attachment of bottom side cask components. Questions concerning the modeling of a crack length limiting reinforcement in the screed layer are discussed. The influence of the mesh density of the screed layer and its strength is considered as well. Finally, the developed finite element model can be used for a numerical safety assessment. It can help to understand the complex mechanisms of the interaction between the cask components and floor construction.
Ziel der im Rahmen dieses Forschungsvorhabens durchgeführten Untersuchungen war der Nachweis der sicheren Auslegung von Transport- und Lagerbehältern radioaktiver Stoffe aus Gußeisen mit Kugelgraphit auch unter bruchmechanischen Gesichtspunkten. Das bisher im nationalen Rahmen für die Bauartprüfung derartiger sogenannter Typ B-Verpackungen (d.h. unfallsicherer Verpackungen) von der BAM angewandte Begutachtungskonzept basiert im wesentlichen auf experimentellen Festigkeitsnachweisen an Prototypbehältern mit entsprechend daraus abgeleiteten Anforderungen an die qualitätsgerechte Herstellung der Serienbehälter. Die Anforderungen an die Werkstoffqualität und die zerstörungsfreien Prüfungen (insbesondere Nachweis von Rissen durch Ultraschallprüfungen) werden so gewählt, daß ein gesonderter bruchmechanischer Nachweis nicht erforderlich ist. Dieses Begutachtungskonzept ist jedoch unmittelbar mit der Bedingung verknüpft, daß die maximale in der Behälterstruktur auftretende Nennzugspannung etwa 50 % der Werkstoff-Streckgrenze nicht überschreitet. Da dies u.U. eine erhebliche Einschränkung für bestimmte Behälterbauarten bedeuten kann, wird das Begutachtungskonzept derzeit um einen bruchmechanischen Festigkeitsnachweis erweitert, der weitgehend werkstoffunabhängig auch für Gußeisen mit Kugelgraphit anwendbar ist. Die Bereitstellung der dafür erforderlichen grundlegenden Erkenntnisse wurde unter direkter Mitwirkung der BAM auch im Rahmen dieses Forschungsvorhabens auf internationaler Ebene durchgeführt. Die Ergebnisse sind in einem "Technical Dokument (TECDOC)" der Internationalen Atomenergie-Behörde (IAEA) niedergelegt, welches diesem Fachband als Anlage beigefügt ist.
In Germany the concept of dry interim storage of spent fuel and vitrified high active waste in dual purpose metal casks is implemented (currently for periods of up to 40 years). The casks being used have an approved package design in accordance with the international transport regulations. The license for dry storage is granted on the German Atomic Energy Act with respect to the guidelines of the German Reactor Safety Commission for dry interim storage of spent fuel. Currently part of the assessment process of the cask design for transport on public routes is to evaluate the suitability of the used materials with respect to their properties and their compatibility for possible transport periods. For transport on public routes during or after long term interim storage periods, it has to be ensured that the transport and storage casks fulfill the specifications of the transport approval or other sufficient properties which satisfy the proofs for the compliance of the safety objectives at that time. This paper describes the state-of-the-art technology in Germany and points out arising prospective challenges and which related questions have to be answered in future. Present research and knowledge concerning the long term behavior of transport and storage cask components (such as gaskets and shielding components) have to be consulted as well as experiences from interim cask storage operations. Challenges in the safety assessment are therefore i.e. the behavior of aged metal and elastomeric gaskets under IAEA test conditions to ensure that the results of drop tests can be transferred to the compliance of the safety objectives at the time of transport after the interim storage period (aged package). Assessment methods for the material compatibility, the behavior of fuel assemblies and the aging behavior of shielding parts (e. g. influence of radiation) are further issues as well.
German approach and feedback on experience of transportability of SNF packages after interim storage
(2014)
In Germany, the concept of dry interim storage of spent fuel in dual purpose metal casks is implemented, currently for periods of up to 40 years. The casks being used have an approved package design in accordance with the international transport regulations. The license for dry storage is granted on the German Atomic Energy Act with respect to the recently revised 'Guidelines for dry interim storage of irradiated fuel assemblies and heat-generating radioactive waste in casks' by the German Waste management Commission. For transport on public routes between or after long term interim storage periods, it has to be ensured that the transport and storage casks fulfil the specifications of the transport approval or other sufficient properties, which satisfy the proofs for the compliance of the safety objectives at that time. In recent years, the validation period of transport approval certificates for manufactured, loaded and stored packages were discussed among authorities and applicants. A case dependent system of 3, 5 and 10 years was established. There are consequences for the safety cases in the Package Design Safety Report, including evaluation of long term behaviour of components and specific operating procedures of the package. The present research and knowledge concerning the long term behaviour of transport and storage cask components have to be consulted as well as experiences from interim cask storage operations. Challenges in the safety assessment are e.g. the behaviour of aged metal and elastomeric gaskets under IAEA test conditions to ensure that the results of drop tests can be transferred to the compliance of the safety objectives at the time of transport after the interim storage period. Assessment methods for the material compatibility, the behaviour of fuel assemblies and the aging behaviour of shielding parts are issues as well. This paper describes the state of the art technology in Germany, explains recent experience on transport preparation after interim storage and points out arising prospective challenges.
German approach and experience feedback of transport ability of SNF packages after interim storage
(2013)
In Germany the concept of dry interim storage of spent fuel in dual purpose metal casks is implemented, currently for periods of up to 40 years.
The casks being used have an approved package design in accordance with the international transport regulations. The license for dry storage is granted on the German Atomic Energy Act with respect to the recently revised “Guidelines for dry interim storage of irradiated fuel assemblies and heat-generating radioactive waste in casks” by the German Waste management Commission (ESK).
For transport on public routes between or after long term interim storage periods, it has to be ensured that the transport and storage casks fulfil the specifications of the transport approval or other sufficient properties which satisfy the proofs for the compliance of the safety objectives at that time.
In recent years the validation period of transport approval certificates for manufactured, loaded and stored packages were discussed among authorities and applicants. A case dependant system of 3, 5 and 10 years was established. There are consequences for the safety cases in the Package Design Safety Report including evaluation of long term behavior of components and specific operating procedures of the package.
Present research and knowledge concerning the long term behavior of transport and storage cask components have to be consulted as well as experiences from interim cask storage operations. Challenges in the safety assessment are e.g. the behavior of aged metal and elastomeric gaskets under IAEA test conditions to ensure that the results of drop tests can be transferred to the compliance of the safety objectives at the time of transport after the interim storage period.