Filtern
Erscheinungsjahr
Dokumenttyp
- Vortrag (24)
- Zeitschriftenartikel (17)
- Beitrag zu einem Tagungsband (6)
Schlagworte
- Overpressure (5)
- Explosion (4)
- CFD simulation (3)
- Safety distance (3)
- Zünder (3)
- Buried gas pipeline (2)
- ESR 4 (2)
- Explosives (2)
- Explosivstoffe (2)
- Fahrzeugbrand (2)
Organisationseinheit der BAM
Eingeladener Vortrag
- nein (24)
Amuay refinery disaster (2012) is another recent example of Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE) and fire accidents preceded by Buncefield (2005), Puerto-Rico (2009) and Jaipur (2009), respectively [9]. The incident has left many safety issues behind which must be repeatedly addressed. Unfortunately, the lessons taught by previous similar events are just not understood carefully. It reveals that the proper safety measures for such facilities were either underestimated or were not accounted seriously. Consequently, the resulting overpressures from explosion and the subsequent thermal radiation from tank fires have once again proved to be disastrous to both mankind and infrastructure. This article highlights the aftermaths of Amuay incident and addresses the challenges put forward by it. Furthermore, a comparative study is performed between such incidents to analyze the similarities and how they could have been avoided.
Experiments in this study reveal that the initiating capability ofcommonly used squibs is not high enough to initiate PETN in all cases. The fulfilment of the 'new ’ essential safety requirement 4 as set out in the European directive 2013/29/EU and the categorization of squibs as theatrical pyrotechnic articles (T2) can therefore be justified, as the explosive investigated belongs to quite a sensitive type (Initiation with low Impulse energiespossible). Underwater initiating capability tests according to EN 13763-15 led to meaningful results, showing that squibs are usually unable to initiate a secondary explosive. For a general assessment of the initiating capability of squibs and comparable (theatrical) pyrotechnic articles a threshold ränge of an equivalent initiation capability in grams of PETN on the basis of the performed underwater initiating capability tests was determined. It was found that squibs are generally not capable of initiating secondary explosives if the underwater initiating capability fest showed an equivalent Initiation capability below 0.25 g PETN. As a consequence of this result, the underwater initiating capability fest gives an effective and safer alternative to the experimental confirmation of the ‘new ’ESR 4 by direct contact of the article with the secondary explosive and should then be preferred to it.
Experiments in this study reveal that the initiating capability of commonly used squibs is not high enough to initiate PETN in all cases. The fulfilment of the ‘new’ essential safety requirement 4 as set out in the European directive 2013/29/EU and the categorization of squibs as theatrical pyrotechnic articles (T2) can therefore be justified, as the explosive investigated belongs to quite a sensitive type (Initiation with low impulse energies possible). Underwater initiating capability tests according to EN 13763-15 led to meaningful results, showing that squibs are usually unable to initiate a secondary explosive. For a general assessment of the initiating capability of squibs and comparable (theatrical) pyrotechnic articles a threshold range of an equivalent initiation capability in grams of PETN on the basis of the performed underwater initiating capability tests was determined. It was found that squibs are generally not capable of initiating secondary explosives if the underwater initiating capability test showed an equivalent Initiation capability below 0.25 g PETN. As a consequence of this result, the underwater initiating capability test gives an effective and safer alternative to the experimental confirmation of the ‘new’ ESR 4 by direct contact of the article with the secondary explosive and should then be preferred to it.
Shock tube systems are non-electric explosive fuses employed in blasting and demolition applications to trigger the detonation of explosive charges. Their working principle is based on the explosive reaction of a fine explosive powder on the tubing's inner surface, generating a shock wave traveling at a velocity of 2,100 m/s along the length of the tube, without destroying it. One of
the key aspects of the manufacturing process of these shock tubes is the size and morphology of the explosive powder grains and their distribution on the inner wall of the tube, in order to propagate the shockwave efficiently and reliably. For the first time, synchrotron X-ray computed tomography has been used to characterize non-destructively the explosive powder grains, typically Al/HMX between 10 and 20 μm in size, in terms of morphology and 3D distribution but also to characterise the presence and location of defects
within the shock tube walls.
Fire and explosion hazards associated with storage and transportation of flammable materials have been a matter of great interest in the recent times. BLEVE is a scenario that occurs when a closed fuel container is subjected to heat for a longer duration. Such events are disastrous to human beings and assets both. In the past there have been numerous studies on BLEVEs and fireballs of hydrocarbon fuels, e.g. kerosene, gasoline, LPG, LNG and others. Though, the fireballs of peroxy-fuels are not looked into detail as such. This article tries to overcome this lack of knowledge. Both, experimental investigation and CFD simulations are performed to measure and predict the fireball characteristics of a peroxy-fuel. Due to thermal decomposition in the liquid phase and active oxygen content a peroxy-fuel fireball burns at a very fast rate and emit higher thermal radiation whereas exhibits smaller diameter and elevation compared to hydrocarbons. That eventually leads to consideration of larger safety distances from them which are also verified by CFD results.