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Erscheinungsjahr
- 2018 (3) (entfernen)
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- Englisch (3)
Schlagworte
- LPG (2)
- Alternative Antriebe (1)
- Auswirkungsbetrachtung (1)
- BLEVE (1)
- Behälterversagen (1)
- Blast wave (1)
- Consequences (1)
- Explosion (1)
- Explosion severity (1)
- Fahrzeugbrand (1)
Organisationseinheit der BAM
- 2 Prozess- und Anlagensicherheit (3)
- 2.1 Sicherheit von Energieträgern (3)
- 2.2 Prozesssimulation (1)
- 3 Gefahrgutumschließungen; Energiespeicher (1)
- 3.0 Abteilungsleitung und andere (1)
- 7 Bauwerkssicherheit (1)
- 7.5 Technische Eigenschaften von Polymerwerkstoffen (1)
- 8 Zerstörungsfreie Prüfung (1)
- 8.1 Sensorik, mess- und prüftechnische Verfahren (1)
In continuation of a preceding test series involving sole LPG vehicle tanks, three passenger cars equipped with identical toroidal steel LPG tanks were set on fire. The tanks were installed in the space normally reserved for the spare tyre, in the car boot. No safety device was installed on the tank, in order to force critical failure of the cylinder. Two of the cars were equipped with a tank filled with liquefied propane to a level of 20 % (5.3 kg), the third one was filled completely (25.5 kg). The partially filled tanks failed critically within a time period of more than 20 min after the initiation of the fire. The fully-filled tank did not rupture; the propane was released continuously through a small leak that appeared during the fire. Comprehensive equipment was used to procure measurement data, enabling an analysis of potential consequences and hazards to humans and infrastructure within the vehicle surroundings. The inner status of the tank (pressure, temperature of the liquid phase and the steel casing), the development of the fire (temperature inside and around the vehicle) and the pressure induced in the near-field in case of tank rupture were recorded. The results were analysed in detail and compared against the data gained in tests involving sole, but identical LPG tanks.
In case of a vehicle fire, an installed LPG (liquefied petroleum gas) tank with a malfunctioning safety device poses severe hazards. To investigate the consequences in case of tank failure, we conducted 16 tests with toroidal shaped LPG vehicle tanks. Three tanks were used for a Hydraulic Burst Test under standard conditions. Another three tanks were equipped with a statutory safety device and were subjected to a gasoline pool fire. The safety device prevented tank failure, as intended. To generate a statistically valid dataset on tank failure, ten tanks without safety devices were exposed to a gasoline pool fire. Five tanks were filled to a level of 20 %; the re-maining five were filled to a level of 100 %. In order to gain information on the heating process, three tem-perature readings at the tank surface, and three nearby flame temperatures were recorded. At distances of l = (7; 9; 11) m to the tank, the overpressure of the shock wave induced by the tank failure and the unsteady tem-peratures were measured. All ten tanks failed within a time of t < 5 min in a BLEVE (boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion). Seven of these resulted directly in a catastrophic failure. The other three resulted in partial failure followed by catastrophic failure. A near field overpressure at a distance of l = 7 m of up to p = 0.27 bar was measured. All ten tests showed massive fragmentation of the tank mantle. In total, 50 fragments were found. These 50 fragments make-up 88.6 % of the original tank mass. Each fragment was georeferenced and weighed. Fragment throwing distances of l > 250 m occurred. For the tanks with a fill level of 20 %, the average number of fragments was twice as high as it was for the tanks that were filled completely.
For evaluation of explosion scenarios in closed systems involving the mildly flammable refrigerants R1234yf, R1234ze and R32 dependent on the ignition energy, ignitions were carried out in a closed autoclave. A newly developed ignition system was used, which allows generating electric arcs with defined energies in a range between 3 J and 1000 J. The lower explosion limit of R32 decreases with increasing ignition energy. R32-explosions can be more severe than explosions involving highly flammable substances.
However, in case of R1234yf and R1234ze, the ignition energy had to be increased to more than 100 J and more than 500 J to detect explosions in the closed system at all, although flame Propagation phenomena can already be observed if these substances are ignited with much weaker ignition sources in open glass tubes. The explosions were very mild with these substances.