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Organisationseinheit der BAM
Im Rahmen des Projekts „Complex Fires – Auswirkung von Behälterversagen“ (CoFi-ABV) sollen die Auswirkungen des Versagens von Gasbehältern für alternative Treibstoffe in Fahrzeugen unter Berücksichtigung komplexer Brand- und Explosionsszenarien untersucht werden. Es wird der aktuelle Hintergrund des Forschungsvorhabens erläutert sowie die geplanten Untersuchungen und beabsichtigten Ergebnisse vorgestellt. Hauptbestandteil des Projekts ist eine Vielzahl von zerstörenden Großversuchen. Im Vorfeld dieser Großversuche werden zur Weiterentwicklung und Adaptierung von Messtechnik Versuche im kleineren Maßstab durchgeführt. Im Folgenden werden Teile dieser Ver-suchsaufbauten im „mid-scale“ sowie die dabei verwendete Messtechnik dargestellt. Weiterhin werden erste Ergebnisse aus Wärmeeintragsversuchen zur Quantifizierung verschiedener Unterfeuerungsmethoden für die zerstörenden Großversuche vorgestellt.
Commercial, off-the shelf propane cylinders are subjected to high safety regulations. Furthermore, those cylinders are equipped with safety devices like pressure relief valves (PRV). Despite these regulations and safety measures, a failure of the Container is possible if exposed to an intense fire. The result of this is severe hazard for users, rescue forces and infrastructure. Within the framework of a destructive test series, 15 identical propane cylinders, without pressure relief devices, were exposed to an intensive fire in horizontal Position until failure. Each cylinder was filled with a mass of m =11 kg of liquid propane. Three different fire sources were used (wood, petrol, propane). The experiments revealed the failure of all cylinders in a time period t < 155 s. The failure lead to a fragmentation into several major parts with throwing distances of up to l =262 m. In all trials, the temperature of the cylinder wall (top, side, bottom), of the liquid phase inside and of the surrounding fire (top, side, bottom) was recorded. In addition, the inner cylinder pressure and the induced overpressure of the blast wave after the failure were recorded. Overpressures of up to p=0.27 bar were recorded close to the cylinder (l =5 m). AM tests were documented hy video from several positions (general view, close-up, high-speed 5000 fps). This test series creates the basis for further experimental studies in the field of alternative fuels for vehicles. The aim of this test series is to assess and analyse the consequences of the failure of gas vessels (for LPG, CNG, CGH2) in the aftermath of severe incidents.
15 identical off-the-shelf propane cylinders (m = 11 kg liquid propane) were underfired. The infrared Radiation of the Explosion, that occurred in the aftermath of the vessel failure, was recorded using four bolometers. These measurements are compared with an estimation of the Maximum intensity gained by an Analysis of the Video data, an Extended Version of the Stefan-Boltzmann law and a BLEVE model.
In continuation of a preceding test series involving sole LPG vehicle tanks, three passenger cars equipped with identical toroidal steel LPG tanks were set on fire. The tanks were installed in the space normally reserved for the spare tyre, in the car boot. No safety device was installed on the tank, in order to force critical failure of the cylinder. Two of the cars were equipped with a tank filled with liquefied propane to a level of 20 % (5.3 kg), the third one was filled completely (25.5 kg). The partially filled tanks failed critically within a time period of more than 20 min after the initiation of the fire. The fully-filled tank did not rupture; the propane was released continuously through a small leak that appeared during the fire. Comprehensive equipment was used to procure measurement data, enabling an analysis of potential consequences and hazards to humans and infrastructure within the vehicle surroundings. The inner status of the tank (pressure, temperature of the liquid phase and the steel casing), the development of the fire (temperature inside and around the vehicle) and the pressure induced in the near-field in case of tank rupture were recorded. The results were analysed in detail and compared against the data gained in tests involving sole, but identical LPG tanks.
Small, mobile propane gas vessels are widely spread and comprise additional hazards in case of a surrounding, intensive fire. The aim of the presented work is to holistically investigate the potential consequences of failure of these off-the-shelf propane gas vessels in case of an absence or malfunction of safety devices. In order to generate a statistically valid dataset, a total of 15 identical propane gas bottles without pressure relief device, each containing m = 11 kg of liquid propane, were underfired in horizontal position. For each selected fire type (wood fire, petrol pool fire, propane gas fire), five vessels were tested under identical conditions. Next to extensive camera equipment including a high-speed camera, systems to record the internal pressure of the gas cylinder, the resulting shock wave overpressure (three positions) and the flame and vessel temperature (three + three positions) during the underfiring were used. Also the unsteady, highly dynamical thermal radiation caused by the explosion of the expanding gas cloud was logged. The fragments were georeferenced and weighed after each test. The experiments prove the failure of all the gas cylinders at a burst pressure of pb = [71 … 98 bar] with a fragmentation into up to seven parts (average: four objects) and a subsequent explosion of the expanding vapour after mixing with the surrounding air. The overpressure measured in the close-up range (distance to the cylinder d = 5 m) resulting from the shockwave caused by the cylinder burst was up to pmax = 0.27 bar, which can potentially lead to significant injuries to humans and damage to building structures and infrastructure, especially in connection with the explosion and the resultant thermal radiation. The distance covered by the fragments after the failure was up to r = 260 m; 47% of the fragments hit the ground more than r = 50 m away from the position of failure.