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The introduction of hydrogen as a safe energy carrier needs a robust knowledge base, tools for the design and safety assessment of hydrogen technologies built on it, and an internationally harmonized set of standards and regulations. Many of the innovative technologies imply hydrogen at high pressures and/or cryogenic temperatures, with which private users come into contact for the first time in distributed applications. In order to avoid over-conservative, expensive safety solutions, while at the same time demonstrating the usability and safety of hydrogen applications and maintaining acceptance for the technology, safety research must also keep pace with, or better yet anticipate, trends in technological development. Thus, this overview article describes not only the current state of knowledge and technology regarding hydrogen safety, but also its further development.
In this presentation the drivers for the rise of hydrogen technologies are outlined and main challenges for the market ramp-up are shown. Finally, the activities and capabilities of the competence center H2Safety@BAM are characterized and some of the current projects at BAM adressing the main challenges for hydrogen technologies are presented focussing on the hydrogen transport and infrastructure.
Die BAM ist nahezu über die gesamte Wertschöpfungskette hinweg wissenschaftlich tätig. Von der sicheren und effizienten Wasserstofferzeugung (POWER-to-GAS), über die (Zwischen-)Speicherung von Wasserstoff in Druckgasspeichern bis hin zum Transport bspw. mittels Trailerfahrzeug zum Endverbraucher.
Komplettiert werden die Aktivitäten der BAM durch die sicherheitstechnische Beurteilung von wasserstoffhaltigen Gasgemischen, die Verträglichkeitsbewertung von Werkstoffen bis hin zur Detektion von Wasserstoffkonzentrationen über geeignete Sensorik, auch mittels ferngesteuerter Messdrohnen (sog. UAV-Drohnen).
Zudem untersucht die BAM proaktiv Schadensrisiken und Unfallszenarien für die Sicherheitsbetrachtung, um mögliche Schwachstellen aufzeigen und potenzielle Gefährdungen erkennen zu können.
In case of a vehicle fire, an installed LPG (liquefied petroleum gas) tank with a malfunctioning safety device poses severe hazards. To investigate the consequences in case of tank failure, we conducted 16 tests with toroidal shaped LPG vehicle tanks. Three tanks were used for a Hydraulic Burst Test under standard conditions. Another three tanks were equipped with a statutory safety device and were subjected to a gasoline pool fire. The safety device prevented tank failure, as intended. To generate a statistically valid dataset on tank failure, ten tanks without safety devices were exposed to a gasoline pool fire. Five tanks were filled to a level of 20 %; the re-maining five were filled to a level of 100 %. In order to gain information on the heating process, three tem-perature readings at the tank surface, and three nearby flame temperatures were recorded. At distances of l = (7; 9; 11) m to the tank, the overpressure of the shock wave induced by the tank failure and the unsteady tem-peratures were measured. All ten tanks failed within a time of t < 5 min in a BLEVE (boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion). Seven of these resulted directly in a catastrophic failure. The other three resulted in partial failure followed by catastrophic failure. A near field overpressure at a distance of l = 7 m of up to p = 0.27 bar was measured. All ten tests showed massive fragmentation of the tank mantle. In total, 50 fragments were found. These 50 fragments make-up 88.6 % of the original tank mass. Each fragment was georeferenced and weighed. Fragment throwing distances of l > 250 m occurred. For the tanks with a fill level of 20 %, the average number of fragments was twice as high as it was for the tanks that were filled completely.
Compressed natural gas (CNG) is a widely used automotive fuel in a variety of countries. In case of a vehicle fire where the safety device also malfunctions, a failure of the CNG automotive cylinder could occur. Such a cylinder failure is associated with severe hazards for the surrounding environment. Firstly, a comprehensive analysis is given below, summarizing various accidents involving CNG automotive cylinders and their consequences. In an extensive experimental program, 21 CNG automotive cylinders with no safety device were tested. Of the 21, burst tests were carried out on 5 Type III and 5 Type IV cylinders. Furthermore, fire tests with 8 Type III and 3 Type IV cylinders were conducted. Apart from cylinder pressure, inner temperature and cylinder mantle temperature, the periphery consequences, such as nearfield blast pressure and fragmentation are documented. The maximum measured overpressure due to a Type III cylinder failure was p = 0.41 bar. Each traceable fragment was georeferenced. All-in-all, fragment throw distances of d > 300 m could be observed. As one key result, it can be stated that the tested Type IV CNG cylinders showed less critical failure behavior then the Type III cylinders under fire impingement.
In continuation of a preceding test series involving sole LPG vehicle tanks, three passenger cars equipped with identical toroidal steel LPG tanks were set on fire. The tanks were installed in the space normally reserved for the spare tyre, in the car boot. No safety device was installed on the tank, in order to force critical failure of the cylinder. Two of the cars were equipped with a tank filled with liquefied propane to a level of 20 % (5.3 kg), the third one was filled completely (25.5 kg). The partially filled tanks failed critically within a time period of more than 20 min after the initiation of the fire. The fully-filled tank did not rupture; the propane was released continuously through a small leak that appeared during the fire. Comprehensive equipment was used to procure measurement data, enabling an analysis of potential consequences and hazards to humans and infrastructure within the vehicle surroundings. The inner status of the tank (pressure, temperature of the liquid phase and the steel casing), the development of the fire (temperature inside and around the vehicle) and the pressure induced in the near-field in case of tank rupture were recorded. The results were analysed in detail and compared against the data gained in tests involving sole, but identical LPG tanks.
In this presentation the results of the Project HySpark are shown. Mechanical impacts are among the important possible ignition sources to be considered in explosion protection. Hydrogen is particularly prone to be ignited by mechanical impacts compared to natural gas. The effectivity of mechanical impacts as ignition source is dependent from different parameters. In this work the effectivity of impacts as an ignition source for hydrogen containing atmospheres was studied experimentally depending on the inhomogeneous material pairing of the impact. Moreover it was studied, how the effectivity of mechanical impacts as ignition source changes when hydrogen is added to natural gas.
Mechanical friction, impact or abrasion is one of the ignition sources that must be avoided in hazardous zones with explosive atmospheres. The effectiveness of mechanical impacts as ignition source is dependent from several parameters including the minimum ignition energy of the explosive atmosphere, the properties of the material pairing, the kinetic impact energy or the impact velocity. By now there is no standard procedure to determine the effectiveness of mechanical impacts as ignition source. In this work the effectiveness of mechanical impacts with defined and reproducible kinetic impact energy as ignition source for hydrogen containing atmospheres was studied systematically in dependence from the inhomogeneous material pairing considering materials with practical relevance like stainless steel, low alloy steel, concrete, and non-iron-metals. It was found that ignition can be avoided, if non-iron metals are used in combination with different metallic materials, but in combination with concrete even the impact of non-iron-metals can be an effective ignition source if the kinetic impact energy is not further limited. Moreover, the consequence of hydrogen admixture to natural gas on the effectiveness of mechanical impacts as ignition source was studied. In many cases ignition of atmospheres containing natural gas by mechanical impacts is rather unlikely. No influence could be observed for admixtures up to 25% hydrogen and even more. The results are mainly relevant in the context of repurposing the natural gas grid or adding hydrogen to
the natural gas grid.
The maximum rate of pressure rise (dp/dt)𝑚𝑎𝑥 and the corresponding K-value of hybrid mixtures containing flammable gases and dusts are important for constructive explosion protection measures. Since the safety characteristics of dusts and gases are determined under different conditions, there has been considerable confusion about the influence of flammable gas on the (dp/dt) of dusts and vice versa. While some investigations showed comparably higher values for hybrid mixtures, others stated that the highest value for the gas component alone is the worst case.
The first part of this paper focuses on the confusion around the different statements about (dp/dt)𝑚𝑎𝑥 of hybrid mixtures and where they come from. In the second part of this paper experimental results are presented that illustrate how to clarify the different findings of past research and show what to expect as a real worst-case-value for hybrid mixtures.
In this presentation the current focus areas of the competence centre H2Safety@BAM are shown. The fields of competence include “Material properties and compatibility”, “Process and plant safety”, “Component testing, component safety and approval” as well as “Sensors, analytics and certified reference Materials. Moreover, the cross-cutting activities regarding “Education and training” and the testing possibilities and planed test facilities at the Test Site for Technical Safety (BAM TTS) are presented.