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BAM as competent authority regarding assessment of mechanical and thermal design, activity release and quality assurance aspects of SNF and HLW transport packages developed a thesaurus of experience feedback topics from recent approval procedures. The list is structured according to the European PDSR guide. It involves issues, which from BAM point of view, needed clarification during last package design assessment procedures. The list contains issues from operation (e.g. deactivation of handling lugs not intended for package handling), maintenance (e.g. leak tightness of impact limiting devices) to technical assessment (e.g. formation of hydrogen by radiolysis and its impact on pressure and ignitability, consideration of ageing mechanisms, thermo-mechanical assessment, impact of gaps between content and flask, spent fuel behaviour) as well as to general and specific safety analysis report requirements (e.g. report structure and required data).
Three drop test campaigns have been performed with DN 30 Protective Structural Packaging (PSP) developed by DAHER NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGIES GmbH for the transport of natural, enriched and reprocessed uranium hexafluoride (up to 5 wt%) in 30B cylinders.
The mechanical prototype testing is intended to demonstrate that the package DN30 complies with regulatory requirements under normal and hypothetical accident conditions of transport (NCT, ACT) relevant to IF, AF and B(U)F packages, respectively.
The paper includes the results of the latest test campaign carried out in 2015-2016 at the drop test facility of BAM, Germany with new full scale prototypes of the DN30 PSP and 30B cylinders. Repetition of drop test sequences became necessary after changing to Polyisocyanurate foam as shock absorbing material with variable foam densities. Furthermore, the mechanical behavior of the UF6 content of the 30B cylinder is now simulated by a mixture of cement and steel grid as modified surrogate material; instead of small steel balls. The behavior of this new content simulation is assumed to be more realistic with respect to the properties of real UF6.
The design of a special form radioactive material has to resist a severe transport accident without undue loss or dispersal of radioactive material.
Safety assessment by authorities competent for design approval has to include besides the required test program (impact, percussion, bending and heat test) also the evaluation of the quality management system for design, manufacture, testing, documentation, use, maintenance and inspection.
These quality assurance measures have to assure that every specimen of the approved design is produced in the same verified quality and every specimen must be able to survive the severe mechanical and thermal tests without undue loss or dispersal of radioactive material at any time of its working life.
All important aspects in the design approval procedure by BAM as the competent authority for approvals of special form radioactive material in Germany are summarized in a guideline published in 2014. This paper will give additional explanations to some aspects in safety assessment, e.g.:
the applicability of leak test methods and the need to consider ageing aspects.
Accident safe packages for the transport of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste shall fulfil international IAEA safety requirements. Compliance is shown by consecutive mechanical and thermal testing. Additional numerical analysis are usually part of the safety evaluation. For damage protection some package designs are equipped with wood filled impact limiters encapsulated by steel sheets. The safety of these packages is established in compliance with IAEA regulations. Cumulative mechanical and fire tests are conducted to achieve safety standards and to prevent loss of containment. Mechanical reliability is proven by drop tests. Drop testing might cause significant damage of the impact limiter steel sheets and might enable sufficient oxygen supply to the impact limiter during the fire test to ignite the wood filling. The boundary conditions of the fire test are precisely described in the IAEA regulatory. During the test the impact limiter will be subjected to a 30 minute enduring fire phase. Subsequent to the fire phase any burning of the specimen has to extinguish naturally and no artificial cooling is allowed. At BAM a large-scale fire test with a real size impact limiter and a wood volume of about 3m³ was conducted to investigate the burning behaviour of wood filled impact limiters in steel sheet encapsulation. The impact limiter was equipped with extensive temperature monitoring equipment. Until today burning of such impact limiters is not sufficiently considered in transport package design and more investigation is necessary to explore the consequences of the impacting fire. The objective of the large scale test was to find out whether a self-sustaining smouldering or even a flaming fire inside the impact limiter was initiated and what impact on the cask is resulting. The amount of energy, transferred from the impact limiter into the cask is of particular importance for the safety of heavy weight packages. With the intention of heat flux quantification a new approach was made and a test bench was designed.
In accordance with IAEA SSR-6 para 306 a management system shall be established and implemented to ensure compliance with the relevant provisions of the IAEA regulations. BAM has issued an update of the guideline: the BAM-GGR 011. The new revision describes necessary quality assurance measures for design, manufacture, testing, documentation, use, maintenance and inspection of packagings for package designs requiring competent authority approval for the transport of radioactive material.
The measures can be categorised as system-related and design-related. They are independently approved and monitored by the German competent authority BAM and its authorised expert (BAM/T). The qualification of the organisation applying for the design approval certificate is reviewed in the context of the design approval procedure. The quality assurance measures for manufacture consist of three main steps. Pre-assessment of manufacturing documents such as quality plans, specifications etc., Manufacturing inspections according the pre-assessed documents and inspection before commissioning including documentation review. Periodic inspections during operation as well as relevant specifications for use and maintenance ensure that the properties specified in the approval certificate are preserved over the package life time. Special provisions for the return on experience regarding operational feedback for design, manufacture, use, maintenance and inspection are given.
Special focus shall be given here to the rearranged and meanwhile established system of manufacturing inspections. This includes more transparent roles for a) the producers authorised inspection 11282 representative, b) the independent inspection expert (S), acting on behalf of the manufacturer with acceptance of BAM, and c) BAM or its authorised expert (BAM/T). Additional attention shall be drawn to the management of deviations during manufacturing and provisions for maintenance and periodic inspections.
In this presentation the main requirements of BAM-GGR 016 regarding maintenance and periodic inspections were explained. BAM ensures during acceptance of the quality management program that specific and relevant instructions for maintenance and periodic inspections are developed and handed to the operator of the packaging. Examples are given.
Most transports of radioactive materials are carried out with packages not requiring competent authority approval of design. These encompass – in accordance with the IAEA SSR-6 [1] regulations – packages of the classification excepted, Industrial packages Type 1, 2 and 3 and Type A packages. Currently an upsurge in number and variation of these package designs can be seen in Germany, resulting from the phase out of nuclear energy in Germany as well as e. g. increased use of radioactive material for medical purposes.
A design assessment regarding the package safety is required in the international IAEA SSR-6 [1] regulations. BAM operates facilities for the performance of all regulatory tests required such as drop towers for a wide range of package masses and dimensions, fire test, leak tightness measurements and pressure test facilities. Experiences with several package types are shown.
Additionally, IAEA SSR-6 [1] requires the establishment of a management system for design, manufacture, maintenance, and repair of the packaging as well as for the preparation, consigning, loading, carriage, unloading and receipt of the package. Relevant for Germany, BAM has published guidance material on the process of management system acceptance in the technical guide BAM-GGR 016 [2]. The requirements encompass quality management plans for the manufacturing of packages including independent manufacturing surveillance and specific instructions for operation, maintenance, and repair of packagings. Examples for management system specifics and requirements are given.
Since the latest edition of the IAEA SSR-6 [1] regulations an ageing evaluation including systematic ageing management measures are required for all kind of package types. BAM is going to update the guidance material BAM-GGR 016 [2] to support the stakeholders with relevant information to fulfil the ageing aspect for packages not requiring competent authority approval. The paper explains how the ageing aspect may be included in the safety evaluation process and the management system measures and will give an outlook for the future guidance material.