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German package design approvals were granted recently for dual purpose casks (DPC) intended for loading with encapsulated damaged spent nuclear fuel (DSNF). Comprehensive assessment procedures were carried out by the authority BAM with respect to the mechanical and thermal package design, the activity release of radioactive material and quality assurance aspects for manufacturing and operation of each packaging. The objective of each procedure was to verify the Package Design Safety Report (PDSR) and the relevant guidelines fulfils the requirements of the IAEA regulations.
Previous approvals of German SNF package designs consider mainly standard fuel assemblies with defined specifications and properties for transport and interim storage. Due to the nuclear power phase-out in Germany all kinds of SNF, e.g. damaged spent fuel rods shall be packed in DPC now. Therefore specific requirements shall be considered in accordance with international experiences including IAEA technical reports. The main requirement for DSNF is a tight encapsulation with specific defined properties under transport and storage conditions.
Due to the interim storage period of currently up to 40 years the encapsulation with DSNF in the casks shall also be long term durable. Thus specific loading and drying procedures are necessary and had to be qualified during the approval process. BAM assessed these drying procedures and could confirm the long-term behaviour of the encapsulation and the suitability of the drying equipment. This special equipment was qualified in a “cold handling”. In addition, it was shown that the behaviour of the test equipment used in the qualification process was comparable with the original equipment, e.g. test fuel rods or test encapsulation. In the development of the drying process, experience was obtained in how to put the requirements of the IAEA regulations and related IAEA technical reports into practice.
The paper gives an overview of approval assessment and testing experience made by BAM and point out the main resulting requirements on drying processes for these kinds of encapsulations with DSNF.
In this presentation, we discuss the potential of probabilistic approaches to the design and assessment of offshore foundations. The potential is demonstrated in a numerical example considering a laterally loaded monopile. As an outlook, we present a concept for managing the risk associated with installing large monopiles.
In this contribution, an approach is outlined to process non-destructively gath-ered measurement data in a comparable way in order to include the measured information in probabilistic reliability assessments of existing structures. An es-sential part is the calculation of measurement uncertainties. The effect of incor-porating evaluated NDT-results is demonstrated by means of a prestressed con-crete bridge and GPR measurements conducted on this bridge as a case-study. The bridge is assessed regarding SLS Decompression using the NDT-results.
In this lecture, the safety assessment of hydrogen gas storage systems is presented using the example of composite pressure vessels. The main element is a probabilistic approval approach based on five steps. Firstly, the testing and evaluation of properties at the beginning of life are shown. Secondly, methods for artificial aging and the effect on the residual strength are presented. Thirdly, testing against dedicated accidents is introduced. Fourthly, effects on the surveillance of production quality are discussed. Finally, degradation and the end of life are estimated. Background information and examples are given for each step. The assessment presented is a method applicable for many safety-related systems.
In this lecture, the safety assessment of hydrogen gas storage systems is presented using the example of composite pressure vessels. The main element is a probabilistic approval approach based on five steps. Firstly, the testing and evaluation of properties at the beginning of life are shown. Secondly, methods for artificial aging and the effect on the residual strength are presented. Thirdly, testing against dedicated accidents is introduced. Fourthly, effects on the surveillance of production quality are discussed. Finally, degradation and the end of life are estimated. Background information and examples are given for each step. The assessment presented is a method applicable for many safety-related systems.
In this lecture, the safety assessment of hydrogen gas storage systems is presented using the example of composite pressure vessels. The main element is a probabilistic approval approach based on five steps. Firstly, the testing and evaluation of properties at the beginning of life are shown. Secondly, methods for artificial aging and the effect on the residual strength are presented. Thirdly, testing against dedicated accidents is introduced. Fourthly, effects on the surveillance of production quality are discussed. Finally, degradation and the end of life are estimated. Background information and examples are given for each step. The assessment presented is a method applicable for many safety-related systems.
In this lecture, the safety assessment of hydrogen gas storage systems is presented using the example of composite pressure vessels. The main element is a probabilistic approval approach based on five steps. Firstly, the testing and evaluation of properties at the beginning of life are shown. Secondly, methods for artificial aging and the effect on the residual strength are presented. Thirdly, testing against dedicated accidents is introduced. Fourthly, effects on the surveillance of production quality are discussed. Finally, degradation and the end of life are estimated. Background information and examples are given for each step. The assessment presented is a method applicable for many safety-related systems.