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Acetylene pressure cylinders are widely used in the industrial sector for welding, flame cutting, or heating.
Sometimes during work, not only with acetylene cylinders, fires occur and in this case the risk of destruction increases and the behavior of such an exposed cylinder is unpredictable. The purpose of this study is to identify those critical conditions when acetylene cylinders burst and explode in fires. In the present study, acetylene cylinders were exposed to fire conditions. For this purpose, a woodpile as a source of fire was chosen, tested, and evaluated. In addition to the fire condition, this option guaranteed reproducibility and similar conditions for all tests. The individual cylinders were equipped with thermocouples measuring the shell temperature, and half of them were prepared in order to measure the temperatures inside the cylinder. An important factor was the measurement of the amount of pressure that was achieved during the destruction of the cylinder. For this purpose, a pressure transducer was attached to the outlet of the cylinder valve. Exposed to direct fire, they can explode in 10 min, which was confirmed. The critical pressure of 40 bar has been reached in 6 min, followed by destruction after 7 min in fire. Cylinders with internal thermocouples were destroyed when lower pressure was achieved. This confirms the fact that any change of the pressure cylinder affects the original properties. After the tests, the fragments of the selected cylinders were subjected to material tests. The results obtained in these tests are the main source of information for understanding the behavior of acetylene cylinders in fire and the possibility of increasing the safety of intervening rescue services in an emergency.
The presentation introduces the BAM as well as the experimental possibilites at the BAM TTS in the first part. The general possibilities regarding Power2Gas with respect to hydrogen production by electrolysis are preseneted. Furthermore the Hydrogen Strategy of Germany and the status quo regarding grenn energy solutions in the transport sector are given. In the last part of the presentation a short overview of relevant investigations in the field of hydrogen safety and alternative fuels for cars as well as perspectively planned investigations of the BAM in this area are presented.
Tetrafluoroethylene (TFE) is an industrial scale starting material e.g. for polymer production (PTFE, FEP). When ignited the chemically unstable TFE is capable to decompose in an explosive way. Explosion propagation through pipe systems of production plants have led to damage and fatalities within the last 7 decades.
Incident analyses identified compression heat a relevant source of ignition. Chemical plants consist of pipes, vessels, separating valves, strainers and other components. Before restarting the process after maintenance work different parts of the plant components could be filled with TFE, Nitrogen or Air at different initial pressures ranging from vacuum or atmospheric to TFE at operating pressure. Valve opening procedures may cause a temperature increase in the gas phase. Compression takes place at polytropic conditions. Heat losses cannot be neglected. Therefore the temperature development in the gas depends upon the surface-to-volume-ratio of the enclosure, geometrical influences, the state of gas flow, how fast the valve opens and the heat capacity of the gas being compressed.
In the present work initial test results from a 2.5” pipe will be compared with existing 1.1” pipe data. Geometrical effects will be briefly discussed as well as some first results concerning the influence of orifices are reported. Furthermore a method allowing for the identification of hazardous initial conditions is discussed.
Tetrafluoroethylene (TFE) is an industrial scale starting material e.g. for polymer production (PTFE, FEP). When ignited the chemically unstable TFE is capable of decomposing in an explosive way. Explosion propagation through pipe systems of production plants have led to damage and fatalities within the last seven decades.
Incident analyses identified compression heat a relevant source of ignition. Chemical plants consist of pipes, vessels, separating valves, strainers and other components. Before restarting the process after maintenance work, different parts of the plant components could be filled with TFE, nitrogen or air at different initial pressures ranging from vacuum or atmospheric to TFE at operating pressure. Valve opening procedures may cause a temperature increase in the gas phase. Compression takes place at polytropic conditions. Heat losses cannot be neglected. The temperature development in the gas depends upon the surface to volume ratio of the enclosure, geometrical influences, the state of gas flow, how fast the valve opens, and the heat capacity of the gas being compressed.
Laboratory scale tests (Meyer, 2009) revealed ignition of TFE/air due to compression heat. Tests in pipes of 28 mm inner diameter, i.e. already industrial scale, were performed by (Kluge et. al., 2016). In the present contribution initial test results from a 63 mm pipe will be compared with existing 28 mm pipe data. A description of the experimental setup as well as an explanation of the hazard diagram will be given.
Furthermore, a method allowing for the identification of hazardous conditions will be discussed.
In case of a vehicle fire, an installed LPG (liquefied petroleum gas) tank with a malfunctioning safety device poses severe hazards. To investigate the consequences in case of tank failure, we conducted 16 tests with toroidal shaped LPG vehicle tanks. Three tanks were used for a Hydraulic Burst Test under standard conditions. Another three tanks were equipped with a statutory safety device and were subjected to a gasoline pool fire. The safety device prevented tank failure, as intended. To generate a statistically valid dataset on tank failure, ten tanks without safety devices were exposed to a gasoline pool fire. Five tanks were filled to a level of 20 %; the re-maining five were filled to a level of 100 %. In order to gain information on the heating process, three tem-perature readings at the tank surface, and three nearby flame temperatures were recorded. At distances of l = (7; 9; 11) m to the tank, the overpressure of the shock wave induced by the tank failure and the unsteady tem-peratures were measured. All ten tanks failed within a time of t < 5 min in a BLEVE (boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion). Seven of these resulted directly in a catastrophic failure. The other three resulted in partial failure followed by catastrophic failure. A near field overpressure at a distance of l = 7 m of up to p = 0.27 bar was measured. All ten tests showed massive fragmentation of the tank mantle. In total, 50 fragments were found. These 50 fragments make-up 88.6 % of the original tank mass. Each fragment was georeferenced and weighed. Fragment throwing distances of l > 250 m occurred. For the tanks with a fill level of 20 %, the average number of fragments was twice as high as it was for the tanks that were filled completely.
Für die Reinigung ihres Klassenzimmers von Klebstoffresten, Schmierereien u. ä. am Ende des Schuljahres verwendeten die Schüler einen 20 l-Blechkanister mit Lösemittel (Ethanol bzw. Spiritus für Matrizendrucker), der als leichtentzündlich gekennzeichnet war. Die Entnahme des Lösemittels durch die Schüler erfolgte durch vorsichtiges Kippen des in einem Regal stehenden Kanisters nach vorne, so dass Lösemittel auf die für die Reinigung verwendeten Papiertücher tropfte. Am 23. Juni 1997 kam es unter Bildung einer Stichflamme zur Entzündung verschütteten Ethanols und in der Folge auch zum Bersten des Behälters. In der Folge des Unfalls verstarb eine Schülerin und acht weitere Schülerinnen und Schüler wurden zum Teil schwerstverletzt. Zudem entstand infolge des Brandgeschehens erheblicher Sachschaden. Dieser Aufsatz stellt das Strafurteil gegen den verantwortlichen Lehrer vor und diskutiert die relevanten, aber im Urteil nicht benannten Anforderungen des Gefahrstoffrechts.
Zwei Brandmeister der Berufsfeuerwehr wollten ein Acetylen-Sauerstoffgemisch für ein Silvester-Feuerwerk verwenden (bzw. zweckentfremden). Dabei kam es zu einer starken Explosion und die beiden Feuerwehrleute erlitten schwerste Verbrennungen. Gegen die beiden wurden Strafbefehle wegen fahrlässigen "Herbeiführens einer Sprengstoffexplosion" erlassen. Der Aufsatz stellt die Strafbefehle vor und bespricht die Schnittstelle zum Arbeitsschutz- und Gefahrstoffrecht.