TY - CONF A1 - Schubert, Sven A1 - Reichardt, Adrian A1 - Müller, Lars A1 - Neumann, Martin A1 - Komann, Steffen A1 - Wille, Frank T1 - Introduction of the German ageing management guide for packages for transport of radioactive materials N2 - The consideration of ageing mechanisms is with integration of the new para 613A into IAEA SSR-6 (Rev. 1) now obligatory for the design of transport packages. In addition, para 809(f) requires for packages intended to be used for shipment after storage the consideration of the effects of ageing mechanisms during storage in safety analyses and the implementation of corresponding instructions for operation and maintenance. Para 503(e) requires that all packaging components and radioactive contents have been maintained during storage in a manner that all requirements specified in IAEA SSR-6 (Rev.1) and in the applicable certificates of approval have been fulfilled. The evaluation of ageing mechanisms and their effects including monitoring are part of BAM’s authority assessment tasks related to the mechanical and thermal package design and quality assurance aspects. BAM has compiled a guideline for the implementation of ageing assessment and of the measures for ageing management of the approval procedure based on requirements of IAEA SSR-6 (Rev.1). The guideline is applicable only for packages requiring a competent authority approval. The paper aims to describe the structure of the guideline and the general approach for ageing management requirements. The type and amount of measures for ageing management depend mainly on the use of the package and on the ageing effects for the component, which result from relevant ageing mechanisms during package operation time. The implementation of measures for ageing management is divided into three levels – systemic measures, package design related measures and documentation. The systemic measures are attributed to the general management system and define the whole activities for organization of ageing management like structure, responsibilities, documentation, reports and evaluation. The package design related measures are defined in an ageing management plan (AMP). These measures shall ensure that the anticipated changes of the package design under consideration of ageing effects still complies with the design approval specification. Therefore, an ageing surveillance program (ASP) and, if necessary, a gap analysis program shall be developed. The ageing management documentation (AMD) ensures the continuous documentation of the compliance of a specific package to the approved package design, comprising mainly records resulting from operation and surveillance. T2 - PATRAM22 - 20th International Symposium on the Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Materials CY - Juan-les-Pins, France DA - 11.06.2023 KW - Guide KW - Ageing KW - Mechanism KW - Package KW - Management PY - 2023 SP - 1 EP - 10 PB - World Nuclear Transport Institute (WNTI) CY - London AN - OPUS4-57770 LA - eng AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER - TY - CONF A1 - Rolle, Annette A1 - Komann, Steffen A1 - Wille, Frank T1 - Ageing aspect in design approval of special form radioactive material N2 - In accordance with the IAEA transport regulations, the design of special form radioactive material (SFRM) shall resist a severe transport accident without undue loss or dispersal of radioactive material. The safety assessment for design approval includes besides the program for physical tests (impact, percussion, bending and heat test) also the evaluation of the management system for design, manufacture, testing, documentation, use, maintenance, and inspection. SFRM source design plus management system shall ensure, that every specimen of the approved design is able to survive the severe mechanical and thermal tests at any time of its SFRM-working life. Due to the long-term use of SFRM designs in most cases, the assessment of the source ageing behavior is an important aspect in the approval procedure. Different fields of application imply a wide range of environmental conditions, from clean room atmosphere to highly aggressive industrial conditions. Besides of radioactive content, corrosion is a main factor for possible SFRM design degradation. Although the IAEA Advisory Material SSG-26 already implies an indication of the need for considering ageing mechanisms, suitable amendments in the regulatory requirements of SSR-6 should be introduced to make the approval procedure more transparent and help to reduce rounds of questions by the authority. A supplementary requirement for considering of ageing mechanisms could be a helpful contribution to an international harmonization of the approval procedure. This paper will describe major influencing factors to be considered to assess the ageing behavior of a SFRM design and will identify the need for a regulatory specification of a SFRM-working life as basis for the assessment of the SFRM design regarding time-dependent weakening. A proposal for an explicit requirement for consideration of ageing mechanisms in safety assessment of SFRM, which should be considered in the ongoing SSR-6 revision cycle, will be explained. T2 - PATRAM22 Conference CY - Juan-Les-Pins, France DA - 11.06.2023 KW - Radioaktive Stoffe KW - Beförderung KW - Zulassung KW - Strahlenschutz PY - 2023 AN - OPUS4-57781 LA - eng AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER - TY - CONF A1 - Rolle, Annette A1 - Komann, Steffen A1 - Wille, Frank T1 - Ageing aspect in design approval of special form radioactive material N2 - In accordance with the IAEA transport regulations, the design of special form radioactive material (SFRM) shall resist a severe transport accident without undue loss or dispersal of radioactive material. The safety assessment for design approval includes besides the program for physical tests (impact, percussion, bending and heat test) also the evaluation of the management system for design, manufacture, testing, documentation, use, maintenance, and inspection. SFRM source design plus management system shall ensure, that every specimen of the approved design is able to survive the severe mechanical and thermal tests at any time of its SFRM-working life. Due to the long-term use of SFRM designs in most cases, the assessment of the source ageing behavior is an important aspect in the approval procedure. Different fields of application imply a wide range of environmental conditions, from clean room atmosphere to highly aggressive industrial conditions. Besides of radioactive content, corrosion is a main factor for possible SFRM design degradation. Although the IAEA Advisory Material SSG-26 already implies an indication of the need for considering ageing mechanisms, suitable amendments in the regulatory requirements of SSR-6 should be introduced to make the approval procedure more transparent and help to reduce rounds of questions by the authority. A supplementary requirement for considering of ageing mechanisms could be a helpful contribution to an international harmonization of the approval procedure. This paper will describe major influencing factors to be considered to assess the ageing behavior of a SFRM design and will identify the need for a regulatory specification of a SFRM-working life as basis for the assessment of the SFRM design regarding time-dependent weakening. A proposal for an explicit requirement for consideration of ageing mechanisms in safety assessment of SFRM, which should be considered in the ongoing SSR-6 revision cycle, will be explained. T2 - PATRAM22 Conference CY - Juan-Les-Pins, Antibes, France DA - 11.06.2023 KW - Ttransport KW - Radioactive material KW - Sealed sources KW - Ageing PY - 2023 SP - 1 EP - 6 AN - OPUS4-57786 LA - eng AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Komann, Steffen A1 - Wille, Frank A1 - Schubert, Sven T1 - Neue Regel für das Alterungsmanagement N2 - Die Regelwerksanforderungen für Verpackungen für den Transport radioaktiver Stoffe basieren auf den Empfehlungen der IAEA und werden über die verkehrsträgerspezifischen internationalen Regelwerke in nationales Recht umgesetzt. Um die Anforderungen des Regelwerkes zu erläutern, entwickelt die Bundesanstalt für Materialforschung und -prüfung (BAM) Gefahrgutregeln (BAM-GGR), welche die Entwickler, Hersteller und Betreiber von Behältern über die von der BAM angewandten Verfahren bei der Umsetzung gesetzlicher Bestimmungen informieren und unterstützen sollen. KW - Gefahrgut KW - Radioaktive Stoffe KW - Alterung KW - Transport PY - 2023 VL - 2023 IS - 9 SP - 16 EP - 18 PB - Heinrich Vogel CY - München AN - OPUS4-58577 LA - deu AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER - TY - CONF A1 - Gleim, Tobias A1 - Komann, Steffen A1 - Neumann, Martin A1 - Linnemann, Konrad A1 - Wille, Frank T1 - Fracture Mechanical Analyses of a Welding Seam of a Thick-Walled Transport Package N2 - Transport packages shall satisfy various safety criteria regarding mechanical, thermal and radiation phenomena. Typical requirements focusing mechanical aspects are usually drop tests in accordance with IAEA regulations [1]. The drop tests are usually carried out experimentally and, as an additional measure, finite element analyses (FEA) are performed. A specific part of the investigations presented is the evaluation of the welding seam connecting cask shell and cask bottom. Experimental results and FEA are presented and compared. The evaluation of the welding seam performed includes a variety of aspects. In addition to the experimental and analytical stresses determined, different standards are used to investigate a possible crack initiation. Several destructive and non-destructive tests are performed for quality assurance in the manufacturing process as well as for different input parameters. The necessary monitoring and non-destructive measurement methods to define the boundary conditions of the standards are introduced. Taking into account all required parameters, the welding seam is examined and evaluated using the failure assessment diagrams (FAD) of the respective standards. It can be shown under the given boundary conditions that considering the experimental data, the welding seam is in the context of crack initiation below the enveloping curve in the acceptable region. More critical drop tests to be conducted are proposed and need to be investigated in future work. T2 - Pressure Vessels & Piping Conference® 2022 CY - Las Vegas, NV, USA DA - 17.07.2022 KW - Drop test KW - Fracture initiation KW - Transport package PY - 2022 AN - OPUS4-55374 LA - eng AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER - TY - CONF A1 - Gleim, Tobias A1 - Neumann, Martin A1 - Linnemann, Konrad A1 - Komann, Steffen A1 - Wille, Frank T1 - Fracture Mechanical Analyses of a Welding Seam of a Thick-Walled Transport Package N2 - Transport packages shall satisfy various safety criteria regarding mechanical, thermal and radiation phenomena. Typical requirements focusing mechanical aspects are usually drop tests in accordance with IAEA regulations. The drop tests are usually carried out experimentally and, as an additional measure, finite element analyses (FEA) are performed. A specific part of the investigations presented is the evaluation of the welding seam connecting cask shell and cask bottom. Experimental results and FEA are presented and compared. The evaluation of the welding seam performed includes a variety of aspects. In addition to the experimental and analytical stresses determined, different standards are used to investigate a possible crack initiation. Several destructive and non-destructive tests are performed for quality assurance in the manufacturing process as well as for different input parameters. The necessary monitoring and non-destructive measurement methods to define the boundary conditions of the standards are introduced. Taking into account all required parameters, the welding seam is examined and evaluated using the failure assessment diagrams (FAD) of the respective standards. It can be shown under the given boundary conditions that considering the experimental data, the welding seam is in the context of crack initiation below the enveloping curve in the acceptable region. More critical drop tests to be conducted are proposed and need to be investigated in future work. T2 - Pressure Vessels & Piping Conference® 2022 CY - Las Vegas, NV, USA DA - 17.07.2022 KW - Transport package KW - Drop test KW - Fracture initiation PY - 2022 SP - 1 EP - 9 AN - OPUS4-55375 LA - eng AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER - TY - CONF A1 - Linnemann, Konrad A1 - Komann, Steffen A1 - Wille, Frank A1 - Reiche, I. A1 - Ramsay, J. T1 - New Sco-III regulations to ship large objects as surface contaminated objects N2 - The decommissioning or refurbishment of nuclear facilities necessitates either the storage or disposal of large radioactive components such as steam generators, pressurizers, reactor pressure vessels and heads, and coolant pumps, to list the major contributors. These components or objects are large in size and mass, measuring up to approximately 6 meters in diameter, up to 20 meters in length, and weighing over 400 000 kg. In many situations, the components are transported off-site to a storage, disposal or recycling/treatment facility. Previously, many large objects had to be transported under special arrangement. The latest 2018 edition of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, No. SSR-6 [1], incorporates regulations for the shipment of large objects as a new category of surface contaminated object, SCO-III, based on the IAEA “performance package” concept. This paper provides background and practical guidance on these regulations. Additionally, the experiences of BAM with the appoval of two steam converters of the NPP Lingen are presented as the first approval process for SCO-III objects in Germany. The primary additions to SSR-6 include SCO-III classification and requirements, approval and administrative requirements for the new classification, and the addition of SCO-III to the proper shipping name for UN 2913. Advisory material drafted for the new requirements will be included in the next revision of SSG-26, Advisory Material for the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, expected to be published soon. Note that at this time the proposed provisions for large objects do not include components such as reactor vessels, due to the more limited experience and greater radioactivity levels. The SCO-III concept lays the groundwork and may be extended to cover other large objects that are classified as low specific activity (LSA) material in the future. T2 - Kerntechnik 2022 CY - Leipzig, Germany DA - 21.06.2022 KW - Transport packages KW - Radioactive materials KW - SCO-III KW - Large objects PY - 2022 SP - 1 EP - 7 AN - OPUS4-55423 LA - eng AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER - TY - CONF A1 - Gröke, Carsten A1 - Neumann, Martin A1 - Komann, Steffen A1 - Wille, Frank T1 - Anforderungen an die Bauartprüfung und Maßnahmen zur Qualitätssicherung für nicht zulassungspflichtige Versandstücke N2 - Überblick über die Regelwerksanforderungen an die Bauarten von nicht zulassungspflichtigen Versandstücken, sowie die zu erfüllenden Maßnahmen zur Qualitätssicherung für die Auslegung, die Herstellung und den Betrieb. T2 - KONTEC 2019 CY - Dresden, Germany DA - 27.03.2019 KW - Radioaktiv KW - Beförderung KW - IP-2 KW - IP-3 KW - Typ A KW - Anerkennung KW - Bauartprüfung PY - 2019 SP - 136 EP - 142 AN - OPUS4-56343 LA - deu AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER -