TY - CONF A1 - Rolle, Annette A1 - Wille, Frank A1 - Komann, Steffen A1 - Neumann, Martin T1 - Qualification Procedure for Seal Designs for Spent Fuel Transport and Storage Cask Containments N2 - The seal is a key component of the containment and closure system of transport and storage casks for radioactive material. It is a major contributor to ensuring compliance with the acceptable limits for activity release according to IAEA regulations. The requirements for a safe seal performance are high, accordingly. Every new seal design intended for use in the containment of a transport cask for radioactive material passes a qualification process in Germany. The qualification process is supervised by BAM as German competent authority for mechanical, thermal and containment assessment of packages requiring design approval. The closure system including the seal shall be able to withstand the corrosive, mechanical and thermal loads associated with routine, normal and accident conditions of transport according to the IAEA regulations without losing the required sealing function. Metal seals of the Helicoflex® type are often used to ensure required package leak tightness for both storage and transport, including transport after long term interim storage. The poster will provide an overview of requirements during a seal qualification process on the example of a Helicoflex® type metal seal. T2 - 21st International Symposium on the Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Materials, PATRAM 2025 CY - San Antonio, Texas , US DA - 27.07.2025 KW - Spent fuel transport KW - Seals KW - Radioactive KW - Containment PY - 2025 SP - 1 EP - 5 AN - OPUS4-63911 LA - eng AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER - TY - CONF A1 - Schubert, Sven A1 - Neumann, Martin A1 - Reichardt, Adrian A1 - Komann, Steffen A1 - Wille, Frank T1 - Experiences with the implementation of ageing management for packages for transport of radioactive materials in Germany N2 - The consideration of ageing mechanisms is now obligatory for the design of transport packages with integration of the para 613A into IAEA SSR-6 (Rev. 1). In addition, para 809(f) of SSR-6 (Rev. 1) requires for packages intended to be used for shipment after storage the consideration of the effects of ageing mechanisms during storage in safety analyses and the implementation of corresponding instructions for operation and maintenance. Para 503(e) requires that these packages have been maintained during storage in a manner that all requirements specified in SSR-6 (Rev.1) and in the applicable certificates of approval have been fulfilled. The evaluation of ageing mechanisms and their effects including monitoring are part of BAM’s authority assessment tasks related to the mechanical and thermal package design and quality assurance aspects. BAM has compiled the guideline BAM-GGR 023 for the implementation of ageing assessment and related measures into the approval procedure. The implementation of ageing management measures is obligatory in case of extension/renewal of package design approval certificates. BAM has evaluated package designs which are used only for transport as well as package designs for long term interim storage. The assessment of ageing mechanisms associated with the identification of ageing effects on components is the main part of the ageing management plan (AMP). Different approaches regarding AMP structure are introduced. Experiences and approaches about the evaluation of components for the expected package operating time are shown. We are focusing the evaluations of proofs for not accessible and not replaceable components. Operational experiences for these package designs are available and should be considered in the ageing evaluation. Corresponding measures for package monitoring are to be derived based on these results. The measures for monitoring shall be fixed in the Ageing Surveillance Program (ASP) to maintain a specification conform package for the transport on public routes. We show exemplary how results from ageing evaluation during the approval procedure are transferred into the ASP. T2 - PATRAM 2025 CY - San Antonio, Texas , US DA - 27.07.2025 KW - RAM KW - Ageing management KW - Radioactive material KW - Transport PY - 2025 SP - 1 EP - 8 PB - INMM CY - Washington D.C. AN - OPUS4-63987 LA - eng AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER - TY - CONF A1 - Müller, Lars A1 - Scheidemann, Robert A1 - Neumeyer, Tino A1 - Neumann, Martin A1 - Komann, Steffen A1 - Wille, Frank T1 - Thightness Assessment of welded Lids for Encapsulations of damaged Spent Nuclear Fuel in the Design Approval Process of Dual-Purpose Casks (DPC) N2 - The disposal of spent nuclear fuel in Germany is ensured using dual-purpose casks (DPC) for transport and interim storage. The leak tightness of the DPC and resulting containment is one of the most important aspects. Additional encapsulations are required for damaged spent nuclear fuel (DSNF) to guarantee safe handling and a separate tight closure. Due to the general design of DPCs for standard fuel assemblies should special requirements be considered for the design of the encapsulations for DSNF to ensure the loading in existing package designs. The absence of a replaceable sealing in the tightness barrier is the main difference for the encapsulations for damaged spent nuclear fuel. Instead, they are welded shut with a lid. The leak tightness of the encapsulation shall be proven in the design approval process for all transport conditions. This is especially valid for accident conditions of transport, where high internal impact forces may occur. BAM as German competent authority is responsible for the safety assessment of mechanical and thermal design, retention of radioactive material and quality assurance aspects of manufacturing and operation. BAM carried out a comprehensive safety assessment concerning the mechanical package design. As there are no representative standards for verifying the leak tightness of a welded lid, two approaches were being pursued. Established German standards may be used for verifying the leak tightness of a weld - but limited to low stresses. Therefore, physical tests were required for higher impact loads. Representative drop tests and highly sensitive leakage tests were performed. The paper presents an overview of the containment assessment by BAM and points out the main findings for the design of welds regarding leak tightness. Both verification procedures are described, on one hand with German standards for lower loads and on the other hand with physical tests for higher impact loads. The leak tightness of the encapsulation weld could be approved based on leakage tests and a corresponding evaluation for all transport conditions. T2 - PATRAM 2025 CY - San Antonio, Texas, USA DA - 27.07.2025 KW - Transport packages KW - Tightness assessment KW - Welded lids KW - Encapsulations PY - 2025 VL - 2025 SP - 1 EP - 11 PB - Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) CY - Indianapolis AN - OPUS4-64023 LA - eng AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER - TY - CONF A1 - Komann, Steffen A1 - Müller, Lars A1 - Neumann, Martin A1 - Wille, Frank T1 - Shipment of SCO-II – Authority assessment of mechanical aspects and quality management N2 - The decommissioning of nuclear facilities necessitates either the storage or disposal of large radioactive components such as steam generators, pressurizers, reactor pressure vessels and heads, or coolant pumps. These components or objects are large in size and mass with up to 6 meters in diameter and 20 meters in length and a weight of up to 400 tons. They are often transported to a storage, disposal, or recycling facility. Large components from nuclear facilities may often not be packed and need to be transported unpackaged due to size and weight. T2 - PATRAM 2025 CY - San Antonio, TX, USA DA - 27.07.2025 KW - radioaktive Stoffe, Rückbau kerntechnischer Anlagen, Transport, Gefahrgut PY - 2025 SP - 1 EP - 10 AN - OPUS4-63878 LA - eng AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER - TY - CONF A1 - Müller, Lars A1 - Scheidemann, Robert A1 - Neumeyer, Tino A1 - Komann, Steffen A1 - Wille, Frank T1 - Tightness Verification Procedures of Welded Lids for Encapsulations for Damaged Spent Nuclear Fuel in the Design Approval Process of Dual-Purpose Cask (DPC) N2 - Damaged spent nuclear fuel (DSNF) can be loaded in Germany in dual-purpose casks (DPC) for transport and interim storage. Therefore, special encapsulations are needed to guarantee a safe handling and a reliable tight closure. These encapsulations must be durable and leak-tight for a possible long interim storage term and the transport thereafter. Because components inside the package containment like these special encapsulations are not accessible within periodical inspections of the DPC. Due to the general design of DPCs for standard fuel assemblies, specific requirements needed to be considered for the design of the special encapsulations for DSNF to ensure the loading in existing package designs. Especially the content of the encapsulations with damaged spent nuclear fuel must be avoided to enter in the inner space of the DPC, due to the possible higher amount of corrosive and radioactive material as well as greater quantities of water, which can be trapped in defect fuel rods. The main difference of the encapsulations for damaged spent nuclear fuel is that they have no replaceable sealing as tightness barrier. They have a specific welded lid. Therefor the tightness needs to be shown in the design approval process for all transport conditions especially for accident conditions, where high internal impact loads can occur. As German competent authority, BAM is responsible for the safety assessment of the mechanical and thermal design, the release of radioactive material and the quality assurance aspects of manufacturing and operation. Concerning the mechanical package design BAM carried out a comprehensive safety assessment for the specific encapsulations during the package design approval process of the commonly used DPC. For the proof of tightness of the welded lid no representative standards are available. For minor loads the German KTA standards can verify the tightness of a weld seam but only for low stresses. For higher impact loads physical tests are required. These tests were performed with representative drop tests and highly sensitive leak tests. The present paper gives an overview of the applied assessments by BAM and points out the main findings of the mechanical design for the welded sealing. Both verification procedures are described, on one hand with German standards for lower loads and on the other hand with physical tests for higher impact loads. The drop tests based on complex numerical pre-calculations by the applicant which result in optimized dimensions and properties of the test specimens and representative drop heights for the drop tests. The horizontal drop orientation with a plane-parallel impact on the unyielding basement was most challenging and led to specific adaptations during preparation and conduction of the drop tests performed by BAM. With leak tests and the corresponding test evaluation, it could be finally approved that the specific welded sealing of an encapsulations for DSNF is tight for all transport conditions. T2 - ASME PVP 2024 CY - Bellevue, WA, USA DA - 28.07.2024 KW - Tightness verification KW - Weld seams KW - Drop tests KW - Encapsulations for damaged spent nuclear fuel KW - Helium leak tests PY - 2024 SN - 978-0-7918-8851-3 SP - 1 EP - 10 CY - New York AN - OPUS4-61351 LA - eng AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER - TY - CONF A1 - Komann, Steffen A1 - Wille, Frank A1 - Linnemann, Konrad A1 - Ramsay, Jeff A1 - Reiche, Ingo T1 - Transport of large nuclear power plant components – new SCO-III regulations and mechanical design assessment N2 - The decommissioning or refurbishment of nuclear facilities necessitates either the storage or disposal of large radioactive components such as steam generators, pressurizers, reactor pressure vessels and heads, and coolant pumps, to list the major contributors. These components or objects are large in size and mass, measuring up to approximately 6 meters in diameter, up to 20 meters in length, and weighing over 400 000 kg. In many situations, the components are transported off-site to a storage, disposal or recycling/treatment facility. Previously, many large objects had to be transported under special arrangement. The latest 2018 edition of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, No. SSR-6, incorporates regulations for the shipment of contaminated, but not activated large objects as a new category of surface contaminated object, SCO-III, based on the IAEA “performance package” concept. This paper provides background and practical guidance on these regulations. Additionally, first experiences with SCO-III in the approval process are presented. For SCO-III components a mechanical assessment regarding the tests specified in the transport regulations SSR-6 for demonstrating ability to withstand normal conditions of transport is required - a free drop of the package onto an unyielding target and a penetration test have to be investigated. Large components are unique objects; therefore, it is not possible to choose experimental testing as assessment method. The application of a complex numerical analysis for mechanical proof is necessary. The assessment of the loads takes place based on local stress distributions. The large nuclear components have typically been transported in an unpackaged manner, so that the external shell of the component provides the containment wall. The paper will represent the methods, which are used for the evaluation of the mechanical integrity of the object for transport approval. T2 - PVP2024, Pressure Vessels & Piping Conference CY - Bellevue, Washington USA DA - 29.07.2024 KW - Transport KW - Radioaktive Stoffe KW - Rückbau kerntechnischer Anlagen KW - Gefahrgut PY - 2024 SN - 978-0-7918-8851-3 SP - 1 EP - 4 AN - OPUS4-60829 LA - eng AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER - TY - CONF A1 - Schubert, Sven A1 - Komann, Steffen A1 - Neumann, Martin A1 - Reichardt, Adrian A1 - Müller, Lars A1 - Wille, Frank T1 - Ageing management measures of transport packages for radioactive materials N2 - The consideration of ageing mechanisms is with integration into the IAEA-requirements now obligatory for the design of transport packages. For packages intended to be used for shipment after storage the consideration of the effects of ageing mechanisms during storage in safety analyses and the implementation of corresponding instructions for operation and maintenance are required. Therefore, these packages have been maintained during storage in a manner that all requirements specified in the IAEA-requirements and in the applicable certificates of approval have been fulfilled. BAM is the competent authority in Germany for evaluating the thermal and mechanical design of packages for the transport of radioactive materials. In this context, BAM also evaluates the aging mechanisms and aging effects occurring during the long-term storage period of such transport packages. BAM has developed a guideline for the implementation of ageing assessment and of the measures for ageing management into the approval procedure based on IAEA-requirements. The goal of the presented paper is to introduce this guideline and the general approach for ageing management requirements and to describe the application to a specific package design. The type and amount of the ageing management not only depend on the use of the packaging, but also on the accessibility of the components that are considered in the ageing assessment. The different operating phases of a packaging are considered for the ageing assessment, such as loading, interim storage or transport. The implementation of measures for ageing management is divided into three levels – systemic measures, package design related measures and documentation. The systemic measures are attributed to the general management system and define the whole activities for organization of ageing management like structure, responsibilities, documentation, reports and evaluation. The package design related measures are defined in an ageing management plan. These measures shall ensure that the anticipated changes of the package design under consideration of ageing effects still complies with the design approval specification. Therefore, an ageing surveillance program and, if necessary, a gap analysis program shall be developed. The ageing management documentation ensures the continuous documentation of the compliance of a specific package to the approved package design, comprising mainly records resulting from operation and surveillance. T2 - RAMTRANS 2024 CY - London, United Kingdom DA - 15.05.2024 KW - Radioactive Materials KW - Ageing Management KW - Transport Packages KW - Dual Purpose Casks PY - 2024 VL - 2024 SP - 1 EP - 8 PB - Nuclear Institute CY - London AN - OPUS4-60186 LA - eng AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER - TY - CONF A1 - Komann, Steffen A1 - Linnemann, Konrad A1 - Wille, Frank A1 - Reiche, Ingo A1 - Ramsay, J. T1 - New SCO-iii regulations to ship large comonents as surface contaminated objects N2 - The decommissioning or refurbishment of nuclear facilities necessitates either the storage or disposal of large radioactive components such as steam generators, pressurizers, reactor pressure vessels and heads, and coolant pumps, to list the major contributors. These components or objects are large in size and mass, measuring up to approximately 6 meters in diameter, up to 20 meters in length, and weighing over 400 000 kg. In many situations, the components are transported off-site to a storage, disposal or recycling/treatment facility. Previously, many large objects had to be transported under special arrangement. T2 - PATRAM22 CY - Juan les Pins, France DA - 11.06.2023 KW - Gefahrgut KW - Radioaktive Stoffe KW - Rückbau kerntechnischer Anlagen KW - Transport PY - 2023 SP - 1 EP - 8 AN - OPUS4-57750 LA - eng AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER - TY - CONF A1 - Rolle, Annette A1 - Komann, Steffen A1 - Wille, Frank T1 - Ageing aspect in design approval of special form radioactive material N2 - In accordance with the IAEA transport regulations, the design of special form radioactive material (SFRM) shall resist a severe transport accident without undue loss or dispersal of radioactive material. The safety assessment for design approval includes besides the program for physical tests (impact, percussion, bending and heat test) also the evaluation of the management system for design, manufacture, testing, documentation, use, maintenance, and inspection. SFRM source design plus management system shall ensure, that every specimen of the approved design is able to survive the severe mechanical and thermal tests at any time of its SFRM-working life. Due to the long-term use of SFRM designs in most cases, the assessment of the source ageing behavior is an important aspect in the approval procedure. Different fields of application imply a wide range of environmental conditions, from clean room atmosphere to highly aggressive industrial conditions. Besides of radioactive content, corrosion is a main factor for possible SFRM design degradation. Although the IAEA Advisory Material SSG-26 already implies an indication of the need for considering ageing mechanisms, suitable amendments in the regulatory requirements of SSR-6 should be introduced to make the approval procedure more transparent and help to reduce rounds of questions by the authority. A supplementary requirement for considering of ageing mechanisms could be a helpful contribution to an international harmonization of the approval procedure. This paper will describe major influencing factors to be considered to assess the ageing behavior of a SFRM design and will identify the need for a regulatory specification of a SFRM-working life as basis for the assessment of the SFRM design regarding time-dependent weakening. A proposal for an explicit requirement for consideration of ageing mechanisms in safety assessment of SFRM, which should be considered in the ongoing SSR-6 revision cycle, will be explained. T2 - PATRAM22 Conference CY - Juan-Les-Pins, France DA - 11.06.2023 KW - Radioaktive Stoffe KW - Beförderung KW - Zulassung KW - Strahlenschutz PY - 2023 AN - OPUS4-57781 LA - eng AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER - TY - CONF A1 - Rolle, Annette A1 - Komann, Steffen A1 - Wille, Frank T1 - Ageing aspect in design approval of special form radioactive material N2 - In accordance with the IAEA transport regulations, the design of special form radioactive material (SFRM) shall resist a severe transport accident without undue loss or dispersal of radioactive material. The safety assessment for design approval includes besides the program for physical tests (impact, percussion, bending and heat test) also the evaluation of the management system for design, manufacture, testing, documentation, use, maintenance, and inspection. SFRM source design plus management system shall ensure, that every specimen of the approved design is able to survive the severe mechanical and thermal tests at any time of its SFRM-working life. Due to the long-term use of SFRM designs in most cases, the assessment of the source ageing behavior is an important aspect in the approval procedure. Different fields of application imply a wide range of environmental conditions, from clean room atmosphere to highly aggressive industrial conditions. Besides of radioactive content, corrosion is a main factor for possible SFRM design degradation. Although the IAEA Advisory Material SSG-26 already implies an indication of the need for considering ageing mechanisms, suitable amendments in the regulatory requirements of SSR-6 should be introduced to make the approval procedure more transparent and help to reduce rounds of questions by the authority. A supplementary requirement for considering of ageing mechanisms could be a helpful contribution to an international harmonization of the approval procedure. This paper will describe major influencing factors to be considered to assess the ageing behavior of a SFRM design and will identify the need for a regulatory specification of a SFRM-working life as basis for the assessment of the SFRM design regarding time-dependent weakening. A proposal for an explicit requirement for consideration of ageing mechanisms in safety assessment of SFRM, which should be considered in the ongoing SSR-6 revision cycle, will be explained. T2 - PATRAM22 Conference CY - Juan-Les-Pins, Antibes, France DA - 11.06.2023 KW - Ttransport KW - Radioactive material KW - Sealed sources KW - Ageing PY - 2023 SP - 1 EP - 6 AN - OPUS4-57786 LA - eng AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER -