TY - JOUR A1 - Pavlovic, Mato A1 - Müller, Christina A1 - Ewert, Uwe A1 - Ronneteg, U. A1 - Pitkänen, J. A1 - Boller, C. T1 - Safe product design - the role of the NDT reliability analysis N2 - Im Zuge der Anwendung des Schadens-Toleranz-Prinzips wird ein adäquates zerstörungsfreies Prüfsystem benötigt um strukturelle Integrität sicher zu stellen. Wenn ein zerstörungsfreies Prüfsystem jedoch bis zu den Grenzen der Detektionsfähigkeit beansprucht wird, liefert es keine übereinstimmende Indikationen der Defektentdeckung (Hit/Miss). Deshalb wird dessen Fähigkeit Defekte zu entdecken als Entdeckungswahrscheinlichkeit (POD Probability of Detection) ausgedrückt. In der herkömmlichen 'Signal Response' Signal-Antwort-Zuverlässigkeitsanalyse wird die Entdeckungswahrscheinlichkeit als eine Funktion der Defektgröße angegeben. Die Eignung des Prüfsystems wird durch den Vergleich der Größe des Defektes, der zuverlässig entdeckt wird, mit der des größten zulässigen Defektes, der die strukturelle Integrität nicht gefährdet, verifiziert. Analysen moderner Strukturen zeigen aber, dass auch andere Parameter den Schweregrad des Defektes bzgl. der Integrität der Struktur bestimmen können. Im Rahmen der Multi-Parameter-Zuverlässigkeitsanalyse kann die Entdeckungswahrscheinlichkeit als eine Funktion verschiedener Einflussparameter ausgedrückt werden. Wenn die Eignung des zerstörungsfreien Prüfsystems bestimmt wird, muss die Fähigkeit des Systems Defekte zu entdecken gegenüber dem kritischen Wert genau des Parameters ausgedrückt und geprüft werden, der den Schweregrad des Defektes für die Integrität der Struktur bestimmt. Die Nichterfüllung dieser Forderung kann zur Ablehnung von intakten Teilen oder der Akzeptanz von schlechten Teilen führen. Das Prinzip wird anhand von longitudinalen Ultraschall-Sende-Empfangs-Prüfdaten der Gußeisenmatrix mit oberflächenoffenen, semi-elliptischen, rißartigen Defekten demonstriert. KW - POD KW - TRL-UT PY - 2013 DO - https://doi.org/10.3139/120.110434 SN - 0025-5300 VL - 55 IS - 4 SP - 270 EP - 275 PB - Hanser CY - München AN - OPUS4-28829 LA - eng AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER - TY - CONF A1 - Bertovic, Marija A1 - Fahlbruch, B. A1 - Müller, Christina A1 - Pitkänen, J. A1 - Ronneteg, U. A1 - Gaal, Mate A1 - Kanzler, Daniel A1 - Ewert, Uwe A1 - Schombach, D. T1 - Human factors approach to the acquisition and evaluation of NDT data N2 - This paper gives an introduction to the field of human factors with the focus on their influence on the reliability of NDT in the nuclear energy production (in-service inspections) and final storage of highly radioactive nuclear waste. A set of methodological tools has been developed in the scope of three projects, namely: 1) a theoretical model describing potential human factors influencing manual ultrasonic inspection performance during inservice inspections in nuclear power plants; 2) a method for identifying potential human errors during acquisition and evaluation of data gathered with mechanized ultrasonic, radiographic and eddy-current systems, as well as visual testing with a remote camera (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, FMEA); and 3) use of eye tracking methodology to optimize existing procedures and practices. The experimental results have shown that time pressure, mental workload and experience influence the quality of the inspection performance. Noticeable were influences from the organization of the working schedule, communication, procedures, supervision and demonstration task. Implementing human redundancy in critical tasks, such as defect identification, as well as using an automated aid (software) to help operators in decision making about the existence and size of defects, could lead to other kinds of problems, namely social loafing (excerpting less effort when working on tasks collectively as compared to working alone) and automation bias (uncritical reliance on the proper function of an automated system without recognizing its limitations and the possibilities of automation failure) that might affect the reliability of NDT in an undesired manner. T2 - 18th WCNDT - World conference on nondestructive testing CY - Durban, South Africa DA - 16.04.2012 KW - Human Factors KW - Time Pressure KW - 4-Eye Principle KW - Automation Bias KW - Nuclear Waste Storage KW - In-Service Inspection (ISI) KW - Nuclear Power Plants KW - Eye Tracking KW - Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) PY - 2012 SN - 978-0-620-52872-6 SP - 1 EP - 10 (Paper 198) AN - OPUS4-27583 LA - eng AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER - TY - GEN A1 - Müller, Christina A1 - Elagin, Mstislav A1 - Bellon, Carsten A1 - Ewert, Uwe A1 - Zscherpel, Uwe A1 - Rosenthal, Martina A1 - Redmer, Bernhard A1 - Ryden, H. A1 - Ronneteg, U. ED - Proske, D. T1 - Probability-of-Detection-Evaluation of NDT Techniques for Cu-Canisters for Risk Assessment of Nuclear Waste Encapsulation T2 - 4th International Probabilistic Symposium CY - Berlin, Germany DA - 2006-10-12 KW - Zerstörungsfreie Prüfung KW - Zuverlässigkeit KW - POD KW - Endlagerung radioaktiver Abfälle PY - 2006 SN - 3-00-019232-8 N1 - Geburtsname von Rosenthal, Martina: Scharmach, M. - Birth name of Rosenthal, Martina: Scharmach, M. SP - 227 EP - 252 PB - Bundesanstalt für Materialforschung und -prüfung CY - Berlin AN - OPUS4-14418 LA - eng AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER - TY - CONF A1 - Müller, Christina A1 - Elagin, Mstislav A1 - Bellon, Carsten A1 - Ewert, Uwe A1 - Zscherpel, Uwe A1 - Rosenthal, Martina A1 - Redmer, Bernhard A1 - Ryden, H. A1 - Ronneteg, U. T1 - POD (Probability of Detection) Evaluation of NDT Techniques for Cu-Canisters for Risk Assessment of Nuclear Waste Encapsulation T2 - 9th European Conference on NDT CY - Berlin, Germany DA - 2006-09-25 KW - Zerstörungsfreie Prüfung KW - Zuverlässigkeit KW - POD KW - Endlagerung radioaktiver Abfälle PY - 2006 SN - 3-931381-86-2 N1 - Geburtsname von Rosenthal, Martina: Scharmach, M. - Birth name of Rosenthal, Martina: Scharmach, M. SP - 1(?) EP - 22(?) PB - European Federation for Non-Destructive Testing CY - Berlin AN - OPUS4-14419 LA - eng AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Müller, Christina A1 - Elagin, Mstislav A1 - Bellon, Carsten A1 - Ewert, Uwe A1 - Zscherpel, Uwe A1 - Rosenthal, Martina A1 - Redmer, Bernhard A1 - Ryden, H. A1 - Ronneteg, U. T1 - Reliability evaluation of NDT techniques for Cu-welds for risk assessment of nuclear waste encapsulation KW - Zerstörungsfreie Prüfung KW - Zuverlässigkeit KW - POD KW - Endlagerung radioaktiver Abfälle PY - 2006 SN - 0025-5300 N1 - Geburtsname von Rosenthal, Martina: Scharmach, M. - Birth name of Rosenthal, Martina: Scharmach, M. VL - 48 IS - 3 SP - 111 EP - 117 PB - Carl Hanser Verlag CY - München AN - OPUS4-14421 LA - eng AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER - TY - CONF A1 - Müller, Christina A1 - Elagin, Mstislav A1 - Bellon, Carsten A1 - Ewert, Uwe A1 - Zscherpel, Uwe A1 - Scharmach, M. A1 - Redmer, Bernhard A1 - Ryden, H. A1 - Ronneteg, U. ED - Bièth, M. ED - Whittle, J. T1 - POD (Probability of Detection) Evaluation of NDT Techniques for Cu-Canisters for Risk Assessment of Nuclear Waste Encapsulation T2 - 5th International Conference on NDE in Relation to Structural Integrity for Nuclear and Pressurised Components CY - San Diego, CA, USA DA - 2006-05-10 KW - Zerstörungsfreie Prüfung KW - Zuverlässigkeit KW - POD PY - 2007 SN - 978-92-79-06107-3 SN - 1018-5593 N1 - Serientitel: JRC Scientific and Technical Reports – Series title: JRC Scientific and Technical Reports IS - Paper 1005 SP - 274 EP - 295 PB - Office for Official Publications of the European Communities CY - Luxembourg AN - OPUS4-15887 LA - eng AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER - TY - CONF A1 - Pavlovic, Mato A1 - Ronneteg, U. A1 - Müller, Christina A1 - Ewert, Uwe A1 - Boller, C. T1 - Safe product design - the role of the NDE reliability analysis N2 - When pushed to the limits of their detection capability, NDE systems do not produce consistent hit/miss indications. Their capability of detecting small defects is therefore expressed in terms of POD. An adequate NDE system is required to ensure the structural integrity. In conventional signal response analysis, the POD is expressed as a function of the defect size, and its adequacy for the inspection task is tested against the maximum allowable defect size which will not undermine the structural integrity. Analyses of modern structures show that other parameters, beside the defect size, can both significantly influence the POD and determine the severity of the defect for the structure. Within the multi-parameter reliability analysis, the POD is expressed as a function of those influencing parameters. When determining the adequacy of the NDE system, the capability of detecting a defect has to be expressed and tested against the critical value of exactly that parameter that determines defects severity for the structure. Failing to do so can lead to a rejection of the healthy, or acceptance of the bad part. The principle is demonstrated on the example of the Transmit-Receive Longitudinal (TRL) ultrasonic inspection of the iron cast component for semi-elliptical surface defects. T2 - 18th WCNDT - World conference on nondestructive testing CY - Durban, South Africa DA - 16.04.2012 KW - Reliability KW - Probability of detection (POD) KW - Multi-parameter KW - Ultrasonics KW - Transmit receive longitudinal (TRL) PY - 2012 SN - 978-0-620-52872-6 SP - 1 EP - 9 (Paper 310) AN - OPUS4-27581 LA - eng AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER - TY - CONF A1 - Müller, Christina A1 - Bertovic, Marija A1 - Pavlovic, Mato A1 - Kanzler, Daniel A1 - Ewert, Uwe A1 - Pitkänen, J. A1 - Ronneteg, U. T1 - Holistically evaluating the reliability of NDE systems - paradigm shift N2 - New methodologies for evaluating the reliability of NDE systems are discussed in accordance with the specific requirements of industrial application. After a review of the substantive issues from the previous decades, the go forward guidance is concluded. For high safety demands a quantitative probability of detection (POD) created from hit miss experiments or signal response analysis and ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristics) are typically created. The modular model distinguishes between the influence of pure physics and technique, industrial application factors and the human factor and helps to learn what factors are covered by modelling, open or blind trials. A new paradigm is offered to consider the POD or reliability of the system as a function of the configuration of input variables and use it for optimisation rather than for a final judgement. New approaches are considered dealing with real defects in a realistic environment, affordable but precisely like the Bayesian approach or model assisted methods. Among the influencing parameters, the human factor is of high importance. A systematic psychological approach helps to find out where the bottlenecks are and shows possibilities for improvement. T2 - 18th WCNDT - World conference on nondestructive testing CY - Durban, South Africa DA - 16.04.2012 KW - Reliability of NDE KW - POD KW - ROC KW - Modular Model KW - Multiparameter-POD KW - Bayesian Approach KW - Human Factor PY - 2012 SN - 978-0-620-52872-6 SP - 1 EP - 14 (Paper 591) AN - OPUS4-27579 LA - eng AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER - TY - CONF A1 - Müller, Christina A1 - Bertovic, Marija A1 - Holstein, R. A1 - Kanzler, Daniel A1 - Pitkänen, J. A1 - Ronneteg, U. A1 - Heckel, Thomas T1 - A plenary view on the vigour of our NDE reliability models N2 - Using the Modular Reliability Model the three different main influencing elements, i.e. intrinsic capability (IC), application parameters (AP) and the human factors (HF), are, in the first instance, investigated separately. The intrinsic capability stands for the pure physical-technological process of the signal detection caused by the waves or the rays from a material defect in the presence of noise (driven by the material and the devices). This intrinsic capability is the upper bound of the possible reliability. Already when measuring this intrinsic capability for thick walled components the original one-parameter POD must be extended to a multiparameter POD, where, in addition to the defect size, a number of additional physical parameters, such as the grain size distribution (or attenuation), defect depth, and angle or surface roughness, must be considered. For real life cycle assessments it is necessary to evaluate the signal response from real defects. The industrial application factors, e.g. coupling conditions, limited accessibility, heat and environmental vibrations, diminish the reliability. The amount of reduction can be determined quantitatively, if the underlying conditions are controlled. In case they are not controlled it is necessary to count for a fluctuation in the reliability in the field anyway. The third group of important influencing factors are the human factors, which do not only cover the individual performance capability of the inspectors but also the design of the working place,the procedure, the teamwork quality, interaction with systems, the organization, and finally, the relationship between the companies involved in the inspection process and to which extend the responsible parties are aware of it. When comparing an “ideal inspection” with a “real inspection” it is worth while to look how the existing practices, rules and standards support reliable testing and where the “delta” is. In the context of vigor, with respect to the industrial end user, it needs to be shown how the level of reliability of NDE, influenced by the different factors, has an impact on acceptance or rejection of safety critical parts. T2 - 5th European-American workshop on reliability of NDE CY - Berlin, Germany DA - 07.10.2013 PY - 2013 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b43-312658 SN - 978-3-940283-53-5 IS - DGZfP-BB 144 SP - Lecture 2, 1 EP - 18 PB - Deutsche Gesellschaft für Zerstörungsfreie Prüfung (DGZfP) CY - Berlin AN - OPUS4-31265 LA - eng AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER - TY - CONF A1 - Pavlovic, Mato A1 - Müller, Christina A1 - Ronneteg, U. T1 - Reliability Analysis of the Phased-Array Ultrasonic System used for the Inspection of Friction Stir Welds N2 - The canister for the permanent storage of spent nuclear fuel used by SKB in Sweden consists of a cast iron insert surrounded by a five centimetre thick shell of copper. It is a safety critical component and in order to secure long-term structural integrity non-destructive methods are used to inspect 100% of the volume of each canister, before it is disposed of in the repository. One of the critical components that requires inspection is a sealing weld, joining the copper tube and the lid. The friction stir weld is inspected using an ultrasonic phased array system. The area of the weld is inspected with several inspection channels with different angles and varying coverage. To make sure that no defects that might occur in the weld are overseen, the reliability of the inspection must be quantified. The reliability of NDT is usually quantified with the probability of detection curves. The influence of the parameters that might influence the POD of the flaws in the weld is investigated analysing the experimental results, as well as with a help of a numerical simulation of the inspection. T2 - 19th Wolrd Conference on Nondestructive Testing CY - Munich, Germany DA - 13.06.2016 KW - NDT KW - Ultrasonic KW - Reliability KW - POD KW - Copper KW - FSW KW - JLH PY - 2016 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b43-366982 VL - 2016/158 SP - We.4.E.5 PB - Deutsche Gesellschaft für zerstörungsfreie Prüfung (DGZfP) CY - Berlin AN - OPUS4-36698 LA - eng AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER - TY - CONF A1 - Bertovic, Marija A1 - Müller, Christina A1 - Kanzler, Daniel A1 - Fahlbruch, B. A1 - Pitkänen, J. A1 - Ronneteg, U. T1 - 'Human factors' bei der Datenauswertung der zerstörungsfreien Prüfung am Beispiel der nuklearen Endlagerung N2 - Für eine ganzheitliche Betrachtung der Sicherheit bei der zerstörungsfreien Prüfung (ZfP) ist es unvermeidlich neben der Technik auch den Prüfer und die Prüforganisation einzubeziehen. Die Prüfung der Unversehrtheit von Endlagerbehältern ist eine eine sicherheitstechnisch wichtige Anwendung. Die Betreiber der geplanten finnischen und schwedischen Endlager, Posiva und SKB, kapseln den radioaktiven Abfall in Kupferkanistern ein und deponieren die Kanister dann in Felsgestein in einer Tiefe von ca. 500m. Die Kanister bestehen aus einem zylinderförmigen Kupfermantel mit einem Deckel und einem Boden, die zusammen die Außenumhüllung ergeben sowie einer Gusseisenmatrix für die Brennstäbe. Alle Komponenten werden auf ihre Dichtheit bzw. strukturelle Unversehrtheit mittels zerstörungsfreier Prüfmethoden geprüft, um sicher zu stellen, dass im Material und in den Schweißnähten keine kritischen Defekte vorhanden sind, die zu Freisetzungen in die Umgebung führen könnten. Vier ZfP Methoden (Ultraschall-, Wirbelstrom- und radiographische Prüfung, und die visuelle Prüfung anhand einer Kamera) werden mechanisiert durchgeführt, die gewonnenen Daten werden von qualifizierten Fachleuten ausgewertet und bieten so die Möglichkeit, dass Fehler entstehen. Das 'Human Factor'- Untersuchungskonzept besteht aus der Identifizierung potenzieller menschlicher Fehler, deren Ursachen und Präventionsmethoden. Mit Hilfe einer abgewandelten FMEA (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis) wurden mögliche Risiken identifiziert, die die Wahrscheinlichkeit für das Auftreten menschlicher Fehler bei der Datenauswertung erhöhen. Einige dieser Risiken sind beispielsweise Verantwortungsdiffusion beim 4-Augen-Prinzip, Übervertrauen in die Technik bei der automatischen Identifikation von Defekten sowie der Aufmerksamkeitsverlust bei dynamischer Bildbetrachtung. Deren Wirkung wird derzeit experimentell überprüft, um Ansatzpunkte für Optimierungen zu ermitteln und damit die Gesamtzuverlässigkeit des Systems zu verbessern. T2 - DGZfP-Jahrestagung 2011 CY - Bremen, Germany DA - 30.05.2011 KW - Human factors KW - UT KW - ET KW - ZfP KW - Nukleare Endlagerung PY - 2011 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b43-251584 UR - http://jt2011.dgzfp.de/Portals/jt2011/BB/p42-ku~1.pdf SN - 978-3-940283-33-7 IS - DGZfP-BB 127 (P 42) SP - 1 EP - 2 PB - Deutsche Gesellschaft für Zerstörungsfreie Prüfung (DGZfP) AN - OPUS4-25158 LA - deu AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER - TY - CONF A1 - Ronneteg, U. A1 - Grybäck, T. A1 - Bertovic, Marija A1 - Müller, Christina A1 - Pavlovic, Mato T1 - Safe for 1 million years – NDT matters! N2 - The General Guidance in the Swedish regulations state that the safety assessment for a final repository for spent nuclear fuel should be 1 million years after closure. SKB developed the KBS-3 method, according to which the spent nuclear fuel is protected by three barriers. It is encapsulated in canisters with a diameter of 1 metre and a length of 5 metres. The canister consists of a cast iron insert surrounded by a 5 centimetre thick shell of copper. The canisters are disposed in the bedrock at a depth of about 500 meters surrounded by bentonite clay. In order to assess the safety over this extremely long period, an extensive quality control programme is applied to the canisters before deposit. In this programme, the use of non-destructive testing (NDT) is vital. The safety assessment of the canister in turn places high demands on the coverage, detectability, and reliability of the applied NDT inspections of the canister parts, i.e. cast iron insert, copper base, tube and lid, and the copper friction stir welds (FSW). This paper presents the extensive full-scale inspection development programme that runs at the Canister Laboratory in Oskarshamn (Sweden). In order to fulfil the high demands, phased array ultrasonic inspection techniques are developed using practical trials aided by ultrasonic modelling. The techniques apply, for example, different frequencies, inspection angles, focus depths, and both longitudinal and shear waves. Increased inspection reliability of the FSW is achieved by applying digital X-ray technique using a 9 MeV linear accelerator and a line detector. To complete the coverage, complementary surface inspections methods, i.e. eddy current array, magnetic flux sensor techniques and magnetic particle inspection, are applied. The canister safety assessment was the driving force to include reliability studies during the NDT development. Initially, the technical reliability was considered, resulting in development of advanced POD models (probability of detection). In combination with human factors studies, these models were implemented as tools in the development of the NDT techniques. Human factors studies were also applied to improve the inspection procedures to be more user-friendly enabling reliable inspections. T2 - 19th World Conference on Non-Destructive Testing CY - München, Germany DA - 13.06.2016 KW - NDT KW - Reliability KW - Spent nuclear fuel PY - 2016 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b43-375785 UR - http://www.ndt.net/article/wcndt2016/papers/we4e4.pdf SP - id 19464, 1 EP - 9 AN - OPUS4-37578 LA - eng AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER -