TY - CONF A1 - Linnemann, Konrad A1 - Ballheimer, Viktor A1 - Müller, Lars A1 - Rolle, Annette A1 - Wille, Frank A1 - Droste, Bernhard T1 - Aspects of spent fuel behavior assessment for transport packages N2 - Transport packages for spent nuclear fuel have to be assessed with respect to specific transport conditions which are defined in the safety regulations of the International Atomic Energy Agency. In general, gastight fuel rods constitute the first barrier of the containment system. The physical state of the spent fuel and the fuel rod cladding as well as the geometric configuration of the fuel assemblies are important inputs for the evaluation of the package safety under transport conditions. The objective of this paper is to discuss the methodologies accepted by BAM for the authority assessment of spent fuel behavior within the package design approval procedure of German package designs. In particular, cracks or failures in the fuel rod cladding can occur under regulatory transport conditions. These defects can cause the release of gas, volatiles, fuel particles or fragments into the package cavity and have to be considered properly in the safety analysis. Another issue is the transport of defective fuel rods. One concept is to use special canisters which can be handled like fuel assemblies. This concept requires additional assessment concerning drying, sealing and the mechanical and thermal design of such canisters. The package as a mechanical system is characterized by a complex set of interactions, e.g. between the fuel rods within the assembly as well as between the fuel assemblies, the basket, and the cask containment. This complexity together with the limited knowledge about the material properties and the variation of the fuel assemblies regarding cladding material, burn-up and the operation history makes an exact mechanical analysis of the fuel rods nearly impossible. The simplified approaches to consider conservatively spent fuel behavior currently accepted by BAM are presented here. T2 - International Conference on Management of Spent Fuel from Nuclear Power Reactors - An Integrated Approach to the Back-End of the Fuel Cycle CY - Wien, Austria DA - 15.06.2015 KW - Transport packages KW - Spent fuel assessment PY - 2015 SP - 1 AN - OPUS4-38102 LA - eng AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER - TY - CONF A1 - Droste, Bernhard A1 - Komann, Steffen A1 - Wille, Frank A1 - Rolle, Annette A1 - Probst, Ulrich A1 - Schubert, Sven T1 - Considerations of aging mechanisms influence on transport safety and reliability of dual purpose casks for spent nuclear fuel or HLW N2 - When storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) or high-level waste (HLW) is done in dual purpose casks (DPC), the effects of aging on safety relevant DPC functions and properties have to be managed in a way that a safe transport after the storage period of several decades is capable, and can be justified and certified permanently throughout that period. The effects of aging mechanisms (like e.g. radiation, different corrosion mechanisms, stress relaxation, creep, structural changes and degradation) on the transport package design safety assessment features have to be evaluated. The consideration of these issues in the DPC transport safety case will be addressed. Special attention is given to all cask components which cannot be directly inspected or changed without opening the cask cavity, what are the inner parts of the closure system and the cask internals, like baskets or spent fuel assemblies. The design criteria of that transport safety case have to consider the operational impacts during storage. Aging is not subject of technical aspects only, but also of 'intellectual' aspects, like changing standards, scientific/ technical knowledge development and personal as well as institutional alterations. Those aspects are to be considered in the management system of the license holders and in appropriate design approval update processes. The paper addresses issues which are subject of an actual IAEA TECDOC draft 'Preparation of a safety case for a dual purpose cask containing spent nuclear fuel'. T2 - PSAM 12 - Probabilistic safety assessment and management CY - Honolulu, Hawaii, USA DA - 22.06.2014 KW - Transport and storage casks for spent nuclear fuel or high level waste KW - Aging mechanisms KW - Corrosion KW - Safety assessment KW - Metal seals KW - Closure system KW - Spent fuel/high-level waste KW - Dual purpose casks KW - Metal seals reliability KW - Cesium corrosion PY - 2014 UR - http://psam12.org/proceedings/paper/paper_180_1.pdf SP - 1 EP - 10 AN - OPUS4-32518 LA - eng AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER - TY - CONF A1 - Rolle, Annette A1 - Droste, Bernhard A1 - Schubert, Sven A1 - Probst, Ulrich A1 - Wille, Frank T1 - Verification of activity release compliance with regulatory limits within spent fuel transport casks T2 - PATRAM 2010 - 16th International symposium on the packaging and transport of radioactive materials CY - London, UK DA - 2010-10-03 KW - Radioactive material KW - Safety assessment KW - Leakage mechanism KW - Leakage rate KW - Sealing behavior PY - 2010 SP - 1 EP - 8(?) AN - OPUS4-32193 LA - eng AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER - TY - CONF A1 - Rolle, Annette A1 - Neumeyer, Tino A1 - Droste, Bernhard T1 - Design Approval of Special Form Radioactive Material- Important Aspects N2 - The design of a special form radioactive material has to resist a severe transport accident without undue loss or dispersal of radioactive material. Safety assessment by authorities competent for design approval has to include besides the required test program (impact, percussion, bending and heat test) also the evaluation of the quality management system for design, manufacture, testing, documentation, use, maintenance and inspection. These quality assurance measures have to assure that every specimen of the approved design is produced in the same verified quality and every specimen must be able to survive the severe mechanical and thermal tests without undue loss or dispersal of radioactive material at any time of its working life. All important aspects in the design approval procedure by BAM as the competent authority for approvals of special form radioactive material in Germany are summarized in a guideline published in 2014. This paper will give additional explanations to some aspects in safety assessment, e.g.: the applicability of leak test methods and the need to consider ageing aspects. T2 - PATRAM 2016 CY - Kobe, Japan DA - 18.09.2016 KW - Transport KW - Radioactive material KW - Safety PY - 2016 SP - Paper 4004-22 AN - OPUS4-39912 LA - eng AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Droste, Bernhard A1 - Komann, Steffen A1 - Wille, Frank A1 - Rolle, Annette A1 - Probst, Ulrich A1 - Schubert, Sven T1 - Consideration of aging mechanism influence on transport safety of dual purpose casks for spent nuclear fuel of HLW N2 - When storage of spent nuclear fuel or high level waste is carried out in dual purpose casks (DPC), the effects of aging on safety relevant DPC functions and properties have to be managed in a way that a safe transport after the storage period of several decades is capable and can be justified and certified permanently throughout that period. The effects of aging mechanisms (e.g. radiation, different corrosion mechanisms, stress relaxation, creep, structural changes and degradation) on the transport package design safety assessment features have to be evaluated. Consideration of these issues in the DPC transport safety case will be addressed. Special attention is given to all cask components that cannot be directly inspected or changed without opening the cask cavity, like the inner parts of the closure system and the cask internals, like baskets or spent fuel assemblies. The design criteria of that transport safety case have to consider the operational impacts during storage. Aging is not the subject of technical aspects only but also of ‘intellectual’ aspects, like changing standards, scientific/technical knowledge development and personal as well as institutional alterations. Those aspects are to be considered in the management system of license holders and in appropriate design approval update processes. The paper addresses issues that are subject of an actual International Atomic Energy Agency TECDOC draft 'Preparation of a safety case for a dual purpose cask containing spent nuclear fuel'. KW - Transport KW - Storage KW - Spent fuel KW - High-level waste KW - Aging KW - Metal seals KW - Transport and storage casks KW - Spent nuclear fuel KW - Aging mechanisms KW - Corrosion KW - Safety assessment PY - 2014 DO - https://doi.org/10.1179/1746510914Y.0000000070 SN - 1746-5095 SN - 1746-5109 SN - 0957-476X VL - 25 IS - 3-4 SP - 105 EP - 112 PB - Ramtrans Publ. CY - Ashford AN - OPUS4-33428 LA - eng AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Rolle, Annette A1 - Droste, Bernhard T1 - Safety during whole life time: important aspect in safety assessment of sealed radioactive sources N2 - Many sealed sources with long halflife isotopes commonly used in industry or medicine have a long working life, up to several decades. Source integrity must be guaranteed in transport and use at any time. On the one hand, safety during the working life has to be ensured by the source design. Its strain has to be tested. On the other hand, source durability depends on the specific operating conditions. BAM as the competent authority in Germany has to assess the suitability of a source design for safe transport and use also for a longer service life for: (a) sources approved as special form radioactive material according to the regulations for the safe transport of radioactive material, (b) sources in approved devices for licence free use according to the Radiation Protection Ordinance, Para 25, and (c) sources with an extended leak test period according to Radiation Protection Ordinance, Para 66. In all these domains BAM has to assess if design and additional arrangements are qualified and guaranteed to prevent a release of radioactive content under the mechanical, chemical and physical operating conditions of the specified working life of a sealed radioactive source. As a result, limits for the duration of validity of the special form status of a source or a type approval of a device are specified and, in many cases, special additional responsibilities for users, such as periodical control and test measurements, have to be specified in approval certificates as binding conditions to satisfy the required safety standards in regulations. This paper presents BAM's experiences and shows which aspects should be considered in assessment of a lifetime limit of sealed sources. KW - Radioactive KW - Sealed sources KW - Aging PY - 2008 DO - https://doi.org/10.1179/174651008X344458 SN - 1746-5095 SN - 1746-5109 SN - 0957-476X VL - 19 IS - 3 SP - 151 EP - 154 PB - Ramtrans Publ. CY - Ashford AN - OPUS4-18741 LA - eng AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER - TY - CONF A1 - Rolle, Annette A1 - Droste, Bernhard T1 - Safety during whole life time - An important aspect in safety assessment of sealed radioactive sources T2 - PATRAM 2007, 15th International Symposium on the Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Materials CY - Miami, Florida, USA DA - 2007-10-21 PY - 2007 IS - (Abstract # 53) SP - 1 EP - 7 PB - Institute of Nuclear Materials Management AN - OPUS4-18742 LA - eng AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER - TY - CONF A1 - Rolle, Annette A1 - Neumeyer, Tino A1 - Droste, Bernhard T1 - Testing of sealed radioactive sources at BAM N2 - Requirements and test programs for sealed radioactive sources are specified in international standards for safety in transport and in use. Sealed sources which are approved as special form radioactive material according to the Transport Regulations, IAEA Safety Standards TS-R-1, must be able to withstand mechanical (9 m drop, percussion and bending) and thermal (800°C heat) tests without loss of radioactive content. The International Standard ISO 2919 provides a set of tests which classifies the sources for their safety in use. Performance tests specified in this standard are temperature (high and low), external pressure, impact, vibration and puncture tests. Each test can be applied at different levels of intensity depending on typical usage. As a criterion of pass or fail, leakage testing has to be done after each test. The poster gives an overview of BAM s comprehensive test equipment and experience in testing sealed radioactive sources. T2 - 3rd European IRPA Congress CY - Helsinki, Finland DA - 2010-06-14 KW - Radioactive KW - Sealed sources KW - Testing PY - 2010 SN - 978-952-478-551-8 IS - P18-07 SP - 2749 EP - 2754 CY - Helsinki AN - OPUS4-23420 LA - eng AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER - TY - CONF A1 - Rolle, Annette A1 - Droste, Bernhard A1 - Dombrowski, H. T1 - Type testing of devices with inserted radioactive sources T2 - 2nd European IRPA Congress on Radiation Protection CY - Paris, France DA - 2006-05-15 KW - Radiation protection KW - Type approval PY - 2006 SP - 1(?) EP - 6(?) PB - IRPA CY - Paris AN - OPUS4-12815 LA - eng AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER - TY - CONF A1 - Ballheimer, Viktor A1 - Wille, Frank A1 - Rolle, Annette A1 - Droste, Bernhard T1 - Mechanical behaviour of high burn-up SNF under normal and accident transport conditions - present approaches and perspectives N2 - Transport packages for spent fuel have to meet the International Atomic Energy Agency requirements for different transport conditions. Physical state of spent fuel and fuel rod cladding as well as geometric configuration of fuel assemblies are important inputs for the evaluation of package capabilities under these conditions. In this paper, the mechanical behaviour of high burn-up spent fuel assemblies under transport conditions is analysed with regard to assumptions to be used in the activity release and criticality safety analysis. In particular the different failure modes of the fuel rods (fine cracks or complete breakage), which can cause release of gas, volatiles, fuel particles or fragments have to be properly considered in these assumptions. In view of the complexity of interactions between the fuel rods as well as between fuel assemblies, basket, and cask containment, the exact mechanical analysis of such phenomena is nearly impossible. The gaps in information concerning the material properties of cladding and pellets, especially for the high burn-up fuel, make the analysis more complicated additionally. In this context some practical approaches based on experiences of BAM Federal Institute for Material Research and Testing within safety assessment of packages for transport of spent fuel are discussed. T2 - ASME 2012 Pressure vessels & piping division conference CY - Toronto, Ontario, Canada DA - 15.07.2012 KW - Fuel rods KW - High burn-up KW - Mechanical behaviour KW - Transport conditions PY - 2012 SP - PVP2012-78302, 1-7 PB - American Society of Mechanical Engineers CY - New York AN - OPUS4-26320 LA - eng AD - Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin, Germany ER -