FG VWL, insbesondere Mikroökonomik
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Institute
This paper surveys possible motivations for having a net wealth tax. After giving a short overview over the state of wealth taxation in OECD countries, we discuss both popular arguments for such a tax, as well as economic arguments. It is argued that classical normative principles of taxation known from public economics cannot give a sound justification for a net wealth tax. The efficiency-related effects are also discussed and shown to be theoretically ambiguous, while empirical evidence hints at a negative effect on GDP growth. Finally, it is argued that despite of widespread and persistent lobbying for a revitalization of the net wealth tax, this is unlikely to happen due to political economy constraints.
In contrast to the contractarian approach to constitutional economics, we follow Voigt (1999) in assuming that constitutional rules are closely connected to informal institutions and that their evolution is a matter of interest group activity and implicit re-interpretation. We add to this the assumption of theoretical uncertainty of individuals regarding the working properties of constitutional rules. Collective learning processes are considered as the third driving force of constitutional evolution, and at the same time as the source of path-dependencies which allow suboptimal constitutions to persist. Finally, it is argued that direct legislation offers more protection than a written fiscal constitution.
The paper compares decision-making on the centralisation of public goods provision in the presence of regional externalities under representative and direct democratic institutions. A model with two regions, two public goods and regional spillovers is developed in which uncertainty over the true preferences of candidates makes strategic delegation impossible. Instead, it is shown that the existence of rent extraction by delegates alone suffices to make cooperative centralisation more likely through representative democracy. In the non-cooperative case, the more extensive possibilities for institutional design under representative democracy increase the likelihood of centralisation. Direct democracy may thus be interpreted as a federalism-preserving institution.
Döring T. and Schnellenbach J. (2006) What do we know about geographical knowledge spillovers and regional growth?: a survey of the literature, Regional Studies 40, 375–395. Modern (endogenous) growth theory tells us that knowledge is crucial for the sustained growth of high-income economies. Against this background, the paper provides a survey of theoretical and empirical findings highlighting the question of how geographically limited knowledge diffusion can help to explain clusters of regions with persistently different levels of growth. It discusses this topic in two steps. First, the theoretical concept of knowledge spillovers is outlined by discussing the different types of knowledge, the spatial dimension of knowledge spillovers, and the geographical mechanisms and structural conditions of knowledge diffusion. Second, it analyses the empirical evidence concerning the theoretical propositions.
In diesem Papier wird das Konzept des liberalen Paternalismus diskutiert, dessen Vertreter überzeugt sind, die Qualität der Entscheidungen von Individuen durch ein effizientes
Design der Randbedingungen dieser Entscheidungen verbessern zu können. Nach einem Überblick über die verhaltensökonomischen Grundlagen des liberalen Paternalismus werden
insbesondere seine normativen Grundlagen und politisch-ökonomischen Implikationen
diskutiert. Es zeigt sich, dass paternalistische Ansätze selbst Entscheidungen häufig verzerren werden und dass eine Verbesserung der Qualität individueller Entscheidungen höchst
zweifelhaft ist.