FG VWL, insbesondere Mikroökonomik
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Institute
BTU
- an der BTU erstellt / created at BTU (102) (remove)
In den letzten Jahren hat sich ein breiter Literatur
strang etabliert, der
neue Formen paternalistischer Interventionen vorschl
ägt, um individuelle Entscheidungen zu
verbessern, die nicht vollständig rational sind. Di
e Motivation hierfür liegt in zahlreichen
Verhaltensanomalien und anderen Abweichungen vom Mo
dell vollständiger Rationalität, die
von der empirischen Verhaltensökonomik identifizier
t wurden. Der neue Paternalismus
zeichnet sich nach seinen Befürwortern dadurch aus,
dass er ‘libertär’ ist, da die betroffenen
Individuen in die als effizient erachtete Richtung
geschubst, aber nicht gezwungen werden.
Die Möglichkeit zu abweichendem Verhalten soll grun
dsätzlich erhalten bleiben. In diesem
Papier wird der neue Paternalismus aus einer ordnung
sökonomischen Perspektive untersucht.
Es wird gezeigt, dass wichtige Varianten des neuen
Paternalismus mit den
ordnungsökonomischen Steuerungsidealen der Konsumen
tensouveränität und der
Bürgersouveränität kollidieren.
This paper argues that an evolutionary approach to policy-making, which emphasizes openness to change and political variety, is particularly compatible with the central tenets of classical liberalism. The chief reasons are that classical liberalism acknowledges the ubiquity of uncertainty, as well as heterogeneity in preferences and beliefs, and generally embraces gradual social and economic change that arises from accidental variation rather than deliberate, large-scale planning. In contrast, our arguments cast doubt on a different claim, namely that classical liberalism is particularly compatible with the evolutionary biological heritage of humans.
Using a framework that distinguishes short-term consumer preferences, individual reflective preferences and political preferences, we discuss from a constitutional economics perspective whether individuals find it in their common constitutional interest to endow representatives and bureaucrats with the competence to impose soft paternalist policies. The focus is specifically on soft paternalist policies, because these often work with non-transparent 'nudges' that are considered as manipulative in some contributions to the literature. We show that those soft paternalist policies that are manipulative indeed collide with three criteria of consumer sovereignty, reflective sovereignty and citizen sovereignty that can be argued to represent common constitutional interest of citizens. On the other hand, we argue that the set of paternalist policies that is deemed acceptable on the constitutional level is restricted to non-manipulative instruments, and their application as government policies is limited to cases with stable and very homogenous preferences. However, we also argue that competitive markets are capable of supplying many mechanisms that allow individuals to cope with problems in their decision-making processes on a private level.