FG VWL, insbesondere Mikroökonomik
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Institute
It is argued that the concepts of mission-oriented innovation policy and also of the entrepreneurial state will lead to the implementation of policies that are highly vulnerable to behavioral biases and the inefficient use of heuristics. In political practice, we can therefore not expect efficient mission-oriented policies. In particular, I argue that missions as a political commitment mechanism intended to devote massive resources to a specific cause will often only work if biases like the availability bias and loss aversion are deliberately used in order to secure voter consent. Furthermore, I also argue that the argument used by Mazzucato (Mission Economy: A Moonshot Guide to Changing Capitalism. London: Penguin UK, 2021) herself also contains several behavioral biases.
Engpass Arbeitsmarkt? Chance und Risiko für den Strukturwandel in der brandenburgischen Lausitz
(2024)
We study a model that establishes a novel theoretical rationale for the empirically well-documented relation between inequality and corruption. According to our model, inequality can nurture corruption by empowering organized crime because collusion between local police forces and criminal organizations is more likely in societies characterized by high inequality or weak security forces. Law enforcement and organized crime have a strong incentive to collude due to efficiency gains from specialization. However, their agreement breaks down when the mobsters can no longer credibly commit to joint rent maximization and thus start to compete with law enforcement for citizens’ wealth. The mobsters then non-violently monopolize the market for extortion by undercutting the police forces, similar to a strategy of predatory pricing. Criminal collusion is thus not very different from its corporate equivalent; hence, similar policy measures should be promising. In addition, our model also suggests that the criminal organization’s higher efficiency in extracting rents has a greater impact when the relative power between law enforcement and organized crime is rather balanced. Accordingly, when violent conflict becomes less predictable, non-violent elements of relative power become more relevant. Our model also allows for the interpretation that in the absence of strong social norms against corruption, organized crime is more difficult to challenge.
In 594 BCE, the Athenian lawgiver Solon, called upon to resolve a deepening social crisis, introduced a new constitution and mandated that in civil conflicts, no citizen is to remain apathetic and must take sides. Because the law seemed to support strife, it presents a puzzle. The paper offers a political economy rationale for Solon’s law against neutrality, modeling social conflict as a rent-seeking competition. We divide society into three groups, a hereditary aristocracy, which monopolized power before the Solonian constitution, a rival wealth-based commercial elite, called the new Solonian elite, and the poor, who are enfranchised only partly. We then identify the conditions under which the third group is better off by allying with one of the other groups, protecting the Solonian constitution. In our framework, Solon’s ban on neutrality is an attempt to change the payoffs from violent redistributions of rents, so that conflict is avoided. Accordingly, the ban should not only impede excessive rent seeking, but also prevent the exclusion of any social group.
Ein Ordnungsrahmen für den Wettbewerb in Sportligen: das Beispiel der National Football League
(2021)
Du sollst nicht lügen: Fake News aus der Perspektive der verhaltensökonomischen Theorie der Politik
(2020)
Verhaltensökonomik
(2020)
Prozesspolitik
(2020)
With its foundation in 1945, UNESCO declared as its main purpose the promotion of international cultural exchange1. A number of legal instruments (Conventions, Recommendations and Declarations) should duly help to substantiate that general purpose and make it work in practice. In this process, the regulation of the international exchange of cultural property plays a key role. However, the proper regulation of cultural property exchange has been a highly controversial issue. This paper focus on UNESCO's guiding ideas and conceptions of cultural property, international exchange and regulation. The central question is: Are the regulations codified in UNESCO’s Conventions and Recommendations helpful in encouraging international cultural exchange or are we faced, due to the neglect of private agents and the roles they play in cultural exchange, with some sort of one-sided regulation running counter to that aim? The author argues that UNESCO's legal instruments are driven by and express a strong anti-private and anti-market bias, which produce problematic economic incentives in the art and antiquities world to the disadvantage of the international exchange of cultural property.
Wir analysieren die Nationale Industriestrategie 2030, die im Februar 2019 vom Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie veröffentlicht wurde. Bei dieser Strategie handelt es sich um einen Versuch, vertikale Industriepolitik in Deutschland zu stärken. Wir argumentieren, dass die theoretische und empirische Rechtfertigung für diese Strategie insgesamt schwach ist. Die vom Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie (BMWi) vorgeschlagenen Instrumente weisen meist nur eine sehr geringe Passgenauigkeit zur mittelständisch geprägten deutschen Unternehmenslandschaft auf. Sie stellen Anforderungen an die Fähigkeiten der staatlichen Entscheidungsträger, die in der Realität kaum vorzufinden sind. Eine sinnvolle Alternative würde in einer Rückbesinnung auf ordnungspolitische Prinzipien, insbesondere die Gewährleistung einer hohen Wettbewerbsintensität, bestehen.
Die Studie beginnt mit einer überblicksartigen Bestandsaufnahme der aktuell vorliegenden Gutachten zur Lausitz und ihrem Strukturwandel (Teil A). Es folgt ein breiter und dabei, soweit es die Datenlage erlaubt, auch möglichste feinkörniger Überblick über die aktuelle Situationder Lausitz und ihrer Teilräume (Teil B). Dieser Überblick ist gegliedert in die Bereiche Wirtschaftsstruktur und Wertschöpfung (Teil B.I), Arbeitsmarkt (Teil B.II), sowie Infrastruktur und Lebensraum (Teil B.III). Es folgen eine Analyse der Integration und Kooperationsmöglichkeiten im Dreiländereck (Teil C) sowie der Erreichbarkeit der relevanten Märkte aus der Region und der regionsüberschreitenden Beziehungen (Teil D). Darauf aufbauend werden die endogenen Potentiale der Lausitz und ihrer Teilräume wiederum so feinkörnig wie möglich analysiert (Teil E). Eine Diskussion von Stärken und Schwächen der Strukturpolitik in einzelnen anderen deutschen Regionen soll auf Fallstricke hinweisen und das Lernen aus erfolgreichen struktur-und regionalpolitischen Ansätzen ermöglichen (Teil F). Die Studie schließt mit einer zusammenfassenden Darstellung von Handlungsempfehlungen, die sich aus den zuvor durchgeführten Analysen ergeben, sowie von Ansätzen für die weitere Forschung (Teil G).
Mehrheitsprinzip
(2019)
Lobby
(2019)
Der Schutz von Kulturgütern als ökonomische, rechtliche und sicherheitspolitische Herausforderung
(2018)
In this note, we outline a general framework for analyzing how inequality and military spending interact in a society governed by a rent-seeking autocrat. Relying on a general equilibrium model, we show that, generally, the autocrat utilizes the military for redistribution in favor of poorer citizens. However, the dictator’s own rent-seeking activity weakens the extent of redistribution and, in the extreme, can even reverse its direction, yielding more unequal secondary distributions instead. Accordingly, the initial level of inequality also affects the impact of military spending on inequality as the former has an impact on the extent of both, the regime’s rent-seeking activity as well as redistribution. Here, our model shows that primary and secondary distributions are rather equal for extreme initial equality/inequality. For medium levels of initial inequality, redistribution is rather large and can be in favor of the poor or of the rich, depending on the extent of rent-seeking and the primary distribution. Based on these results, we highlight the importance of a society’s institutional framework for analyzing the relation of inequality and military spending.
Zwischen homo oeconomicus und homo sapiens: ein Nobelpreis für Realismus in den Verhaltensannahmen
(2018)
Finanzpolitik
(2018)
Greece and its creditors concluded negotiations over a third bailout by signing a Memorandum of Understanding on 19 August 2015. The dominant view among most economic policy analysts and commentators seems to be that the actions of the Greek government in the months before the deal had been erratic and lacked coordination. In this paper we argue instead that the decisions of the Greek leaders, including asking the voters to reject the earlier terms demanded by the creditors in a referendum, can be rationally explained by the logic of brinkmanship. We develop a game-theoretic model to show that the actions of the Greek government are consistent with a strategy aimed at getting a better bailout deal.
Allokation
(2017)
Using a framework that distinguishes short-term consumer preferences, individual reflective preferences and political preferences, we discuss from a constitutional economics perspective whether individuals find it in their common constitutional interest to endow representatives and bureaucrats with the competence to impose soft paternalist policies. The focus is specifically on soft paternalist policies, because these often work with non-transparent 'nudges' that are considered as manipulative in some contributions to the literature. We show that those soft paternalist policies that are manipulative indeed collide with three criteria of consumer sovereignty, reflective sovereignty and citizen sovereignty that can be argued to represent common constitutional interest of citizens. On the other hand, we argue that the set of paternalist policies that is deemed acceptable on the constitutional level is restricted to non-manipulative instruments, and their application as government policies is limited to cases with stable and very homogenous preferences. However, we also argue that competitive markets are capable of supplying many mechanisms that allow individuals to cope with problems in their decision-making processes on a private level.
The theoretical literature on the economics of fiscal federalism has identified several potential effects of government decentralization on economic growth. Much of the traditional literature focuses on the efficiency aspects of a decentralized provision of public services. However, decentralization may also increase growth by raising the ability of the political system to innovate and carry out reforms. On the contrary, some authors argue that decentralization increases corruption and government inefficiency. After a discussion of the theoretical arguments, we provide both a traditional survey and a meta-analysis of the empirical literature on decentralization and economic growth. Based on our survey, we identify open questions and discuss possible ways of answering them.
This paper argues that an evolutionary approach to policy-making, which emphasizes openness to change and political variety, is particularly compatible with the central tenets of classical liberalism. The chief reasons are that classical liberalism acknowledges the ubiquity of uncertainty, as well as heterogeneity in preferences and beliefs, and generally embraces gradual social and economic change that arises from accidental variation rather than deliberate, large-scale planning. In contrast, our arguments cast doubt on a different claim, namely that classical liberalism is particularly compatible with the evolutionary biological heritage of humans.
In explaining individual behavior in politics, economists should rely on the same motivational assumptions they use to explain behavior in the market: that is what Political Economy, understood as the application of economics to the study of political processes, is all about. In its standard variant, individuals who play the game of politics should also be considered rational and self-interested, unlike the benevolent despot of traditional welfare economics. History repeats itself with the rise of behavioral economics: Assuming cognitive biases to be present in the market, but not in politics, behavioral economists often call for government to intervene in a “benevolent” way. Recently, however, political economists have started to apply behavioral economics insights to the study of political processes, thereby re-establishing a unified methodology. This paper surveys the current state of the emerging field of “behavioral political economy” and considers the scope for further research.
Ausgehend von einer ausführlichen Darstellung der Entwicklungslinien des Völkerrechts analysiert Sören C. Schwuchow die Entstehung von Jurisdiktionskonflikten im internationalen Luftraum vor dem Hintergrund rechtlicher Rahmenbedingungen sowie der strategischen Interessen der Staaten. Grundlage ist die Annahme, dass manche Regierungen „Kanonenbootdiplomatie“ im Luftraum betreiben, indem sie über umstrittenen Territorien gezielt Abfangmanöver provozieren, um die eigene Konfliktbereitschaft zu signalisieren. Der Autor analysiert modelltheoretisch die strategische Interdependenz der Staaten und überprüft sie empirisch. Er liefert so einen Beitrag zum besseren Verständnis der Bestimmungsgründe staatlicher Außenpolitik sowie der Ausgestaltung des Völkerrechts.
Döring,Thomas: Öffentliche Finanzen und Verhaltensökonomik. Wiesbaden : Springer Gabler, 2015
(2015)
Das Konzept des sogenannten "liberalen" oder "libertären" Paternalismus wird in der akademischen Debatte zunehmend kontrovers diskutiert und findet gleichzeitig immer mehr das Interesse politischer Praktiker. Dieser Beitrag argumentiert, dass es sich beim neuen Paternalismus nicht um ein liberales Konzept handelt. Zunächst wird in einer kurzen theoriegeschichtlichen Zusammenfassung gezeigt, welchen Weg die Ökonomik von traditionellen homo oeconomicus zur modernen Verhaltensökonomik zurückgelegt hat und wieso aus dieser heutigen Perspektive die Frage nach der Effizienz paternalistischer Intervent
ionen naheliegend ist. Darauf aufbauend werden grundsätzliche Probleme paternalistischer Ansät
ze diskutiert und es wird gezeigt, dass diese Ansätze mit zwei fundamentalen Eigenschaften einer liberalen Politik nicht vereinbar sind, nämlich dem Respekt für die Autonomie heterogener Individuen und der Offenheit für ökonomischen und gesellschaftlichen Wandel.
We discuss the effect of formal political institutions (electoral systems, fiscal decentralization, presidential and parliamentary regimes) on the extent and direction of income (re-)distribution. Empirical evidence is presented for a large sample of 70 economies and a panel of 13 OECD countries between 1981 and 1998. The evidence indicates that presidential regimes are associated with a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, while electoral systems have no significant effects. Fiscal competition is associated with less income redistribution and a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, but also with a more equal primary income distribution. Our evidence also is in line with earlier empirical contributions that find a positive relationship between trade openness and equality in primary and disposable incomes, as well as the overall redistributive effort.
In den letzten Jahren hat sich ein breiter Literatur
strang etabliert, der
neue Formen paternalistischer Interventionen vorschl
ägt, um individuelle Entscheidungen zu
verbessern, die nicht vollständig rational sind. Di
e Motivation hierfür liegt in zahlreichen
Verhaltensanomalien und anderen Abweichungen vom Mo
dell vollständiger Rationalität, die
von der empirischen Verhaltensökonomik identifizier
t wurden. Der neue Paternalismus
zeichnet sich nach seinen Befürwortern dadurch aus,
dass er ‘libertär’ ist, da die betroffenen
Individuen in die als effizient erachtete Richtung
geschubst, aber nicht gezwungen werden.
Die Möglichkeit zu abweichendem Verhalten soll grun
dsätzlich erhalten bleiben. In diesem
Papier wird der neue Paternalismus aus einer ordnung
sökonomischen Perspektive untersucht.
Es wird gezeigt, dass wichtige Varianten des neuen
Paternalismus mit den
ordnungsökonomischen Steuerungsidealen der Konsumen
tensouveränität und der
Bürgersouveränität kollidieren.
Pointing out the remarkable levels of hostile interaction in the air space over contested territory between states like China and Japan or Greece and Turkey we argue that air space incursions can be interpreted as a rational strategy with ultimately political aims. In our interpretation deliberate intrusions of military aircraft into sensitive air space serve as an indirect risk-generating mechanism, as they will trigger scrambles of the opposed government's air force which may escalate into a military crisis. We derive testable hypotheses from a game-theoretic model, which we developed in earlier work to explore the strategic logic behind this risk-generating mechanism more rigorously. In order to test whether the model's predictions regarding the effect of short-term economic developments on the states' interaction hold, we built a database of daily event observations from the Hellenic National Defence General Staff reports of the last 4 years, containing time series data of Turkish intrusions into Greek-claimed air space and the number of dogfights between Greek and Turkish fighter planes. What we find is that not only Greek engagements of Turkish intruders but also massed, provocative Turkish intrusions have become significantly less likely after the onset of the Greek economic crisis. These findings are well in line with the predictions of the model and thus supportive of our theory.
Unvollständige Rationalität ist keine hinreichende Begründung für paternalistisches Eingreifen
(2014)