Refine
Document Type
Language
- English (8)
Keywords
- Routing, Internet of Things, Protocols, Cryptography, Servers (1)
- TLS Performance, Efficient Secure Communication, TLS Session Resumption, Network Security, Security and Privacy, Mobile Networking, 5G and IoT (1)
- Traffic Analysis;Website Fingerprinting; Privacy; Anonymous Communication; Onion Routing; Web Privacy (1)
Institute
Users of an onion routing network, such as Tor, depend on its anonymity properties. However, especially malicious entry nodes, which know the client’s identity, can also observe the whole communication on their link to the client and, thus, conduct several de-anonymization attacks. To limit this exposure and to impede corresponding attacks, we propose to multipath traffic between the client and the middle node to reduce the information an attacker can obtain at a single vantage point. To facilitate the deployment, only clients and selected middle nodes need to implement our approach, which works transparently for the remaining legacy nodes. Furthermore, we let clients control the splitting strategy to prevent any external manipulation.
In recent years, the amount of traffic protected
with Transport Layer Security (TLS) has significantly increased
and new protocols such as HTTP/2 and QUIC further foster
this emerging trend. However, protecting traffic with TLS has
significant impacts on network entities. While the restrictions for
middleboxes have been extensively studied, addressing the impact
of TLS on clients and servers has been mostly neglected so far.
Especially mobile clients in emerging 5G and IoT deployments
suffer from significantly increased latency, traffic, and energy
overheads when protecting traffic with TLS. In this paper,
we address this emerging topic by thoroughly analyzing the
impact of TLS on clients and servers and derive opportunities
for significantly decreasing latency of TLS communication and
downsizing TLS management traffic, thereby also reducing TLSinduced
server load. We propose a protocol compatible redesign
of TLS session management to use these opportunities and
showcase their potential based on mobile device traffic and mobile
web-browsing traces. These show promising potentials for latency
improvements by up to 25.8% and energy savings of up to 26.3%.
Anonymous communication on the Internet is about hiding the relationship between communicating parties. At NDSS ’16, we presented a new website fingerprinting approach, CUMUL, that utilizes novel features and a simple yet powerful algorithm to attack anonymization networks such as Tor. Based on pattern observation of data flows, this attack aims at identifying the content of encrypted and anonymized connections. Apart from the feature generation and the used classifier, we also provided a large dataset to the research community to study the attack at Internet scale.
In this paper, we emphasize the impact of our artifacts by analyzing publications referring to our work with respect to the dataset, feature extraction method, and source code of the implementation. Based on this data, we draw conclusions about the impact of our artifacts on the research field and discuss their influence on related cybersecurity topics. Overall, from 393 unique citations, we discover more than 130 academic references that utilize our artifacts, 61 among them are highly influential (according to SemanticScholar), and at least 43 are from top-ranked security venues.
This data underlines the significant relevance and impact of our
work as well as of our artifacts in the community and beyond.
Tailoring Onion Routing to the Internet of Things: Security and Privacy in Untrusted Environments
(2019)
An increasing number of IoT scenarios involve mobile, resource-constrained IoT devices that rely on untrusted networks for Internet connectivity. In such environments, attackers can derive sensitive private information of IoT device owners, e.g., daily routines or secret supply chain procedures, when sniffing on IoT communication and linking IoT devices and owner. Furthermore, untrusted networks do not provide IoT devices with any protection against attacks from the Internet. Anonymous communication using onion routing provides a well-proven mechanism to keep the relationship between communication partners secret and (optionally) protect against network attacks. However, the application of onion routing is challenged by protocol incompatibilities and demanding cryptographic processing on constrained IoT devices, rendering its use infeasible. To close this gap, we tailor onion routing to the IoT by bridging protocol incompatibilities and offloading expensive cryptographic processing to a router or web server of the IoT device owner. Thus, we realize resource-conserving access control and end-toend security for IoT devices. To prove applicability, we deploy onion routing for the IoT within the well-established Tor network enabling IoT devices to leverage its resources to achieve the same grade of anonymity as readily available to traditional devices.