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Institute
BTU
Taktüberwachungsschaltung
(2007)
Erweiterter Clock Watchdog
(2007)
Verschlüsselungseinheit
(2006)
Combinatorial Logic Circuitry as Means to Protect Low Cost Devices Against Side Channel Attacks
(2007)
Unifizierter Multiplizierer
(2010)
Symbiosis on a Lightweight ECC Security and Distributed Shared Memory in Wireless Sensor Networks
(2011)
Unifizierter Multiplizierer
(2011)
RESCUE: Interdependent Challenges of Reliability, Security and Quality in Nanoelectronic Systems
(2019)
Many technical solutions are bio-inspired. Octopus-inspired robotic arms belong to continuum robots which are used in minimally invasive surgery or for technical system restoration in areas difficult-to-access. Continuum robot missions are bounded with their motions, whereby the motion of the robots is controlled by humans via wireless communication. In case of a lost connection, robot autonomy is required. Distributed control and distributed decision-making mechanisms based on artificial intelligence approaches can be a promising solution to achieve autonomy of technical systems and to increase their resilience. However these methods are not well investigated yet. Octopuses are the living example of natural distributed intelligence but their learning and decision-making mechanisms are also not fully investigated and understood yet. Our major interest is investigating mechanisms of Distributed Artificial Intelligence as a basis for improving resilience of complex systems. We decided to use a physical continuum robot prototype that is able to perform some basic movements for our research. The idea is to research how a technical system can be empowered to combine movements into sequences of motions by itself. For the experimental investigations a suitable physical prototype has to be selected, its motion control has to be implemented and automated. In this paper, we give an overview combining different fields of research, such as Distributed Artificial Intelligence and continuum robots based on 98 publications. We provide a detailed description of the basic motion control models of continuum robots based on the literature reviewed, discuss different aspects of autonomy and give an overview of physical prototypes of continuum robots.
his paper presents Window Canaries, a novel approach to Stack Canaries for architectures with a register window that protects return addresses and stack pointers without the need of adding additional instruction to each potentially vulnerable function. Instead, placement and check of the canary word is moved to window exception handlers that are responsible to handle register window overflows and underflows. The approach offers low performance overhead while guaranteeing that return addresses are protected by stack buffer overflows without relying on a heuristic that decides which functions to instrument. The contributions of this paper are a complete implementation of the approach for the Xtensa LX architecture with register window option as well as a performance evaluation and discussion of advantages and drawbacks.
With the increasing popularity of IoT (Internet-of-Things) devices, their security becomes an increasingly important issue. Buffer overflow vulnerabilities have been known for decades, but are still relevant, especially for embedded devices where certain security measures cannot be implemented due to hardware restrictions or simply due to their impact on performance. Therefore, many buffer overflow detection mechanisms check for overflows only before critical data are used. All data that an attacker could use for his own purposes can be considered critical. It is, therefore, essential that all critical data are checked between writing a buffer and its usage. This paper presents a vulnerability of the ESP32 microcontroller, used in millions of IoT devices, that is based on a pointer that is not protected by classic buffer overflow detection mechanisms such as Stack Canaries or Shadow Stacks. This paper discusses the implications of vulnerability and presents mitigation techniques, including a patch, that fixes the vulnerability. The overhead of the patch is evaluated using simulation as well as an ESP32-WROVER-E development board. We showed that, in the simulation with 32 general-purpose registers, the overhead for the CoreMark benchmark ranges between 0.1% and 0.4%. On the ESP32, which uses an Xtensa LX6 core with 64 general-purpose registers, the overhead went down to below 0.01%. A worst-case scenario, modeled by a synthetic benchmark, showed overheads up to 9.68%.
Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) are indispensable in critical infrastructures and industrial control systems. The increasing demand for enhanced cost-effectiveness and production efficiency has driven automation manufacturers to integrate PLC-based applications and systems with external networks, such as Internet. Unfortunately, this connectivity has exposed systems to potential malicious attacks from motivated adversaries. Addressing this pressing issue necessitates a comprehensive summary of ongoing research related to PLCs and their related systems. This summary should classify these systems based on disclosed vulnerabilities, potential threats, and proposed security solutions, catering to both scientists and industrial engineers. While several recent surveys have reviewed and discussed PLC security and related topics, they often fell short of covering all essential aspects comprehensively. Furthermore, prior surveys tended to focus on analyzing vulnerabilities at the system level, overlooking the vulnerabilities specific to PLCs themselves. Consequently, their findings failed to effectively secure current operational systems or propose improved solutions for future PLC designs. In this article, we bridge this research gap by providing a detailed review of all aspects concerning the security of PLCs and related systems. This includes vulnerabilities, potential attacks, and security solutions including digital forensics. We aim to offer a precise analysis, addressing the shortcomings of previous studies. Finally, we conclude this article by presenting our recommendations tailored for PLC manufacturers, researchers, and engineers. We hope that these recommendations will contribute to the development of more secure PLCs in the future.