Refine
Year of publication
Document Type
Keywords
- Fiscal federalism (2)
- Centralisation (1)
- Centralization (1)
- Constitutional reform (1)
- Creative destruction (1)
- Deutschland (1)
- Direct democracy (1)
- Electoral systems (1)
- Finanzbeziehungen (1)
- Finanzreform (1)
- Finanzverfassung (1)
- Fiscal consolidation (1)
- Fiscal constitution (1)
- Fiscal decentralization (1)
- Fiscal referendums (1)
- Fiscal reform (1)
- Fiscal relations (1)
- Formal institutions (1)
- Germany (1)
- Grants in aid (1)
- Haushaltskonsolidierung (1)
- Impact assessment (1)
- Presidential and parliamentary regimes (1)
- Public dept (1)
- Public good provision (1)
- Redistribution (1)
- Representative democracy (1)
- Schuldenschranke (Nulldefizit) (1)
- Structural change (1)
- Verfassungsreform (1)
- Wirkungsanalyse (1)
- economic performance (1)
- fiscal decentralization (1)
- fiscal federalism (1)
- growth (1)
- Öffentliche Schulden (1)
Institute
Several authors have argued that a centralization of fiscal powers in a federation is less likely to occur if citizens have to approve a change in the assignments of responsibilities by a popular referendum. This outcome may be due to the fact that logrolling is more difficult under direct than under representative democracy. It may also be caused by citizens’ fear that a centralization of fiscal authority facilitates the extraction of rents by the government or the legislature. In this paper, we test the hypothesis that centralization is less likely under referendum decision-making in the unique institutional setting of Switzerland. Using a panel of Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998, the empirical analysis provides evidence that referendums induce less centralization of fiscal activities.