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Political Institutions and Income (Re-)Distribution: Evidence from Developed Economies

  • We discuss the effect of formal political institutions (electoral systems, fiscal decentralization, presidential and parliamentary regimes) on the extent and direction of income (re-)distribution. Empirical evidence is presented for a large sample of 70 economies and a panel of 13 OECD countries between 1981 and 1998. The evidence indicates that presidential regimes are associated with a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, while electoral systems have no significant effects. Fiscal competition is associated with less income redistribution and a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, but also with a more equal primary income distribution. Our evidence also is in line with earlier empirical contributions that find a positive relationship between trade openness and equality in primary and disposable incomes, as well as the overall redistributive effort.

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Metadaten
Verfasserangaben: Lars P. Feld, Jan SchnellenbachORCiD
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-013-0116-4
ISSN:1573-7101
Titel der Quelle (Englisch):Public Choice
Dokumentart:Wissenschaftlicher Zeitschriftenartikel referiert
Sprache:Englisch
Erscheinungsjahr:2014
Freies Schlagwort / Tag:Electoral systems; Fiscal decentralization; Formal institutions; Presidential and parliamentary regimes; Redistribution
Band / Jahrgang:159
Heftnummer:3
Erste Seite:435
Letzte Seite:455
Fakultät / Fachgebiet:Fakultät 5 Wirtschaft, Recht und Gesellschaft / FG VWL, insbesondere Mikroökonomik
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