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The political economy of Solon’s law against neutrality in civil wars

  • In 594 BCE, the Athenian lawgiver Solon, called upon to resolve a deepening social crisis, introduced a new constitution and mandated that in civil conflicts, no citizen is to remain apathetic and must take sides. Because the law seemed to support strife, it presents a puzzle. The paper offers a political economy rationale for Solon’s law against neutrality, modeling social conflict as a rent-seeking competition. We divide society into three groups, a hereditary aristocracy, which monopolized power before the Solonian constitution, a rival wealth-based commercial elite, called the new Solonian elite, and the poor, who are enfranchised only partly. We then identify the conditions under which the third group is better off by allying with one of the other groups, protecting the Solonian constitution. In our framework, Solon’s ban on neutrality is an attempt to change the payoffs from violent redistributions of rents, so that conflict is avoided. Accordingly, the ban should not only impede excessive rent seeking, but also prevent theIn 594 BCE, the Athenian lawgiver Solon, called upon to resolve a deepening social crisis, introduced a new constitution and mandated that in civil conflicts, no citizen is to remain apathetic and must take sides. Because the law seemed to support strife, it presents a puzzle. The paper offers a political economy rationale for Solon’s law against neutrality, modeling social conflict as a rent-seeking competition. We divide society into three groups, a hereditary aristocracy, which monopolized power before the Solonian constitution, a rival wealth-based commercial elite, called the new Solonian elite, and the poor, who are enfranchised only partly. We then identify the conditions under which the third group is better off by allying with one of the other groups, protecting the Solonian constitution. In our framework, Solon’s ban on neutrality is an attempt to change the payoffs from violent redistributions of rents, so that conflict is avoided. Accordingly, the ban should not only impede excessive rent seeking, but also prevent the exclusion of any social group.zeige mehrzeige weniger

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Metadaten
Verfasserangaben: Sören C. SchwuchowORCiD, George TridimasORCiD
URL:https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11127-022-00980-8
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-022-00980-8
ISSN:1573-7101
Titel der Quelle (Englisch):Public Choice
Dokumentart:Wissenschaftlicher Zeitschriftenartikel referiert
Sprache:Englisch
Erscheinungsjahr:2022
Freies Schlagwort / Tag:Ancient Athens; Civil war; Inclusive institutions; Intra-elite competition; Political apathy; Political non-neutrality; Rent seeking; Solon
Band / Jahrgang:192
Heftnummer:3-4
Erste Seite:249
Letzte Seite:272
Fakultät / Fachgebiet:Fakultät 5 Wirtschaft, Recht und Gesellschaft / FG VWL, insbesondere Mikroökonomik
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