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Political Institutions and Income (Re-)Distribution: Evidence from Developed Economies

  • We discuss the effect of formal political institutions (electoral systems, fiscal decentralization, presidential and parliamentary regimes) on the extent and direction of income (re-)distribution. Empirical evidence is presented for a large sample of 70 economies and a panel of 13 OECD countries between 1981 and 1998. The evidence indicates that presidential regimes are associated with a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, while electoral systems have no significant effects. Fiscal competition is associated with less income redistribution and a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, but also with a more equal primary income distribution. Our evidence also is in line with earlier empirical contributions that find a positive relationship between trade openness and equality in primary and disposable incomes, as well as the overall redistributive effort.

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Metadaten
Author:Feld, Lars P., Schnellenbach, JanORCiD
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-013-0116-4
ISSN:1573-7101
Titel der Quelle (English):Public Choice
Document Type:Wissenschaftlicher Zeitschriftenartikel referiert
Language:English
Erscheinungsjahr:2014
Tag:Electoral systems; Fiscal decentralization; Formal institutions; Presidential and parliamentary regimes; Redistribution
Band / Jahrgang:159
Issue:3
First Page:435
Last Page:455
Institution / Subject:Fakultät 5 Wirtschaft, Recht und Gesellschaft / FG VWL, insbesondere Mikroökonomik