Holding out for a better deal: Brinkmanship in the Greek bailout negotiations
- Greece and its creditors concluded negotiations over a third bailout by signing a Memorandum of Understanding on 19 August 2015. The dominant view among most economic policy analysts and commentators seems to be that the actions of the Greek government in the months before the deal had been erratic and lacked coordination. In this paper we argue instead that the decisions of the Greek leaders, including asking the voters to reject the earlier terms demanded by the creditors in a referendum, can be rationally explained by the logic of brinkmanship. We develop a game-theoretic model to show that the actions of the Greek government are consistent with a strategy aimed at getting a better bailout deal.
Author: | Athanassios Pitsoulis, Sören C. SchwuchowORCiD |
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URL: | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268016301574 |
DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.08.011 |
ISSN: | 0176-2680 |
Title of the source (English): | European Journal of Political Economy |
Document Type: | Scientific journal article peer-reviewed |
Language: | English |
Year of publication: | 2017 |
Tag: | Brinkmanship; Crisis management; Greek debt crisis |
Volume/Year: | 48 |
First Page: | 40 |
Last Page: | 53 |
Faculty/Chair: | Fakultät 5 Wirtschaft, Recht und Gesellschaft / FG VWL, insbesondere Mikroökonomik |