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A Tale of Two Federalisms: Long-Term Institutional Change in the United States and in Germany

  • This paper offers a comparison of government centralization in the United States and in Germany. After briefly laying out the history of federalism in both countries, we identify the instruments of centralization at work. It is argued that an initial constitutional framework of competitive federalism does not prevent the long-term centralization of competencies. Against a background of historical evidence, we discuss the political economics of government centralization. It is argued that formal institutions clearly have an effect on the pathways of government centralization, but not necessarily on the broader trend of centralization. The conclusion is reached that preservation of state and local autonomy may eventually hinge on informal political institutions.

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Metadaten
Author: Thomas Döring, Jan SchnellenbachORCiD
ISSN:1043-4062
Title of the source (English):Constitutional Political Economy
Document Type:Scientific journal article peer-reviewed
Language:English
Year of publication:2011
Tag:Bryce Law; Constitutional economics; Federalism; Formal institutions; Government Centralization; Institutional Evolution; Popitz Law; State and Local Autonomy
Volume/Year:22
Issue number:1
First Page:83
Last Page:102
Faculty/Chair:Fakultät 5 Wirtschaft, Recht und Gesellschaft / FG VWL, insbesondere Mikroökonomik
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