Political Institutions and Income (Re-)Distribution: Evidence from Developed Economies
- We discuss the effect of formal political institutions (electoral systems, fiscal decentralization, presidential and parliamentary regimes) on the extent and direction of income (re-)distribution. Empirical evidence is presented for a large sample of 70 economies and a panel of 13 OECD countries between 1981 and 1998. The evidence indicates that presidential regimes are associated with a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, while electoral systems have no significant effects. Fiscal competition is associated with less income redistribution and a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, but also with a more equal primary income distribution. Our evidence also is in line with earlier empirical contributions that find a positive relationship between trade openness and equality in primary and disposable incomes, as well as the overall redistributive effort.
Author: | Lars P. Feld, Jan SchnellenbachORCiD |
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DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-013-0116-4 |
ISSN: | 1573-7101 |
Title of the source (English): | Public Choice |
Document Type: | Scientific journal article peer-reviewed |
Language: | English |
Year of publication: | 2014 |
Tag: | Electoral systems; Fiscal decentralization; Formal institutions; Presidential and parliamentary regimes; Redistribution |
Volume/Year: | 159 |
Issue number: | 3 |
First Page: | 435 |
Last Page: | 455 |
Faculty/Chair: | Fakultät 5 Wirtschaft, Recht und Gesellschaft / FG VWL, insbesondere Mikroökonomik |