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The Evolution of a Fiscal Constitution When Individuals are Theoretically Uncertain

  • In contrast to the contractarian approach to constitutional economics, we follow Voigt (1999) in assuming that constitutional rules are closely connected to informal institutions and that their evolution is a matter of interest group activity and implicit re-interpretation. We add to this the assumption of theoretical uncertainty of individuals regarding the working properties of constitutional rules. Collective learning processes are considered as the third driving force of constitutional evolution, and at the same time as the source of path-dependencies which allow suboptimal constitutions to persist. Finally, it is argued that direct legislation offers more protection than a written fiscal constitution.

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Metadaten
Author: Jan SchnellenbachORCiD
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026389926709
ISSN:0929-1261
Title of the source (English):European Journal of Law and Economics
Document Type:Scientific journal article peer-reviewed
Language:English
Year of publication:2004
Contributing Corporation:Philipps-University Marburg
Tag:collective learning; path-dependent rule-evolution; positive constitutional economics
Volume/Year:17
Issue number:1
First Page:97
Last Page:115
Faculty/Chair:Fakultät 5 Wirtschaft, Recht und Gesellschaft / FG VWL, insbesondere Mikroökonomik
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